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A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE

VOLUME II

A CENTURY OF
PREDOMINANTLY INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
1830-1935




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Published January, 1936.

FOREWORD

Herewith appears the concluding volume of the author's History of Modern Europe. It carries the story through the latest and most crucial century, the century of predominantly industrial society, of romanticism and realism, of the culmination and decline of the Enlightenment and the beginning of the contemporaneous Disillusionment.

The present volume is not a revision of an earlier volume. It is a new work, and it has had to be so. For the World War and its aftermath have profoundly altered our perspective. We now see the nineteenth century not only as an auspicious season for the fruition of liberal aspirations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also as an ominous seed-time for the disquicting realities of the present day. Moreover, we now have at hand a host of documents and monographs which have been published since the war and which add materially to our detailed knowledge and understanding of the prewar century. Finally, we now recognize the possibility, as well as the desirability, of escaping from the narrowly political or economic framework of nineteenth-century historiography and of achieving a broadened cultural interpretation.

The actual writing of the volume has required four years of close application. It would have required much more, had not the author borrowed unblushingly from the time and scholarship of many of his colleagues and friends. The sections on science have been criticized and emended by Professor Frederick Barry; those on England and the British Empire, by Professor Robert Livingston Schuyler; those on France, by Madame Charlotte Muret; those on Latin America, by Dr. Frank Tannenbaum; those on international relations, by Professor Parker Thomas Moon; those on industrial developments, by Professor Charles W. Cole of Amherst College and by Dr. Shepard B. Clough of Columbia College. Besides, Dr. Jacques Barzun of Columbia College has devoted many days and his exceptional knowledge of literature and art to the improvement of the entire manuscript; Professor Walter Phelps Hall of Princeton University has read it

and supplied helpful criticism; and valuable suggestions on special points have been furnished by Professor Maude A. Huttman of Barnard College, by Colonel Herman Beukema of the United States Military Academy, and also by Dr. Donald O. Wagner, instructor at New York University and author of a companion volume on Social Reformers of the Nineteenth Century. Last but not least, Professor Edward Mead Earle has read the proofs and amply demonstrated that protracted illness has not dulled his sense of proportion or impaired his scholarly acumen. To all who are mentioned here, and to all others who have assisted less directly though not less truly, the author pays his grateful respects.

The present volume retains the distinctive mechanical features of its immediate predecessor. Much attention has been given to the selection and reproduction of initial letters, chapter tailpieces, and some eighty full-page illustrations, all by outstanding artists. And very much attention has been given in this volume to the maps. These number eleven in colors and thirty-two in black and white. All are original, and all have been designed and executed by Mr. Thomas II. Thomas of Cambridge. Mr. Thomas is, then, the author of the maps; and in addition he is part author of the chapter on the World War, while other chapters have benefited from his grasp on the realities of modern history.

As was said in the foreword to the first volume, there is no short cut to an understanding of modern Europe. The present work, planned mainly though not exclusively as an introductory survey for college students, is somewhat detailed and purposely long. The author is quite convinced that college students, like other mature and curious persons, should be induced to read more history, rather than less, that they should ponder on a substantial general work as well as browse freely over a wide range of monographic literature,—that is, if they are to know anything worth while about the past of their kind. The wise need not be reminded that man without man's past is meaningless.

C. J. H. H.

AFTON, NEW YORK, January 6, 1936.

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PART IV LIBERAL AND ROMANTIC EUROPE

XV. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

XVI. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM

XVII. ROMANTICISM AND NATIONALISM

CHAPTER XV

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

I. ITS NATURE AND BASIS



ONTEMPORARY European civilization derives in part from the French Revolution. Ideals of individual liberty, popular sovereignty, and national patriotism were clearly proclaimed in France toward the close of the eighteenth century. They were widely disseminated over the Continent during the eras of

Napoleon and Metternich. They have constituted the goal for a vast deal of political, social, and intellectual endeavor in Europe and throughout the world—down to the present day.

Another, and even more important, source is the Industrial Revolution. For what chiefly distinguishes contemporary civilization is its industrial character, and the French Revolution effected no marked change in the industrial arts. French Revolution occurred in a predominantly agricultural society, and the early dissemination of its principles was in countries where the masses still labored in fields and lived in cottages as their ancestors had done for ages. Industry was still mainly domestic, and travelling was by stagecoach or sailing vessel. It required a revolution in the industrial arts to fashion the economic and social features of contemporary civilization.

The Industrial Revolution may be defined as a fundamental change or series of changes in the methods of manufacture, whereby the masses have been taken away from traditional agricultural pursuits, introduced into novel ways of working, travelling, and living, and pretty

trial Revolution"

thoroughly "industrialized." It has involved several aspects. (1) Machines were invented to supplement or take the place of human labor in the manufacture of cloth and other staple commodities. (2) Motive power—water, steam, electricity, oil--was developed and put to innumerable uses. (3) The production of coal, iron, and steel was speeded up. (4) Transportation was extended and quickened by locomotive and by power boat. (5) Mass production of goods in factories largely supplanted earlier small-scale production in private homes. (6) An impressive migration set in from farm to factory, from country to city, from agriculture to industry. (7) Machinery was applied to agriculture, as well as to industry and commerce, so that economic production and exchange were enormously augmented in every respect and the standard of living for large numbers was perceptibly raised. (8) Capitalism, providing the financial backing for experimentation in the industrial arts, was immensely magnified by the resulting machine production. (9) The two social classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat were greatly increased in numbers and sharply differentiated in function.

Taken together, these aspects of industrial transformation have been so fruitful—they have so really revolutionized human society—that they may properly be described as the Industrial Revolution. But if the word revolution be thought of as implying a sudden or spectacular change, then the industrial transformation was not so much revolutionary as evolutionary. The trans-

formation was slow and gradual. It originated in the eighteenth century. It was apparent in some noteworthy respects in the sixty years from 1770 to 1830.

It went much farther in the forty years from 1830 to 1870. But not until after 1870 did it produce astounding world-wide effects. It was unattended, moreover, by popularly acclaimed events. Its course was not marked by such milestones as a Tennis Court Oath, a royal beheading, a Napoleonic battle, a peace treaty, or a parliamentary election. Machines, on which its development depended, were not made overnight or by persons bulking large in the public eye; usually they were the work of relatively obscure men, the result of protracted improvement of preceding inventions; and once they were "invented" and "patented," considerable time might elapse before they came into profitable and general use.

The Industrial Revolution began in England, and England was the first country to be transformed by it. This fact may seem surprising when we recall that the leading country of Europe in the eighteenth century seemed to be not England, but France. True it is that the vast prestige which Louis XIV and Colbert

Finally, England, rather than France, had the capitalistic means for accomplishing the Industrial Revolution. Wealth had

gradually been accumulating in England since the sixteenth century—from piracy, plunder, and slave trading, from colonies in America and trading-posts in India, from the operation of navigation acts, tariff protection, and other mercantilist policies, from the

Its Connection with English Capitalism

checks successively administered to the competition of Spaniards, Netherlanders, and Frenchmen, from the development of domestic agriculture and industry. Wealth had similarly been accumulating in France, but French capital was not so readily available for industrial experimentation; it tended, rather, to be diverted by loans or taxes to governmental hands and unproductive uses—to upkeep of the luxurious Bourbon court and courtiers, to wasteful support of a host of officials and pensioners, and to prodigal expenditure on army and vain military undertakings. There was no solid or adequate banking system in France in the eighteenth century, and the bankruptcy of the French monarchy in 1789 and of the French republic in 1799 spelled disaster, at least temporarily, to many a French capitalist. Not until the era of Napoleon, in the first decade of the nineteenth century, was the Bank of France established and some order introduced into French finance.

English capital was better husbanded and put to more productive use. England expended a relatively small amount of money on her army, and her navy cost her much less than the French army cost her rival. English taxation was considerably lighter than that of the French and more equitably distributed, with the result that a much greater proportion of English wealth was available to individual owners. Besides, banking developed fairly early in England, steadying governmental finance and providing pooled funds for individual and corporate enterprise. By the end of the seventeenth century, London was competing with Amsterdam as the money-lending centre of the world. The Bank of England was first chartered in 1694. The London Stock Exchange was organized in 1698. Numerous important private banks, including Barclay's and Lloyd's, were founded at London in the eighteenth century. The London clearing house was established about 1750.

Growing capitalism wrought an agricultural revolution in

England in the eighteenth century. Wealthy landlords enlarged capitalistic Agriculture their holdings and introduced "scientific," capitalistic farming. They put pasturage to cultivation, improved the breeds of domestic animals, substituted novel rotations of crops for the old practice of allowing fields to lie fallow, developed some agricultural machinery (including Tull's horse-driven hoeing machine), and supplanted many quasi-independent tenants with fewer and utterly dependent agricultural laborers. By these means, and by such concurrent parliamentary aids as enclosure acts and corn laws, both the yield and the profits of English farming were increased. The agricultural revolution was at once an effect and a cause of the growth of English capitalism.\(^1\)
With the increasing profits from "scientific" farming in Eng-

land were combined the rapidly mounting profits of the English East India Company, its agents, and its stockholders. As more and more surplus capital became available, and as markets for English manufactured goods widened, it was but natural that a considerable part of the surplus capital should be applied to the development of English industry. At first, this development involved merely an emphasizing and intensifying of the "domestic" (or "putting-out") system which had characterized some part of European inclustry ever since the rise of modern capitalism at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Thus, it had long been the practice of certain wealthy industrialists to set themselves up as middle-men outside the guilds, to buy raw materials in quantity, and to "put them out" to be made into manufactured commodities by farmers and poor townsmen in their several homes. The "domestic" workers, usually owning the necessary tools and combining industrial with agricultural pursuits, would receive wages for their industrial labor and would turn back the finished goods to the middle-man who would sell them and reap for himself whatever profits he could. By the eighteenth century these industrial entrepreneurs were numerous and influential in England; the "domestic" system was flourishing, and it was becoming ever more capitalistic. Most workers labored in their homes, but they labored less to the profit of themselves than to the profit of middle-men who provided them with raw materials and took their finished products.

¹ On this agricultural revolution, see Vol. I, pp. 466-469.

Before long, certain industrial middle-men in England, desirous of supplying their expanding markets with a more copious production of goods than they could obtain through "domestic" and "putting-out" practices, were applying surplus capital to the exploitation of new machinery and new methods, Capitalisespecially in the textile and mining industries. They were supplementing hand-work with machine-work. They were building factories and foundries and mills for the making or housing of the novel instruments of production. They were seeking new fuel and new motive power for their workshops. They were substituting for the domestic system a factory system of capitalist industry. Presently, they were urging and financing larger and swifter means of transportation. The preliminary phase of the Industrial Revolution was beginning. It was to last, roughly, from 1770 to 1830 and was to inaugurate the transformation of Great Britain into the first of modern industrialized countries.

2. THE PRELIMINARY PHASE, 1770-1830

During the years from 1770 to 1830, two major industries were profoundly altered in England—the cotton industry and the mining industry—while a third, the transportation industry, was on the eve of revolution. What happened to the third was dependent in large part upon the development of the second, but the original revolutions in cotton manufacture and mining were independent of each other. They occurred simultaneously, and together they constituted the outstanding achievements of the preliminary phase of the Industrial Revolution. For the sake of convenience we shall here discuss them separately.

Cotton manufacture was not an old or well-established industry in England. It was youthful and exotic in comparison with the manufacture of other textiles—woollens and linens and even silk. The world-centre of the cultivation and manufacture of cotton had long been, not England, but India; and not until the seventeenth century, when the English East India Company was developing direct commercial relations between India and England, was there any considerable demand for, or supply of, cotton goods in England. Once introduced into England, however, the "calicoes" of India quickly became fashionable; every lady had to wear them, and the styles set by

ladies must be followed by women of the middle and lower classes. The use of woollens and linens fell off, and soon the vested interests in these old staple industries were demanding protection. In 1700 the English Parliament forbade the importation of Indian cotton goods and in 1721 it prohibited the "use and wear of all printed, painted, flowered, or dyed calicoes in apparel, household stuffs, furniture or otherwise."

Prohibition only increased the vogue of "calico," and if it

Prohibition only increased the vogue of "calico," and if it could not be brought from India, it had to be manufactured in England. Some raw cotton had previously been imported, some cotton thread had been spun and some cotton cloth woven, but from the "calico act" of 1721 dated the real importance of the cotton industry in England. It soon became a "vested interest" itself, powerful enough to sway the aristocratic Parliament. In 1735 the wearing of calico was legalized with the stipulation that in its manufacture some wool or linen should be combined with the cotton. In 1766 the tariff on the importation of raw cotton was removed, with the proviso that the importation must be by British ships. In 1774 the "calico act," in so far as it restricted the English cotton industry, was formally repealed.

Prior to 1770 cotton manufacture had been carried on in England in much the same way as the traditional manufacture of woollens and linens and silks-by hand-spinning and handweaving under the "domestic" system. For all the textiles, there had been little improvement of tools. The common handloom for weaving had remained in principle what it had been in the days of the Roman Empire and throughout the middle ages, except that in 1733 John Kay patented a "flying Kay's Flying Shuttle shuttle," a simple spring device which speeded up the carrying of the weft back and forth across the warp, saved labor, and doubled production. The spinning-wheel had been in use in Europe since the middle ages; in the sixteenth century a foot-treadle had been added, enabling the spinner to use both hands in twisting and drawing the fibre over the wheel; and in 1738 a crude machine was patented for faster and more automatic spinning.¹ But neither this machine nor Kay's flying shuttle was immediately put to any considerable commercial use. Especially in the woollen and linen industries, the old tools

¹ John Wyatt and Lewis Paul worked together in constructing this machine and both claimed the credit for its invention.

were the familiar tools. Most artisans were duly distrustful of novelties and were sufficiently energetic to resist their introduction by capitalistic middle-men.

In the cotton industry, almost alone among the textiles, were conditions favorable to mechanical experimentation.¹ It was a relatively new industry, unhampered by guild traditions or organized labor. It was a rapidly growing industry, whose demands outstripped its supply. To cotton weaving, and particularly to cotton spinning, the eighteenth-century interest in mechanics could be applied freely and with prospect of financial gain. About 1770 began a series of epochal inventions affecting the cotton manufacture.

By this time, Kay's flying shuttle was coming into considerable use, and the resulting increase of weaving was creating a demand for more spinning. Many attempts were made to speed up spinning, but the first practical success was due to James Hargreaves, a

weaver who was also a good carpenter. The story goes that he happened to see his wife upset her spinningwheel, and, as he noticed the wheel continuing to spin, the idea struck him that several spindles might be set in

Hargreaves's Spinning Tenny

a frame and operated by one wheel. At any rate Hargreaves about 1767 made a frame with eight spindles and devised a pair of clamps to take the place of human fingers in holding and guiding the threads, so that one person by turning the wheel and moving the clamps could spin eight threads at a time. He gave to his spinning appliance his wife's name and called it a "jenny." When his neighbors learned that he had made a machine which might rob them of their work, they broke into his house and smashed the jenny. But Hargreaves moved to another town and went into the business of building jennies, some of them big enough to spin a hundred threads at a time, and selling them to "progressive" spinners who wished to save time and make more goods. The jenny was an improved handmachine; it was employed by spinners in their own homes; it quickened the cotton industry and it enriched Hargreaves.

Another kind of spinning machine was patented in 1769 by

¹ As early as 1607 water-power machinery had been devised in Italy for the twisting and winding of silk thread, and in 1719 an English silk mill was set up at Derby and equipped with machinery copied from Italy. The English silk industry, however, was not particularly important.

Richard Arkwright, an uneducated but shrewd barber and horsedealer, who knew how to exploit the inventive genius Arkand the capital of other persons. Arkwright's machine wright's drew out the fibres between pairs of rollers and then Spinning Frame automatically twisted them into hard firm thread by revolving spindles. At first it was operated by horse-power, but, as water-power was soon substituted, it acquired the name of "water-frame." Unlike Hargreaves's jenny, the water-frame was too expensive and cumbersome to be purchased and housed by many individual spinners, but, by forming a partnership with two well-to-do manufacturers, Arkwright was enabled to install water-frames in factories for the large-scale production of cotton hosiery (1771) and then of cotton cloth (1773). Soon the barber was a capitalist—a captain of the new industry--- and in 1786 King George III created him Sir Richard Arkwright.

There were serious defects in both the jenny and the waterframe. The thread made by the former was fine but weak, while that made by the latter was strong but coarse. Combining the machines so as to eliminate the defects of each was the achieve-

ment of Samuel Crompton, a young man who had Cromplearned to spin on a jenny and who thought he could ton's Spinning Mule improve it. After five years of experimentation, he brought out in 1770 the spinning "mule," so called because, like the animal of that name, it was a hybrid. The spinning mule in its first form required much attention and many of its parts had to be operated by hand; subsequently it was steadily improved and rendered almost completely automatic. It was a complicated machine, adapted to factory rather than to domestic production. The manufacturers who purchased Crompton's first mule as a model for the construction of others, never paid him what they promised, and as he had taken out no patent he could not prevent them from using his invention; the mule made huge profits for many factory owners, but its inventor died poor.

A few years after Crompton's invention, Edmund Cartwright, a clergyman of the Church of England, chanced to hear a friend say that the new spinning machines—jenny, water-frame, and

¹ Evidence was presented in court in 1785 that Arkwright had derived his spinning machine, through his assistant, John Kay, from a certain Thomas Highs, or Hayes, who had invented a similar machine prior to 1768.

mule—would soon be producing far more thread than could be woven by all the hand-looms in England. Someone, he replied, ought to invent an automatic weaving machine. The thing was impossible, his friend said. The clergyman, however, had recently seen an automatic chess-player exhibited in London and was sure that an automatic loom could be devised; he himself would devise one, he declared. Though Cartwright knew Cartcomparatively little about weaving or about mechanwright's ics, he confidently grappled with the problem, thought Power out a plan, and employed a carpenter and a smith to give effect to his ideas. The resulting machine, which Cartwright patented in 1785, was clumsy, but it worked after a fashion. The clergyman turned industrialist and set up a weaving factory, in which his power-loom was operated at first by horses and after 1780 by steam. But neither he nor the few other manufacturers who tried to use his invention could make it pay. Only after a lapse of two decades and a series of improvements by other inventors 1 were the most serious defects of Cartwright's machine remedied, and even then the hand-weavers, who in the meantime had adopted Kay's "flying shuttle," were so hostile to power-looms that they refused to operate them and frequently ruined factories in which they were installed. Not until the 1820's did the power-loom largely supplant hand-weaving in the ·cotton industry.

With revolutionary changes in spinning and weaving went similar changes in other processes of cotton manufacture. A

carding machine to comb the cotton fibre in loose Istrands and prepare it for spinning had been invented in 1748 by Lewis Paul and was improved and made a commercial success by Richard Arkwright in 1775. A scutching machine for cleaning and opening the fibres

Supplementary Inventions in Cotton Industry

preparatory to carding them was invented by Snodgrass in 1797. A machine—the "cotton gin"—for separating the seeds from the raw material was invented in America by Eli Whitney in 1792.² In place of old and slow ways of bleaching cotton

¹ Including the "dressing" machine of Johnson (1803) and the compact iron loom of Horrocks (1813).

² The cultivation of cotton as a staple crop in the United States dates from about 1770. In 1791 the export of raw cotton from the United States amounted to 200,000 pounds, and in 1800, after Whitney's invention, to 2,000,000 pounds. America was thus becoming an important source of supply for the revolutionized cotton

(or linen), such as steeping it in sour milk and exposing it to the air for months, rapid bleaching by chemicals was instituted. Oil of vitriol was used by Roebuck beginning in 1746; and chlorine, developed by a French chemist (Berthollet) and brought to England by James Watt in 1786, was employed successfully by Tennant in 1799. Moreover, chemical dyes were introduced—"Turkey red," scarlet, green, yellow, etc. Then, to get the colors in patterns on the calico, a cylindrical printing machine was invented by Thomas Bell and put in operation in 1785; a man and a boy could print as much cotton with this machine (driven by power) as two hundred persons using the earlier hand blocks.

Synchronizing with the development of machinery (and factories) in the cotton industry, but at first quite independent of it, was the development of metallurgy (and mines, fur-The Metnaces, and foundries). There had long been some minallurgical Industry ing in England, but prior to the eighteenth century there was no great demand for iron or coal. Wood was the chief fuel, and wood was the principal building material. So great, indeed, had been the consumption of wood that by the latter part of the seventeenth century English forests were seriously depleted, and, despite governmental encouragement of timber imports from America, the supply of wood was not keeping pace with the demand. In the circumstances, attempts were made to extend the use of coal as fuel, not only for homes but also for the industrial smelting of iron ore.1

In the eighteenth century, coal mining developed fairly rapidly, in part because the demand for coal was steadily growing, and in part because capital was increasingly available for large-scale mining—for sinking of shafts, construction of side galleries, ventilation, pumping water from underground, hoisting coal to the surface, and furnishing the necessary tools and engineering apparatus.

industry of England. Incidentally, the development of cotton growing in the southern American states dampened the earlier humanitarian enthusiasm for the abolition of negro slavery. Negro slaves were now needed on the cotton plantations.

¹ And also for the manufacture of pottery and porcelain. This industry developed rapidly in England in the second half of the eighteenth century through the enterprise of Josiah Wedgwood and his successors, and through the substitution of coal for charcoal in the baking of "china clay" (which was discovered in England in 1768). By 1785, some 20,000 persons were employed in the potteries of Staffordshire.

Pumping water out of coal mines had been especially difficult and expensive, but in 1712 Thomas Newcomen built a steamengine for the purpose. This engine, though crude and clumsy, could do the work of fifty horses at one-sixth the cost, and it gradually became a serviceable auxiliary to English mining. The production of coal increased from two million tons in 1700 to six million in 1770.

The development of coal mining was accompanied by progress in the iron industry. Newcomen's engines, as well as many other newer machines and tools, had to be made of iron, and the growing scarcity of wood called not only for new Industry fuel but for new methods of smelting iron ore. For centuries, smelting had been done in the so-called "Catalan forge," a simple oven in which iron ore was mixed with burning charcoal and heated to the desired temperature by the help of a hand-bellows. Since the sixteenth century, several significant books had been published on metallurgy, and some improvements had been made in iron manufacture. In the seventeenth century the "power furnace," with larger and higher oven and with bellows and hammers operated by water-power, had been devised on the Continent and introduced into England from Germany, and about the same time an English furnace-owner by the name of Dudley, alarmed by the scarcity of wood and hence of charcoal, had tried, though with only meagre success, to smelt iron with coal. What Dudley failed to do was achieved in the first half of the eighteenth century by two English iron manufacturers -father and son-both with the name of Abraham Darby. The elder Darby discovered in 1700 that if coal was heated and transformed into coke (corresponding to the trans-Darby formation of wood into charcoal), the coke could be and Use of Coke used for iron smelting, and the younger Darby made the venture a commercial success by employing a big waterdriven bellows to blow a strong blast of air on the burning coke. The iron furnace thus became both a coke furnace and a "blast furnace." It is noteworthy that the younger Darby, in order to

¹The principle of the steam-engine had been described by a Greek (Hero of Alexandria) 130 B.C., and crude steam engines of various types had been designed by Porta, an Italian, in 1601, by Branca, another Italian, in 1629, by Edward Somerset (Marquess of Worcester) in 1663, by Denys Papin in 1690, and by Thomas Savery in 1698. Newcomen's invention, however, was the first commercially successful steam-engine.

hoist the water over the wheel which worked his bellows, installed a Newcomen steam-engine.


An improvement in the manner of getting air into the blast furnace was made in 1760 by John Smeaton, an engineer emsmeaployed in a Scottish iron foundry, where coke was ton's being used with rather poor results. For the old-fashioned leather bellows, Smeaton substituted an air pump consisting of four large iron cylinders, fitted with pistons and valves, and run, like Darby's bellows, by water-power. With Smeaton's pump, coke could at last be used generally for smelting iron. The English production of smelted iron—or "pig iron"—increased from 10,000 tons in 1700 to 50,000 in 1770.

When coke was used as fuel, the "pig iron" produced in blast furnaces was found to contain impurities which made it too brittle for many purposes. How to transform pig iron into the purer and tougher forms known as wrought iron and steel was for some time a puzzling problem. A solution of the problem was worked out about 1784 by Henry Cort, a purchasing agent for the

Cort's British navy, who entered the iron industry as an experimenter rather than as a practical manufacturer. Cort invented, or at any rate patented, several "processes." One was a new type of furnace—the "reverberatory furnace"—in which the coke, instead of being mixed with the iron ore, was burned in an adjacent but separate chamber. Another was a way of stirring or "puddling" the molten iron so that impurities could be skimmed off. A third was a device whereby the metal taken from the furnace, instead of being beaten out with hammers, was pressed into the form of bars or sheets by means of heavy rollers. These "Cort processes" marked a really revolutionary advance in the iron industry. Thanks to them, cheaper and better iron was made available for machinery, tools, and boilers.

With better iron, it was possible to make a better steam
steamengine. And one of the outstanding achievements during the preliminary phase of the Industrial Revolution
was the invention of James Watt's steam-engine. James
Watt (1736-1819), a Scottish contemporary of Napoleon Bonaparte, was working as a maker and repairer of

NOTE. The picture opposite is from a drawing by the English caricaturist, George Cruikshank (1792-1878). On Cruikshank, see below, pp. 170-171.





scientific instruments at the University of Glasgow when (in 1764) a model of the Newcomen steam-engine was brought to him for repair. Having put the model in order, he studied its defects, noting especially its waste of power and fuel, because, with each stroke of its piston, the steam in its cylinder had to be condensed by cooling, and then the cylinder had to be heated up for the next stroke. After puzzling over the matter for some time, and scientifically investigating the properties of steam, Watt evolved a new principle for the steam-engine. He would let the steam escape through a valve into a separate condensing chamber which should be kept cool constantly while the main cylinder remained hot.

When Watt tried to construct such an engine, he encountered difficulties which would dishearten most men. No iron-workers seemed skillful enough to make the cylinders perfectly round or the piston absolutely smooth and straight or the valves tight. He had just about given up his experiments when a wealthy friend, who thought the Watt engine might be used profitably in his own coal mines, paid the inventor's debts and persuaded him to persevere. In the year 1769 Watt patented his first steamengine—"Beelzebub," he appropriately named it—but hardly was it ready for use when his friend suffered reverses and was compelled to withdraw financial support. Fortunately, a well-to-do hardware manufacturer of Birmingham, Matthew Boulton, took an interest in "Beelzebub" and formed a partnership with Watt for the manufacture of steam-engines. Boulton supplied the capital and Watt the inventive genius.

The first engines manufactured by the firm of Boulton and Watt were sold to proprietors of coal (and copper) mines or iron works and took the place of the earlier Newcomen engines in pumping water out of mines or air into blast furnaces. Watt, however, continued to improve his steam-engine, with a view to rendering it still more economical and extending its use. In 1781 he patented a method of converting the reciprocating motion of the piston into a rotary motion so as to adapt the engine for driving various kinds of machinery. In 1782 he patented a rearrangement of valves so that the pressure of the steam was applied to the backward as well as to the forward stroke of the

Note. The portrait opposite is from a sculptured bust of James Watt by Sir Francis Chantrey (1781-1842).

piston; thereby a saving of fuel was effected with an increase of efficiency and power.

Further improvement of the steam-engine, and of iron machines of every sort, followed the invention of certain "tools of precision" in the 1790's, particularly Maudslay's invention of the "slide-rest" (1794). This was an iron lathe or turning-machine, which assured far greater smoothness

and accuracy in shaping cylinders and pistons and valves than the earlier hand-work which had all but frustrated Watt's first labors with the steam-engine.

By the year 1800 the production of coal and iron was reaching large proportions in Britain. Steam-engines and many other machines were being made of iron; and coal was being used as fuel for the engines and (in the form of coke) for the manufacture of iron. The annual production of coal had grown from 6 million tons in 1770 to 12 million in 1800, and of pig iron, during the same period, from 50,000 tons to 130,000. Already Britain was producing as much iron and coal as all the rest of the world. And the demand on British mines and foundries was steadily augmenting.

By the year 1800 a relationship was being established between the hitherto separate revolutions in metallurgy and in the cotton

Relationship of Revolutions in Metallurgy and Cotton industry. Steam-engines were supplanting waterwheels as motive power for the new spinning and weaving machinery in cotton factories, and this machinery was beginning to be made of iron instead of wood. Moreover, as mechanical spinning and weaving were slowly but surely adapted from cotton manufacture to

the older and more conservative woollen inclustry, cluring the three decades from 1800 to 1830, a basic change in the whole textile business was promised, not only from home to factory, but from wood and water to iron and coal.

The revolutionary development of the textile industry and especially of the coal and iron industries had a revolutionary effect

Revolution in Transportation upon transportation. Large-scale manufacturers and mine operators demanded better and faster and more economical means of getting their goods to their widening markets. And as such means were gradually forth-

coming in the three decades from 1800 to 1830, they, in turn, stimulated the output of factories, foundries, and mines.

During the greater part of the eighteenth century, tr. nsport tion had been more backward and primitive in England than France. By the middle of the century, France had a fairly go system of highways and a considerable network of canals. T British Parliament, it is true, had passed a "turnpike act" early as 1663, but the results were slight. British highways lo remained notoriously bad, and not until 1759 did Parliame authorize the construction of the first canal in England—from Manchester to Worsley, a distance of seven miles.

Toward the close of the eighteenth century, however, can building was quickened in Britain, and the construction and pair of highways began to benefit from methods applied by two British engineers, Thomas Telford and and Rc Buildir Telford (1757-1834), imitating John Macadam. French and Roman methods, laid down a foundation of her flagstones which he bound together with pitch and surfaced w smaller rolled stones; the result was an enduring but very pensive road. Macadam (1756-1836), adopting new metho devoted prime attention to drainage and then laid down a sec of gravel coatings, beginning with very coarse stones and shace off through finer stones to a top dressing of pitch or tar; his road were somewhat less expensive than Telford's and in time becare more common. By 1830 England possessed an adequate netwo of main roads and about 2,500 miles of canal.

The transport of such a heavy and bulky commodity as involved a special problem. Even before the eighteenth century plank roads had been built on which cars of coal could be draw by horses or mules from the mines to the nearest ocean or resports. Then, with the increasing use of coal (and iron) in platter part of the eighteenth century, the horse-drawing of cars was rendered easier and quicker by running the cars flanged iron rails which were laid along plank roads or on creaties (first in 1776). Presently some mine owners began to speciate on the possibility of utilizing the steam-engine, instead horse-power, for pulling the coal cars.

While this speculation was proceeding, a young inventigation and Trevithick (1771-1833), the son of a mine manager Cornwall, was preparing the way for the steam locomotive.

¹ The great Southern Canal, 148 miles in length, had been built during the refer of Louis XIV.

HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE

year 1800, aided by improvements in the handling of sheet 1, he constructed a steam-engine on a different principle from Watt's Watt's was a low-pressure, condensing engine, while his was a high-pressure, non-condensing engine. ⊶:k's Then Trevithick found that he could make his steamengine into a locomotive, and this he patented in with the idea that it could be operated over the highways England. Several highway locomotives were actually built Trevithick; one was run ninety miles over the roads to mouth under its own steam, and another, which he dubbed "Catch me who can," was operated on a circular track at don in 1808. His locomotives were too defective, however, he himself was not sufficiently businesslike to make a favorimpression on Englishmen of wealth. He went off to South erica to construct engines for the Peruvian mines, and when eturned a dozen years later, someone else had made a success he steam locomotive and Trevithick died penniless.

The success of the locomotive was due to George Stephenson 1848), a workman in a colliery, who learned to read and e after he was seventeen years of age and by his own efforts me a professional engineer. In 1813 he prevailed upon the corietor of the colliery at which he worked to try steam traction he tramway connecting the mine with its port nine miles

struhen-Rail .ocomo-174

away, and in the following year a locomotive which he constructed on the principle of Trevithick's, and which he called "Blücher" in honor of the Prussian general who was then fighting against Napoleon, drew

ateain of coal cars over the tramway. During the next few years stephenson's studies and experiments convinced him that the from locomotive could not be used successfully on ordinary ski ways (as Trevithick had imagined), and that for its sucessful use on rails it would be necessary to prepare the roadand with great care and as level as possible so as to reduce rolling wistance to a minimum. In 1822 he was appointed engineer for the building of a coal railway from Stockton to

Mest heam lailway,

Darlington, and in 1823 he established a locomotive factory at Newcastle. He could not convince the owners of the Stockton and Darlington railway that hey should spend the funds requisite to prepare a properly

ruled road-bed, and hence, when the railway was opened to

traffic in 1825, it was operated on the level by steam locomotives but on hills by pulleys and stationary steam-engines. Yet the Stockton and Darlington was the first railwry on which animal power was wholly supplanted by steam power.

Almost immediately, a steam railway was projected to connect Manchester (the centre of the rapidly expanding cotton industry) with the important port of Liverpool. George Stephenson was put in charge of its construction, and this time he had his way about grading the road-bed; hills were cut through and swamps were filled. At length, in June 1830, an improved locomotive, the Rocket, designed by the son of George Stephenson, Robert Stephenson, and manufactured in the Stephenson locomotive works at Newcastle, traversed the line, a distance of forty miles, in an hour and a half. In September 1830, the Liverpool and Manchester railway was formally opened to public traffic—alike of goods and of passengers. From the outset it proved financially profitable to its promoters. The age of railways was opening. In the meantime the steam-engine was being applied to water

transportation. Several persons, as early as the 1790's, were grappling with the problem of how paddles and steam-engines might be substituted, in whole or in part, for the sails and wind which from time immemorial had been depended upon to propel ships. John Fitch, an American, who had been a revolutionary soldier and a surveyor of lands in Kentucky, became interested in the possibilities of steam navigation on the great water courses of the United States. He built a rude steamboat which carried passengers on the Delaware River for several months in 1790, and he went to France in 1703 to try to persuade the revolutionary government at Paris to adopt his invention. The French were deaf to his pleas, his venture on the Delaware was a financial failure, and Fitch committed suicide in 1708. But already William Symington, an Englishman, was experimenting with steam navigation; and in 1802 a tug of his, equipped with a Boulton and Watt engine which was ingeniously connected with a paddle-wheel, was given a trial "run" on the Forth and Clyde canal (in Scotland). The boat "ran." but as its motion and vibration threatened to injure the canal banks, its further use was abandoned.

The first inventor of a commercially successful steamboat was Robert Fulton (1765-1815), an American, who went to England

in 1787 in order to study the art of painting under Benjamin West. In England, however, he made the acquaintance of the Duke of Bridgewater (the proprietor of rich coal mines and the chief promotor of canal construction) and also of James Watt, and under the influence of these men he turned his attention from painting to engineering. In 1796 he published a Treatise on the Improvement of Canal Navigation. Then, taking up his residence in Paris, he launched his first steamboat on the Seine in 1803 and built a submarine boat which he vainly besought Napoleon to adopt. Returning to America and forming a partnership with Robert Livingston (who furnished the requisite capital), Fulton constructed a paddle-wheel steamer, the Clermont, which he powered with a Boulton and Watt engine and which began in 1807 to ply regularly on the Hudson River between New York and Albany. In 1815 the United States obtained from Fulton the first steam warship—a vessel of thirty-eight tons with central paddle-wheels.

The first profitable steamboat in Britain was designed by a Scottish inventor, Henry Bell, and put into operation on the Clyde River in 1812. This vessel (named the Comet), of about twenty-five tons, was propelled by a Watt engine of three horse-power at a speed of seven miles an hour.

The steamboats of Fulton and Bell were too small and too weak, and consumed too much fuel, for safe or profitable use on long sea voyages. For some years, therefore, steam navigation was confined to tugs and river craft and to boats for short voyages, such as coasters and cross-channel packets. When a steam-engine was installed on a transoceanic ship, as on the Savannah in 1819, it was employed as an auxiliary to sails rather than as a substitute for them. Nevertheless, a significant beginning had been made of revolutionary changes in transportation, by water as well as by land.

A beginning of revolutionary change in printing was likewise made prior to 1830. In 1800 a printing press was built entirely of Iron and iron. In 1811 was constructed the first steam-driven printing machine, and shortly afterwards the "cylin-der" press was invented. In 1814 the London Times inaugurated the use of the new printing machinery, which produced 1,000 impressions an hour and thus quadrupled the output of the earlier hand press. By 1827 the machinery

was so improved that it could produce 4,000 impressions an hour. And with the increasing output of printing presses went a growing demand for—and supply of—paper. Paper had always been made by hand, sheet by sheet, until 1803, when Henry Fourdrinier, after much toil and perseverance, erected in England a paper machine, the principle of which he derived from a French inventor. Thereafter, paper machinery, keeping pace with the improvements in printing machinery, gradually supplanted hand manufacture.

Altogether, the Industrial Revolution was passing beyond its preliminary phase in England by 1830. Profound changes were apparent in the cotton industry and in the iron and coal industries; machines were taking the place of hand tools; steam was becoming an important motive power; locomotive, steam-boat, and power press were heralding even more epochal changes. The main phase of the Industrial Revolution was at hand.

3. THE MAIN PHASE, 1830-1870

Sixty years—from 1770 to 1830—had been required to inaugurate the Industrial Revolution in Britain. During the ensuing forty years, it progressed and expanded by leaps and bounds. It not only carried further the transformation of the iron, coal, and cotton industries and the means of transportation, but also affected a wide range of other industries, altering old ones and introducing new ones, and leading in all fields toward the goal of machine mass production. Not only did it continue to advance in Britain but it spread to the continent of Europe and to America.

Neglecting for the moment this geographical spread of the Industrial Revolution, let us now trace the most significant aspects of its development in Britain from 1830 to 1870. First of all must be noted the fundamental fact that without the growth of capital, which had been powerfully stimulated during the preliminary phase of the Industrial Revolution, the subsequent developments could not have constituted its main phase. Nor could its main phase have been what it was without the rise of professional engineering and the coöperation of "practical" scientists.

The word "engineer" had originally been employed to denote a person who constructed military fortifications and engines of

war; and, in the eighteenth century, when some persons began to concern themselves with works which were neither exclusively military in purpose nor executed by soldiers, such per-Rise of sons were called, by way of distinction, "civil engi-Engineers." None of the early industrial inventors--Harneering greaves, Arkwright, Crompton, Cartwright, Smeaton, Cort, or even Watt—was professionally an "engineer," military or civil. But as industrial invention proceeded and became more complicated and demanded greater technical competence, it gave rise to a new and important professional class of civil engineers. In 1828 the "civil engineers" of London formed a society with a charter which described their profession as "the art of directing the great sources of power in nature for the use and convenience of man, as the means of production and of traffic in states, both for external and internal trade, as applied in the construction of roads, bridges, aqueducts, canals, river navigation, and docks for internal intercourse and exchange, and in the construction of ports, harbors, moles, breakwaters, and lighthouses, and in the art of navigation by artificial power for the purpose of commerce, and in the construction and adaptation of machinery, and in the drainage of cities and towns." A most comprehensive—and quite utilitarian—definition of the work which professional engineers would henceforth perform in forwarding the Industrial Revolution!

As time went on, after 1830, and the extent of industrial change widened, a specialization arose among "civil engineers." Some, concerning themselves with steam-engines, machine-tools, mill-work, and moving machinery in general, became "mechanical engineers." Others, busying themselves with locating and working deposits of coal, iron, and other minerals, became "mining engineers." By 1870, there were appearing "marine engineers," "sanitary engineers," "chemical engineers," and "electrical engineers." Every industrial plant of large size or ambition had to have some kind of engineer for daily advice or at least for occasional consultation as to how it might produce more goods at less expense.

Similarly a close relationship was established between the Industrial Revolution and natural science, especially physics and chemistry. Natural science, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been primarily theoretical and even

metaphysical, was now drawn into the service of machine industry and rendered more "practical." Industrialists took a new interest in science, and scientists in industry. Application of the Industrial Revolution received direct aid, during its preliminary phase, from such a scientist as Sir Humphry Davy, and inestimable advantages, during Industry its main phase, from a considerable number of very distinguished physicists and chemists, including Faraday, Liebig, Bunsen, and Kelvin. Of these men, and their contributions, we shall have more to say in the course of the present section.

One highly significant aspect of industrial development between 1830 and 1870 was the improvement of all kinds of machinery through the perfecting and the increased use of "tools of precision." Maudslay, it is true, had invented his with Tools slide-rest back in 1794, and the slide-rest, with a few of Precision like inventions, had enabled James Watt, for example, to surmount some of the worst obstacles which had confronted him during his first labors on the steam-engine. Now, however, the making of machines was almost completely revolutionized by a notable series of inventions, including Clement's planing machine (1825) and lathe (1828), Nasmyth's steam hammer (1839) and machine for cutting key grooves in metal wheels (1836), and Roberts' punching machine for drilling holes in iron plates (1848). Thanks to these "tools of precision," all manner of ironwork was greatly facilitated and improved.

Another significant aspect of the era from 1830 to 1870 was the quantitative expansion of industries whose revolution had clearly begun in the preceding era. There was an enormously increased demand for iron and coal, and these commodities were produced in unprecedented and constantly augmenting amounts. The annual British production of pig iron rose from 750,000 tons in 1830 to six million tons in 1870, and of coal from 26 million tons to 110 million tons.

The production of iron was stimulated by the invention of new processes for its large-scale conversion into steel. One such process—the so-called Bessemer process—was patented in 1856

¹ Davy (1778-1829), a native of Cornwall and a largely self-taught chemist, made important practical contributions to agricultural chemistry and to electrical science. He was knighted in 1818 for his construction of the Davy safety lamp for coal miners.

by Henry Bessemer (1813-1898), a prolific inventor 1 and successful engineer. Bessemer used a large metal converter, somewhat the shape of an egg, which was heated to a Steel very high temperature by burning coke inside it; then Processes of Bessecast iron, taken from a blast furnace, preferably in a mer and molten condition, was poured into the converter, which Siemens swung on a swivel to receive supplies and emit the product; next. a blast of air was blown from beneath, producing a pyrotechnic display and consuming the impurities in the iron; and finally, after fifteen or twenty minutes, when the effervescence died down, the iron was taken out as hard steel. The other process—the Siemens or open-hearth process-was evolved, almost simultaneously, by William Siemens (1823-1883), a German engineer and scientist.² who settled in England and in 1859 became a naturalized Englishman. Siemens introduced a special "reverberatory" furnace, on the open hearth of which the iron was heated by flames coming from coal or gas; the gases thus generated were themselves heated and brought into the fire box to help raise the temperature to such a point that the impurities would be burned out of the iron and that steel would result. Whereas the Bessemer converter used an air blast and was quick acting, the Siemens furnace relied upon great heat and proper mixture of ingredients and was slow acting. Both processes were speedily perfected and proved quite successful; a keen competition developed between them; and each contributed to the supplanting of cast iron with steel.3

A large part of the growing demand for steel, which gave rise to the Bessemer and Siemens processes (and which these proc-

¹ In addition to the steel-converter, Bessemer invented machines for embossing velvet and pressing cane-sugar, and devices for making bronze powder, government stamps, and projectiles.

² Siemens, like Bessemer, was prolific in invention. Among his devices, besides his steel process, were a process in electroplating, a differential governor for steam-

engines, and several appliances for electrical lighting and power.

Siemens invented his "reverberatory" furnace in 1856 and began to use gaseous fuel in it in 1861. In 1864 a French steel manufacturer, Pierre Martin, mude a valuable addition to the Siemens process by manipulating the materials on the hearth and thereby helping to control the carbon content and at the same time enabling him to utilize scrap iron and scrap steel as well as new cast iron. Hence, the Siemens process came to be known as the Siemens-Martin process.

The Bessemer process, it may be added, had at first the one serious defect of not getting rid of phosphorus in the iron, but this defect was remedied in 1878 by Thomas, an Englishman, who lined the converter with lime or magnesia. The Thomas "lining" was subsequently employed not only in the Bessemer converter

but also in the Siemens furnace.

esses, in turn, served to supply), was for the construction of railways. The great success of the Liverpool and Manchester railway (opened in 1830) led to feverish activity in railway building for the rapid transportation alike of of Steam

Railways

goods and of passengers, in England and throughout Europe and in America. In Britain alone the mileage of steampowered railways mounted from 49 miles in 1830 to 15,300 in 1870. Small lines were consolidated into large systems, such as the Great Western (1838), the Midland (1844), and the London and Northwestern (1846). London was linked by iron and steam with Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Plymouth, and, in 1847, with Edinburgh. Locomotives were improved and multiplied. Dozens of inventions were made to assure greater safety and efficiency to the new railway transportation.

Transportation by steamboat was similarly pushed forward not only on rivers and along coasts, but also on the high seas.

In 1838 two ships crossed the Atlantic under steam power, the Sirius in eighteen days and the Great Western in fifteen days, and in 1840 Samuel Cunard inaugurated the regular trans-Atlantic passenger steamship

Development of Steam-

line which has ever since been known as the Cunard line. In the 1850's screw propellers, which had independently been patented in 1836 by Francis Smith, an Englishman, and by John Ericsson, a Swede then sojourning in England,1 were widely adopted in place of the earlier paddle-wheels, and iron began to supplant wood as the favorite building material for the larger ships. In the 1850's, also, the "expansion" or "compound" engine, which had been patented in 1824 by James Allaire, an American, and in which steam was used in a second cylinder at a lower pressure after it had done its work at high pressure in the first, was introduced and soon proved its commercial value by conserving fuel and increasing speed.

The cotton industry, already largely mechanized before 1830, advanced prodigiously after 1830. The market for cotton goods was rapidly developed by railways and Advance of Cotton steamships; raw cotton poured into England, and ma-Manufacture chine-made cotton poured from English factories throughout Britain and into the outside world. There was steady

¹ Ericsson subsequently went to the United States and in 1848 was naturalized as an American citizen.

improvement of cotton machinery; iron almost wholly replaced wood, and the "ring spinning frame," invented by John Thorp, an American, in 1830, produced coarse thread faster and more cheaply than Crompton's spinning mule. The value of British cotton exports almost tripled between 1830 and 1870 (from nineteen to fifty-six million pounds sterling).

Moreover, the revolution in the cotton industry was now communicated to the other textile industries. The new machinery for spinning and weaving had begun to be adopted by woollen manufacturers, despite the energetic protion in Other tests of hand-workers, especially hand-weavers, in the vears between 1800 and 1830; after 1840 its triumph in the woollen industry was assured. In the case of the linen industry, which had long been centred at Belfast in northern Ireland, power machinery was only casually employed before 1830, but thereafter it commenced to compete successfully with hand-work. The relation of the revolution in cotton to that in the other textiles may be indicated by reference to the fact that whereas the number of workers who tended factory machines constituted 65 per cent of the total number engaged in the cotton industry in 1830, and 88 per cent in 1870, the corresponding percentage in the woollen industry increased from 30 to 78, and in the linen industry from 5 to 70.

Among important aspects of the main phase of the Industrial Revolution from 1830 to 1870, note should be taken of the large number and great variety of traditional industries which were now mechanized and revolutionized for large-scale operation. Such were the textiles other than cotton. Such, too, were the boot and shoe industry, flour milling, brewing, laundering, furniture making, the building trades, the loading and unloading of goods.

One of the most significant of these industries was the making

of firearms. Alike for soldiering and for hunting, firearms had been in wide demand since at least the sixteenth century. There had been some gradual improvement in the manufaction in ture both of cannon and of small arms but no really revolutionary change prior to 1830. The old-fashioned flintlock musket was still employed for fighting and fowling, as it had been in the days of Napoleon and in the age of Louis XIV. After 1830, however, the much greater and far more skillful use

of iron combined with the solicitude of European governments for "national preparedness" to revolutionize the means of waging war. The percussion cap, the principle of which had been worked out by Alexander Forsyth during the Napoleonic wars, was first substituted for the flintlock in the British army in 1836. At about the same time, the rifle, with its grooved barrel, was substituted for the musket, and elongated bullets for the earlier spherical ones. Breech-loading, applied first in Prussia in 1860, was soon embodied in the improved British rifle—the "Enfield rifle." And in 1862 Richard Gatling, an American inventor whose genius was directed toward firearms by the Civil War then raging in his country, devised a machine gun which would discharge 350 shots a minute. The Gatling machine gun definitively carried the Industrial Revolution into war and preparedness for war.

Still another important aspect of the Industrial Revolution during its main phase was the remarkable rise of certain new industries, particularly the development of food preserving, gas lighting and heating, electrical works, and photography, and the commencement of the rubber and petroleum industries. Each of these merits attention.

The canning of food had been attempted during the Na-

poleonic wars, with but indifferent success. In the 1840's, however, thanks to a variety of reasons—growing urban demand, greater agricultural supply, increasing experimentation and knowledge, better methods of manufacturing glass jars and tin receptacles—canning began to be extensively and successfully practiced. By the 1860's, not only were fresh fruits and fish and vegetables being preserved by canning, but the famous "extract of beef," which the German scientist Liebig had just invented, and the condensed milk which an American dairyman, Gail Borden, had just patented, were being widely purveyed in cans. Dried milk, it may be added, was first made in England in 1855, and contemporary experiments in creating artificial temperatures already pointed the way to the

The use of gas grew out of the discovery that, when coke was obtained from coal, a volatile matter—coal gas—was released which could be stored and burned. The first practical application

refrigeration which in a later period would nicely supplement the

canning process for the preservation of food.

of coal gas as an illuminant had been made by William Murdoch who had lighted his factory with it early in the nineteenth century; a "gas light and coke company" had been incorporated in London in 1812; and the American city of Baltimore had contracted to light its streets with gas in 1816. After 1830 gas was generally employed for street lighting in large towns, and after 1860 for the lighting of private houses. For other domestic purposes, the first use of gas was in 1832, when a certain James Sharp of Northampton, in England, demonstrated its availability for cooking in his own home. The resulting expansion of "gas works" reached fairly large dimensions in Britain in the 1860's.1

Electricity was another thing which, before 1830, had been theorized about and experimented with, but not put to much practical use. Benjamin Franklin, to be sure, had Pioneer preached the blessings of "lightning-rods" back in the Work in Electricity eighteenth century; and two Italian scientists -Galvani (1737-1798) and Volta (1745-1827)—had made highly important discoveries about electricity. Galvani, beginning with investigations as to the effects of electrical action upon the muscles of frogs, had ended by establishing the basic principles of what became known, from his own name, as "galvanic action" or "galvanism." Volta had devised the electric battery and had used it for chemical action, that is, for "electrolysis." Then, too, just prior to 1830, Ampère (1775-1836), a French scientist, had developed the relationship between electricity and magnetism. while Ohm (1787-1854), a German scientist, had elaborated the theory and suggested certain applications of current electricity. All these scientists gave their names to the terminology of electrical knowledge,2 but commercial exploitation of such knowledge awaited other scientists who should be more concerned with mechanical invention.

Such a scientist was Michael Faraday (1791-1867), whose

¹ The invention at this time by a famous German scientist, Robert von Bunsen (1811-1899), of the "Bunsen burner," so designed that it mixes a predetermined quantity of air with the stream of gas before the latter is ignited, and gives off an extremely hot but non-luminous flame, was useful immediately to chemists and subsequently to persons who derived from it the principle for the construction of gas heaters.

² Besides the use of the term "galvanism" indicated above, "volt" came to be defined as the electromotive force which produces a current of one "ampere" in a resistance of one "ohm."

father was a London blacksmith and whose formal education was of a very sketchy sort. Finding favor with Sir Humphry Davy. Faraday shared his patron's interest in "applied science" and soon surpassed him in originality of reand Electroplating search and genius of invention. Becoming director of the laboratory of the Royal Institution of Great Britain in 1825, when the Industrial Revolution was rapidly developing, he was in a peculiarly favorable position to follow his natural bent toward practical industrial research. He made special studies of chlorine as an aid to the bleaching industry and of the chemical properties of carbon as a help to the coal industry. His most significant contributions, however, were in the field of electricity, where he took the largely theoretical findings of Volta and Ampère, tested and elaborated them, and deduced practical applications.

Faraday's exact quantitative study of Volta's principle of electrolysis gave rise about 1830 to the process of electroplating. By employing an electric current to induce chemical action, it was discovered that iron could be plated with nickel and thus protected against rust. Electroplating speedily became an important industry. It was utilized for the manufacture of copper, aluminum, and numerous alloys. By the 1850's it was superseding the older silver plating which had characterized the famous "Sheffield plate."

The telegraph was an even more epochal application of electricity. Ampère had suggested in 1820 that electromagnetism might be used for transmitting messages by wire between distant points, and in the 1830's practical systems of electric telegraphy were formulated simultaneously in Britain and in America. In Britain, Charles Wheatstone (1802–1875), a maker of musical instruments and a friend of Faraday, took out a patent for an electric telegraph in 1837 and, with financial backing from a capitalist associate, secured its wide adoption. In America, Samuel Morse (1791–1872), an artist by vocation and an electrician by avocation, completed a telegraphic apparatus in 1836, demonstrated it publicly in New York and patented it in the following year, and promoted the

¹ Another important contributor to the development of electroplating was William Siemens, the inventor of the "open-hearth" system of making steel. See above, p. 26.

construction of the first commercial telegraph line in the United States (from Baltimore to Washington) in 1844. Once begun, the building of telegraph wires spread with a rapidity suggestive of the speed of the messages on the wires. It extended wherever railways were and to many places where railways were not. In 1851 a telegraph wire was laid down in a specially prepared cable under the English Channel, thus providing almost instantaneous communication between London and Paris. Then, after several unsuccessful attempts and several helpful inventions by Lord Kelvin (1824-1907), a submarine cable was laid across the Atlantic Ocean in 1866 and telegraphic communication was established between Britain and America. To the increasing circulation of newspapers which railways were promoting and to the multiplying copies of newspapers which the iron and steam presses were producing, the telegraph now added a vast amount of upto-date news from distant places for incorporation in the newspapers. A new mechanical journalism sprouted from the union of steam-engine with electrical telegraph.

Electricity also began to be applied as a motive force. In 1831 Faraday fashioned an electric dynamo or motor, but it was inefficient. Only after a long series of experiments and improvements, among which those of William Siemens and his brother Werner were probably preëminent, did commercial electric motors come into use. This occurred about 1866; and the first electric-powered railway was demonstrated by Werner von Siemens at a Berlin trade exhibition in 1870. Electric power was being developed during the main phase of the Industrial Revolution, from 1830 to 1870, but it did not seriously compete with steam power until after 1870.

It was likewise with the fourth major application of electricity—electric lighting. An electric arc had been made by Sir Humphry Davy during the Napoleonic era, but it was only a curiosity and was as commercially impracticable as Faraday's motor. A much better arc was designed by Bunsen, utilizing his own important invention of the carbon-zinc electric cell

Electric Lighting (1841); and during the 1860's lighting by electric arcs began to be employed commercially. Nevertheless, the recently acquired supremacy of gas for artificial lighting was not seriously threatened by electricity until after the invention of incandescent filament lamps about 1878.

Quite a different kind of new industry which arose between 1830 and 1870 was photography. It was a development, on the one hand, of the "magic lantern" or "camera ob-Photogscura," which had been known since at least the sixraphy teenth century,1 and, on the other hand, of the eighteenth-century experimentation with silver compounds, which were sensitive to light. In 1822 a Frenchman by the name of Niepce managed to make the first photograph by exposing a specially prepared plate to the sun for six hours, and his primitive process—which he called "heliography" was the inspiration and starting-point for the more famous work of Daguerre (1789-1851). Daguerre, a French painter and promoter, who formed a partnership with Niepce and independently experimented with silver salts, improved the process so much that in 1839 he could "take pictures" in thirty minutes and he advertised it so successfully that the word "daguerreotype" was long a synonym for "photograph." A quicker photographic process was evolved by Fox Talbot, an Englishman, in 1841; and, ten years later, following the employment of collodion 2 on the glass plates, Talbot devised a method of almost instantaneous photography. Henceforth the new art developed as a commercial industry swiftly and extensively.

Another great modern industry—the rubber industry—had its origin, though not its principal development, in the period from 1830 to 1870. Since the discovery of rubber trees in Brazil in the sixteenth century, their sap had been and Its utilized for the manufacture of a few "India rubber" vulcanizing commodities, chiefly erasers for the removal of leadpencil marks. But with the Industrial Revolution came a greatly increased demand for rubber products—for rubber pipes, tires, washers, and other special equipment of the new machinery, and also for a variety of household uses—and a corresponding impetus to improvement of their manufacture. One of the most significant improvements was the introduction of "vulcaniza-

¹ Sec Vol. I, p. 127.

² Collodion, made by dissolving gun-cotton in a mixture of alcohol and ether, was first prepared in 1848 by an American surgeon, J. Parkers Maynard of Boston, as an aid to his professional work; it was applied to photography by Frederick Archer, an Englishman, in 1851. Daguerre's process of photography, it may be interesting to note, was introduced into the United States by Samuel Morse, one of the inventors of the telegraph.

tion" by an American inventor, Charles Goodyear (1800–1860). Goodyear discovered in 1839 that rubber, when heated and fused with sulphur, was stronger, more elastic, and less affected by changes of temperature than the raw material; he patented the process in 1844; and in 1851 he displayed at the International Exhibition in London a number of interesting articles which had been made of vulcanized rubber. In the 1860's there was a marked growth of rubber factories, a considerable amount of experiment in blending rubber with various minerals, tars, and asphalts, and some tentative efforts to supplement the supply of the raw material by creating rubber plantations. The rubber industry was clearly expanding, but its great advance was to occur later.

Of still another great modern industry-the petroleum industry—a beginning, but only a beginning, was made prior to 1870. In 1848 James Young (1811-1883), a Scottish indus-Begin-nings of trial chemist, commenced to experiment with a spring Petroof petroleum which had made its appearance in England; in 1850 he took out a fundamental patent for dustry the distillation of the crude oil; and shortly afterwards he successfully employed it in the manufacture of naphtha and lubricating oils, and subsequently of paraffin wax and kerosene oil. Gradually these products found a market, and other distillers appeared on the scene. The annual world production of petroleum, amounting to only 2,000 barrels in 1857, rose slowly to five and a half million in 1870, and then jumped to thirty million in 1880.

If we bear in mind at once all the inventions and developments which we have sketched in the present section machines of precision, steel making, railway building, iron steamboats with screw propellers, the application of machinery to all the textiles, rifles and machine guns, gas lighting, the canning of foods, electroplating, telegraphy, the electric dynamo and arc light, photography, the vulcanizing of rubber, the manufacture of parafiin and kerosene—and if we remember at the same time that dozens of other and older industries were being mechanized and reorganized on a factory basis for mass production, then it should be clear that the period from 1830 to 1870 truly constituted the main phase of the Industrial Revolution in Britain.

Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of the Revolution

during its main phase was the unprecedented production of coal and iron. Of these minerals, there had been a remark-The Age able increase of production during the sixty years of Coal and Iron from 1770 to 1830, but it was dwarfed in comparison with the gigantic increase during the next forty years. And naturally so. All railway locomotives and tracks and most ships were now built of iron; almost every new machine in almost every revolutionized industry now required iron for its manufacture. Moreover, for most of the new industry coal was now vitally necessary; coal was used in all the steam-engines that drove locomotives, steamboats, textile and other factory machinery; coal supplied coke for steel making and gas for lighting; coal was employed to heat food for canning and rubber for vulcanizing and to warm factories and homes. Veritably, the age of coal and iron was come.

A very obvious characteristic of the Revolution in its main phase was the quantitative growth of industry and commerce. Far more goods could be made by machine than by Industrihand. Railways and macadam roads and steamboats alization of Engcould bring far larger stocks of raw material to factories, and distribute manufactured articles to far wider markets. Demand and supply—those ubiquitous twins of modern economics-received a fresh start from every invention and ran on in a mad race with each other. As England's industry and commerce forged ahead, moreover, her population became more and more urban and less rural—less agricultural. Back in 1770 Arthur Young had estimated that the English agricultural class then comprised almost half of the country's population. By 1831 it comprised less than a third, and in 1871 hardly a sixth. It was obvious by this date, not only that England was the workshop of the world, but that the masses of her people no longer harvested crops or tended sheep as their ancestors for countless centuries had done. They now lived in towns, dug minerals, or tended machines, and served as cogs in the wheels of the new industry or the new commerce.

Yet when we speak of the Industrial Revolution, we must not forget that agriculture, which had usually been rather sharply distinguished from "industry" and "commerce," was itself revolutionized and transformed into what is described today as an "industry." Agricul-

General Effects on English Agriculture

tural change was, indeed, one of the outstanding features of the main phase of the Industrial Revolution.

On the one hand, England's agricultural population, relative to her total population, declined sharply, as we have just noted. On the other hand, the demand for agricultural products increased even more—the demand of multiplying factories for raw materials and the demand of rapidly growing cities for foodstuffs. More food and more materials (meat, milk, vegetables, wool, flax, cotton, leather, etc.) had to be supplied by fewer persons. The problem was solved in Britain, partly by importing a larger quantity of agricultural products from abroad, and partly by applying new machinery and new methods to agricultural production at home.

What has been termed an "agricultural revolution" had occurred in Britain in the eighteenth century. It had involved the introduction of capitalistic, large-scale, "scientific" farming, the putting of pasture lands under cultivation, the development of crop rotation and "horse-hoeing husbandry," the improvement of breeds of farm animals, the "enclosure" of common lands,1 the growth of large private estates, and the consequent replacing of comparatively independent small-scale farmers with a class of agricultural laborers directly dependent for jobs and wages on a landlord or his "manager." This agricultural revolution soon demonstrated that a large estate under scientific management could produce with fewer farm-hands more foodstuffs than had been produced by a large number of farmers working on the same area under the antiquated strip system. And farmers who were forced off their ancestral lands by the agricultural revolution helped to provide factory hands or mine workers for the Industrial Revolution, which just then was in its preliminary England's agricultural revolution 2 certainly helps to explain why England had an industrial revolution.

For a time English agriculture (or, at any rate, English landlords) benefited greatly from the changes in industry as well as from those in farming. The "corn laws" and, even more, the Napoleonic wars served to limit, if not actually to stop, the importation of grain from the Continent and thus to preserve

¹ The "enclosure" movement, developing rapidly in the latter half of the eighteenth century, culminated in the first four decades of the nineteenth century.

² See Vol. I, pp. 466-469, 716-717.

English markets for English grain, at the very time when a greater quantity of grain was required for the rapidly augmenting population of English industrial towns. In the circumstances, the price of foodstuffs went up and English landlords planted more grain and reaped richer profits.

By 1815, however, the prosperity of English agriculture was seriously threatened. The cessation of the Napoleonic wars brought a renewal of normal trade relations between Britain and the Continent and the subsequent modification of the corn laws permitted a considerable importation of foreign grain, with which domestic grain had difficulty in competing—for several reasons. Much capital, which in the eighteenth century would have been applied to large-scale agriculture, was now being applied to largescale machine manufacturing, where its returns were greater or promised to be greater. Labor was being so rapidly diverted from countryside to city—from farm to factory—and there was so much discontent on the part of workers who remained on the soil that the production of even the large estates fell off and, with the mounting competition of cheap Continental (and Irish) foodstuffs, the profits of English landlords declined. Besides, English agriculture suffered relatively more than English industry or commerce from the disordered currency, bank failures, and other symptoms of the collapse of the inflation, or "boom," which had been artificially stimulated by the peculiar and abnormal developments of the Napoleonic era. It was symbolic of the post-Napoleonic age that the governmental Board of Agriculture, which gentlemen farmers of the eighteenth century had championed and which Arthur Young had headed, was formally abolished in 1822. English agriculture was in a slough of despond for almost twenty-five years after 1815.

Then came a great revival and development of agriculture—extending over the years from 1840 to 1874 and coinciding approximately with the main phase of the Industrial Revolution. It was, indeed, more than a coincidence that the agricultural revival occurred during the main of Agriculture phase of the Industrial Revolution; it was a matter of

cause and effect. For, whereas the so-called agricultural revolution of the eighteenth century had been accomplished in an agrarian society, with the assistance of little or no machinery, the agricultural revival of the nineteenth century occurred in a

predominantly industrial society and as a direct result of the application of industrial machinery and methods to farming. This revival of agriculture was basically more revolutionary than the earlier "agricultural revolution" had been; it was not so much an agricultural revolution *per se* as an aspect of the Industrial Revolution. Agriculture now became an "industry," marked by much the same developments as were revolutionizing the textile and metal and many other industries.

One important factor in the revival and "industrialization" of English agriculture was the rapid construction, after 1830, of railways. These enabled the products of English farms to be carried to city markets more expeditiously and Iess wastefully than hitherto. And the fact that steam railways reached a high stage of development earlier than steamships was of special significance in explaining why for at least three decades English industrial towns were better markets for products brought by rail from English soil than for those transported by boat from foreign lands.

Another important factor was the application to agriculture of "practical science," particularly engineering and chemistry, which, as we have had occasion to remark, was closely allied to the Industrial Revolution during its main phase. Engineering science, as employed for the construction of railways and macadam roads, was applauded and backed by agricultural, as well as by strictly industrial, capitalists.

Landlords soon learned, moreover, that engineering science could be utilized directly for agricultural purposes, especially for systematic drainage and other works making for a material access of tillable land. In 1823, a certain James Smith, the manager and engineer of a cotton factory, inaugurated on a farm near his factory systems of drainage and deep ploughing which converted marshes into gardens and stimulated wide interest and considerable imitation; a book of James Smith, Remarks on Thorough Draining and Deep Ploughing (1831), enjoyed a large sale. In 1843 John Reade, a gardener by trade and a self-taught mechanic, produced a cylindrical clay pipe, and two years later Thomas Scragy patented a machine for the manufacture of drain tiles. "Drainage works" speedily became a commonplace of English agriculture and a tie between it and the Industrial Revolution.

The basic contribution of chemical science to agriculture was made by a German, Justus von Liebig (1803-1873), who was professor of chemistry at the University of Giessen Agriculfrom 1824 to 1852 and thereafter, until his death, at ture and Chemistry the University of Munich. As a young man he did some important work in "pure chemistry," particularly in respect of the ethyl family (to which alcohol belongs); and in his old age he acquired household fame throughout the world by the "extract of beef" with which his name was associated. But most of Liebig's life was devoted to utilitarian study of the chemistry of animals, vegetables, and soils. He showed conclusively that plants take certain minerals from the soil, thus tending to "exhaust" it. He urged that, as a preventive of soil exhaustion and an aid to plant growth, tillable land should be scientifically fed with fertilizers containing the requisite chemicals; and he pointed out that superphosphate of lime and ammonium salts would be particularly helpful.

Liebig's doctrines were propagated in Britain through the translation and circulation of his famous book, Chemistry in its Bearing on Agriculture and Physiology (1840), and also through the activity of an agricultural station which one of his disciples set up in England to conduct scientific experiments with soils and fertilizers. In 1843 the director of this station began the manufacture of superphosphate of lime, which was soon sold in large quantities. Moreover, the importation of Peruvian guano, which had amounted to only 1,700 tons in 1841, rose to 220,000 tons in 1847; and the use of nitrate of soda, which had been introduced in 1835, grew proportionately in the 1850's. As the age of "chemical agriculture" advanced, the production of English farms (with fewer hands) increased.

Still another important factor in compensating English agriculture for the shortage of manual labor was the invention and adoption of farm machinery. Horse-hoes and horse-rakes were improved. Mechanical drills and ploughs and iron rollers and

¹This experimental station, at Rothamsted, was founded and headed by Sir John Lawes, an enthusiastic "gentleman farmer" and indefatigable exponent of "agricultural chemistry," and it was rendered technically competent by the collaboration of Sir Henry Gilbert, a professional chemist who had studied in Germany under Liebig. It should be added that the Royal Agricultural Society was incorporated in 1840, under the patronage of Queen Victoria and with the motto "Practice with Science."

cultivators and threshing machines were developed. In 1853 the "Croskill reaper" was perfected in England, and at about Agriculthe same time the "McCormick reaper" began to be tural Machinery it may be remarked, was the invention of Cyrus McCormick (1809–1884), a West Virginian farmer, who took out his first patent in 1834 and, after effecting further betterment of his machines, proceeded in 1847 to set up at Chicago a factory for their commercial production.

With the advent of machinery and applied science, British agriculture was "industrialized." It became a prosperous business and attained to a high degree of technical excellence. Of some English landlords it was reported in 1870 that they offered a reward to anyone who could find a weed on their cultivated land. No other country could then show such yields of grain and root-crops per acre; and dealers came from all over the world to buy English live stock with which to improve the farm animals of their several countries. Such supremacy, to be sure, was not long maintained, but while it lasted—say from 1850 to 1870—it demonstrated that a basic alteration and advance of agriculture, hardly less than of transportation and manufacturing, characterized the main phase of the Industrial Revolution.


4. INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM

A most significant accompaniment of the Industrial Revolution in England during the century from 1770 to 1870 was the growth of capitalism. Capitalism did not originate with the Industrial Revolution, for, as we have seen, it had been steadily developing in Europe since at least the sixteenth century, and without a considerable accumulation of wealth and a widespread desire for profits the Industrial Revolution could not have occurred.

Prior to the Industrial Revolution, however, capitalism had been mainly commercial or financial. Wealth had been accumulated in Europe principally from overseas commercial or mercial or commerce and had been applied, through such banking centres as Florence, Augsburg, Antwerp, and latterly Amsterdam and London, to the promotion of ever more

Note. The picture opposite is from the engraving of a British warship, The Fighting Téméraire, by J. M. W. Turner (1775-1851). On Turner, see Vol. I, p. 748.





pretentious overseas undertakings and likewise, within Europe, to the stimulation of agriculture and the "domestic system" of industry. So obviously dependent was this capitalistic industry upon trade that in England the word "trade" came to denote not only commerce in general but any particular industry whose products were traded; thus, the "iron trade" meant the manufacture of iron as well as commerce in iron.

Moreover, the earlier capitalism had been managed and directed chiefly by landed nobles and upper middle-class persons, whose activities did not radically undermine the traditional society of Europe. As late as the eighteenth century the mass of Europeans were peasants, engaged in agriculture; and if an increasing number of them were engaging in capitalistic industry, they were doing so, through the "putting-out" system, in their own homes and in combination with farm-work. Certain industries, such as mining and metallurgy, had long been capitalistic (in the more modern sense), owned and operated by aristocratic capitalists and employing fairly large numbers of workingmen who were neither farmers nor guildsmen. Besides, certain other industries, such as cotton and pottery, had been developing outside the guilds and drawing workmen from the land. Yet in most industries a premium was put upon skilled artisans, and in most countries guild regulations about apprenticeship were respected. Industry (as well as agriculture and commerce) was becoming capitalistic, but capitalism was still closely associated with such historic habits as living in rural communities, belonging to guilds, and preserving traditional class distinctions.

England in 1770 was different from other European countries not so much in the kind as in the degree of its capitalism. And as has been indicated in preceding pages, it was the high degree of capitalism in England which, with the exceptional circumstances of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, expedited in that country the revolution of industry from small scale to large scale, from farmhouse to factory, from simple tool to complex machine. Without large capital easily accessible through banks, it would have been impossible to finance the manufacture and installation of such machinery as Arkwright's water-frame,

Note. The picture opposite is from an etching, entitled "Things that Tower," by an American artist, Joseph Pennell (1860-1926).

Crompton's "mule," Cartwright's power loom, Smeaton's pump, Cort's "processes," or Watt's steam-engine.

But such machinery, once in successful operation, served to enhance capitalism and to give it novel significance. With the Industrial Revolution, capitalism entered a new and extraordinarily expansive phase. Capitalism became distinctively industrial. How this happened may be learned from an examination of certain effects of the mechanizing of industry.

First of all, it should be borne in mind that most of the new industrial machinery was far too expensive to be owned by peasants or artisans and much too cumbersome and complicated to be housed in their cottages or operated by them without superintendence. Hence it was purchased by wealthy men, or by "promoters" with the backing of wealthy men, and it was installed and operated in special buildings—factories or foundries—which the same wealthy men put up and to which they could bring numerous workingmen to tend the machines under expert central guidance.

In other words, the factory (or mill) came with industrial machinery. It is true that there had been some mills or factories before the Industrial Revolution; we have referred to a silk mill in England in 1719; and even earlier Factory there had been factory-like foundries and collieries in connection with metallurgical industry. The fact remains, however, that only with the advent of much machinery at the end of the eighteenth century did the factory become a common and usual centre of industrial production. Thereafter, we may properly speak of a factory system as prevailing in the "great industry" carried on by machines in capitalists' factories. It was obviously very different from the domestic system of the older, and still continuing, "little industry" conducted by hand or simple tools in the workers' houses. For a long time the new factory system and the old domestic system existed side by side, and even today the latter has not wholly disappeared in England or anywhere else. But in measure as an industry has been mechanized, the factory system has tended to dominate and then to supplant the domestic system.

Another very important fact to be borne in mind is that the owners of machinery and factories were in a position to make far

greater profits than the middle-men who utilized the hand-work and home-work of artisans and peasants. The domestic worker usually labored hard for a very small wage, but his employer could get from him only what he actually made with his own hands and his own tools, and he frequently alternated work for his industrial employer with agricultural work for himself. On the other hand, the factory worker, usually divorced from the land and deprived of any income from that source, labored exclusively for his industrial employer, and labored in such a way that his employer got from him much more than he could possibly have produced with his own hands. In the factory, it was the machine which really did the work, and it did an amount of work which, before its invention, could only have been done by ten, or a hundred, or a thousand, or several thousand human beings. The machine was thus equivalent to so many human beings; they were iron men because they were mechanical; and they were iron slaves to the employer because he owned the machine. The factory worker was merely an overseer of gangs of iron slaves; he tended them and made them work; and their multiplying production accrued to the profit, not of their overseers, but of their masters, the capitalists who owned them. Machine-owning capitalists were at first of two kinds. Some

were persons who had already been enriched by the earlier commercial capitalism and who belonged to the upper middle class or the landed nobility. These were es-Owning pecially enabled by their ownership of extensive es-Capitaltates, as well as by their association with banks and their familiarity with joint-stock companies, to apply new machinery and new processes to coal mining and iron working. Such a gentleman as the Duke of Bridgewater, the coal magnate and canal builder, is a good example of the aristocratic agricultural capitalist who during the preliminary phase of the Industrial Revolution turned industrial capitalist. Other machine-owning capitalists, however, were "self-made men," drawn from the lower classes, without previous name or fame. These came to the fore, particularly in the textile industry, by reason of inventive genius and ability as "promoters." Arkwright, the exbarber, was such a "self-made man," and such too, with the assistance of Matthew Boulton, was James Watt. In these and numer-

ous other cases, the "self-made man" shared profits of factory

production with established capitalists and often became an outstanding capitalist himself. Industrial capitalism thus held out to lower-class individuals a more alluring prospect of rising in the social scale than the earlier and more aristocratic capitalism had done, and hence it was more subversive of traditional class distinctions.

Early industrial capitalists were likely to be in close and direct contact with their business enterprises. Richard Arkwright, for example, was not so much a passive capitalist as an active "promoter," manager, superintendent, and dealer. As "promoter" he contracted loans, built factories, and installed machinery. As manager, he hired workmen and sought profits with which he could pay off the loans and amass wealth for himself. As superintendent, he sped from mill to mill in his "coach and four," seeing that the work was being done properly, that the laborers were not idle, that the machines were in good order. As dealer, he purchased the raw cotton and sold the finished goods. Richard Arkwright, like many other industrial capitalists of his day, was both shrewd and hard-working; the title of knighthood which King George III conferred upon the exbarber seemed an appropriate reward for his abundant qualities of assiduity and ambition.

As time went on and the factory system was extended and became more complicated, and especially as larger industrial enterprises, like railways, were undertaken, the individual capitalist tended to play a less active rôle. Ownership of large-scale industry passed more and more from individuals and partnerships to joint-stock companies and corporations, which entrusted the superintendence and dealing, even the management and promotion, to salaried employes and which contented themselves with floating the necessary loans (in the form of stocks or bonds) and distributing the ensuing profits (in the form of dividends or interest) among their directing officers and among "investors" outside. In this way, many industrial capitalists came to have no personal relationship whatsoever with the business from which their profits were derived. They were mere investors, delivering profits which they had obtained from one industry to a banker or broker for investment in another industry and receiving dividends and interest, perhaps from several different industries, without serious expenditure of mental or

physical energy on their part. There was, of course, a considerable element of gambling in this procedure. Individual investors might lose, as well as make, fortunes. Not knowing first-hand much about a given enterprise, they might invest in one which was badly conceived or badly managed. Even well-managed and normally profitable enterprises might occasionally experience "hard times" and suffer reverses. In such instances directors of large means could afford, better than small investors, temporarily to forego profits and patiently to await a revival of business. It soon became evident that the capitalist's hazard would be lessened if he invested his capital in several different industries. Hence, a man who made money in one business was likely to become a financial supporter and beneficiary of several businesses, and the more capital he had the more likely he was to weather storms and add to his ownership and his wealth.

By means of machinery and the factory system, the wealth of England increased prodigiously during the period of the Industrial Revolution. Just as previous and relatively modest accumulations of capital had permitted the Industrial Revolution to get under way in England, so Industrial Capital in greater and greater accumulations resulted from every major advance of the Revolution and paved the way in turn for new progress. The quantitative growth of industrial capitalism from 1770 to 1830 carried England from the preliminary phase into the main phase of the Industrial Revolution, and its forward leap during the main phase, from 1830 to 1870, introduced England to an even higher stage of industrialization, as we shall have occasion to show in a later chapter.

It is impossible to state precisely what the wealth of England amounted to at any given time, but from certain estimates which have been made ¹ some notion of its growth may be obtained. According to these estimates, the value of English capital, fixed at 500 million pounds sterling in 1750, rose to 1,500 million in 1800, to 2,500 million in 1833, and to 6,000 million in 1865. If such sums had been distributed evenly among all the people, every man, woman, and child in England would have had £71 in 1750, £167 in 1800, £176 in 1833, and £275 in 1865. In fact, however, they were not distributed evenly. The portion of them repre-

¹G. R. Porter, The Progress of the Nation, new ed. by F. W. Hirst (1912), pp. 694-705.

senting the value of land and agricultural equipment—a portion which declined from 60 per cent in 1750 to 31 per cent in 1875—belonged to a relatively small number of titled aristocrats and country gentlemen, while the waxing remainder of English wealth, representing chiefly the value of mines, factories, and shipping, was owned by industrial capitalists—an undoubtedly growing group but growing proportionately less than the total population.

Hence, while the mass of the English people were not immediately benefited economically by the Industrial Revolution, the capitalist class, including landlords, as well as bankers, commercial magnates, and machine manufacturers (among whom must be reckoned some persons who had risen from poverty), were enormously enriched and rendered very powerful. These added wealth to riches. The new wealth came from coal, iron, machines, factory production. It came from improved means of transportation—canals, macadam roads, railways, and steamboats. It came from a rapidly expanding domestic market for the products of English industry; the population of England increased from seven and a half million in 1770 to almost twenty-three million in 1871. It came from foreign trade, which grew in value from 32 million pounds sterling in 1785 to 546 million in 1870. It came also from investments abroad, for especially after 1815 England exported capital as well as commodities.

after 1815 England exported capital as well as commodities.

We have said that the mass of the English people were not immediately benefited economically by the Industrial Revolutitle Imtion. Indeed, for a considerable time they were worse off under the new régime of industrial capitalism than they had been previously. The large number of them who had been engaged in domestic manufacture, along with agricultural work, gradually discovered that they could not successfully compete with factory manufacture. They could produce by hand an ever lessening fraction of what a machine could produce, and the wages which they received from middle-men correspondingly decreased. The lot of hand-loom weavers in competition with mechanical weaving, for example, was pitiable and tragic. Persons who clung to hand-weaving were reduced to incessant toil and the direst poverty. Some rioted and vainly attempted to smash machines and destroy factories. Others gave up the unequal contest and, prevented by "enclo-

sures" and the excess of agricultural laborers from making a full living on the land, they put away their hand-looms and spinning-wheels, packed up their few personal belongings, and with their families left the rural cottage and went off to seek employment in a factory town.

But if it was almost impossible to earn a living by hand-work in the country, it was by no means easy to earn a living in the city by machine-work. Machines, in order to do vastly more work than all the human beings in England, required, as we have pointed out, only a relatively small number of human workers to oversee and tend them. With the rapidly increasing population of England, which was being concentrated more and more in the cities through their own natural growth as well as through migration from the surrounding countryside, there were many more persons seeking factory jobs than could be profitably employed—without reducing the profits of factory owners (which would have been contrary to a basic principle of industrial capitalism).

Many persons did find employment in factories, mines, and foundries, on railways and steamboats, or in other novel undertakings of the Industrial Revolution. But even for the more fortunate, there was likely to be an anxious period of transition from one occupation to another, involving many difficulties of adaptation to unfamiliar environment and to strange ways of living and working. And such employes were degraded into the position of "proletarians," owning proletarians of their own, dependent exclusively on daily wages, and living in rented rooms. The distinction between "proletarians" and "capitalists," though incomplete, was greatly enhanced by the Industrial Revolution.

The life and labor of the English masses under the earlier systems of manorial agriculture and domestic industry have sometimes been too glowingly idealized. Rural cottages of the old régime were small and uncomfortable, and their inmates—women and small children as well as men—knew all about hard work, long hours, and small wages and occasionally something first-hand about pestilence and famine. Yet the life and labor of the English masses under the factory system of industry, at least in its preliminary phase, can hardly be described too sombrely.

Congestion was one characteristic of the new system. Several big machines were huddled in one building—the factory—which was put up usually with haste and cheapness and with Congeslittle attention to problems of lighting, ventilation, or tion ` sanitation. Then where there was one factory so located as to avail itself most economically of motive powerwater or coal—and of transportation facilities, other factories tended to cluster. And then, about an ever-congesting industrial centre of machines, water-wheels, and smokestacks, would be grouped row after row of tenement houses, constructed for factory workers with even greater haste and cheapness and with even less thought of light and air than was bestowed on the housing of machines. In dark and dingy quarters, whose supply was usually behind the demand, lived in congestion and squalor an aggregation of human beings—a whole family in a room or two, a single block of tenements housing more persons than many a country village. Congestion involved not only the concentration of industrial plants but also the growth of ugly, insanitary city slums.

Monotony was another characteristic of the new system. There was monotony in the appearance of factory towns, in the rectangular blocks and the rows of box-like tenements: and there was monotony in factory labor. The factory worker did not daily alternate one kind of occupation with another; he was not weaving at one hour and hoeing at another; his time was not his own. He came and went at the sound of the factory whistle. He worked steadily for long hours—twelve. fourteen, and even more—amid the monotonous buzz and hum of machinery. Moreover, the work itself was monotonous. It was not, for the individual worker, the whole varied process of making cloth, but rather it was attention to one particular detail—tending some part of a machine, pulling a lever, brushing away dirt, mending broken threads. This was an outcome of the "division of labor," which the Industrial Revolution emphasized and which undoubtedly contributed to speed and efficiency of production but which tended to make the worker

¹ The northern and midland counties of England, which before the Revolution had been more sparsely inhabited than the southern counties, now became, thanks to their water-power and their deposits of coal and iron, the chief seats of industrial enterprise, and such cities as Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham, Newcastle, Glasgow, and Liverpool became the most populous, with the exception of London, in all England.

almost an automaton, habitually repeating some special operation and suffering consequently from rustiness of mind and restiveness of body. Boredom and nervousness were further accentuated by the necessity of the worker's keeping pace with the machine, no matter how tired he might be, for the machine seldom slackened its speed, and prompt accurate action on the part of the worker, no matter how trivial it might seem in itself, was vitally necessary to machine production.

Finally, insecurity of employment was characteristic of the new system, and it had several aspects. (1) The growing urban proletariat was utterly dependent on the wages of in-dustry. Its members had no land, not even garden patches from which they could supplement their income and on which they could fall back at least for food if they lost their industrial jobs. (2) There was a surplus of urban proletarians who had nothing to sell but their labor. The result was keen and bitter competition among them for factory jobs, a fact which factory owners were not slow to perceive and profit from. Wages could be kept low, and factory workers could be ruthlessly discharged with the certain knowledge that at least equally competent and cheap workers would take their places. (3) The factory system put a premium on unskilled workmen. For most factory jobs, neither high intelligence nor a long period of apprenticeship was requisite. Indeed, there was a marked preference for persons who were mechanically rather than mentally inclined and who did not think that they knew all about the industry.

(4) There was an especially marked preference for the employment of women and children, particularly in the textile industries. They were used to smaller wages. They were more amenable to orders. They were apt to be nimbler and more conscientious. In some factories children of eight or nine years of age worked from five or six o'clock in the morning till ten or eleven at night, with very little time off for meals and none for recreation. Employ-In some factories, pauper children were practically ment of women enslaved; they were lodged in factory lofts and boarded in factory dining-rooms, and their whole time Children belonged to the factory owners. Nor was it uncommon for the

foreman of a factory to beat children who fell asleep at their work

¹ In mining, too, women and children were employed to pull carts of coal through underground tunnels and to the surface.

or who broke the rules of the establishment. Employment of women and children was no novel invention of the Industrial Revolution, but it was novel, under the factory system, to employ them away from home and in mass. This new kind of factory employment of women and children had, of course, disruptive effects on the family and on home life and sadly deleterious effects on health and morals. It also had the effect of lowering the level of wages and the standard of living and of depriving many able-bodied men of jobs. Not infrequently, in fact, the traditional relations of the family were reversed; wives and children became the breadwinners, while grown men kept what house there was and vainly sought employment or resigned themselves to chronic idleness.

(5) Before the Industrial Revolution almost anyone could work who would; the labor might be arduous and its returns meagre, but there was some remunerative work for Unemeveryone; unemployed persons were "rogues and vagaployment bonds." With the Revolution, however, appeared a new social phenomenon, the product of the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph—the phenomenon of chronic unemployment. With the large-scale mechanizing of industry and the rise of the factory system, a considerable number of persons (sometimes larger and sometimes smaller) who could and would work were unable to find work to do. They constituted a jobless as well as landless element in the proletariat, and existed, in the midst of unprecedented accumulations of capital, only on public bounty or private charity. (6) To the persons who under the new system could not get any work, and who therefore were chronically unemployed, must be added from time to time a larger number of persons who lost their jobs through industrial depressions or crises, through age or impaired efficiency, through strikes and other labor disputes, through perfecting of machinery or invention of new processes. Whatever the cause, the result was a high degree of insecurity in employment and income for the mass of industrial workers. (7) Even workers who were fortunate enough to have steady employment were ordinarily in receipt of wages which barely sufficed for their immediate needs. They could not provide adequately for old age, for illness or accident, for schooling of dependents. They could have for themselves few of the comforts and luxuries which in ever greater abundance they were helping to produce.

In fine, the immediate economic effects of the Industrial Revolution were, on the one hand, to add enormously to English wealth and capital and, on the other hand, to degrade the English masses, enlarging the urban proletariat and holding it to poverty as a permanent condition. In time, as we shall point out in subsequent chapters of this book, much was done in England, and elsewhere, to better the lot of industrial workers and to improve the material conditions of their life and labor. The worst conditions undoubtedly prevailed in England during the preliminary phase of the Industrial Revolution, from 1770 to 1830, and some improvement was already perceptible during the main phase, from 1830 to 1870. Yet nowhere and at no time to the present day has any acceptable solution been found of the most basic problem which industrial capitalism entailed, and which its continuing progress has only served to complicate, the problem of how, in the midst of multiplying wealth, to prevent poverty.

Against the undoubtedly unfortunate effects of industrial capitalism and the factory system must be set some very real or potential advantages. Industrial capitalism, we must Potential emphasize, was the historically vital force in the Industages in trial Revolution; and the Industrial Revolution repre-Industrisented a most epochal development in man's efforts to subdue nature and make it serve his ends. Through the coming of machinery, a man could produce a wide range of luxuries as well as necessities, and he could produce them in a fraction of the time which had been required by previous handwork. He could travel much faster and more cheaply. He could live more comfortably, with electric lights, hot and cold running water, steam heat, a profusion of mechanical conveniences. He could feed on the most varied products of the whole world. He could know quickly what was happening throughout the world. And from routine toil he could be assured of an unparallelled amount of leisure for recreation and for self-cultivation, mental and spiritual as well as physical. It must be noted that in reference to all these admittedly desirable ends, we have used the word could. We know that few of them were actually realized for the English masses by the coming of machinery. This sad fact, however, was not the fault of machinery. Machinery was potentially a great blessing to mankind. Its coming, together with the amazing development of industrial capitalism,

at least held out to the masses, not less than to the classes, an inspiring and substantial hope.

Moreover, there were direct and perhaps more tangible advantages of the new system, even to the proletariat. In contrast with the domestic system which kept industrial workers apart, the factory system brought them together and eventually led them to unite for the promotion of their common interests. The rise of trade unionism, with its certainly beneficial effects upon living and working conditions, was a concomitant of the rise of industrial capitalism. Then, too, the rapid growth of population, particularly of urban population, served to break down a good deal of previous isolation and conservatism, to foster a democratic spirit, and to intensify the request for popular education and for a large number of political and social changes. The urban proletariat was a far more vocal and effective force than the rural workers had been in denouncing abuses and demanding reforms. And there can be little doubt that life in a factory town, with all its misery and squalor, was preferred to country life by a large number of persons. It was at once more sociable to those who liked company and more concealing to those who wished to live aloof. It was more casual and, to many, more exhilarating.

5. SPREAD OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

So far, we have spoken of the Industrial Revolution almost wholly as an English (or British) development. Such it was during most of its preliminary phase, from 1770 to Industrial Revolu-1830. It began in England, for reasons which have been set forth in the first section of the present chapter; at first English and the advantage which England thereby gained was strengthened by the circumstances of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, from 1793 to 1815, by the continuing vigor throughout these years of rural economy and guild regulations on the Continent, by the confirming of peasant proprietorship of land in France, and by Britain's legal prohibition, until 1825, of the export of machinery.

With the increase of industrial capitalism in England, it was quite natural that some Englishmen should invest surplus capital in foreign enterprises. As early as 1781 an English iron-master, Wilkinson by name, established the famous Creusot ironworks in France and equipped them with a steam-engine. Then, while

the Napoleonic wars were in progress, a goodly number of English mechanics cooperated with English capitalists (and foreign governments) to smuggle textile and other machinery Export of out of Britain and to install it in factories, especially English Capital and Main the Netherlands, in order to profit from the exceptional demand of Continental peoples at that time chinery for cheap clothing and for war munitions. For example, William Cockerill, an English mechanic and inventor, with the assistance of English capital, constructed in 1700 at Verviers in the southern Netherlands (it then belonged to France and is now in Belgium) the first wool-carding and wool-spinning machines on the Continent, and in 1807 he established a large machine shop at Liége. Orders soon poured in on him from all over Europe, and he

After the restoration of peace and more normal trade relations in 1815, machine production was quickened and extended on the


Continent. For a long time the bulk of machinemade goods continued to come from English factories and foundries, but as a growing number of persons on the Continent were anxious to emulate English capitalists and as English capital and English engineers could be drawn upon to finance and operate new in-

amassed a handsome fortune.

Beginnings of Industrial Revolution on European Continent

dustrial enterprises, Continental factories and foundries (usually equipped with machinery whose parts or designs were derived from England) began to spring up and spread and to supply some of the Continental market. John Cockerill, the son of William Cockerill, formed a partnership with the King of the Netherlands in 1817; the King supplied confiscated church buildings and Cockerill additional capital and the brains for housing and developing a great iron foundry at Seraing (near Liége). By 1840, Seraing was the largest plant of its kind in the world, making steam-engines and employing 2,500 men. By this time, too, Cockerill owned cotton, woollen, and linen factories, and a paper mill in Belgium, spinning mills and zinc mines in Germany. forges in southern France, a cotton mill at Barcelona (in Spain), a cloth factory in Poland, a sugar plant in Dutch Guiana (in South America), and had important investments in four coal mines, a gun factory, and several rolling-mills.

It was during the main phase of the Industrial Revolution in England, from 1830 to 1870, that the Revolution became really



impressive in certain Continental countries. The legal prohibition on the export of machinery from Britain was now removed. Moreover, the progress of the Revolution in Britain was providing an ever-growing amount of surplus capital for export abroad and an ever-increasing incentive to ambitious foreigners to visit Britain and to study and imitate its financial methods and industrial technic. Besides, the successful opening of the first important railway in England in 1830 created an enthusiasm for widespread railway construction, not only in Britain but also on the Continent, and railways speeded up the Industrial Revolution on the Continent as well as in Britain. Furthermore, thanks to prior beginnings of industrial capitalism on the Continent and to the patronage of Continental bankers and statesmen, considerable funds were now available outside Britain for supplementing the foreign investments of English capitalists.

Belgium was the first country on the Continent to be revolutionized industrially. Here the process began before 1830, but afterwards it went on rapidly, so that by 1870 Belgium was already the most densely populated country in Revolu-Europe and a majority of its inhabitants were urban tion in Belgium and directly dependent upon industry or trade. As early as 1834—only four years after the completion of the Liverpool and Manchester railway in England—the Belgian parliament adopted a plan (which had been drawn up by George Stephenson) for the construction of a national system of railways radiating from Liége and Brussels, and, through loans contracted in England, the plan was carried into effect speedily and profitably. Thenceforth, relative to her population, Belgium kept pace with Britain in all manner of industrial development.


France was more slowly and much less thoroughly industrialized. Her mineral resources were less plentiful, and her traditions of hand-work, luxury manufacture, and small-scale agriculture were more solidly entrenched. Yet the Industrial Revolution gradually penetrated France. At first it affected mining and metallurgy. The output of coal rose from 800,000 tons in 1815 (about the same as in 1770) to 1,800,000 in 1830, and of pig iron from 100,000 to 300,000 tons, while the number of steam-engines increased from 15 to 625 (still used mainly for pumping water out of mines). After 1830 the French government was more favorably disposed toward machine in-

dustry; and such industry was especially vitalized by railwav construction, which began in France in 1842 with a line from Paris to Rouen and thence to Le Havre (built by an English company with English capital and English workmen), and was extended farther and farther during the 1850's and 1860's, radiating out from Paris to Strasbourg, Lyons, Marseilles, Brest, Bordeaux, and Toulouse. From 1830 to 1870, the output of French coal increased from 1,800,000 tons to 16,000,000, and of French pig iron from 300,000 to 1,400,000 tons, while the horsepower of French steam-engines (exclusive of locomotives and marine engines) rose from 20,000 to 336,000. After 1840, moreover, power-driven machinery began seriously to compete with hand-work in the French textile industries. Most of the new mechanical industry in France was concentrated in the north of the country—in Alsace and Lorraine and in the regions about Lille, Rouen, and Paris. Nevertheless, despite the coming of railways and factories, with significant social and political consequences, France remained in 1870 predominantly agricultural, and the domestic system of industry still flourished widely.

Germany, despite vast resources of coal and iron, was even more backward than France. Although some machinery was brought in from England and a few factories were In built prior to 1830, there was hardly the beginning of Germany an industrial revolution in Germany until after that date. The formation of the Zollverein (the tariff union of most of the German states except Austria) in 1833, actuated by agricultural demands, served to stimulate trade and increase wealth, and simultaneously to foster the desire and provide some surplus capital for improving the means of internal transportation. In 1830, with the additional aid of English capital, the first important German railway was built from Dresden to Leipzig; in 1840 it was extended to Magdeburg; and by 1848 Germany (including Austria) possessed some 4,000 miles of railway, connecting Berlin with Hamburg, the Rhine, Cracow, Prague, Vienna, and Laibach. In Germany, unlike England, Belgium, and France, railway construction preceded the real beginnings of industrialization; but just as railways speeded up foundries and factories in those countries, so it brought them into being in Germany. Here the coal output, less than France's in 1850.

On the formation of the Zollverein, see Vol. I, p. 794.

rose to 16 million tons in 1860 and to 37½ million in 1870, while the production of pig iron jumped to half a million tons in 1860 and to almost two million in 1870. In the meantime power-driven machinery was being applied to cotton spinning, and textile factories were arising in Saxony, Silesia, Westphalia, and



INDUSTRIAL CENTRES, 1870

the Rhineland. Cotton weaving, as well as the manufacture of other textiles, still remained predominantly a hand industry in 1870, and at this date 64 per cent of the population of Germany (exclusive of Austria) were classed as rural and agricultural, as compared with 36 per cent urban and industrial. Yet the Industrial Revolution was clearly under way in Germany; its revolutionary consequences were to become obvious after 1870.

Elsewhere on the Continent, large-scale manufacturing with its attendant factory system and industrial capitalism appeared before 1870—occasionally and sporadically. There were some in-

stances in the Dutch Netherlands, in Sweden, in Spain. There was considerable development in Russian Poland, particularly near Warsaw; and a few factories were erected by English "promoters" at St. Petersburg and Moscow. Bohemia (especially Prague) and German Austria (especially Vienna) participated somewhat in the mechanizing of industry, but other areas of the Habsburg Empire—and the whole expanse of the Russian and Ottoman Empires—were scarcely touched as yet by the Industrial Revolution. In the 1850's some steam-engines were brought into northern Italy (Piedmont), and Count Cavour acquired his first fame—and large wealth—as a promoter of industrial undertakings and industrial capitalism; yet before 1870 the factory system was embryonic in the north and hardly existent elsewhere in Italy.

Overseas, English machinery and English capital helped to inaugurate the Industrial Revolution in the United States. Here, as we have noted earlier in the present chapter, there Industrial was a good deal of mechanical invention, and in the Revolution in northeastern part of the country there was consider-United States able factory production, before 1830. After 1830, however, the progress of industrialization was more rapid. Factories for large-scale production of textiles and shoes sprang up in New England; extensive building and operation of railways between 1840 and 1870 led to a prodigious development of coal mining and ironworking in Pennsylvania and also of markets for machine-made goods of every kind. These markets continued to be served largely by British factories, and the majority of the American people continued to devote themselves to agriculture, but it was evident by 1870 that the United States was to become a great industrial—and capitalist—nation.

Wherever the Industrial Revolution spread, it displayed in greater or less degree the same features as characterized it in England—power-driven machinery, the factory system, rapid growth of cities, greatly increased production of textiles, coal, and iron, expansion of trade, multiplication of banks and business corporations, transformation of "domestic" and agricultural workers

¹ The Dutch Netherlands (Holland) continued to be important economically, but by reason more of the older commercial and financial capitalism, than of the newer industrial capitalism.

into a landless wage-seeking proletariat, notable growth in numbers and a more notable growth in wealth and power of industrial capitalists, and a whole series of social and political problems gravely affecting capital and labor and their mutual relationship. Accompanying the spread of the Industrial Revolution, moreover, and in some cases preceding other phases of it, went improved means of communication and certain aids to more comfortable living—railways, steamships, telegraph lines, gas lighting, photography, canning, and engineering and chemical contributions to agriculture as well as to manufacturing.

In general, it may be said that the Industrial Revolution, occurring originally in England between 1770 and 1870, spread significantly to Belgium about 1815, to France about 1825, to the United States about 1830, to Germany about 1850, to Italy about 1860. With the exception of Great Britain and Belgium, all these countries were still preponderantly agricultural in 1870, but in all of them manufacturing was growing faster than agriculture, while machine manufacture, the factory system, and industrial capitalism were expanding at the expense of handwork, the "domestic" system, and the older and more traditional class distinctions. It was the years from 1830 to 1870 which witnessed not only a full-fledged economic revolution in England but the clear beginnings of such a revolution in western Europe and in America, and which already promised, through railway construction, export of capital, and search for markets, to revolutionize, at no distant date, central and eastern Europe, and perhaps the whole world.

The Industrial Revolution in its beginnings was evolutionary rather than truly revolutionary. The date of 1770 for its beginning in England is, of course, quite arbitrary, and so too are the several dates which have been assigned to its spread to other countries. But even so, it is much more defensible to maintain that the Industrial

Revolution had definite beginnings than that it has had an end. The date of 1870 is not only arbitrary; it is purely imaginary. We have used it simply because by that time a leading country of Europe had been radically changed from an old agricultural and commercial basis to a new basis of industry and because the factors in producing such a change in one country were already operating to bring about a similar change in other countries.

Already the Industrial Revolution, developing in Europe and spreading outward, bade fair to create a mechanical industrial society and civilization throughout the world. But the creation was the work of the Industrial Revolution even more after 1870 than before, and it is yet far from complete.

Before following the later course of the Industrial Revolution, we shall do well to turn aside and consider the political and cultural developments which in Europe parallelled the progress of industrialization from 1830 to 1870.



CHAPTER XVI

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM

THE STATE-SYSTEM AND THE NEW LIBERALISM



T LEAST superficially, the state-system of Europe in 1830 was about what it had been in the eighteenth or seventeenth cen-There were numerous independent tury. states. Certain of them, by reason of their size or strength, were accounted Great Powers-Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

Others ranked as "second-class" powers-Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and (latterly) the Ottoman Empire. Others, though aspiring to a higher position, could appropriately be described as "third-class"—Portugal, Denmark, Sardinia, the Two Sicilies, Bavaria, Saxony, Belgium, Greece, etc. Still others, constituting the largest number, were almost negligible in resources—Baden, Oldenburg, Saxe-Weimar,

Powers" in European

Bremen, some thirty other German states, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, the Papal State, the loose federation of Swiss cantons, Andorra, San Marino, Liechtenstein, etc.

Every one of the European states, whether great or small, rich or poor, was a sovereign state, theoretically equal to every other, exercising supreme authority within its territory and maintaining

the same sort of international relations with the outside world as had obtained among European states since the Thirty Years' War and the time of Grotius.1 As in earlier times, too, common historic traditions of a distinctively European civilization were strong enough to supply the several political entities (except the

Their Theoretic Equality Commu-

Ottoman Empire) with a consciousness of belonging to a Continental community and thus helped to bind them together morally in a real European state-system.

On the state-system of the early seventeenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 274-275.

In 1830 the form of government in European states was as predominantly monarchical as it had been in the seventeenth or eighteenth century. There were still a few so-called republics —the Swiss cantons, four city-states in Germany, and infinitesimal San Marino in Italy-but the Netherlence of lands, once a republic, was now a monarchy, the former Monarchy Italian republics of Venice and Genoa had recently passed to the monarchies of Austria and Sardinia respectively, the newly independent states of Belgium and Greece were acquiring monarchs, and elsewhere—from England to Russia and from Sweden to Spain—government continued to be carried on under the old name and with the traditional etiquette of monarchy. European monarchs of 1830, as of an earlier century, might differ in title—emperor, king, archduke, grand-duke, or plain duke; they might be addressed variously as "Majesty," "Most Christian Majesty," "Imperial Majesty," or "Serene Highness"; they might be "limited," like the king of Great Britain, or "automatical" "I have a superior to the superior of the superior cratic," like the tsar of Russia. But still, as formerly, they were a select little caste, belonging to famed families, such as Habsburg, Bourbon, Hohenzollern, Romanov, and Saxe-Coburg, now much intermarried; 2 greeting one another as "brother" or "cousin"; and solemnly talking at home and abroad about "my people," "my army," "my treasury," "my laws," and "my government." Around these monarchs, moreover, were still grouped the traditional ranks of European society—titled nobility (with nominal gradations peculiar to each state), privileged clergy, a bourgeois class (reckoned as "the citizens," that is, as respectable city dwellers), an artisan class, Distincand peasantry (still by far the largest part of the tions population of every European state except Great Britain and Belgium). In a part of western Europe, the nobility and clergy had recently suffered some loss of wealth and prestige, but this perhaps was only temporary, and elsewhere—in Britain, as well as all over central and eastern Europe—they appeared as indispensable props and decorous adornments of abiding European society and civilization.

Nevertheless, beneath the superficial appearance of the Euro-

¹ Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and Frankfurt.

² For dynastic relationships in the nineteenth century, see the several genealogical tables, pp. 132, 182, 488, 538, 586, 610, 648, 674.

pean state-system in 1830, four novel developments were going on which were to have, sooner or later, profound effects upon it. One was the Industrial Revolution, of which we have spoken in the preceding chapter. A second was the spread and intensification of national-

Novelties in the State-System

ism, accompanied by ever more insistent efforts to base the statesystem on the principle of nationality. A significant phase of this we shall discuss at length in the next chapter. The other two developments were quite apparent in 1830: the one had to do with the actual conduct of government in most European states; the other had to do with the rise, especially in western and southern Europe, of liberal ideas about the functions of state government and international relations. These two developments we shall here briefly sketch.

As to the actual conduct of government, it must be emphasized that the average European state was more governed and better governed in 1830 than it had been under the "old régime" before 1789. The French Revolution, the career of Napoleon Bonaparte, the reforms of Stein in Prussia, of Stadion in Austria, even of the Tsar Alexander in Russia, had served to carry the evolution of governmental administration a considerable distance beyond any achievement of the "enlightened despots" of the eighteenth century. The French government was more substantial under Charles X and Louis Philippe than under Louis XIV; the Prussian government, under Frederick William IV than under Frederick the Great.

State government in 1789, and previously, had been almost wholly a court government. On the Continent, at least, it had usually been in the hands of courtiers or officials who

enjoyed the royal favor and were appointed directly by the monarch. The functions of government had been relatively few and rather poorly executed. Governmental finance had been somewhat chaotic; and state taxes, inequitably levied and badly collected, had barely sufficed to maintain the officials, the court, and

Supplanting of Government by Professional Government

the army. The state government as such had had little surplus to spend on public works, roads, schools, or hospitals.

By 1830 the functions of state government were in the hands

¹ Except, of course, in Great Britain, where the definite departure from court government dated from the "Glorious" Revolution of 1689.

of comparatively competent officials, with an orderly organization into ministries or departments under chiefs who were still customarily appointed by the monarch but who were now entrusted with a large measure of independence in choosing subordinates and determining policies. Even where the monarch was "unlimited" by constitution or charter and in theory still exercised "personal rule," his actual powers were largely delegated to departmental heads. That these heads, and likewise their subordinates, were more competent, as a class, than earlier state officials had been, was due to the fact that they were now chosen less because of court favoritism and intrigue than because of special training and aptitude. Official service was now, in the phrase of the day, "open to talent." It was an orderly career for members of the bourgeoisie and the rural gentry on practically equal terms with the higher nobility. It was treated as of almost equal social status with the military profession. And hence it attracted the best elements of the middle as well as the upper classes.

Besides, there was a new prestige of trained and educated men, with the result that a university generation succeeded a court generation of state officials. An equipment of learning had to be superimposed on the baggage of good manners; and even aristocratic families of the greatest social pretensions prepared their sons for government service by sending them to a university. Indeed, the newer state officials represented a professional rather than a social type. They possessed or acquired a common background, and they naturally evinced a strong corporate spirit. Moreover, they were in fact, if not in name, servants of the state rather than of the monarch (who formally appointed them). By reason of their university training and their application to work, they were apt to share the ideas and aspirations of their generation; and in practice they, rather than the monarch, constituted the state and the government.

With such personnel and organization, "government of officials" was a much more solid structure, physically and morally, than had been the "royal absolutism" of the old regime. In some states it was more fully developed, and hence more solid, than in others—more in Prussia, Austria, and France, for example, than in Russia, and more in the Netherlands and in Sardinia than in Spain or the

Two Sicilies. By and large, however, it may be affirmed that government within the European state-system was more efficient in 1830 than it had ever been before, that it touched a wider field, and that it promised to provide a more substantial bulwark against the storms of revolution. Revolutions-many revolutions—would occur after 1830; this or that monarch, this or that statesman, would be overturned or compelled to change front: particular states would be dismembered or enlarged in the cause of revolutionary nationalism. Yet "government of officials" would abide. It would assure to actual administration within states and to the state-system as a whole a continuity—a conservatism—in the midst of apparent change and revolution. Throughout the nineteenth century it would render both political revolution more superficial and political evolution more basic, and at the same time it would tend ever to expand the scope of state activities.

Contemporaneous with the emergence of more systematic and efficient agencies of government in Europe was the development of liberalism. This was a "radical" intellectual movement which flourished particularly in western (and central) Europe during the decades from 1830 to 1870 and which was ism" and vastly important in the evolution of European society Its Sunporters

and politics. It was espoused by some state officials and eventually became, for a considerable time, the guiding philosophy of a goodly number of governments in the European state-system. Its original appeal, however, was chiefly to persons out of office and critical of existing political states and governmental policies—radically minded intellectuals, university professors and students, middle-class traders, industrialists, and capitalists, professional men, shopkeepers, some army officers, and some urban workingmen.

The new liberalism had two main roots. One was grounded in the radical "enlightened" philosophy of the eighteenth century; the other, in the Industrial Revolution. The peculiarly fertile soil for the one was Continental; for the other, British. Yet before long the two roots were nourishing the same plant and bringing forth its fruit alike in Britain and on the Continent.

The central doctrine of liberalism was the emancipation of the individual from class or corporate or governmental restraint. During the period of the "Enlightenment," this doctrine had

been based on "natural law," "natural rights," "reason," "humanitarianism," and "the perfectibility of man." It had then had such famous exponents as John Locke, Vol-One Root of Libertaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham, and Thomas Jefferson. It had been expressed in the alism in 18th-Cen-American Declaration of Independence (1776) and in tury "Enthe French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789).1 lightenment" Subsequently the doctrine had suffered partial and temporary eclipse in the minds of many intellectuals through the shock of the French Revolution. Nevertheless, the central doctrine was too firmly fixed in the consciousness of many European intellectuals—it opened up too many glorious prospects of social reform and individual advancement—to be wholly repudiated and forgotten. Fairly early in the nineteenth century, in fact, it notably revived, though in a slightly modified form. "Natural rights" dropped into the background, and "historic rights" and "national rights" came to the fore. Earlier reliance on cold reason was more obviously supplemented, if not supplanted, by emotional romanticism. There was less vehemence against organized religion, against the persons of "tyrants" and "aristocrats," against existing institutions as such, and more talk about evolutionary reform, about popular education, about the duties as well as the rights of man, about legal limitations of existing institutions.2

These adaptations of liberal doctrine were formal and minor, and should not blind our eyes to the fact that a large part of nine-teenth-century liberalism was essentially identical with social and political strivings of the eighteenth century. In general, it extolled individualism and individual liberties. Every person should be free to say, write, and publish whatever he would, to assemble peaceably with his fellows, to adhere to any or no religion, to go and come as he might wish, to live his life and do his work as he might desire, with only such restrictions as would be required to assure to others the same freedom.

On the Continent, liberal principles were applied to peoples as well as to individuals, and, particularly with the develop-

On the "liberal" and "individualist" philosophy of the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 511-512, 523, 537-555. On the American and French Declarations, see Vol. I, pp. 482 and 608 respectively.

² On these intellectual currents in the first part of the nineteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 738-742.

ment of romantic nationalism in the first part of the nineteenth century, it became usual in liberal circles to couple the cause of individual freedom with the cause of national freedom. Nationalities, like individuals, should be twined with Rofree to live an independent life and to do anything mantic which did not harm others. They had a right to self-Nationaldetermination. Unless they could exercise this right, they were "oppressed" and "enslaved." If they were free, they were expected to adopt liberal constitutions and to pursue liberal policies in respect of society and religion. Wherefore, liberals tended to sympathize with attempts to free "subject nationalities" from "alien" states, and the leaders of such attempts were naturally wedded to liberalism.

Philosophic liberalism was born and first grew in the European society of the old régime—in a society which was predominantly agricultural. Undoubtedly its most devoted disciples

agricultural. Undoubtedly its most devoted disciples were always of the middle class, but it appealed also to a considerable number of titled noblemen, gentlemenfarmers, and intellectuals (regardless of class). This was true alike of England and of the Continent in the eighteenth century, and it continued to be true of the Continent after England had proceeded far in

Intellectual Liberalism in Predominantly Agricultural Society

transition from agricultural to industrial society. On the Continent it was a France overwhelmingly agricultural which solemnly proclaimed the liberal Declaration of the Rights of Man. It was a Spain and a Prussia, both overwhelmingly agricultural—the latter under the guidance of a liberal nobleman (Baron von Stein)—which were aroused by a liberal constitution or by liberal reforms to wage national war against Napoleon Bonaparte.

After 1815, moreover, it was a romantic and philosophic liberalism, amid a predominantly agricultural society, which inspired the formation of secret revolutionary societies, like the Carbonari and the Hetairia Philike, and the numerous revolutionary outbreaks—at once liberal and patriotic—that on the continent of Europe (to say nothing of South America) caused trouble and worry to Prince Metternich and his fellow statesmen who were doing their best to safeguard traditional society and bring peace and discipline to a troubled world. Liberalism (with nationalism) was in back of the German student demonstration in 1817, the uprisings of the 1820's in Italy, Spain, and Portugal,

the Greek revolt, the revolutions of 1830 in France and Belgium, and the immediately ensuing disturbances in Germany, the Papal State, and Poland.¹ In all these lands except Belgium and possibly France, the romantic and philosophic elements of liberalism (and nationalism) outweighed the economic. There was as yet almost no factory system, no industrial capitalism—and hence no powerful group of middle-class industrialists or numerous group of urban wage-earners—in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Germany, or Poland, any more than in Russia or the Ottoman Empire. Continental liberalism in 1830, as in the eighteenth century was a minority movement in the midst of a predominantly agricultural society.

In the meantime, both the doctrine and the following of liberalism had been reënforced in England. Here, Adam Smith had published his *Wealth of Nations*, with its eloquent advocacy of free trade, and Jeremy Bentham had begun his literary campaign for a utilitarian régime of liberal government and liberal

Second Root of Liberalism in Industrial Revolution laws, just when the Industrial Revolution was getting under way, when factory owners and mine operators were appearing with demands for the removal of handicaps which the laws of an earlier agricultural society imposed on the latest economic developments.² It was but natural that many of the new industrialists

should accept with enthusiasm the liberalism of Bentham and Smith and that the subsequent rapid growth of British manufacturing, commerce, and capital should call forth in Britain a vast deal of speculation on the nature of wealth and on the means of obtaining it. In other words, the process of industrialization was attended in England by an increase, in numbers and influence, of persons who wanted economic liberty and by the rise of an important "school" of political economists—the "classical" school—who preached economic liberty.

To the classical school of political economy, several distinguished students made important contributions—differing in detail, but all eventually fitting into a coherent system of eco-

¹ For details about these liberal movements, see Vol. I, pp. 751-793.

² On Adam Smith, see Vol. I, pp. 547-548. On Jeremy Bentham, see Vol. I, pp. 544-545, 740, 761. On existing legal handicaps to British industrialists, see Vol. I, pp. 453-454, 458-460, 461-462, 490, 492-494.

nomic liberalism. Adam Smith (1723-1790), as we have seen, was the founder of the school; he optimistically extolled the

blessings which would flow from individual initiative and the division of labor and from the abatement of attempts on the part of the state to regulate commerce and industry. Smith wrote at the very beginning of the Industrial Revolution; and as the Revolution went on, from 1800 to 1830, a galaxy of British economists

Economic Liberalism: the English Classical Economists

added much to his liberal gospel. Thomas Malthus (1766–1834), Anglican clergyman and professor at the East India Company's college, tried to explain in his Essay on the Principle of Population why there was continuing poverty as well as growing plenty. David Ricardo (1772–1823), son of a Jewish immigrant from the Netherlands, and wealthy stock broker, set forth in his closely reasoned Principles of Political Economy the "laws" which in an ideally competitive society would determine "rent," "wages," and "profits" for individuals. James Mill (1773–1836), non-conformist preacher and zealous apostle of utilitarianism, combined economic liberalism with political "radicalism." And Nassau Senior (1790–1864), professor at Oxford and "final flower of the classical school," produced neat and dogmatic syntheses of his predecessors' teachings.

As developed by the classical economists and crystallized in the writings of Senior, economic liberalism was a mighty prop to the new industrialists. It maintained that the "greatest good of the greatest number" would be promoted by encouraging individual business enterprise and individual industrial profit, and that such encouragement could best be given through a policy of laissez-faire—freedom of trade, freedom of contract, freedom of competition, free operation of the "laws" of supply and demand, without interference by government or social groups. Free trade would surely be advantageous to industry. It would enable factory owners to buy raw materials more cheaply and to spend less on the wages of workers (whose cost of living would decline), thereby increasing the return—the profit—on capital. Free trade, of course, might reduce the profit of English agriculture, but the classical economists from the time of Ricardo were careful to explain that agricultural interests were at variance with industrial and commercial interests, that profit for the former would reduce the profit for the latter, and that the latter were distinctly more promising for the future and should therefore be preferred.

Freedom of contract (the right of individual employers to hire or discharge individual workers and to pay them only what was required in the open market of supply and demand, without regulation by the state or interference by trade unions) would obviously be advantageous to industrial capitalists. They would be enabled, in the existing over-supply of factory workers, to treat labor as a commodity and to purchase it cheaply, thereby again increasing their own profits. Of course, freedom of contract might be disadvantageous to workingmen, but Ricardo had pointed out in one of his "laws"—the "iron law of wages" that workingmen could expect to get nothing above what was actually necessary for their subsistence, and Malthus had contended that if any workingman fell below the standard of subsistence it must be his own fault. According to this view of Malthus, which later liberal economists shared, population tends naturally to increase faster than the food supply; population may be checked by such irrational and deplorable scourges as war, pestilence, and famine; or it may be checked by a rational and laudable abstention from procreation on the part of individuals unable to support a family. If workingmen would not be thrifty and abstemious, then at least their pressure on the food supply should not be abetted by any government, any law, or any agency of private charity. Workingmen had only themselves to blame for their poverty.

In this, as in other respects, economic liberalism stressed the principle of "enlightened self-interest," or selfishness. It also was quite insistent that its principles were true "scientific laws," which no human legislature, no moral tradition, and no government could afford to overlook or violate. Wherefore, it gave counsel in the domain of politics as well as in that of economics. It aspired to putting the industrial middle class into political power and letting them use it to reshape government and legislation in accordance with their own enlightened self-interest.

Knowledge of the "science" of economic liberalism was spread in England (and elsewhere) not only by the "classical school" of economists but also by a host of sympathetic popularizers—textbook writers, story-tellers, publicists, and tutors. University chairs in the new political economy were founded at Oxford (1825)

and London (1828). Harriet Martineau published in 1832-1834 nine volumes of popular "stories," clothing the abstruse "laws" of economic liberalism in simple and romantic garb.1 A textbook of the 1840's, "for use of elementary schools," explained that "the first principles of political economy are mere truisms which children might well understand, and which they ought to be

Popularizing Economic Liberalism in England

taught; a hundred years ago only savants could fathom them: today they are the commonplaces of the nursery, and the only real difficulty is their too great simplicity."

Economic liberalism, thus developed and popularized in Britain between 1776 and 1840, appealed most strongly to the industrial and commercial classes whom the Industrial Revolution was enlarging and enriching. It confirmed members of these classes in the belief that their financial gains were the result exclusively and inevitably of their own individual efforts—their thrift, their foresight, their industry—and that they might multiply

Appeal of Economic Liberalism to English Industrialists

financial gains for themselves (and for the nation at large) if they could get control of the government and reform legislation in accordance with liberal principles. And so great was the glamor of the new industrial wealth, so irrefutable seemed the logic of the new political economy, that many an aristocrat and many a workingman were prepared to applaud "self-made" men of means and to acquiesce in just such political reform as they demanded.

Factory owners were especially active as political and economic liberals. Occasionally, as in the case of Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850), the son of a prosperous calico-printer, they would attach themselves to the Tory party, rise high in its councils, and drag along its agricultural and conservative members more or less willingly toward the liberal goal. Usually, however, the most influential factory owners brought pressure on Parliament, not so much directly through the oligarchic groups of Tories or Whigs ² as indirectly through organized popular agitation outside

² On the political parties in the British Parliament prior to 1832, see Vol. I,

pp. 454-456, 461-465, 492-493, 714-715, 758-764.

¹ The same estimable lady wrote in her Autobiography concerning "those wretched factory children" that their case "seems desperate; the only hope seems to be that the race will die out in two or three generations, by which time machinery may be found to do their work better than their miserable selves" (1877 ed., Vol. III, p. 87).

Parliament. This was the case, for example, with Richard Cobden (1804-1865), a calico-printer of Manchester, and with John Bright (1811-1889), a fustian manufacturer of Rochdale. These men, together with other cotton manufacturers at Manchester-whence the name of "Manchester School" for the whole group-not only accepted the basic doctrines of the chester School "classical economists" but also financed and conducted vigorous campaigns throughout the country in behalf of certain practical applications of those doctrines, such as reforming the House of Commons, opposing factory legislation, restricting poor relief, repealing the corn laws and navigation acts, establishing complete freedom of trade, reducing the scope and expense of government, and promoting international peace.

From Britain the teaching of the "classical economists" was exported to the Continent. In France, J. B. Say, cotton manu-

Spread of Economic Liberalism from England to Continent

facturer and translator of Adam Smith, corresponded assiduously during the 1820's with his English contemporaries and became in 1831 the first professor of political economy at the Collège de France. In France, too, shortly afterwards, Frédéric Bastiat, merchant and liberal theorist, organized a free-trade association

after the model of the Anti-Corn-Law League of Cobden and Bright. In Germany, a conspicuous doctrinaire of the new school was John Prince-Smith, English by birth but German by choice, who turned in the 1840's from tutoring German girls in the English language to instructing German men in the English political economy. And as the Industrial Revolution penetrated France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy, it produced in these countries, as in Britain, industrial capitalists who naturally became economic liberals and gave new strength to the general liberal movement. To the existent philosophical and romantic liberalism was thus added, on a widening front, a strongly eco-

Fusion of Newer Economic Liberalism with Older Intellectual Liberalism

nomic liberalism. "Practical men," "self-made men," bankers and promoters of big business, joined hands with professors, poets, and popular propagandists.

The "new liberalism" was thus a fusion of the older eighteenth-century intellectual liberalism with the economic liberalism which the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century was prompting. The fusion took place in England as well as on the Continent, and for several decades after 1830 it was remarkably influential in western and southern Europe.

Nowadays the word "liberal" is used vaguely and generally to describe many diverse movements. Immediately after 1830, however, it was employed much more precisely. It then had specific significance. It referred to the definite body of doctrines whose development we have been tracing and whose content we shall now summarize.

Liberalism during the middle part of the nineteenth century had intellectual, economic, political, and international aspects.

Intellectually, it championed freedom of thought, extolled technology, natural science, and "machine civilization," and treated religion as a private affair of the individual conscience. In economics, it stood for individualism, for freedom of occupation and profes-

Specific Content of Mid-Century Liberalism

sion, for freedom of trade, for freedom of contract between the individual employer and the individual worker, and for unrestricted competition in business and trade. As such it was hostile to economic privileges of the agricultural classes, to tariff protectionism, to guilds and trade unions (in so far as these inspired strikes or otherwise interfered with freedom of contract), and to governmental regulation of commerce or industry. politics, liberalism regarded the ideal state as a "passive policeman," not concerning itself actively with the affairs of its individual citizens, but merely preserving order, protecting private property, fostering some public education, and promoting some public works. It likewise regarded as ideal a government which would be "constitutional," representative, and parliamentary, in which the propertied middle class would predominate, and under which individual liberty would be large and taxation In international affairs, liberalism, while romantically sympathetic with efforts of "oppressed" peoples to win national independence for themselves, was generally pacifist. demned war as financially burdensome, as injurious to property and profitable trade, and as destructive of personal life and liberty. In the name of free trade it inveighed against imperialism of the mercantilist variety. In the name of thrift, as well as in that of peace, it sought to reduce expenditure for armaments.

A great stir this liberalism made in the world in the nine-

teenth century, as we shall presently see. We shall begin with it in Britain between 1830 and 1865. Next we shall see it at work in France from 1830 to 1850, and then in central Europe in 1848. At the end of the present chapter we shall indicate certain elements of opposition to liberalism.

2. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BRITAIN, 1830–1865

While the society of Great Britain was being transformed by the Industrial Revolution between 1770 and 1830, while population shifted from country to town, and the industrial middle class grew rapidly in wealth and numbers, the British government underwent no corresponding alteration. The government of Britain in 1830 was still essentially what it had been ever since the "Glorious" Revolution of 1689—an oligarchy of Britain's titled landlords, Anglican ecclesiastics, country gentle-Oligarchical Govmen, and commercial magnates. The oligarchy domernment inated Parliament, House of Commons equally with since **1689** House of Lords; and through its parliamentary majority, which might be Tory or might be Whig, it dictated the choice of royal ministers and the determination of public policies. Ever since 1689, it is perhaps needless to add, policies had been pursued according to the wishes of the agricultural and commercial aristocracy—policies involving "corn laws," "enclosures," "navigation acts," etc.1

For a time, back in the eighteenth century, during and just after the American Revolution, there had been some agitation for "parliamentary reform," and Fox, the Whig leader, and Pitt, the Tory leader, had then vied with each other in talk about broadening the franchise and extending representation to newer factory towns. But the French Revolution soon silenced such talk, and the ensuing protracted war with France aroused so much patriotic ardor in Britain that the Tory party, which was in office during the war and which was most vociferously patriotic, could continue its sway several years afterwards and without bothering about "parliamentary reform."

After 1815, however, the demand for "reform" was renewed and grew gradually louder outside Parliament and the aristocratic

¹On the British government and its policies from 1689 to 1830, see Vol. I, PP. 453-469, 490-494, 709-717, 758-764.

oligarchy. It came from "Radicals," such as the philosopher Bentham, the journalist Cobbett, the economist James Mill, the tailor Francis Place, the cotton manufacturer Richard Cobden, all of whom wished a new political régime for Parliamenand were quick with voice and pen. It came also from Catholics, especially among the Irish masses, Reform who, under the leadership of Daniel O'Connell,2 were agitating for the removal of religious disabilities which kept them out of Parliament. It came likewise from Protestant dissenters-Methodists, Quakers, etc.—who thought the existing Tory government was too partial to Anglicanism; John Bright, an ardent Quaker and severe critic of the state-church as well as an enterprising manufacturer, was a vigorous young advocate of parliamentary reform. But the effective strength of the general demand for reform lay with the waxing wealth and numbers of middle-class factory owners and with their tightening hold on the population of factory towns, like Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, and Leeds, which already were large cities but which as yet had no representation in Parliament. Why should a "rotten borough," in which no one lived, be entitled to two seats in the House of Commons, while a city, in which hundreds of thousands lived, was entitled to none? Tory proprietors of "rotten boroughs" might ignore the question, but industrial capitalists of the cities would not, and in their reiteration of the question they swelled the chorus of the "Radicals."

The Tory party did ignore the question completely. But not so the other group which participated in the parliamentary oligarchy—the Whig party. The Whigs were just as aristocratic as the Tories, but as a group they were a bit more commercial and a bit less agricultural and therefore a Supported by Whigs trifle more sympathetic with the new industrial capitalism. Besides, the Whigs had been out of office a long time; perhaps if they espoused the cause of parliamentary reform, they might get back into office. At any rate, Lord John Russell, a prominent Whig, proposed in 1819 the enfranchisement of the well-to-do industrial middle class, and in the late 1820's Earl Grey!

¹ Francis Place (1771–1854) was an interesting "self-made" man of the time. He had fought his economic way up from the poverty of a journeyman tailor to a comfortable position as a small capitalist, and his intellectual way up from studying Euclid's geometry alone to hobnobbing with the great Bentham.

² A portrait of Daniel ()'Connell faces p. 84, below.

the leader of the Whigs, formally committed his party to the support of moderate reform.

In the late 1820's, moreover, a few of the governing Tories, notably Canning and William Huskisson and Sir Robert Peel, sponsored certain "liberal" measures and policies, such as lower-

Some LiberalLiberalism among
Tories in 1820's cipating Catholics (1829). But the Tory party as a whole was adamant against any general parliamentary reform¹ and its leader, the Duke of Wellington, declared in 1830, with pugnacity worthy of the victor of Waterloo, that the existing political régime was "perfectly satisfactory."

In this year, however, occurred at Paris the so-called July Revolution, substituting for the aristocratic government of Charles X the bourgeois government of Louis Philippe.² There were immediate repercussions in Britain. Outside Parliament,

Reform Bills of 1831 and Tory Opposition the demand for reform grew noisy and menacing; inside Parliament, some of the Tories showed signs of fear. The Duke of Wellington blustered and then resigned as prime minister. Earl Grey formed a Whig ministry and introduced a reform bill in the House of Commons.

Upon the defeat of this bill by the Tory majority early in 1831, the House was dissolved, new elections were held amid much public excitement, and Grey obtained a Whig majority in the new House.

In 1831, therefore, Earl Grey put a second reform bill through the House of Commons, but it was defeated by the Tory majority in the House of Lords. Then, upon the refusal of King William IV 3 to create enough Whig peers to change the majority in the upper house, the Whig prime minister resigned and the Duke of Wellington undertook to form a Tory ministry. He promised to scrap the reform bill and to coerce its supporters.

"Radicals" and factory owners proceeded to organize demon-

^{1 &}quot;Catholic emancipation"—enabling Catholics to be members of Parliament—was accompanied by the actual raising of property qualifications for voting, so that almost 200,000 Irish electors were disfranchised. On the "liberal" tendencies in the Tory party during the late 1820's, see Vol. I, p. 764.

² On the July (1830) Revolution in France, see Vol. I, pp. 785-788.

³ William IV succeeded his brother, George IV, in 1830 and reigned until 1837.

strations in the industrial cities and to stir up the masses against the government. Some of the "reformers" announced their intention of paying no more taxes and of creating what financial troubles they could until a reform bill was passed. Francis Place, for example, urged middle-

ing Tory Opposi-tion

class bank depositors to precipitate a financial panic by withdrawing money from the banks. In the disquieting circumstances the Duke of Wellington regretfully had to abandon his attempt to form a hostile ministry; his Tory associates in the House of Commons were a minority, and some of them were very timid. Consequently, Earl Grey and the Whigs returned to power in May 1832, with a definite though most reluctant pledge from King William IV that, if necessary, he would nominate enough new peers to assure the passage of the reform bill by the House of Lords. The necessity did not actually arise, for the Tory lords vielded, somewhat ungraciously, and the reform bill received the royal assent in June 1832.

By the Reform Act of 1832 three important changes were made in the system of parliamentary elections in Britain. (1) Certain boroughs containing fewer than 2,000 inhabit- Reform ants—the so-called "rotten boroughs"—were entirely Act of deprived of representation in the House of Commons, and boroughs with a population of from 2,000 to 4,000 were deprived of one of their two seats. Of the 143 seats thus taken away from small towns, 65 were allotted to the more populous English counties, 8 to Scotland, 5 to Ireland, and 65 to large industrial cities, including Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, and Leeds. (2) The qualifications for voting were simplified and made uniform in all the counties (where anyone could vote who owned or regularly leased land having a rental value of £10 a year or were tenants of land with a rental value of £50 a year) and in all the boroughs (where anyone could vote who owned or rented a building having a rental value of £10 a year). This did not mean anything like universal suffrage; property qualifications, though slightly reduced, were retained, and the proportion of voters to the total population was only increased from one thirty-second to one twenty-second. (3) Qualified voters still voted publicly, so that there was no correction of the evil of intimidation; but by defining the period of voting (which hitherto had varied in different constituencies, sometimes extending to fifteen days) and reducing it to two days, the Reform Act of 1832 helped to lessen the attendant evils of drunkenness and bribery.

The central fact about the Reform Act of 1832 was that it registered the passing of the political monopoly which the agricultural and commercial aristocracy had exercised in the British Parliament and over British policies since 1689. The British

Admission of Industrialists to Governing Oligarchy

government was still an oligarchy, but the oligarchy now included not only agrarian aristocrats and commercial magnates but the new industrialists—factory owners, industrial capitalists, and the industrial middle class generally. The reformed oligarchy could be expected to serve industrial as well as agricultural interests, and gradually to harmonize public policies with the

precepts of the new liberalism.

Toward the fulfillment of such an expectation, events soon after 1832 gave promise of contributing. In the first parliamentary elections under the Reform Act, the Whigs, with the backing of the newly enfranchised industrialists, won a victory: and then, as the grateful Whigs proceeded to support Transforcertain liberal demands of their new allies, they began mation of Whig to call themselves "Liberals." Thus it befell that in Party into the 1830's the Whig party was transformed into the Liberal Party Liberal party, which now embraced a right wing of tolerant aristocrats (the old Whigs), a central group of ambitious industrialists (the real Liberals), and a small left wing of doctrinaires (the Radicals). The handful of Radicals in the reformed Parliament displayed mildly democratic and anti-ecclesiastical tendencies, and were frequently critical of the aristocratic Whigs, but, inasmuch as they were far more critical of the aristocratic Tories, they were content to remain in alliance with the Liberal party and usually to follow its Whig leadership.

On the other hand, the Tory party underwent an alteration after the Reform Act. The mildly "liberal" element in it which had sponsored minor reforms in the late 1820's was strengthened by the discomfiture of the Duke of Wellington and the widespread reaction against his ill-starred opposition to parliamentary

NOTE. The picture opposite, showing Sir Robert Peel at the right and the Duke of Wellington at the left, is from a painting by Franz Xavier Winterhalter (1806-1873), a famous German artist who painted many European statesmen of the time.





reform. Now that the reform was accomplished, the Tories found a new leader in Sir Robert Peel, himself a factory owner, who accepted the Reform Act as "final" and began to Transforseek among the more "conservative" members of the mation of new electorate a broader basis of support for the Tory Party into Con-Tory party. Not all the Tories were enthusiastic about Peel, and some were belligerently opposed to servative policies which he advocated. Yet as time went on, almost all of them were willing to drop the somewhat discredited name of "Tory" and assume the more alluring label of "Conservative." In this way the Tory party was transformed, during the 1830's, into the Conservative party. Its right wing was still thoroughly agrarian, devoted to the interests of agriculture and of the Anglican Church, and intensely nationalist, but its left wing, becoming permeated with industrial capitalism, was not unwilling to cooperate on occasion with the central industrial group of the Liberal party.

Between Conservatives, mainly landlords, and Liberals, mainly industrialists, a kind of balance of political power was thus effected in Britain. The new industrialists could not Political have their way about everything, and the old land-Balance between lords certainly could not. The balance, of course, was Conservanot always even; on the whole, after 1832, it tipped tive Landlords and most of the time in favor of the Liberals. 1 Yet for Liberal many years there was no thought on the part of the Industrialists majority of Liberals, any more than on the part of the Conservatives, of altering the Reform Act of 1832 in a democratic direction, either by extending the franchise for elections to the House of Commons or by limiting the power of the thoroughly aristocratic House of Lords. On the contrary, Liberals and Conservatives alike argued that the reformed régime of 1832 was the most perfect political system which the world had ever known. Without sacrificing what was traditional, it harbored what was novel. While continuing to let landlords and country gentlemen "represent" all the agricultural and rural population, it enabled the well-to-do middle class to "represent"

¹Liberals headed cabinets 1832-1841, 1846-1852, 1853-1858, 1859-1866.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is from a painting of Queen Victoria, just after she came to the throne in 1837, by an American artist, Thomas Sully (1783–1872). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York

all the industrial and urban population. It was "representative" without being democratic, substantial and evolutionary without being revolutionary or demagogic. Altogether, it was, to the The Victorian Compromise.

And so acceptable was it to the British nation at large that the political compromise of 1832—subsequently referred to as the "Victorian Compromise" 1—lasted without material change and with a good deal of prestige until 1867.

Two minor alterations were made in Britain's political fabric between 1832 and 1867, but they were mere by-products of earlier reform. One was the "municipal corporations act" of 1835 which permitted the same industrial class as had recently obtained the parliamentary franchise to choose and control the local government in industrial cities. The other was Jewish emancipation; by an act of 1858 Jews were admitted to Parliament, as Catholics had been admitted in 1829.

A few Radicals in Parliament and a number of urban workingmen outside Parliament were not satisfied with the Reform of 1832 and the ensuing "compromise." The Radicals, Opposiinclining in a doctrinaire way toward political demoction of Radicals racy, regarded the Reform as only a first step which should be succeeded by other steps along a democratic Workingmen path. Urban workingmen, discovering that the Reform did not perceptibly increase their wages or shorten their hours of labor or even assure employment to them, came to believe that these benefits might somehow be procured if the Reform were radically extended so that the masses as well as the classes would have some direct say in Parliament. By 1838 a group of workingmen, with the support of middle-class Radicals, were demanding that, just as there had been a medieval Magna Charta for the barons, an early modern Bill of Rights for landlords and commercial magnates, and recently a Reform Chartist Move-Bill for industrial capitalists, so in the near future a ment "People's Charter" of six points should become a part of the British Constitution. The six points were specified as:

¹ Queen Victoria succeeded her uncle, William IV, in 1837 and reigned until 1901. The first thirty years of her reign were the period of the "Victorian Compromise" here referred to; they were also the years which in art and manners are sometimes called "Early Victorian."

(1) universal manhood suffrage; (2) annual election of Parliament: (3) equal electoral districts; (4) vote by ballot; (5) removal of property qualifications for members of Parliament; and (6) payment of salaries to members of Parliament.

For a time, the "Chartists," as the advocates of the "People's Charter" were called, conducted a widespread and seemingly determined agitation in the industrial centres of the country, holding mass meetings and drawing up petitions to present to Parliament. In Parliament, however, Liberals and Conservatives united to reject the petitions and to sanction military preparations of the ministry for putting down any revolt, while presently the Chartist leaders fell to quarreling with one another, and their followers split on the question of employing violence. After 1842, the Chartist movement declined in numbers if not in noise. Of the noise enough remained in of Char-1848, when a revolution occurred at Paris and when tist Movement

petition" to Parliament, to arouse the aged but still courageous Duke of Wellington and bring him to the defense of the British government with regular troops and 170,000 special middleclass constables. It was the last exploit of the "Iron Duke," and the end of the "People's Charter." 1 By this time the mass of British workingmen were more concerned with free trade and trade unionism than with political democracy. Almost another twenty years had to elapse before they would seriously reassert even a part of the Charter.

at London the Chartists prepared to present a "monster

The Chartist movement did not amend the Reform of 1832. Nor did it divert Parliament from legislating more and more in accordance with the idealism and economic inter-Legislation of the ests of that middle class whom the Reform had enfran-Reformed chised. The liberal idealism of the reformed Parliament Parliaappeared in two important measures of 1833. One ment was the abolition of negro slavery throughout the British Empire,2

¹ Simultaneously, an insurrection by a group of Irish patriots and democrats the "Young Ireland" society—was undertaken at Tipperary and easily suppressed by British troops (1848). The leaders of the insurrection were put to death or exiled.

² G. K. Chesterton remarks of the very serious Liberals, who freed negro slaves thousands of miles away from England and simultaneously combatted efforts to improve the lot of white factory workers within England, that "they loved the negro for his color, and would have turned away from red or yellow men as needlessly gaudy."

accompanied, of course, with financial compensation from the public treasury to persons who thereby were deprived Abolition of private property. The other was the inauguration of a system of subsidizing private (church) of Negro Slavery, 1833 schools from the public treasury, with a view to spreading "liberal knowledge" and "sober piety." Then, in 1836 Parliament authorized the creation of a new university —the University of London—with special provision Subsidizfor the teaching of political economy. And, throughing Eduout the 1830's and 1840's, there was steady progress cation. 1833 with humanitarian legislation, reforming the penal law, abolishing brutal sports, prescribing a more merciful treatment of debtors, creating a governmental bureau of public health.

More strictly economic motives prompted the enactment of a significant poor law in 1834. This law was an amendment of the statute which since the reign of Queen Elizabeth Poor Law had prescribed the treatment of pauperism in Engof 1834 land,² and it was sponsored by such liberal economists as James Mill and Nassau Senior. It transferred the administrative direction of poor relief from local officials, who might be too charitably disposed and too prodigal with taxpayers' money, to a national commission which would be "scientific" rather than merciful. It imposed on all paupers who could work the necessity of toiling in public workhouses, which were rendered as dreadful as possible and to which the lower classes euphemistically gave the name of "Bastilles." It also provided that, in giving money to persons who were too old or too infirm to work, the officials should be guided by the principle that the condition of such persons must be kept worse than the condition of the lowest class of laborer living without relief. This poor law of 1834 was regarded as a triumph of reforming legislation by the industrial middle class whom the Reform Bill of 1832 had elevated to power. To them it had two distinct advantages: it reduced the numbers of the poor (and hence the cost of caring for them), since the poor could die outright as easily as being kept alive by charity; and it ensured a cheap labor supply, since

¹ The subsidy at first was very modest—£20,000 a year from 1833 to 1839 and £30,000 from 1839 to 1846. After 1846, it was considerably increased, reaching £160,000 in 1852 and £840,000 in 1860.

² On the Elizabethan poor law, see Vol. I, p. 218.

the alternative to accepting an employer's stipulations about wages and hours was to endure the worse regimen of the Bastilles. What went on within the workhouses was merely a detail of the operation of the immutable laws of political economy and hardly a matter of moral consideration or parliamentary concern.

Similar economic motives actuated middle-class agitation for the abolition of restrictions on trade, especially for the repeal of the "corn laws." If import duties were done away with, manufacturers could procure raw materials, such for Free as cotton, more cheaply and sell finished wares more profitably. If the protective tariff on grain were abolished, the free importation of cheap foreign foodstuffs would reduce the cost of living in Britain and enable the manufacturers to pay lower wages and obtain higher profits. As early as 1820 the leading merchants of London had petitioned Parliament to substitute a system of complete free trade for the long-prevailing system of tariff protectionism and mercantilism; and in the decade before the Reform Act of 1832, even the Tory government had haltingly reduced some duties and had experimented with a "sliding scale" of grain tariffs.1 But however willing English landlords might be to lower duties on certain raw materials which they did not produce and on occasion to make concessions to foreign grain, they were adamant against any drastic change in the "corn laws," from which they profited directly. Landlords constituted a majority of the Tory, and later of the Conservative, party; and this party, even after the Reform Bill of 1832 and the admission of middle-class industrialists to the House of Commons, dominated the House of Lords and continued to be largely represented in the lower House. For some time after 1832, moreover, Whig members of the Liberal party in the House of Commons seemed more devoted to their economic interests as landlords than to the philosophical doctrine of free trade.

In 1838, the very year in which the Chartist movement was launched by workingmen, factory owners organized an Anti-Corn-Law League, "to convince the manufacturers that the corn laws were interfering with the growth of trade, to persuade the

¹By a law of 1822, the tariff on wheat remained prohibitive if the crop was plentiful in England and sold for less than 70 shillings a quarter, but in measure as the price of English wheat rose above 70 shillings the tariff on foreign importation would be scaled down.

people that they were raising the price of food, and to teach the agriculturist that they had not even the solitary merit of securing a fixed price for corn." With the executive genius of Richard Cobden, with the passionate oratory Corn-

of John Bright, and with the financial backing of other Law League interested industrialists, the Anti-Corn-Law League conducted vigorous propaganda throughout the country. Mass meetings were held in all the cities; pamphlets were distributed in quantities; petitions were drawn up and poured on Parliament.

Nature assisted the free traders. In 1845 rain badly damaged the wheat crop in England and a blight ruined the potato crop in Ireland. Irish peasants died of famine by the tens of The Irish thousands, and English workingmen had to pay dearly Famine for the bare necessities of life. Popular clamor for the political objects of the "People's Charter" was speedily drowned in popular clamor for the economic demands of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and there were members of Parliament who, deaf to the former, were very attentive to the latter.

Since 1841 the Conservatives had had a majority in the House of Commons, and their leader, Sir Robert Peel, had consequently been prime minister. Peel, it should be remembered, was not a


Sir Robert Peel and the Re-Corn Laws, 1846

. landlord but a manufacturer, and now, with middle classes and workingmen arrayed against landlords, this Conservative prime minister suddenly deserted the Repeal of the latter. In 1846, against the vehement protests and resolute votes of the majority of his own party, but with the applause and votes of the Liberal party, Peel passed through Parliament a bill repealing the

corn laws and establishing free trade in grain. The Anti-Corn-Law League had won its battle, and its leader, Richard Cobden, was rewarded by his grateful fellow-manufacturers with a purse of £80,000. As for Peel, his conduct cost him the leadership of the Conservative party, and with it the premiership of the

¹ The population of Ireland declined from 8,500,000 in 1845 to 6,500,000 in 1851. This means that more than two million Irishmen died or emigrated during the period of the "great famine."

NOTE. The portrait opposite, of Daniel O'Connell, the Irish leader, is from the painting by an Anglo-Irish artist, Sir Martin Archer Shee (1769-1850). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. On O'Connell, see above, p. 75, and below, pp. 492-493.





THE DEAF POSTILION.

government. The Conservatives separated into two hostile groups, the majority agrarian, and the minority—the so-called "Peelites"—industrially minded, while the Liberals returned to power and gave free rein to the advance of industrial liberty.

In 1840 the navigation acts were finally repealed and British commerce set free. In 1851 the first international exposition of the fruits of industrial progress was held under the Repeal of huge expanse of a machine-made "crystal palace" in Naviga-Hyde Park, London, with Queen Victoria and her tion Acts and Trifaithful prince-consort, the mechanically minded umph of Prince Albert, in conspicuous attendance. During the Free Industry 1850's, furthermore, Parliament abolished almost all of the remaining tariff duties, and, by retrenchment in expenditure and by regular imposition of direct income taxes, put Britain's internal fiscal system, as well as her commercial relationship with the outer world, squarely on the basis of economic liberalism. In 1860 Richard Cobden had the satisfaction of representing the Liberal government of Britain in the negotiation of a free-trade treaty with France.

To the serious labor problems which attended the Industrial Revolution, the doctrine of economic liberty was not fully or consistently applied. The industrial capitalists as a Opposiclass agreed, no doubt, with the leading economists of tion to **Economic** the period that there should be no legalization of trade unions or collective bargaining and no state regulation

Liberalism in Labor Domain

of conditions of individual employment. Yet the position of the urban working class was so shockingly degraded during the early phase of the Industrial Revolutionthere was so much misery and suffering, such obvious fruitage of overwork and under-pay 2—that an increasing number of persons whose humanitarianism exceeded their devotion to liberal economics raised their voices in behalf of positive ameliorative measures for factory workers. Among such persons were to be found: (1) a goodly number of titled aristocrats and country gentlemen, who were accustomed to patronize the lower classes

NOTE. The cartoon opposite, depicting Sir Robert Peel as a postilion oblivious to the sad plight of his protectionist passengers, is by George Cruikshank, concerning whom see below, pp. 170-171. The cartoon appeared originally in Punch.

¹ On the navigation acts, see Vol. I, pp. 394, 442, 474-475.

² On the evils of the factory system, see above, pp. 46-51.

and who, suspicious of the swift rise of the industrial middle class and fearful of its hostility to agricultural interests, were doubly minded to espouse the cause of factory workers against factory owners; (2) some Anglican and "radical" clergymen, who reacted against the un-Christian "selfishness" and "individualism" of the prevalent economic liberalism; (3) some labor leaders, who sought to organize the workers into trade unions and coöperative societies and to promote collective bargaining; and (4) an occasional factory owner, who was exceptionally benevolent or who felt that his business would be more profitable if his employes were better off.

The outstanding "humanitarian" factory owner of the period was Robert Owen (1771-1858), usually described as an "utopian socialist." Owen was a "self-made man," manager Robert and proprietor of large cotton mills at New Lanark in Owen's Utopian Scotland. He began his social work among his own employes, with results which he later described: "For 29 years we did without the necessity for magistrates or lawyers; without a single legal punishment; without any known poor rates; without intemperance or religious animosities. We reduced the hours of labor, well educated all the children from infancy, greatly improved the condition of all adults, diminished their daily labor, paid interest on capital, and cleared upwards of £300,000 of profit." Owen did his best, by speech and writing, to persuade other manufacturers that they should follow his example, and he sponsored the establishment of several "utopian" communities in which families would live together and share the profits of their coöperative labor. He was also an early champion of trade unions and coöperative societies.

Among Anglican clergymen, Denison Maurice (1805–1872), journalist and professor, and Charles Kingsley (1819–1875), novelist and chaplain to Queen Victoria, were leaders of a "Christian Socialist" movement, which in the 1840's conducted a campaign against insanitary factories, tenements, and sweat-shops, and in behalf of the health and the moral and educational improvement of the masses. Like Robert Owen, the "Christian Social-

¹ Owenite communities were established at Orbiston in Scotland, at Ralahine in Ireland, at Tytherly in England, and at New Harmony (Indiana) in the United States. All were short-lived.

ists" did not agitate so much for governmental intervention in labor matters as for voluntary coöperation and profit-sharing in industry between employers and employes. It may be remarked, however, that Kingsley's Alton Locke (1849), along with Disraeli's Coningsby (1844) and Sybil (1845), and with contemporaneous writings of Carlyle and Dickens, helped to impress upon the British public certain evils of the new industrial system and to fortify the efforts of some members of Parliament to correct the evils.

The most directly influential persons in labor reform—because they had parliamentary backing-were so-called "reactionaries," Tory in politics and usually strongly Anglican in re-Tory So-cialism of ligion. Such was Michael Sadler (1780-1835), who Sadler wrote books against the liberal economists, characterizing them as pests of society and persecutors of the Shaftespoor, and who ruined his health in unmasking the grim reality of factory conditions and entreating Parliament to regulate them. Such, too, was Lord Ashley (1801-1885), the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury and related on his mother's side to the Duke of Marlborough. Shaftesbury opposed the Reform Act of 1832 and the subsequent repeal of the corn laws, but he acquired first-hand knowledge of working-class misery and devoted his life to its relief. He founded workingmen's institutes and unions, and with tireless persistency he besought Parliament for labor legislation.

From different sources, therefore, came the stimulus for measures and policies which were directed toward improving the condition of the industrial proletariat. Some of these measures, notably a series of parliamentary statutes regulating employment, were contrary to economic liberalism and to the wishes of factory. owners. As early as 1819, before the general admission of representatives of the industrial middle class to the House Beginnings of of Commons, the Tory majority in Parliament had re-Factory sponded to the pleas of Robert Owen by enacting the Legislafirst significant factory act. This act applied only to cotton mills and contained slight provision for its enforcement, but it formally prohibited the employment of children under nine years of age and limited the working day of older children to twelve hours. Then, after the electoral reform of 1832, the Tory minority in the House of Commons obtained sufficient coopera-

tion from humanitarian Whigs, thanks to the ceaseless activity of Michael Sadler, to enact in 1833 a more general and more effective factory act—despite the bitter opposition and gloomy prophecies of liberal economists and capitalists. This act restricted the employment of persons under eighteen years of age; it applied to all textile factories and provided for governmental "inspectors" with power to enforce the act. There followed the energetic propaganda of Lord Shaftesbury inside and outside Parliament, rendered more impelling, no doubt, by the contemporaneous agitation of the "Christian Socialists," of Robert Owen, of the Chartists, and of budding trade unions. During the Tory ministry of Sir Robert Peel (1841-1846), two important statutes were written into the law of Britain. The factory act of 1844 strengthened governmental inspection, fixed a twelvehour working day for women, and prescribed that children should not work more than twelve hours a day on alternate days or "half-time" every day. The mines act of 1842—the first of its kind-excluded all women and girls, and boys under ten years of age, from underground working.

By 1846, at the very time when "freedom of trade" was becoming a national policy, precedents were pretty well established that the state might interfere with "freedom of contract." Thenceforth, just as Conservative landlords were unable to prevent the extension of free trade, so Liberal industrialists were unable to prevent the extension of labor legislation. It must be said, however, that the extension of the latter was slighter and slower than the extension of the former. Yet some progress was made between 1846 and 1865. By an act of 1847, the working day of women and young persons in textile factories was reduced from twelve hours to ten. By an act of 1855, mine owners were obliged to provide appliances for the safety of their workers. And in the early 1860's regulatory legislation was applied in turn to bleaching and dyeing, to lace-making, and to other kinds of factory industry, including baking, pottery manufacture, match-making, and gun-making.

In the meantime, trade unionism had been developing in Britain. In the early days of the Industrial Revolution, factory workers had had no agency through which they could deal collectively with factory owners. The medieval guilds had broken down in Britain long before 1770; and it had been difficult, indeed

impossible, for workers to create any new unions in the face of the common law of England against "combinations in restraint of trade" and in the face of a specific parliamentary Attempted statute of 1800 forbidding workers, under penalty of Prohibition of imprisonment, to combine "with others to advance Labor their wages or decrease the quantity of their work, or Combinain any way to affect or control those who carried on any manufacture or trade in the conduct or management thereof." Gradually, however, workers in particular trades did combine. first in local societies, and then in national unions; and gradually the legalizing of the unions was demanded by such persons as Robert Owen, Michael Sadler, and Francis Place. In 1824, a bill was slipped through Parliament, repealing all restrictions upon the right of combination. When the factory manufacturers, who were not yet largely represented in Parliament, Partial heard of this action, they protested so vehemently Legalization of that Parliament, duly alarmed, reconsidered the mat-Trade ter. The result was embodied in a new act of 1825. Unions, 1824-1825 which represented a compromise between the views of industrialists, on the one hand, and those of Sadler, Place, and workingmen, on the other. Its preamble warned against labor combinations as "injurious to trade and commerce, dangerous to the tranquillity of the country, and especially prejudicial to the interest of all who were concerned in them." But its actual text, while prohibiting "threats or intimidation, molestation or obstruction," finally legalized trade unions for the purpose of peacefully raising wages and shortening hours of labor.

The act of 1825, imperfect though it was from the standpoint of labor, was the legal charter for British trade unionism for the next half-century. Under it, despite the hostility of most manufacturers and of a large part of public opinion, and despite repeated interference of police and law courts, trade unions developed fairly rapidly among the British workingmen, especially among the more skilled, the Union, more thoughtful, and the more thrifty. Immediately after 1825 labor combinations had a mushroom growth, and

¹ Place, good Liberal as he was, had no real sympathy for trade unionism. He thought, however, that the workers were needlessly irritated by its legal prohibition and that, if it was repealed, they would discover sooner that thrift and birth control, not trade unions, were the only means by which they could really improve their lot.

in 1834 Robert Owen undertook to federate all sorts of workers into a "Grand National Consolidated Trades Union," with an avowed policy of inaugurating a general strike for an eighthour day. The "Consolidated" was too flimsy; it fell apart, without inaugurating the strike, and its constituent societies, never very strong, were overshadowed by the rise of Chartism, which for a decade absorbed the energies of working-class leaders.

With the final collapse of Chartism in 1848, however, trade unions came to the fore again, though with somewhat altered policies. They now aimed to leave politics alone and The New to concentrate their efforts in the economic field. By Unionism assessing their members, they would accumulate subof 1850's stantial funds with which they could pay insurance and 1860's benefits and carry on successful strikes. They would thereby make it practically impossible for employers to conduct business satisfactorily without employing trade-union men and paying the "standard wage," and they themselves would fix as "standard wage" what the best employers were willing to concede. These policies were worked out first by the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, which was formed in 1851 and soon counted 11,000 members paying contributions of a shilling a week. So firmly held together was the membership of this trade union by practical benefits of insurance and wages, that its organization and policies were widely imitated by workers in other British trades during the 1850's and 1860's. Though the "new trade unionism" formally eschewed politics, its vigor and solidity had no little indirect influence on the enactment of labor legislation and, as we shall later see, on the extension of the franchise.

Alongside trade unions appeared coöperative societies. As the former were designed to raise the wages of workingmen, so the

Rise of Coöperative Societies latter were intended to lower the cost of living for workingmen by buying foodstuffs and other needful supplies wholesale and retailing them direct, without middlemen's profits, to the members of the societies.

Early cooperative societies proved unstable and short-lived, but Robert Owen and the Christian Socialists persevered in encouraging their formation. And beginning with the foundation of a worker's cooperative society at Rochdale in 1844—the "Rochdale Pioneers"—success finally attended the movement. Co-

¹ See below, p. 273.

operative societies, similar to the one at Rochdale, sprang up all over Britain. Gradually they broadened their functions and linked together their organizations. A central "wholesale society" was started in England in 1863 and another in Scotland in 1868, and a comprehensive union was effected in 1869. By this time, the membership of cooperative societies was numbered by the hundreds of thousands, to the great material benefit of workers, and an increase, not to be reckoned by statistics, in their power of combination and self-help.

The British working classes were still far from any millennium, but they were materially better off in the 1850's and 1860's than in earlier decades of the Industrial Revolution. This some was owing in part, doubtlessly, to an increase of general British "prosperity"—quickening of industry and lessening of unemployment—attendant upon the removal of commercial restrictions and the adoption of free trade. It was also owing in considerable part to labor legislation and to the activity of workers themselves in trade unions and coöperative societies. It was owing in some part to the freedom and encouragement given to working-class people to leave England and seek their fortunes in English-speaking lands overseas.

Throughout the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century there was an extraordinary migration not only from Ireland, but also from England and Scotland, to the United States, Emigrato Canada, and to the newer British territories of tion from Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Such migration was rendered easier by the Industrial Revolution; and, in turn, the Industrial Revolution, through the impetus it furnished to the construction of railways and the large-scale production of raw materials and foodstuffs, was constantly opening up wider and wider areas of America and Australasia for European colonization. And the discovery of gold in California, British Columbia, and Australia, almost simultaneously about 1850, proved peculiarly alluring to immigrants.

With the growth of English-speaking population and English commercial opportunities in the British Empire was associated the development, among English liberals, of a new attitude toward the overseas empire, at least toward the predominantly English-speaking part of the empire. The same liberals who championed free trade and the abolition of negro slavery were

naturally inclined, by their economic beliefs and their humanitarian impulses, to look with favorable eye upon the self-reliance

New Liberal Attitude toward English-Speaking Colonies of colonists and to feel that it should not be hampered by economic or political interference from the mothercountry. Some Englishmen, notably Cobden and Bright, went so far as to assert that Britain had no further use of an empire, that it was an anachronism in an age of free trade, that it was a luxury requiring

undue financial expenditure for its administration and protection and a standing danger to international peace, that consequently it should be dissolved. Most Englishmen did not go as far as this, but, whatever they may have thought about the empire, their support of the repeal of tariffs and navigation acts by the British Parliament actually served to assure to the British Empire quite a different economic basis from what had obtained at the time of the American Revolution in the eighteenth century. Moreover, almost simultaneously with cessation of economic interference with colonies, the mother-country began to surrender her political control over some of them.

The beginning was made in North America. Here, in addition to the maritime colonies of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Bruns-

wick, and Prince Edward Island, there had been, since Canada 1791, the two separate colonies of Lower Canada (cenand the Revolt of tring in Quebec and overwhelmingly French) and 1837 Upper Canada (north of Lake Ontario and largely British), each with an assembly elected by the inhabitants and a governor sent out from Britain and empowered to veto acts of the assembly.1 Alike in Upper Canada and in Lower Canada, conflicts were chronic between governor and assembly, especially over the responsibility of officials; and in Lower Canada the conflicts were the more acute by reason of the fact that the assembly was French while the governor was English. At length in 1837 a rebellion broke out in Lower Canada and spread to Upper Canada. The rebellion was easily crushed, but it succeeded in calling attention to Canadian grievances and inducing the British government to send a High Commissioner to investigate them. Lord Durham, who was selected for this difficult mission. was an extreme Liberal, in politics as well as in economics, and

 $^{^1\,\}mathrm{On}$ the earlier history of British Canada, see Vol. I, pp. 404, 409-410, 412, 469 n., 480, 491.

was anxious not only to "pacify" Canada, which he did with a firm hand, but also to introduce radical reforms in its government.

Upon Lord Durham's recall to Britain in 1839 he published a lengthy report, containing two recommendations of epochal significance in the history of the British Empire. One was that in each of the Canadian colonies self-government should prevail in almost all matters (except the conduct of foreign affairs): the royal governor should be a figure-head, like the king in England; the local laws should be enacted by a colonial parliament and executed by a ministry responsible to the majority in the local parliament. The other recommendation was that Upper and Lower Canada should be united and that eventually the other British colonies in North America should be joined with it.

The British Parliament did not at once accept Lord Durham's recommendations. In 1840, however, it authorized the union of Upper and Lower Canada, and in 1846 it acquiesced

in the appointment of Lord Elgin, the son-in-law of Lord Durham, as governor of Canada and in the policy which he then pursued of giving full effect to the first

Canadian Self-Government

of his father-in-law's recommendations. In 1849, Canadian self-government was formally recognized by the British Parliament.¹

Once the principle of colonial self-government was sanctioned for Canada, it was applied rapidly to other British colonies where English-speaking population predominated. In North America, self-government was accorded to Nova Scotia, New-Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island immediately, to New-foundland in 1855, and to British Columbia in 1859. In Self-Australia,² it was embodied in constitutions for New Government in South Wales, Victoria, and Tasmania in 1853, for Australia South Australia in 1856, and for Queensland in 1859. In New Zealand, which was formally annexed by Great Britain in 1840, responsible parliamentary government was fully established in 1856.³

¹ Earl Grey, the son of the Earl Grey who had sponsored the Reform Act of 1832, was Colonial Secretary in the Liberal ministry from 1846 to 1852 and sponsored this new policy of colonial self-government. He was the first cabinet minister to proclaim that colonies were to be governed for their own benefit and not for the mother-country's.

² On the carlier history of Australia (and New Zealand), see Vol. I, pp. 419-421. ³ In South Africa, the grant of self-government was delayed by chronic conflicts

Meanwhile, agitation had been growing in Canada for some sort of a colonial union, as Lord Durham had recommended.

The Dominion of Canada, 1867

The outcome was a series of resolutions adopted by a convention at Quebec in 1864, which served as the basis of the British North America Act passed by the British Parliament in 1867. It provided for a close federation of Ouebec (Lower Canada), Ontario (Upper Canada), New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia into a union to be known as the Dominion of Canada, with a governor-general (appointed by the British government and exercising only nominal power), a federal parliament (Senate and House of Commons), and a ministry responsible to the parliament, and with certain local powers granted to the sev-

In India, also, the era of British liberalism witnessed important changes. In 1833 the liberal majority in the British Parliament

eral "provinces" within the Dominion.1

Expansion of Individual Enterprise and Political Sway in India

renewed the charter for the English East India Company for twenty years, but only on condition that the Company should abandon its commercial monopoly and permit Europeans to settle freely in India.² More and more it became apparent that the old régime of chartered trading companies was giving way to a new régime of individual enterprise, and that, in a huge

and diversely populated country like India, British manufacturers could sell more goods if they were free to compete with one another and if at the same time they all enjoyed the protection and prestige of the expanding political dominion of their own nation. At any rate the English East India Company, though shorn of special trading privileges, continued to extend its military and political sway. It waged war with Afghanistan in 1841-1842, annexed Sind in 1842, and during the governorship

between British immigrants and the earlier Dutch settlers-called Boers. The Boers bitterly resented the abolition of negro slavery by the British Parliament in 1833, and a large number of them, making a "great trek" in 1836–1840 out of Cape Colony and northward over the Vaal River, eventually established the two Dutch republics of Transvaal and Orange River Free State, whose independence was recognized by Great Britain in 1852 and 1854 respectively. To British Cape Colony, self-government was granted in 1872.

¹ To the four original "provinces" within the Dominion of Canada were soon added Manitoba (1870), British Columbia (1871), and Prince Edward Island (1873). Newfoundland stubbornly remained outside the Dominion.

² On the English East India Company and the rise of British rule in India, see Vol. I, pp. 389, 398-399, 405, 410-412, 413-418.

of Lord Dalhousie (1848–1856) acquired territories in Burma and the Punjab.

Popular unrest also developed in India. Natives, both Moslem and Hindu, were disquieted by the British annexations of territory, by the protests of deposed Indian princes, and by the importation of steam-engines, telegraph wires, and railway locomotives from Britain, as well as of humanitarian liberal ideas which threatened to subvert the social and religious customs of India and its distinctive traditional civilization.¹ In the year 1857 native unrest was fanned into fierce flame Indian (Sepoy) by the circulation of a story, subsequently admitted Mutiny of to be true, that British army officers were forcing their native troops, the so-called sepoys, to use cartridges greased with the fat of cows and pigs. This was revolting to the religious masses of India, for the cow was sacred to Hindus, and Moslems might not touch pork.

In May 1857 a native cavalry regiment at Merrut, rather than use the sacrilegious cartridges, mutinously left their barracks and galloped off to the ancient imperial city of Delhi to offer the Grand Mogul—the surviving symbol of the once great Indian Empire of the Moguls—their services in driving out the British. Quickly the mutiny became general throughout the Ganges provinces and central India. At Campore hundreds of European residents and British soldiers were massacred. At Lucknow the British garrison was closely besieged by a host of mutineers, and at Delhi the Grand Mogul came out of seclusion and asserted his rights. As soon as the British government appreciated the gravity of the situation, it rushed reënforcements to India, and these, with the aid of loyal Sikh and Gurkha regiments and with superior armaments, proceeded to recapture Delhi, Lucknow, and Cawnpore, and to stamp out the rebellion. By 1859 the mutiny was over, and terrible punishment was being meted out to the mutineers. Many sepoys were shot from the mouths of cannon. The feeble old Mogul was exiled to Rangoon, and his sons were put to death. "No mutineer," said one of the leading British officials at the time, "ever surrenders; for directly he is caught he is shot or hanged."

¹ Lord William Bentinck, who was governor from 1828 to 1835, attempted, for example, to abolish the practice of "suttee," a Hindu practice of widows' cremating themselves on the funeral pyres of their husbands.

The Indian Mutiny sealed the doom of the English East India Company. An act of the British Parliament in 1858—the Better

"Better Government of India Act," 1858: a Viceroy in Place of English East India Company Government of India Act—deprived the Company of its political powers and provided that thenceforth supreme control of Indian affairs should be vested in a cabinet minister (the secretary of state for India), assisted by a small council sitting in London, while the actual British administration in India should be directed by a viceroy, appointed by the British government and ruling at Calcutta with the assistance of an executive council. This did not mean that any real

self-government was accorded to India, but some of the sponsors of the Act of 1858 prophesied that it would lead to self-government. In any event, the English East India Company had finally disappeared from the scene.¹

But despite some anti-imperialist talk on the part of advanced English liberals like Cobden and Bright, and despite an almost revolutionary change of governmental policy in respect of colonies, there was no actual disruption or diminution of the British Empire. The Empire was quite as far flung in 1865 as it had been in 1815. Indeed, its vast

Indian possessions were more numerous and more firmly comented in 1865 than ever before. And it is not without significance that the one European war which Britain waged between 1815 and 1865—the Crimean War of 1854—1856 3—was waged to prevent Russia from expanding southward at the immediate expense of the Ottoman Empire and at the possible later expense of the British Empire in India.

Altogether, the years of the "Victorian Compromise" in Britain were eventful and, to persons who profited from them, quite satisfying. The Industrial Revolution steadily advanced. National wealth multiplied. Commerce was freed. The lot of industrial workers was gradually improved, without lessening

¹ The rule of the Company was ended, but the Company continued to exist for the purpose of distributing among its stockholders the ro½ per cent yearly dividend which, on its capital stock of £6,000,000, it received from the government.

² Daniel O'Connell, who had successfully agitated for Catholic emancipation in the 1820's, was imprisoned in the 1840's for agitating for "home rule" for Ireland, and an insurrection of radical "Young Ireland" was put down by force in 1848. See above, p. 81, note, and below, p. 493.

On the Crimean War, see below, pp. 196-198.

the profits of industrial capitalists. And, thanks to the mounting demand for agricultural products and to the increasing use of agricultural machinery, the profits of landlords were British not perceptibly diminished by the repeal of the corn "Prosperlaws. No wonder that landlords and industrial capiity" under Victorian talists united to maintain the political "compromise" Comprowhich had been effected in 1832. Small wonder that in due time they agreed to a colonial "compromise," whereby the British Empire would be preserved and even extended, while some of its most "progressive" parts would be granted novel rights of self-government.

Manufacturers and landlords, joint guardians of the "Victorian Compromise," were alike a sober and an optimistic oligarchy. They dressed themselves in frock coats, long trousers, and high hats, all preferably black, and accentuated their gravity by wearing "mutton-chop" whiskers. They walked with precision and took seri-

Manners and Romanticism of Governing

ously their heavy responsibility of setting the masses Classes a good example in manners and morals, including the economic morality of making as much money and spending as little as they could. They talked earnestly about statistics and were as eager for "retrenchment" as for "reform." Perhaps because they were so sober and so prosaic in outward demeanor, they were certainly poetical in mind and impulsive of heart. They took to romanticism, as ducks to water. They read Tennyson with abandon. They looked with favor on medieval architecture. They felt a noble sympathy for the very word "liberty." Any nation aspiring to liberty, any negro longing for liberty—particularly if the nation or the negro was somewhat remote from British shores—was bound to evoke the compassion of knightserrant among British landlords and industrialists. And a close second to "liberty," as their favorite word, was "progress." To them there was obvious "progress" in machinery, in individual fortunes, in national well-being, and equally obvious "progress" in science and art and morality and political wisdom.

The outstanding English statesman of the "Victorian Compromise" was Viscount Palmerston (1784-1865), and he was notably "compromising." A proprietor of Irish lands, he was English by birth and feeling and conventionally Anglican in religion. A member of the Irish peerage, he managed to be a member of

the British House of Commons for almost sixty years (from 1806 to 1865). A loyal Tory at the outset, and secretary of war chough without a seat in the cabinet) under a Tory prime minister from 1809 to 1828, he drifted in the statesmen unwake of Canning into an espousal of a "liberal" foreign policy and into an alliance with the Whigs. Appointed foreign minister by Earl Grey, and serving in der the Victorian Comprothat rôle from 1830 to 1841 and again from 1846 to mise 1851, he proved himself a liberal by his support of revolutionaries in Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and at the same time alarmed many of his fellow liberals in Britain Lord by his warlike words and his seeming willingness to dis-Palmerston turb the peace of Europe—and the profits of peaceful trade—in order to back up his threats. It was the business of modern Britain, as of ancient Rome, he proudly proclaimed, to protect with its strong arm the lives and property of its citizens everywhere.

Lord Palmerston, if something of a scandal to staid and very advanced Liberals, was rather refreshing to many Liberals and to the public at large. These enjoyed his impulsive conduct of foreign affairs, especially as it did not actually bring war, and they delighted in his dandified appearance, his unruffled buoyancy, and his irrepressible gaiety. He was immensely popular, and prime minister of the Liberal government from 1855 to 1858 and again from 1859 to his death in 1865. Liberal as he was in name, and popular as he was in fact, Palmerston remained throughout his long life a statesman of the old aristocratic type, "liberal" in sentiments, convinced of the "march of progress," but devoted to the "Victorian Compromise" and entirely opposed to the principle or practice of democracy.

Another Liberal statesman came into prominence during the last two decades of the "Victorian Compromise"—William Ewart Gladstone (1809–1898). Gladstone was of the commercial, rather than the landed, aristocracy. His father was a wealthy merchant of Liverpool and his mother belonged to a family of slave-owning planters in the British West Indies. While a student at Oxford, young Gladstone debated so eloquently against the pending Reform Bill that the Tory Duke of Newcastle had him elected to Parliament from the "pocket borough" of Newark, and his maiden speech in the House of

Commons was directed against the abolition of negro slavery. For a time Gladstone was regarded as the rising star of the Conservative party, but by following his family interests and supporting Sir Robert Peel in the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) he alienated himself from the main body of his party. Joining the "Peelites," as the free-trade faction of the Conservative party was called, he became more and more critical of "Tory reaction" and more and more favorable to "liberal" ideas, especially after a sojourn in 1850 in the reactionary Italian kingdom of the Two Sicilies. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer as a "Peelite" from 1852 to 1855, and as a full-fledged Liberal in the Palmerston ministry from 1858 to 1865. An important work Gladstone did during the 1850's and 1860's in transforming the taxation system of Britain from a protectionist to a free-trade basis, and the facility and eloquence with which he presented long columns of figures in the House of Commons, together with his obvious anxiety to effect "retrenchment" in governmental expenditure, endeared him to the economically minded. But Gladstone had qualities which endeared him to wider circles. He was a flaming sort of person in speech and sympathy, a gifted orator and a robust humanitarian. He was deeply attached to the Anglican Church and to the social aspects of the "Victorian Compromise," but he was no standpatter. His liberalism was ever growing, and he occasionally hurried a bit to keep pace with "progress." He was an excellent politician.

Over against Palmerston and Gladstone, two Tories who became leaders of the Liberal party in Britain, must be set an astonishing "radical" who became a Tory and the rejuvenator of the Conservative party—Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881). Disraeli was not altogether proper to the "Victorian Compromise." His grandfather was a Jewish immigrant from Venice, who made a handsome fortune in London, but this fortune Benjamin's father employed, not to promote any particular industrial enterprise, but to satisfy a taste for literature and a longing for "respectability." The Disraeli family joined the Anglican Church and purchased a country estate when Benjamin was a boy. Yet the boy, as he grew to manhood, displayed qualities which shocked respectable folks. He wrote clever but daring novels. He appeared at dinner parties

in green velvet trousers and canary-colored waistcoat, with curled hair and numerous rings, with lace and perfumery. He spoke with wit and in paradoxes, and when, in 1831, he turned his attention to politics, he assailed the rising liberalism and appealed for support to the Radicals. Only after repeated failures, only after a break with the Radicals, did he get into the House of Commons in 1837, and there, as a Tory, he was long suppressed and eclipsed by Sir Robert Peel. His main achievement in the early 1840's was not in Parliament but in the writing of two novels—Coningsby and Sybil—which exposed social ills of the day and preached the gospel that Tory aristocrats should take the lead in social reform and thereby bind the masses more securely to the traditional institutions of Britain—the crown, the nobility, the Anglican Church.

Sir Robert Peel's "betrayal" of agricultural interests by his repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 gave Disraeli his political opportunity. He forced Peel out of office and out of the Conservative party. While the party was thereby weakened, and its titular leadership passed to the phlegmatic Earl of Derby, Disraeli assumed its real leadership in the House of Commons. Then, with such dexterity and astuteness did he use his talents in Parliament and in the country that gradually he revivified the Conservative party and rendered it a fairly formidable opposition to the dominant Liberals. For a brief time in 1852 and again in 1858 Disraeli served as Chancellor of the Exchequer in fleeting Conservative ministries headed by Lord Derby, but his budget speeches were not as convincing as Gladstone's; they contained fewer figures and more paradoxes. Disraeli's forte was not finance; it was personality and an appeal to things which the "Victorian Compromise" neglected but which the British nation never wholly forgot.

The death of Palmerston in 1865 conveniently marks the passing of the "Victorian Compromise." He, in a sense, was its personification. The most fruitful achievements of both Disraeli and Gladstone were to come after 1865—and they would serve to inaugurate a new era in British history.

¹The 14th Earl of Derby (1799–1869) had been liberally inclined in the 1820's and had supported the Reform Act of 1832, but, great landlord as he was, he broke utterly with Sir Robert Peel in 1846, and from his own position in the House of Lords he thereafter inveighed equally against "Peelites" and Liberals.

3. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE, 1830-1850

In France, the revolutionary disturbance of July 1830 shifted the exercise of political power and the direction of economic policy from aristocracy to middle class, from conserv-Bourgeois atism to liberalism. Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, (or July) Monarchy a kind of "bourgeois king," succeeded his old-régime of Louis cousin, Charles X, and made a few gestures to win Philippe, 1830-1848 the support of the groups who still cherished the democratic principles of the French Revolution of 1789 or who recalled with pride the national exploits of the Napoleonic era. The traditional title of "King of France and Navarre" Its Demowas abandoned in favor of the newer and more popular cratic title of "King of the French," and the qualifying Gestures phrase "by the grace of God" was supplemented with the words Gestures "and by the will of the nation." The revolutionary tricolor was restored as the national flag, and the stirring strains of the Marseillaise were heard again as the national anthem. aristocrats were largely retired from public office, and their places were taken by commoners. Ecclesiastics were treated as private and quite unprivileged individuals. In the name of popular sovereignty, the government was proclaimed "parliamentary" and "representative." 1

Despite these gestures, the régime of Louis Philippe was not "radical" and certainly not democratic. It was brought into existence not by a popular upheaval all over France Its Essenbut by a riot in Paris, not by the mass of peasants and tially Middleartisans but by an urban middle class aided by some Class and urban workingmen. Most of the middle-class persons Liberal Character who acclaimed it were liberals of the Continental, rather than of the British, type; that is, they were professional men, intellectuals, shopkeepers, proprietors of small businesses not yet much affected by the Industrial Revolution. other hand, the persons who most truly created the régime of Louis Philippe-those who managed the rioting and brought the Duke of Orleans forward at the right moment-were industrial capitalists and economic liberals (in the British sense),

¹ On the July (1830) Revolution in France, see Vol. I, pp. 785-788. On the relationship of Louis Philippe to Charles X, see the genealogical chart, below, p. 539-

men like the banker Laffitte and the manufacturer Casimir-Périer. Without the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in France, such a régime as Louis Philippe's would hardly have been conceivable.

From the circumstances of its origin, it was natural that the government of Louis Philippe should be bourgeois, and its policies liberal. The form of government was consciously modelled after Britain's: a king who would reign but not rule; a parliament, theoretically "representing" the nation, but actually chosen by a small minority of the people; and a ministry, responsible to the parliament. In practice, the French government from 1830 was strikingly similar to the government which Britain secured by the Reform Act of 1832. The franchise was so restricted by property qualifications that no workingmen and few peasants could vote. Members of parliament were elected by 250,000 individual owners of large property (industrial or agricultural), and this meant in France, where the old landed nobility had already lost much of its wealth and prestige, that the governing oligarchy was even more bourgeois than in Britain. It meant also that in France the royal ministers, the directors of public policy, being responsible to the parliament, would be bourgeois and "liberal," industrial or intellectual.

The chief minister of Louis Philippe at the outset was the banker Laffitte, and he was succeeded by Casimir-Périer (1777-1832), who, in association with a brother, operated Casimirmines, textile factories, a sugar refinery, a distillery, Périer and and a foundry. Casimir-Périer defined the policy of Louis Philippe's régime as that of the "just mean." The era of revolution, he said, was over. Henceforth, evolution would proceed very gradually and always legally along the lines of the compromise which at last had been finely arrived at. Conserving the constitution which vested political power in persons of wealth and brains, the government would pursue liberal policies in economic matters. It would broaden individual liberty, so that eventually there would be the utmost freedom for everyone to follow "enlightened self-interest" and thereby assure "the greatest good to the greatest number." In foreign affairs the government, of course, would be pacifist and favorable

¹ The brother, Antoine Périer, also introduced gas lighting into France and was a regent of the Bank of France.

to free development of international commerce and comity. As an earnest of his sincerity, Casimir-Périer appointed J. B. Say, the manufacturer and liberal economist, to a professorship of political economy in the Collège de France. Neither Say nor his patron lived long enough to prove what they could really do in their responsible positions. Both died prematurely in 1832. But the principles enunciated by Casimir-Périer were dutifully taught by Say's successor at the Collège de France, Pellegrino Rossi, from 1833 to 1845; and, what was much more important, they remained the guiding star of French government during the whole reign of Louis Philippe from 1830 to 1848.

The chief ministers of the "bourgeois monarchy" after 1832 were François Guizot (1787-1874) and Adolphe Thiers (1707-1877). Both were middle-class persons, ambitious, aggressive, and markedly "self-made"; both wrote Agents of the Bourvoluminous histories, and both were "liberal." Guizot geois was a devout Calvinist (Huguenot), a bit cold in Monarchy reasoning and speech, but ardently romantic in writing and in feeling about the virtues of individual thrift and international peace. Severely critical of popular movements, such as the one in his own country in 1793 which had been irreligious, bellicose, and socialistic, and which had put his father to death, he was an unqualified admirer of the political, economic, and religious institutions of middle-class "liberal" England. Thiers was something of a free thinker and more of an opportunist. He acquired wealth by marriage and was trained in politics by Talleyrand. Distrustful of the masses from whom he had risen, temperamentally hostile to arbitrary government, and rationally attached to the "liberal" philosophy of the eighteenth century, he yet had a romantic predilection for "great men" in history, especially for Napoleon Bonaparte, while in his patriotism, which sometimes partook of chauvinism, he was a kind of bourgeois Palmerston. Both Thiers and Guizot, it will be noted, were intellectuals rather than industrialists, but with their intellectual liberalism it was

¹ Rossi (1787–1848), an Italian by birth and for some time professor of law at the University of Bologna, became famous as a liberal economist through a book which he published in French in 1819. He was naturalized as a French citizen shortly after his appointment to the chair of political economy at the Collège de France, and in 1845 was appointed French ambassador to the Vatican. On what befell him at Rome, see below, pp. 121, 130.

natural and easy for both to serve Louis Philippe and likewise the cause of economic liberalism. Thiers was the leading minister from 1832 to 1836 and prime minister in 1840. Guizot was minister of public instruction from 1832 to 1839 and chief minister from 1840 to 1848.

The régime of Louis Philippe was bourgeois in action as well as in purpose and personnel. Much was done to encourage in-

Fostering of Industrialization and Economic Liberalism dustry. The government applauded the importation of machinery from England and the erection of factories and foundries in France.¹ It commissioned an English company to construct a railway from Paris to Rouen, and then to Le Havre, and presently it planned a whole network of railways which should om Paris. It guarantied the cost of these public works

radiate from Paris. It guarantied the cost of these public works but handed them over, as soon as they were built, to private companies for profitable operation. It rigorously refrained from any undertaking which could be called "socialistic" and constantly appealed to individual thrift and private initiative. The King set a good bourgeois example by simple living and by investing the income of his numerous family in stocks and bonds, preferably British.

Laissez-faire was the governmental policy in respect of manufacturing and wealth-making. There was no interference by the state, and no serious interference by trade unions. Guilds and other combinations of workingmen had been banned back in 1791, and the ban on them (and on collective bargaining) was retained and enforced in the name of "freedom of contract." Inasmuch as the Industrial Revolution was relatively backward in France, the number of industrial proletarians was proportionately less in France than in Britain, but their economic position was no better. Nevertheless, with one minor exception, the bourgeois monarchy enacted no labor legislation. The one exception was a factory act (1841), which prohibited the employment of children under eight years of age, limited the working day of children under sixteen years of age to twelve hours, and

¹ For some statistics on the growth of French industry during the period of the bourgeois monarchy (1830–1848), see above, pp. 55–56.

Note. The picture opposite is of Guizot by an unfriendly critic and famous caricaturist, Honoré Daumier (1808–1879). On Daumier, see below, pp. 169–170.





prescribed a minimum of schooling for children under twelve. This act, however, contained no provision for adequate enforcement; it was merely a pious gesture.

The government, being liberal, was interested in education, and, under the guidance of Guizot, an important school act was passed in 1833. While leaving the church free to conduct elementary schools, it strengthened state control of secondary and higher schools, and required all educational institutions to teach "internal and social peace." The number of schools was increased, but at-

Education Religion under Louis Philippe

tendance upon them was not made compulsory. In religious matters, the government, being liberal, tried to be neutral. The concordat, which Napoleon Bonaparte had concluded with Pope Pius VII in 1801,1 was retained; and, under it, the state continued to nominate the bishops and pay the salaries of the Catholic clergy. But the bourgeois monarchy would treat all religions alike; in 1831 it formally put Judaism on an equal footing with Christianity and proceeded to pay the salaries of Jewish rabbis just as it was supporting Catholic priests and Protestant pastors.

In commercial policy, the bourgeois monarchy was not so liberal. Political economists like Say and Rossi extolled the theory of free trade, and government officials paid Unsuclip service to it. Moreover, some of the merchants cessful of Paris and of Bordeaux and other seaports were for Free really interested in free trade, and with them concurred numerous wine-growers and some silk-manufacturers who perceived that foreign countries would be more likely to reduce tariffs on French wines and silks if France lowered duties on the manufactures of those countries. Generally speaking, nevertheless, industry in France was "infant industry"; and seemingly unable to compete on equal terms with the lusty machine industry of Britain (or Belgium), many French industrialists and French bankers (who were now supplying most of the capital for French industry) arrayed themselves against any change in the existing protectionist system. These prosperous bourgeois had their way with the government of Louis Philippe. Hence,

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 653-654, 743, 765.

during the period there was no French legislation comparable with Britain's corn-law repeal, though a merchant and economist, Frédéric Bastiat, organized a Free-Trade Association in France in 1846 in imitation of the Anti-Corn-Law League of Cobden and Bright in Britain, and conducted a similar campaign.

In foreign (and colonial) matters, the July monarchy wavered between a liberal desire to preserve and promote peace and a more

Foreign Policy: Pacifism vs. National Honor

traditional anxiety to uphold national prestige and "national honor." Louis Philippe was on most friendly personal terms with Queen Victoria, though not with Palmerston; and Guizot, like most French economists and industrialists, was very pro-English. In the main, therefore. French foreign policy was directed in harmony with Britain's. In concert with Britain, France helped to establish

the independent liberal kingdom of Belgium, to find a liberal monarch for the new national state of Greece, and to maintain the status quo in the Near East against the aggression of the Russian Tsar on the one side and the ambition of the Sultan's viceroy of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, on the other.1

But Thiers, with his intense patriotism and his admiration for Napoleon, and with the special thought of diverting the masses of his countrymen from criticism of the domestic policies of the bourgeois monarchy to enthusiasm for its foreign policy, did what he could, when he was in office, to be vigorous and assertive and ostentatiously independent of England. Thus, in 1836, he would have defied Britain by sending a French army into Spain to suppress an insurrection against Queen Isabella II, had he not been peremptorily dismissed from office by Louis Philippe. Again in 1840, when he was back in office, he threatened to intervene on the side of Mehemet Ali in the armed con-

¹ Mehemet Ali, an Albanian adventurer, had utilized the troubled conditions consequent upon Napoleon's intervention in Egypt to make himself master of this province of the Ottoman Empire and to build up a strong Egyptian army. Formally appointed "pasha" of Egypt by the Ottoman Sultan in 1805, Mchemet Ali had later given military and naval aid to his suzerain against the Greeks on condition that Syria should be annexed to the "pashalik" of Egypt. The Greeks were not overcome, and the Sultan did not keep his promise to Mehemet Ali. Hence, in 1831 the latter sent out an army which overran Syria and Asia Minor and was turned back from Constantinople only through the intervention of the Tsar Nicholas I of Russia. After protracted negotiations, in which France cooperated with England, an arrangement was made in 1833 whereby Mehemet Ali secured the governorship of Syria and Adana, in addition to Egypt; the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan was reaffirmed; and Russia withdrew.

flict which had newly broken out between that redoubtable Egyptian pasha and the Ottoman Sultan. The British government, together with Russia and Austria, was supporting

the Sultan, and for a time it seemed possible that Thiers would plunge France into war with the greater part of Europe. This time Louis Philippe threw his

French Policy in Near East

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bellicose minister out of office with a finality that outlasted the remaining years of the bourgeois monarchy. The King and Guizot kept the peace by acquiescing in a naval demonstration by Britain and Austria against the Egyptian pasha and by agreeing to a settlement under which Mehemet Ali surrendered Adana and Syria but became "hereditary governor" of Egypt and practically independent of the Ottoman Empire.

Louis Philippe, if "liberal" and even "unpatriotic" in his desire to maintain peace in Europe, was sensitive to the dynastic and colonial traditions of the French monarchy. In respect of colonial policy, he fell heir to an important question which had been posed just before the July Revolution of 1830.

His predecessor, Charles X, had despatched an expeditionary force across the Mediterranean against Algiers, whose ruler (or "dey") had neglected to settle a questionable financial claim of two French citizens and had

French Policy in Algeria

added insult to injury by striking the French consul on the face with a fly-slapper. The French force had only occupied Algiers and exiled the dey, when at Paris the reactionary Charles X was succeeded by the liberal Louis Philippe. What should the French government do with the territory of the deposed dey-not merely the city of Algiers but the extensive surrounding country of Algeria?

For several years Louis Philippe's government wavered among ideas of conquering the whole country, occupying a part of it, and evacuating it altogether. Advanced liberals in the French parliament and on the French press urged complete withdrawal, and from 1834 to 1839 the government seemed committed to a policy of confining French occupation to Algiers and certain other coast towns. Gradually, however, French the King authorized the penetration of the interior Conquest by French army officers; and when in 1839 a brave of Algeria,

and resourceful native, Abd-el-Kader, proclaimed a "holy war" and aroused his fellow tribesmen against the French, Louis Philippe sent General Bugeaud with an army of 100,000 men to repress Abd-el-Kader and conquer Algeria. The ensuing struggle was protracted and destructive. Not until 1847 was the Moslem leader caught and Algeria pacified. But then it was finally a French possession, and some 40,000 French colonists were already settled in it. The acquisition of Algeria was the first step in rebuilding a French colonial empire.

In respect of dynastic ambitions, Louis Philippe was a worthy

In respect of dynastic ambitions, Louis Philippe was a worthy successor of the Bourbons of the old régime. He married one of his daughters to the new King Leopold I of Belgium and another to the king of Württemberg, hoping thereby to strengthen Orleanist-Bourbon influence in Belgium and southern Germany. He also planned to reëstablish dynastic ties between the sovereigns of France and Spain, and in 1846, in the face of British opposition, he married one of his sons to the sister (and at that time the heiress) of Oueen Isabella II of Spain.

By 1846, however, the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe was very unpopular in France. It satisfied Guizot and some wealthy industrialists of the middle class, but there were not so many of these in France as in Britain, and not so many persons who, while accepting the existing régime, would seek peacefully to perfect it. The forces of opposition to bourgeois liberalism as exemplified in France by Louis Philippe were numerous and determined. At least six large groups were highly critical, if not openly hostile.

(1) Legitimists comprised many persons of the old nobility, a considerable part of the Catholic clergy, some peasants (especially in Brittany), and certain intellectuals. They were still attached to the social and political institutions of the old régime as it had been before the great revolution of 1789, and they regarded Louis Philippe as a usurper and his government as "revolutionary" and quite too bourgeois. They regretted the deposition of Charles X, and after his death in exile in 1836 they looked upon his grandson, the Count of Chambord, as the legitimate king of France.

(2) Republicans were to be found among radical commoners, peasants, and artisans who cherished recollections of the democratic republic of 1792. They criticized the form of Louis

Philippe's government for being monarchical and undemocratic and its policies for being in the interest of the moneyed class rather than truly popular and national. They lacked organization and leaders, but the growth of the licans urban proletariat consequent upon the development of the factory system added to their numbers and their grievances. They wanted universal manhood suffrage and the replacement of the bourgeois monarchy by a popular republic.

(3) Socialists emerged as a left wing of the Republicans. Some of them were lower middle-class persons who were concerned with social problems of the new industrial age and were anxious, like Robert Owen in Britain, to experiment with utopian schemes for their solution. Such were the followers of Saint-Simon (who had advocated a cooperative state directed by scientists and engineers), or of Charles Fourier (who sponsored cooperative communities—phalanxes, he called them), or of Étienne Cabet (who urged a slightly different kind of cooperative community—Icaria, he called his kind). Other "socialists," more distinctly of the urban working class, followed Louis Blanc, a popular agitator, in demanding that the state should foster cooperative factories and guaranty a living wage to all workers; or they followed P. J. Proudhon, a radical revolutionary, in calling for the destruction of private property and all authoritarian government and the establishment of a wholly new order on the basis of voluntary anarchistic coöperation. The Proudhonians-or Anarchists, as they began to be styled in the 1840's—were a small but extremely radical group, bent more on destruction than on construction. The "utopian" socialists were also a small group, and relatively mild in their manners and methods. By far the largest group of socialists, following the leadership of Louis Blanc, put their faith in a democratic republic. As Blanc explained: "To the ablebodied citizen the state owes work; to the aged and infirm it

¹ Cabet was active in the 1840's and under his auspices 1,500 "Icarians" were transported from France to Texas in 1848. The disciples of Saint-Simon (who died in 1825) established a socialist humanitarian cult near Paris and were a nuisance to Louis Philippe's government in the 1830's. Fourier had some following in France during the 1830's and 1840's, but his gospel was more widely preached in the United States, whither it was brought by Albert Brisbane, and where it gave rise to forty phalanxes, from Massachusetts to Wisconsin, including the famous "Brook Farm" experiment.

owes aid and protection. This result cannot be obtained except through a democratic power. A democratic power is that which has the sovereignty of the people for its principle, universal suffrage for its origin, and for its goal the realization of the formula: 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.'"

- (4) Catholics tended to be critical of the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe. Some of them were staunch Legitimists and longed for a restoration of the "legitimate monarchy." 4. Cath-Others were "liberal," accepting the revolutionary olics principles of popular sovereignty and individual liberty, but usually distinguishing between their own "true Catholic liberalism" and the "false liberalism" of Louis Philippe's régime. Several influential Catholics, such as the Legitimist Vicomte de Villeneuve-Bargemont and the Liberal Frédéric Ozanam, assailed the prevailing economic liberalism and demanded drastic social legislation in behalf of the working classes, including the restoration of guilds.1 A number of "liberal" Catholics, such as Lamartine, the poet and journalist, and Montalembert, the historian, developing a romantic enthusiasm for "Christian democracy," found fault with the undemocratic constitution of the bourgeois monarchy; 2 and a large number of Catholics, "reactionary" as well as "liberal," criticized Guizot and particularly the restrictions which this Huguenot statesman put upon the freedom of Catholic education.
- (5) Patriots were scandalized by Louis Philippe's foreign policy—his anxiety for "peace at any price," his subservience to

 England, his indifference to national honor and national glory, his dismissal of Thiers whenever this statesman tried to pursue a more vigorous and adventurous policy. Even liberals who supported the bourgeois monarchy in

² These democratic Catholics were usually "ultramontane," that is, they emphasized papal authority in religious matters. Their original leader was Lamennais, who, following a dispute with Pope Gregory XVI in 1833, abandoned Catholicism but not democracy.

¹ Villeneuve-Bargemont (1784–1850) set forth his "Social Catholicism" in several notable books, including *Chistian Political Economy* (1834) and *The Book of the Afflicted* (1841). Ozanam (1813–1853) founded the celebrated charitable Society of St. Vincent de Paul in 1833 and as professor of literature at Paris delivered a course of lectures on the social problem in 1840. Another "Social Catholic," and severe critic of the economic policies of the bourgeois monarchy, was Armand de Melun (1807–1877), aristocrat and exponent of factory legislation, a Legitimist who allied himself with reforming Republicans.

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many of its domestic policies were grieved that it did not give active assistance to liberal nationalist movements in Poland and Italy, and after 1840 Thiers was a recognized leader of the patriotic opposition to Guizot. Moreover, there was a recrudescence of popular enthusiasm for Napoleon Bonaparte during the period of the bourgeois monarchy, attributable partly to the spread of the "Napoleonic legend" by surviving veterans of the Napoleonic wars and partly to the idealization of "Napoleonic glory" by disaffected journalists in order to emphasize the contrasting inglorious régime of Guizot and Louis Philippe. Gradually a Bonapartist faction appeared, and, as we shall soon see, it had a venturesome leader and secured a large popular following.

(6) Reformers there were among the middle class, men who

were liberal in the general spirit of the bourgeois monarchy, who had no desire to overturn it, but who did wish to effect gradual peaceful reforms in its political structure—to broaden the franchise, to do away with official corruption, to render the king less active in politics and more purely ornamental, in a word to shift the existing compromise more and more in a democratic direction. Such reforms might have served as a safety-valve for the developing explosiveness of the more extreme groups of patriots, Catholics, socialists, and republicans, but Guizot and Louis Philippe doggedly refused to consider them, and thereby they alienated a part of the bourgeoisie in whose behalf they imagined that they were conducting the government. As the tide of disaffection rose even within the parliamentary oligarchy, Guizot felt obliged, in order to maintain his "liberal" régime, to resort to the most illiberal measures. He manipulated elections and employed bribery to secure a majority in parliament. He stilled outside criticism by censoring the press and limiting the right of free assembly. He relied increasingly upon the police. By 1848 his long ascendancy had the character of a dictatorship rather than a parliamentary ministry, and the fundamental liberal idea of the state as a passive policeman was concealed by an actual state with very active policemen. Guizot still professed liberalism loudly, but just as loudly did his opponents profess liberalism.

Against Guizot, the chief minister from 1840 to 1848, and against Louis Philippe, the stubborn "bourgeois monarch" whom

On the "Napoleonic legend," see Vol. I, pp. 695-696.

he served, the opposition grew apace. Legitimists criticized the régime as illegal and narrow. Republicans attacked it as undemocratic. Socialists assailed it as individualistic. Catholics censured it as un-Christian and immoral. Patriots denounced it as cowardly. Liberals began to discover that it was illiberal. Of course, the French masses went their usual way in fields and workshops, with little serious thought of revolt, though with increasing indifference to the fate of the bourgeois monarchy which had come without their sanction and might go at any time without their regret. In Paris, however, the various forces of opposition were less passive, and here in 1847–1848 they converged on the demand for an extension of the franchise.

In 1847 liberal reformers, estopped by the existing censorship from press propaganda, began to voice their demand for electoral

Demand for Electoral Reform and the Banquets of 1847–1848 reform at large banquets which they held at Paris, and republicans and socialists, who attended, imparted a revolutionary tone to the proceedings. Sometimes glasses were raised "to the amelioration of the lot of the working classes," and on one occasion Lamartine evoked loud cheering by predicting the fall of the In alarm, the government prohibited a "monster ban-

monarchy. In alarm, the government prohibited a "monster banquet" which was scheduled by the reformers for February 22, 1848. This prohibition was the last straw. It showed how very strong the wind was blowing against the bourgeois monarchy. It precipitated a revolution at Paris—the February Revolution of 1848.

On February 22, the day appointed for the banquet, angry workingmen and reckless students crowded the Place de la Concorde, shouting for reform; in side streets bonfires were lighted and the Marseillaise sung. On the next day, Paris Revoluas the tumult continued and spread, Guizot ordered tion of national guardsmen to restore quiet, but the guards-February men, instead of obeying orders, were soon joining in the popular cry, "Down with Guizot," and Guizot resigned from the ministry. The rioting might have stopped here, had not a detachment of soldiers, guarding Guizot's residence, rashly fired on a crowd of boisterous demonstrators, killing twenty-three and wounding thirty others. For a moment the crowd was stunned. Then in rage it bore off the corpses on a wagon, blood-stained and ghastly in the glaring torch-light, for all Paris to behold. Reform could not now suffice. Revolution was in the air.

The dawning day of February 24, 1848, beheld the streets of Paris ominously barricaded by workmen and placarded with signs: "Louis Philippe massacres us as did Charles X, let him go ioin Charles X." Like the prudent man he had always been, Louis Philippe tarried only long enough tion of to abdicate in favor of his grandson, the Count of Louis Philippe Paris, and then drove off as "Mr. Smith" in a closed carriage to follow Charles X to England, the asylum of superfluous French royalty.1

The Count of Paris was ignored, and a "provisional government" installed itself at the city hall in Paris. It was a composite body, including Lamartine, the "liberal" Catholic leader; Ledru-Rollin, a Jacobin republican; Louis sional Blanc, the socialist theorist; and Albert, a working- Governman. Even a legitimist like Villeneuve-Bargemont and, at the other extreme, an anarchist like Proudhon, though not members of the "provisional government," rallied temporarily to its support. What would the "provisional government" do? All its diverse members agreed that monarchy had failed—both the Orleans-Bourbon rule of Louis Philippe and the earlier Legitimist Bourbon rule of Charles X-and that consequently a republic was the only practicable form of government for Proclama-France. So the "provisional government" promptly tion of proclaimed France a republic—the second republic French in the country's history. But what kind of republic would it be, primarily bourgeois and conservative or primarily proletarian and socialist?

At the outset the Second French Republic was impelled by the Parisian proletariat in a radical and socialist direction. "provisional government" decreed the election of a National Assembly by direct and universal manhood suffrage, opened the national guard (hitherto reserved to the middle classes) to all citizens, and undertook to guaranty work to everybody by creating national workshops, as Louis Blanc demanded, and by creating a special commission, including the "Social Catholic"

² The First French Republic, it will be recalled, lasted from 1792 to 1804. The

Second Republic, as we shall see, lasted from 1848 to 1852.

¹ Louis Philippe died in England in 1850. He did not have the pleasure (or discomfort) of mingling there with his cousin whom he had supplanted in 1830, for Charles X had died in 1836. Guizot never held public office after 1848; he devoted his long retirement to attacks on socialism and on biblical criticism.

Armand de Melun, to elaborate a program of social reform. The "national workshops" did not function as Louis Blanc desired.

Labor Problems and the National Workshops

He had contemplated a system of coöperative industrial associations established and guarantied by the state and managed by the workingmen which would manufacture goods and supplant private industry. But in the emergency of 1848 there was not time to build up such a system and give it a fair trial, and in any event there was too much opposition to any such system from private business men. The result was that the "provisional government" contented itself with putting unemployed proletarians to

work on certain public improvements at Paris (constructing a railway station, dredging the Oise River, and digging trenches) and paying them two francs a day from the national treasury. "National workshops" were thus only a name for a government subsidy to the unemployed of Paris. Yet from February to May 1848, there was the utmost enthusiasm in Paris on the part of socialists and radicals. "Liberty trees" were planted. The red flag was unfurled as the national flag. The principle of private property was openly and hotly assailed.

A different turn was given to the Second French Republic by the election of the National Assembly at the beginning of May 1848. It was a democratic election in which not only the Parisian proletariat participated but also the mass of peasants and the

Conservatism of National Assembly vs. Parisian "Socialism"

middle and upper classes all over France. The large majority of these, though quite unsympathetic with any restoration of Louis Philippe and willing to sanction a republican form of government, were anxious that the republic should be "conservative," that it should respect private property and cease to waste national

funds on Parisian ne'er-do-wells. By reason of universal manhood suffrage-and of the fact that France as a whole was not profoundly affected as yet by the Industrial Revolution—the Assembly was socially almost a "reactionary" body. It contained a few "socialists," including Blanc and Proudhon, but a great number of middle-class republicans and a considerable group of upper-class monarchists. One of the first things which the Assembly did, when it met at Paris in June 1848, was to get rid of the so-called "national workshops"—the "abomination of abomination of abomination". inations," as their critics feelingly described them!

The withdrawal of the government subsidy to workingmen, and the resulting economic distress in the poorer quarters of Paris,

precipitated a rebellion at the capital. Workmen again built barricades in the narrow streets, while the Assembly entrusted dictatorial power to General Cavaignac. Cavaignac, resolute and proudly honest, called out regular troops and bourgeois national guards in overwhelming force to crush the working-class rebellion. The archbishop of Paris lost his life in a futile at-

Suppression of National Workshops and Parisian Insurrec-

tempt to avert bloodshed. For three days—the terrible "June days" (June 24-26, 1848)—sanguinary street fighting went on in Paris. Eventually the forces of "order" triumphed. Some of the rebels were shot, and 4,000 were transported to penal colonies overseas. Socialism as an

The June Days of 1848

organized movement was stamped out. Louis Blanc, threatened with prosecution, fled to England, and Proudhon was jailed. With assurance of untroubled continuity to its labors, the

National Assembly proceeded during the summer and autumn of 1848 to lay foundations for the Second French Republic in conformity with wishes of its moderate elements. Emphasis was put upon "the family, rights of property, and public order." At the same time, concessions were made to working-class sentiments by authorizing

Triumph of "Moderation" in Second French Republic

Armand de Melun to head a "commission of thirty" on social reform; to Catholics by promising educational changes in harmony with their desires; to humanitarian liberals by abolishing negro slavery in the colonies, by decreeing the freedom of the press, and by doing away with capital punishment for political offenses; and to Jacobin democrats by restoring the tricolor and the Marseillaise as national symbols and by adopting finally a democratic republican constitution. constitution of 1848 provided for a president to be

Democratic Constitution of Second Republic

elected for four years by universal manhood suffrage and for a legislature elected similarly; the president would choose his own cabinet, as in the United States, but he might not veto an act of the legislature and he would be ineligible for reëlection.

Of the various groups which had opposed the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe, all (except the extreme legitimists and the extreme socialists) got something from the Revolution of 1848. The "patriots" were the only large group for which the National Assembly made no specific provision. But the "patriots" more than compensated for any slight of them in the work of the Assembly by electing as first president of the Second French Republic a nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte—Prince Louis Napoleon. So numerous did they become and such support did they secure from the middle and upper classes, from the peasantry, even from the proletariat, that in the presidential elections of December 1848, their candidate polled five of Prince Louis and a half million votes as against one and a half Napoleon million cast for General Cavaignac, 370,000 for Ledruas President, 1848 Rollin, and a paltry 17,000 for Lamartine. Prince Louis Napoleon was a symbol of patriotism and of "order."

how he used his position, we shall indicate in the next chapter. In the meantime, it should be pointed out that the Second French Republic did not mark such a revolutionary change from the bourgeois monarchy as might be supposed, that the February revolution of 1848 was not basically different from the July revolution of 1830. Both revolutions were chiefly Parisian

affairs; both were essentially political and only incidentally social;

How he rose to high office in the Second French Republic, and

Revolution of 1848, like That of 1830, Essentially Liberal

both were primarily "liberal." One, it is true, set up a monarchy, with a very restricted franchise, while the other established a republic, with universal manhood suffrage. But both recognized the principle of popular sovereignty, both employed the tricolor and the Marseillaise, and, much more significant, both eventuated in the triumph of property owners and the adoption

of policies which reflected the wishes of property owners.

The legislature of the Second French Republic, elected by universal manhood suffrage, was more responsive to certain popular demands than had been the parliament of Louis Philippe, chosen by the upper bourgeoisie. It was a bit more Religion and Edu-"religious," in that it backed the pope in his conflict cation with Italian revolutionaries 1 and enacted a new edunder the Republic ucational law. This so-called Falloux Law 2 of 1850 extended popular education and at the same time removed

¹ See below, p. 131.

² Falloux, a nobleman and originally a Legitimist, who "rallied" to the Republic, was minister of education under Prince Louis Napoleon in 1849-1850.

the restrictions which the Guizot Act of 1833 had imposed on the conduct of schools by clergymen. The legislature was also a bit more "socially minded." Though it rejected most of the recommendations presented to it in 1849 by Armand de Melun, it did accept his pleas for the creation of a government commission on insanitary dwellings, for the legalizing Social of mutual aid societies, and for a reform of the poor law Legislawhereby the state would dispense outdoor relief; and to a factory act of 1848, limiting the employment of adults to twelve hours a day, it added an act in 1851, empowering government officials to prevent the overwork of apprentices. Outside these obviously mild measures, however, the government of the second republic proved itself as loval as that of the bourgeois monarchy to the principles and practices of economic liberalism. Taxation was kept down. Individual enter-Material **Progress** prise was encouraged. Material progress was fostered.

Before long, the republican legislature was displaying its predominantly bourgeois complexion by authorizing the government to censor "subversive" articles in the press and by proposing what amounted to a property qualification for the exercise of the franchise. On this matter a break occurred between the legislature and the prince-president, a break which would lead to the fall of the republic and the restoration of a Napoleonic empire. But this is a later story.

4. THE REVOLUTIONARY UPHEAVAL OF 1848 IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Liberalism, as we have seen, was triumphant in Britain and France (and Belgium) from the 1830's; the British adoption of free trade in 1846 and the French establishment of republican government in 1848 served to confirm the sway of liberalism in

those countries. Elsewhere in Europe, however, liberalism was more backward and less popular. Throughout central Europe, from Scandinavia to Italy and from the Dutch Netherlands to Hungary, social life remained in the 1840's much the same as it had been in the eighteenth century—a life of the "old régime,"

Relative Backwardness of Liberalism in Central Europe

mainly agricultural, provincial, and class-bound, with numerous survivals of feudalism and serfdom; while political administration, though recently improved in personnel and efficiency, was

still conducted mainly by aristocrats and wholly in the name of absolute, divine-right monarchs. Central Europe retained, at least outwardly, all the characteristics of the society and government which the Bourbon King Charles X had vainly longed to restore in France. In eastern Europe—in the And Russian and Ottoman Empires—there could be no Almost None in doubt that, inwardly as well as outwardly, liberalism Eastern was hardly existent. The régime of the Tsar Nicholas I Europe (1825-1855) was not very different in kind from that of the Tsar Peter the Great, and the Sultan Abdul Medjid's (1839-1861) from any Turkish Sultan's of the eighteenth century. And in the 1840's, Prince Metternich, though growing old, was still optimistic that the paternal tradition of a Frederick the Great, perhaps even of the Emperor Charles V, could be indefinitely preserved, along with the peace of Europe. Prince Metternich was the implacable foe of liberalism. He

would have no written constitution intervening between a sover
AntiLiberalism of
Metternich,
1815-1848

method of new rights to middle-class capitalists which might abate the old rights of landlords and clergy; no compromise with revolutionary demands for personal or national "self-determination." As long as he was in office, he would, with his own forces, repress liberalism (and nationalism) within the extensive Habsburg Empire and wherever else he

forces, he might utilize the armies of his close and like-minded allies, the King of Prussia and the Tsar of Russia.


Despite the attitude and precautions of Metternich, liberalism was the creed of an increasing number of persons in central Europe.

could. Where he could not repress liberalism with his own

Gradual Some were heirs of the general "enlightenment" of Multiplication of Liberals in Central Europe with the activity of Napoleon Bonaparte. Still others were drawn to liberalism by British example, by the liberating spirit of patriotic uprisings against Napoleon, by romantic yearnings for novelty, or by personal hostility to traditions and regulations which cramped the career of one's self or one's class. Most such persons were middle-class intellectuals,

¹ On the career of Metternich prior to 1848, see Vol. I, ch. xiv

though they found allies among peculiarly humanitarian landlords, among particularly "progressive" clergymen, and, perhaps more naturally, among professional men and urban dwellers generally. Now and then a prince acquired the reputation of being



CENTRAL EUROPE, 1848

"liberal," and some peasants were clearly "liberal" in their longing for the abolition of serfdom. But even so, liberalism did not assume serious proportions in central Europe until the Industrial Revolution entered, strengthening bourgeois wealth and ambition, increasing the size and importance of cities, and providing the growing number of city dwellers—"citizens"—with an incentive to possess the state and determine its policies.

Metternich had had no serious cause for alarm when liberal uprisings occurred in 1830-1831 in Italy, Germany, and Poland. They were minor disturbances of the peace. They were easily suppressed. They left no apparent scars on the perfect form of Metternich's "system" in central Europe. But those uprisings of 1830–1831 Liberal Disturbances of occurred before there was any appreciable introduction of machinery, before there was any railway, before the intellectual liberals were reënforced by industrial liberals. In the 1830's, and more so in the 1840's, factories were erected in Germany and Poland and Italy; railways were constructed; industrial capitalists and industrial proletarians appeared and swelled the power and the numbers of the liberals. Wherever the Industrial Revolution was most in evidence, there was a strong-Beginhold of liberalism-in the towns of northern Italy, in nings of Industrithe cities of Westphalia, the Rhineland, Saxony, and alization Silesia, in the Slavic centres of Prague and Cracow, and, most ominously, in the capitals of Prussia and Austria at Berlin and at Vienna. If he had been aware of the full significance of the new industrialization, Metternich at the begin-

Already there were dangerous symptoms. In 1845 the old-fashioned provincial Diet of Bohemia responded to the liberal demands of the middle class at Prague by petitioning Mounting the Emperor Ferdinand I that it be allowed to admit Liberal Agitation, a larger representation from the towns and to manage 1845-1847 financial matters with a minimum of interference from the Austrian bureaucracy; Metternich ignored the petition, and against his régime agitation increased in Bohemia In among both Czechs and Germans. In 1846 a liberal Bohemia insurrection broke out in the free Polish state of Cracow against its governing oligarchy; Metternich suppressed the insurrection with Austrian troops and, with the Tn consent of Russia and Prussia, incorporated Cracow Cracow in the Habsburg Empire. In the same year Pope Gregory XVI, an ultra-conservative factor in political and ecclesiastical affairs, died at Rome and was succeeded by Pius IX, who immediately confirmed an earlier reputation for

ning of 1848 would have been greatly alarmed.

¹ Cracow had been made a "free state" in 1815. Its annexation by Austria in 1846 removed the last vestige of an independent Polish state.

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liberalism by freeing political offenders, liberating the press, and commissioning Pellegrino Rossi, the liberal economist and statesman, to undertake radical reforms in the government of the Papal State. Metternich expostulated and in with the Pope, only to find that Pius IX went blissfully ahead with his liberal reforms and was soon imitated by the Grand Duke of Tuscany (an "enlightened" cousin of the Habsburg Emperor).

In 1847 liberal aspirations were voiced widely throughout central Europe. In Prussia, where King Frederick William IV was consolidating the various local and provincial diets into a "United Landtag" for the whole kingdom, the third estate of this body at its first meeting declared that it should be transformed into a parliament, assembling regularly and sharing with the king in legislative power. In Switzerland, radical liberals in the Protestant cantons employed force to break up a special federation of seven Catholic cantons—the so-called "Sonderbund," which had been formed for defensive purposes in 1845-and to oblige them to adopt liberal constitutions, expel religious orders, and consent to a closer and more democratic union of all the Swiss cantons. In Italy, liberals were ascendant at Rome and in Tuscany and active in Sicily and Lombardy. In Sicily a new uprising occurred at Palermo against the arbitrary government of the Bourbon king and in behalf of the liberal constitution of 1820.1 In Lombardy, which was a province In Lomof the Habsburg Empire, Italian liberals, resenting the tobacco monopoly of the Austrian government, boycotted the cigar shops and at Milan and Padua participated in "smoking riots" against Austrian soldiers who ventured to smoke in public.

In Hungary, liberal agitation was particularly acute. Here it was less the work of urban intellectuals (or industrialists) than of "enlightened" and patriotic landlords In Hungary who utilized it to emphasize Hungarian separateness from Austria and their own solidarity with the middle classes and the peasant masses of the Hungarian nation. In 1847 Francis Deák, a country squire, trained lawyer, and able statesman, united various factions in the Hungarian Diet in support of a

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 755-756.

program of specific liberal demands. These demands, which expressed the current ideas of liberals not only in Hungary but also in other parts of the Habsburg Empire—and elsewhere in central Europe—included: constitutional government, with a parliament elected by individual taxpayers (rather than by traditional social classes) and with a ministry responsible to the parliament (rather than to the monarch); freedom of political assembly; absolute religious liberty; equality of civil rights for all individuals regardless of class; revocation of monopolies and of exemptions from taxation; abolition of serfdom with financial compensation to landlords.

Central Europe was ripening for a general liberal harvest when across it, late in February 1848, following the easy new routes of railway and telegraph wire, blew swiftly the favoring Liberal winds which had been stirred up at Paris by the violent Upheaval of 1848 overthrow of Louis Philippe. Around Metternich at Vienna the winds seemed to eddy and swirl. On March 3, in a furious speech, Louis Kossuth, an enthusiastic patriot and an advanced liberal, called upon Metternich to accord parliamentary autonomy to Hungary, and on March 11 a group of liberals at Prague made like demands upon him in respect of Bohemia. On March 12, two professors waited upon the Emperor Revoluat Vienna and asked him to establish liberal parliation at Vienna. mentary government throughout Austria, and on the March next day a turbulent mob of students and workingmen clashed with imperial troops in the streets of the capital. The middle-class civic guard, called out by Metternich, refused to disperse the crowds collecting about the imperial palace, while a civic deputation urged the Emperor to dismiss Metternich at once. Assured that his hour had at last arrived. the white-haired old minister, still very courtly in his blue swallow-tail coat, and still suavely ironical, requested Ferdinand I that, since his presence was no longer required, he "might be allowed" to resign. His residence was al-Flight of Metterready sacked and burning. On March 14, 1848, an elderly "Englishman" and his wife departed hurriedly from Vienna for London. Metternich, the veteran foe of revolution, was fleeing for his life before a revolution.

By the time that Metternich reached London a little more than a month later, the revolutionary storm was rocking not only the chief cities of the Habsburg Empire but all central Europe, and the liberal régime which Metternich had always detested and long repressed seemed to be supplanting the traditional régime which he loved and supported, in Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Italy, Germany, Denmark, and the Dutch Netherlands. So widespread and so simultaneous were the manifestations of revo-

Spread of Liberal Revolution, First Half of 1848

lution in central Europe that it is extremely difficult to tell a clear and accurate story of them. If we follow a chronological order, we are apt to be confusing in our geographical references. If we treat of the several countries in turn, we are likely to lose sight of the revolution as a whole and of the interrelationship of its national parts at any given time. In the circumstances, we shall resort to the "liberal" principle of "utilitarian compromise," outlining first the triumphs of liberalism during the spring and summer of 1848, country by country; then its ensuing setbacks, country by country; and finally, the residue of its successes and failures in 1850.

At Vienna, promptly after the flight of Metternich, the Emperor Ferdinand I named a liberal ministry, annulled the press censorship, authorized the formation of a "national Making a guard," and promised a constitution for Austria. A Constituconstitution was promulgated by him in April, guartion for antying civil and religious liberty and creating a bicameral legislature for the whole Austrian Empire except Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia. By this time a self-constituted committee of liberals, backed by the liberal national guard, was in actual control of Vienna, and it was not willing to accept a constitution which was granted by the Emperor and might subsequently be revoked by him. The Viennese liberals, determined that constitutional government should be based not on the will of the monarch but on the doctrine of popular sovereignty, coerced the Emperor into convoking a Constituent Assembly. Ferdinand, still emperor in name but hardly so in fact, retired from Vienna to Innsbruck (in the remote and agricultural province of the Tyrol); and in July 1848, the Assembly, which had been elected nominally by universal manhood suffrage but principally by bourgeois voters, met at Vienna to draw up a constitution for the Habsburg Empire (except Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia, which were not represented in the Assembly). One of the first acts of the Constituent Assembly was to decree the abolition of serfdom.

Meanwhile, Hungarian liberals, taking advantage of the flight of Metternich and the fears of Ferdinand, proceeded in March and April 1848 to effect a revolution within Revolutheir own country. The press was freed. A national tion in Hungary guard was organized. Serfdom, feudal privileges, and the exemption of nobles from taxation were abolished. The Diet was to meet annually at Budapest and to comprise representatives of middle-class taxpayers as well as landlords; it would make the local laws for Hungary, and to it an Hungarian ministry, separate from the Austrian, would be responsible. Though no step was taken to depose the Emperor Ferdinand as King of Hungary, the liberal government at Budapest adopted a national flag and otherwise acted as though Hungary were a free national state. In this course they had the sympathy and support of the liberals at Vienna and could therefore afford to ignore the hostility of the "King" at Innsbruck.

At Prague, too, liberals—both Czech and German—seized the opportunity afforded them by the difficulties confronting the Emperor in other parts of the Habsburg realm to set Revoluup a special ministry for Bohemia, to transform the tion in Bohemia local Diet into a parliament, and to create a national In April the Emperor agreed in general terms to an autonomous liberal régime for Bohemia. But as the German liberals at Vienna and the Hungarian liberals at Budapest appeared no more eager than the Habsburg Emperor to bestow real autonomy on Czechs, or other Slavs, the Czech liberals (and nationalists) convoked at Prague, in June 1848, a Pan-Slavic Congress, consisting of Czech, Slovak, Polish, Yugoslav, and Russian delegates, to concert measures which might assure liberty and autonomy to the Slavic peoples, especially those within the Habsburg Empire.

In Italy, a revolt had begun within the kingdom of the Two
Revolution in olution at Paris, and in January, King Ferdinand
had been forced to accept a liberal constitution.

Immediately after the revolution in France, King Charles Albert

¹Liberalism was already in the ascendant, it should be recalled, in the Papal State (under Pope Pius IX) and likewise in the grand-duchy of Tuscany.

of Sardinia-Piedmont (the Italian state nearest to France and most independent of Austrian influence) promulgated a liberal constitution—the Statuto, March 4, 1848— Constituwhich provided for a parliament elected by taxpayers, tion for Sardinia for ministerial responsibility, for the suppression of feudal survivals and the guaranty of the usual individual liberties. Then, with the collapse of Metternich's power at Vienna and the ensuing confusion in Austrian affairs, the tide of liberal (and national) revolution rolled all over Italy. At Milan, the populace, after five days of street fighting (March 18-22), expelled General Radetzky with his 18,000 Austrian troops and cheered for the transfer of Lombardy from Austria to the newly liberal kingdom of Sardinia. At Venice, the townspeople under the leadership of Daniele Manin, a patriotic liberal, drove out the Austrian officials and garrison (March 22) and proclaimed the restoration of the independent Venetian republic. Austrian troops were still entrenched in the strongly fortified "Quadrilateral"—Verona, Peschiera, Mantua, and Legnano-whence they might set out again, when conditions improved at Vienna, to reëstablish Austrian supremacy in Italy. In order to rid the peninsula once for all of this danger and to expel the Austrians finally from Italian soil, Charles Albert of Sardinia declared war against Austria (March 23, 1848). To his army of the Liberation of 60,000 men were soon added detachments from the Two Sicilies, the Papal State, Tuscany, and Lombardy. Charles Albert captured Peschiera from Radetzky at the end of May. It seemed certain, in the enthusiasm of the moment, that Italy was not only securing liberal government but winning national independence and unity.

Throughout Germany, where Metternich's influence, as in Italy, had been predominant since 1815, the downfall of that statesman was the signal for liberal (and national) rejoicing and revolution. The most sensational upheaval (outside the Habsburg Empire itself) was in Hohenzollern Prussia—the largest of the German states (except Austria), notoriously autocratic and aristocratic in government, but with a fast-growing middle class at Berlin and in the more recently acquired provinces of Westphalia and the Rhineland. King Frederick William IV of Prussia was a versatile and histrionic prince, arbitrarily paternalistic, and romantically attached to the art and what he imagined to be the

social and political institutions of the middle ages. He was quite surprised when his "beloved" Berliners, in imition at tation of the Viennese, took to rioting and erecting Berlin. barricades (March 15-17, 1848). To allay the excite-March ment, he promised to reconvene the United Landtag 1848 as a Prussian Parliament and to forward plans for German national union; but when crowds of workingmen and students flocked to the palace square to applaud him, they were received with musket-shots from his royal guardsmen. Again, resort was had to barricades and street fighting, in which two hundred citizens lost their lives. On March 19, Frederick William IV displayed a change of heart; he called off the troops, appointed a liberal ministry, convoked a Constituent Assembly, and, donning a scarf with the revolutionary colors of black, red, and gold (which he wore well), he theatrically paraded the streets of his capital. In ecstasy over the popular acclaim which attended his change of front, he wrote to the indignant Tsar Nicholas of Russia in fulsome praise of "the glorious German revolution." The assembly, which was to draft a constitution for Prussia, was elected by universal manhood suffrage and met at Berlin in May. It was overwhelmingly liberal.

In the smaller German states, liberals came to the fore. In Bavaria, they compelled King Louis I, who had treated the Revoluconstitution of that state rather cavalierly, to abdicate in favor of his son, Maximilian II, who swore to observe and liberalize the constitution. In Baden, Würtstates temberg, Hesse, Hanover, Saxony, Nassau, Brunswick, and the petty Thuringian states, they frightened the princes into appointing liberal ministers and agreeing to constitutional government and freedom of the press. They rioted in Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck, and insisted on a liberalizing of the oligarchical governments of these "free cities."

Beyond the confines of Germany, the liberal upheaval affected Denmark and the Dutch Netherlands. In Denmark, King Frederick VII acceded to the demand of liberal rioters at Copenhagen by pledging himself (March 21, 1848) to convoke a constitutional convention. The convention was elected and met in October, and the constitution which

¹The Bavarian constitution had been promulgated by royal decree in 1818. See Vol. I, p. 753.

it drafted, providing for a parliament in part elected by middleclass taxpayers, was accepted and promulgated by the King in June 1849. In the Dutch Netherlands, King William II put himself at the head of the liberal movement Dutch and sanctioned in October 1848 a constitution under Netherwhich the States-General became a parliament, elected directly by well-to-do individuals and having control of the

ministry, public finance, and colonial administration. With the apparent triumph of liberalism throughout central

Europe, and with liberal ministries directing the policies of Austria, Prussia, and all the other German states, it was but natural that steps should be taken to transform the loose "German Confederation," which had

Movement for Liberal National Union in Germany

been formed in 1815 by the princes and conducted thereafter as an agency of Metternich's reactionary policy, into a close union, which would be both national and liberal. In April 1848, responding to popular demands and to the instructions of the new liberal governments of the several states, the Diet of the German Confederation at Frankfurt² authorized the democratic election of a German national assembly to devise a new federal government for the whole of Germany. Elections were duly held in Austria, Prussia, and the other German states; and inasmuch as many conservatives refrained from voting, the liberals obtained a large majority. The assembly met at Frankfurt in May. The Diet Assembly, May 1848 of the old German Confederation ceased to function. And the new assembly, reflecting the national enthusiasm and

liberal aspirations of the time, proceeded to proclaim a German National Empire, to select a temporary administrative head in the person of a liberal Habsburg prince, Archduke John of Austria, and to elaborate a constitution.

From the outset, it was assumed by the majority in the National Assembly at Frankfurt that the new Germany, like the old, would include Austria-not the whole Austrian Empire, but the German part of Austria; that it would be a federation, somewhat like the United States of America, with delegation of some

¹ On the German Confederation of 1815, see Vol. I, pp. 727, 752, 754.
² Frankfurt on the Main was an old "free city." It had been the "capital" of the Holy Roman Empire, and after 1815 it was the meeting-place of the Diet of the German Confederation.

powers to the central government and reservation of other powers to the several existing states; that the central government would be at once monarchical and parliamentary, with one of the German princes (preferably the ruler of Austria, and, failing him, the ruler of Prussia) as emperor, with a parliament consisting of a chamber representing the states and another chamber representing the people, and with a ministry responsible to the parliament; and that, against possible encroachments of government, whether state or federal, there should be a clear statement of individual liberties. To write all these assumptions into a constitution and to get necessary support for them from both the German people and the German princes, was a difficult task, at which the Frankfurt Assembly labored for a year. After protracted debates, and in the midst of delicate negotiations about the headship of the contemplated federation (whether it should be the Austrian or the Prussian monarch), the Assembly at length reached an agreement on the "Fundamental Rights of the German Nation." This document was similar, in a general way, to the French "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen" of 1789, though it was more detailed, more frankly nationalist, and at the same time less dogmatically democratic and more obviously "liberal" in a middle-class sense. It was, in fact, a classic expression of the European liberalism (and liberal nationalism) of the middle of the nineteenth century.

The "Fundamental Rights" were proclaimed in December 1848. But already the tide of liberalism in Germany, and throughout central Europe, was ebbing. The liberals in the Ebbing of Frankfurt Assembly continued, several months longer, Liberal Revoluto adopt resolutions, and in March 1849 they actually tionary voted a constitution for a united liberal Germany. Movement, By this time, however, the liberals had lost all in-Second fluence with the governments of Austria and Prussia, Half of 1848 and the princes of these states, backed now by conservative ministers and by a restored weight of conservative public opinion, could safely flout any liberalism emanating from Frankfurt.

We must now turn from our survey of the revolutionary progress of liberalism in central Europe—in Austria, Hungary,

¹ On the French Declaration, see Vol. I, p. 608.

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Bohemia, Italy, Germany, Denmark, and the Dutch Netherlands—to an account of its retrogression. It made phenomenal gains during the first half of the year 1848; thereafter it suffered set-backs, with a cumulative effect which fell little short of complete disaster.

It may appear strange, on first thought, that revolution, en-

thusiastic and widespread, should have been followed by reaction so quickly and on such a broad front. It should be Weakness remembered, nevertheless, that the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 in central Europe was primarily an among Liberals urban and middle-class affair. The cities spoke first and spoke vehemently in behalf of a new regime. Then, in due course, the countryside spoke—less noisily but with greater weight-and the countryside was more devoted to traditional usages than to abstract liberty. Despite recent industrialization, the large majority of the population of Germany, Italy, and the Austrian Empire still lived in rural communities, worked in the fields. distrusted townsfolk, and deferred with confidence and trust to landlord, priest, and government official. Most landlords and clergymen were hostile to fundamental or revolutionary change; and the staff of government officials which had been growing in numbers and efficiency, and likewise the regular army officers, were more used to an "absolute" and relatively permanent sovereign than to an unstable parliamentary ministry. Moreover, the urban population did not give united and continuous support to revolution. Cleavage appeared early between middle class and proletarians, and the more the latter rioted, the greater was the willingness of the former to sacrifice "liberty" to "order and security." Besides, patriotism, which was emphasized by liberals, was a sentiment cated by which could be-and was-utilized by conservatives Nationalto wean the masses, urban as well as rural, from revolution. In the circumstances, it should occasion no great surprise that the long-acknowledged "pillars" of conservative society and

The first serious set-back to the liberal revolutionary movement in central Europe was in Bohemia. Here, in June 1848, the Austrian governor and army commander, Prince Windischgrätz, angered by fresh Czech rioting at Prague, in which his

government, recently toppled over, were soon propped back

into their customary places.

wife was killed, acted swiftly to restore "order." His troops, with the sympathetic coöperation of the German element in the province, subdued Prague, dispersed the Pan-Slavic Congress, and overthrew the revolutionary liberal government. Liberal reforms were revoked and all Bohemia was placed under martial law.

The next important set-back was in Italy. Here, the army of Charles Albert of Sardinia had already been weakened by the withdrawal, in May, of the auxiliary troops of the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies. Both of these Italian sovereigns had become alarmed by the "excesses" of the revolutionaries and the continuing disorders in their states. Pope Pius IX formally repudiated war as a means of obtaining national unity, while the recall of Neapolitan troops enabled King Ferdinand to abrogate the constitution which he had granted and Failure of to restore absolutism in the Two Sicilies. Now, in War for July 1848, the Austrian army under General Radetzky, Italian Liberation reënforced from the Tyrol, decisively defeated the Italian army of Charles Albert at Custozza. Charles Albert felt obliged to agree to an armistice, and Radetzky reoccupied Milan and all Lombardy.

This set-back to Italian liberty and unity incited Italian extremists to furious and frantic endeavors. At Rome the liberal minister Rossi was assassinated (November 1848); Pope Pius IX fled, thoroughly disillusioned and in fear of his life; and in February 1849, a republic was proclaimed under the leadership of Mazzini. Radical republicans likewise got the upper hand at Florence and at Naples and transformed Tuscany and the Two Sicilies into dictatorial republics. Charles Albert, threatened with a similar republican outbreak in the kingdom of Sardinia, renewed the war with Austria, but in March 1849 suffered a second and quite overwhelming defeat at Novara at the hands of Radetzky. Forced then to conclude an humiliating peace with Austria, Charles Albert abdicated in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel II, while the victorious Austrian army was free to cooperate with other Italian princes in suppressing the revolutionary republics.

In May 1849, the king of the Two Sicilies and the grand-duke of Tuscany were restored to their respective thrones, and Venice, which had been blockaded by land and sea, capitulated to the

Austrians. As for Rome, the prince-president of the French republic, Louis Napoleon, in response to pleas of French Catholics and in order to prevent Austria from becoming too powerful in Italy, sent thither a French military force. Revoluwhich overthrew Mazzini's republic at the end of tion in Italy, 1840 June 1849 and reinstated Pope Pius IX. By midsummer of 1849 all Italy was at last under traditional control. Republicanism was no more; and, except under Victor Emmanuel in Sardinia, liberalism was no more. The Pope was protected in reactionary policy by French bayonets; King Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies was filling his prisons with such revolutionaries as he did not put to death; and General Haynau, who had succeeded Radetzky in command of the Austrian troops in northern Italy, was earning by the cruelty with which he inflicted penalties the

popular nickname of "General Hyena." Meanwhile conservatives had triumphed in Austria—which was the main reason for the culminating Austrian restoration in Italy. The success of General Windischgrätz in Bo-Conservahemia in June 1848 and the first success of General tive Mili-Radetzky in northern Italy in July heartened the tarism Arrayed conservatives in Austria and revived the drooping against spirits of the Emperor Ferdinand at Innsbruck. It Liberalism in was apparent that armies under loyal and able com-Austria manders could shortly be employed to overawe the revolutionary liberals at Vienna. It also became apparent that developments in Hungary might contribute to a similar end. The revolutionary Hungarian government at Budapest, under the leadership of Louis Kossuth, was not only liberal but nationalist; while it was outraging the Emperor and Austrian conservatives by its "radical" and separatist tendencies, it was arousing the active opposition of its numerous non-Magyar Slavic subjects-Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, and Rumanians-Nationalby refusing to grant their demands for national autonism Arrayed omy and by taking steps to "Magyarize" them. These against anti-Magyar nationalists, many of them "liberals," Liberalism in found an astute champion in Joseph Jellačić, a Croatian Hungary soldier and patriot. Pointing out to the Emperor at

Innsbruck how the Croats (and other Slavs in the Habsburg Empire) could be counted upon to make common cause with Austria against Hungarian pretensions, Jellačić was appointed

governor of Croatia and commissioned (September 1848) to attack Hungary with a Slavic Austrian army, which would be reënforced by the German Austrian garrison from Vienna.

The liberals at Vienna, sympathizing with the liberals at Budapest, vainly sought to prevent the despatch of the imperial garrison to the aid of Tellačić. A mob hanged the Counterminister of war from a lantern post (October 6) and Revolution in seized and despoiled the armory. But upon Vienna Austria. now converged two Austrian armies—that of Win-October 1848 dischgrätz from Bohemia and that of Jellačić from Croatia—while to the assistance of the Viennese "rebels" an Hungarian army marched. Jellačić defeated and turned back the Hungarians, and on the last day of October Windischgrätz beat down the resistance at Vienna and occupied the city in force. A score or so of radical leaders were executed, and the liberal government of the Austrian Empire was supplanted by a ministry headed by Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, soldier, diplomat, cynic, aristocrat, brother-in-law of Windischgrätz, and worthy successor of Metternich.

Schwarzenberg's first important act, after assuring order in German Austria as well as in Czech Bohemia, was to prevail

Schwarzenberg and the Accession of Emperor Francis Toseph

upon the Emperor Ferdinand I to abdicate in favor of his eighteen-year-old nephew Francis Joseph (December 2, 1848) and to get the new Emperor to annul the liberal commitments which the old one had made. He allowed the Austrian constitutional convention to continue its debates for several months longer, but he ignored the document which it prepared and eventually

The second important act of Schwarzenberg was to direct an energetic offensive against the Hungarian revolution-The Hunaries. To the support of Jellačić, already invading garian Republic Hungary with a Croatian army, he sent Windischgrätz and Its with a German (and Czech) army. Kossuth, the Overthrow Magyar leader, replied by proclaiming the independence of Hungary (April 1849) under a republican form of gov-

repudiated any idea of a liberal constitution for Austria.

¹ The Czechs, it should be remembered, were Slavs; and they showed a readiness to support any Austrian government which would espouse the cause of fellow Slavs against "oppressive" Hungarians. Thus, even "liberal" Czechs rallied to Windischgrätz and Schwarzenberg and ceased to create trouble for them in Bohemia.

ernment and by stirring the masses to fiercely patriotic resistance. For a time Kossuth's forces held the invading armies at bay, but Schwarzenberg successfully besought aid from the Russian Tsar Nicholas I, who was anxious not only to ensure the suppression of revolution in central Europe but also to check the danger of another national uprising in Poland. Counter-By August 1840, the combined armies of Austria and Revolution in Russia were in complete control of Hungary. The Hungary, republic collapsed, Kossuth fled, other revolutionaries were slain or exiled, and the liberal constitution was abrogated. Hungary was again ruled as an Austrian province.

The successive victories of political (and social) reaction in the Habsburg Empire-in German Austria itself and in its dependencies of Bohemia, Italy, and Hungary-could not fail to exert a profound influence on the course of events in Germany. Next to Austria, the most important German state, we know, was Prussia; and the traditional governing classes of Prussia were essentially as hostile to liberalism as were those of Austria.

In Prussia, landlords and Protestant clergymen and military and civil officials were particularly influential Revolunot only with King Frederick William IV but with the tion in masses of the rural population and with many conserv-

atively minded individuals in the cities, and by the summer of 1848 they were regaining confidence in their ability to do what their fellows in Austria were doing. They would suppress liberalism in Prussia. And Frederick William IV, no matter how many liberal emblems he might display, was heart and soul with the conservatives.

Two developments in the late summer of 1848 moved Frederick William IV to defy the liberals who had been in control of the Prussian government since March. One was foreign pressure on him from Great Britain, France, and Russia to terminate the war which, on the request of the German National Assembly at Frankfurt and in accord with liberal sentiment throughout Germany, he had been waging with Denmark over the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. The other was the pressure on him from

¹ These duchies, on the peninsula between Denmark and Germany, had long been ruled by the King of Denmark, though Schleswig was half German as well as half Danish in population, while Holstein was peopled almost wholly by Germans and after 1815 was a member of the German Confederation. In March 1848, German liberals in the duchies attempted a revolt against King Frederick VII of conservatives within Prussia to halt the work of the Prussian Constituent Assembly whose liberal majority was voting to abolish the nobility, to make the king a mere figurehead, and to despatch a Prussian army to the assistance of the revolutionaries at Vienna. In the autumn of 1848 Frederick William IV acted. He supplanted his liberal ministry with an ultra-conservative one under the headship of Count Brandenburg, nobleman, large landowner, and resolute reactionary, and at the same time he utilized the troops whom he withdrew from Schleswig-Holstein to overawe the Constituent Assembly and the populace at Berlin. Finding that these actions elicited no serious tumult, he presently dissolved the Assembly and drafted a constitution of his own, under which the chief political power would remain in the hands of the king and his ministers, though on certain matters—as a sop to "liberalism"—he would consult with a parliament representing the upper classes and the wealthiest part of the middle class.

The triumph of reaction in Prussia as well as in Austria left the liberal majority in the German National Assembly at Frank-

Final Efforts of Frankfurt Assembly for German Unification furt in an embarrassing situation. In a desperate hope that the Prussian King's romantic attachment to nationalism might outweigh his aversion to liberalism, they provided in the constitution which they finally adopted in April 1849 that the head of united Germany should be an hereditary emperor and that he

should be none other than the king of Prussia. At the same time they used their influence in the smaller German states—where the reaction was less pronounced—to persuade the princes of these states to unite in urging Frederick William IV to accept the imperial crown.

Frederick William IV hesitated. He was enamored with the prospect of national unity and eager to enhance the prestige of Prussia and the Hohenzollern dynasty. But he had no stomach Denmark, while the King attempted to make Schleswig an integral part of Denmark. The German Confederation thereupon commissioned Prussia to go to war with Denmark, and thus it befell that "liberal" Prussia fought "liberal" Denmark over a nationalist problem. Soon, however, Prussia was faced with threats from

with Denmark, and thus it befell that "liberal" Prussia fought "liberal" Denmark over a nationalist problem. Soon, however, Prussia was faced with threats from Great Britain, France, and Russia, signatories of the treaty of 1815 guarantying Schleswig and Holstein to the King of Denmark, that unless she stopped the war they would intervene on the Danish side. A truce was concluded at Malmoe in August 1848, and Frederick William IV withdrew his troops—to the disgust and discomfiture of German liberals.

for the liberal constitution which came with the imperial crown from the Frankfurt Assembly—it came from the "gutter," he said. He was well aware that any assumption of an imperial title by him would evoke jealous opposition from the Kings of Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, and Hanover, and especially from the Habsburg Em-

peror of Austria. And he received ominous expos-

Repudiation of Frankfurt Assembly by Prussian King,

tulations from the Tsar Nicholas of Russia. April 28, 1849, Frederick William ended the period of uncertainty by repudiating the Frankfurt constitution and refusing the imperial crown.

In mad protest against the obvious failure of the Frankfurt Assembly, groups of liberal extremists tried in May 1849 to dethrone princes and set up republican governments in various parts of Germany-in the Rhenish Palatinate, in Saxony, in Baden, and at Breslau (in Prussian Silesia). These German republics had an even briefer duration than the contemporary republics in Hungary and Italy. They were suppressed by Prussian troops with speed and no little cruelty. Surviving German republicans and liberal extremists were jailed or exiled; many found refuge across the Atlantic in the United States.

Frederick William IV, though now a bitter foe of liberalism, was still haunted by the dream of creating a German union under Prussian (and Hohenzollern) leadership. Accordingly, after the collapse of the Frankfurt Assembly and the suppression of republican rioting, he invited the other German states except Austria to form a new and close union under his presidency, with a council representing the princes and a parliament representing the nation. Seventeen of the lesser states accepted the

invitation, and the parliament of the "German Union" met at Erfurt in March 1850. By this time, however, Austria was in a position to follow up the triumph of conservatism at home and in her dependencies of Bohemia, Italy, and Hungary with the forceful reassertion of her hegemony in Germany. Count Schwarzenberg,

The Prussian King's Own "German Union." 1850

her dominating statesman, was quite sympathetic with the conservatism of Frederick William IV and Count Brandenburg, but Schwarzenberg would brook no attempt on the part of even these fellow conservatives to oust Austria and the Habsburgs from Germany and put Prussia and the Hohenzollerns in their place. He demanded the reëstablishment of the German Confederation as it had been from 1815 to 1848—with Austria

Austria's of a Diet of princes, with no popular parliament, and with little real power.

Leader-ship in Germany

For a time in 1850 it seemed likely that war would break out between Austria and Prussia. Yet Frederick William IV hesitated to precipitate war. He

knew that Bavaria and Württemberg would ally themselves with Austria; he believed that Saxony and Hanover would do likewise;

and he was very fearful that Russia would be arrayed Restoraon the Austrian side against Prussia as she had been detion of German cisively arrayed against Hungary. Eventually the Confed-Prussian King gave way and with Schwarzenberg eration under signed a treaty at Olmütz in November 1850, stipulat-Austrian ing for the dissolution of the "German Union" under Leadership the presidency of Prussia and for the restoration of the "German Confederation" under the presidency of Austria.

With the restoration of the German Confederation, conservatism was again entrenched throughout Germany and liberalism routed. The restored Diet at Frankfurt, consisting of personal agents of the several princes and obeying identical instructions from the conservative governments of Austria and Prussia, formally repealed the "Fundamental Rights of the German Nation" and directed a special commission—the so-called "reactionary committee"—to purge any state constitution of "revolutionary novelties."

The revolutionary upheaval of 1848 was over. The political (and social) régime which Metternich had previously personified

was now, in 1850, almost as perfectly personified by Schwarzenberg. This nobleman was rewarded, as his predecessor had been, with the title of "prince." In the name of the Emperor Francis Joseph, he dominated the extensive Austrian Empire—German Austria, Czech Bohemia, Polish Galicia, Magyar Hungary, Rumanian Transylvania, Yugoslav Croatia,

and Italian Venetia and Lombardy. Through the "presidency" of the German Confederation, he dictated to all the lesser German states and even to Prussia. By means of Austrian troops and Habsburg dynastic relationships, he controlled most of the

Italian states. Throughout central Europe he could behold and promote with real Metternichian satisfaction the disregard of individual liberties and the confirmation of social distinctions and privileges.1

Yet the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 left some liberal remains in central Europe. In the Austrian Empire, the abolition of serfdom was lasting; all peasants in Hungary, in Bohemia, and in Austria itself were henceforth legally free to buy land for themselves or to move at will from country to town. From the upheaval, moreover, survived some form of constitutional government, not in the Austrian Empire, but in other states of central Europe-in Sardinia, Switzerland, the Dutch Netherlands, Denmark, and Prussia.

Exceptional Liberal Gains

Abolition of Serfdom in Austrian Empire

Only one of these constitutional governments was democratic, and few were really liberal. Switzerland emerged from the revolution of 1848 with a democratic federal constitution.2 In Sardinia, the liberal régime which was instituted by King Charles Albert in March 1848, and which was patterned after England's, was retained by King Victor Emmanuel II despite the protests of Austria and of Italian neighbors who rid themselves of constitutional restrictions as soon as possible. In the 1850's. Sardinia was the only constitutional and liberal state in Italy, as Switzerland was the only democratic republic in Europe.3

Democratic Constitution in Switzerland

Liberal Constitution in Sardinia

The Dutch constitution which King William II granted in 1848 and the Danish constitution which King Frederick VII finally promulgated in 1840 were somewhat less liberal than the Sardinian, in that they did not make the royal ministers com-

¹ Schwarzenberg did not long enjoy the preëminent position which he had earned, for he died in 1852. But his policies were continued by other Austrian ministers during the 1850's.

² The "modern" political system of Switzerland dates from 1848. The constitution of this year strengthened the authority of the federal government and entrusted it to a bicameral legislature (a Council of States, consisting of two representatives from each canton, and a National Council, elected by universal manhood suffrage) and to a republican executive (a Federal Council, elected by the legislature for three years, and a President, chosen by the legislature for one year). Religious liberty was proclaimed, but the Jesuits and certain other Catholic religious groups were expelled from the Confederation.

³ France was a democratic republic until 1852, but was then transformed into a Napoleonic empire. See below, pp. 188-189.

pletely responsible to the parliaments which were set up. On the other hand, all three constitutions were equally Partially liberal (and not democratic) in that they imposed Liberal property qualifications for the exercise of the suf-Constitutions in frage and thereby restricted direct parliamentary rep-Holland

resentation to the upper and middle classes. and

Denmark In this latter sense, the Prussian constitution which Frederick William IV decreed in 1850 was "liberal." It pretended to base the choice of the lower chamber of the Prussian Partially Liberal parliament on the principle of universal manhood suf-Constitufrage, but by means of a complicated three-class system tion in of indirect election it actually limited the membership Prussia of the chamber to landlords and wealthy bourgeois. In Prussia, however, there was not even a pretense of ministerial responsibility. The constitution of 1850 recognized the divine right of the king not only to reign but also to rule. It empowered him to appoint all officials and ministers, to command the army, to name the majority of the upper chamber, and to veto any act of parliament. And presumably, as this constitution was decreed by the king "out of the plenitude of his power," it might be abrogated at any time by a similar exercise of monarchical authority. In fact, it remained the royal charter of Prussian government from 1850 to 1918.

Such were the enduring monuments of the revolution of 1848 in central Europe. They may appear slight in comparison with the noise and confusion which liberalism (and nationalism) made in that year from Sicily to Schleswig and from Holland to Hungary. We must remember, nevertheless, that the noise and confusion were out of proportion to the number of liberals, and in view of the basic strength and determination of the conservatives we might well wonder that liberalism left any monuments. There

can be no doubt that in central Europe, generally Continuspeaking, liberalism was discredited by its manifold ing Liber-al Movefailures in 1848, and during the ensuing decade liberal ment in actors were rarely seen on the public stage. Yet, be-Central Europe hind the scenes, liberalism was not dead. Its following, indeed, grew ever more numerous, as the Industrial Revolution proceeded. And if the liberals of the 1850's and 1860's were

less vocal than the liberals of 1848 had been, they were, indirectly and in the long run, more influential. We shall speak

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further of liberalism in central Europe when in the next chapter we discuss the development of nationalism. In the meantime we must indicate the forces which at this very time were opposing, or tending to modify, "pure liberalism."

5. THE OPPOSITION TO LIBERALISM

As one looks back over the "Victorian Compromise" in Britain from 1832 to 1865, over the bourgeois monarchy and the second republic in France from 1830 to 1852, and over the Summary revolutionary upheaval throughout central Europe in of Liberal 1848-1849, one is struck with many evidences of a ment in common liberalism which influenced all those phases Europe, 1830-1860 of European history. In Britain and France (and Belgium), in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Holland, and Denmark, liberalism was primarily a middle-class movement, led by romantic intellectuals and capitalistic industrialists, and pointing to a new society and a new polity, of which individualism (rather than class solidarity or "socialism") would be the cornerstone. The superstructure should be a group of free, national states, serving "the greatest good of the greatest number" of their citizens by allowing the utmost practicable freedom of thought and economic activity to everyone and by entrusting the conduct of government—constitutional, parliamentary, and responsible to persons of intelligence and property.

Nowhere was the ideal of liberalism completely realized. It came nearest to realization in Britain, where the Industrial Revolution and resulting urbanization were most ad-Specifivanced, where long existing political institutions were cally in peculiarly favorable to liberal adaptation, and where a large part of the nobility and the most articulate portion of the proletariat coöperated with the middle class. In Belgium, too, the ideal of liberalism came near to realization; here was a similarly intensive industrialization, and the presence of romantic nationalism and the importation of constitutional machinery (along with other machinery) from England largely compensated for the lack of indigenous parliamentary experience. In France, liberalism was a very real faith of the upper bourgeoisie, especially of the industrial bourgeoisie, but this class was proportionately less numerous in France than in Belgium or Britain, and for most

Frenchmen—nobles, clergymen, peasants, shopkeepers, and artisans-liberalism was not so much an inspiring faith as a seemingly necessary compromise between the aristocratic ideals of the old Bourbon monarchy and the democratic ideals of the First Republic. In central Europe, where machine In industry was distinctly backward and where there Central Europe had been little tradition of forceful opposition to noble landlords and divine-right monarchs, liberalism was earnestly championed by only a comparatively small number of persons, and the partial successes which it secured—in Sardinia, Prussia, the Dutch Netherlands, and Denmark—as well as the outright failures which attended it in Hungary, Italy, and Germany, were associated less with purely middle-class economic aspects of liberalism than with its popular patriotic aspects.

Wherever liberalism penetrated—in central Europe as well as in western Europe—there can be no doubt that it served as an important leaven in society and government, a leaven which kept on working after the Austrian repressions of 1849, after the subversion of the Second French Republic in 1852, after the formal termination of the "Victorian Compromise" in 1865. More and more, as time went on, the Industrial Revolution developed and the influence of the middle class increased with the masses and with the governments (whatever their form might be).

Industrialism and Individualism and Individualism and Individualism believes, breaking down traditional barriers of social and commercial intercourse, according an ever larger degree of religious toleration, and prompting an ever wider extension of public works and popular education.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that from the outset liberalism encountered various forces of opposition or criticism Kinds of Which in some instances quite suddenly halted its onward march and which in general gradually modified its nature and altered its course. Such paralyzing or qualifying forces were most obvious in central Europe, but they were by no means lacking in France and Britain. There were four principal kinds.

(1) Agrarian Opposition. This came from landlords, usually titled noblemen and country gentlemen, who for centuries had been in the habit of owning large agricultural estates, patroniz-

ing the peasants who were their tenants or laborers, serving as officers in the army or civil administration of a monarch who was normally a great landlord like themselves, and receiving from state and church many marks of favor rian Oppoand distinction. Landlords were apt to oppose liberalism. They objected to its economics, which preferred industry to agriculture, the factory town to the rural village, the individual to the class, competition to coöperation. They objected to its politics, which aimed not only at putting the despised urban middle class into power under the "revolutionary" banner of popular sovereignty and through novel constitutional limitations on monarchy and aristocracy, but also at conducting government as a business enterprise from which considerations of private charity and benevolence should be excluded.

In Britain agrarian opposition to liberalism was mild and not very effective. British landlords were accustomed to parliamentary government and to some public guaranty of individual liberty, and many of them were identified in Britain one way or another with the Industrial Revolution.

What opposition there was, was evinced mainly by the right wing of the Tory (Conservative) party and took the form of unsuccessful attempts to prevent the reform of parliament in 1832 and the repeal of the corn laws in 1846, or of more successful efforts to enact factory legislation which would exemplify the continuing paternalistic interest of aristocrats in social welfare and at the same time harass middle-class manufacturers. Such tireless critics of economic liberalism as Michael Sadler and the Earl of Shaftesbury were ardent Tories; and it was chiefly the outcome of their endeavors and those of like-minded landlords, not only that middle-class liberals had to share permanently with aristocratic conservatives the actual conduct of British government, but also that British liberalism had to surrender its extreme demands for laissez-faire in industrial relations. It is also noteworthy that Tory landlords, who were most vehemently nationalist, contributed a good deal, through their patriotic appeals to the masses, to preserve the traditional pageantry (if not always the substance) of monarchy, aristocracy, and a decorous established church, and to counteract the anti-imperialist and pacifist tendencies of radical liberalism.

In France, by a strange paradox, agrarian opposition to liberal-

ism was less effective from aristocrats and more effective from peasants. Most French noblemen were Legitimists, who, unlike their Tory brethren of England, were basically In France hostile to any parliamentary régime and unyieldingly loyal to the pre-revolutionary organization of society and government. But they had lost much landed property and popular prestige during the great French Revolution, and the attempt of Charles X, their friend and ally, to rehabilitate them had cost him his throne in the July Revolution of 1830. Thereafter they continued as a polite and exclusive sect, criticizing the bourgeois state and the bourgeois tendencies of the new age, and looking forward, always in vain, for a restoration of the "good old times." From their ranks came such anti-bourgeois social reformers as the Vicomte de Villeneuve-Bargemont and the Vicomte de Melun, and by their clamors against "liberal" monarchy they indirectly helped to create the Second French Republic and then the Second Napoleonic Empire.

But agrarian interests in France, if lacking aristocratic leadership, were impressed on bourgeois liberal consciousness by the mass of peasants among whom the great French Revolution had distributed a large part of landed property. Most of these peasant proprietors were "liberal" in their own fashion. They were foes of aristocracy and privilege, and friends of parliamentary government and private property; and they were sufficiently indifferent if not inimical to the urban proletariat to share the bourgeois capitalists' distaste for any labor legislation that might be labelled "socialist." Nevertheless, as farmers, they opposed the economic favors which bourgeois liberals would confer on industry, and as small property owners they resented the monopoly of political power which the same bourgeois liberals would entrust to large property owners. The French peasants were numerous enough, moreover, to constitute a powerful rudder in steering liberalism in their country, in the long run, away from free trade and toward agricultural protectionism, away from oligarchy and toward democracy. They were a force at once conservative and democratic, but not strictly "liberal."

In central Europe the agrarian opposition to liberalism was most pronounced. Here, it was voiced in subdued tones by peasant proprietors of southern Germany and of Italy, like those of France, and in stentorian tones by owners of great landed estates

in northern Germany (especially Prussia) and the Austrian Empire. 1 These agricultural magnates had the philosophy of French Legitimists and the practical civil and military experience of British Tories; unlike the former, they still had Europe wealth, prestige, and large personal followings, and, unlike the latter, they had only contempt for parliamentary government and written guaranties of individual liberty. The result was that they were bitterly antagonistic to the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 and strong and resourceful enough to subdue it. To guard against a recurrence of any such upheaval, they organized Conservative parties in Prussia and Austria in 1840-1850 and conducted popular propaganda against liberalism through governmental machinery which they operated and through journals which they founded (of which the Prussian Kreuzzeitung was the most celebrated and influential). In Austria they thought it expedient to acquiesce in the abolition of serfdom, and in Prussia they reluctantly accepted the constitution which Frederick William IV decreed in 1850; but further social or political concessions to liberalism they would not make. Indeed, the most conservative of them—the so-called "Feudalists"-found fault with monarchs for conceding anything to revolution or liberalism, and proclaimed their own devotion to a "new feudalism" under which agriculture, industry, commerce, and the professions would be organized in corporations with a large measure of political as well as economic autonomy. The Feudalists hated and ridiculed liberalism. One of them defined it as "heads and dollars!-each man's head as long, as broad, and as thick as anyone else's; each man's dollar as bright, as round, and as hard as anyone else's-and from heads and dollars is built a revolutionary, bureaucratic, anti-Christian machine!" 2

(2) Religious Opposition. It should be borne in mind that parallel with the development of liberalism during the first half of the nineteenth century went a noteworthy revival of Christi-

² Ludwig von Gerlach, speaking in the Prussian Parliament in 1853. The political philosophy of the Feudalists and other ultra-Conservatives received classic expres-

sion in the writings of Karl Ludwig von Haller (1768-1854).

¹ The situation in Hungary was peculiar. Magyar magnates joined bourgeois liberals in the patriotic struggle of r848-r849 against Austrian domination of Hungary, but the magnates retained a preponderant influence in the Hungarian Diet and used it for essentially illiberal purposes.

anity. The intellectual class, which in the eighteenth century had been impregnated with scepticism about any supernatural religion, now furnished numerous apologists for dog-2. Relimatic Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant, and gious Op-position many of the bourgeoisie as well as of the nobility resumed worship in their traditional churches. The majority of the bourgeois churchgoers seem to have managed to be "religious" and "liberal" at the same time. Convinced of the truth of liberal economics and of the desirability of liberal politics, they thought of religion as a purely private concern of each individual and as hardly applicable to public or business affairs. In their opinion, clergymen could and should combine the gospel of individual thrift, free competition, and parliamentary government with the gospel of eternal salvation. Clergymen who did so might properly continue to be entrusted with the conduct of public schools and even salaried by the state, but otherwise the liberal bourgeoisie, while "religious," would be tempted to be "anti-clerical." And many clergymen, particularly among the Radical Christian sects in Britain and among the Calvinist churches of Scotland, Holland, Switzerland, and Hungary, were sincere supporters of political and economic liberalism.

But many Christian clergymen and many lay believers were opponents of liberalism in one way or another. Some of the opposition was to the "un-Christian" implications of economic liberalism—its materialism, its selfishness, its wilful nomic neglect of the poor, its condemnation of private charatypects ity. This kind of opposition was expressed in Britain by the "Christian Socialists" (chiefly clergymen of the Anglican Church, like Kingsley and Maurice), in France by the "Social Catholics" (including Villeneuve-Bargemont and Ozanam), and in Germany by certain Lutheran clergymen and most vigorously by a famous Catholic bishop of Mainz, Baron von Ketteler (1811–1877), who enlisted a large number of his coreligionists in a crusade in behalf of trade unionism, labor legislation, and other "radical" social reforms.

Another part of the religious opposition, especially marked on the Continent, was to the political aspects of liberalism. Some Christians thought it not democratic enough; others thought it

¹ On the religious revival of the early nineteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 741-743, and below, pp. 155-156, 436.

too democratic; and Christians of diametrically opposite views on what should be the form of modern government were prone to agree that the "liberal state" was not Political a "Christian state." Democratic criticism of the nar-Aspects rowly middle-class character of political liberalism was intensified and strengthened by the activity of so-called "liberal Catholics" (who should more appropriately be termed "democratic Catholics") in France, Belgium, Ireland, and southern Germany. On the other hand, reactionary criticism of limited monarchy, parliamentary government, individual liberty, and the whole doctrine of political liberalism was voiced by Lutheran Feudalists in Prussia, by Catholic Legitimists in France, and by most of the upper classes elsewhere, who were Christian as well as agrarian and whose attacks on liberalism were curiously compounded of economic interest and religious idealism. Pope Gregory XVI (1830-1846) issued several encyclicals against "liberalism," and in political conviction and action he was ultra-conservative. His successor, Pius IX (1846-1878), was at first, as we have seen, rather favorably disposed toward political liberalism, but after his first practical experience with revolutionaries at Rome in 1848 he condemned the "new liberalism" and found fault with "modern progress." 1 Individual Catholics went on being democratic or even liberal, but the weight of authority in the Catholic Church, like the weight of opinion in the Lutheran Church (and to a lesser extent in the Anglican Church), was in formal opposition to principles and practices dear to mid-nineteenth-century liberalism

(3) Democratic and "Socialist" Opposition. While political liberalism was assailed from one side by reactionaries, who would have no parliamentary régime, it was attacked from 3. Democratic and the opposite side by radicals, who would establish a Socialist parliamentary régime that would be thoroughly demo-Opposition cratic. A large part of this democratic radicalism, especially on the Continent, was an heritage from the eighteenth century—from general "humanitarianism," from the From political philosophy of Rousseau, from the American Radicals Revolution, and, most specifically, from the Jacobinism of the First French Republic. As such, it was reënforced

¹ Papal condemnations of "liberalism" were resumed in the celebrated Syllabus of Errors which Pius IX issued in 1864. See below, pp. 422-423.

in the first half of the nineteenth century by the growing romantic concern of intellectuals with the "people" and the "nation." Its apostles were usually liberal in general philosophy, but they constituted a left wing of the liberal movement. Alike as humanitarians, romantics, and logicians, they were impelled to teach that the doctrine of popular sovereignty justified, not a parliamentary franchise limited by property qualifications, as rightwing liberals contended, but universal manhood suffrage. Some went so far as to condemn limited monarchy along with limited suffrage and to espouse republicanism as well as democracy.

suffrage and to espouse republicanism as well as democracy.

Radical (democratic) liberalism commanded the largest following in France, where the traditions of "liberty, equality, and fraternity" were peculiarly strong and vital. The Parisian shopkeepers and artisans who coöperated with the upper bourgeoisie in overthrowing Charles X in 1830; the parliamentary minority who criticized the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe and Guizot; intellectual radicals and many members of the lower middle class and the peasantry who supported the republic of 1848; all these were disciples of democratic liberalism. And to them were added, as supporters of democracy, if not of liberalism, a goodly number of ardent Catholics and, temporarily for purposes of expediency, some Legitimists who were less fearful of popular democracy than of bourgeois liberalism.

Elsewhere on the Continent, the democratic spirit was less influential. It was not strong enough in Belgium, prior to 1880, to arouse any serious agitation in favor of universal manhood suffrage. And the attempts at democratic government and republicanism which it abetted in Germany and Italy in 1848–1849 were quite abortive.

In Great Britain, democracy was advocated by some liberal "radicals" like Jeremy Bentham and John Bright, and likewise by some Irish revolutionaries. In Britain, however, its chief advocacy was on the part of urban proletarians, who made up the rank and file of the Chartist movement of the 1840's. The Chartist movement, as we have seen, failed to shake the "Victorian Compromise" or the conviction of capitalistic liberals that the parliamentary suffrage should

¹ From 1831 to 1893, the number of voters in Belgium did not exceed 150,000, out of a total population of from 3,500,000 (in 1830) to 6,000,000 (in 1890).

be rigidly restricted to persons of property. Yet almost instinctively the mass of factory laborers and mine workers in Britain felt, even when they were silent, that, just as a restricted suffrage enabled the capitalist class to serve its special economic interests, so their own economic lot could and would be bettered if, through universal manhood suffrage, they were enabled to exert a direct influence on the conduct of government and the shaping of public policies. The urban proletariat was naturally democratic, and numerically it was growing faster than any other class.

As the Industrial Revolution spread out from Britain, it gave rise to a similar sort of urban proletariat, with similar democratic aspirations, in every country which it penetrated. This meant that after 1830 the earlier philosophical and liberal democracy was supplemented and reoriented by a democratic movement among workingmen for social ends not wholly in keeping with economic liberalism. Workingmen were critical of a From passive-policeman state which protected private property (of which they had none) and permitted a freedom under which capital was multiplied (while they themselves might starve). They desired a state which would actively intervene in the business of its citizens, restraining the capitalists and promoting the material welfare of the "toiling masses."

In response to the trend of thought among "radical" proletarians, "socialist" movements appeared in the 1840's: utopian coöperative socialism of Owen in Britain and of Varieties Fourier and Cabet in France; Christian socialism of of Social-Kingsley and Maurice and social Catholicism of Villeneuve-Bargemont, Ozanam, and Melun; the state socialism of a few of the Chartist leaders in Britain and of Louis Blanc, with his "national workshops," in France. Most of these socialist movements were unimpressive in immediate achievement. Louis Blanc's, which secured the largest popular support of any, was wiped out in blood during the "June days" of 1848.

Yet, in contradiction to the idea of "individualism" entertained by liberals, an ideal of "socialism" entered permanently into European consciousness. And it became usual to link the ideal of "socialism" with that of political democracy.

It must be emphasized that prior to 1865 "socialism" did not signify a definite or detailed program. Karl Marx did expound as early as 1848 the particular socialism which was to make a

big stir in the last decades of the nineteenth century; but prior to 1865 few persons knew anything about Marx or Marxian socialism. "Socialism" was then a very general word, connoting in the popular mind almost anything which was manifestly opposed to "individualism." As such, it was anathema to doctrinaire liberals, but not necessarily so to benevolent aristocrats or even to bourgeois humanitarians. It proved to be a curiously subtle weapon against middle-class economics and politics.

In time, democratic and "socialist" opposition to liberalism was to be more effective than agrarian or religious opposition not in destroying liberalism but in modifying it. In fact, agrarians and Christians gradually perceived an advantage to themselves in championing the cause of the masses against that of the middle class; and leaders of the liberal middle class, not to be outdone in bidding for popular support, eventually vied with aristocrats and clergymen in making concessions to democracy and "socialism." Thereby, middle-class liberalism, as it flourished between 1830 and 1865, was subverted and merged in a new, and in many respects quite different, kind of democratic, socially minded liberalism. The story of this change belongs to a later chapter,² though it may here be remarked that the change could not have been what it was without the development of that democratic opposition to liberalism which we have outlined in the preceding paragraphs.

(4) Nationalist Opposition. Most liberals were patriots. The right of national self-determination seemed to them an obvious corollary to the right of individual self-determination, and they envisaged a happy world in which every nationality, endowed with an independent state and a liberal government, would freely compete with every other in industry and trade, in moral culture and material prosperity. Most of the liberals, moreover, were pacifists—at least in theory—and they honestly hoped to bring about the new world-order of national liberal states without serious sacrifice of human life or destruction of private property.

In practice, however, the nationalizing of Europe turned out to be a vastly more arduous and costly undertaking than most

¹ On Karl Marx and his "scientific socialism," see below, pp. 374-380.

² See below, pp. 308-312.

liberals had imagined. The existing state-system in central and eastern Europe was not nationalist, and its traditional governing classes, including the numerous and increasingly efficient civil and military services, were apt to be defenders of the status quo. To break up large empires (like the Austrian) into their component national parts, or to weld small fragments of a nationality (like the Italian or the German) into a single national state, required, as the event proved, repeated popular uprisings and international wars. To make a people zealous for Nationalinsurrection or war, it was necessary to inculcate in ism Not Compatthem a sense of solidarity and an enthusiasm for ible with military heroism which were subversive of the rugged Liberal Pacifism individualism and the idealistic pacifism that liberals extolled. In other words, liberals themselves helped to create a

situation which tended to modify, if not to destroy, liberalism. But patriotism was no monopoly of liberals. By the middle of the nineteenth century it was a powerful emotional force with all sorts of persons in western and central Europe. In National-

Britain, Tory landlords and Anglican clergymen and a ism Es-"liberal" statesman like Palmerston could make tell-


poused by

ing patriotic appeals to the mass of their countrymen against the pacifist and anti-imperialist tendencies of such doctrinaire liberals as Cobden and Bright. In France, Thiers could do irreparable harm to the bourgeois monarchy by criticizing the unpatriotic foreign policy of Louis Philippe and Guizot, and Prince Louis Napoleon by waving the banner of nationalism could rally almost the whole nation to his presidency and eventually to his personal dictatorship. In Germany, the conservatives repressed liberalism but they adopted nationalism; they subsequently succeeded, where the liberals had failed, in establishing a national state, and a grateful people turned, apparently forever, from liberalism to conservatism. Even in Italy, where liberals, defeated in 1848-1849, would try again and at last accomplish national unity, nationalism would some time eclipse liberalism.

Nationalism, democracy, "socialism," traditional religion, and agrarian interests—all these contributed to undermine liberalism. Yet middle-class liberalism, intellectual, political, and social, had a great vogue in Europe with radical leaders of thought and progressive captains of industry from 1830 to at least 1865. It left to later generations, moreover, an imposing legacy—a lessening of class distinctions, an emphasis upon individualism, a

Abiding fashion of written constitutions, guaranties of perLegacy sonal liberties, limited monarchy, representative parliamentary government, ministerial responsibility, a
tradition of free trade, a dream of international peace,
and a slogan of national self-determination. The
legacy remained—and liberals remained—long after 1865. But
after 1865 liberalism as a movement was merged in other
movements.

One of the great movements which was steadily developing between 1830 and 1865 and which subsequently absorbed a good deal of historic liberalism was nationalism. To this, we shall give attention in the following chapter.



CHAPTER XVII

ROMANTICISM AND NATIONALISM

I. THE HEYDAY OF ROMANTICISM, 1830-1878



ARKING the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century was a curious era in European history. It was then that the Industrial Revolution developed and spread and that economic and political liberalism arose. It was then, also, that cultural romanticism flourished.

Leaders of thought and wealth and fashion might be concerned with the establishment of parliamentary government, with the discovery of "laws" of political economy, or with the operation of a factory or a railway; they might seemingly be absorbed in mechanical inventions, in rows of figures about production and shipping, private income and public expenditure, or in other details of material "progress." Most of them, however, had po-Poetical etry, as well as prose, in their souls, and they were not so absorbed in factual routine as to be precluded from delightful flights of fancy. Industrial capitalists, of course, tried to be wholly mundane about their business affairs, and liberal parliamentarians were famed for the seriousness with which they debated national budgets and the responsibility of ministers. Yet outside office-hours, so to speak, even the most conscientious and most profit-seeking individuals were wont to indulge, along with less weighty persons, in the most romantic moods and tastes. Perhaps to the middle classes, as to proletarians and landlords, romanticism afforded welcome relief or necessary escape from a world of machinery, commodities, ledgers, and parliamentary majorities. At any rate, romanticism was fashionable. It was the cultural mode of the era.

Romanticism had appeared in the eighteenth century as a rival of long-established "classicism" in literature and in painting. During the first three decades of the nineteenth century,

it had extended its scope and influence and fought a more even battle with "classicism." Now, in the era from 1830 to 1878, Rise of it all but routed its old rival and put its own impress not only upon literature, architecture, painting, sculpture, and music, but also upon scholarship and philosophy and religion, upon household arts and personal manners.

Romanticism was no simple or single phenomenon, and its influences were as complex as its elements were diverse. No two of its apostles were exactly alike, and between some of them wide chasms yawned. Among its disciples were liberals and conservatives, revolutionaries and reactionaries, authors of scholarly tomes and authors of voluminous fiction, deeply religious persons and vehemently anti-religious persons, those who were severely conventional in morals and those who were not conventional at all. The two things on which all romantics agreed were: (1) that sentiment and emotion should be prized as guides to what is "true"; and (2) that the "beautiful" should be sought in departure from

In other words, romanticism, when reduced to the lowest common denominator, was a reaction against the "rationalism" and "classicism" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It called for "different" forms of thinking and doing. But what should be the substance of romantic thought or art? Toward what positive end should the romantic "react"? On these questions there was no consensus of opinion. Romanticism was not a unified movement. It was rather a confederation of movements, loosely bound together by silken threads of feeling and sentiment—perhaps sentimentality.

classical rules and models.

Some romantics, reacting against "rationalism" and "classicism," turned to the "natural" for what was true and to the "primitive" for what was beautiful. Others, in their reaction, turned for like stimulus to the "historical," and frequently to the "medieval." Still others found inspiration in an imaginary utopia of the future or in an exciting quest for "freedom" in the present. A few took to cultivating art just for "art's sake," and a larger number seemed to enter-

¹ On romanticism in the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 565-566, 570-572. On romanticism from 1800 to 1830, see Vol. I, pp. 734-751.

tain a fondness for revolution for the sake of revolution, or for reform for the sake of change. Many derived pleasure from a melancholy pose and the shedding of tears. Finally, patriotic emotions entered freely into the complex of things which made up romanticism.

With these general reflections in mind, we may now consider in some detail the varied aspects of romantic culture during the era from 1830 to 1878. We shall concern ourselves first with developments in the fine arts (including literature); next, with parallel developments in scholarship, especially in historiography and the social sciences.

It was perhaps in national literature that romanticism was most strikingly and most variously expressed. During the era from 1830 to 1878 romantic literature flourished all over Europe, not merely in Britain and Germany, Romantic where it represented a continuation of eighteenth-century romanticism, but also in Latin and Slavic countries, where it was less indigenous but hardly less popular. It was exemplified everywhere by poets and novelists.

In Britain, the earlier romantic poetry of Coleridge and Wordsworth, of Byron, Shelley, and Keats, was now succeeded by the romantic poetry of Robert Browning (1812-1889) and Alfred Tennyson (1809-1892). Browning adhered in general to the "naturalist" tradition of Wordsworth, but he infused "nature" with bourgeois morality and invested it with a dramatic revolutionary quality, and he displayed at times a special fondness for the grotesque, Browning even for the horrible. His most famed poems were the fanciful Pippa Passes (1841), Rabbi Ben Ezra (1864) in praise of self-formed character, and The Ring and the Book (1869), a series of dramatic monologues on an historic Italian murder. It may be remarked that Browning's wife, Elizabeth Barrett (1806-1861), was peculiarly fervent in her romanticism—in her qualms about leaving her queer father, in her passionate love for Browning, immortalized in her Sonnets from the Portuguese, and in the sentimentality with which she protested against child labor in England and championed the cause of Italian nationalism and Prince Louis Napoleon. Tennyson was an even bigger figure among his contemporaries. He sang the glories of the new industry, the coming of perpetual peace on the heels of free trade, the heroic virtues of English patriotism, the noble courtly exploits of such legendary medieval characters as King Arthur, Sir Galahad, and the Lady of Shalott. Tennyson was a highly cultured Englishman and possessed a wizardry of words. No wonder that the classes and the masses read his verse with avidity, and that Queen Victoria (and the Prince-Consort Albert) admired him and made him poet laureate.

In the case of the English novel, the eighteenth-century Richardson, with his sentimental romanticism, had already been followed by Sir Walter Scott with his historical ro-English Fiction manticism. And at the height of Scott's career were born four persons who, in the succeeding generation, established themselves, in different ways and varying degrees, as the chief English novelists of the era of liberalism and industrialization. (1) William Makepeace Thackeray (1811-Thackerav 1863), born at Calcutta in India, found favor by satirizing the artificial upper classes in his Book of Snobs and Vanity Fair (1848), by his Henry Esmond (1852), an historical novel of the War of the Spanish Succession, and by The Newcomes (1854), a character study of a gallant army officer against the background of the British empire in India. (2) Charles Dickens Dickens (1812-1870), the son of a lower middle-class father who was so unheedful of the provident admonitions of liberal economists as to be imprisoned for debt, proved to be the most original and the most voraciously read of all this group of novelists. He became the humorous, sympathetic portrayer of the whole lower middle class of contemporary England, beginning with the immortal Pickwick F. ers (1837) and continuing through Nicholas Nickleby (1839), Dombey and Son (1846), David Copperfield (1850), etc. His Oliver Twist was a particularly telling exposé of the wretched condition of the poor in Britain, and his Tale of Two Cities was a moving story of the French Revolution. Dickens was very English in his patriotism, in his affection for good old national customs, and in his distaste for religious nonconformity. He was quite radical in his zeal for the reform of iustice and education and in his denunciation of the oppression of the poor by the rich, of the weak by the strong. He loathed selfish individualism, but he was sufficiently under the spell of current liberalism to represent the most unfortunate of his

characters as becoming wholly fortunate through the simple device of emigrating from England to the colonies.

(3) Charles Reade (1814-1884), son of a Tory squire and in turn student and fellow at Oxford, acquired fame by his romantic tale of Peg Woffington (1853), and then, in the spirit of such Tory social reformers as Sadler and Shaftesbury, he wrote a series of novels dealing with the need of reform in prisons, in insane asylums, and in the merchant marine. His most celebrated work. The Cloister and the Hearth (1861), was an historical novel dealing with the early life of the sixteenth-century humanist Erasmus and betraying a marked predilection for the "interior life" of evangelical Protestantism. (4) Mary Ann Evans, better known by her pen-name of George Eliot (1819-1880), reacted violently against the severely conventional training of her childhood and grew up with peculiar prejudices about religion and morality which she freely expressed in her books and which render them less popular nowadays than they were in her own time. Yet George Eliot's romantic novels of Adam Bede (1859), The Mill on the Floss (1860), and Silas Marner (1861) still afford us a better insight into the life of common people in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution than we can obtain from any textbook.

Outside the ranks of poets and novelists, several great British writers were outstanding exponents of literary romanticism. For example, Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) in his essays, Other histories, and biographies displayed at once a mysti-English Prose cism, a sardonic humor, a hero worship, an appreciation of German idealist philosophy, and a political radicalism which were indicative of conflicting tendencies of his Carlyle age and yet all of which were essentially romantic. A more strictly liberal romanticism was exemplified by Lord Macaulay (1800-1859), a Whig proponent of the Macaulay Reform Act of 1832 and of thoroughgoing economic liberalism. He wrote elaborate and richly worded history to demonstrate to the emotions as well as to the reason that England was the home of liberty and that the Whig party was primarily responsible for liberty in England. Then, too, John Henry Newman (1800-1890), Oxford teacher and preacher, not only wrote beautiful prose (and a famous hymn) in the romantic manner but also was inspired by his studies of church history

and his fear of intellectual liberalism to assume the leader
Newman ship of the so-called Oxford (high church or AngloCatholic) movement of the 1830's within the Church of England, and subsequently, through his own conversion to the
Catholic Church (1845), to contribute to the revival of Catholic Christianity in Britain. Still another kind of romantic was John Ruskin (1819–1900), master of sonorous prose and earnest preacher of honest work and æsthetic appreciation.

French literature of the era was likewise rich, and predominantly romantic. Perhaps the outstanding genius was Victor Hugo (1802-1885), the son of a French general in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. He began his lit-Fiction erary career in the shadow of Chateaubriand, writing romantic poetry about the twilight, about the leaves of autumn, and also a play about Cromwell. Then, in 1830, he brought out his famous romantic drama of Hernani, the produc-Hugo tion of which on the Paris stage led to riotous demonstrations on the part of its classicist critics. Hugo wrote several other dramas, but he achieved his greatest contemporary fame by his historical novels, Notre Dame de Paris (a medieval story) and Ninety-Three (a tale of the French Revolution), and by Les Misérables, which dealt with the characters and actions of common people of his own day. Hugo was an intellectual liberal and a political democrat; he did not like the bourgeois monarchy, and, though a fervent panegyrist of Napoleon I, he was contemptuous of Prince Louis Napoleon and exiled himself from France during the latter's ascendancy.1


A peculiarly interesting romantic was Alexandre Dumas (1802–1870), similarly the son of a general in the French revolutionary

Dumas war, but the grandson of a West Indian negress. He was a thrilling person—passionate, boastful, always getting into scrapes, yet always writing at breakneck speed. A prodigious number of exciting volumes he turned out—plays, short stories, novels. His masterpiece, The Three Musketeers, was published in 1844. Dumas was an untamed Jacobin, who

¹ See the portrait of Hugo, facing p. 188, below.

Note. The portrait opposite is of Newman when he was a young man, by an English artist, George Richmond (1809–1896).





rejoiced at the overthrow of the Bourbon-Orleanist king in 1848 and the erection of the Second French Republic.

Far greater than Dumas or Hugo in the portrayal of individual character was Honoré de Balzac (1799–1850). Balzac came, like Dickens, from the lower middle class, and the "de" Balzac in his name was not a sign of nobility but rather of the romanticism which impelled him to pretend that he was noble. Balzac began as an admirer and imitator of Sir Walter Scott, but his powers of observation were greater and his interests were different; and he soon showed an originality and a genius of his own in depicting all sorts of second-rate persons among the French bourgeoisie of his day. The numerous volumes of Balzac's Human Comedy constitute a marvellous panorama of the vices and weaknesses, the stupidities and foibles, of the middle class in the 1840's, when the Industrial Revolution was permeating France and influencing the public policies of the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe.

A fourth French novelist of the era should be mentioned—a woman who was even more romantic than her predecessor, Madame de Staël 1—Madame Aurore Dupin Dudevant, known best by her pen-name of George Sand (1804–1876).² George Sand diverted herself with a succession of George Sand tuberculous young men whom she caught firmly and played with briefly, but her real occupation was the pouring out of innumerable volumes of fiction which enjoyed a great but fleeting vogue. Some were deeply characterized by the spirit of revolt against moral and social arrangements. Some were pseudophilosophical or pseudo-psychological. Some were autobiographical and hence very romantic. Some were quite melodramatic.

Among the nostalgic young men whom George Sand commandeered was Alfred de Musset (1810–1857), who wrote poetry in the Byronic manner, both passionate and graceful; a patriotic outburst of his muse about the River Rhine brought dozens of challenges to duels from German army officers. Of other French poets of the

¹ See Vol. I, p. 747.

² George Sand's paternal grandfather was a natural son of Louis XV and her paternal grandmother was a natural daughter of Maurice de Saxe, who was a natural son of Augustus the Strong of Saxony. George's father was an army officer and her mother was the daughter of a Paris bird-fancier. A romantic pedigree!

Note. The portrait bust opposite, of Balzac, is by the French sculptor, Auguste Rodin (1840-1917). On Rodin, see below, pp. 412-413.

period, note may be taken of Leconte de Lisle (1818–1894),

French
Poetry:
Musset,
Lisle,
Baudelaire

who sought inspiration in Celtic and Oriental sources
and found pessimism; and Charles Baudelaire (1821–
1867), whose Fleurs du Mal with their perversity
shocked the morally respectable but charmed the
romantically inclined with their sound and imagery.

German literature was much less important in the middle of the nineteenth century than it had been in the preceding age of Goethe, Schiller, Herder, and Lessing, but what there was of it was predominantly romantic and patriotic. Heine (1797–1856) wrote his charming travel-books and most of his exquisite lyrics just prior to 1830; afterwards he lived, a rebellious exile, at Paris. Only Uhland (1787–1862), with his medieval ballads and collections of folk-songs, remained as a first-rate representative of German poetry. Of German prose writers, the best, or any rate the most characteristic, was Gustav Freytag (1816–1895), author of a famous comedy, Die Journalisten (1852), of a celebrated romance of German commercialism, Soll und Haben (1855), and of essays and historical novels.

Italian literature, on the other hand, developed greatly from the "classicism" of Alfieri and the "romanticism" of Foscolo, and, whether its form was classical or romantic, its subject-matter was increasingly nationalist. Leopardi (1798–1837) was a Shelley-like person, devoted to Literature classical themes and classical verse-forms, but radical, patriotic, unhappy, and pessimistic. His lyrics are among the finest in the Italian language. Manzoni (1785-1873) turned from a discipleship of Voltaire and eighteenth-century "enlightenment" to an apostleship of nineteenth-century nationalism and romanticism, tinged with a sentimental regard for historic Catholicism. produced distinguished poetry and, in I Promessi Sposi, the greatest Italian novel of the century. He was an ardent patriot, and Verdi's Requiem was a personal and national tribute to him on his death. D'Azeglio (1798-1866), a nobleman and liberal statesman like Cavour, wrote several historical novels, and De Sanctis (1818–1883), an exponent of Hegelian philosophy, alternated æsthetic criticism with impassioned eulogies of the leaders of Italian national freedom and unity.

In Russia, also, literature became significant in quality and

quite romantic in style and mood. In the footsteps of Pushkin ¹ followed three great novelists. (1) Gogol (1809–1852) published his masterpiece, Dead Souls, in 1842; it Russian comprised a series of humorous, unflattering sketches of Russian provincial society. Gogol, in later life, became a devotee of religion and mysticism. (2) Turgeniev (1818–1883), a contemporary of Dickens, Hugo, and De Sanctis, was melancholy and pessimistic; he wrote with pathos of abuses in Russian society, and his masterpiece, Fathers and Children (1862), treated of the revolutionary agitation which was then gathering headway in Russia. (3) Dostoievski (1821–1881) was perhaps the most romantic of this group. He liked common people and he perceived much good in the midst of poverty and evil. He was patriotic and thought the Russian peasantry superior to every other class in society. Among his famous books were Poor People (1846) and Crime and Punishment (1866).

Contemporary with the Russian novelist Gogol was the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855)—the national poet of nineteenth-century Poland. Mickiewicz dealt in his verse with the medieval prowess of Polish arms, with the good old customs of Polish nobles and gentlemen, and with the natural beauty of Polish skies and wicz forests. He was an intense patriot and, becoming professor of Slavic literature at the Collège de France in 1840, he devoted his last years to mystical propaganda among his own countrymen and among both liberals and Catholics in western Europe. He died in 1855 at Constantinople, where he was assembling a Polish "legion" to fight with France and England against Russia in the Crimean War.

What has been said of poets and prose writers during the era from 1830 to 1878 in Polish, Russian, Italian, German, French, and English, may be said in general of lesser literary lights who contemporaneously contributed to other Vogue of European literatures—Scandinavian, Czech, Magyar, Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese. Their poems, novels, dramas, and essays likewise reflected the current interest in common people, in national history, in medieval customs, in the "good old days," or in "local color" or sentimental grief or natural beauty or glorious liberty. Romanticism was the

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 747-748.

prevailing mood, and patriotism the outstanding object of solicitude.

Architecture, from its very nature, was more conservative than literature. During the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth, when literature was beginning to re-Architecflect the new romanticism, architecture had remained ture Less Romantic staunchly true to the older traditions of classicism. than Clas-The romantic writing of Richardson, Rousseau, and sicist in Form Goethe, of Chateaubriand, Byron, and Schlegel, had been parallelled by the neo-classical building of the Bourbon and Napoleonic periods; and the use of classical models for new national monuments in America and England, as well as in France, had promised permanently to house the concededly romantic spirit of the new nationalism in temples of severely classical form. In England, it is true, a few attempts had been made in the eighteenth century to depart from time-honored patterns of classical architecture and to adopt other modelseither Chinese or the so-called "Gothic"—but the results were regarded by most contemporary "people of taste" as merely freakish.1

From 1830, however, the sway of classical architecture was challenged by a considerable "Gothic revival," a going back for

Romantic Architecture: the "Gothic Revival" inspiration, not to the domes and columns of classical antiquity, but to the pinnacles and towers and pointed arches of the middle ages. To the strengthening and spread of romantic influence was due the interesting fact that medieval architecture, which artists and

intellectuals for the past three hundred years had despised, became fashionable once more in the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century.

A prominent leader of the Gothic revival was Augustus Pugin (1812–1852), a native of London and the son of a French father

As early as 1740 Chinese pagodas were being built in English gardens in the midst of classical surroundings. Presently, fantastic "Gothic" tea-houses appeared, symbolizing the ideals of rusticity and primitiveness which were becoming fashionable in literature and philosophy. The first modern Gothic building of any pretentiousness was the country residence of Horace Walpole, a son of Sir Robert Walpole and an enthusiastic admirer of the middle ages and author of the first "Gothic romance"—The Castle of Otranto (1764). Walpole's building (1753-1776), a jumble of "castellated" battlements and details copied from various medieval castles, was imitated by several other English aristocrats, notably for Fonthill Abbey (1706-1814) and Eaton Hall (1803-1814).

and an English mother. As a boy he conceived an enthusiasm for everything medieval, an enthusiasm which his later reception into the Catholic Church tended to confirm. Pugin designed "medieval" scenery for romantic operas; he designed furniture in the medieval style for Windsor Castle; he designed several new Gothic church buildings. At the same time began a marked interest in "ritualism" in the Anglican Church, and the study of church architecture in relation to ritual arrangements. The religious revival in general, and the "ritualist" movement in particular, thus combined with the energetic propaganda and artistic ability of Pugin to render "Gothic" the seemingly appropriate style for ecclesiastical architecture. And almost simultaneously John Ruskin was appealing eloquently for a broader utilization of medieval architecture. In his Seven Lamps of Architecture (1849) and his Stones of Venice (1851) Ruskin contended that modern art should re- Ruskin's turn to the methods as well as the forms of medieval art, and this for moral as well as religious and ritualistic reasons. The individual craftsman would be en- chitecture abled to free himself from modern machine industry and aid modern society to attain to true beauty. For true beauty, Ruskin proclaimed, lay not in abstract "classical" qualities, such as proportion and restraint, but in honesty of materials and of structure and in evidence of personal devotion and enthusiasm. Ruskin failed to shake modern industrialism. but he succeeded in communicating to many a modern industrialist an admiration for medieval architecture.

The "Gothic revival" in England was exemplified most strikingly in the rebuilding of the palace at Westminster, with the houses of Parliament, which was accomplished, under the guidance of Sir Charles Barry, Revival in between 1840 and 1860. It was further exemplified at Manchester, the centre of the cotton industry and of economic liberalism, by the court-house (1859–1864) and the town hall (1868–1869); and at London by the national law courts (1868–1884). Lord Palmerston, with his "classical" background and his great political prestige, managed, it is true, to force the rejection of a Gothic design for the new Foreign Office in favor of a classical scheme. But until the 1870's, Gothic architecture was being more and more employed

throughout Britain for public buildings and private manor-houses as well as for churches.

In France the "Gothic revival" was championed by Viollet-le-Duc (1814–1879), a native of Paris and an especially appreciative Gothic reader of Victor Hugo's Notre Dame de Paris (1831). Revival in He became a distinguished architect, scientist, and France: scholar, and was employed by the successive French governments of Louis Philippe and Louis Napoleon to "restore" many a medieval building which had fallen into decay or ruin. One of Viollet-le-Duc's major achievements was the restoration of the Gothic cathedral of Notre Dame at Paris; another was the preparation of a monumental Dictionary of French Architecture from the 11th to the 16th Century (1854–1868), which guided other architects in making Gothic designs. Probably the best example of the use of Gothic for new French building was the church of Sainte Clotilde which was erected at Paris between 1846 and 1859.

In Germany, a romantic architect, Schinkel, prepared as early as 1819 a Gothic plan for a projected Protestant cathedral at Berlin, and thereafter Gothic was used widely for churches and occasionally for other buildings. The most notable modern Gothic church in German lands was the Catholic "votive church" at Vienna, constructed by Ferstel in 1853–1879. In Hungary, at a somewhat later date, the great parliament building at Budapest, like the mother building of parliaments at Westminster, had to be erected in the Gothic style (though surmounted by a "classical" dome). The "Gothic revival," nevertheless, did not really dominate

The "Gothic revival," nevertheless, did not really dominate European architecture. It was more in the nature of an incidental

Predominance of "Eclectic" Classicist Architecture

supplement to prevailing classical traditions. These traditions, nevertheless, underwent some modification under romantic influences, so that the "classicism" of the era from 1830 to 1878 was "eclectic," varying from country to country and frequently embodying peculiar features which were not strictly classical

but which were supposed to represent a classically distinctive national culture.

Of eclectic classical architecture, the main inspiration came from Italy, where romantic patriots found models for a modern "Italian style" in structures at Florence dating from the period

of Dante and Petrarch, of the transition from medieval to early modern art. This "primitive classical" was utilized in Italy itself, and likewise in other parts of Europe where sympathy for "Italian art" was so habitual as to be deemed a national characteristic. Into England it was introduced by Sir Charles Barry (who in another mood used Gothic, as we have seen, for the parliament building at Westminster) and was applied by him to new club-houses in London and by other architects to banks and railway stations (of which the St. Pancras Station was the most impressive). In Germany it was adopted as the basis for the systematic and sumptuous architectural embellishment of Munich, Dresden, and Vienna, though as time went on this embellishment assumed an increasingly ornate character reminiscent less of the "primitive classical" of Italy than of full-fledged renaissance or even baroque. At Munich, under the patronage of the art-loving Bavarian Kings, Louis I (1825-1848) and Maximilian II (1848-1864), new art galleries and governmental palaces were put up with arcades and other details borrowed from Florentine designs. At Dresden a noteworthy architect, Gottfried Semper (1804-1879), built the Saxon court theatre in the manner of the Italian classical renaissance. The same Semper was largely responsible, too, for making the Ringstrasse at Vienna one of the most magnificent streets in all Europe—with its reconstructed imperial palace, its court theatre, and its museums of art and natural history. For all these structures, Semper continued to draw his inspiration from Italian styles, with an ever more pronounced leaning toward the grandiose effects of the baroque.

In France, there was less direct borrowing from Italian styles and more independent development of peculiarly French classical architecture. Respect for the "pure Greek" French In France monuments of the latter part of the eighteenth century combined with romantic French interest in the cause of modern Greek nationalism to give rise in the 1830's to a "neo-Greek" fashion which found most perfect expression in the building for the School of Fine Arts at Paris (1832–1862) and in the refined façade of the Library of Sainte Genevieve (1843–1850). Simultaneously, a revival of the "restrained classical" style of the age of Louis XIV was indicated and stimulated by

the enlargement of the Paris city hall (1836–1854) and its rebuilding again after 1871. Then, too, with the advent of Louis Napoleon to political power, there was a pronounced tendency among French architects to resuscitate the "empire style," with its imperial Roman (and Egyptian) solemnity, and to invest it with a profusion of baroque detail which would proclaim the continually increasing wealth and grandeur of French civilization. To achieve this end, Louis Napoleon had the assistance of a great "city planner," Baron Haussmann (1809–1891), who spent years of hard work and huge sums of money in laying out parks and broad boulevards in Paris, rendering the whole city a suitable setting for public monuments. Likewise, Louis Napoleon had the service of a very great architect, Charles Garnier (1825–1898), whose luxurious operahouse at Paris was at once the crowning glory of the Second French Empire and the inspiration for much of the subsequent "French" architecture.

In countries touched by the Industrial Revolution, it seemed as though architecture became ever more sumptuous and imposing, as it borrowed increasingly now from the Gothic of the middle ages or now from the classical of the renaissance, now from the "pure Greek" or now from the "baroque" or the "empire." An extreme of such borrowing (and of fusing) was reached in the gigantic Palace of Justice (1866–1883) In Belgium at Brussels, in highly industrialized Belgium: an eclectic use of various classic styles, with an admixture of elements suggesting Egypt and even India, produced effects of the most monumental character. But, all over Europe, whatever might be the forms of architecture, whether "classical" or "Gothic" or eclectic, the art itself was more and more regarded as an expression of national life. As such, it was, even in its "classical" aspects, quite "romantic."

Sculpture and the other decorative arts showed more obviously the influence of romanticism. In sculpture, the baroque religious spirit of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the "Greek" intellectual spirit of the eighteenth century gave way in the nineteenth century to a more sentimental feeling. The neo-classic coldness of Canova and Thorwaldsen 1 dominated the first decades of the century

¹ On Canova and Thorwaldsen, see Vol. I, pp. 736-737.

but by 1830 it was melting in the sunshine of romance. Simultaneously, a new type of memorial, that of a statue put up in a public street or square, was replacing the indoor sepulchre as a major object of the sculptor's art, and the new type invited treatment of more popular and less formal appeal. Of course, in private gardens the somewhat old-fashioned nymphs and goddesses were still in evidence, but interspersed with them were likely now to be quite modern little boys and girls, holding umbrellas perhaps, and some more or less lifelike dogs and lions; and the newcomers might be, not in stone, but in iron!—romantic contributions of the Industrial Revolution!

One of the foremost sculptors of the era was François Rude (1784-1855), whose best work was done on the ornamentation of the Arch of Triumph in Paris; his group was intensely nationalist in subject and highly dramatic in effect. 1 A pupil of Rude, Jean Baptiste Carpeaux (1827–1875), Rude and Carpeaux was equally gifted and equally romantic; he had great talent and a marked feeling for vehement and passionate action: his masterpieces were the allegorical group, "Dancing," for the facade of the new opera-house at Paris and the spirited "Fountain of the Four Races" in the public gardens of the Luxembourg.2 David d'Angers was less talented, but the numerous statues of famous Frenchmen with which he bestrewed the streets of French cities—all the figures being represented in chaste modern dress and with gestures and expressions in supposed harmony with their natures and activities—may be taken as typical of what was done by scores of sculptors all over Europe in catering to the widespread current interest in national history and national heroes. The best sculpture of the era was undoubtedly French, but similar motives and similar mannerisms characterized many contemporary sculptors in Britain, Germany, Italy, and the United States of America.3

The household arts received special stimulus from a number of contemporary developments. One of these, most palpably,

¹ For an example of Rude's art, see the picture facing p. 743 in Vol. I. The Arch of Triumph was planned by Napoleon I but was completed and adorned during the reign of Louis Philippe.

For an example of Carpeaux's art, see the portrait bust of Napoleon III facing p. 180, below.

³ Note, for example, memorials erected in the United States after the Civil War (1861-1865).

was romanticism. Another was the Industrial Revolution. which produced quantities of "machine-made" furni-Houseture, ornamental iron fences and park benches, and hold Arts: jig-saw woodwork for porches and railings, cornices and doorways. Still another was the improving Romantic, Industrial means of communication and trade throughout the world, with a resulting increased flow of the most diverse art-objects from the most distant lands to European middle-class homes, in the "parlors" of which were set up "whatnots" to accommodate the "curios." Finally, note should be taken of the growing fashionable influence of the bourgeoisie, especially of bourgeois And Bourladies, who were apt to be both staid and indusgeois trious. They were romantically staid. They wrapped themselves most chastely in yards and yards of crinoline and lace flounces, and their long hooped skirts and carefully balanced curls helped-nay, required-them to walk most primly. Likewise they were romantically industrious. They plied their needles in embroidery and "fancy" sewing; they became amateurs at painting and stencilling and adepts at making artificial flowers of wax or tinfoil; they worked hard to be decorous in appearance and behavior and achievement. And they were appropriately sentimental. Tears were shed by them, sighs were heaved by them, at the right moment; they could readily "swoon"; and their favorite wood was black walnut.

All the newer "domestic art" was well intentioned, but some of it strikes us nowadays as being pretty bad. Much of the machine-made furniture and jig-saw work seems as ugly and dreadful as Ruskin said it was. Yet it is historically important, for it clearly indicates that the middle classes were becoming arbiters of art at the very time when they were becoming arbiters of finance and politics. Moreover, it betokens a widening interest in household arts and a broadening conception of them. We should remember in this connection that the era from 1830 to 1878 witnessed a great development of public art-Art-Galgalleries and national museums and also a series of leries and international exhibitions at which were displayed not only the latest triumphs of machine industry but also the best (as well as some of the worst) examples of general cultural change.1

¹ Such international exhibitions, or "world fairs," were held at London in 1851,

In France, household arts were remarkably developed and expanded during the career of Louis Napoleon, from 1848 to 1870. Some attempts were made to apply "Gothic" styles to them, but more popular and more usual were the romantically patriotic revivals of the "empire" style of the first Napoleon. From France the new vogue of "empire" furniture and "empire" decorations spread to other European countries.

In England, alongside of "empire" efforts in imitation of the French, an earnest attempt was made, particularly by William Morris, to revive a peculiarly medieval and English handicraft in household art. William Morris Handi-(1834–1896) was an able artist and a devoted romantic. crafts As a student at Oxford, in the early 1850's, he was drawn into the Anglo-Catholic movement which Newman had inspired, and thence into an enthusiasm for medieval painting and poetry, for Gothic architecture, and also for Tennyson. After leaving Oxford, Morris wrote poetry and painted pictures in the medieval manner, but his principal achievements were in the designing and manufacture of "Gothic" household equipment—furniture (including "Morris chairs"), wall paper, tapestries, carpets, glass, and tiles. It is not without significance that Morris was led by his medieval interest and his handicraft experience into active opposition to modern capitalism and "liberalism," and that in his later years he acquired fame (or infamy) as a propagandist of Marxian socialism in Britain.

Of all the era's decorative arts, that which reached the highest perfection and showed the most consistent romanticism was painting. Delacroix, the French painter, and Constable and Turner, the English painters, had already, Painting just prior to 1830, departed radically from classical traditions and established new fashions in subject-matter and form. Classical traditions, of course, survived; they were meticulously cherished by the distinguished Ingres, who lived

at Paris in 1855, at London in 1862, at Paris in 1867, at Vienna in 1873, at Philadelphia in 1876, and at Paris in 1878. The attendance ranged from six million at London in 1851 to sixteen million at Paris in 1878.

¹ On Turner, Constable, and Delacroix, see Vol. I, pp. 748-749. For an example of Turner's art, see the picture facing p. 40, above. There is an example of Delacroix's in Vol. I, facing p. 790.

² On Ingres, see Vol. I, p. 736.

until 1867, and were utilized by other French painters to tie the age of Louis Napoleon with the age of the great Napoleon—and with that of Louis XIV. Nevertheless, from 1830 Delacroix, rather than Ingres, symbolized the predominant element in French painting, and in the painting of other countries also.

Portrayal of historical scenes, in bright colors and with plenty of emotion and action, became one of the outstanding features of romantic painting. Most of the historical scenes so portrayed

were of patriotic import. Some had to do with a National nation's supposed advance in the past toward political Painting liberty; many, with episodes in the lives of national heroes or anecdotes of a people's military prowess. Victor Hugo and Schiller took Mary Stuart, Don Carlos. or William Tell as subjects of romantic dramas, so romantic painters pictured English barons wresting Magna Carta from King John, or Oliver Cromwell bestriding the bed of Charles I, or Joan of Arc at the coronation of Charles VII or in the presence of her judges at Rouen, or Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, or the charge of the Guard at Waterloo. There was a big demand for such pictures. The newer parliament buildings, innumerable government buildings of every kind-including Windsor Castle and the palaces at Versailles and Potsdam and Schönbrunn—the enlarged museums, all must be filled with canvasses depicting the great and glorious feats of the country's past. One of the most popular "anecdotal" painters of the period was

Meissonier (1815–1891), a Frenchman who followed up his first characteristic picture—"Dutch Burghers" (1831)—with a long series of battle scenes and dueling scenes and scenes of soldier life, done in microscopic detail and with attention to histrionic effects. Meissonier is less in fashion nowadays, but in his own time he was deemed one of the very greatest of modern artists and was imitated by a large

Another outstanding feature of romantic painting was the portrayal of nature in poetical and even mystic beauty. The great master in this respect, after Constable and Turner, was the Frenchman Corot (1796–1875). Of a well-to-do bourgeois family, Corot was wealthy and fortunate, so generous

number of second-rate sentimental painters throughout Europe.





and kindly to others that in his old age he was popularly called "Papa Corot," and the fame of his genius, unlike Meissonier's, has not lessened with the lapse of time. He painted the most exquisite landscapes, charming in composition and dream-like in detail. He inspired a notable school of landscape painters. He died still dreaming of landscapes.

The "school" which Corot inspired was the Barbizon school, so called by reason of the fact that the group who composed it lived not in Paris or in any other large city but in the "Barbizon little French village of Barbizon at one end of the lovely forest of Fontainebleau. Among its members sear and special note should be taken of Theodore Rousseau Millet (1812–1867), who painted woodland and country lane a bit baldly and yet with distinguished gravity and melancholy, and Jean François Millet (1814–1875), the greatest and most original, who combined with sincere love of the land a deeply religious feeling for the dignity of the lowliest human beings and their labor. Millet interpreted human life in the fields with a lofty realism; in such masterpieces as "The Sower" and "The Angelus" he proved himself the true painter of the humble French peasant.

Ouite a different sort of artist was Honoré Daumier (1808-1879). He was the "man about town," with an eye for the ridiculous and occasionally for the sublime in city streets, in railway stations, in the haunts of the urban multitude, which he portrayed with as much enthusiasm and in as varied moods as the contemporary Barbizon school portrayed the countryside. Some of Daumier's chief work was in lithography rather than in painting, and took the form of caricature. Of the art of caricature he was a supreme master, and with it he did what Dickens and Balzac were doing in their novels. He portrayed, in extenso and with ludicrous extravagance, the foibles of the bourgeoisie, the corruption of the law courts, and the incompetence of blundering and "unpatriotic" middle-class government. Besides, though he was more of a "realist" than a "romanticist," he mercilessly caricatured the surviving classicism which, in his opinion, still held modern art in fetters.1

¹ For examples of Daumier's caricature, see the tailpieces on pp. 60, 783, 1089, and the pictures facing pp. 104, 105, 271.

Note. The picture opposite, "The Churner," is by Millet.

The best paintings of Daumier were on religious themes—"Christ and His Apostles," "The Good Samaritan," "Christ Mocked"; we might suppose that they would have appealed to the religious romanticism of his time, but their execution was not romantic enough and they were appreciated only after his death.

France, it will be observed, was the seat of the best and most distinctive painting (as well as sculpture) of the era from 1830 French to 1878. Indeed, there was almost no distinguished Supremacy in painting during the era in Italy, Spain, Germany, or the Netherlands—countries which in earlier periods tive Arts had been important centres of pictorial art. In all these countries, there was now a good deal of painting, particularly historical painting, but it was imitative and it was second-rate or worse.

Only in England was there a "school" of painting of some independent distinction. It was the "Pre-Raphaelite brother-

English Romantic Painting: the Pre-Raphaelites hood," and it was even more romantic than the contemporary French painters. It included Burne-Jones, Rossetti, and Holman Hunt, and aimed to ignore all "classical" development in art since the time of Raphael, to go back for inspiration to Giotto and Fra

Angelico, and to be as medieval as possible in both theme and style. Burne-Jones's "Merciful Knight" and Holman Hunt's "Light of the World" are famous examples of the efforts of Pre-Raphaelites to recapture the knightly and religious moods of medieval civilization.

In England, as in France, the art of caricature was highly developed. Probably the most famous English caricaturist of the era was George Cruikshank (1792-1878). He Caricature in continued the traditions of his immediate predecessors, England: James Gillray (1757-1815) and Thomas Rowlandson Cruikshank (1756-1827),1 and he delineated Tories, Whigs, and Radicals with fine impartiality. Satirical capital came to him from every public event and from extensive private observation—from wars, the army, the court, the parliament, the church, low life and high life, the humors of the common people and the follies of the governing classes. He provided

¹ For examples of Gillray's art, see the tailpieces in Vol. I, pp. 422, 495, 798, and 840. One of Rowlandson's caricatures is reproduced in Vol. I, p. 717.

noteworthy humorous illustrations for many books, including Dickens's Oliver Twist. Cruikshank also devoted his talents to a campaign against "the demon rum" and in behalf of "total abstinence," a campaign which was developing at the time in English-speaking countries, thanks in part to an idealistic surge of evangelical Christian sects toward "sober piety," and in part to an equally romantic conviction on the part of Radical capitalists (such as John Bright) that, if money were not spent on "drink," poverty could be cured.¹

Music during the era from 1830-1878 was the most thoroughly romantic of all the arts (except perhaps literature). The mighty genius Beethoven had set the pace for the newer style of music during the Napoleonic era, and in the 1820's Komar and 1830's romanticism had suffused the songs of . Schubert, the compositions of Weber and Mendelssohn, and the operas of Rossini, Bellini, and Donizetti.2 With such a start, it was well-nigh inevitable that music in the succeeding generation should express and strengthen the current tendencies. Composers indeed came forward in all European lands with sentimental and frequently melancholy music, with mournful chords and plaintive arias, with heroic operas, and with symphonies descriptive of woodland scenes or religious exaltation or stirring historical events. Everywhere, moreover, a patriotic note was sounded. National anthems were written, folk songs were discovered (or invented) and enshrined in concertos. Operas—and most other musical forms—were no longer accounted "European," as the music of Mozart and Bach had been, but "German," or "French," or "Italian," or "Polish." French composers were expected to express French character, to treat of French subjects, or, if they employed other subjects, to deal with them in a "French manner." Similar expectations affected German composers, Italian composers, and others. Opera in particular became a national institution, and the size and sumptuousness of opera-houses an object of rivalry among national governments. Louis Napoleon demonstrated the cultural supremacy of France by gracing Paris with the finest opera-house in the world.

The era appropriately opened with sentimental "light" opera.

¹ For examples of Cruikshank's caricature, see pictures facing pp. 16, 85, above.

² On this earlier romantic music, see Vol. I, pp. 749-751.

In 1830 was produced at Paris the witty, picturesque, bourgeois Fra Diavolo of Auber (1782-1871), and the production Light Opera of the same popular composer's Masaniello at Brussels precipitated the liberal revolution of that year in Belgium. In 1831 Hérold (1791-1833), the son of an Alsatian pianist, presented his masterpiece, Zampa, to an enraptured Paris. At about the same time there came to Paris a German Jew, Jacob Beer (known as Meyerbeer, 1791-1864), who turned from banking to operatic imitations of Rossini and staggered France with his scenic effects and melodramatic choruses; Robert the Devil appeared in 1831, and then in 1836 The Huguenots—a proper subject for a country whose chief minister at the time was the Huguenot Guizot. By way of compensation, Halévy (1799-1862) produced *The Jewess* in 1835, and in 1849, after the overthrow of Guizot, *The Prophet*. In the meantime, two Irishmen were contributing to the vogue of sentimental opera at Paris-Wallace (1812–1865), with his fairy extravaganza of *Maritana*, and Balfe (1808–1870) with the honeyed ballads and cadences of his Bohemian Girl.

Across the lightness (and shallowness) of the opera of the bourgeois monarchy fell Chopin like a shadow, and from Paris Chopin as a centre the shadow, as well as the light, was soon bewitching all Europe. Chopin (1810–1849), half-French and half-Polish in parentage, was a most unlucky person. After the failure of the rebellion of 1831, he was an exile from the Poland which he loved, and he was one of the love-sick tuberculous young men whom the masterly George Sand took in tow and then set adrift. But Chopin was a great pianist and a great composer for the piano, and he expressed his grief and melancholy in a profusion of compositions characterized by finish of detail, delicacy of nuance, and expressive charm.

As the period proceeded, music became at once more grandiose. A richer and more involved orchestration was employed, and efforts were consciously made to invest the themes with opera and involved orchestration. These newer tendencies were fostered by a galaxy of famous composers who shone brilliantly in the 1850's, 1860's, and 1870's. The form of their music was apt to be baroque, but its inspiration was romantic and the effect of much of it was nationalist. Great modern music was being conventionally differentiated into "national" schools.

Of the "French" school, three members are particularly noteworthy. One was Hector Berlioz (1803–1869), who fairly worshipped Shakespeare and Beethoven; he wrote several dramatic symphonies (including one in celebration of the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe), and a cantata on the Damnation of Faust (founded on Goethe's drama). Another was Charles Gounod (1818–1893), who, besides composing a good deal of sentimental church music, provided in his Faust (1859) and Romeo and Juliet (1867) the most renowned examples of romantic French opera. The third typically "French" composer of the period was Georges Bizet (1838–1875), whose Arlésienne and Carmen, replete with "local color," were produced in the 1870's.

Franz Liszt (1811–1886) was a romantic pianist and composer from Hungary. After touring Europe as an unrivalled piano virtuoso for eighteen years, he settled at Weimar in 1848 and thenceforth exerted a commanding influence over many younger men by his lessons, his literary activity, and his varied musical compositions—piano pieces, songs, symphonies, cantatas, masses, and oratorios. One of his daughters married Richard Wagner.

Richard Wagner (1813–1883) was born at Leipzig (in Saxony) in the very year when the Battle of the Nations was being fought there between Napoleon and the Germans, and he lived to see the Franco-German War of 1870-1871 and the political unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. It is not surprising, therefore, that Wagner should have devoted his very great musical talents to the cause of German nationalism in thoroughly romantic manner. He derived the subjects of his operas, such as Tannhäuser, Lohengrin, Tristan and Isolde. Meistersinger, the Ring, and Parsifal, from medieval German literature and folklore, and he labored to clothe them with a striking musical form which should be not only beautiful and novel but distinctively "Teutonic." Wagner was patronized by the madly romantic Louis II of Bavaria, who erected at Bayreuth, in the years immediately following the establishment of the German Empire (1871), a huge temple for the special presentation of Wagnerian operas.

Born in the same year as Wagner was Giuseppe Verdi (1813-1901), an Italian, who began as an imitator of Rossini and

Donizetti but who remained in Italy and came to be regarded as the outstanding exemplar of national (and romantic) "Italian" opera. His Rigoletto (1851) and Trovaore and Traviata (1853) won him fame as a sensationally tuneful and dramatic composer; and Aida, his most grandiloquent opera, ull of rich "local color," was written at the request of the Khedive of Egypt and first produced (1871) at Cairo just after the opening of the Suez Canal. The famous Requiem which Verdi composed n 1874 was in honor of Manzoni, one of the literary lights of the Italian risorgimento.

It must be apparent that the art of the period from 1830 to 1878 was predominantly romantic. It was manifest in the music of Verdi, Wagner, Gounod, and Chopin; in the painting of the Pre-Raphaelites and of Corot and Delacroix; in the sculpture of Carpeaux and Rude; in the "Gothic" architectural revival; in the novels of Dostoievski, Manzoni, Balzac, Hugo, Dickens, and Thackeray, and in the poetry of Tennyson, Musset, Uhland, Leopardi, and Mickiewicz. And along with the finest art, the pest scholarship of the period was tinged with romanticism.

In the realm of scholarship, historical interests held first place. The era, indeed, was characterized by its historical-mindedness.

There was a widespread new curiosity about the middle Scholarhip in the ages, about the continuously developing nature of Age of government and society and culture from "primitive" Romanmen through antiquity and the middle ages down to icism There was an ubiquitous enthusiasm about the past of one's nationality, its old tribal organization, its medieval evolution, its historic language and literature, its historic manners and customs. There was also a novel emphasis Tistorion so-called "scientific method," on the collecting and :al-Mindcritical editing of source-materials and on the narratng of events comformably with contemporaneous records of hem and sympathetically with the "spirit of the time" when hey occurred.

This meant that historiography of the nineteenth century not mly was richer and more plentiful than that of the eighteenth century; it was also different in kind. It was less "rational" and more pragmatic in spirit. It was less cosmopolitan and more national in scope. It was as "ancient" and as "modern" in the chronological fields which it tilled, but at the same time more "medieval." Generally speaking, too, it was more "scientific," more intent on telling what really happened than on teaching a philosophy. The "scientific" element in nineteenthcentury historiography (and other social studies) was scientific doubtlessly derived not from romanticism but from the abiding interest of intellectuals in that natural science which had distinguished the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and whose methods, it was now insisted, could and should be applied to the "social sciences," including history. To all social phenomena, the "scientific" approach seemed to be the genetic, that is, the historical.

But if the method of the newer historiography was increasingly "rationalist," the use to which it was put, the subject-matter with which it dealt, was inspired less by the older rationalism than by the newer romanticism. Much the same romantic stimuli as directed the fancy of artists tional in between 1830 and 1878 toward the national, the medieval, the local, and the popular guided contemporary scholarship toward the same goals.

"Scientific" critical history had been significantly developed, it may be recalled, by the work of the French Benedictine monks of St. Maur in the latter part of the seventeenth century.¹ But the monumental source-materials which they—and Muratori, their scholarly contemporary in Italy—collected and painstakingly edited in the first half of the eighteenth century, though relating respectively to "France" and "Italy," had to do rather with ecclesiastical affairs than with national history as such. It was left for the nineteenth century to nationalize the editing of sources and the writing of "scientific" history.

Sources for German history were collected and edited in a huge series, called the *Monumenta Germaniæ Historica*; its prospectus was published in 1824 and the first volumes National appeared under the able editorship of G. H. Pertz (1795–1876). Beginning in 1834, sources for French Historical history were similarly collected and edited under the auspices of Guizot, historian and leading minister of Louis Philippe. In England, Parliament had created a "Record Commission" in 1800 to assemble and publish the "chronicles and

¹ On "scientific" history in the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 533-535-For earlier foreshadowings of it, see Vol. I, pp. 104-105, 131-

memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the middle ages," but only with the appointment of a "Master of the Rolls" in 1838 did the scholarly publication of sources for British history—in the so-called Rolls series—get well under way. By 1870 almost every government in Europe was helping to finance the printing of source-materials which commissions of national historians were gathering and editing.

German historians surpassed all others alike in the scientific and in the nationalist development of historiography. Pertz and his collaborators made the Monumenta a model of German careful scholarship for the editing of sources. Then, Historiography too, Dahlmann (1785-1860), a most thorough scholar and at the same time a leading liberal nationalist, issued in 1830 a model index (or bibliography) of all historical writings about Germany; Dahlmann's work, frequently reëdited and brought up to date, is still the basic guide for German history and has been widely imitated in other countries.² Moreover, Germany furnished to the world the most influential exemplars of the "scientific" writing of history. Of these, two-Niebuhr and Ranke—are especially noteworthy.

Georg Niebuhr (1776-1831), royal historiographer to the King of Prussia and professor at the University of Berlin, was the first to apply the principles of critical schol-Niebuhr arship to the general field of ancient history, and his Roman History (1812-1832) was a striking example of realistic, rather than philosophical, approach to the past. Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) learned the new historical method Ranke from Niebuhr and applied it in voluminous works which he published on events of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries-histories of Germany, the Papacy, France, and England. Ranke purposefully based his writing on "narratives of eye-witnesses and the most genuine immediate documents"; he strove to tell precisely how things had happened, without moral disquisition or literary adornment; and, though he could not always divest himself of personal bias, he tried to be absolutely fair and impartial. Because the original sources were

¹ On the beginning of this national compiling of sources, see Vol. I, pp. 740-741.

² Dahlmann's Quellenkunde is now (1935) in its eighth revised edition. Dahlmann himself, it may be remarked, was a prominent member of the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848 and one of its members who offered the crown of a liberal, united German Empire in 1849 to King Frederick William IV of Prussia.

more plentiful and accessible for political than for any other kind of history, and because political interests outweighed others in the Germany of his day, Ranke tended to identify "scientific" history with political history; and because he sought so eagerly to be "scientific," his narrative tended to be "dry-as-dust." Ranke was connected with the University of Berlin for some sixty years, and as a great teacher and a great conductor of seminars as well as the leading exponent of scientific research and writing, he exerted a tremendous influence on German scholars, and, through foreign students who flocked to him at Berlin, on the historical scholarship of all Europe and America.

In England, historical writing was less pretentiously "scientific" and somewhat more traditionally "literary." The most conscious approach to the method of the German English school was made by Freeman (1823-1892), professor for many years at Oxford and author of a very detailed History of the Norman Conquest (1867-1876), in which he not only showed a penchant for German historical method and for the idea of Ranke that history is "past politics" but also espoused the patriotic German contention that the early Anglo-Saxons were a peculiarly gifted Teutonic people and sought to demonstrate that the free institutions of modern England had been derived fundamentally from them rather than from the Latinized Normans. One of the ablest English historians of the period was William Stubbs (1825-1901), also professor at Oxford and subsequently an Anglican bishop, who in the spirit of German scholarship edited a large number of documents in the 1860's and 1870's and published a valuable Constitutional History of England (1873-1878) covering the whole period of the middle ages.

Carlyle, too, was an admirer of German civilization, its philosophy and scholarship, but his history of the French Revolution and his biographies were more Germanic in use of words than in utilization of scientific method. Carlyle was not so much concerned with the narrating of facts as with the expounding of a theory that great men—great heroes—rather than Carlyle social forces, make history. In Carlyle's footsteps and followed Froude (1818–1894), originally associated with Newman in the "Anglo-Catholic" movement but soon transferring his romantic enthusiasm from Christianity to na-

tionalism, from religious leaders to heroic patriots. Froude won popular acclaim (and the denunciation of a scholar like Freeman) with his *History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada*, prejudiced and inaccurate, but a dramatically brilliant panegyric of his country's triumphs in the sixteenth century over Spain and Catholicism. To a popular appreciation of the greatness of England (and the Whig party and modern liberalism), Lord Macaulay had already contributed

with the matchless prose and dogmatic certainty of his History (1848–1855) of the "Glorious" Revolution of 1688. An even more popular—and more general—work, contributing to the same end, was John Richard Green's Short History of the English People (1874), picturesque, vivid, and intensely patriotic.

In France, historiography, though gradually influenced by the "scientific" ideals emanating from German professors, was eminently "literary" and patriotic. The outstanding French historian of the period—a kind of combination French Historiography of Green, Froude, and Macaulay-was Jules Michelet (1798-1874), of Huguenot extraction and tradition, at first a liberal supporter of the bourgeois monarchy and after-Michelet wards a democratic champion of the Second French Republic and critic of Louis Napoleon, always a fervent nationalist. Michelet's big *History of France* in nineteen volumes (1831– 1867) displayed extreme religious and political prejudices, but also a comprehensiveness and a graphic literary quality which rendered it extremely popular. Guizot and Thiers, those rival liberal statesmen of the bourgeois monarchy, were rival national historians of the era. Guizot published a one-volume Guizot History of Civilization in Europe and a four-volume and History of Civilization in France (1830), besides turning out a variety of works in praise of the English Puritan Revolution and Cromwell. Thiers produced an elaborate sympathetic History of the French Revolution and followed it up with a glorification of Napoleon in an extensive History of the Consulate and the Empire (1845–1865). Mention should also be made of the waxing interest of many French historians in medieval studies; one of the chief romantic monuments of the period was a significant history of monasticism (1860–1877) written by the "liberal" Catholic nobleman Montalembert.

Medieval and especially national history was coming to the fore among all the peoples throughout Europe—and in America.1 Considerations of space preclude us from listing even the most influential exponents of the newer tendency in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and eastern Europe. It may suffice to point out that nationalism was stimulated among most "oppressed" peoples in much the same way as it was aroused among the Czechs by Francis Palacký's fivevolume History of the Bohemian People (1836-1867). Palacký was a liberal Czech and the inspirer of the Pan-Slavic Congress held at Prague in 1848; he aimed at being a "scientific" historian but also at awakening

Patriotic Historiography among "Oppressed Peoples"

in his fellow Czechs a desire to emulate the national greatness of their medieval ancestors.

So far, we have spoken of "history" and of "historians" in a rather technical sense. But it should be borne in mind that during the period from 1830 to 1878 a wide range of scholars engaged in one kind or another of historical research as Historical the principal approach to other subjects in which Approach to Most they were severally interested. It was no longer Social fashionable, as it had been in the eighteenth century, for students of political science or jurisprudence or philology or anthropology to work out "systems" from contemporary observations and a priori reasoning. It now seemed necessary, in the nineteenth century, to trace historically how peoples had developed their peculiar governments, laws, languages, and customs. There was less speculation about what was ideally desirable and more detailed study of the history of existing phenomena.

The fields of scholarly study remained about the same in the nineteenth century as they had been in the eighteenth.2 The method of tilling them was somewhat different, and the tilling was deepened and quickened by the spread and intensification of national sentiment. The rationalism of the "Enlightenment" had contributed to the rise of the "social sciences." The romanticism of the age of nationalism contributed still more.

¹ The great nationalist historian of the United States was George Bancroft (1800-1891). Contemporaneous with him in America was such a distinguished literary historian as Parkman.

² On the development of the social sciences and what they were in the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 532-555. The novel social science of the nineteenth century was "sociology," concerning which see below, pp. 371-374.

The historical approach to jurisprudence and political science was stressed. One of the prime movers in this newer tendency was Savigny (1779-1861), a professor at the Univer-Political sity of Berlin and an eminent authority on the history Science of the Roman law in ancient times and during the In a celebrated little book which he published middle ages. in 1814, Savigny set forth a philosophy of law that Savigny was extremely influential throughout the nineteenth Starting with the earlier assumption of Herder that every nationality has a distinctive language and "spirit," he went on to assert that every nationality also possesses a distinc-tive system of law and that by the transmission of common law as well as common language from one generation to another a people maintains its existence and unity throughout the centuries.

Indeed, not only in Germany, but in almost every country of Europe, there was a profusion of historical dictionaries, encyclopædias, and treatises dealing with national institutions, political and legal. Some of the authors were "conservative"; more were "liberal"; but almost all of them were historically and patriotically minded. Such was Bishop Stubbs, whose Constitutional History of England we have already mentioned. Such also was Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), a brilliant French liberal, whose essays On Democracy in America (1835) and On the Old Régime (1855) were famous not only for their literary qualities but also for their spirit of "historical" detachment. Tocqueville Noteworthy, likewise, was Sir Henry Maine (1822-1888), a teacher of English law, a government official in the 1860's in India, and subsequently professor of historical and Maine comparative jurisprudence at Oxford; his volume on Village Communities in the East and the West (1871) fostered the growing idea of an "Aryan race" by pointing out similarities among "Aryan" peoples in Europe and India, not only in respect of language but also in respect of basic social and legal institutions. It may be noted in passing that Maine's book stimulated special interest in the Russian village community—the so-called *mir*—which Slavic patriots glorified as a sign of their abiding "pure Aryanism."

Parallelling the historical (and national) study of law and government was a similar study of philology and anthropology.

Predom-

Liberal

but Not Historical

inant Economics.

Both these subjects, in fact, were enormously enriched by nineteenth-century scholarship. Of philological scholars. Philology probably the most profound and most original was and An-Tacob Grimm (1785-1863), who owed his early training thropology and national interests to Savigny and his fame to the scholarly career which he pursued as professor at Göttingen and Grimm then at Berlin. Grimm was the author of an elaborate German Grammar, a detailed History of the German Language, and an imposing German Dictionary. He was also a critical student of comparative philology—of the differences and similarities among the various European and "Aryan" languages. He was also the real founder of the "science" of folk-lore; he collected and published popular fairy tales, and wrote an historical account of the pre-Christian religion and mythology of the Teutonic peoples. Grimm's work was very important not only in philology but also in anthropology. To language (and law), he added folk-lore and folk-religion as distinguishing badges of national culture.

From Grimm's time onward, a large number of European intellectuals were busily engaged in writing presumably "scientific" histories of language and literature, in ransacking the countryside for surviving evidences of historic folkculture—myths, ballads, proverbs, dances, customs, and costumes-or in connecting the results of such study of anthropology and philology with the results of contemporary study of legal institutions and usages. These things were done not only for Germans, and for Frenchmen and Englishmen and Scandinavians, but likewise, with mounting enthusiasm, for Italians, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Russians, Finns, Bulgarians, Basques, and every other nationality in Europe and some nationalities outside Europe.

Only in the field of economics, alone among the "social sciences," was the prevailing scholarship not historical in method or nationalist in implication. Here the tradition of eighteenth-century rationalism, enshrined in the economic liberalism of Adam Smith and the French Physiocrats, was peculiarly potent, and the newly developing Industrial Revolution seemed to point rather

to cosmopolitanism than to nationalism. Hence, while the period from 1830 to 1878 abounded in economists, most of them belonged to the so-called "classical school" who neglected history in favor of a priori reasoning and minimized national peculiarities in their advocacy of free trade. Yet even here, in the realm of political economy, some scholars and writers rejected the teachings (and method) of the predominant "classical school" and gradually evolved "national" or "historical" schools.

A pioneer of "national economics" was Friedrich List (1789-1846), a German who lived for several years in the United States and, returning to his native land, took a leading part Dissenting "Na-tional" in promoting railway construction. List's National System of Political Economy (1841) maintained that Economno two peoples were in the same stage of economic ics: List development and that each government should pursue such particular economic policies (including tariff protectionism) as would contribute most to national solidarity and well-being. The pioneer of "historical economics" was another German, Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894), professor at Göttingen and Leipzig, who in a work which he published in 1843 criticized Dissentthe "logic mania" of the classical economists and ining "His-terical" sisted that if economics were to become a true science, Econombased on observation, economists must study history ics: Roscher and found their systems on it; furthermore, economics must become, he said, "the science of national development." Roscher published in 1874 a monumental History of National Economy in Germany. Political economy was obviously beginning to respond to the same stimuli which were already actuating the bulk of European scholarship and art.

When we associate in our minds the patriotic implications of the philology, anthropology, jurisprudence, political science, and history and also of the music, painting, sculpture, architecture, and literature which we have outlined in the present section, we shall not be surprised to find that nationalism in deed as well as in thought was an outstanding attribute of the era from Flowering of Ro-1830 to 1878. Cultural nationalism paved the way for manticism the advance of popular, political nationalism, and as in Nationalism this advanced step by step it inspired more nationalism in scholarship and art. Under the joint influence of cultural and political factors, and in the midst of a reviving militarism, na-

¹ On the "classical economists," see above, pp. 68-72.

tionalism conquered "liberals" and "conservatives" and took possession of Europe. It dominated the Second French Empire from 1852 to 1870. It effected national unifications in Italy and Germany. It created commotions in eastern Europe. These things we shall now consider in turn.

2. THE SECOND FRENCH EMPIRE

Romanticism, during the era from 1830 to 1878, was not confined to art and scholarship. It operated in the spheres of society and government. It was closely related to the current vogue of liberalism and even more to the contemporary development of nationalism.

Of all the statesmen of the era, the most romantic was Prince Louis Napoleon. He was romantic in his personality, his education, and his adventures. And the romantic appeal of his name, of his reputed liberalism, and of his very real nationalism enabled him to reëstablish a Napoleonic empire which dominated France from 1852 to 1870 and profoundly affected all Europe. The career of this prince and the tale of his empire occupy a central place in nineteenth-century history. They merit a somewhat detailed description.

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was the son of Louis Bonaparte, brother of the great Napoleon and erstwhile king of Holland, and of Hortense Beauharnais, daughter of the Empress Josephine and step-daughter of Napoleon. He was born in Paris in 1808, and his uncle, then at the height of his power, stood sponsor for him at baptism and inscribed his name in the family register of the imperial Bonapartes. With the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1815, the Bonapartes were exiled from France, and Prince Louis Napoleon was taken by his mother to Switzerland. He attended school at Augsburg (in southern Germany) and was instructed in military science by an able Swiss general, but the credit for his general education was due chiefly to his gifted mother.

Brought up to regard the tradition of his family as identical

¹ The recognized Bonapartist line of succession after Napoleon I was: (1) the son of Napoleon I—the "King of Rome," titular Napoleon II, who was born in 1811 and died in 1832; (2) the older brother of Napoleon I—Joseph, erstwhile king of Naples and Spain, who died at Genoa in 1844; (3) the next brother of Napoleon I—Louis, who died at Genoa in 1846; (4) an older son of Louis Bonaparte—"Napoleon Louis," who died in 1831; (5) the younger son of Louis Bonaparte—our Prince Louis Napoleon, who became Napoleon III.

with that of the great French Revolution of 1789, Prince Louis Napoleon thought of himself as a born liberal and His Rodemocrat and patriot, a predestined champion of the mantic Career principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. His attitude toward the Revolution was, indeed, quite romantic; and in 1830 he would have gone straight to Paris and there claimed the fruits of the overthrow of Charles X, had not the bourgeois government of Louis Philippe been formed too quickly. As it was, he joined in Italy the revolutionary society of the Carbonari and participated in the liberal, nationalist uprising of 1831 in the Papal State. The uprising, as we know, was suppressed, and Prince Louis Napoleon, taken prisoner by Austrian soldiers, was released only through his mother's tearful entreaty. The prince then intrigued simultaneously with French republicans and Polish patriots, but the watchfulness of Louis Philippe on one hand, and the firm action of the Russian Tsar on the other, reduced Louis Napoleon to the necessity of wielding the pen rather than the sword.

In a series of writings which culminated in the Napoleonic Ideas (1839), he set forth his political doctrines. The Napoleonic His "Napoleonic" Empire, he declared, had been the perfect realization of the principles of 1789. It had rested upon a foundation of national sovereignty. It had employed universal manhood suffrage to determine its chief internal policies, and in its foreign policies it had aimed at a confederation of national states. It had been solidified, directed, and rendered glorious by its "cæsarism," that is by entrusting power to an emperor the success of whose dictatorship depended upon his ability to promote the public welfare and to retain popular support. Such, according to Louis Napoleon, had been the aims of the first Napoleon and such would be his own aims in endeavoring to reëstablish the Empire in France.

The Napoleonic legend in France

The Napoleonic Legend in France

The Napoleonic legend in France

The Napoleonic legend, which the great Napoleon had begun to spin on sea-girt St. Helena before his death in 1821,2 and which thereafter romantic French writers like Victor Hugo and Adolphe

¹ See Vol. I, p. 791.

² On the "Napoleonic legend," see Vol. I, pp. 695-696.

Thiers wove ever more elaborately for the delectation of their countrymen. The bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe (1830-1848) might reject democracy and combat "socialism," Fostered but with its liberalism and its romanticism it posiby Govtively encouraged the popular nationalism which was associated with the memory of Napoleon. It replaced the lilied white flag of the Bourbons with the tricolor which Napoleon's armies had borne in all their glorious exploits. removed from the Vendome column, which Napoleon had erected at Paris to commemorate the victory of Austerlitz, the fleur-de-lis with which the restored Bourbons had topped it, and fittingly substituted an iron statue of the "little Corporal." The same government completed and solemnly dedicated the magnificent Napoleonic Arch of Triumph at Paris (1836); and Louis Philippe paid the crowning tribute to the Napoleonic legend when he had the bones of the Emperor ceremoniously brought back from St. Helena (1840) and piously laid to rest under the stately dome of the Invalides, just as the great national hero and exile had willed, "on the banks of the Seine among the people whom he had so dearly loved."

Twice during the reign of Louis Philippe, Louis Napoleon attempted to take personal advantage of the growing Bonapartist sentiment in France. The first time, in 1836, he Louis Naappeared at Strasbourg and called upon its garrison poleon's Early to help him reëstablish the Napoleonic Empire; he Attempts was speedily arrested and expatriated across the Atto Overthrow lantic to America. The second time, in 1840, landing Louis at Boulogne with the declaration that the Emperor's Philippe, 1836, 1840 bones should rest only in a "regenerated France," he was condemned to life imprisonment and shut up in the fortress of Ham. Such misadventures did not discourage him. In jail. as in exile, he continued to plot and to agitate for the reëstablishment of the Empire. From the fortress of Ham, he corresponded with the leading literary lights of France and with a variety of "reformers," including Louis Blanc, the socialist, and Proudhon, the anarchist; and he wrote another book, the Extinction of Pauperism, promising, as the cornerstone of his projected régime, the material prosperity of the whole nation. It would be his business, he said, to assist capitalists by opening up new fields of industrial enterprise, to help peasants by stimulating agricultural production, and to aid urban workingmen by providing them with abundant employment. Thereby, under a national democratic empire, everybody would profit and poverty would eventually disappear. "The triumph of Christianity abolished slavery; the triumph of the French Revolution abolished serfdom; the triumph of democracy will abolish pauperism."

Prince Louis Napoleon was lucky. In 1846 he contrived to escape from the prison of Ham, in the guise of a workingman, curiously enough, and to make his way to England. Two years

Prince Louis Napoleon was lucky. In 1846 he contrived to escape from the prison of Ham, in the guise of a workingman, curiously enough, and to make his way to England. Two years His Operation of the Second French and the revolution of February 1848 at Paris—the overthrow of the bourgeois monarchy, the flight of Louis Philippe, and the proclamation of the Second French Republic. Louis Napoleon, this time, refrained from any demonstration in behalf of reëstablishing the Empire. He professed devotion to democracy and republicanism. So as not to "embarrass" the Republic, he ostentatiously remained in England. He was thus aloof from the terrible fighting at Paris in June 1848 between the bourgeois republicans and the proletarian socialists and could not be blamed by "radicals" for their bloody suppression. At the same time, the offer of his services to the aged Duke of Wellington, then gallantly overawing the British Chartists in London, 2 gave assurance to the French bourgeoisie and peasantry, lovers of law and order, that his radicalism was not of a dangerous sort.

In the circumstances, the name of Prince Louis Napoleon presented itself as a common symbol to Frenchmen of diverse political opinions—to radicals and reactionaries, to democrats and liberals, to ardent republicans and moderate monarchists, and, above all, to the mixed patriotic emotions of all classes. Here was a name which overshadowed all special differences of class and occupation and personal ambition. In June 1848, Louis Napoleon was elected to the National Constituent Aspresident of Second dency of the Second Republic by an overwhelming popular majority. At the close of the eventful year, he took the oath "to remain faithful to the democratic republic; . . . to regard as enemies of the nation all

¹ See above, pp. 112-113.

² See above, p. 81.

³ See above, p. 116.

those who may attempt by illegal means to change the form of the established government." French nationalism had at last brought Louis Napoleon to power; and his régime, in turn, would serve to emphasize nationalism in France and throughout Europe.

As president of the Second French Republic (1848–1852), Prince Louis Napoleon pursued policies which were calculated to heighten his personal popularity with different elements in the nation. While he praised the urban workingmen and prevailed upon the Assembly to enact in their favor a scheme of voluntary old-age insurance (1850), he was especially solicitous for certain measures advocated by the bourgeoisie and

for certain measures advocated by the bourgeoisie and by Catholics. On one hand, industrial interests were safeguarded and promoted. On the other hand, a French military expedition was despatched to Rome

His Bourgeois and Catholic Policies

(1849) to reinstate Pope Fius IX in the temporal sovereignty from which the revolutionary movement of the preceding year had deposed him, and an educational act of 1850—the so-called Falloux law —restored the privileges which the Catholic clergy had exercised in the days of Charles X over the schooling of French children. Thus, Catholics were reassured and appeased by Louis Napoleon; and the bourgeoisie discovered that its material ambitions were regarded with as favorable an eye by the Bonapartist president as by any Bourbon king.

These conservative measures might have cost the President the sympathy and support of radical and democratic elements

throughout the country, had he not taken advantage of a constitutional question which arose between him and the Assembly to demonstrate his own loyalty to the principle of national democracy. It will be recalled that both the President and the Assembly because of the Assembly of the As

His
"Democratic"
Policy

recalled that both the President and the Assembly had been elected in December 1848 by universal manhood suffrage. In the voting for the Assembly, the bourgeoisie and the peasantry had swamped the urban proletariat, and the elected deputies, chiefly middle-class persons, felt a repugnance to radical democracy and were minded, while they had the chance, to restrict the suffrage of workingmen for the future. In 1850, accordingly, the Assembly passed a law prescribing that henceforth no one should be permitted to vote who had not lived and paid taxes for three years in one and the same district. This meant the

¹ See above, p. 130.

² See above, pp. 116-117.

practical disfranchisement of the ever-moving artisans of the large towns; it threatened to take the ballot away from three million adult males, out of a total of nine million. There were immediate and loud protests from the cities, particularly from Paris; and to the protests Louis Napoleon gave willing ear.

Impasse between President and antional mandate to prevent the Assembly from disassembly franchising Frenchmen. For a year the conflict between President and Assembly continued. In November 1851, the President delivered to the Assembly an ultimatum, that it must reëstablish universal suffrage at once, and, upon the Assembly's refusal, he executed in December a coup d'état which in its general purposes and results resembled the celebrated coup d'état of 1799, when the first Napoleon Bonaparte had overturned the government of the First French Republic. 1


On December 2, 1851, the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz, Prince Louis Napoleon issued a manifesto, proclaiming a temporary dictatorship, the dissolution of the Aspoleon's Coup sembly, the restoration of universal manhood suffrage, and the submission to popular vote (plebiscite) of a d'État. proposal to entrust the Prince-President with the task of revising the republican constitution. The President had guessed correctly that most Frenchmen would acquiesce in his coup d'état. Loyal troops overawed the minority and easily quelled a few riots. Press censorship and police activity prevented the spread of counter-agitation. And the most notorious critics of the President, such as Adolphe Thiers and Victor Hugo, were seized and hustled out of the country. In the circumstances, the French people decided, on December 21, 1851, by 7,500,000 votes against 640,000, to empower Louis Napoleon to prepare a new instrument of government for the Second Republic.


New "Republican"

Constitution, 1852

In January 1852 the new constitution was promulgated. It retained republican forms, and specified that universal manhood suffrage should be employed in electing a legislature. Its chief departure from the democratic republican constitution of 1848 was in respect of the 1See Vol. I, pp. 644-645, 640-650.

Note. The portrait bust opposite is of Victor Hugo by Rodin. On Hugo, see above, p. 156; and on Rodin, see below, pp. 412-413.





president and his powers. His term of office was lengthened from four years to ten. He would appoint a Council of State. which should draft all bills to be considered by the legislature, and a Senate, which might revise existing laws and propose new ones and which alone might interpret the constitution. president, moreover, would appoint all military and civil officers; and the democratic legislature was rendered strictly subordinate to him. It might not initiate legislation or amend bills presented by him; it might not interfere with his appointment or dismissal of ministers; it might not determine the details of the budgets it voted; it might not publish its proceedings or even choose its own presiding officer. By means of the coup d'état of 1851 and the ensuing promulgation of this remarkable constitution, Prince Louis Napoleon had taken a long step, in the name of national democracy, toward a political dictatorship which was quite nationalist and only incidentally democratic.

The year 1852 marked the transformation of France from republic to empire. Louis Napoleon, still nominally president of the Second Republic, put his own effigy on the national From Seccoins and restored to army and national buildings the ond Republic to gilt eagles and other insignia of the Napoleonic em-Second pire. He made state processions through the provinces, Empire accompanied by a subservient staff of newspaper reporters and by a paid group of shouters, who, stationed at strategic points in the audiences, led the applause and opportunely cried Vive l'Empereur. He spoke honeyed words to peasants, to artisans, to capitalists, to rich and poor, to reactionaries and revolutionaries, to believers and agnostics. And his reward President

was speedy and complete. On December 2, 1852, he became in name what he already was in fact, and was solemnly proclaimed, with the sanction of a new national plebiscite, Napoleon III, Emperor of the French. The Second Republic was thus changed into the Second Empire,

and the "republican" constitution of 1852 became, with necessary minor alterations, the new "imperial" constitution.

Second French Empire, 1852-1870

Louis Napoleon to

Emperor

Napoleon III

The Second Empire, according to Napoleon III's initial declaration, was to be "the final flower of the French

Note. The portrait bust of Napoleon III, opposite, is by J. B. Carpeaux (1827-1875). On Carpeaux, see above, p. 165.

Revolution," and the Emperor himself was to be "the beneficent motive force of the whole social order." For eighteen years (1852–1870) the Empire lasted; and during this period Napoleon was the central figure in France, and France was the chief power in Europe.

In internal affairs, Napoleon III proved himself, for several years, a consummate "politician," a clever manipulator of public opinion, and an adroit harmonizer of seemingly conflicting philosophies. He organized an effective secret police; he rigorously controlled the press; he dominated the legislature and the whole governmental system, local as well as national; and he jailed or exiled his outspoken enemies. But while he ruled with a strong arm, he endeavored to make his rule acceptable to both "radicals" and "conservatives." On the one hand, he preserved universal manhood suffrage, however illusory it might be in practice, as the theoretical foundation of his government; he talked a good deal about the glorious achievements of the French Revolution and frequently boasted that his Empire, like that of the first Napoleon, rested upon the popular sovereignty of the nation.

On the other hand, he fascinated many conservatives by the brilliance of the imperial court which he reëstablished and maintained. In the drawing-room and over the tea-cups, Napoleon III was infinitely more at home than his uncle had been; and his marriage in 1853 with Eugénie, Countess of Montijo, a Spanish lady, gave him an Empress whose beauty and charm were of the utmost service in rendering the French court once more the focal point of European styles and fashions. By the form of monarchical majesty, Napoleon III was rallying French conservatives to himself, just as he was attracting French radicals by the form of political democracy.

The Emperor was much impressed by the contemporary vogue of liberalism. He was hardly a liberal in politics, but in economics he was almost, if not quite, as liberal as Louis Philippe or Guizot. Indeed, the Second Empire, in its economic policies, represented a continuation and development of the preceding

¹ In the elections to the national legislature, the government paid the expenses of "official candidates," that is, of those who were acceptable to Napoleon III, while other candidates had to pay their own expenses. Moreover, the electoral machinery was almost completely in the Emperor's hands, and by an act of r858 every candidate was obliged to take an oath of fidelity to Napoleon III.

² A law of 1858 allowed the government, without the formality of civil trials, to intern political offenders in France or Algeria or to exile them.

bourgeois monarchy. Economic liberalism was taught in the French universities and was applied to legislation in Its Ecothe interest of the industrial middle classes. Governmental regulation of private business was steadily Liberallessened. The introduction of machinery and the organization of industrial corporations were facilitated. A system of savings banks was established. Tariffs were gradually lowered, and in 1860 Napoleon III negotiated with Richard Cobden an Anglo-French commercial treaty facilitating trade between the two Great Powers of western Europe. 1 Moreover, the Emperor sponsored a series of remarkable public works as indirect means of stimulating industry and commerce (and providing employment for proletarians). Not only were harbors improved, swamps drained, canals dug, and roads repaired, but the network of railways, which had been projected by Louis Philippe's government, was now brought to completion. At the same time, vast sums of money were spent on constructing broad boulevards and magnificent public buildings (including the imposing opera-house) in Paris, under the supervision of the Emperor's devoted friend, Baron Haussmann, and on making the French capital the most beautiful and attractive city in the world.2 Many were the private fortunes made or swelled during the Second Empire. And for a goodly number of years, the bourgeoisie, who were the chief beneficiaries, were loyal to Napoleon III.

Napoleon III, unlike Louis Philippe, was not so engrossed in economic liberalism and the cause of the industrial bourgeoisie as to ignore the sentiments and demands of the growing industrial proletariat in France. He assured the workingmen that he was one of them. He rode in engine cabs with Favors to locomotive engineers. He talked familiarly with artisans and laborers upon the boulevards. He drank healths to masons, carpenters, and plumbers. He subsidized their organizations, and he and the Empress endowed charitable institutions. It was for the working class, he affirmed, that his government of cheap bread, public works, and holidays existed. He gloried in the appellation, "emperor of the workers." There

¹ See above, p. 85.

² The international expositions held at Paris in 1855 and 1867 attested the magnificence of the city and the growth of material comfort throughout the nation.

was some actual labor legislation during the Second Empire—just enough to encourage workingmen and not so much as would alienate bourgeois liberals. One law permitted laborers to form coöperative societies, as in England, for collective buying and selling (1863). Another partially legalized trade unions and recognized for the first time the right of strikes (1864). A third extended workmen's voluntary insurance, with state guaranties, to death and industrial accidents (1868).

Of the French peasantry, especially of the numerous peasantproprietors, Napoleon III was also mindful. He recalled frequently to them his devotion to the principle of private
property, his intense interest in their vineyards and
wheatfields, and the prosperity which was assured
them by his improvement of transportation and his enlargement
of markets. He also took pains to cater to the traditional religious
convictions of many of the peasants, as well as of persons of the
upper and middle classes. Napoleon III was not deeply religious,
but his Empress was, and he himself recognized, as

Catholics Louis Philippe had not recognized, the reviving vigor of Catholic Christianity in France and the political desirability of enlisting ardent Catholics, as well as irreligious free-thinkers, in support of his government.

Consequently, while the Emperor was fostering material well-being for the nation, he and his consort were favoring the spiritual ascendancy of the Catholic Church. The Empress Eugénie, by her personal piety and her famed charities, acquired the reputation of being at once the promoter of ecclesiastical causes and the devoted friend of the poor. Napoleon III won the positive support of Catholics by strengthening the hold of the clergy upon the universities and public schools in France, by maintaining French troops at Rome for the protection of the Pope, and by posing as the international champion of Catholic Christianity.

For the first time since the advent of the first Napoleon, it seemed as though France had a government which would rise Napoleon III's Constructive Domestic Policies Napoleon III addressed to the French people on one of his trips across the country just prior to his assumption of the imperial dignity, appeared peculiarly prophetic of his achieve

ments in domestic policy. "I would conquer," he had said, "for the sake of religion, morality, and material ease, that portion of the population, still very numerous, which, in the midst of a country of faith and belief, hardly knows the precepts of Christ; which, in the midst of the most fertile country of the world, is hardly able to enjoy the primary necessities of life. We have immense uncultivated districts to bring under cultivation, roads to open, harbors to construct, rivers to render navigable, canals to finish, and our network of railways to bring to completion. . . . This is what I understand by the Empire, if the Empire is to be reëstablished. These are the conquests which I contemplate, and all of you who surround me, who, like myself, wish the good of our common fatherland, you are my soldiers." i These words not only were a promise, beautifully phrased, but they are a convenient summary of what Napoleon III actually accomplished.

In another part of the same speech, the prospective Emperor had sought to allay a fear which might haunt equally the economic liberal and the pious Christian. "There is, nevertheless, one apprehension, and that I shall set at III's Perrest. A spirit of distrust leads certain persons to say that the Empire means war. I say the Empire means peace. France longs for peace, and if France is satisfied, the world is tranquil. Glory is rightly handed down hereditarily, but not war." This part of the prophecy was not fulfilled. In foreign affairs, Napoleon III was not as fortunate as in domestic policies. The Second Empire, whatever he meant it to be, involved real war—several colonial wars and three European wars.

Napoleon III was pacific at heart. He was a product of midnineteenth-century liberalism, humanitarianism, and romanticism. He lacked the fiery martial zeal of the born soldier and he had a most un-Napoleonic aversion to the smell of gunpowder and the sight of bloodshed. He liked to display arms, but he hesitated to use them. He would engage with gusto in the most intricate diplomatic negotiations, but at the mere thought of executing such war plans in person, of being himself in the thick of battle, he was apt to feel ill. Inherently, he was timid rather than bellicose.

Yet, this same Napoleon III was impelled to war by the very ¹ The Bordeaux address, October 9, 1852.

circumstances of his own rise to power in France and by the very nature of the policy he chose to follow in order His Politto retain his power. He was a nationalist par excelical Nationalism lence. He had been reared under the expanding spell of the "Napoleonic legend" and he had habitually and Its Danger to Peace expressed his sympathy with contemporary strivings for liberal nationalism throughout Europe—in Italy, Germany, and Poland, as well as in France. It was his nationalism and his name-which had attracted the French masses to him after they had gotten rid of the "unpatriotic" bourgeois monarchy; which had raised him to the post of President and then of Emperor; and which required him to do his utmost to obscure factional bickerings behind a showy front of national solidarity. If factions quarrelled within France, or if one grumbled because he was temporarily favoring another, he was quick to perceive that, in a nationalist age, he could silence the grumbling and stop the domestic squabbling, at least for a time, by embarking the nation on a glorious foreign enterprise. Besides, his nationalism—and his romanticism—made him the centre of intrigues and the object of constant pleas for active assistance in forwarding the freedom and unity of "oppressed" nationalities in Europe. Liberal patriots throughout the Continent looked to him for support, as reactionary sovereigns had formerly looked to Metternich; and he imagined that by supporting nationalism abroad he might secure for France "compensations" of territory and prestige which would heighten patriotic pride at home and strengthen the Napoleonic Empire.

One forceful policy, short of European war, appealed to Napoleon III from the outset, and that was the rebuilding of an overseas colonial dominion for France. He injected new vigor into the administration of the remnants of the old empire¹—Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies, Cayenne on the Guiana coast of South America, Senegal in western Africa, and the trading posts in Asiatic India. He did not hesitate, as Louis Philippe had done, about annexing the whole of Algeria to France:² he completed its pacification in 1857; he established a per-

¹On the collapse of the earlier colonial dominion of France, see Vol. I, pp. 412-413. On the unsuccessful efforts of Napoleon I to reëstablish it, see Vol. I, p. 656.

²On the preceding French occupation of Algeria, see above, pp. 107-108.

manent civil government for it in 1858; and under the governorship of one of his ablest generals, Marshal MacMahon, from 1864 to 1870, Algeria became the largest and most promising oversea dependency of France.

In the meantime, the Emperor was sending out naval expeditions to appropriate islands in the Pacific; New Caledonia, the most noteworthy, was acquired in 1853. In 1856 France joined Great Britain in a military demonstration against China, and, after four years of spasmodic fighting, culminating in an allied advance on Peking, the Chinese government agreed by the treaty of Tientsin (1860) to open several ports to free European trade and to protect Christian missionaries in the interior. South of the Chinese Empire—in the peninsula of Indo-China—Napoleon III laid at this Indotime the foundation of French dominion; he avenged the murder of French missionaries by sending punitive expeditions into Annam and Cochin-China (1858) and by erecting a French protectorate over Cambodia (1863). In 1863, also, he initiated, alike for commercial and religious motives, a French intervention in Mexico, which was not so fortunate and of which we shall presently say more. Yet despite the disastrous outcome of the Mexican enterprise, the Second Empire witnessed the rehabilitation of the French as colonizers and traders on a scale second only to the British. The real restorer of the French colonial empire was, indeed, Napoleon III. It was a tribute to the nationalism, if not to the liberalism, of the era.

In Europe, Napoleon III had begun his reign by most pacific protestations, which served to reassure the Great Powers that they could safely suffer a Napoleon to sit once more on Napothe throne of France. And so careful was the Emperor leon III's to harmonize the foreign and commercial policies of Foreign Policies France with those of Britain that for some years he could count on a virtual alliance with the Power which had been most stubbornly and fatefully hostile to the first Napoleon. Against one Power in Europe, however, Napoleon III was arrayed almost from the outset. That Power was Russia, then ruled by the most reactionary sovereign on the Continent, the Tsar Nicholas I. The Tsar, ever

Friendly Relations with

the foe of revolution and democratic principles, distrusted the upstart Emperor of the French and most grudgingly recognized his title and government. Not only was Napoleon III personally piqued by the Tsar, but the French people were pecul-Unfriendiarly unsympathetic to Tsarist Russia: business men ly Rela-tions with Russia found fault with its tariff restrictions and economic backwardness; Catholics complained about its religious intolerance; liberals inveighed against its autocracy and its oppression of the Poles.

Quarrels at the holy places in Palestine between monks of the Catholic communion and those of the Orthodox faith provided the spark for igniting the train of ill-feeling toward Russia on the part of France (and Great Britain). The Tsar, as the champion

Supporting Turkey against Russian "Aggres-

of Orthodox Christianity, denounced the inability or unwillingness of the Sultan to preserve peace at the holy places and demanded that he recognize the "right" of Russia to a protectorate of Christians within the Ottoman Empire. But Napoleon III promptly pointed out that such a "right" would violate the long established treaty-rights of France to the protection of

Catholics at the holy places and throughout the Ottoman Empire, and called upon the Sultan to resist Russian "agression." The Sultan was only too happy to comply with the French Emperor's request, for he well knew that the Tsar Nicholas had been describing him as the "sick man of the East" and had been proposing to England the partition of his empire.

Napoleon III, though naturally pacific, could not let slip such a highly favorable opportunity for a war of glory. He knew that he would have the French nation solidly with him, and the sympathy of all liberals throughout Europe-Polish, Italian, even German. He knew, too, that the international situation was wonderfully auspicious. Not only would he have an ally in the Ottoman Empire, but he would have far more significant assistance from Great Britain. British Coöperaliberals were pacific in theory, and some of them were tion stridently so in utterance; but they were also antiagainst Tsarist. Many of them, together with the British Russia masses, shared the fear of the British government of the day that a Russian protectorate over Christians in the Ottoman Empire would be speedily followed by Russian appropriation of European Turkey, and that Russia, ensconced at Constantinople, would be an infinitely graver menace than the Turks

to British communication with India and to British trade in the eastern Mediterranean. So, despite some opposition from Cobden. Bright, and other radical pacifists, and considerable divergence of counsel within Parliament and the ministry, Great Britain backed France in the demand for the preservation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Franco-British cause was espoused, moreover, by the little kingdom of Sardinia, for reasons of its own which will be indicated later. The Austrian government preserved a troubled neutrality, wavering between a desire to repay Russia for its recent help in putting down the Hungarian revolt of 1840 2 and a lively apprehension of Russian territorial expansion. King Frederick William IV of Prussia alone was really "benevolent" toward Tsarist Russia, but he who had just surrendered German leadership to Austria was in no mood to complicate the situation in Germany by going to war with France and Britain.

1853; it was joined, on the Ottoman side, by France and Great Britain in 1854 and by Sardinia in 1855. The struggle, confined mainly to military operations in the peninsula of the Crimea, including a notable protracted siege of Sevastopol, has been known in history as the Crimean War. There were many evidences of unpreparedness and bungling on both sides. The Russian military machine proved itself corrupt and inefficient and might have been disposed of fairly quickly, had not the Allies been equally inefficient in providing arms, food, and sanitation. There was some severe and heroic

War began between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in

At Paris, Napoleon III's capital, a peace congress of European Powers arranged a general settlement. Russia agreed to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to renounce any claim to a protectorate over its Christian inhabitants, to restore

fighting, but sickness and starvation wrought more havoc than bullets.³ In 1856 Russia sued for peace. The Crimean War had

cost half a million lives and at least two billion dollars.

¹ See below, p. 221.

² See above, p. 133.

³ Some improvement in camp sanitation and in the health of soldiers resulted, in the latter part of the war, from the devoted labors of the famous English nurse, Florence Nightingale, "the angel with the lamp." It was about one of the heroic episodes of the Crimean War that Tennyson, whose romantic patriotism could outweigh his romantic pacifism, wrote the *Charge of the Light Brigade*.

to it a strip of the province of Bessarabia,1 and no longer to build or maintain warships on the Black Sea. Simul-Peace taneously Russia joined with the other Powers in Congress of Paris, creating an international commission to supervise the 1856 free navigation of the Danube. These results of the Crimean War were not very startling. But at any rate, Russia was checked; the Ottoman Empire was preserved; Great Britain felt safer; and Napoleon III was cheered by returning veterans and acclaimed by all French patriots. In the midst of the popular applause, a son was born to the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Eugénie—the "Prince Imperial," who might some day become Napoleon IV. Surely, fortune smiled upon the Emperor of the French and lured a pacifist on to more wars.

While the Congress of Paris was in session, the delegate from Sardinia—the masterful Cavour, of whom we shall soon take

Napoleon
III and
the Question of
Italian
Freedom
and Unity

special note—was already urging Napoleon to aid Sardinia in expelling Austria from the peninsula and creating a free and united state for the Italian people. The Emperor was receptive: his uncle had erected a "kingdom of Italy"; he himself had been a *Carbonaro*; the Bonapartes had Italian blood in their veins;

Austria had given no active assistance to France in the Crimean War; a war with Austria for the unification of Italy would be popular with French liberals; and Napoleon III might get some decent tangible "compensations" for French effort. Yet the Emperor hesitated: an Austrian war was risky in view of Austria's repeatedly displayed prowess and prestige in Italy (and in Germany); a united Italy might prove to be a strong and perhaps a dangerous rival to France in the Mediterranean; and—most alarming consideration—many French Catholics were heeding the fearful entreaties of the Pope against any Italian unification which might deprive him of his temporal state and were controverting French Liberals about the desirability of the Emperor's intervention in Italy.

To Napoleon III, it was soon obvious that whatever he did he ran the danger of antagonizing one or the other of the major

¹ Bessarabia, lying on the Black Sea between the Dniester and Pruth rivers, was peopled largely by Rumanians. It had been acquired by Russia in 1812 (during the Napoleonic War) and a part of it was now, in 1856, reincorporated in the Rumanian principality of Moldavia, under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan.

French groups on whose united support he had hitherto relied. If he championed Italian national unity, the Catholics would be disaffected; if he held aloof, the Liberals would be disappointed. Good politician as he was, he temporized and postponed the decision, until an attempt on his life in January 1858 by a crazed Italian nationalist, Orsini by name, touched a little chord of cowardice which was usually concealed beneath the Emperor's sphinx-like features and stung him into action. Within a month of the outrage, he laid before Cavour a proposal for a Franco-Sardinian alliance. He would remove the grievance of potential Italian assassins and cater to the liberal patriots of France and the world. He would temporarily risk the reproaches of Pope and French Catholics.

At an "accidental" meeting between Napoleon III and Cavour at Plombières in July 1858 an informal agreement was reached, whereby France would assist Sardinia in driving the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia and sanction Sardinian the formation of a single north Italian state, and, in return, Sardinia would cede to France the Alpine duchy of Savoy and the Mediterranean port of Nice. To cement the alliance, Prince Victor Napoleon, cousin and next of kin (after the infant Prince Imperial) to the Emperor, would marry the daughter of King Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia. Forthwith, military preparations were ostentatiously set on foot against Austria.

In April 1859, the Austrian government, thoroughly aroused


by the preparations, presented an ultimatum to Sardinia, demanding immediate demobilization. The prompt rejection of the ultimatum was the signal for the outbreak of war, which, with Austria on one side and France 1850 against and Sardinia on the other, lasted from April to July 1859, and constituted the first successful step toward Italian liberation and union. French troops under the Emperor and Marshal MacMahon entered Piedmont, where they were received with enthusiasm and were joined by the Sardinian army under King Victor Emmanuel II and General La Marmora. The allies then advanced into Lombardy: the victory of Magenta early in June, which delivered Milan to them, was shortly followed by that of Solferino; and the Austrians fell back upon their strong fortresses in Venetia.

The successes of the allies inflamed Italian nationalism and led to popular demands for the incorporation of the states of central Italy, including the Papal State, in a united Italy under the King of Sardinia. This was more than Napoleon III had bargained for. In attempting to obtain Lombardy and Venetia for Sardinia, he was inspiring a far more extensive Sardinian expansion, which threatened serious danger to France. French Catholics naturally attributed the nationalist movement in the Papal State to their own Emperor's sacrilegious intervention in Italy, and Dupanloup, an eloquent and influential French bishop, from his cathedral pulpit branded Napoleon as "the modern Judas Iscariot." Other considerations worried the Emperor. Prussia was mobilizing along the Rhine. The Austrian armies, entrenched in Venetia, were being reënforced. French losses were comparatively heavy. And, quite unlike his illustrious uncle, Napoleon III was troubled by the spectacle of the dead and wounded upon battlefields.

Consequently, the Emperor of the French, without previously informing Cavour, stopped short in July 1859, and concluded at Napoleon Willafranca an armistice with the Linguist Tomore Joseph of Austria, whereby Lombardy would be Austrian. Villafranca an armistice with the Emperor Francis ceded to Sardinia, Venetia would remain Austrian, with the princes in central Italy would be reinstated, and Austria the Pope would become president of an Italian federation. It was now the turn of Italian patriots and French liberals to assail Napoleon as a traitor. Loud were their protests. King Victor Emmanuel, left in the lurch by his powerful ally, felt obliged to accede to the truce, but Cavour denounced it and resigned his office in disgust. The terms of the truce of Villafranca were ratified by the treaty of Zürich in the following November between France and Austria.

Napoleon, however, had not reckoned with the resolution of Italian patriots. Under the influence of radical leaders and with the connivance of the Sardinian government, the inhabitants of the duchies of central Italy and of part (Romagna) of the Papal State would not hear of any Italian federation under the Pope or of the reinstatement of their former rulers; they held plebiscites and voted to join the kingdom of Sardinia. At first Napoleon III categorically refused to recognize such an exercise of the "right of national self-determination." Presently, however,

Cavour, who had swallowed his pride and returned to his post, persuaded the Emperor to change his mind. By the treaty of Turin, signed in March 1860, between Napoleon III Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel II, Sardinia ceded to France both Savoy and Nice, just as if Napoleon had carried with out the original bargain and freed Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic," and, in return, France recognized Sardinia's annexation not only of Lombardy but also of the duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, and of the papal province of Romagna.



Italy at End of Franco-Austrian War of 1859

In accordance with the treaty of Turin and with the wish of their inhabitants expressed through plebiscites, Savoy and Nice were annexed to France—or, as Napoleon III said, "restored to France." For they had belonged to the First French Republic and to the First France Napoleonic Empire and had been handed over to Sardinia by the

Viennese peace settlement of 1815. Now, in 1860, they were back in the Second Napoleonic Empire. They represented tangible territorial gains for France from Napoleon III's intervention in Italy.

Other results of his intervention in Italy were less advantageous to France and the Napoleonic régime. To the enmity of Russia, Napoleon III had now added the ill will of Growing Austria, the disaffection of Sardinia, and the suspicion International Isoof Great Britain. He was isolating France and establation of lishing an unenviable reputation for himself as an France ambitious and dishonest schemer. At the same time, the example which he had given of forwarding Italian nationalism was not lost on patriotic Rumanians, Poles, and Germans; they beset him more than ever after 1860 with pleas for French assistance to their respective causes, and they certainly complicated his foreign policy.

Especially troublesome were the effects of the Emperor's Italian war on French domestic politics. Until 1859 marked success had attended Napoleon III's astute appeals to all French-

Growing Domestic Opposition to Napoleon III

men-rich and poor, radical and conservative, religious and irreligious—to unite in "one great national party" and follow his leadership along the glorious paths of a "new nationalism." But his intervention in Italy split the "national party." French Catholics blamed him for going too far; French Liberals abused him for not going far enough. After 1850 the breach between these important factions widened, and the Emperor's efforts to keep his

grasp on both, for a time grotesque, ended in tragedy.

In 1860, to appease the Liberals, Napoleon made a show of "liberalizing" his government. He permitted the legislature to

Napoleon's Concessions to French Liberals and Catholics, 1860 discuss his policies and to criticize his ministers. He removed some of the restrictions on the freedom of speech both inside and outside the legislature. He authorized the full publication of parliamentary debates. Simultaneously, to appease the Catholics, he declared his firm determination to uphold the temporal sov-

ereignty of the papacy and never to allow the Italians to appropriate Rome. But on neither side were these concessions wholly satisfactory. Both Liberals and Catholics were henceforth increasingly critical of the Emperor.

Some minor and temporary prestige Napoleon III won, at least with liberal patriots, by his foreign policy in behalf of the Rumanians. This nationality inhabited the Ottoman principalities of Moldavia and Walachia (and the Russian province of Bessarabia); it spoke a Latin language leon III's

leon III's Championship of Rumania, 1856-1862

akin to French, Italian, and Spanish; and its leaders, actuated by the ubiquitous rise of romantic nationalism, were intent upon establishing a free and united Rumania. At the conclusion of the Crimean

War, Napoleon III had insisted on adding a part of Bessarabia to Moldavia and on guarantying to the Rumanian principalities a large measure of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. In 1858, on the eve of his intervention in Italy, he had secured from the Great Powers (and the Sultan) a general recognition of the right of each of the Rumanian principalities to elect its own parliament and choose its own prince, though with the express proviso that Moldavia and Walachia should not be united. This proviso the Rumanian leaders obviated by having the two principalities choose one and the same prince, Alexander Cuza. And in 1861-1862 Napoleon III demonstrated his continuing interest in Rumania by prevailing upon the Powers to recognize not only the one prince but also the fusion of the two parliaments into a united "Rumanian" parliament. The Second French Empire thus helped to create the modern national state of Rumania as well as that of Italy.

Less success and prestige attended Napoleon III's sympathy for Polish national aspirations, which, fanned by romantic breezes

and touched off by nationalist developments in Italy and Rumania, burst into open flame in 1863 with a revolt against Russia. France was the traditional ally of Poland, and Poles had fought desperately for the first Napoleon. Why should not the third Napoleon,

His Desire but Inability to Champion Poland, 1863

the friend of oppressed nationalities, assist the Poles? French Liberals urged him to do so because the Poles were fighting for the liberal principle of self-determination, and French Catholics besought him to do so because the Poles were a devoutly Catholic people. It was clear that in this case, unlike the Italian case, he would have the united support of the French people. Yet the general European situation was now against him. He knew that if he went to war with Russia on behalf of

her rebellious Poles, he would find Prussia and Austria, because of their own Polish populations, in alliance with Russia against him, and that such a big war could only be calamitous to France and to Napoleonic fortunes. So he contented himself with filing a feeble protest with the Tsar about "atrocities"; and as Great Britain did likewise, the Poles were left, despairing and unfriended, to be overwhelmed by Russian soldiery. As Napoleon III stood helplessly by, French Liberals and French Catholics alike heaped reproaches on him.

It was in large part for the purpose of restoring the prestige which he was conspicuously losing at home from his Italian and Polish policies that Napoleon III launched a far-away Mexican adventure. The opportunity was afforded him by His Intertroubled conditions in the republic of Mexico and by a vention in fierce American Civil War (1861-1865) which seemed Mexico. 1862 to preclude the United States from interfering with his project. In Mexico, chronic ill feeling between the poor halfbreed or Indian peasantry on one hand and the wealthy landowning Spanish-Mexicans on the other had been exploited by rival chieftains, of whom one faction, catering to the landlords, championed conservatism in religion and politics, while the other, with its eyes on the peasants, championed violent radicalism. In 1861, after a protracted struggle, Benito Juarez (1806-1872), a radical leader and a full-blooded Indian, overthrew a conservative government and inaugurated a drastic ecclesiastical "reform" in the country. Religious communities were suppressed; all ecclesiastical property was confiscated; civil marriage was instituted; cemeteries were transferred to secular control; and, in short, the church was not only separated from the state but persecuted. The Juarez government also repudiated the public debts which its predecessor had contracted.

Ostensibly to protect French owners of Mexican bonds, Napoleon III then turned his eyes across the Atlantic. At first he merely negotiated an agreement with Spain and Great Britain—countries likewise affected by the Juarist repudiation of debts—for joint seizure and retention of Mexican customs houses until satisfaction of the debts should be obtained. Within four months financial adjustments were made satisfactory to Great Britain and Spain, and the forces of these Powers were withdrawn. But the French still tarried. In the autumn of 1862 Napoleon des-

patched to Mexico an army of 30,000 French veterans, who, with the aid of a constant stream of reënforcements from France. captured Mexico City in June 1863 and drove Juarez into the mountain fastnesses of the north. Instead of annexing the country outright to France, Napoleon preferred to control it indirectly. By prevailing upon the Archduke Maximilian, brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, to become "Emperor of Mexico" (1864), he sought to mollify the Austrian Habsburgs for their losses at his hands in Italy; and by supporting Maximilian with French funds and French soldiers, he was assured that the Mexican Emperor would not act contrary to French interests. He counted on the well-known loyalty of the Habsburgs to the Catholic Church to undo the anti-ecclesiastical work of Juarez and thereby to please Catholic Frenchmen; and he was sure that a sense of obligation would lead Maximilian to grant many favorable commercial concessions to bourgeois Frenchmen, whose devotion to liberal principles was second only to their anxiety for liberal profits.

But "the great idea of his reign," as Napoleon termed it, proved peculiarly disastrous. From the outset, Maximilian's position in Mexico was precarious. Many Mexicans who had no special liking for the radical Juarez preferred him to a "foreign" emperor. The French troops, on whom Maximilian relied, were unaccustomed to the guerilla warfare waged against them and were most seriously handicapped by the nature of the country and the lack of transportation facilities. Then, too, the ending of the Civil War in the United States (1865) enabled the American government to reassert the principle of the Monroe Doctrine and add very real threats to its protests. Whereupon, the French Emperor, fearful of what a million veterans of the American Civil War might do in conjunction with Juarez's unpleasant fighters, faced about and gradually recalled his expeditionary forces. The

Enforced drawal from Mexico. 1867

ruary 1867. Maximilian, who was gallant or foolhardy enough to remain, was soon captured and shot, and the victorious Juarez reinstalled himself as president.

French completed their evacuation of Mexico in Feb-

The Mexican enterprise of the French was not only disastrous in itself; it was a veritable boomerang against Napoleon III. The restoration of Juarez involved in Mexico the enforcement of anti-Catholic legislation and the annulment of numerous profitable franchises recently acquired by French financiers. In France, the natural result was a redoubling of criticism of the Emperor on the part of bourgeois Liberals and ardent Catholics.

Such criticism came to be shared generally by Frenchmen, as these beheld how the Emperor's failure in Mexico contributed to the waning of French prestige in Europe. At the very time when Napoleon III was absorbed in the enterprise overseas and some of his best troops were fighting in far-away Mexico, a vigorous and resourceful Prussian statesman—Otto von Bismarck, of whom we shall soon have much to say—was perfecting plans

Napoleon
III and
the Question of
German
Unification

for the expulsion of Austria from Germany and for the establishment of a national state under the Hohenzollern King of Prussia. Important reforms were effected in the Prussian army between 1862 and 1866, without parallel reforms in the French army. In 1864 Prussia undertook a war with Denmark over the

disputed duchies of Schleswig and Holstein,1 and Austria, not to be outbid as a champion of German interests, joined Prussia. The war was brief: the duchies were wrested from Denmark; and the only crumb of comfort which Napoleon III received was a promise, written into a later peace treaty, that a plebiscite in Schleswig should determine what part of the duchy would pass to Germany and what part should remain Danish-and the promise was not kept. In 1865 Bismarck had an interview with Napoleon at Biarritz. The Prussian statesman knew how to work upon the French Emperor's romantic attachment to the principle of nationality, upon his personal vanity, and upon his desperate readiness to clutch at any chance to obtain a little glory for France and the Napoleonic dynasty. The Emperor did not oppose Bismarck's scheme for a joint attack of Prussia and Italy on Austria and for a closer union of the states of north Germany with Prussia. He was vaguely given to understand that France might seek "compensation" toward the Rhine perhaps Belgium or some of the Rhineland. And he doubtless imagined that the parties to the impending struggle in Germany would be so evenly balanced as to render subsequent French intervention easy, decisive, and highly gainful.

The German war came suddenly in 1866, with Prussia (and See above, pp. 133-134, and below, pp. 231-232.

Italy) arrayed against Austria (and several smaller German states). Of the general significance of the war, we shall Prussian treat at greater length in the next section. Here it Triumph suffices to remark that the war was short and decisive in Germany so short that it is known as the "Seven Weeks' War" and so decisive that Austria was obliged to cede Venetia to Italy and (more important for our present purposes) to yield the hegemony of Germany to Prussia. Prussia annexed some of the lesser German states, brought the others north of the Main River into a compact "North German Confederation" under her own domination, and contracted defensive alliances with the remaining and nominally independent south German states.

Napoleon III got no "compensations" for France. In vain he intrigued to obtain Belgium. In vain he besought Bismarck's kind offices to help France get the Rhenish Palatinate. No Com-For a time he thought he might at least secure Luxempensation for France burg. This was a small grand-duchy adjacent to Belgium on the northern frontier of France; since 1815 it had been a member of the German Confederation and had been governed by the King of the Netherlands and garrisoned by Prussia. Early in 1867 the French Emperor negotiated with the Dutch King for the purchase of the grand-duchy; the King was willing, but Bismarck objected. As Napoleon was not prepared for war, he could only refer the matter to a conference of the Powers signatory to the treaties of Vienna under which the status of Luxemburg had been fixed and abide by the arrangement accordingly reached at London (May 1867). The Prussian garrison was to be withdrawn and the grand-duchy released from any formal tie with Germany, but the King of the Netherlands was to retain his sovereignty and Luxemburg be neutralized and guarantied as an independent state, like Belgium, by all the Great Powers.

Napoleon III was aging. He was tired and sick. sadly disappointed. Distrust of him was widespread throughout Europe, and disaffection was growing within France. Here, especially after 1867, many conservatives and Catholics who had previously supported or acquiesced in the Second Empire regarded with increasing favor the prospect of bringing about another royalist restoration, either of the "legitimate" Bourbon

Rapidly Rising Opposition to Napoleon III in France

He was

monarchy of Charles X or of the "liberal" Orleanist-Bourbon monarchy of Louis Philippe.¹ Simultaneously, many middle-class liberals, including business men and professional men, underwent a conversion to republicanism and gave leaders and strength to a party which hitherto had been struggling along against Napoleon III with the aid only of a few doctrinaire radicals and of groups of ill-organized workingmen. From the disintegration of the national combination which Napoleon III had created were now emerging once more the factions of royalists and republicans, based, as before the Emperor's advent, on class distinctions and religious predilections.

The domestic danger to the Second Empire was disclosed by the parliamentary elections of 1869, which, despite governmental manipulation, returned fifty royalists and forty republicans. To maintain his throne, Napoleon III at once made liberal conces-

Liberalizing the Second Empire sions. He reduced the rigors of press censorship. He promised to abandon the practice of paying the election expenses of "official" candidates for the Legislature. He agreed to recognize the responsibility of his minis-

ters to the Legislature rather than to himself. And he appointed as prime minister Émile Ollivier, who had been a liberal royalist critic of the Napoleonic régime but who now seconded Napoleon III's scheme for establishing a "Liberal Empire."

Through the collaboration of Ollivier and Napoleon III, a new "liberal" constitution was drafted for the Second Empire.

The Con- It embodied the concessions already made by the stitution Emperor and provided further that the Senate should become an upper house in a bicameral parliament and thereby share with the popularly elected lower house (the Legislative Body), freed from imperial interference, in the making of laws and the determination of public policies. Such reforms might partially conciliate the liberal royalists, but they satisfied neither "legitimists" nor republicans. The latter, in fact, redoubled their subversive agitation, with ominous results apparent

¹ The candidate of the "liberal" royalists for the throne of France was the Count of Paris, grandson of Louis Philippe, while the candidate of the "legitimate" royalists was "Henry V," Count of Chambord and grandson of Charles X. The latter had a larger personal following than the former, though probably the majority of French royalists preferred the liberal and constitutional principles proclaimed by the Count of Paris to the absolutist doctrines associated with Charles X and the Count of Chambord. See genealogical table at p. 539, below.

in the plebiscite of May 1870. Although over seven million votes were cast in favor of the new constitution, not all of them could be reckoned as endorsements of the Empire. Besides, one and a half million votes were cast against the constitution, and nearly two million qualified voters absented themselves from the polls.

On one matter it was still possible for any French government to command the almost unanimous support of Frenchmen. That was the matter of the political unification of Germany under Prussian auspices. French Liberals detested Prussia as a reactionary state. French Catholics disliked Prussia

as an intolerantly Protestant state. French patriots—
the mass of Frenchmen—were jealous and fearful of
the sudden emergence on their northeastern frontier of

French Feeling against Prussia

a strong state, more populous and perhaps more powerfully armed than their own. For centuries, a disunited Germany had been of advantage to France. Would not a united Germany be a grave menace? Would it not tip the European balance of power decisively against France? Frenchmen had recently done much, as we have seen, to abet the nationalism of Italians, Greeks, Rumanians, Poles, and other European peoples. They might favor in a platonic way a similar nationalism among the Germans. But the Germans were too near and too numerous to render France enthusiastic about them, and latterly they seemed to have a way of securing national unity without any assistance from France or any "compensation" to her. Not alone the vanity of Napoleon III, but the patriotic pride of the vast majority of Frenchmen had been grievously wounded by the cavalier fashion in which Bismarck and the Hohenzollerns had flouted France in all the German wars and negotiations, in all the annexations and consolidations, from 1864 down to 1870. Was not France still a Great Power? Was she not still the first Power in Europe? Prussia had overwhelmed Austria in 1866, but France had defeated Austria in 1859. Could not and should not France prove her superiority to Prussia-by force of arms if necessary? It was a vital question of national prestige.

Napoleon III had no stomach for a war with Prussia. He was broken in health. He was troubled, rather than reassured, by his recollections of his wars with Russia and Austria and his expedition in Mexico. And he was aware of the inauspicious appearance of the international scene. The Russian Tsar had not

forgotten the French Emperor's part in the Crimean War, and was distinctly pro-German. The Austrian Emperor, Napoleon III's Reif humiliated by Prussia, had first been humbled by luctance France. The Italian King could feel no enthusiasm to War for a former ally who had "betrayed" the cause of against Prussia Italian freedom and who, by keeping troops at Rome, still prevented the fruition of Italian unity. British statesmen now thoroughly distrusted Napoleon III, and British public opinion was pronouncedly hostile to him. Even Bavaria and other south German states, which had been traditional allies of France, were suspicious of the French Emperor and in alliance with Prussia. To wage war with Germany would be a big and un-pleasant gamble for Napoleon III. Yet just such a gamble seemed to be the only recourse left to him, if he would check the growing opposition to himself in France and the waning prestige of France in Europe. If the gamble were successful, if France won the war and prevented Prussia from consolidating

Germany, French hegemony would be guarantied and the Napoleonic Empire would be maintained in glory Anxiety by a grateful French nation. Napoleon III was anxious Prestige that his young son, the Prince Imperial, should eventually succeed him as Emperor, and whatever qualms he might feel about a German war as the necessary means of assuring his son's succession were counteracted by the ambitious pleas of the Empress Eugénie.

Bismarck, the Prussian statesman, believed that a Franco-German war was inevitable and that the defeat of France was prerequisite to the completion of German freedom and unity.1 He therefore worked for war. And, in the midst of mounting patriotism on both sides of the Rhine, a pretext for war was not long lacking. It was supplied by Spanish liberals, who, having precipitated a revolution in their country (1868) and deposed the absolutist Queen Isabella II,2 were seeking a new sovereign

who would be liberal and constitutional. After receiv-Question ing more or less polite refusals from several European of a Prussian King princes, the Spanish liberals offered the crown to Prince for Spain Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a Catholic cousin of the King of Prussia. Prince Leopold was not eager for

¹ The German side of the matter is given below, pp. 242-243.

² Isabella II had succeeded her father, Ferdinand VII, in 1833. See below, p. 277.

Spanish adventures and at first declined the offer; but Bismarck, who scented the possibilities of the situation, procured a renewal of the invitation and its acceptance by the Hohenzollern prince (July 2, 1870).

Napoleon III, urged on by his wife and his ministers, professed to see in the Hohenzollern acceptance a projected union of Germany with Spain reminiscent of the sixteenth-century empire of Charles V 1 and menacing to French security. He addressed strong protests to the Prussian and Spanish governments; and on July 12 it was announced in Madrid that Prince Leopold of his own accord had revoked his acceptance of the Spanish crown. Here the business might have ended, but the French Emperor was pressed by his advisers to utilize the occasion to administer an open diplomatic defeat to Prussia. Hence the French ambassador at Berlin was instructed to obtain from the King of Prussia a solemn public promise that he would never permit a Hohenzollern to become a candidate for the throne of Spain. The ensuing interview of the ambassador with the Prussian King, then at the famous watering-place of Ems, was indecisive; and when the persistent ambassador requested another interview, the King merely stated that he was leaving Ems Editing by that night and could not receive him. The news of Bismarck this rebuff was telegraphed by the King to Bismarck, who after consulting the military chiefs and satisfying himself that Prussia was prepared for war, communicated the despatch to the public press-not, however, in the exact original form in which he had received it from the King but in a form so edited as to convey the impression to Germans that the Prussian King had been insulted by the French ambassador and to Frenchmen that their ambassador had been insulted by the Prussian King. The telegram was rightly calculated to have the effect, in Bismarck's own cynical words, "of a red rag on the Gallic bull."

The report of the Ems interview, published in Paris on July 14, 1870, the French national holiday, threw France into a paroxysm of anger and a frenzy for war. Napoleon III that night acquiesced in the popular demand and in the counsel of his ministry, and decided on war. The next war, day the French parliament, with but ten dissenting votes, authorized a formal declaration of war against Prussia.

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 225-241.

The third—and last—of the European wars of the Second Empire was beginning.

The Empire entered the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) with enthusiastic shouting, but with little else. Foreign sympathy was largely on the other side, and foreign allies were conspicuously lacking. For a few days Napoleon III imagined that Austria and Italy might join him. But his unwillingness, in the face of Catholic opposition within France, to withdraw the French garrison from Rome deprived him of any bargaining power with King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy; and veiled threats from the Russian Tsar convinced the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria that he should await actual French victories before casting his lot against Prussia. So far as the other German states were concerned, they promptly joined Prussia—to the delight of Bismarck and the chagrin of Napoleon.

Nor was the French army prepared for the war. While the Prussian military machine was operating with precision and effectiveness, the French soldiers were slowly mobilized, badly led, and hopelessly outnumbered. Napoleon III, now quite ill, was excessively timid, and his entire military establishment was sadly defective; it was without adequate organization, plans, or supplies, and was overrun with dishonest officials and corrupt contractors. The outcome could not long remain in doubt.

Early in August 1870, Marshal MacMahon, who had been hurriedly recalled from Algeria to command the French army near Strasbourg, suffered such reverses at the hands of the invading Germans that he was obliged to evacuate the greater part of Alsace and fall back upon Châlons. On August 18, another French army under Marshal Bazaine was defeated by the Germans (under Moltke) in a bloody battle at Gravelotte (in Lorraine) and shut up in the fortress of Metz. In the emergency, Marshal MacMahon counselled Napoleon III, who had just joined him at the front, to order a general retirement of the French armies upon Paris, where they could be concentrated, reënforced, and properly prepared to give decisive battle to the Germans. But when the Emperor wired the plan to the Empress, whom he had left as Regent at Paris, she wired back that a general retreat would mean the overthrow of the Empire and that he should go forward at once to the relief of Metz. So Napoleon and Marshal MacMahon, with heavy hearts, moved their in-

ferior forces down the Meuse River, endeavoring to find a place where they might cross and thence drive back the French Germans. At Sedan, almost down to the Belgian Defeat at Sedan border, they made the despairing attempt, September 1-2, 1870. Outnumbered and finally encircled, they surrendered themselves with 81,000 men, having lost in killed and wounded about 25,000. The battle of Sedan terminated the first phase of the Franco-Prussian War; to date the war had lasted barely six weeks.

The battle of Sedan also ended the Second Empire. On September 4, 1870, when it became generally known in Paris that Napoleon III, together with the main French army in the field, was a prisoner of the Germans, a selfappointed group of republicans, among whom Léon Gambetta was conspicuous, proclaimed at the city hall the deposition of the Emperor and the establishment of a republic—the Third French Republic. The Empress Eugénie fled to England, and a "government of national defence" was hastily constituted to rule

Deposition of Napoleon III and Proclamation of Third French Republic, Sept. 1870

France until peace could be restored and the nation consulted on the making of a permanent constitution for the country. About the nature of a permanent constitution, there was difference of opinion among Frenchmen-between republicans and royalists, between radical "socialist" republicans and moderate "liberal" republicans, between "legitimist" royalists and "liberal" royalists—but there was a consensus of opinion that the Empire had finally failed and that the Napoleonic dynasty was permanently deposed. The Second Empire had done much for the internal development of France, but its foreign policy, after securing transient glory from the Crimean and Italian wars, had led to the frightful year of 1870 and the terrible disaster of Sedan.

Of the second phase of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871—the phase following Sedan—we shall speak elsewhere.1 Here we may note the last chapter in the personal career of Napoleon III. He was released from his German prison at the close of the war (1871) and joined his wife and son at Chislehurst in England. He protested against the verdict of the French National Assembly

Years of Louis Napoleon

that he was "responsible for the ruin, invasion, and dismember-

¹ See below, pp. 244-245.

ment of France," and he penned some apologetic pamphlets. But his cause was too hopeless and he was too ill. He died in 1873. His son—the Prince Imperial, "Napoleon IV"—was trained in the British army and met an early death fighting Zulus in South Africa in 1879. The Empress Eugénie long survived husband and son; she outlived by two years the triumph of republican France over imperial Germany in 1918. But there was no renewal of the extraordinary fortune which had enabled the romantic nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte to dominate France from 1848 to 1870.

3. NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The era of the Second French Empire was the era of significant national movements in central Europe, movements which were highly fruitful for Italians, Germans, and Hungarians, though less so for Poles and Czechs. In 1848, at the beginning of the era, the revolutionary upheaval throughout central Europe, which we have already described, was both liberal and nationalist. Thereafter, liberalism declined, at least in Germany, but nationalism grew, so that by 1871, at the close of the era, there were national states of Italy and Germany and an autonomous state of Hungary. We shall now see how the new political order was established.

Italy was the first to erect a national state, and Italian patriotism during the era was closely associated with liberalism. The kingdom of Sardinia, about which the new Italy Movement for was built, had acquired a typically liberal constitution Italian in 1848, and the most influential patriots in the peninsula, no matter how they might differ about the ideal form of national government, were agreed that its practical substance should be liberal. This was the conviction of the whole group of playwrights, poets, and novelists who, from Alfieri and Foscolo at the beginning of the nineteenth century to Manzoni and De Sanctis in the middle of the century, contributed to the Italian literary revival—the "risorgimento" and to the spread of patriotic ardor among literate Italians.2 A common liberalism likewise characterized the foremost Italian

See above, pp. 124-125.
 On Alfieri and Foscolo, see Vol. I, pp. 570, 699. On Manzoni and De Sanctis, see the present volume, above, p. 158.

champions of political union, though at first these were divided into three factions on the question of the ultimate form of national union.

One faction, radically liberal, was republican. Its outstanding

exponent was Joseph Mazzini (1805-1872), a native of Genoa and the son of a university professor. As a young man Republihe joined the patriotic revolutionary society of the can Agita-Carbonari and was jailed and then exiled for particition: Mazzini pating in one of its riots. In 1831 he projected a new and non-secret organization—"Young Italy"—which, composed of intellectuals under forty years of age, should conduct an incessant campaign among all classes of Italians for the purpose of instilling in them the duty of liberating their country from foreign and domestic tyrants and unifying it under a popular "Roman republic." Mazzini took himself and the cause of nationality very seriously; he was the fanatical apostle of a new religion. He was a poor organizer and a worse administrator, but by word and pen he did inspire. The flood of pamphlets, epistles, and instructions which for many years he poured out from his exile in France or England, and his flaming personal appearances in Italy, as at Rome in 1849,1 were supremely moving to the Italian youth of his day. At least 50,000 young men of the middle classes were enrolled in Mazzini's "Young Italy," and, though its republicanism proved ineffectual, the patriotic and liberal ideas in back of it became a major factor in Italian developments from 1831 to 1870.

The most celebrated disciple of Mazzini was Joseph Garibaldi (1807–1882), a native of Nice, who as a sailor in the royal Sardinian navy was attracted to "Young Italy"—its nationalism and its republicanism, and especially its incentive to heroic feats in which by temperament he revelled. Condemned to death for participating in a republican insurrection on his warship, he escaped and fled to South America, where he enlisted in an "Italian legion" and for fourteen years fought valiantly in revolutionary wars on that continent.² Returning to Italy, a romantic figure in a red shirt, he led a volunteer army of 3,000 personal followers in the Sardinian war of 1848 against

¹ See above, pp. 130-131.

² Victories of Garibaldi in 1846 helped to assure the independence of republican Uruguay from monarchical Brazil.

Austria, and in Mazzini's struggle of 1849 against the Pope. Following the dismal failure of this last venture, Garibaldi took refuge in the United States (at New York), where, first as a candle-maker and afterwards as a trading skipper, he managed to amass a small fortune. In 1854 he returned once more to Italy, living on the island of Caprera and awaiting a new opportunity to strike for national liberty.

A second faction, seeking to reconcile traditional conservative religion with modern liberalism, was led by Vincent Gioberti (1801-1852), a Piedmontese priest, who, like Garibaldi Federalist and Mazzini, lived many years in exile but, unlike Agitation: Gioberti them, was never a republican. His chief book, the Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians (1843), urged the historical and religious right of national unity and its realization through a confederation of existing Italian states, each provided with a liberal constitution, and all presided over by the Pope. A considerable number of upper-class persons, including patriotic members of the Catholic clergy, shared Gioberti's dream, and for a time—from 1846 to 1849—Pope Pius IX appeared to sympathize with it.1

The third faction, and the one which eventually predominated, was that of liberal royalists, particularly those who looked to Liberal the liberal King of Sardinia to accomplish the freeing Royalist and unifying of Italy. Prior to 1848, this faction had been practically non-existent. The Sardinian kingdom had then been as reactionary as any state in Europe; its government with fine impartiality had imprisoned or exiled any liberal advocate of national union, whether republican like Mazzini or Garibaldi, or federal like Gioberti. From 1848, however, the situation changed. Liberal nationalism took firm root in Sardinia, and to the Sardinian government Italian patriots turned with increasing respect and admiration.

The change was due in part to developments within the kingdom of Sardinia.² The kingdom included the fertile and progressive district of Piedmont, which, of all districts in Italy,

¹ On the liberalism of Pius IX at this time, see above, pp. 120-121, 125.

² It must be borne in mind throughout this section that the words "Sardinia" and "Piedmont" are both used to designate the state in northwestern Italy ruled by the royal family of Savoy, whose head, since 1720, had been officially entitled "King of Sardinia." Technically, Sardinia and Piedmont were different areas of one state—the former being an island, and the latter being the mainland about Turin.

was first affected by the Industrial Revolution, and in which, consequently, the nobility and the bourgeoisie were Centring most naturally devoted to liberalism and in the best in Sareconomic position to promote nationalism. In 1848, as we have learned, the Sardinian King, Charles Albert, acceded to liberal demands by establishing free constitutional government within his state and going to war with Austria. Sardinia, we know, was twice crushed in 1848–1849 by the weight of Austrian arms, and Charles Albert despairingly abdicated in the dark days of 1849. Yet Sardinia's liberal constitution remained, and so too did the memory of Sardinia's sacrifices in the cause of national liberation.

Simultaneously, Italian republicanism began to wane. royal Sardinia had failed against Austria, Mazzini had failed even more egregiously with his Roman republic of 1849. He had demonstrated that the Italian masses were not canism really with him; that they were too steeped in monarchical traditions to support his radical republicanism. By his "excesses" at Rome, moreover, he had alienated the order-loving middle class, disgusted the clergy, and helped to transform Pope Pius IX from a liberal patriot into a reactionary protected by French troops. Republicans there were in Italy after 1849, but they were a dwindling sect of rather wild-eyed intellectuals and workingmen. Mazzini, living in exile, engaged ever more in vain plots and conspiracies. And Garibaldi showed an ever greater willingness to subordinate his own republican sentiments to the practical task of creating a united Italy.

Even more striking than the decline of republicanism was the collapse of Gioberti's scheme for a federal union of the Italian states. Pope Pius IX, on whom the scheme depended, Wane of repudiated it after the overthrow of Mazzini's Republic and the restoration of the Papal State. He condemned liberalism as inimical to the traditional rights of the church. He likewise evinced hostility to the political unification of Italy, fearing, as his predecessors for centuries had feared, that it would decrease his own spiritual authority and cause non-Italian nations to regard him merely as a kind of chaplain for Italy rather than as Christ's vicar for the whole world. From

¹On the liberal Sardinian constitution of 1848, see above, pp. 124-125, and on the war of 1848-1849 with Austria, see above, pp. 125, 130.

1840, Pius IX was an implacable foe of national change in Italy; he called on Italian Catholics to resist the "encroach-Defection ments" of Sardinia and on foreign Catholics to help of Pope Pius IX him retain his temporal sovereignty at Rome. There was considerable sympathetic response to his pleas among foreign Catholics, especially in France, and French troops were kept at Rome by Napoleon III. In Italy, however, Pius IX found that he had to deal with patriots as well as with Christians, and that a large number of his fellow-countrymen who loyally confessed the spiritual supremacy of the Bishop of Rome were bent on disregarding his political counsels and on coöperating in the unification of Italy. Gioberti, in his last book, the *Civil Renovation of* Italy (1851), retracted his liberal papal plan and advocated the expansion of Sardinia into a liberal kingdom of Italy. It was a symptom at once of the disillusionment of the papal faction among liberal patriots and of the growing attraction of the Sardinian royalist party.

Two personalities in the Sardinian government of the 1850's made significant contributions to the royalist and nationalist cause—the king and a great prime minister. The Sardinian king was Victor Emmanuel II, who succeeded his Leadership to the father, Charles Albert, in 1849. He endeared himself Fore to liberals by retaining, alone of all the Italian princes, the constitution which had been granted in 1848; and in the eyes of all patriots he gained favor by doing so in the face of persistent Austrian protests. Victor Emmanuel, more-over, had several qualities which won him wide pop-King Victor ularity: his sober common-sense in crises, his soldierly Emmanuel II bearing, his loyal support of his ministers, and his bluff manners which earned him the title of "the honest king." The recognized piety of his family, too, conciliated many Catholics; and he himself was the sort of king whom a republican like Garibaldi could admire.

Less popular than Victor Emmanuel, but easily the most constructive factor in the political unification of Italy, was Count Count Camillo di Cavour (1810–1861). Born in the very year that Metternich became chancellor of Austria, and belonging to a noble Piedmontese family, Cavour was to become a greater, at least a more permanently successful, diplomat than Metternich and to acquire fame as the foremost

liberal nation-builder of the nineteenth century. In his teens, while he was serving in the Sardinian army, he imbibed strongly marked liberal notions and a pronounced dislike of absolutism and ecclesiasticism, ideas which an extensive reading of English authors and a subsequent sojourn in Great Britain confirmed. Indeed, the liberalism which Cavour espoused was that of contemporary England: individualism; material progress; a king who would reign without ruling; and a parliament which would represent the educated classes and would assure to the nation the utmost practicable liberty in political, ecclesiastical, intellectual, and economic matters.

During the reign of Charles Albert (1831-1848), whose unsteady waverings between liberalism and conservatism had been the despair of rational beings, Cavour took no part in government. He helped to manage his family estates. He travelled and studied. He interested himself and many of his fellow nobles in the new English industrial machinery. He became a director of steamship and railway companies, of factories and banks. He became part owner and joint editor of a famous journal, Il Risorgimento, which urged constitutional liberal reform in Sardinia and the preparation of the state for leadership in the cause of national freedom and union. After the grant of the constitution, the waging of the untimely war with Austria (1848-1849), and the accession of Victor Emmanuel II, Cavour came rapidly to the fore in Sardinian politics. Entering the cabinet in 1850, he became prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in 1852; and at these posts he remained, with but one brief interruption, until his death in 1861.

As premier, Cavour strove to promote the material welfare of his country in accordance with English liberal models. Tariffs were lowered. The building of factories and the im-Cavour's Liberal portation of machinery were encouraged. Roads were **Policies** improved and railways constructed. The public budget was reorganized, and the taxes, though in-Sardinia creased, were more equitably distributed. At the same time, Cavour sought to lessen the influence of the church in Sardinia and to restrict its privileges. He expelled the Jesuits from the country and suppressed a goodly number of monastic establishments. His ideal, he said, was "a free church in a free state," but in practice he was subordinating the church to the state. In this he had the support of the Sardinian parliament and of many Italian patriots.

Cavour directed liberal reforms in Sardinia at the very time when other parts of Italy were in the throes of reaction against the revolutionary upheaval of 1848-1849. Pope Pius IX was now pursuing a reactionary policy in the Papal State Reactionin central Italy. In southern Italy, a thoroughly desary Policies in potic sway was exercised by the cruel and treacherous Other Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand II Italian States (1830-1859), who was nicknamed "King Bomba" in reference to the bombardments which he decreed against towns that offended him and who kept some 30,000 political prisoners in filthy jails. In the three duchies of north-central Italy-Tuscany, Parma, and Modena 1—the local governments were more benevolent but quite arbitrary. In the important lands of northern Italy east of Piedmont-Lombardy and Venetia-a reactionary Austrian governor carried out instructions from ultraconservative ministers at Vienna. In all these regions, the native Italians were infected with revolutionary liberalism and nationalism, but they appeared powerless to act. Austria maintained large garrisons in the provinces of Venetia and Lombardy, which she owned outright; and thence she might despatch troops to support the King of the Two Sicilies, who was her ally, or to safeguard the Dukes of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, all of whom were related by family ties to the Habsburg Emperor of Austria. Outside Sardinia, the one state in Italy not directly protected by Austrian soldiers was the Papal State, and this was guarded by French soldiers.

In the circumstances, Italian liberals and patriots turned ever more expectantly, during the 1850's, toward Sardinia, toward its king and its prime minister. Sardinia could set an example of liberalism, but could it free and unite all Italy? It had failed to do so and had been terribly beaten by Austria in 1848–1849. It was still comparatively weak, and its population aggregated less than five million. The national task before it was difficult and seemingly impossible.

¹A fourth duchy—that of Lucca—had been incorporated into Tuscany in 1847. In addition to the six nominally "independent" Italian states mentioned in the above paragraph—Sardinia, the Two Sicilies, the Papal State, Tuscany, Parma, and Modena—the infinitesimal republic of San Marino still survived from the middle ages.

Cavour, however, was not easily disheartened. Reforms within Sardinia, in his mind, were but a prelude to a far more ambitious plan—the political union of the entire Italian peninsula Cavour's under Victor Emmanuel II—and the greater the obstacles to it, the more dogged was Cavour's determination to surmount them. He coöperated with the King in reorganizing the Sardinian army and improving its discipline. He had mysterious conversations with Garibaldi. He patronized secret societies which aimed at binding together throughout Italy the scattered elements of resistance to Austrian control. Above all, he utilized his great diplomatic talents in order to enlist foreign aid for Sardinia in the war which he contemplated with Austria.

Cavour's first significant step in foreign policy was to cause diminutive Sardinia in 1855 to join France and Great Britain (and the Ottoman Empire) in the Crimean War Sardinia against Russia. He expected Austria to side with in the CriRussia in this war, and in joining France and Britain he counted on their support against Austrian rule in Italy. The persistent neutrality of Austria rendered abortive this part of his scheme, but Cavour had the satisfaction of reaping other rewards which he had foreseen. Sardinia gained the ardent sympathy of liberals all over western Europe, and Cavour was enabled to attend the peace congress at Paris (1856) and there expose at length and in the angry tones of which he could be master the injustice and iniquity of Austrian rule in Italy. His next step was to cement the alliance between Sardinia and

France, for he had made up his mind that French assistance would be most practicable and most effective in expelling the Austrians from Italy. In this step he was aided by the sympathy of French liberals and by the pressure which they exerted on Napoleon III, and he knew how to flatter the French Emperor and to appeal to his various motives for intervening in Italy. Nevertheless the difficulties were great. Napoleon III was timid and hesitating, and French Catholics besought him not to help Sardinia in a policy which was sure to be most distasteful to the Pope.

Only in July 1858 was an agreement reached between Cavour and Napoleon. France would coöperate in "freeing Italy from

¹ See above, pp. 196-197.

the Alps to the Adriatic," in driving the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia and sanctioning the union of these provinces with Sardinia. In return, Sardinia would cede to France (subject to confirmation by plebiscite) the border duchy of Savoy and the border city of Nice. It still required a nice exercise of Cavour's diplomatic talents to pick a quarrel with Austria in such a way that to the world at large Sardinia and France would appear justified in fighting a war. Finally, in April 1859, the Austrian government was led to present an ultimatum to Sardinia, demanding immediate demobilization of its army. The rejection of the ultimatum was the signal for the beginning of hostilities.

The actual war between Sardinia and France, on one side, and Austria, on the other, lasted only from April to July. The War 1850. Its course and its significance for France and of 1850 for the fortunes of Napoleon III have already been against Austria sketched.1 We know that the allies won notable victories at Magenta and Solferino, and that the French Emperor stopped short and made peace with Austria before he had fulfilled his promise to "free Italy from the Alps to the Sardinia's Adriatic." In fact he fulfilled only half of his prom-Annexation of ise: he turned over Lombardy (including Milan) Lomto Sardinia, but he left Austria in possession of bardy, 1859 Venetia (including Venice). Cavour and other patriotic Sardinians were bitterly disappointed by Napoleon's "betrayal." ² Yet the French Emperor had enabled Sardinia to annex Lombardy and thereby to double her area and population, and simultaneously his military intervention had incited in central Italy a patriotic outburst which Cavour could reasonably expect to utilize for further annexations to Sardinia. The defeat of Austria left the rulers of the Sarduchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena without dinia's their customary foreign support, and against the riot-Annexation of ing of their liberal and nationalist subjects they could **Duchies** not stand. Wherefore they abdicated and fled, while and Romagna. provisional revolutionary governments took charge 1860 of the respective duchies and petitioned for their

union with Sardinia. In parts of the Papal State, likewise—at

¹ See above, pp. 199-200.

² Cavour was so angry that he resigned his office. However, he continued to advise Victor Emmanuel unofficially, and soon formally returned to office.

Bologna and throughout Romagna, for example—rioting occurred against the Pope and in favor of the Sardinian King. Cavour responded to the petitions by sending commissioners to administer all these regions of north-central Italy in the name of Victor Emmanuel.

After protracted negotiations, Cavour and Napoleon III arrived at a new agreement in March 1860. Napoleon, to the dismay of French Catholics, consented to the annexation of the duchies and papal Romagna by Sardinia. Cavour, with a heavy heart, paid the Emperor's price by consenting to the Loss of annexation of Savoy and Nice to France. Plebiscites Savoy were formally held and the annexations were duly made. To the acquisition of Lombardy in 1859, Sardinia thus added in 1860 a large part of central Italy. She had had to part with Savoy (the original possession of her royal family) and with the port of Nice, but these losses were very minor in comparison with her gains. And she was about to gain still more.

Close upon the heels of the unifying movement in northern and central Italy came a similar movement in the south, the credit for whose guidance belongs, however, less to Cavour or Victor Emmanuel than to Garibaldi. The tyranny of the Bourbon Kings of the Two Sicilies was notorious; Ferdinand II, the infamous "Bomba," had been succeeded in 1859 by Francis II, but the change of sovereign meant no change of system. The very next year groups of Sicilians, aroused by the stirring events in northern and central Italy, rose in Revolt against King of revolt. Forthwith, Garibaldi assembled at Genoa a volunteer army—the celebrated "redshirts"—in prep-Naples aration for a filibustering expedition in aid of the Sicilian rebels. As the governments of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies were at peace with each other, it was the duty of Cavour as the responsible minister of the former to prevent the use of the Sardinian port of Genoa as a base of attack against the latter. But Cavour was willing to sacrifice the obligations of international law to the expediencies of Italian nationalism. While openly he threatened the "red-shirts" with arrest and punishment, secretly he intimated to Garibaldi that the expedition might proceed.

Garibaldi left Genoa with his picturesque volunteers in May 1860, and was received by the Sicilian revolutionaries with

enthusiasm. Within three months he was master of the island.

Thence he crossed over to the mainland and in Septem-Gariber took possession of Naples. Francis II, deserted baldi's Expediby many of his own troops and unable now to procure tion into Austrian soldiers, retired with a small force to the for-Southern Italy, 1860 tress of Gaëta. Garibaldi's swift and almost complete conquest of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies exalted him to the position of a popular idol, and for a time it appeared as though he would become a republican dictator. To offset the danger of an Italy divided between a royalist north and a republican south, Cavour and Victor Emmanuel then decided that Sardinia should actively intervene. A Sardinian army invaded the Papal State, defeated the papal troops, and passed on into the Neapolitan territory, besieging Francis II at Gaëta and joining the


Sardinia's Annexation of Sicily, Naples, and Most of Papal State, 1860

Garibaldian volunteers at Naples. Cavour, despite the vehement protests of Pope Pius IX, announced Sardinia's appropriation of the whole Papal State except Rome and its immediately surrounding territory (September 1860), and in November Victor Emmanuel II rode side by side with Garibaldi through the streets of Naples amid the bravos of the populace. Garibaldi was a republican but he was more a patriot; for the sake of national unity, he put aside personal preference and personal

ambition and turned over the Two Sicilies to his king. A plebiscite confirmed Garibaldi's action. The surrender of Gaëta and the exile of Francis II in February 1861 removed the last internal obstacle to the unification of Sicily and Naples and the major portion of the Papal State with the already enlarged Sardinian kingdom.

There were no serious external obstacles. Austria was in no position, since her recent military reverses, to play her traditional rôle as protector of separate Italian states; she was now concerned far more vitally with Germany and Hungary than with Italy. British public opinion was overwhelmingly favorable to Italian unity and Sardinian liberalism; Palmerston, the British foreign minister, was on the best of terms with Cavour. Only the French Emperor might make trouble. Napoleon III, however, was too worried about the internal situation in France to pursue any consistent policy about the internal affairs of Italy. He contented himself with strengthening the French garrison at Rome and warning Sardinia not to trespass on what remained of the Papal State.

Thus it befell that within the two years from 1859 to 1861 all the disparate Italian states, except Rome and Venetia, were politically united under Sardinia's patriotic king and liberal constitution. Sardinia, with its previous population of barely five million, was enlarged into an Italian state of Kingwith a population of twenty-two million. The Sardinian parliament was transformed into an Italian parliament, and on March 17, 1861, Victor Emmanuel II dropped the title of King of Sardinia and assumed that of King of Italy.



ITALY, 1861-1866

Less than three months later Cavour died, a victim of his own restless energy, but his ambitions were already largely realized Most of Italy was united, and the new Italian régime was liberal The successful issue of the struggle for Italian national free

dom and unity had important effects on the Habsburg Empire. Austria's defeat in the war of 1859 not only deprived her of the preëminent position which she had held in Italy since Effect on 1815 and obliged her to surrender all her possessions Austria there (except Venetia), but also cost her a considerable loss of prestige in Germany and a considerable growth of disruptive nationalist spirit within her own realm. This spirit, at once nationalist and liberal, had been kept in check by Metternich from 1815 to 1848. It had broken loose in 1848 in German Austria, Czech Bohemia, Magyar Hungary, and Yugoslav Croatia, but, after threatening to subvert the whole empire, had been suppressed in 1849, as we know, by the reactionary labors of Prince Schwarzenberg and by the coöperation of Russian troops.1 Now, in 1859, following the failure of Austria's ultraconservative government to keep its hold on Italy, there was a notable recrudescence of liberal and nationalist agitation in Hungary, in Bohemia, and in German Austria.

To allay the unrest and stave off revolution, the Emperor Francis Joseph made concessions. In 1860 he extended the powers of the provincial diets in Bohemia and Croatia and restored the Hungarian Diet (or parliament) as it had been Joseph's prior to 1849. Then, in 1861, he promulgated for the Conceswhole Habsburg Empire a constitution, according to sions. which the levying of taxes and the enactment of laws would be subject to the approval of a central parliament elected by the provincial diets and meeting regularly at Vienna. This Austrian constitution of 1861 did not work very well; the central parliament proved to be a cockpit for spokesmen of rival nationalities within the empire rather than an orderly and effective legislative body; and the Hungarian leaders particularly demanded the substitution of a federal for a centralized system of government. Nevertheless, Francis Joseph had made a gesture of "constitutionalism," and the new ministry which he instituted in 1860-1861 pleased many liberals throughout his dominions and likewise in Germany.

Throughout Germany, especially in Prussia, the Italian developments of 1859–1861 had a profound influence. German liberals, who had been depressed and silenced since their fiasco of 1848–1849, were heartened by the triumph of Italian liber-

¹ See above, pp. 131-133.

alism to speak out anew and boldly in behalf of thoroughly liberal institutions in the several German states and in behalf of a close union of the German people under liberal auspices. Moreover, the weakness which Austria displayed in 1850 convinced many Germans that

Revival of Liberalism in Germany

not she but Prussia must be the standard-bearer of German national unity, and that, just as Sardinia had unified Italy by forcing Austria out of the peninsula, so Prussia could unify Germany by forcing Austria out of the German Confederation.

This conviction was entertained not so much in the South German states or by liberals as in Prussia and by conservatives. Conservatives and reactionaries had dominated Prussia since 1849—not only the king and his ministry but also the nominally "liberal" parliament which had ism in been provided for in the Prussian constitution of 1850.1 Germany Prussian conservatism remained strong, but while it combated the political and economic doctrines of liberals, it tended more and more to appropriate their nationalist ardor. It was not the constitutional liberalism of contemporary Italy which appealed to Prussian (and German) conservatives, but Sardinia's example of forceful nationalism. Austria had humiliated Prussia in 1850 and compelled King Frederick William IV to agree to the reëstablishment of the German Confederation which was loose and weak and presided over by Austria.2 What a blow that had been to the pride of Frederick William and all good Prussians!

Now, however, Austria was weakening; and the hopes of Prussian conservatives, as well as of German liberals, expanded. On the eve of Austrian defeat in Italy, the supreme direction of Prussian affairs had passed from the romantic, volatile Frederick William IV to his prosaic and soldierly brother, Wil-William I. liam.3 William was not intellectually brilliant, but he King of Prussia possessed qualities which endeared him to the traditional governing classes of Prussia; he was industrious and honest, rigidly conservative, deeply religious, and fully convinced of the divine right of kingship. Above all he was a soldier; in military matters he had an absorbing interest which recalls the

¹ See above, pp. 134, 138.

² See above, pp. 135-136. ³ Frederick William IV went insane in 1858 and died in 1861. William was princeregent from 1858 to 1861, and king as William I from 1861 to 1888.

Impasse

Hohenzollerns of the eighteenth century. As soon as he was in power, William began a reform of the Prussian army. He chose as its chief of staff a specially gifted officer, General Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1801), and in 1850 he appointed a remarkable organizing genius, Albrecht von Roon (1803-1879), as minister of war. Then, William zealously backed the recommendations of Roon that steps should be taken forthwith to extend the principle of compulsory military training: that 63,000, instead of the prevailing 40,000, young men should be conscripted annually; that the term of active service should be three years; and that the necessary increase of financial expenditure should be authorized by the Prussian parliament.

The King and his conservative advisers were eager for military reform, but the lower house of the Prussian parliament was less so. This body was responsive to the liberal sentiment which was then resurgent among the middle classes of Prussia. The lib-

eral leaders were not acutely hostile to military reform in Prussia between as such, but they were anxious to make Prussia a King and Parlialimited constitutional monarchy with responsible parment liamentary government, and they believed that by holding up the financial appropriations for military reform they could compel the King to acquiesce. With the liberals in the lower house combined enough moderates and conservatives of pro-Austrian proclivities to embarrass the King and his ministers. At first. the parliament authorized a temporary trial of the reform, but in 1861 it refused further appropriations. Whereupon, the King dissolved the lower house and ordered new elections, but the results were as disappointing to him as they were encouraging for liberalism. The lower house in 1862 comprised 100 Conservatives, 23 Moderate Liberals, and 235 Progressives—the last representing

tion on both sides, and an open conflict between them. Bismarck The impasse was broken through by a statesman to the whom Roon prevailed upon King William to appoint King's Rescue as his chief minister in 1862. The statesman was Otto von Bismarck, and the policy which he would pursue he

a new political party consciously patterned after the British and Italian liberal parties and resolved to make the King pursue liberal policies and submit to real parliamentary government. The Prussian parliament was now definitely arrayed against King William and his conservative ministers. There was resoluannounced to the Prussian parliament promptly and a bit ominously: "Not by speeches and majority resolutions are the great questions of the time decided—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by iron and blood."

Bismarck belonged, like Roon, to the country gentry, still the most influential social class in Prussia, whose members for centuries had divided their attention between their own landed estates and the public service, military or civil, of their Hohenzollern sovereigns. Born in the comfortable ancestral manor-house at Schönhausen, some forty miles west of Berlin, in 1815, the year of the Congress of Vienna, he had been brought up

of the Congress of Vienna, he had been brought up to combine the aristocratic traditions of his class with the enthusiastic patriotism stimulated by Prussia's rôle in the overthrow of the first Napoleon. As a young man he had acquitted himself but illy at the universities of Göttingen and Berlin, and had been dismissed

Bismarck's Earlier Career and Ultra-Conservatism

from the civil service for "deficiency in regularity and discipline." His marriage in 1847 with the pious daughter of a neighboring landlord had steadied him and confirmed his attachment to the Lutheran state church and to ultra-conservative principles.

During the revolutionary upheaval of 1848-1849 Bismarck had consistently defended the existing Prussian state against the liberals. He offered to bring his peasants to Berlin to protect Frederick William IV, and, when the King promised the grant of a Prussian constitution, Bismarck voted in a minority of two against returning thanks. He scoffed at the efforts of the Frankfurt Assembly to unify Germany on a platform of constitutional liberties and rejoiced at the refusal of Frederick William to take the imperial crown "from the gutter." Out of fealty to his King, he acquiesced in the one permanent concession which Frederick William IV made to liberalism—the Prussian constitution of 1850, with its parliament and its curious three-class electoral system—but he was active in forming a definite Conservative party which would resist any further liberalizing of Prussia, any parliamentary legislation or ministerial policy inimical to the royal prerogative, to agricultural interests, to the army, or to the Lutheran Church.

In 1851 Bismarck had entered his King's diplomatic service, hugely enjoying it and evincing a marked aptitude for it. As Prussian representative in the revived Diet of the German Con-

federation from 1851 to 1859, he not only acquired an unrivalled knowledge of general German politics but also deepened his earlier distrust and dislike of Austria. As ambassador at St. Petersburg for the next three years, he learned Russian and won the warm regard of the Tsar. As Prussian ambassador at Paris for a few months in 1862, he obtained a pretty accurate insight into the complexities of Napoleon III's character.

Now, in the autumn of 1862, Otto von Bismarck was summoned to Berlin by King William I, chiefly on the advice of Roon, in order to "tame" the self-willed majority in the Prussian parliament. It was a task after Bismarck's own heart. With Bisthe King's military policy he was in full sympathy; he marck's Dictatorfelt it essential to the leadership which he believed ship Prussia should assume in the unification of Germany. within And both his political principles and his class con-Prussia, 1862-1866 sciousness gave zest to the prospect of an encounter with the bourgeois liberals who constituted the obstructionist majority in the parliament. For a brief time Bismarck, as president of the ministry, tried to break down the Progressive majority by a variety of methods—compromise, cajolery, entreaty, bribery. The Progressives stubbornly resisted him, and in 1863 they declined to vote the governmental budget unless the King should dismiss Bismarck.

Whereupon Bismarck, with the King's consent, proceeded to govern Prussia without a legal budget and without a parliament. As virtual dictator and in flat violation of the constitution of 1850, he decreed the levy and collection of taxes and the execution of the whole program of military reform. The Prussian Progressives grumbled, of course; and liberals in the other German states, contrasting the reactionary dictatorship of Prussia with the recently inaugurated constitutionalism in Austria, heaped abuse on Bismarck and loudly demanded to be saved from any national union which would exclude Austria and put Prussia and her swaggering minister at the head. Yet neither abuse nor grumbling altered Bismarck's course. For nearly four years he maintained the unconstitutional régime in Prussia under the questionable maxim that the end justifies the means. He knew from earlier experience that the Prussian liberals were more given to words than to action; that while, under the electoral system, they might have a majority in the parliament they did

not necessarily have one in the country at large. He knew, too, that they were not likely to resort to violence in a state where there was no tradition of successful revolution and where the masses were habitually deferential to king, aristocracy, and army. So far as the other German states were concerned, he would temporarily flout their liberalism and their pro-Austrian sentiment and act on the assumption that most of their citizens, like most Prussians, would not care, in the long run, how a German national state was achieved so long as it was achieved. Bismarck's estimate of the situation proved correct. To the undoing of his Progressive opponents, patriotism was a more basic attribute of the mass of Prussians (and eventually of other Germans) than liberalism, and the reformed Prussian army-splendid machine as it wasserved as a safeguard against revolution.

The reformed army could also be used—and this was Bismarck's basic interest in it—to create a national German state in which Prussia would occupy the chief position.

This undoubtedly would involve a war with Austria, for the Habsburg Emperor would not voluntarily surrender the German primacy which his ancestors had Unificaheld for centuries. With the reformed army, however,

marck's Aim: a Prussian tion of Germany

Prussia should be able to beat Austria as decisively as Sardinia and France had recently defeated her. It might be unfortunate, from the standpoint of liberal nationalism, to exclude German Austria by force of arms from the contemplated German nation; but it was the price which Bismarck would gladly pay for the establishment of a Prussianized Germany. Consequently, while Bismarck was seemingly engrossed in Prussian military reform, he was ever on the alert for a plausible excuse for using the army against Austria. Such an excuse he cleverly detected in a reopening of the dispute with Denmark over the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein.

It will be recalled that these duchies, ruled by the King of Denmark and peopled mainly by Germans, had been a bone of contention in 1848 between liberal nationalists of Germany and those of Denmark; that Prussia had then championed the German cause; and that, through the diplomatic intervention of the Great Powers, a compromise had been effected in 1852 highly favorable to Denmark: the duchies were not to be incorporated in the kingdom of Denmark, but the King of Denmark would

remain their sovereign. 1 Now in 1863, following the death of Frederick VII of Denmark, his successor, Chris-War of tian IX, responded to patriotic demands of his Danish 1864 with Denmark subjects by accepting a new constitution which, conover trary to the agreement of 1852, unified the political Schleswig-Holstein institutions of Denmark and the duchies. The German response was an opposing wave of patriotic agitation and combined threats from Austria and Prussia, neither of which would be outdone by the other in bidding for leadership of the popular German cause. Christian IX refused to budge. And in 1864 ensued a brief war between Denmark on one side and Austria and Frussia on the other. The Danes fought furiously, but, unable to obtain foreign help and overborne by force of numbers, they were obliged to submit in October 1864 to the terms of the treaty of Vienna, in accordance with which their King renounced all his rights in the duchies in favor of Austria and Prussia.

The sequel to the Danish War of 1864 was, as Bismarck anticipated, a quarrel between Austria and Prussia over the disposi-

Dispute between Prussia and Austria over Schleswig-Holstein tion of the spoils. Austria at once proposed that the duchies be made a separate state under a German prince of their own, who would be, of course, a member of the loose German Confederation; and the Diet of the Confederation, by a small majority, endorsed the Austrian proposal. Bismarck's reply was to deny the right of the Diet to interfere in a matter which Austria and Prussia alone. As neither of these Powers

concerned Austria and Prussia alone. As neither of these Powers felt quite ready for war, diplomatic negotiations were under-

Temporary Compromise: Convention of Gastein, 1865 taken between them, leading to the temporary convention of Gastein (August 1865), whereby, pending a final settlement, Schleswig would be occupied and administered by Prussia, and Holstein by Austria.² The convention of Gastein was advantageous to Bismarck's schemes: it conveyed to the world an

impression that Prussia was conciliatory; it registered Austria's formal repudiation of her first proposal that the question at issue was for the German Confederation to decide; and by surrender-

¹ See above, pp. 132-133, note.

² A third and smaller duchy, that of Lauenburg, had been associated with Schleswig and Holstein in the disputes between Germany and Denmark, in the Danish war, and in the treaty of Vienna. By the convention of Gastein, Austria, in return for a money payment, permitted Prussia to annex Lauenburg outright.

ing to Austria the duchy of Holstein, encircled by Prussian territories, it provided a splendid oportunity for Bismarck to engineer exasperating plots against Austrian rule. Before precipitating a civil war in Germany between Prussia

and Austria, Bismarck was anxious to ensure the former against the danger of foreign intervention in behalf of the latter. Austria, he knew, would be the champion of the German Confederation which had been erected in 1815 under the joint guaranty of the Great Powers of Might not one or another of the Great Powers ioin with Austria to prevent him from sup-

Bismarck's Diplomatic Preparations for War with

planting that Confederation with a closely knit national state under Prussian auspices? He gave thought to Great Britain. Russia, and France, and also to the newly founded kingdom of Italy. From Britain he expected no trouble. British opinion was unmistakably favorable to Prussia, partly by reason of the freetrade policy of the Prussian Zollverein in contrast with the protectionist policy of Austria, and partly by reason of the romantic antipathy of English liberals to any Continental Power, such as Russia or Austria, which, as in Hungary, Italy, or Germany, opposed national freedom and union. Nor did Bismarck anticipate any trouble from Russia. He knew that the Tsar had been greatly offended by Austria's refusal to aid Russia during the Crimean War; and he was sure, on the other hand, that the Tsar was sincerely grateful for Prussia's offer of assistance to Russia in suppressing the Polish revolt of 1863.1

The attitude of France was more problematical. French opinion of all sorts, liberal, Catholic, and nationalist, was much more anti-Prussian than anti-Austrian, and no Frenchman could be expected to wax enthusiastic about the establish-Securing ment of a united, powerful Germany on the Rhine. French. Bismarck understood Napoleon III, however, and Neutralthought it safe to gamble on the French Emperor's natural timidity, on the difficulties which at the moment he was encountering in far-away Mexico, and on the obvious unpreparedness of the French army. Bismarck took the trouble, as we have seen, to visit Napoleon III at Biarritz in October 1865. to solicit his friendly benevolence, and vaguely to hint to him that, if Prussia were given a free hand in Germany, France ¹On this revolt, see below, p. 260.

might get some "compensation." 1 Bismarck trusted that Prussia with her reformed army would make such quick work of Austria as to preclude any effective French intervention.

From Italy Bismarck expected more than mere neutrality. This state had been formally erected in 1861, but it conspicuously lacked two provinces-Papal Rome, guarded Securing by French troops, and Venetia, still held by Austria. Italian Alliance There was no immediate prospect of acquiring Rome, but the strained relations between Austria and Prussia promised to afford Italy an early opportunity to do what Napoleon III had failed to do-to wrest Venetia from Austria. In the circumstances, the Italian government was receptive to Bismarck's overtures, and in April 1866 it concluded a formal alliance with him: if war broke out within three months between Prussia and Austria, Italy would join the former and obtain Venetia from the latter.

It was now the business of Bismarck to provoke Austria to war. He multiplied his intrigues against the Austrian administration of Holstein; and when Austria, unable to Provoking obtain satisfaction from him, complained to the Austria to War Frankfurt Diet of the German Confederation. he declared that Austria had thereby violated the convention of Gastein. He at once despatched Prussian troops to occupy Holstein and oust the Austrian officials, and almost simultaneously he submitted to the Diet a scheme for reforming the Confederation and excluding Austria from it. By this timein June 1866—the Austrian government at Vienna was thor-

Basic **Ouestion** in Germany: Existing Loose Confederation under Austria or New Close Union under Prussia

oughly aroused against Bismarck and Prussia; it called upon the Diet not only to reject the "reform" but also to authorize a general mobilization throughout Germany in order to restrain Prussia from interfering with Austrian rights in Holstein and in the Confederation. The Prussian representative in the Diet protested, but the representatives of most of the other states sided with Austria and voted accordingly. The pro-Austrian attitude of the lesser German states was taken in response to the personal wishes of their respective sovereigns, who foresaw a diminution of power and prestige if the loose German Confederation should be

¹ See above, p. 206.

"reformed" into a close union under the hegemony of Prussia; but their attitude was applauded, in central and southern Germany, alike by liberals who feared Prussian conservatism and militarism and by Catholics whose cultural sympathies were Austrian.¹


The action of the Diet was interpreted by Bismarck as tantamount to a joint attack upon Prussia by the other Austria German states. He recalled the Prussian representa-Supported by Lesser tive from Frankfurt, announced Prussia's secession German from the Confederation, and proclaimed to the world States that against Austria and her German allies Prussia would fight a "defensive" war for the national union of Germany. Prussia Italy, of course, was soon found on the Prussian Toined by Italy side. And so astutely had Bismarck managed the affair that public opinion in most foreign countries was preponderantly favorable to Prussia.

The actual war between Prussia and Italy, on one side, and Austria and lesser German states, on the other, was of such surprisingly brief duration as to earn for it the name of Seven Weeks' War (1866). Austria was not nearly as well prepared as Prussia. Moreover, she had to fight defensively and simultaneously on two widely separated War of fronts—in Bohemia against invading Prussians and in Venetia against invading Italians—and all the while she was not quite certain of the loyalty of her own Hungarians. In fact, the Hungarians were loval, for reasons which we shall presently indicate. In fact, too, the Austrian army in Venetia repulsed the Italians, and an Austrian fleet in the Adriatic defeated an Italian squadron. What really brought disaster to Austria was the Prussian military machine. It moved with vigor and speed. First it broke the feeble resistance of the lesser German states. one by one, before they had time to complete their mobilizations and join hands with Austria. Then it moved with its full force against the army which Austria had managed to assemble in Bohemia. The ensuing battle of Sadowa (Königgrätz), on July 3, 1866, was the decisive engagement of the war. It was an

¹In central Germany the kingdoms of Saxony and Hanover, and in southern Germany the kingdoms of Bavaria and Württemberg, the duchies of Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Cassel, and the free city of Frankfurt, were formally allied with Austria.

overwhelming victory for the Prussians, establishing their reputation for military preëminence in the world and Manifold having significant effects on the nationalist movements Results of both in Germany and in Italy and on the internal Prussian Victory politics of Prussia, of the lesser German states, of the

Austrian Empire, and of France.




PRUSSIA IN THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION, 1815-1866

By the treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866), Austria was obliged to cede Venetia to Italy and Holstein to Prussia, to pay a small war indemnity, and to consent to the dissolution of the German Confederation and the erection of a North German state of which Prussia would be the head and from which she herself would be excluded. Thus while the new Italy was absorbing more and more

Italians, a large number of Germans—the Austrian Germans—were being definitely cut off from the new Germany.

I. Austria's Exclusion from Germany and Loss of Venetia to Italy

Bismarck confirmed Prussian dominance by the arrangements which he made after the Seven Weeks' War with the other German states. Some of them he annexed outright in order to round out Prussia's misshapen territories, to increase her population and economic resources, and to strengthen her military position. Into Prussia, accordingly, he incorporated the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein,



Prussia in the North German Confederation, 1867

the kingdom of Hanover,¹ the duchies of Hesse-Cassel and Nassau, and the free city of Frankfurt. These additions were

¹ Hanover had been joined in a personal union with Great Britain from 1714 to 1837, when Queen Victoria had succeeded to the throne of the latter. The law of succession in Hanover prescribed that its sovereign must be male, and hence in 1837 her uncle had become King Ernest of Hanover, and he had been succeeded in 1851 by his son, George V. In 1866 this George V was deposed and exiled, and Hanover was annexed by Prussia. See genealogical table at p. 489.

important. For the first time, the Hohenzollern sovereign of Prussia was king of compact and continuous lands stretching from Russia and Denmark to the Main River and the French frontier; he gained more than 27,000 square miles of territory and almost five million subjects. Henceforth, excluding Austria, two-fifths of the area and two-thirds of the population of all Germany belonged to Prussia.

With the lesser German states north of the Main River which were not annexed outright by Prussia—twenty in number— Bismarck negotiated an arrangement whereby they 3. Forma-tion of joined Prussia in 1867 in a new and closely knit North North German Confederation. Each state retained a measure German of local autonomy, but all were subordinated to a Confederation federal government, whose executive authority was vested in the King of Prussia as hereditary "president," assisted by a chancellor and ministers responsible to himself, and whose legislative powers were entrusted to a bicameral parliament comprising (1) a federal council (Bundesrat) of personal representatives of the sovereigns of the several states, and (2) an imperial diet (Reichstag) of elected representatives of the people in the Confederation. The Prussian king as president of the North German Confederation would direct its foreign affairs and army and he might declare war.

Certain German states remained outside the North German Confederation. In addition to German Austria and the German cantons of Switzerland, there were the four states im-4. Independence mediately south of the Main River: the kingdoms of of South Bavaria and Württemberg and the grand-duchies of German Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt. In these states with the exception of Baden, whose grand-duke was pro-Prussian, both princes and people were especially hostile to any political union with Prussia, the princes fearing a diminution of their own importance and the people dreading the certain imposition of compulsory military service and the probable enactment of anti-Catholic or anti-liberal legislation. Toward these south German states, however, Bismarck adopted a most conciliatory attitude. He did not penalize them for siding with Austria in the Seven Weeks' War. He did not force them into his new North German Confederation. He scrupulously respected their independent position. Meanwhile, he missed no

chance to alarm them with the possibility of French aggression at their expense; he drew closer with them the economic bonds of the Zollverein; and he "protected" them by negotiating secret

treaties of defensive alliance whereby if Prussia or one of them should be attacked by a foreign power, such as France, the others should come to the assistance of the party attacked. Bismarck trusted to the growth of

Alliance Prussia

anti-French feeling and of German nationalism to bring the four states of southern Germany into eventual political union with Prussia. And to hasten such an outcome, he was willing and anxious that war should be brought on with France.

One factor of inestimable value in resigning the German people, south as well as north, to Prussian leadership was a remarkable

change which the Seven Weeks' War produced in Bismarck's attitude toward liberalism and in the attitude of liberals toward him. From 1862 to 1866, as we have seen, he had flouted liberal opinion throughout Germany and defied the liberal (Progressive) majority in the Prussian parliament, and if Prussia had been de-

5. Restoration of Constitutional Government in

feated in 1866, Bismarck in all probability would have been the most discredited statesman in Europe. But Prussia won the war, and German patriots, whether conservative or liberal, hailed the event as a big step toward the realization of national unity and naturally attributed it to the farsighted diplomatic and military policies of Bismarck. The Prussian statesman, from being an unpopular and unscrupulous dictator, became rather suddenly a national hero, and he speedily confirmed his new reputation by pursuing conciliatory policies toward his former liberal adversaries in Prussia.

In 1867 Bismarck restored the full operation of the Prussian constitution and asked a bill of indemnity from the Prussian parliament for the illegalities of which he had been wantonly guilty during the preceding four years; the liberal majority in the parliament met him half-way and passed the bill with unanimity and enthusiasm. the same year, he sponsored the provision in the new constitution of the North German Confederation that its Reichstag should be elected by direct and universal manhood suffrage. To this there was objection from some Prussian conservatives, but he assured them that the

marck's Concession to Democracy in the New Germany

Demand

for a Pen-

German masses bade fair to be more conservative than the middle class and more patriotically devoted to the maintenance of a strong central government. As a result of these popular concessions, a new political party soon took shape. Rise of known as the National Liberal party, and recruited National Liberal largely from the bourgeoisie and in many instances Party from former Progressives. Its main object was to uphold Bismarck in his national endeavors and for this purpose to subordinate, though not wholly to surrender, the earlier liberal demands for free constitutional government. Incidentally, the new party favored a strong federal government, a large army, and an economic policy of free trade, and it was inclined to be anti-Catholic. Originating in Prussia, it promptly spread throughout Germany; in the south, its adherents were useful missionaries of pro-Prussian German patriotism, alike as an ideal desirable in itself and as a practical bulwark against France.

All the developments which we have just been describing—the rise of the National Liberal party, the expansion of Prussia, the formation of the North German Confederation, the defensive alliances between this Confederation and the four independent states of South Germany—emerged from the Seven Weeks' War of 1866. They indicated quite clearly that the Germans outside Austria and Switzerland would soon have a powerful national state under Prussian leadership.

Inside Austria the Seven Weeks' War also accentuated nationalism—not merely among Germans, but among other peoples of that polyglot Empire-Magyars and Slavs. The 6. Accen-Austrian Germans, deprived by the outcome of the tuation of Nationalwar of any hope of inclusion in a strictly German ism within national state, were the more determined to maintain Austrian Empire their traditional political and social ascendancy in the large Empire of which they constituted a numerical minority. On the other hand, the Slavic peoples in the Empire had been growing more and more nationalist since at least the revolutionary upheaval of 1848, and their leaders thought they perceived in the Austrian military reverses of 1866 an auspicious Slavic opportunity to persuade the Emperor Francis Joseph

and his German ministers to reorganize the Austrian tarchy Empire as a federal state. They urged that a liberal measure of national autonomy should be accorded not only to the Germans in Austria proper and to the Magyars in Hungary but likewise to the three principal groups of Slavs: (1) the Czechs (in Bohemia and Moravia) and Slovaks (in northern Hungary); (2) the Slovenes (in Carniola), Croats (in Croatia), and Serbs (in southern Hungary); and (3) the Poles (in Galicia). Patriotic representatives of these three Slavic nationalities held a congress at Vienna on the morrow of the battle of Königgrätz (July 1866) and formally endorsed a scheme for the transformation of the Austrian Empire into a "pentarchy," or five-state confederation, of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland, with the Habsburg Emperor as joint sovereign.

Against the Slavic scheme were arrayed the Magyar patriots of Hungary. These were devoted to the memory of the old independent Hungarian state; they were resolved to Hungasacrifice none of its historic provinces, peopled though rian Desome of them were by Croats, Serbs, and Slovaks; and a Dual the Magyars, although profoundly hostile to German interference from Vienna in their own national affairs, were peculiarly bitter against the Slavs for the decisive part which they had played in 1849 in enabling the Vienna government to put down the Hungarian revolt. Louis Kossuth, who had led the Hungarian revolt of 1840, continued from exile to preach Magyar rebellion against the Habsburg Austrian Empire, but in the 1860's his influence declined at home, while that of Francis Deák rose. Deák believed that the Magyars could better satisfy their ambitions through a partnership with the Germans than through a rebellion against them. Mutual opposition to the Slavic peoples within the Habsburg Empire would cement a real alliance of Magyars and Germans. He accordingly advocated the transformation of the centralized empire into a dual monarchy. And in the expectation that the Emperor Francis Joseph and his German ministers would see the problem of imperial reorganization as he saw it, Deák exerted his influence to assure the loyal cooperation of Hungary with Austria in the war of 1866.

Deák gambled successfully. Francis Joseph and his fellow Austrian Germans recognized, when military disaster of 1866 followed so closely upon military defeat in 1859, that the Habsburg Empire could not go on as it had been, that a drastic internal change must be made. They imagined, too, that their

own position would be less imperilled by a dual arrangement, such as Deák and the Magyars urged, than by a pentarchy, such as the Slavs demanded. So, after due negotiations, a new political régime was instituted in east-central Europe by the 7. Rejec-"Ausgleich," or "Compromise," of 1867. By this tion of Pensettlement, the Habsburg dominions were divided into tarchy, two parts: (1) Austria, embracing Austria proper, Boand Establishhemia, Galicia, Carniola, and the Tyrol; and (2) Hunment of gary, including Hungary proper, together with its Dual Monarchy crown-lands of Croatia, the Banat, and Transylvania. of Austria-Hungary: the "Aus-Each part would have a constitution and parliament of its own, and each would be independent of the other gleich" of 1867 in most respects. Yet the two would be united by a common sovereign—to be known henceforth by the dual title of "Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary"—and by a common army, common foreign relations, and certain common ministers. The Austrian Habsburg Empire was thus transformed into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The Seven Weeks' War had proved as advantageous to Hungarian, as to German, nationalism.

Not so well fared the Slavic peoples in the Habsburg dominions. Austria, it is true, made special concessions to her Polish subjects in Galicia, and so favored them that after 1867 they Slavic were disposed to cooperate with the Austrian Germans Opposition and in holding other Slavs (Czechs and Slovenes) in check. Unrest in Hungary, moreover, partially appeared the Croats by Austria-Hungary according a degree of local autonomy in 1868 to her province of Croatia. Yet neither the Poles nor the Croats were satisfied; the latter dreamed about a day when they might free themselves and kindred Serbs from Hungary (and kindred Slovenes from Austria) and build a united Yugoslavia, while the Poles were apt to be less zealously interested in the future welfare of Austria than in the fate of fellow Poles in Russia and Prussia. As for the Czechs in Bohemia and their kinsmen, the Slovaks, in Hungary, they were denied all privileges and treated by the Dual Monarchy as inferior and subject peoples. The result was that after 1867 Czech nationalist leaders did what they could to embarrass the Austrian government—at home, by making disturbances in the parliament at Vienna, and abroad, by intriguing with Slavic Russia.

Immediately, the Seven Weeks' War of 1866 deprived Austria

of both the will and the means of preventing the triumph of nationalism in Germany and in Italy. After the war, 8. Inindeed. France was the only European Power which creasing seemed minded and able to stop the fruition of between Cavour's plans for a completely unified Italy or Bis-Prussia marck's plans for a German national state under and France Prussian leadership. French troops still garrisoned Rome, and in 1867 they repulsed an armed effort of Garibaldi to overthrow the temporal rule of Pope Pius IX and annex his state to Italy. Simultaneously, the Emperor of the French was warning Bismarck that the South German states must not be incorporated in the North German Confederation and that France would expect "compensations" for Prussian expansion. But the gains made by Prussia and Italy in the war of 1866 only whetted the appetite of their patriots for more—this time at the expense of France.

Bismarck was particularly desirous of a war with France. He was certain that the Prussian army was superior to the French, and that the South German states, in the patriotic enthusiasm engendered by war, would throw in their lot with Prussia and her North German Confederation. He must, of course, get France to declare the war, so as to show the world that she, and not Prussia, was the aggressor. But he knew that French patriots were irritated by the recent spectacular victories of Prussia and could be expected to egg on Napoleon III to make demands which Prussia would refuse.

How Napoleon made demands on Bismarck for territorial "compensation" in 1866–1867, and how they were rejected, we have already told. We have also told how, finally, Bismarck's published account of King William's refusal of a French demand in 1870 concerning a Hohenzollern candidacy to the Spanish throne aroused such passions at Paris that Napoleon III and his Parliament declared war against Prussia.¹

The Franco-Prussian War began in July 1870. France was without allies, while Prussia was actively supported not only by the North German Confederation but also by the four states of South Germany. The first and decisive phase of the struggle, culminating in the French disaster at Sedan in September 1870, has been sketched in another

¹ See above, pp. 206-207, 209-211.

place. It remains to sketch the second and concluding phase and to indicate some of the war's immediate consequences.

With the surrender of Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon, and the main field army of the French at Sedan, German forces tightened their sieges of Strasbourg and Metz while large German armies advanced rapidly on Paris. Bismarck let it be known that he would not make peace with France unless Germany should be "safeguarded" against future French interference by "regaining" Alsace and Lorraine and holding the Rhine as a really German river. On the other hand, the new republican government of France declared that it would "not cede an inch of French soil or a stone of French fortresses." So the war continued, after Sedan, from September 1870 to January 1871.

Léon Gambetta, the war minister of the French republic, escaping in a balloon from Paris just as the Germans were closing in about the French capital, did his utmost to arouse the country-side to continuing resistance. He improvised armies out of surviving remnants of regiments. He proclaimed a levée en masse of all men from twenty-one to forty years of age. He had the recruits hastily drilled and he despatched one force after another in frantic endeavors to relieve the beleaguered French armies at Paris, Metz, and Strasbourg. Such resolute endeavors astonished the invading Germans, but the outcome was never in doubt. The German armies were well prepared and organized; the French were not.

Strasbourg capitulated to the Germans late in September. In October, Marshal Bazaine, with shameful pusillanimity if not positive treachery, surrendered to the Germans the great fortress of Metz, together with a French army of 150,000 men. Paris held out until January 28, 1871, and then surrendered only because its population was freezing and starving. Four days after the capitulation of Paris, an armistice was arranged in order to admit of the election of a French National Assembly Treaty of which would possess authority to conclude peace. The preliminaries, agreed to at Versailles between Bismarck and Adolphe Thiers, were most reluctantly ratified by the Assembly in March; and the definitive treaty was signed at Frankfurt in May 1871.

By the treaty of Frankfurt, France ceded to Germany the ¹See above, pp. 212-213.

whole of Alsace, excepting Belfort, and the eastern part of Lorraine, including the fortress of Metz, and agreed to pay an indemnity of five milliard francs (one billion dollars). German troops remained in occupation of northern France until the indemnity was fully paid (in 1873).

Of the numerous and far-reaching results of the Franco-Prussian War, the most striking was the fulfillment of Bismarck's plan for the unification of Germany and the establishment of a German Empire under Prussian and Hohenzollern leadership. Just as the Prussian statesman had anticipated, the fact that South Germans fought in the war shoulder to shoulder with North Germans and that the great triumph of German arms was achieved by Bavarians and Württembergers as well as by Prussians aroused all over Germany a popular patriotic ardor strong enough to overcome princely jealousies and liberal scruples. By November 1870, while the war was still in progress, treaties of union were negotiated by Bismarck on behalf of the North German Confederation with the governments of the several South German states—Bayaria. Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt. These treaties,

of Franco-

Prussian

I. Union of South German States North German Confederation

duly ratified by the respective sovereigns and parliaments, simply extended the North German Confederation so as to include the southern states and changed its name to the "German Empire." The King of Prussia, instead of being "President of the Confederation," was henceforth to be styled "German Emperor."

By a curious irony of fate, the solemn ceremony of inaugurating the German Empire was held on January 18, 1871, exactly 170 years after the Prussian Hohenzollerns assumed the title of king: 1 and, as the Germans were still besieging Paris, the ceremony was held in the hall of mirrors in the palace of Louis XIV at Versailles, "in the ancient centre," the official report explained, "of a hostile power which for centuries had striven to divide and humiliate Germany." There, surrounded by sovereigns,

Creation of German Empire of Prussian Hohenzollerns, 1871

generals, and soldiers, Bismarck read the imperial decree which sealed the first part of his life-work, and the grand-duke of Baden led the loud cheers for King William I of Prussia, now, by the grace of God and the will of his fellow princes, German Emperor.

¹ See Vol. I, p. 333.

Not only did the Franco-Prussian War hasten the creation of a Prussianized German Empire, but it served to remove every Its Promise of Permanence foreign danger of its early destruction. The war confirmed beyond the peradventure of a doubt the preëminence of the German military machine. Thereafter Austria must abandon every thought of avenging Sadowa, and France, for many a year to come, would be unequal to the task of avenging Sedan.

In one respect, Bismarck, as later events disclosed, overreached himself. That was in the taking of Alsace-Lorraine from France.

He took the provinces in part for patriotic reasons and 2. Gerin part for military reasons. His military advisers many's Annexapointed out that the new frontier of the Vosges tion of Mountains would be easier for Germany to defend in Alsace-Lorraine another war with France than the old frontier of the Rhine River and that the fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz would provide additional security for Germany. Besides, Bismarck heeded the pleas of German patriots that the provinces had belonged to the medieval German empire, that the majority of their population still spoke German, and that their "reannexation" to Germany would strengthen and enrich the new Empire and likewise the German element in the provinces. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the people of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, regardless of what language they might speak, showed themselves French and not German in national sentiment; their elected representatives protested most solemnly and unequivocally, both to the French National Assembly and to the German Reichstag, against the compulsory cession of the provinces from France to Germany. The right of national self-determination, which had been exercised through popular plebiscites in all instances of territorial annexation by France and Italy during the era of Napoleon III, was repudiated by Bismarck in Germany's appropriation of Alsace-Lorraine.

A consequent bitterness became chronic in Franco-German relations. In contrast to the relatively lenient treatment which Embittering of harsh and humiliating terms which he imposed on Franco-German Relations in 1871; and the results displayed a corresponding discrepancy. In the case of Austria, the soreness of defeat soon disappeared and within a comparatively short time

the Emperor Francis Joseph was the sworn friend and ally of the Emperor William. On the other hand, the French remained painfully aware of their disgrace and eagerly anxious to recover Alsace-Lorraine. The Franco-Prussian War fanned, rather than banked, the fire of mutually vindictive nationalism on either side of the Franco-German frontier. It was this war, more than any other single event, which, throughout the next forty years, gave grave complexion to international politics and constituted the first link in that causal chain of developments which led straight on to the World War of the twentieth century.

More immediately, the Franco-Prussian War had an important bearing on Italian, as well as on German (and French) national union. On the eve of Sedan, Napoleon III, hard pressed for troops, withdrew the French garrison from Seizure of Rome and left Pope Pius IX to defend his temporal rule as best he could with only the assistance of his personal guards and a small force of miscellaneous foreign volunteers. Then, when the collapse of the Second French Empire at Sedan made it clear that Napoleon III could not again intervene at Rome, the government of King Victor Emmanuel II, with Bismarck's approval, ordered an Italian army of 60,000 men to invade and occupy the Papal State. The Pope protested vehemently and made a show of armed resistance. At the first tidings of bloodshed, however, he directed his little army to cease firing, and on September 20, 1870—less than three weeks after Sedan the troops of Victor Emmanuel entered Rome. Thus Pope's Loss of did the Rome of the popes, which had endured for Temporal more than twelve centuries, become the Rome of Soverthe Italian nation. A plebiscite ratified the appropriation of the Papal State by the kingdom of Italy, and in 1871 Rome became the capital of united Italy. One other result of the Franco-Prussian War merits passing

mention. The fall of Napoleon III permitted the undoing of another part of his work. In this instance, the Russian Tsar, also with Bismarck's benevolent approval, denounced in October 1870 the articles of the treaty of Paris of 1856 which limited Russian naval forces and armaments in the Black Sea; and a conference of the Powers in London, in March 1871, formally assented to

4. Russia's Resumption of Aggressiveness in Near

the accomplished fact. It was an omen of the resumption of

Russian activity in the Near East and a presage of another war against the Ottoman Empire.

4. NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

During the third quarter of the nineteenth century, nationalism played a somewhat different rôle in eastern Europe from what it played in central Europe. In central Europe, where nationalities were distinguishable from one another and where national aspirations were especially fostered by a rapidly growing middle class, by numerous scholars and publicists on the one hand, and by rising industrial capitalists on the other, nationalism inspired the political welding together of the fragmentary states among which a particular nationality had hitherto been distributed. It created national states, as we have seen, for Italians and for In eastern Europe, however, political and social conditions were not so favorable for the erection of strictly national states. Here, it was not a problem of unifying petty kindred states but rather of disrupting huge polyglot empires. For all the extensive lands and all the diverse nationalities of eastern Europe were comprised in three imperial sovereigntiesthe Russian of the Romanov tsars, the Turkish of the Ottoman sultans, and the Austrian of the Habsburg emperors.

In at least two of these empires, the Turkish and the Russian, the Industrial Revolution had as yet scarcely penetrated. There

Relative Backwardness of Turkish and Russian Empires was a relatively small middle class, whether of intellectuals or of business men. There was a very wide social chasm between nobles and officials, on the one hand, and the vast mass of ignorant peasants, on the other. There was a natural tendency on the part of the sovereigns to disregard or minimize national differences in subjects. The result was that frontiers of largue and

among their subjects. The result was that frontiers of language (and nationality) were shadowy and uncertain; frequently in the same area the upper classes were of different nationality from the lower classes; and sometimes an area was so diversely peopled that it might be claimed with equal justice by several nationalities or by none. For example, the peasants of Macedonia (in the Ottoman Empire), though obviously Christian and not Turkish, were of dubious nationality; they adhered to the Greek Church and were often reckoned by their Turkish rulers as "Greeks," but they spoke dialects which some scholars said

were "Serb" and others said were "Bulgarian." Then, too, as philologists discovered, there was a linguistic relationship between the "Little Russians" of the Ukraine (in Russia) and the "Ruthenians" of eastern Galicia (in Austria), and similarly between the Croats and Slovenes (in Austria-Hungary) and the Serbs (in the Ottoman Empire), but centuries of political and religious separation had developed among such groups cultural peculiarities which seemingly outweighed any bond of common speech.

The Habsburg Empire was intermediate, in a nationalist as well as in a geographical sense, between central and eastern Europe. Economically and intellectually, it was much Intermore advanced than the Russian or the Ottoman Empire, and its various peoples shared in large degree the Austrian patriotic enthusiasm which possessed Italians and Empire Germans (and other peoples of central and western Europe) in the nineteenth century. Under nationalist pressure, moreover, the Habsburg Empire was compelled between 1859 and 1866 to relinquish its provinces in Italy and its hegemony in Germany and, by the "Ausgleich" of 1867, to reorganize itself as the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. This represented a compromise between the older imperial idea and the newer national conception. In Hungary, where the Magyar inhabitants were compactly patriotic, and in Austria proper where there was a solidly German population, separate and virtually national states were set up. Yet such national concessions (and lesser ones at about the same time to the Croats within Hungary and to the Poles in Galicia) were intended, not to disrupt, but to strengthen, the Empire of the Habsburgs. The two "national" states of Hungary and Austria were joined in an intimate personal union under the Emperor, and to them were subjected their respective "crown lands": Czech Bohemia and Slovene Carinthia and Polish Galicia, to German Austria; Croatia and the Serbian Banat and the Slovak provinces and Rumanian Transylvania, to Hungary. The fact that many landlords and other upper-class persons in these "crown lands" were either German or Magyar seemed both to justify the "imperial" sway of Hungary and Austria and to give promise of counteracting disruptive effects of nationalism among the subject peoples.

Indeed, one of the immediate consequences of the extrusion

of the Habsburg Empire from Italy and Germany was the shifting of its interests and policies from central Shift of (and western) Europe to eastern Europe. It sought Austrian compensation in the East for the prestige it had lost in the West. Its rivalry lessened with Prussia, Interests from Central to France, and England, and increased with Turkey Eastern Europe and especially with Russia. And the more Austria-Hungary competed with Russia for the imperial heritage of the Ottoman Turks, the more its internal national problems became interlocked with those of the Russian Empire and the Balkan peninsula.

Among the Christian population of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism was clearly developing before 1848 and already producing disruptive effects. Rise of Among the Greeks and the Serbs there had always Nationalism in been some consciousness of distinctive nationality and Ottoman some cherished recollections of bygone independence Empire and greatness. To the Greeks, particularly, their Turkish masters had long accorded a privileged position in the trade of the Ottoman Empire and in the civil government of its Orthodox Christian subjects. But not until the first decades of the nineteenth century did political nationalism seriously disturb the Ottoman Empire. This came out of the French Revolution and was carried from the West to the East during the Napoleonic wars. It was soon seized upon by Greek and Serb chieftains and utilized by them to stir up popular revolts against the Turks and to elicit Greeks the sympathy and support of foreign countries. The and Serbs Greek and Serbian revolts we have discussed in another place; we have noted how they were aided by France and Britain and by imperial Russia and how they were brought to partially successful issue in 1829–1832. The greater part of the Greek peninsula and some of the Greek islands in the Ægean (though not by any means the whole Greek nationality) were incorporated in an independent Greek kingdom under the guaranty of Russia, France, and Great Britain and with a German prince— Otto of Bavaria—as constitutional sovereign. Almost simultaneously the Ottoman province of Belgrade was recognized as the autonomous principality of Serbia under a native "hereditary prince," Miloš Obrenović, and the Rumanian-speaking popula-

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 705-708, 782-785.

tion of Moldavia and Walachia were accorded a more limited degree of autonomy.

After 1832, nationalism spread and was intensified in the Balkans, partly because of the successes of the Greeks and Serbs, partly because of the obviously growing weakness and corruption of the Ottoman Empire, and partly because of interested promptings in foreign countries—at times from romantic patriots, especially in France and Britain, and more often from statesmen who grasped any opportunity to heighten the power and prestige of their own governments. Greece and Serbia aspired to become bigger and labored to infuse all Greeks and Serbs with an eager desire for complete national freedom and unity. Rumanians, also, commenced to be taught that they were nians and Bulgarians distinctive Latin nationality, with a glorious ancient history and with a rosy future. There were patriotic stirrings, likewise, among Bulgarian peasants, who began to learn that they were true Slavs although different from the Serbs.

By the 1850's the masses throughout the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire were becoming nationalist. Once they had been distinguished from the Turks by religion: all of them alike were Christian and Orthodox, while the Turks were Moslem. Now they were distinguished from one another, as well as from the Turks, by nationality: they were Greek, or Serb, or Rumanian, or Bulgarian. Only the Turks and their fellow-Moslem Albanians were still imperially minded and largely unaffected by nationalism. The Turks, it should be remembered, constituted a governing and landholding minority in the European

a governing and landholding minority in the European provinces of their Empire. They had hitherto been comparatively tolerant of their Christian subjects, but with the development of a subversive nationalism

Reaction of the Governing Turks

among the latter, the Turks resorted to strenuous methods to hold them in check. Turkish "atrocities" and "massacres" were a concomitant of rising nationalism among the Balkan peoples, and Balkan nationalists not only repaid their Turkish "oppressors" in kind but also worked upon the sympathy of Christian Europe by dwelling upon their suffering and oppression. The story of Balkan nationalism in the nineteenth century is not a lovely one for Turks or for the Balkan peoples—or for Europe at large.

¹ On the gradual weakening of the Ottoman Empire from the eighteenth century see Vol. I, pp. 377-381, 704-705.

The huge Russian Empire resembled the Ottoman Empire in that it was fundamentally an autocratic and military state, the vast majority of whose subjects were poor and illiter-Nationalate. It was unlike the Ottoman Empire, however, in ities in that the majority of its European inhabitants were of Russian Empire a single homogeneous nationality—the Slavic "Great nationality—occupying the central part of the country Russian" and stretching out from Moscow in all directions. In The fact, the Russian Empire may be described as a Great "Great Russian" Russian national state which, under the ambitious di-Majority rection of its autocratic sovereigns since the time of Peter the Great, had been surrounding itself with a wide fringe of dependent alien lands, most of which were ruled quite imperially by the Russian Tsar, without any thought of constitutional government or any recognition of the doctrine of national selfdetermination. In the far northwest of the empire, Fin-Subject Nationland, it is true, retained the rank of grand-duchy and alities: the old-fashioned feudal constitution which it had had Finns and **Poles** before its cession by Sweden in 1809; and at the extreme west, the large portion of Poland which Russia had obtained from the peace settlement at Vienna in 1815 had been treated as a separate constitutional kingdom until its unsuccessful rebellion in 1831.2 Other conquered territories—and Poland after 1831—were administered as integral parts of the Russian Empire. Such was the fate of the Ukraine, whose "Little Russian" peas-"Little ant population dwelt in the southwest of the Empire Russians" and spoke a Slavic dialect akin to, but somewhat different from, "Great Russian." Such, too, was the lot of the former grand-duchy of Lithuania, embracing two principal nationalities: "White Russians" in the east, interspersed with Great "White Russian landlords; and Lithuanians in the west, inter-Russians" and Lithstrewn with Polish landlords. Such also, was the posiuanians tion of Bessarabia, in the far southwest corner of the Empire, where Rumanian peasants were mingled with Great Russian colonists. Such, finally, was the case with the Estonians Baltic provinces: Estonia had a peasantry of Finnish and Latvians stock; Livonia and Courland had a peasantry of Latvian nationality, akin to the Lithuanian; and all three provinces had landlords who were Germans partially Russianized.

¹ See Vol. I, p. 703.

Nationalism made slow and slight headway in the nineteenth century among Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, White Russians, or Little Russians. These peoples appeared to be definitely submerged in the Russian Empire. They seemingly entertained no desire for political freedom, and the only "national" demands which they voiced were for the Tsar's toleration of their linguistic and religious peculiarities. On the other hand, Finns and Poles alike felt the full nationalist fervor of western and "West-central Europe. The former jealously defended their privileged position within the Russian Empire, and the latter were chronically rebellious. And, at the core of the Empire, the intellectuals and upper classes, if not the peasant-mass, of the Great Russians became infected with nationalism.

Nationalism among the Great Russians in the middle of the

nineteenth century took one of two forms-"Westernism" or "Slavophilism." The first was imitative of the contemporary liberal nationalism of England, France, and Italy. Its Russian advocates, the so-called "Westernizers," wished to westernize Russia, to transform the existing autocracy into a Nationalliberal, constitutional government, to industrialize ism the country, and to apply the revolutionary principles among Great of liberty, equality, and fraternity. "Slavophilism," Russians: "Weston the other hand, was an indigenous reaction against ernizers" the "Westernizers." Its apostles lauded and sought to preserve whatever they thought was distinctive of "Slavophiles" Slavic civilization: the autocratic tsardom, half political and half religious; the traditional Orthodox Church; the social customs and institutions of the Russian masses—the agricultural peasants—centring particularly in their time-honored village communities, or "mirs." Both "Westernizers" and "Slavophiles" talked about the "Slavic" nationality or race as something superior to the Russian nationality and tended to regard Russian nationalism as an aspect of a higher Slavic nationalism. But whereas the "Westernizers" looked forward to a voluntary confederation or alliance of diversely liberal Slavic states-Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.—the "Slavophiles" emphasized the "sacred mission," incumbent on the Russian people as the purest and most powerful of all the Slavs, of safeguarding and promoting the common cause of traditional "Slavdom" at

Poland.

home and abroad. Slavophile Russians could hardly be sympathetic with the Poles, whose liberalism and Catholicism and chronic rebelliousness against "Holy Russia" were ample evidence of a traitorous attitude toward Slavdom, but they could and did foster a patriotic Russian pride in the Slavic peoples within the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires.

The Russian tsars, from the very nature of their political principles and traditions, were not disposed to countenance, in

the abstract, the liberalism and constitutionalism of Russian the Westernizers or even the extreme nationalism of Tears Imperial the Slavophiles. Alexander I (1801-1825) had toyed rather for a time with the thought of granting a constitution than Nationalist to Russia, and in his dreamy, mystical way he had fancied himself in various nationalist rôles—in respect of Russia itself and in respect of Poles and Finns. But Alexander's chief hobbies, like his predecessors', were making a big military show (with size rather than efficiency of armaments) and intriguing for any territorial expansion which might enhance the prestige of the "Tsar and Autocrat of all the Russias." Alexander had appropriated Finland, Bessarabia, and the lion's share of

Nicholas I (1825-1855) was more hard-headed. There could be no misunderstanding about his attitude toward Nicholas I liberalism and constitutionalism. He began with (1825merciless suppression of a rebellious "liberal" outbreak 1855), and His Reacamong his troops at St. Petersburg—the so-called tionary Decembrist revolt 1—and he continued to punctuate Policies within his reign with thoroughly reactionary measures. In Russia 1826 he instituted a "third section of the imperial chancery" for the detection and summary punishment of any

chancery" for the detection and summary punishment of any advocate of "political or social novelties." In 1831 he put down the Polish insurrection and abrogated the Polish constitution.² In 1833 he got the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia to join him in an international alliance against liberalism.³ In 1848 he expostulated with the King of Prussia about the latter's "surrender" to "Western revolution," and in the following year he despatched an army to help the Austrian Emperor crush the national movement in Hungary.⁴ Nicholas was no more a friend

¹ See Vol. I, p. 758.

² See Vol. I, pp. 792-793.

³ See Vol. I, p. 793.

⁴ See above, pp. 132-133.

of abstract nationalism than of liberalism. As an ambitious Emperor and heir to the Romanov tradition, how could he be? Nevertheless, a Russian Tsar could perceive in the rising

nationalism of Europe, particularly in the nationalism of Russian Slavophiles, a practical means of widening the influence and perhaps the territory of the Russian Empire. The imperial ambition of the Romanovs might be served if they should champion the cause of Slavic or Orthodox peoples against the Ottoman Empire or perhaps even against the Habsburg Empire. There had long been pressure from the waxing Russian

His Supism out-Russia

Empire against the waning Ottoman Empire. Of late there had been growing rivalry between the Russian and Habsburg Empires for the spoils of the Ottoman Empire. What now accentuated the pressure and the rivalry was the intensification of nationalism among the several peoples in all these empires and the encouragement which the Russian Tsar could afford to give to "oppressed" nationalities in the other empires.

This use of alien nationalism for Russian imperial purposes was first conspicuously demonstrated by Nicholas I in the war which he waged with the Ottoman Empire in 1828-1829. Thereby, he not only assured independence to Greeks, autonomy to Serbs, and special privileges to Rumanians, but he obtained for the Russian Empire

Empire,

an extension of territory in the Caucasus and the reputation of being the mighty yet altruistic friend of all Orthodox and all Slavic peoples. This reputation he confirmed in 1849 by his

military expedition against the Hungarians, who were dangerously "liberal" but who at the same time were "oppressing" Slavic Croats and Slovaks and

gary, 1849

Orthodox Rumanians. Shortly afterwards he was secretly proposing to Britain a partition of the Ottoman Empire and was ostentatiously claiming a virtual protectorate over all Orthodox Christians within it. Over this question, and doubtless for

the fulfillment of far-reaching designs, he went again to war with the Turks in 1853. This time, Britain and France (and Sardinia) intervened to protect the Ottoman Empire against Russian "aggression." The re-

Again in Ottoman Empire,

sulting struggle—the Crimean War (1854-1856)—we have dis-

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 784-785.

cussed elsewhere.1 Here we may recall that the war halted Russian interference in the Ottoman Empire and temporarily lowered the prestige of the Tsar's army and government.

The check to Russian imperialism did not signify any check to Balkan nationalism. The several peoples in southeastern Europe only clamored the louder after 1856 for cultural and

French and British Tutelage in Southeastern Europe, 1856-1870 political independence, and for the realization of their desires they now sought, and sometimes obtained, the assistance of France and Great Britain instead of Russia's. Rumanian demands for the union of Moldavia and Walachia under a single prince and a single parliament were granted in 1862, mainly through the good offices of the French Emperor,

Napoleon III.² Greek ambitions were fed by Great Britain's coöperation in deposing the unpopular Bavarian king of Greece,

Otto (1832-1862), in selecting a more acceptable sov-In ereign in the person of a Danish prince who in 1863 took the title of George I, "King of the Hellenes," Rumania and at the same time in permitting the Greek national state to annex the Ionian Islands which Britain had held since In Greece 1815. Moreover, Serbian security and pride were enhanced by Great Britain's prevailing upon the Ottoman Sultan in 1867 to withdraw the petty garrisons which until then he had maintained in certain fortresses in the autonomous principality of Serbia. It was thus obvious during the 1860's that not Russia, the imperial rival of the Turks, but Britain and France, the professed defenders of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, were actively abetting a nationalism which was endangering the Empire by building or strengthening national states for Greeks, Serbs, and Rumanians.

Alexander II (1855 -1881) and His "Westernizing" Reforms

in Russia

Tsar

In the meantime, the check which the Crimean War administered to Russian imperialism in the Balkans had significant effects within the Russian Empire. Nicholas I had died in the midst of the war, and his son and successor, Alexander II (1855-1881), was soon faced with the necessity not only of negotiating an humiliating peace with Turkey, France, and Britain

but also of allaying domestic unrest. With criticism of the conduct and outcome of the war, the "Westernizers" pressed upon

¹ See above, pp. 196-198.

² See above, p. 203.

the Tsar their demands for political and social reforms within Russia. To allay the unrest at home and to regain prestige abroad, Alexander II devoted his major attention, for some seven or eight years after the Crimean War, to establishing his reputation as a "reforming tsar" and a friend of the Westernizers. The first and most important problem of internal reform which he tackled was social, having to do with the Russian peasants. He knew that both liberal Westernizers and conservative Slavophiles were much interested in the lot of the Russian peasant masses, and he hoped that by improving their lot he would solidify their loyalty to Russia and to himself.

Russia, it must be remembered, was overwhelmingly an agricultural country, and when Alexander II came to the throne the majority of his subjects were still in a condition of serfdom, similar in kind to the serfdom which had in Russia prevailed in western Europe in the middle ages and worse in degree. It is true that northern Russia was inhabited by land-owning peasants, that the extreme south was studded with economically independent colonies of Cossacks, and that serfdom had already been abolished in the Baltic provinces and in Poland.² Yet nine-tenths of the whole arable land of the Empire were still embraced in large estates, some belonging to the tsar and the imperial family and the rest to some 100,000 noble families. Each such estate was divided into two parts, the produce of the one going directly to the landlord and that of the other being for the support of a community (mir) of peasants. Under the system of serfdom, as developed in Russia, the position of the peasants was pretty sorry. They were "attached to the soil"; that is, without their lord's consent they could not leave the estate on which they were born, and the transfer of an estate from one lord to another automatically transferred the peasants' allegiance. To their lord the peasants paid dues, for him they performed manual labor, to him they rendered obedience as to a personal master. Sometimes lords detached their peasants from the land and sent them to work in the cities, requiring them to

¹ The Cossacks were Russian colonists on the frontiers of the Empire, particularly in the South and in Siberia, who were endowed with special privileges and bound in return to give military service for specified periods under specified conditions.

² Serfdom had been abolished in the grand-duchy of Warsaw (the main part of what was later Russian Poland) in 1807, and in the Baltic provinces in 1816–1819. See Vol. I, p. 703.

remit a fixed portion of their earnings and reserving the right to call them home at will. Sometimes lords employed peasants in household service virtually as slaves; of these there were about two million in 1855. Doubtless in many parts of Russia there were kindly and lenient landlords and considerate taskmasters, but too often the nobles and their overseers were cruel or capricious. They could make the most exorbitant demands upon their peasants' strength and funds and visit disobedience with corporal punishment. They could, and often did, interfere outrageously in the strictly family concerns of their serfs. Under serfdom, furthermore, the mass of peasants remained almost wholly illiterate and quite unable to improve their minds or better their fortunes. And there can be no doubt that serfdom contributed greatly to the retention of primitive and wasteful methods of farming and hence to the general economic backwardness of Russia and to the chronic financial difficulties of its government.

To reform the Russian land system was an herculean task. Yet it was undertaken by Alexander II, with results, both fortunate and unfortunate, which we shall now indicate. Setting an example by freeing first the serfs on the estates belonging to members of the imperial family, and then with dogged pertinacity and cautious compromise overcoming the natural opposition of interested and selfish landlords, the Tsar at length Abolition promulgated a general emancipation decree, in March of Serfdom, 1861 1861, the sixth anniversary of his accession to the throne. The decree abolished all legal rights of noblemen over The serfs who were living detached from the soil, whether as domestic servants or as town laborers, obtained their personal liberty but no right to property. The serfs who were working on large estates secured not only their liberty but an interest in a portion of the land which, bought from the nobles with money advanced by the government, was turned over to the village communities (mirs) to be parcelled out for use among the resident peasants. The benefits of even partial emancipation gradually appeared in an enlarged area of cultivation, increased value of land, greater yield of taxes, growth of export trade, and improved general condition of the peasantry.

There were also less happy results of Alexander II's abolition of serfdom. Many peasants found themselves in a worse economic

plight than before. Lands allotted to them were too small to provide them with anything like a comfortable living, and for whatever land they got they were burdened with long-term installment payments of the money which the government advanced as compensation to nobles. Besides, while these peasants were freed from the jurisdiction of noblemen's courts, they were subjected to the rules and regulations of their village communities and to the tax-gatherers and police officials of the central government. And the treatment of emancipated peasants by the state authorities was often harsh and corrupt. It has been remarked wisely, though perhaps a little strongly, that the decree of Alexander II liberated the peasants from the nobles only to make them "serfs of the state." Many ex-serfs, of course, received no land at all; and a large proportion of these, together with some of the others, tended to seek town work and to swell the proletariat and slums of the cities. The gradual urbanization and industrialization of Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century were due to the abolition of serfdom as well as to the introduction of machinery and the erection of factories.

emancipation of serfs. In 1864 he instituted a political reform the creation of provincial assemblies—which optimistic "Westernizers" interpreted as preliminary to his esof Provincial tablishment of a constitutional, parliamentary régime. Assem-The decree of 1864 provided that each district of the blies: the thirty-four administrative provinces, or "govern-Zemstvos, ments." into which Russia had been divided since the eighteenth century, was to have a local assembly, or "zemstvo," composed of landed nobles and of delegates indirectly elected by townsfolk and peasants, and that each zemstvo was to levy local taxes and exercise local authority over public works, churches, schools, and prisons, poor relief, and public health.

Alexander II did not confine his reforming activities to the

Judicial reform was also undertaken by Alexander II. In 1862 he decreed that the trial of civil and criminal cases should be transferred from administrative officials to a hierarchy of courts modelled in organization and procedure after Judiciary, those in western Europe: justices of the peace, elected locally; district and circuit judges; and a senate, acting as court of final appeal. Accompanying the decree were instructions for the codification of the laws, for the appointment of prosecuting

attorneys, for the use of jury trial in criminal cases, and for holding trials in public rather than in secret. From his decree, however, the Tsar significantly excepted one kind of judicial trial—that of political offenders, for whom the old secret and arbitrary administrative procedure was retained in full force.

Such were the main reforms of Alexander II: emancipation of the serfs in 1861, reorganization of the judiciary in 1862, and creation of the zemstvos in 1864. In addition to these specific changes, the Tsar during the same period encouraged the establishment of some elementary and technical schools, accorded a measure of liberty to the press, and advanced plans for railway construction and for developing the mineral resources of his empire.

By 1865, however—ten years after his accession—the reforming spirit of Alexander II was spent. He had never been at heart Cessation a liberal. What reforms he had instituted were an impulsive response to the protest of Russian Westernizers against a régime which had suffered humiliating foreign reverses in 1854–1856. By 1865 the Crimean War was a thing of the past, and a much more recent occurrence—the Polish Rebellion of 1863—was discrediting the Westernizers and throwing the Tsar into the arms of the reactionary Russian Slavophiles.

For some time before 1863 Polish patriots had been organizing secret societies and agitating for the restoration of their country's independence. In 1863 they precipitated open rebellion Polish at Warsaw against the Russian government. The Revolt of 1863 rebellion was not nearly so formidable as the revolt of 1831 had been. It was merely a struggle of groups of ill-armed patriots against regular troops, and it was marked by no real battle. From the nations of western Europe, the Polish leaders received only sympathy; 1 and they angered all Russian nationalists, liberal as well as conservative, by demanding the reunion of Lithuania with Poland. And Bismarck, for the sake of his domestic and foreign policies, offered the armed assistance of Prussia to the Tsar. The Tsar, however, had no need of Prussian assistance. His own army put a speedy end to the disorders in Poland, and his governors and police-agents inflicted dire penalties on surviving rebels and suspects.

¹ On the French attitude, see above, pp. 203-204.

² See above, p. 233.

Slavophiles and other Russian reactionaries were not slow to advise Alexander II that the troubles in Poland had been accentuated by his leniency and his concessions to liberalism and that further introduction of Western novelties into "Holy Russia" would lead just as inevitably to dreadful commotions and bloodshed throughout the sian Reaction Empire. The advice was welcome to the Tsar. He willingly turned back on the political path which he had been following, and from 1865 Alexander II was as reactionary as any of the other Romanovs. Nothing more was heard of a parliament for Russia. The provincial zemstvos were forbidden to express political opinions, and their acts were made subject to veto by the imperial governors. Rigorous press censorship was restored. The government assumed the right to distinguish by administrative decree between political offenders and ordinary criminals: the former could be arbitrarily seized by the police and either kept indefinitely in prison on mere suspicion or bundled off to some place of detention in Siberia without any judicial formalities. Even the schools felt the force of reaction: everything was scrupulously expurgated from the curricula which might be inimical to the Orthodox religion or conducive to social and political unrest. The only reform of Alexander II's later vears—and that hardly a liberal reform—was the reorganization of the army in paper imitation of the national German army (1874).

With the cessation of his zeal for social and political reform within Russia, Alexander II renewed his predecessor's zeal (and

tactics) for the expansion of the Russian Empire at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, almost of Rusas soon as he had curbed nationalism in his own Polish provinces, he was abetting nationalism among Slavic and other Orthodox peoples in southeastern Europe in the hope that thereby imperial Russia might profit.

Renewal sian Pressure against Ottoman Empire

In 1865 Alexander II encouraged the Greeks of Crete to revolt against the Ottoman Empire and to demand union with the kingdom of Greece. In 1870 he helped the Bulgars to establish a national Orthodox Church of their own, independent of the Greek patriarch at Constantinople. In 1871—in the midst of the Franco-Prussian War-he secured, with the aid of Bismarck,

¹ The Cretan revolt was put down by the Turks with great severity.

the right to refortify Sevastopol in the Crimea and to maintain a Russian fleet on the Black Sea.¹ He then prepared for another war with the Ottoman Empire.

It was easy for the Tsar to find justification for military intervention in the Ottoman Empire. Turkish suppression of popular uprisings in the Serb provinces of Bosnia and Serb and Herzegovina and likewise in the Bulgarian provinces Bulgarian was accomplished in 1875-1876 with such cruelty as to Revolts, 1875-1876 arouse general indignation throughout Europe as well as among the Christian peoples of the Balkans. English statesmen denounced the "Bulgarian atrocities" of the Moslem Turks, and the principality of Serbia in concert with the diminutive principality of Montenegro 2 went to war with the Ottoman Empire in behalf of their fellow Serbs in Bosnia. Simultaneously, the Ottoman government at Constantinople appeared to be drifting rapidly toward impotence and ruin. It seemed unable to maintain order in the Empire or to command the loyalty of its provincial governors and soldiery. Its treasury was bankrupt and its administration paralyzed. Within a single year, two Sultans were deposed, and a usurper mounted the throne in the person of Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909).

Abdul Hamid II was essentially a cruel and cunning despot, but, in order to curry favor with the Western Powers, he inaugurated his reign by promulgating (1876) a liberal constitution for the whole Ottoman Empire. In this, the Sultan was quite insincere, and the constitution remained a purely paper document. In his purpose of employing any means to restore order in his dominions and stave off foreign intervention, however, the Sultan was thoroughly sincere. And, by intrigue and butchery, he did restore a semblance of internal order, and thereby only hastened Russian intervention. In April 1877, the Tsar Alexander II, formally espousing the cause of "oppressed nationalities" within the Ottoman Empire, declared war against the Sultan. Another Russo-Turkish conflict began.

A Russian army invaded the Ottoman Empire from the north, traversing Rumania and crossing the Danube in June 1877. To

¹ See above, pp. 247-248.

² Montenegro, the "Black Mountain," was a practically independent little state, situated near the Adriatic and peopled by Serbs. It had a capable prince in the person of Nicholas I (1860–1918). On its history prior to 1860, see Vol. I, pp. 707–708, 806.

its surprise, it encountered fierce and effective resistance from Turkish troops ensconced in the stronghold of Plevna, in Bulgaria, just south of the Danube. Twice in July, and again in September, the Russian infantry was hurled back Turkish War, 1877 -1878 by Plevna's Turkish garrison. Presently, however, after the Russians settled down to besiege the fortress, its Turkish commander, Osman Pasha, seeing his men slowly starving to death, attempted a desperate sortie. The attempt failed and Osman surrendered with 40,000 men. In January 1878 the advancing Russians won a second victory and compelled the surrender of another Turkish army of some 36,000 men. By this time, Serbian and Montenegrin troops were clearing the Turks out of the western part of the Balkan peninsula; Bulgarians were volunteering for service in the Russian army; and Rumanian troops had already given invaluable aid to the Russians. The Turkish soldiers fought stubbornly, but they were now outnumbered and outmanœuvred and apparently incapable of staying the triumphant advance of the Russians and their Balkan allies. Adrianople fell on January 16, 1878; and a Russian army marched on Constantinople. In a panic of fear, the Sultan Abdul Hamid sued for peace.

The immediate outcome was the treaty of San Stefano, March 1878, between Tsar and Sultan. The Sultan was to recognize the

sovereign independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania; he was to sanction the creation of a Bulgarian national state, which should embrace not only Bulgaria proper but most of Macedonia from the Ægean to Albania, and which, though still belonging nominally to the Ottoman Empire and paying annual tribute to it, should possess a prince of its own and enjoy complete autonomy; and he was to carry out

Peace-Settlement between Russia and Turkey: Treaty of San Stefano

sweeping reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides, he was to raze all Ottoman fortifications along the Danube and open the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the free commerce of all nations. These engagements of the Sultan were to the advantage of the Balkan nations as well as Russia, and the Tsar insisted upon them in the expectation that Bulgarians and Serbs and Rumanians would forever be the grateful debtors of their Russian "big brother." Directly for the Russian Empire, the Tsar was to receive part of Armenia, a large war indemnity (whose probable

non-payment would give him an excuse for renewed interference in Turkey), and a strip of Dobruja (which he planned to exchange with Rumania for the portion of Bessarabia which he had lost in 1856).

The satisfaction with which the Tsar Alexander II and the Russian Slavophiles regarded the terms of San Stefano was equalled by the criticism and opposition which they evoked from

Opposition of Austria Britain to the Settlement

Germany.

the governments of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary. At the head of the British government of the time was the Tory patriot, Benjamin Disraeli (now Earl of Beaconsfield), who was sure that Britain's national and imperial interests were gravely menaced by such Russian hegemony in the Near East as the treaty of San Stefano clearly implied. Quite as emphatic against the treaty was the Habsburg Emperor, Francis Joseph. He feared that an unchecked triumph of Slavic nationalism in both Russia and the Balkans would intensify the disruptive nationalism of Slavic peoples in his own dominions, and he knew that the entrenchment of Russia in southeastern Europe

Wherefore Francis Joseph set himself squarely against Alexander II and demanded that the treaty of San Stefano should be revised by a congress of the European Powers which had assumed responsibility for the Ottoman Empire at Paris in 1856—not only the Tsar and the Sultan, but also Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Lord Beaconsfield, on behalf of Britain, promptly seconded the demand; and Bismarck, assuring both Francis Joseph and Alexander II that Germany was disinterested and would be an "honest broker" between them, invited the Powers to hold the contemplated congress at Berlin. The Tsar was disappointed and angry, knowing full well that such a congress would be likely to deprive Russia of some of the spoils and prestige of its recent victory, and it required a threat of war from Britain and a demonstration by the British fleet in Turkish waters to bring Alexander II to reason and induce him to participate in the congress.

would prevent Austria-Hungary from obtaining in that direction any future compensation for its past losses in Italy and

The Congress of Berlin met in the summer of 1878 and negotiated what was termed a "final" settlement of Near Eastern

questions. The treaty of San Stefano was superseded by the treaty of Berlin (July 1878), to which all the European Great Powers (and the Ottoman Empire) were signatory, and in accordance with which less attention was given to satisfying the national aspirations of Balkan peoples and more to bolstering up the Ottoman Empire and effecting a compromise among rival ambitions of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain.

Revised Settlement of the Great Powers: Congress of Berlin,

Russia was permitted to regain the strip of Bessarabia. north of the Danube delta and east of the Pruth, which she had lost in 1856, and to retain the Armenian districts at the eastern extremity of the Black Sea which the treaty of San Stefano had promised her. To offset Russia's gains, however, Austria-Hungary was accorded the right to occupy Occupaand administer the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and tion of Bosnia by Herzegovina and to garrison the province of Novibazar Austria-(southwest of Serbia), and she obtained special com-Hungary mercial privileges in Serbia and Montenegro. Great Britain's "compensation" was provided for in a separate Anglo-Turkish Convention (June 1878), which practically formed a part of the Berlin agreement: in return for a pledge from Britain Occupathat she would defend the integrity of the Ottoman tion of Cyprus by Empire against any future Russian assault, the Sultan handed over to her the island of Cyprus and promised to collaborate with her in reforming the government of his


The treaty of Berlin embodied the provision of the treaty of San Stefano recognizing Rumania and Serbia and Montenegro as completely independent principalities. But in respect of these newly free states, the treaty of Berlin was somewhat harsh. It saddled all of them with portions of the Sultan's debts, and it outraged national feeling in each of them. Rumania lost all of Bessarabia (peopled largely by Rumanians) to Russia and received in return

Christian subjects.

Independence of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro

¹ Rumania was transformed from a "principality" into a "kingdom" in 1881, and Prince Charles (member of the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family and cousin of the Prussian King), who had been "Prince" of Rumania since 1866, now became King Charles I of Rumania with a royal crown wrought of steel from Turkish cannon captured at Plevna. In the following year, 1882, Serbia was similarly transformed from a "principality" into a "kingdom," and its Prince, Milan Obrenović (1868-1880), took the title of King.

a part of Dobruja (peopled chiefly by Turks and Bulgarians). Serbia, which was already aspiring to play the rôle which Sardinia had recently played in Italy, and to unify the whole Serbian



SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, 1815

nationality under her ægis, found herself at the close of a victorious war not only restricted to almost the same narrow territories which she had had before the war, but hemmed in, north,

west, and south, by the powerful Habsburg Empire, now possessing far more Serbian subjects than she herself possessed. Montenegro, the other tiny Serb state, gained nominal ownership of the



SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, 1878

port of Antivari on the Adriatic, but was obliged to make it a "free" port for Austrian shipping and the Austrian navy.

Even worse fared the national ambitions of the Bulgarians.

The "big Bulgaria," for which the Tsar had stipulated in the negotiations at San Stefano, was divided by the Berlin Partition treaty into three separate parts. The northern part of Bulalone was recognized as the autonomous principality garia of Bulgaria, paying annual tribute to the Ottoman I. Auton-Empire. The southeastern part (exclusive of the omous province of Adrianople) was formally dubbed "Eastern Rumelia" and left "under the direct military Principality and political control of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan," with special provision that its governor should be a Chris-2. Septian and enjoy some "administrative autonomy." arate Province The third part, comprising most of Macedonia and of the province of Adrianople, was allowed no degree Eastern Rumelia of autonomy but was restored without restriction to the direct rule of the Sultan and his agents. Such treatment of Bulgarian aspirations was dictated by Austrian 3. Maceand British belief that Bulgaria was only a stalkingdonia Rehorse for Russia and that the bigger and "freer" stored to Turkey Bulgaria was, the stronger would be the Russian Empire in southeastern Europe. The main result was an intense quickening of Bulgarian nationalism.

Greece alone of the Balkan nations profited by the revision of the treaty of San Stefano. By that treaty, Greece had been

Annexation of Thessaly by Greece Thessaly was formally annexed to the Congress of Berlin she obtained a considerable extension of territory on the mainland toward the north. The new boundary was not definitely fixed until 1881, when Thessaly was formally annexed to the Greek kingdom.

The Ottoman Empire, despite its surrender of Cyprus to Britain, of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novibazar to Austria, and of a part of Armenia to Russia, despite its cession of Thessaly to Greece, its recognition of the complete independence Extent of of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania, and its grant Surviving of different degrees of autonomy to Bulgaria and Ottoman Empire Eastern Rumelia, remained, under the treaty of Berlin, an extensive and important state in the Near East. It still retained all its traditional territories in Asia (except a relatively small area in the Caucasus), and, in addition, a not inconsiderable portion of them in Europe: Constantinople, Thrace, Macedonia, Albania, and Crete in outright ownership, and Eastern Rumelia,

Bulgaria, Novibazar, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as nominal dependencies.¹ And now its "integrity" was solemnly reaffirmed by all the Great Powers of Europe and newly guarantied by a special pledge of Great Britain.

Nevertheless, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and its immediate consequences exposed quite clearly a situation most menacing to the continuing integrity, nay to the very existence, of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire was still, as it

of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire was still, as it had always been, a hodgepodge of nationalities and in no sense a national state; but now, like a contagious fever, a nationalist spirit was rapidly taking firm hold of its European peoples and promising thence to infect even its Asiatic provinces. The fever was being stimu-

Survival of Ottoman Empire Imperilled by Nationalism

lated not only by the nationalism of western Europe and the recent rise of national states in central Europe but also, even more ominously, by the ambitious assertiveness of new national states in southeastern Europe-Greece, Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria—and by patriotic popular pressure, all over eastern Europe, on Russian Tsar or Habsburg Emperor (or British government) to intervene in the Ottoman Empire. For a time a wily Sultan might play off one danger against another, British government or Habsburg Emperor against Russian Tsar, or one Balkan nationality against another. No Sultan, however, could "reform" the Ottoman Empire to the satisfaction of its nationalist inhabitants and neighbors without sacrificing its essential imperial character. Presently the Turks themselves would become nationalist, and then, with intensified acerbity between them and their subject peoples and with loss of even British "protection," their Empire would be finally doomed. In the meantime, during the forty years from 1878 to 1918, the Ottoman Empire would lead a chequered, troubled existence.

If the Ottoman Empire was obviously weakened by the events of 1877–1878, the Russian and Habsburg Empires seemed to be strengthened. The Russian Empire won a war, extended its territories, and earned the reputation of being the champion of all Slavic peoples. The foreign prestige of its sovereign was heightened and likewise the domestic patriotism of its Great

¹ In Africa, Tripoli and Cyrenaica were still Ottoman possessions, and Egypt, though ruled by a practically independent prince (styled "Khedive" since 1867), was nominally a vassal state.

Russian Slavophiles. The Russian Empire remained a Great Power. The Habsburg Empire likewise remained a Survival Great Power. It intervened decisively in the peace of Rusnegotiations of 1878 and obtained territorial compensian and Austrian sation in southeastern Europe for what it had pre-**Empires** viously lost in central Europe, and it confirmed and Seemcemented the loyalty of its German and Hungarian ingly Assured subjects by restricting the pretensions of Serbia and


Bulgaria and thus putting at arm's length the danger that its own Slavic peoples might be incited by Slavic successes in the Balkans to rebel against the Austro-Hungarian "Ausgleich" of 1867.

Yet the strengthening of the Habsburg and Russian Empires was more apparent than real. In each of them, just as in the Ottoman Empire, subject peoples would become more But Really and more self-conscious, more and more determined to Threatened utilize the first favorable opportunity to secure cultural and political autonomy or independence. The more territories the Tsar annexed, the more numerous and widespread were the dissident groups within his empire; and the lands which Francis Joseph took in 1878 soon involved him in the same sort of losing struggle with Yugoslavs as he had already been engaged in with Italians and Germans. Despite the fact that after 1878 both Russia and Austria-Hungary would continue to figure as Great Powers, their imperial sway would not outlast that of the Ottoman Turks. Nationalism, rampant by 1878 in eastern Europe, would eventually doom all three empires to practically simultaneous disruption.

5. ADVENT OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1885

The spread of nationalism all over Europe—west, central, and east—synchronized, as we have pointed out, with the vogue of romanticism. It also led to an interesting shift in the political tenets of mid-nineteenth-century liberalism. Liberalism in the 1830's, it may be recalled, was chiefly a middle-class movement, and then and for some time afterwards its political aims were (1) to guaranty individual liberties, and (2) to establish constitutional parlia-

NOTE. The picture opposite is from a romantic painting of a street scene in Constantinople by an Italian artist, Alberto Pasini (1826–1899). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.





mentary government under the guidance of persons of wealth and education. The latter aim involved a limitation, if not an abrogation, of traditional privileges of the upper classes, but it did not necessarily or usually involve a recognition of political democracy. Indeed, the most typically "liberal" governments, such as that of the Victorian Compromise in Britain (from 1832 to 1867), or that of Louis Philippe in France (from 1830 to 1848), or that of Belgium after 1831, or that of Sardinia after 1848 and united Italy after 1861, though theoretically "representative," were in practice quite undemocratic. They were based on a franchise rigorously restricted to property owners, to a relatively small minority of the country's population.

Gradually, however, and in marked degree after 1865, professed liberals tended to acquiesce in, and sometimes to sponsor, a broadening of the basis of government, a lessening or total removal of property qualifications for the suffrage, a transition from middle-class control to thoroughgoing political democracy. Several factors conspired to this end. One was the logic in the situation,

Gradual Conversion of Liberals to Political Democracy

the perception of so-called Radical liberals that the individualist principle on which liberalism itself was founded could not logically justify a monopolizing of political life by any minority of individuals. Another was the steady growth of political consciousness and ambition among the masses, particularly among urban proletarians, a consciousness quickened by the Industrial Revolution and an ambition fed by experience with trade unions and cooperative societies and by agitation for ameliorative social legislation. A third factor was the pressure of upper-class conservatives upon middle-class liberals; the former were accustomed to patronize the lower classes and may have thought that these, when entrusted with political responsibility, would serve as a counter-weight to middle-class liberal "excesses." A fourth factor, and an important one, was fear on the part of the governing minority in the typically liberal state that they might be overthrown if they did not heed democratic demands; to stave off the danger of violent revolution, they would suffer the coming, step by step, of an evolutionary democracy.

In France, the association of democracy with patriotism had

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The New Democracy," is by Honoré Daumier, concerning whom see above, pp. 160-170.

begun with the First (Jacobin) Republic of 1792. That republic and its democratic experiments had been short-lived. Advent of however, and from 1814 to 1848, under the restored Political Democ-Bourbons and their Orleanist successor, the French racy in electorate constituted a small minority of the coun-France try's population. In 1848, with the establishment of the Second French Republic, democracy reasserted itself in the Second form of universal manhood suffrage and in the popu-French lar choice of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte as president. Republic, 1848 Louis Napoleon was one of the very first "democratic" politicians in Europe; as President of the Republic he championed universal manhood suffrage, and as the Emperor Napoleon III he made a great show of employing it in elections and plebiscites. As we have indicated elsewhere, there was a good deal of sham in the actual operation of political democracy in France under Napoleon III, at least until 1870, the last year of his reign, when, in response to public criticism, a new and really democratic constitution was adopted.1

In 1871, in the midst of the patriotic excitement of the Franco-Prussian War, the National Assembly of the Third French Republic was elected by universal manhood suffrage, and the constitutional laws which it enacted in 1874-1875 for Constituthe government of the Republic provided for a parliation of Third mentary system similar in general to the British, but French with a "president" instead of a "king" as titular Republic. head, with an upper chamber (the Senate) appointive or indirectly elective instead of hereditary, and with a lower chamber (the Chamber of Deputies) elected not by specially qualified persons but by all adult male citizens. The Third Republic was thus organized democratically, and its democratic future was definitively assured when its royalist Senate and royalist President were finally supplanted in 1878-1879 by staunchly democratic republicans.2 France was a standardbearer of political democracy in Europe. Her leading statesmen and the mass of her people after 1870 were unswervingly democratic, as well as intensely patriotic.

In Germany, the nation-building Bismarck, aristocrat and ultra-conservative, outbid his liberal Progressive critics for popu-

¹On political democracy in France under Louis Napoleon, see above, pp. 186-188, 208-209.

² See below, pp. 540-543.

lar support by instituting a democratically elected Reichstag for the North German Confederation in 1867 and for the entire German Empire in 1871.1 The Reichstag had no such control of government as the French Chamber of Deputies possessed; universal manhood suffrage, therefore, was more formal than real in Germany.

Universal Manhood Suffrage in Germany, 1867

Yet it is significant that even Bismarck, in the moment of personal and national triumph, was moved to concede and utilize the form of political democracy.

In Britain, the stronghold of "liberal" as opposed to "democratic" government, the breakdown of the "Victorian Compromise" 2 between upper and middle classes and the Agitation extension of the parliamentary franchise to the lower for Extension of classes were more halting and gradual. In the 1840's Suffrage the working-class Chartists and a handful of doctriin Britain naire Radicals had agitated for universal manhood suffrage, in vain. In the 1850's the Radical John Bright stood forth as a vigorous proponent of drastic parliamentary reform in addition to international free trade and peace; and in 1859 Benjamin Disraeli, the Conservative leader, introduced a moderate reform bill in the House of Commons. Neither Bright's propaganda nor Disraeli's manœuvre bore immediate fruit. So long as life was in Viscount Palmerston, the popular patriot and the very embodiment of the "Victorian Compromise," he could be counted upon to block in Parliament and in the nation any move to alter the constitutional arrangements of 1832.

Palmerston died in 1865, and democratic agitation was immediately resumed in Britain-by trade unionists, by Radicals, and by politicians, both Liberal and Conservative, who hoped by forwarding it to draw new electors to the support of their respective parties. The agitation was stimulated, moreover, by the contemporaneous conclusion of the great Civil War in the United States

Especially after Palmerston's Death. 1865

(1861-1865) and the victory (according to a popular interpretation in Britain) of the free democratic North over the slaveowning oligarchic South.3 It was also stimulated, doubtless, by

¹ See above, pp. 238, 239–240, 245.

² See above, pp. 77–80.

³ The outcome of the Civil War in America meant a strengthening of the national ² See above, pp. 77-80.

union, and involved amendments to the Constitution of the United States which not only abolished Negro slavery but sought to accord to Negroes full civil and political rights (1865-1870).

the contagion of rising democratic demands on the Continent of Europe and by appreciation of the fact that political democracy was already the practice of self-governing British colonies in North America and Australasia.1

Following Palmerston's death, Gladstone became the real leader of the Liberal party, although the aged Earl Russell, father of the Reform Act of 1832, headed the ministry. And Gladstone promptly proposed an extension of the franchise to £14 householders in rural districts and to £7 householders in the cities.2 The proposal was not radical enough to please John Bright and his working-class supporters, and it was too radical to be acceptable to the Whig element in the Liberal party. The latter combined with the Conservatives to reject the proposal and overthrow the ministry (1866). Shortly afterwards Earl Russell retired from public life, and Gladstone became the titular as well as actual leader of his party.

Little popular interest had been aroused by Gladstone's very moderate proposal for reform, but when it was rejected by Parliament and a Conservative ministry was formed, excitement was stimulated by fiery speeches of John Bright and other Radicals who claimed that the installation of the Conservative ministry was a declaration of war against democracy and the working classes. Trade unionists coöperated in organizing a (democratic) National Reform League, and when the cabinet sought to prevent the League from holding a big mass-meeting at London by locking the gates of Hyde Park, an immense mob defiantly threw down the railings. Alarmed by the prospect of further violence, the Conservative prime minister, Lord Derby, authorized Disraeli, his chief lieutenant, to introduce a reform bill in the House of Commons, though some of the ultra-Conservatives protested against any such "surrender" and withdrew from the cabinet. Disraeli's bill as first presented was even less radical than Gladstone's had been, and yet Disraeli could not obtain for it a majority in the House of Commons. Whereupon the Conservative statesman executed an astonishing political manœuvre. Rather than allow the Liberal party to get the credit for

 $^{^1}$ See above, pp. 93–94. 2 "£14 householders" and "£7 householders" are English phrases signifying persons who owned or rented houses having annual rental value of £14 and £7 respectively.

accomplishing a popular reform, he accepted radical amendments which his opponents presented in the hope of embarrassing him, and thus he came to sponsor a bill which was Parliaconsiderably more democratic than Gladstone's bill mentary Reform of 1866 and which was enacted by a combination of Act of Conservatives and left-wing Liberals in 1867. It was, as the fearful Lord Derby said, "taking a leap in the dark." It was certainly a departure from the "Victorian Compromise."

The British Reform Act of 1867 transferred 58 seats in the House of Commons from small boroughs to more populous districts and extended the franchise, in the counties, to tenants of property having an annual rental value of £12 (formerly £50) and to holders of leases having an annual value of £5 (formerly £10), and, in cities (boroughs), to every man who occupied a separate building or rooms having a rental value of £10 a year unfurnished. This act, it will be noted, was not thoroughly democratic; voting in Britain was still limited by property qualifications. Yet it was an important step toward democracy. It almost doubled the electorate and practically enfranchised the working classes in the industrial cities. It clearly pointed to a goal toward which not only Radicals but Liberals and Conservatives would gradually approach.

In 1872, under Gladstone's auspices, the secret ballot—called the "Australian" ballot in reference to the place of its origin—was prescribed for all municipal and parliamentary elections. In 1884, again under Liberal auspices, another measure of reform was adopted, which, by making the Acts of suffrage qualifications in the counties identical with those in the boroughs, enfranchised two million rural workers and increased the electorate by forty per cent. In 1885, under Conservative auspices, the whole country was redistricted so that members of the House of Commons would be chosen by approximately equal constituencies of about 50,000 people each.

Thus it befell that between 1867 and 1885 Britain moved away from the oligarchical government which it had previously had and toward the political democracy which in the 1840's the Chartists had vainly demanded. Of the "six points" in the "People's Charter," four were substantially, though not per-

¹ The Act of 1867 applied to only England and Wales, but in 1868 almost identical measures were enacted for Scotland and Ireland.

fectly, realized by 1885: (1) universal manhood suffrage; (2) equal electoral districts; (3) vote by ballot; and (4) removal of property qualifications for members of Parliament.¹

In Italy and Belgium, whose leading statesmen were admirers of British liberalism and whose constitutional governments had been consciously patterned on the "Victorian Com-Demopromise," the response to democratic stimuli was cratic notably sluggish. In both countries the upper and Backwardness middle classes long hesitated to enfranchise the masses. in Liberal Yet democratic agitation went on in both and grad-Italy and Belgium ually produced some effect. Under liberal auspices, Italy, without sanctioning universal manhood suffrage, doubled the number of its electors in 1882. In the case of Belgium, it was only after the passing of parliamentary control from the Liberal to the Catholic party that the suffrage was divested of property qualifications (1894).

In the Scandinavian countries, there was considerable popular aspiration for democratic reform, but comparatively little was done to satisfy it. Norway had had a liberal constitution since 1814,² but its parliament was not elected by universal manhood suffrage until 1898 and its ministry was actually responsible to the king (who was also king of Sweden) rather than to the parliament. In Sweden the old-fashioned Estates-General was transformed into a bicameral parliament in 1863, and in Denmark the electorate was somewhat enlarged by a constitutional amendment in 1866. In neither country, however, was universal manhood suffrage introduced in the nineteenth century.³

The two halves of the Habsburg Empire—Austria and HunAustriaHungary
Constitutional, but
Hardly
Democratic
Democratic
Hungary.
The two halves of the Habsburg Empire—Austria and Hungarian are definitively "constitutional" at the time of the "Ausgleich" in 1867. The Austrian half was a bit more democratic in form than the Hungarian. But real democratic spirit was evidenced less in the parliaments than in nationalist movements among the "oppressed" peoples of AustriaHungary.
The Russian Empire, of course, represented in its

¹ This last had been achieved by an act of 1858.

² See Vol. I, pp. 703-704.

³ It was likewise with the Dutch Netherlands, which had obtained in 1848 a liberal but not a democratic constitution. See above, pp. 127, 137-138.

central government the very antithesis of democracy, although the zemstvos which Alexander II created in 1864 for local government 1 were in obvious keeping with the current democratic

tendencies of western Europe. In the national state of Greece, a popular revolution in 1862 served to transfer the kingship from the conservative Otto to the liberal George I² and to secure the adoption, in 1864, of a thoroughly democratic constitution, in

Democratic Constitution in Greece. 1864

accordance with which a single-chamber parliament was to be elected by universal manhood suffrage. The federal government of Switzerland had been rendered

thoroughly democratic, as well as republican, as an outcome of the civil war of 1847-1848.3 Thereafter the several cantons were correspondingly democratized, and in 1874 a revision of the federal constitution not only emphasized the national character of the Confederacy but also provided for the use of the democratic referendum in law-making for the whole of Switzerland.

Democratic Constitutions in Switzerland, 1848, 1874

Democratic tendencies appeared in the politics of Portugal and Spain during the period. In Portugal, the liberal constitution which King Pedro IV had granted in 1826,4 and which

had been withdrawn by his uncle Miguel (1828-1834), was renewed by Queen Maria in 1834 and supplemented in 1852 by provision for popular direct elec-

Democratic Trend in

tion of members of the lower chamber. Under Louis I (1861-1880), slavery was abolished in the colonies (1869) and nobles were deprived of their hereditary right to sit in the upper chamber of the parliament (1885).

In Spain, a liberal constitution had been promulgated in 1837 in the name of Oueen Isabella II (1833-1868), the successor of the despicable Ferdinand VII,5 but Isabella was no better and less successful than her father. She used the constitution to assure her of popular support in the struggle which she waged with her ultra-conservative uncle,

Spanish Revolution of

Don Carlos, who disputed her claim to the throne, and then,

¹ See above, p. 259.

² See above, p. 256.

³ See above, pp. 121, 137.

⁴ See Vol. I, pp. 774-775. ⁸ See Vol. I, pp. 769-773.

⁶ Don Carlos claimed that his brother, Ferdinand VII, had no power to set aside the Salic law, which restricted royal succession to the male line and which had always been respected by the Bourbon family, and that consequently he and not his

when Don Carlos was suppressed, she violated the constitution and conducted herself most scandalously. In 1868 a popular insurrection drove Queen Isabella into exile and inaugurated seven years of political turmoil in Spain.

A new Spanish constitution was adopted by a democratic national assembly in 1869. It guarantied individual liberties, including complete religious toleration, and provided for a popularly elected parliament and for a king, strictly "limited" as in

Britain. But there was difficulty in obtaining such a Experiking. At length, after several princes had declined the menting honor, including Prince Leopold of Hohenzollernwith Demo-Sigmaringen (whose temporary candidacy was the occratic casion for the Franco-Prussian War¹), Prince Amadeo Monarchy in Spain, of Savoy, the second son of King Victor Emmanuel II 1869-1873 of Italy, accepted the Spanish crown in 1870. It was a shaky throne which the new King mounted. Both the reactionary Carlists and the radical Republicans were hostile to him. The liberal royalists who were supposed to favor him were so split up into quarrelsome factions that their favor was not very helpful; and many Spanish patriots, regardless of political affiliation, eyed him askance as a foreigner and an intruder. In disgust Amadeo abdicated in February 1873, and returned to Italy; and a democratic republic was proclaimed in Spain.

The First Spanish Republic proved even less stable than Amadeo's democratic monarchy. From the outset, its supporters disagreed as to whether the republic should be a federal First or a centralized state, whether local autonomy should Spanish Republic, or should not be conferred on the several nationalities 1873-1874 within Spain (Catalans and Basques, along with Castilians). For a year, from February 1873 to January 1874, the federalists had the upper hand, but the President, Emilio Castelar, felt obliged to employ dictatorial methods in order to forward federalist policies. Then a group of Republican army chiefs, devoted to the principle of national centralization, executed a coup d'état and supplanted Castelar with Marshal Serrano. Marshal Serrano made his presidency but a prelude to the destruction of the republic and the restoration of the Bourbons.

niece Isabella should have succeeded Ferdinand. See genealogical table at p. 587. "Carlist Wars" were waged in Spain from 1833 to 1840 and in the 1870's.

1 See above, pp. 210-211.

In January 1875, the son of Isabella II, a young man in his eighteenth year, entered Madrid as King Alphonso XII amid the plaudits of the Spanish nation. Within a year order Restorawas restored. The radical Republicans and the tion of reactionary Carlists were alike suppressed.¹ In 1876

a new constitution prescribed that the Spanish government should henceforth be conducted by the king, acting always on the advice of a ministry responsible to

Liberal Bourbon Monarchy in Spain, 1875

a bicameral parliament—an appointed Senate and a popularly elected Congress. For elections to the latter, universal manhood suffrage was formally instituted in 1800.

In Spain, and likewise in Portugal, Greece, Rumania, Serbia, Austria-Hungary, and Norway, the formal steps taken in the direction of political democracy between 1865 and 1885 were impeded, in practice, sometimes by the existing social traditions of life among the peoples concerned. and sometimes by the dishonest or factional character

Special Handicaps to Political Democracv

of political action, on occasion (as in Austria-Hungary, or to a lesser extent in Spain) by the conflict of dissident nationalities within the state, and on occasion (as in Norway) by interference from without. Moreover, certain countries, such as Italy and Belgium, were so strongly attached to the earlier liberal traditions of middle-class parliamentary government that they were slow to try really democratic experiments; and certain other countries, such as the Dutch Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, were still too absorbed in the task of establishing liberal parliamentary government to pay much attention to giving it a democratic foundation. In the Russian and Ottoman Empires, there was only a beginning of liberalism and almost none of political democracy. The Russian "Westernizers" preached liberalism and the Tsar Alexander II aroused brief democratic hopes by creating the zemstvos. The liberal constitution which the Ottoman Sultan promulgated in 1876 was only a gesture and remained a dead-letter.

Yet even this gesture was an eloquent tribute to the heightening popularity of liberalism and democracy in Europe as a whole during the age of romanticism and nationalism. And in addition

¹ A little later, in 1878, the Spanish government succeeded in putting down an insurrection which Cubans had been conducting since 1868 for the national independence of their island.

to the partial and qualified evidences of the new democracy in Summary of Democratic Progress in Europe, 1848–1885 and especially from 1870 to 1879, and the inspiration which it gave to the adoption of universal manhood suffrage in Germany in 1867–1871 and to the far-reaching extension of the franchise in Great Britain from 1867 to 1884.

A further word must be said about the advent of political democracy between 1865 and 1885. It attended the intensification of nationalism, and in turn it was attended, wher-Growth of ever it was taken seriously, by national fostering of National compulsory schooling, with a view to training the School-Systems masses in the duties, as well as in the rights, of democratic citizenship. Systems of national education, particularly after 1870, were elaborated in one country after another, and nations were soon boasting of the progress made in reducing the percentage of illiteracy among their citizens. The story of the rise and results of national schooling, together with the story of the ever fiercer nationalism accompanying the ebb-tide of liberalism and romanticism, belongs to the next part of this volume.



PART V DEMOCRATIC AND REALIST EUROPE

XVIII. THE VOGUE OF REALISM, 1870-1910

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE VOGUE OF REALISM, 1870-1910



OTABLY convenient is the division of the eighty years of European history from 1830 to 1910 into two eras of equal duration. The first, of forty years, the 1830's to the 1870's, was characterized by the Industrial Revolution, full-fledged in Britain and incipient on the Continent, by the rise of liberalism,

political and economic, and by the ubiquitous vogue of romanticism, the widespread interest in nationalism, and the gradual advance of political democracy. Of these matters we have treated in the three preceding chapters.

The second era of forty years, from the 1870's to about 1910, appears superficially to be a mere continuation and development of the first. Democracy goes on making gains. Nationalism is more and more in evidence. A good deal of romanticism remains. Liberalism, at least as a verbal slogan, grows in popularity. The Industrial Revolution becomes a vital common phenomenon of almost all Europe.

Fundamentally, however, a significant change occurs. Novel modes of thought and action come to prevail, and what continues of the old is modified and adapted to a new situation General and a new environment. There is a wider spread and a Features faster speeding-up of machine industry, attended less Era of by intense competition of individual industrialists, Realism. 1870-1910 which in the previous era had nourished economic liberalism, than by acute rivalry of industrial nations, which leads to economic nationalism. There is consequently a weakening of liberalism and an intensification of nationalism, a decline of international free trade and a revival of mercantilism, a special stimulus to overseas imperialism and to an unprecedented Europeanization of the whole world, and a confusing of the dream of universal peace with a nightmare of mounting national armaments, military and naval.

There is, also, an absorption of intellectuals, and a great interest of the masses, in the pursuit of natural science, especially its "practical" and "applied" aspects. There is an accompanying shift of emphasis in philosophy from the spiritual and the free to the material and the fatalistic, in the social sciences from the historical to the statistical, and in popular movements from the individualistic or the coöperative to the socialistic and combative. There is a growing faith that, as machines multiply, creature-comforts must inevitably increase and automatically make the world a fit and fine habitation for human beings. And in this era of machinery and materialism, traditional religion is extraordinarily troubled, while art and culture testify to the outmoding of romanticism and the rise of a new fashion, which is concerned with factual data, with social problems, and with personal psychology, and which, as over against "romanticism," is called "realism."

These general features peculiar to the era from the 1870's to about 1910 are discussed, in order and in some detail, in this and the next chapters. Their relationship to the political and social history of particular parts of Europe during the era are then indicated in three succeeding chapters, dealing respectively with Britain, Latin Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe.

I. STRENGTHENING OF INDUSTRY AND WEAKENING OF LIBERALISM

The Industrial Revolution had been developing in Great Britain for a century prior to 1870, and during the forty years just previous to 1870 the process of mechanical industrialization had assumed such proportions in Britain and had begun to spread so widely and so effectively in Europe and America that we have elsewhere identified those forty years with the "main Continuphase" of the Industrial Revolution. The process, ity of Industrial Revolution "had a beginning, but it has had no end. "revolution" had a beginning, but it has had no end. Or, expressed a bit differently, the industrial change evident in 1870 has been followed by a continuous series of industrial changes: one mechanical invention has led to another in an ever-extending ambit of industries and areas.

¹ See above, pp. 23-60.

Our first business, in the present section, is to indicate the chief features of mechanical industrialization during the forty years from 1870 to 1910, noting, as we proceed, the Its Main increasing output of industries already largely mecha-Features. nized, the rapid evolution of novel industries, and the 1870-1910 swift transformation of agricultural into industrial population, which is no longer specifically restricted to Britain (and Belgium) but becomes generally characteristic of Germany and the United States, and to a lesser degree of many other countries of the European world. Then, in the latter part of the section, we shall try to show the relationship of this intensifying and expanding industry to capitalism, and particularly to that politico-economic liberalism whose rise had attended the earlier industrialization. We shall have occasion to remark that the new era witnessed. along with the strengthening of industry, a weakening of historic liberalism.

All the industrial developments of the period from 1830 to 1870 continued and spread throughout the period from 1870 to 1010, in an exaggerated degree and with more and more farreaching effects. Engineers and scientists—physicists and chemists-became ever more numerous and allied themselves ever more helpfully to machine industry. The establishment of "polytechnical" schools and schools of "applied science" (schools of mines, of civil engineering, of electrical engineering, of mechanical engineering) was now epidemic in all countries which aspired to be "civilized" and "progressive." Tools of precision were multiplied and rendered ever more "precise" and useful. The production of coal and iron, the twin bases of the

Industrial Revolution, was speeded up by mounting tion of demand on the one hand, and by improving methods of supply on the other. The British production of

Coal and

coal increased from 110 million tons in 1870 to 265 million tons in 1910, and of pig iron from six to nine million tons, but these figures tell only a part of the story. For whereas up to 1870 Britain produced more coal and iron than all the rest of the world, she produced in 1910 only 26 per cent of the coal and 14 per cent of the iron. In the meantime the output of coal had increased in Germany from 371/2 millions tons to 222, in France from 16 to 40, and in the United States from 35 to 415; while the output of pig iron had grown in Germany from 2 million tons to almost 15, in France from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 5, and in the United States from $1\frac{2}{3}$ to $27\frac{1}{3}$.

There was steady progress in perfecting and utilizing the Bessemer and Siemens processes 1 for the manufacture of steel. There was a marked improvement of steam locomo-Extension tives and of all accessories to railway transportation, of Railwavs and a noteworthy extension of railway mileage. Not only was the network of rails in western and central Europe elaborated, but it was extended into eastern Europe,2 and railway construction went on apace outside Europe. In the United States the mileage increased from 30,000 in 1860 to 250,000 in 1910. In Canada and Australia, it increased proportionately. Long lines were built and more were projected in Latin America, in Asia, and in Africa. By 1905 the great trans-Siberian railway linked Moscow (and St. Petersburg and Berlin) with Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean. There was corresponding development of steamships in numbers, size, and speed. Regular steamship services were multiplied for passengers and goods Steamship Lines not only from London and Liverpool but also from Hamburg and Bremen, Le Havre and Marseilles, Antwerp and Rotterdam, Genoa and Trieste, New York and Montreal, Yokohama and Shanghai, Bombay and Melbourne, and Cape Town and Buenos Aires.

The cotton industry, whose mechanization had been an important aspect of the preliminary stage of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, kept on growing. In Britain itself, the Growth of number of spindles increased from 36,700,000 in 1870 Cotton Industry to 53,500,000 in 1910 and the number of power looms from 475,000 to 700,000. But, while Britain possessed far more spindles and power looms than all the rest of the world put together in 1870, in 1910 she had only about 40 per cent of the spindles and 30 per cent of the power looms. By this time there were 37,200,000 spindles on the Continent of Europe (distributed mainly among Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Austria, and Spain), 27,800,000 in the United States, and 10,000,000 in other parts of the world (chiefly in India and Japan). Britain was still

¹ See above, pp. 25-27.

² For the railway network in Europe in 1877, see the rear end-papers.

Note. The picture opposite, entitled "Transport," is by a "modernist" French sculptor, Alfred Bottiau (born 1889).





the premier cotton manufacturer of the world, and her cotton goods were generally of the finest quality, but her earlier monopoly was obviously gone.

It was similar with the other textile industries of wool and linen. These, following the lead of cotton, had been pretty largely put on a machine- and factory-basis in Britain before Other 1870, and after 1870 the same basis was firmly established for them on the Continent of Europe and in the United States, with similar results. The silk industry of France and Italy was likewise mechanized and expanded, and gradually the search for an "artificial silk" led to the emergence of still another large-scale textile industry.

"Artificial silk," or "rayon" as it is called in the United States, was originally invented by a French nobleman, Count Hilaire de Chardonnet (1839-1924), who studied under Pasteur 1 at the Paris Polytechnic and who, after twenty years' experimentation, took out a patent in 1884 on a process for the conversion of a form of cellulose (wood-pulp) into a textile resembling silk. By 1910, some two and a half million pounds of "Chardonnet silk" were being manufactured. In the meantime, other and cheaper processes were being invented and utilized for making "artificial silk" from cellulose. The most important was the "viscose" process, patented by a British firm in 1892 and supplemented in 1900 by the invention of a special spinning machine—the "Topham spinning box." The new industry spread quickly from France and Britain to the United States, Germany, Italy, and Belgium; and although its big development was after 1010, its total output in this year already amounted to six million pounds (almost a tenth of the output of real silk).

Another noteworthy addition to the great mechanized textile industry during the period following 1870 was the steady progress in applying chemistry to the dyeing of Dyes fabrics. A profusion of chemical dyes were derived from coal-tar, and were used as cheap and varied substitutes for natural dyes.

Comparable with the advance of the textiles was that of other ¹ See below, pp. 337-338, 351.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Shipbuilding on the Clyde," is from an engraving by a British artist, Muirhead Bone (born 1876).

significant industries whose production had already been speeded up by machine and factory. With improving machines and enlarging factories and increasing markets, there was a mounting output, not only in Britain, but on the Continent of Europe and in the United States, of cutlery, porcelain, tinware, boots and shoes and leather goods of all sorts, paper, furniture, tools, firearms and all manner of war implements.

In respect of the last category, special mention should be made of the machine-gun, the rifle, the submarine, and certain new explosives. The first machine-gun, as we know, was the Gatling gun, invented in America in 1862.1 Another, the so-called "mitrailleuse," was devised in France and employed Firearms in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Then, in 1889, Sir Hiram Maxim, an American who acquired a British title, designed a truly automatic machine-gun, which was widely adopted and, with subsequent improvements, became the principal weapon in the World War of 1914. Sir Hiram Maxim also invented, in 1908, the "Maxim silencer" for suppressing the noise of the discharge of firearms; and his brother, Hudson Maxim, in addition to inventing a high explosive which he termed "maximite," perfected a smokeless powder. Rifles were much improved, and were produced in great quantities by the everexpanding factories of the Vickers and the Armstrongs in Britain, the Krupps in Germany, the Schneiders (Creusot works) in France, the Du Ponts and the Remingtons in the United States. Of high explosives, an outstanding inventor was Alfred Nobel (1833-1896), a Swedish chemist and engineer, who introduced dynamite in 1867 and "blasting gelatin" in 1876, and who amassed an immense fortune from their manufacture.² As for "submarines," they had long been experimented with, Submabut the first really practical one was the invention of rines an American, John Holland, in 1875. France added submarines to her national navy in 1888, Italy in 1892, Great Britain in 1900; Germany acquired one in 1800 and began the construction of a large fleet of them in 1906.

¹ See above, p. 29.

² The bulk of his fortune Nobel left in trust for the support of the "Nobel prizes," which have been awarded since 1901 for distinguished work in physics, chemistry, medicine, literature, and international peace.

The era from 1870 to 1910 was characterized not only by the intensification and spread of previously mechanized industries, but also by the rather sudden appearance of essentially new industries. The rayon industry, already mentioned, was one of these. Among the many others, even more important, special attention should be paid to: (1) those connected with the increasing knowledge and exploitation of electricity; (2) those having to do with a miscellany of mechanical aids to individual comfort, such as heaters and refrigerators, the sewing machine, the typewriter, the bicycle, wood-pulp paper, concrete building, sanitation and plumbing; (3) those representing a revolutionary development of photography; and (4) those dependent on novel types of engine, especially on the internal-combustion engine.

Interest in electricity had been growing since the eighteenth century, and prior to 1870 one very practical application of itthe telegraph—had already revolutionized the means of communication throughout the European world.1 Moreover, there had been, since the time of Faraday in the early part of the nineteenth century, a succession of attempts to utilize electricity for lighting and motive power; and toward the close of the 1860's, largely due to the work of Siemens and certain collaborators,2 direct-current dynamos and motors were being manufactured and were acquiring commercial value. From 1870, however, electricity and its applications came to occupy a central industrial position similar to that held previously by the steam-engine. This did not signify a lessening number or importance of steam-engines. It meant merely that, side by side with the omnipresent steam-engine, there appeared now a wide range and great variety of highly serviceable electrical devices. Nor was the development of "applied electricity" confined to one country as the early development of the steamengine had been. It occurred simultaneously in Britain, in America, and all over the European continent. It was closely associated everywhere with the general advance of physics and chemistry and with the particular advance of electrical science.

Electrical dynamos and motors were rapidly improved and multiplied. Alternating-current generators were introduced in the early 1880's and polyphase alternators in the early 1890's.

¹ See above, pp. 31-32.

² See above, p. 32.

The individual inventors included a Russian, a Frenchman, a Pole, an Hungarian, an Italian, a Yugoslav, an Eng-Electric lishman, and an American. Of these, the Yugoslav. Dynamos Nikola Tesla (born 1857), had a particularly interestand ing career. The son of an Orthodox Christian clergy-Motors man, he was educated in Austria, Croatia, and Bohemia and first employed as an electrical engineer by the Austrian government. Then, after private practice of his profession at Budapest and Paris, he emigrated to the United States in 1884, became an American citizen, and for a time was associated with Thomas A. Edison. Tesla was one of the first to conceive an Tesia effective method of utilizing the alternating current, and in 1888 he patented the induction motor. He also helped to effect the transmission of electrical power from Niagara Falls, and he invented new forms of dynamos, transformers, and electric lights. The successful transmission of electrical power, to which Tesla contributed, was a matter of prime importance. It was secured through the efforts of a large number of engineers, including Edison; and it fostered the establishment of central power plants for ever extending systems of electric lighting and traction.

Commercial electric lighting began about 1876 with the use of the arc light, the principle of which had been discovered by Sir Humphry Davy many years before,1 but which Electric was now applied successfully and independently by Lighting Paul Jablochkov, a Russian working at St. Petersburg, and by Charles Francis Brush, an American working at Cleveland, Ohio. A great improvement on the arc light was soon made by Thomas Edison. Edison (1847-1931) was a native of Ohio, with almost no formal schooling but with a very Edison real genius for mechanical invention and moneymaking, a genius which his youthful experience as a telegraph operator invited him to exploit. He took out his first patent in 1868 on an improvement in the telegraph. In 1877 he invented a carbon transmitter for the Bell telephone which was just then being put on the market, and in the same year he devised the phonograph for the recording and reproduction of sound.2 In

¹ See above, p. 32.

² Edison's "phonograph" was greatly improved upon by Emile Berliner's "gramophone" in 1887. Edison continued to perfect the "talking-machine," and in 1896 he equipped it with a mechanical governor.

the meantime he was experimenting with electric lamps, and in 1879 he patented the greatest of his inventions, the incandescent filament lamp. The filament in the first Edison lamps was of carbon; the more efficient tungsten was substituted later.

Lighting by gas or kerosene 1 lingered for some time, but eventually it was largely supplanted by electric lighting. Edison wrought a revolution in the artificial illumination of streets and residences and factories and offices and public buildings. For many years after 1879 Edison, from his combined workshop and laboratory in New Jersey, with the assistance of numerous skilled employes, went on inventing and reaping rich profits from new methods for the generation and distribution of electric light and power.

Almost simultaneous with the application of electricity to lighting was its application to the telephone. Here, the preeminent inventor was Alexander Graham Bell (1847– 1922), a Scotsman who was educated at the universities of Edinburgh and London, and who, emigrating to America in 1870, opened at Boston a school for training teachers of the deaf and in 1873 became professor of "vocal physiology" at Boston University. In 1876 he exhibited an apparatus embodying the results of his studies in the transmission of sound by electricity; this invention was the telephone. It was immediately successful, and with improvements and modifications it was quickly adopted throughout Europe and America. Before long, the mileage of telephone wires surpassed that of telegraph wires.

Close upon the heels of the telephone came electric trams and street cars.2 The first regular line, a short one with a single motor-car, was opened at Lichterfelde (in Germany) in 1881. By the end of the 1880's, most cities in Europe and America were being provided, or were taking steps to be provided, with systems of electrically powered street railways. Subsequently, electric railways began to parallel steam railways between populous centres, and certain steam railway companies "electrified" some of their lines.

¹ See above, pp. 29-30, 34. ² On the beginnings of experimentation with electric traction, see above, p. 32.

Meanwhile, a theoretical foundation was being laid for wireless telegraphy and telephony by a distinguished British physicist, Wireless James Maxwell (1831–1879). Maxwell, in his Elec-Wireless tricity and Magnetism (1873), propounded the theory Telegthat electrical action is propagated through space in the form of disturbing waves which travel with the velocity of light. Proof of this theory, and indication of how it could be practically applied, was subsequently furnished by a famous German physicist, Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894). During the years from 1885 to 1889, Hertz demonstrated the progressive propagation of electromagnetic action through space, measured the length and velocity of electromagnetic waves, and showed conclusively their correspondence with the waves of light and radiant heat. Then came the actual invention of practical machinery for wireless Marconi telegraphy by Guglielmo Marconi, in 1895, when he was twenty-one years of age. A year later Marconi patented his invention in Britain and began the organization of a company for its commercial exploitation. In 1898 wireless telegraphic communication was established across the English Channel, and in 1901 across the Atlantic from Cornwall to Newfoundland.

Marconi was awarded the Nobel prize for physics in 1909.

Wireless telephony (or "radio broadcasting") was not developed until after 1910, although the basis for it was prepared shortly after 1900 by the special work of two British scientists, J. J. Thomson and Owen Richardson, in what was called "thermionics," a new branch of electrical physics dealing with the influence of heat on matter in generating electrically charged particles (ions or electrons). Among the devices invented to give effect to thermionic discoveries, one of the most important for wireless telephony was the three-electrode "tube" prepared by Lee de Forest in the United States in 1907.

As the nineteenth century ended and the twentieth advanced, the applications of electricity, especially for domestic purposes, Miscelbecame ever more numerous. There were electric lights and telephones, and presently "receiving sets" for radio broadcasting. There were small electric motors for vacuum cleaners, for sewing machines, and for washing machines. There were electric refrigerators. There

were electric stoves, toasters, irons, etc. There were electric appliances for automobile and airplane. And, on a large scale, there was rapid progress in electroplating, in electrotyping, and in the use of electric furnaces for making steel. The "age of electricity" was even marked by New York's substitution in 1888 of "electrocution" for hanging as the legal death penalty for criminals.

Parallel with the development of industries connected with the increasing exploitation of electricity, proceeded the development of a large number of important industries having to do with special mechanical aids to individual comfort. For the comfort of people at home and in shop or office, artificial heating was provided by a variety of "furnaces"—coal-burning or (later) oil-burning, hot-air, hot-water, or steam-while higher standards of sanitation and

better methods of plumbing contributed to a rapidly growing vogue of bathrooms and lavatories and all manner of accessories.

For lightening the labor of housekeepers and ensuring to populous centres a copious and varied supply of foodstuffs, great "canning" industries arose and flourished. And to the earlier means of preserving food by heating or drying, 1 refrigeration was now added, in ever more scientific ways and on an ever larger scale. Refrigeration depends, of course, on a plentiful supply of ice; and this was rendered possible and comparatively cheap by the ingenuity of chemists and en-

gineers. Certain chemicals were found useful for making ice, as well as for preserving tinned or potted goods, and engineers eventually learned how to apply electricity to refrigeration. Already, in the first decade of the twentieth century, astounding quantities of meat, fish, fruit, butter, eggs, and vegetables were being refrigerated for long-distance transportation and longterm preservation.

A special aid to domestic economy was the sewing machine. The first practical design had been patented by an American, Elias Howe, in 1846, and the first commercial exploitation of it, with some modifications, had been under-Sewing taken by another American, Isaac Singer, in the 1850's. It was not until 1863, however, that the "Singer Manufacturing

¹ On the beginnings of large-scale food preservation, see above, p. 29.

Company" was solidly established and not until 1872 that it erected its first large factory (at Elizabethport, New Jersey). Thereafter, the production and improvement of sewing machines went on apace, principally in the United States, and to a lesser extent in other countries. The "electric" sewing machine was patented in 1889.


A special aid to office economy was the typewriter. There had been several early experiments with mechanical writing devices in England, America, and France; but the first really successful typewriter was made jointly by writer three ingenious residents of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1867-1872,1 and its commercial manufacture was inaugurated by Remington and Sons, gunmakers of Ilion, New York, in 1874. Thereafter other firms took to making typewriters, in America and in Europe, and there was steady improvement in the "Remington" and its competitors. The first shift-key typewriter appeared in 1878; the first "visible writing" in 1883; the first "portable" in 1912. In the meantime, the typewriter was being supplemented with other mechanical devices for office work: a tabulating machine was first employed in assembling the data of the United States census of 1890; a decimal tabulator appeared in 1898; and soon there were adding machines, addressing machines, and cash registers.

A special aid to individual locomotion (and a special stimulus to outdoor exercise and "sport") was the bicycle, whose manufacture developed steadily after 1870. For several years, especially in Britain, the front wheel was made big and the rear wheel small. Gradually, however, a "standard" form was evolved. Ball bearings were introduced in 1877. "Safety" rear-driving was generally adopted about 1885. Pneumatic rubber tires were added in 1889. By the 1890's the bicycle was widely used in Europe and America. It was peculiarly helpful to workers going back and forth to the factory and to young people going back and forth to school; and it provided incentive and opportunity for all sorts of persons, including many other-

¹ Christopher Sholes, Carlos Glidden, and Samuel Soulé. Soulé soon dropped out, and the machine, first known as the "Sholes and Glidden," was rechristened the "Remington."

Note. The picture opposite, "Mining," is from the Monument to Labor by the Belgian sculptor, Constantin Meunier (1831-1905). On Meunier, see below, p. 413.





wise quite staid women, to escape periodically from home and town on outings into the open spaces. By 1910 it was estimated that seven million bicycles were in use in France, seven million in Britain, five million in Germany, two million in Italy, and comparable numbers in other countries.

Many utilitarian ends were served by a remarkable contemporary exploitation of wood pulp or "cellulose." One form of it, "celluloid," was first made in the United States in 1860 and thence its manufacture and use spread to lose" Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Japan. Other forms came to be employed for the new "artificial silk," or "rayon," for explosives, for photographic films, and, most quantitatively from the 1880's, for print paper. Indeed, the extensive manufacture of cheap wood-pulp paper was of primary significance in the veritable revolution of journalism The New during the era from 1870 to 1910. Not only did the constantly improving printing machines, powered by electricity as well as steam, permit of much swifter printing of news. Not only did the telegraph and telephone and wireless and the perfected means of transport greatly facilitate the collection of news and the distribution of newspapers. But also the substitution of cheap wood-pulp paper for the more expensive (and durable) cotton or linen paper enabled publishers to print more stuff in their newspapers and to sell them more widely. These developments, together with the marked increase of "advertising" which attended the latest phase of the Industrial Revolution, ushered in the distinctive popular and "sensational" journalism of the twentieth century.

Photography had been discovered and developed before 1870.²
After 1870, however, its progress was veritably revolutionary.
In 1884 the film-roll system of photography was invented, and in the following year George Eastman laid in Photography the foundations of his great photographic industry at Rochester. New York, by patenting a machine for the manufac-

¹ In addition to the so-called "two-revolution printing machine" perfected by Robert Miehle in the 1880's, mention may here be made of the linotype, the machine for typesetting, which was simultaneously devised by Otmar Mergenthaler. Both of these inventors were Germans.

See above, p. 32.

Note. The picture opposite is from a drawing in *Punch* by George Du Maurier (1834-1896).

ture of films. In 1888 the Eastman Company marketed the first "kodak," a small portable roll-film camera, which enabled amateurs, as well as professionals, to "take pictures." Daylight-loading film was first made in 1891, and in the same year a French inventor produced the first photograph in colors. By 1900 photography was an important and widespread industry. Cameras and "kodaks" were used everywhere for artistic and scientific purposes, for individual diversion, for journalistic illustration. Large-scale factories employed some 20,000 persons in the making of materials sensitive to light and as many more in the manufacture of cameras and the wholesale distribution of photographic supplies.

The idea of "moving pictures" had been toyed with in France,

The idea of "moving pictures" had been toyed with in France, Britain, and America since the 1860's, but it did not lead to practical results until after Eastman had begun the manufacture of roll-films in the 1880's. In 1891 Thomas Edison patented a peep-show device known as the "kinetoscope," which was put to commercial use for the first time in New York City in 1894. In 1895, another American, Thomas Armat of Washington, D. C., added a "projector," so that an observer would not have to peep into a box to see moving pictures but could see them projected on a screen, and Armat called his machine a "vitascope"; it was publicly demonstrated at a music hall in New York City in 1896. Meanwhile, in 1895, two brothers by the name of Lumière, in Lyon, France, patented the "cinematograph," a mobile machine, combining a camera, a film-printing device, and a projector; and this marked the real beginning of the motion-picture industry. True, there was some delay in exploiting the "cinema," in part because of lawsuits over patent rights. But after 1900 the display of motion pictures became a regular feature of most vaudeville shows in the larger cities throughout the world, and in 1905 the first exclusively motion-picture theatre was opened at Pittsburgh. Though the enormous growth of the motion-picture industry was to come afterward, the preparation for it was made before 1910.

An especially characteristic feature of the era from 1870 to Progress in Engineering ing: the devising of the steam turbine and internal-combustion engines, the application of the latter to motor car, motor boat, and aviation, and the consequent prodi-

gious rise of the petroleum, rubber, and cement industries. The turbine is a rotary motor in which the shaft is rotated steadily in its bearings, not by means of cranks, as in the earlier "reciprocating" engine, but directly by a current of The Turbine water, air, or steam. The principle of the turbine had long been embodied in the windmill, but its utilization for a steam-engine was the master invention of a British engineer, Sir Charles Parsons, who patented his steam turbine in Parsons thereafter. In 1889 Parsons established at Newcastle a large factory for the manufacture of steam turbines, and by 1910 they were being extensively employed for the running of electrical dynamos and steamships.

The internal-combustion engine is a device for the direct translation of energy into mechanical power by means of gas explosion behind a piston; it "puts the furnace into the cylinder." There had been much experimentation with "The Internal-Combustion engines throughout the nineteenth century, but not until the last quarter of the century did it produce practical results. In the late 'seventies, large stationary gas engines, worked with coal gas or natural gas, were invented in Germany and Great Britain. A much better internal-combustion engine, burning oil, was evolved by a German engineer, Rudolf Diesel (1858–1913). The "Diesel engine" was patented in 1892 and publicly demonstrated for the first time in 1898. By 1910 it was being employed in electrical works, ocean liners, and locomotives.

Another German engineer, Gottlieb Daimler (1834–1900), devised in 1885–1886 a small, portable internal-combustion engine, fuelled with light oil and capable of propelling vehicles and boats. This was the "gasoline engine," destined speedily to rival Watt's steam-engine in revolutionizing transportation and Stimulating industry. Daimler himself applied the Gasoline gasoline engine to a bicycle in 1886 and to a wagon in 1887, but, being much more interested personally in water travel than in land travel, he sold his patents for motor cars to a French concern (the Panhard Company) and devoted himself to the manufacture, in Germany and Great Britain, of motor launches. These were made and sold in increasing number, especially after 1900, not only by the Daimler Com-

pany but also by competing firms in most countries of Europe and America.

In the meantime, in the late 1880's and during the 1890's, there was fairly rapid progress in applying the "gasoline engine" to vehicles. Many of the essentials of the modern "automobile" were incorporated in the Panhard car The Automobile of 1894, and soon a large number of engineers and mechanics and "promoters" were producing varieties of motor cars in France, Germany, England, and the United States. At first, more cars were manufactured in France than elsewhere, but by 1910 three-fourths of the world's output were being produced in the United States. Here, the output of four cars in 1895 increased to 181,000 in 1910, and this figure was only a little augury of the monster production, twenty years later, of pleasure cars, business cars, trucks, buses, and tractors. Probably the most famous popularizer of the motor car was Henry Ford (born 1863), an American mechanic, whose company, founded at Detroit in 1902 with a cash capital of about \$14,000, began a large-scale production of cheap "Ford" cars in 1909 with such success to itself that fifteen years later it had assets of about a billion dollars and was the largest motor-car corporation in the world and the third largest industrial establishment in the United States; it had branches in Europe and some fifty affiliated industries in America; it employed some 200,000 persons directly and an equal number indirectly.

Aviation also was rendered practicable by the gasoline engine. Man had long dreamed about flying, from the ancient Psalmist who voiced his yearning for "the wings of a bird," Pioneer through the medieval Roger Bacon who prophesied Efforts in flying machines and the early modern Leonardo da Vinci who drew designs for some. In the 1780's Louis XVI of France had been edified, and his courtiers and countrymen elated, by several sensational balloons—one round and another egg-shaped, one filled with hot air and another with hydrogen, most of them pulling courageous human beings, in attached "cars," far up toward heaven and then depositing them in earthly fields or trees. In the nineteenth century, balloon ascents—sometimes with parachute drops—became a sport in many countries, at local fairs and at international expositions; and balloons were occasionally used for military reconnaissance, as in

the American Civil War and in the Franco-Prussian War. In 1870, it will be recalled, a balloon wafted Gambetta, the French war-minister, from Paris, over the heads of the German besiegers, to Tours.¹

In 1851 a Frenchman had attempted to power an elongated balloon with a steam-engine, and in 1885 another Frenchman made a similar attempt with an electric motor. Neither was satisfactory. But then Daimler's light gasoline engine appeared, and in the 1890's experience was gained in utilizing it for "airships." The pioneers were an elderly Ger-Airships man, Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin (1838-1917), and a vouthful Brazilian, Alberto Santos-Dumont (1873-1934). The latter, coming to Paris, inaugurated the building of dirigible motor airships in 1898, and in 1901 won a prize for the first definite flight in a given time, from St. Cloud to the Eiffel tower. Count Zeppelin, a retired army officer Dumont who devoted many years to the scientific study of and Zeppelin aeronautics, designed dirigibles of larger size and with a rigid framework of aluminum. The first "zeppelin" was constructed in 1000, and the first really successful flights with one were made in 1006.

While Zeppelin and Santos-Dumont were building motor airships (lighter than air), various mechanics and engineers were devising motor airplanes (heavier than air). Among the pioneers of the latter, the most successful were two American brothers by the name of Wright.² They were associated in the business of repairing bicycles at Dayton, Ohio, and in the early 1800's, as a recreation, they took up "gliding" with a winged contrivance. Gradually they learned how to adjust and control the wings, or "ailerons," and in 1903, after intensive study and much manual labor, they installed a gasoline engine in a glider and made a successful short flight with it. In 1905 they made fortyfive airplane flights, in the longest of which they kept their machine in the air half an hour and travelled twenty-five miles. These feats of the Wrights were soon imitated and excelled by others. Santos-Dumont at Paris turned from gas dirigibles to flying machines. In 1909 Bleriot, a French aviator, flew across

¹ See above, p. 244.

² Wilbur Wright (1867-1912) and Orville Wright (born 1871).

the English Channel from Calais to Dover. The age of aviation was really dawning.

From the invention of the internal-combustion engine and its rapidly extending utilization for motor cars, motor boats, and airplanes, and likewise, through the Diesel engine, for Stimulus dynamos, ocean liners, and locomotives, arose a great. and essentially new, petroleum industry.1 The output Petroleum Industry of crude oil throughout the world, amounting to half a million barrels in 1860, reached a total of 325 million barrels in 1910. Almost all the output of petroleum, prior to 1880, was from the United States; after 1880, though at least two-thirds of it continued to be from the United States, sizeable quotas were obtained from Russia, Rumania, Mexico, South America, Persia. and the Dutch East Indies. It was a large industrial undertaking to refine the crude oil and to transport it from industrially backward areas, where it was produced, to industrially advanced regions, where it was used.

There was a parallel development of the rubber industry,² in general because of the steadily growing manufacture of miscellaneous rubber goods, and specifically because of a Stimulus suddenly mounting demand for rubber tires for motor to Rubber Industry cars. The world's production of crude rubber rose from 10,000 tons in 1870 to 75,000 tons in 1910. The supply from wild rubber trees of Brazil proved insufficient and was supplemented and after 1900 surpassed by the supply from rubber plantations in the Dutch East Indies, Ceylon, Borneo, French Indo-China, and various regions of tropical Africa. Of the annual output of crude rubber, some 60 per cent was imported into the United States, where rubber manufacturing was most highly developed, about 10 per cent into England, and slightly smaller percentages into Germany and France.

The motor car was an important factor in stimulating not only the rubber and petroleum industries but also the building of cement ("concrete") roads. Lime cements had been made back in the eighteenth century and the relative value of different kinds of them had been scientifically studied by Smeaton³ in the 1780's. Subsequently, about 1825,

¹ On the beginnings of the petroleum industry, see above, p. 34.
² On the beginnings of the rubber industry, see above, pp. 33-34.

³ See above, p. 16.

a particularly good kind was invented in Great Britain and named "Portland cement" by reason of its resemblance in color to Portland limestone. The manufacture of this Portland cement was carried on in Britain and France in the Portland Cement 1850's. After 1870, the manufacture was notably improved, through a lessening of the water content and an increasing rapidity of drying, and was extended to many countries on a scale commensurate with the growing demand for "concrete construction," in which Portland cement was a principal ingredient.

With all the strictly industrial progress of the era from 1870 to 1010 went hand-in-hand the steady mechanizing and industrialization of agriculture. Farm machinery, which had appeared in the preceding decades, continued to be improved and steady multiplied. To bigger and better drills, seeders, cultivators, and harvesters, were now hitched gasoline engines; and to an ever greater knowledge and use of chemical fertilizers, which immensely increased the yield of crops, were now added novel means of marketing them, at a great distance as readily as near by. All of which meant that the countries of western and central Europe and the eastern part of the United States, as they became more intensely industrialized and urbanized, were becoming more and more dependent for foodstuffs and many raw materials on those regions of the world which undertook large-scale "industrial" agriculture-Russia, Argentina, Canada, and the Middle-West and South of the United States. Of course, small-scale farming remained fairly important in France and Germany, in Italy and Scandinavia, in the Relative eastern United States, in Ireland and even in England, of Smallbut it was relatively static, and at its best, as in France, Farming it hardly sufficed to meet local demands. It was now rapidly dwarfed in international trade by the newer large-scale agriculture of other areas.

From what has already been said, it must be evident that, to the preponderant industrialization of Britain and Belgium, which had occurred between 1830 and 1870, the era from Geograph-1870 to 1910 added a similar industrialization of other countries—Germany and the United States, most Spread of Industrial Strikingly; France, less so, but still to a large extent; Revolution and, in lesser and varying degree, Italy, Austria, Bohemia, the Dutch Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Russia, Canada,

Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. In 1870, England and Belgium were the only countries in the world having more people engaged in manufacture and mining than in agriculture. In 1910 Germany and the United States could be ranked with England and Belgium in this respect, and in all the above-named countries there was a marked lowering of the percentage of farmers and raising of the percentage of day laborers.

Nor do these percentages tell the whole story. For, with the advancing industrialization went noteworthy scientific progress in the prevention and cure of disease,1 and with this Growth of went an astounding growth of population. Between Popula-1870 and 1910 the population of England rose from tion in Indus-22 million to 36; of Germany, from 40 million to 65; trialized Countries and of Europe as a whole, from 300 to 440 million. It has been estimated that in 1910 a quarter of the human race dwelt in Europe, the smallest of the four major continents, and that there were then ten Europeans for every four a century previously. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the increase of population in Australia and in the American continents, particularly the increase in the United States from seven million in 1810 to 92 million in 1910, was largely of European emigrants or their descendants.

A most significant aspect of this growth of European population was the fact that it corresponded almost exactly to the contemporary growth of European cities. In Germany, An Urban for example, there were, in 1870, eight cities of over Growth 100,000 inhabitants, while in 1910 there were forty-one, of which eleven had over 250,000 inhabitants and five had over half a million. Berlin had barely 160,000 inhabitants in 1810 and over two million in 1910. Altogether the percentage of Germany's urban population increased from 35 per cent in 1870 to 60 per cent in 1910—representing the same increase as that of Germany's total population during the era. Of course, the birth rate remained as high in rural as in urban areas, but in the country districts a stationary or even dwindling population, with the aid of agricultural machinery and foreign imports, sufficed to feed ever larger aggregations of people, and the excess of countryborn persons naturally sought and usually found employment in factory towns or mining centres. There was much emigra-

On this important matter, see below, pp. 350-352.

tion from populous countries of Europe to more sparsely settled countries in America. There was much more migration, within the industrialized countries of Europe, from farms to cities.

Cities, thanks to the latest progress of the Industrial Revolution, were becoming peculiarly attractive to the European (and American) masses. In cities, people could now live in rooms lighted by electricity and provided with sanitary plumbing. They could travel to and fro on bicycles tiveness or in electric trams. They could buy, relatively cheaply, a profusion of foods, raw or canned, produced near by or shipped in refrigeration from a great distance. They could clothe themselves, likewise cheaply, in a bewildering variety of fabrics, including "artificial silk." They could provide themselves with innumerable little labor-saving devices and creaturecomforts. They could find novel diversion in a dozen ways, looking at pictures or reading sensational stories in the newer type of journal, peering into the new fangled kinetoscope or at the performance of the cinema, bicycling into the country, thrilling at the first sight of balloon ascent and parachute drop, of motor car, motor launch, zeppelin or airplane, meeting in old beer-gardens or "pubs" recently "modernized" in most garish fashion, and talking about the latest speed-contests and other material wonders of modern civilization. And all these newest achievements of the Industrial Revolution, added to those which had gone before, afforded to city dwellers unprecedented opportunity for employment—in new factories and foundries, in the new traction and transportation, in expanding offices and warehouses and retail shops, and in the multiplying repair-shops which the age of machinery brought in its wake.

With the spread of industrialization and the growth of cities, it was but natural that a "city spirit"—the bourgeois spirit—should become more and more prevalent. It was most prevalent in Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, and the The City Spirit United States. It was prevalent to a large extent in France, Italy, and all the other countries of western and central Europe. It was undoubtedly developing not only in the Habsburg Empire but also in the Russian Empire—and in Japan. The more industrialized a country was and the more numerous were its cities, the greater were the prestige and power of its

upper bourgeois class—its "captains of industry," its bankers and big manufacturers and exploiters of "natural resources" and directors of railways, steamship lines, electric lighting, and traction systems.

For industrial capitalism, the economic framework in which industrialization had gone on prior to 1870, was enormously solidified and extended by the industrial progress of the ensuing Mounting era. The rise of great new industries, the prodigious expansion of old industries, the rapid extension of Importance of manufacturing and commerce, vastly enlarged the Industrial fields in which persons of wealth could make lucrative At the same time it enabled many a pushing, ingenious, and sometimes unscrupulous individual to emerge from economic and social obscurity into monopolistic ownership of mines, petroleum wells, electrical works, motor-car factories, dynamite manufacture, or other key-business, and thence into front rank among the world's captains of industry. The opportunities for "self-made men," as well as for professional bankers (and corporation lawyers), were now golden. And such opportunities were not neglected.

According to estimates compiled by economists for the years 1870 and 1910, capital investments increased in Great Britain from 35 to 70 billion dollars, in France from 28 to 55. Growth of and in Germany from 17 to 70, while the foreign investments of Britishers grew from 5 to 20 billion Capital Investments. dollars, of Frenchmen from 21/2 to 8, and of Germans Domestic from none to five. Of this augmenting wealth, a Foreign growing proportion, especially in Germany and the United States, was owned or controlled by great industrial combinations—"cartels" as in Germany, or "trusts" as in the United States. They represented consolidations or federations of formerly competing businesses in a given industry, for the purpose of reducing "overhead" expenses, securing a practical monopoly, and thereby increasing profits for managers Growth of and stockholders. There were national "trusts" or Cartels and "cartels," sometimes with international affiliates, Trusts of steel, of petroleum, of copper, of sugar, of electrical works, of chemical works, etc. And the directors and heavy stockholders of such combinations or pools were the great

¹ On industrial capitalism, see above, pp. 40-46.

"barons"—in some cases, in public opinion, the "robber barons"—of the new industrial era.

The era gave promise not only of creating vast fortunes for a relatively small number of industrial and banking magnates but also of widening and deepening the well-being and prosperity of whole nations. There can be no doubt that, generally speaking, the misery—the veritable "reign of terror"—to which British proletarians had been subject during the first half of the nineteenth century (when the Industrial Revolution was in its infancy) 1 was somewhat mitigated toward the close of the century (when the Revolution was reaching maturity). Unemployment was less and not quite so chronic. Wages, and the standard of living, tended to rise. Working and living conditions improved. Skilled artisans and clerical employes, together with shopkeepers and other retail merchants, and many farmers likewise, could now save a little money and put it in savings banks or invest it in government bonds or corporation stocks. Indeed, the development of savings banks (and insurance companies) and of small investments in government securities or in industrial enterprises was an outstanding feature of the era from 1870 to 1910, in Germany, France, and the United States, as well as in Britain, and a clear indication that in these industrialized countries the lower middle class and upper proletarian class were sharing, to a modest degree, in the unprecedented prosperity of the upper bourgeoisie.

In the circumstances, the bourgeois capitalist spirit—the spirit ambitious for profits from banking, industry, and trade—possessed, in unwonted degree, the bourgeoisie not alone, but also the other traditional classes of European society. To emulate the great captains of industry became more and more the eager desire of the whole citizenry of an industrialized nation—with obviously revolutionary social effects.

The Industrial Spirit:
Bourgeoisie and Other Social Classes

Thus, the landed aristocracy gradually changed front. The nobleman who formerly had prided himself upon ownership exclusively of land and had despised the bourgeois as a Landed vulgar shopkeeper and tradesman, now perceiving Aristochat profits from agriculture were not keeping pace with those from factory, railway, or mine, identified himself.

¹ See above, pp. 46-51.

ever more closely with the new industry. He invested heavily in stocks and bonds, became a director of business corporations, and used his hereditary landed estates as secondary assets, in many cases as hunting preserves for his personal recreation. On the other hand, especially wealthy bourgeois bought large estates from impoverished noblemen and in some cases obtained titles of nobility for themselves. From both sides, forces operated to weld together the traditional land-owning aristocracy and the newer industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. Prior to 1870, the rivalries of these classes had characterized much of the social history of Europe. After 1871, their coöperation was patent, particularly in Great Britain and Germany.

Peasants and artisans and day laborers came also, though in a different way, under the spell of industrial capitalism and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Peasants who were in the Peasantry category of thrifty independent farmers, as in France and southern Germany, began discreetly to invest their little hoardings in bonds or stocks and to become identified in a small but very real way with the capitalist system. In company with nobility and bourgeoisie, such peasants were anxious to guard against anything which might endanger their investments or reduce their dividends. Peasants who were less independent, such as the generality of rural laborers in Britain and northern Germany, observing that their wages bore some relationship to their landlord's gains or losses in business and on the urban exchange, concluded that their own welfare depended upon industrial progress. Peasants who migrated to the towns and sought employment in mill or shop learned from proletarians already established there that the income of every wage-earner, urban as well as rural, was conditional upon the current situation in the money market and in the market of supply and demand, that a slump in stocks might suddenly throw thousands out of work, and that the livelihood of all was dependent in fact upon the mounting profits of the industrial bourgeoisie.

The idea that wages are derived from capital and that consequently the sustenance of the masses comes from the bounty of an acquisitive class of industrialists was popularized by industrialists themselves, by professional men closely associated with them—engineers, lawyers, journalists, professors—by a host of their humbler admirers and emulators, and, perhaps most im-

pressively, by personal observation and experience. As the idea became widespread, it gave common currency to the doctrine that the first duty incumbent upon all citizens, regardless of class, was to speed up industry, to produce more commodities, and to quicken the accumu-

Earners and the Bounty of Big Business

lation of large fortunes. So far was the doctrine pushed that the prosperity of "big business" was accepted in many quarters as the end and aim of national patriotism. And the doctrine was rendered peculiarly alluring to many among the masses in Europe by the knowledge that now and then an individual from their midst rose to be an industrial magnate and by the belief that, under the multiplying blessings of industrialization, all of them might rise in the social scale. It was what those who had already risen—the great industrial

capitalists—termed "equality of opportunity for all."

The era from 1870 to 1910 witnessed, then, along with a fascinating acceleration of industry and industrial capitalism, the seeming consummation of bourgeois ascendancy in Bourgeois western and central Europe. It remains to point out Ascendthat this signal triumph of the industrial bourgeoisie was accompanied, curiously and somewhat paradoxically, by a weakening, or at any rate a blurring, of that doctrinaire liberalism which had previously been the special solicitude of the industrial and commercial middle class.1

Liberalism continued to be talked about. In fact, the word was in greater use than ever before, and so popular did it become that not only middle-class persons and romantic humanitarians but also political and religious conserv-Triumph atives took to describing themselves as "liberals." of Liber-

And, at least superficially, there were sufficient evidences of "liberal" achievement during the era to convey the general impression that the "triumph of liberalism" nicely parallelled the "triumph of the bourgeoisie." There was a general vogue, throughout western and central Europe (and in America) of constitutionalism, of parliamentary government, of religious toleration, of freedom of the press, and of other individual liberties. There was a waxing desire of the masses for, and a waning opposition of the classes to, the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. And such liberal desires, such vogue of

¹ On liberalism prior to 1870, see above, pp. 65-74.

liberalism, penetrated more and more into Russia and other regions of eastern Europe.

If we look below the surface, however, we shall perceive that the word "liberalism" was used much more vaguely after 1870 than before and that a good many of the political and social developments of the new era were really a Modification of departure from liberal norms of the preceding age. ism Back in the 1830's and 1850's liberalism had been, politically as well as socially, a middle-class movement, and few liberals had sponsored a political democracy in which the mass of men without property or education might participate in voting and office-holding. A handful of "radicals," like John Bright in England and Mazzini in Italy, had represented, it is true, a democratic left-wing of the liberal movement, but for a long time they had been unable to prevail upon the majority of liberals to democratize the Victorian Compromise in Britain, the bourgeois monarchy in France, or the severely restricted suffrage in Belgium and Italy. Wherever liberalism was strongest, there was parliamentary government, but a parliamentary government of upper and middle classes and not a democratic government.

Adoption of the form of democratic government, at least of universal manhood suffrage for parliamentary elections, occurred widely in western and central Europe, as we have

Democ-

seen, between 1867 and 1885. Its occurrence at the ratizing Governbeginning of the era which we are discussing in the ment present chapter is attributable less to the activity of convinced middle-class liberals than to the agitation of workingclass leaders and to the opportunist tactics of professed conservatives like Disraeli in Britain and Bismarck in Germany. It was usually acquiesced in, and even applauded, by liberalswhich was a sign that they were weakening in their devotion to a major political tenet of historic liberalism. Of course, they thought they could afford to acquiesce and applaud. For, now that the bourgeois spirit was permeating upper and lower classes, the whole citizenry of an industrialized nation might be expected to share the basic concern of the bourgeoisie for industry and commerce, for money and banking, for property rights and material prosperity.

¹ On the rise of political democracy, see above, pp. 270-280.

So political democracy, or important concessions to it, attended the advance of industrialization. And gradually, almost imperceptibly, this one departure from earlier liberalism was attended by other departures. One was in the field of ratizing popular education. Liberals had always been friendly Education to the idea that, while education should be "free," the secular state should broaden the opportunities for popular education by subsidizing private schools and supplementing them, if necessary, by a system of public schools, attendance at which, however, would be voluntary. Such had been the actuating motives of the school law which Guizot had sponsored in France in 1833,1 of the financial grants which from the same year had been made by the British Parliament to church schools,² and of other liberal legislation in respect of schools in Belgium and Italy down to 1870. With the advent of political democracy, nevertheless, the movement for popular education took a new turn and became more insistent. Trade unionists and working-class people generally demanded a radical extension of public schools, and the upper and middle classes, intent upon preparing the masses for "enlightened" and patriotic exercise of their new political rights, heeded the demand.

Almost immediately, under democratic auspices, great systems of state-maintained and state-directed schools were inaugurated or strengthened. And eventually, still under dem-Making Education ocratic auspices, school attendance ceased to be National voluntary and was made compulsory, while public and Comsecular schools were preferred to private religious pulsory schools. In Prussia, an important consolidation of the school system was effected in 1872, and the direct financial contribution of the state to elementary education rose from \$1,125,000 in 1871 to \$37,125,000 in 1911.3 In Britain, a statute of 1870 (three vears after the enfranchisement of urban workingmen) set up a national system of elementary public ("board") schools, and another statute of 1880 made school attendance compulsory. In France, the secularization and expansion of elementary

³ The Prussian school system had been pretty fully developed in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, before the advent of political democracy. After 1870, it was consolidated and strengthened. The direct financial contribution of the state in 1911 represented about a fourth of the amount spent that year on elementary education, the remaining three-fourths being provided by local taxes.

education was undertaken in 1881 (two years after the democratic republicans got complete control of the government), and compulsory schooling was enacted in 1882. In the United States, where formal schooling was especially a twin fetish with material "progress," the estimated value of school property rose from 130 million dollars in 1870 to over a billion in 1910 (and to almost five billion in 1930). It was becoming an obvious purpose of industrialized nations to oblige all parents to send their children to schools which the several national governments would supervise. It might involve, theoretically, an abridgement of individual liberty. Practically, it was a response on the part of liberals themselves to the insistent demand of a machine age for the more intelligent popular use of labor and leisure which presumably would result from universal literacy.

Similar to the increase of state power in education was the parallel extension of state control over matters of public health and charity. The more industrialized a nation became, Assuring Public the more extensive and rigorous was its exercise of Health "police powers" over individual conduct, even over and State individual property rights, affecting the health and physical well-being of the community. Statute followed statute, regulating, in one country after another, the treatment of communicable disease, the disposal of sewage, the sanitation, ventilation, and lighting of factories and shops and private dwellings. Simultaneously, governmental appropriations multiplied for the establishment and maintenance of public hospitals and sanitariums, as well as of prisons and reformatories. In all these developments, professed liberals, full of humanitarian zeal, cooperated with conservatives and radicals and thereby helped to bring about a situation in which the old liberal ideal of the state as a "passive policeman" gradually receded before the new reality of the omnipotent state.

In respect of the churches, likewise, liberalism shifted its ground, partially because of the hostility which it encountered from many churchmen, partially because of the "étatisme"—the increasing scope of state powers and functions—which liberals themselves were beginning to champion, and partially because of growing popular absorption in scientific achievement and material prosperity with attendant neglect of supernatural "other worldly" religion. The original liberal slogan of "a free

church in a free state" tended now to be translated into practice as an inferior and barely tolerated church in a superior and

controlling state. From 1870 there was a marked recrudescence of acute conflict between state and church, especially between national states and the Catholic Church; and in attempts to shackle the church to the

Subordinating Church to State

state and to transfer education and charitable institutions from the former to the latter, the majority of liberals were usually to be found in unaccustomed alliance with Marxian socialists.

In the newer "liberal" attitude toward religion, public health, popular education, and political democracy, nationalism played a significant part. Liberalism had always been identified with the principle of national self-determination, and liberals were peculiarly elated by the apparent triumph of this principle in Italy and Germany (and in the Balkans) in the 1860's and 1870's. They were so elated, in fact, that, in many instances, their nationalism after 1870 rose superior to their liberalism and was scarcely distinguishable from that of conservatives. It followed that professed liberals not only ism to Nasupported the strengthening of central (at the expense of local) government in national states, but also favored the adoption of governmental policies which eventually served to transform liberal nationalism into a nationalism more intensely political and imperialist and more intolerant of internal dissent. There were new restrictions on "foreigners." There were novel attempts to impose the language and culture of a major nationality upon ethnic minorities within its political borders, attempts at "nationalization" under such bizarre names as "Germanization," "Magyarization," and "Russification." In all of which illiberal attempts and restrictions, some "liberals" participated.

The weakening of historic liberalism was most evident, however, in the economic domain. The intense economic individualism which had characterized the preceding era was considerably abated by the increasing recognition of the desirability of national and social solidarity, and by the natural trend of the newer industry toward combinations of capital and of labor. As the competition of individual employers was lessened by monopolistic "trusts" and "cartels," as banks were consolidated and

Substituting Economic Nationalism for Economic Liberal-

coordinated, industrial capitalists could hardly gainsay the logical

right of workmen to combine, to organize trade unions, and to engage in collective bargaining about wages, hours, and conditions of labor. As a matter of fact, the growth of trade unionism was an outstanding feature of the era from 1870 to 1910, and one in which even liberals more or less willingly acquiesced.

Away from "freedom of contract," liberalism slowly but surely moved. This was evidenced by the legalization of trades unions Departing and collective bargaining. It was evidenced also by a growing amount of "labor legislation" in behalf of urban workers: state-regulation of the labor of women and children and even adults in factories, mines, and shops; state insurance of workingmen against illness, death, accident, and unemployment; state fixing of minimum wages in particular industries.

Away from "freedom of trade," liberalism likewise tended to move. Excepting Great Britain, the pioneer and still the chief large-scale manufacturing country in the world, the Departing industrialized nations, with the support and frequently from at the behest of middle-class "liberals," turned more "Free Trade" and more from free trade to tariff protectionism, from public policies of economic liberalism to those of a revived mercantilism. This "neo-mercantilism" was part of a new orientation, during the closing decades of the nineteenth Rise of century, toward an economic nationalism, an economic Neo-Mercanimperialism, and a militarism (and navalism), the tilism general nature of which we shall presently indicate, and the detailed development of which in the various countries we shall describe in succeeding chapters.

Here we may remark that, whereas liberalism was a very definite doctrine prior to 1870, it became less and less so after 1870. Among the increasing number of persons who called themselves "liberals" were henceforth to be found liberals who favored tariffs as well as liberals who advocated free trade, liberals who were imperialist as well as liberals who were anti-imperialist, and liberals who accepted the new militarism as well as liberals who continued to preach pacifism.

2. NATIONAL ECONOMICS, IMPERIALISM, AND MILITARISM

It must be emphasized that the advancing industrialization of which we have spoken in the preceding section nicely synchronized with a marked access of nationalism. In the 1860's and 1870's, at the very time when "big business" was becoming deeply enrooted on the Continent of Europe (and in America), a series of wars was eventuating in the erection of national states for Italians, Germans, Magyars, and Balkan peoples (and the repression of sectionalism in Business

Association of Big Business with Intensifying Nationalism

the United States) and was promoting an intensification of national spirit and rivalry all over Europe (and America). In the circumstances, it was but

natural that this spirit and rivalry should find expression in the economic and industrial field as well as in strictly cultural and political domains. The fostering of a country's machine industries, the exploitation of its natural resources, the stimulation of its domestic and foreign trade, the increase of the security and purchasing power of its citizens, became central objects of concern to the statesmen (and the masses) of every nation and principal sources of an exaggerated competition among national states.

In other words, industrial progress was attended, after 1870, not so much by governmental policies of laissez-faire—giving free rein to individual competition, respecting the "laws" of supply and demand, and establishing the freedom of profession, trade, and "contract"—which had been especially advocated during the era from 1830 to 1870—as by a return of most national governments to the mercantilist, regulating policies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before the advent of liberalism.¹

To the reviving and intensifying economic nationalism, the

differences among nations in degree of industrialization gave strength. So long as the Industrial Revo-Economic Nationallution was mainly confined to Great Britain, as was the case before 1870, this industrialized nation and likewise the other nations, predominantly agricultural, could readily perceive mutual advantages in international free trade. British manufactured goods could be freely exchanged Industrial for the rest of the world's raw materials and foodstuffs, Competition to the profit of all concerned. But after 1870, with the among extension and development of machine industry in one Nations country after another—the United States, Germany, France,

¹On early mercantilism, see Vol. I, pp. 92-94, 296, 473-475, 546. On the later, and opposing, *laissez-faire*, see Vol. I, pp. 547-548, and the present volume, above, pp. 68-72, 181-182.

Italy, Austria, Russia, etc.—the argument for free trade was not so convincing. If all these countries had remained agricultural, or if all of them had been industrialized equally with one another and with Britain, free trade might conceivably have continued as an ideal of their economists and a practical policy of their statesmen.

Britain, it is true, did cling to free trade during the era from 1870 to 1910. Her industrialization was so much more complete than that of any other nation, she had so much more capital, so much more experience in mechanical production, so many more customary markets, so much greater need for raw materials and food supplies, that her "national interests" did not appear to be seriously endangered by foreign developments. Few of her manufacturers demanded tariff protection for themselves and all of them opposed it for dwindling British agriculture.

Other nations, nevertheless, were in a different position. They were undergoing a novel industrialization. Their developing

Demand for Protection by Britain's Competitors mechanical industries were "infant industries," varying greatly from country to country in lustiness and promise, and yet everywhere creating unusual strains for traditional agriculture. In these nations, consequently, tariff protectionism was sought for "infant

industries" against more highly developed foreign industries, and likewise for agriculture against both rising domestic industry and mounting importation of foreign foodstuffs and raw materials. And intensified popular nationalism helped interested manufacturers and farmers to obtain what they sought.

The trend away from economic liberalism (or laissez-faire) and toward economic nationalism (or neo-mercantilism) was re-

Reaction of Economists against Economic Liberalism flected in the partial supplanting, especially in Germany and other newly industrialized countries, of the "classical school" of political economy by the "historical national school." This "school" had had exponents in Germany in the 1840's, but its vogue and influence, here and elsewhere, dated from the 1870's.

Perhaps its chief ornament was Adolf Wagner (1835–1917), professor in his earlier years at Heidelberg and after 1870 at Berlin, a popular lecturer, a prolific writer, and an effective propa-

¹ Notably Roscher and List. See above, p. 182.

gandist. Wagner maintained that the teachings of the Physiocrats, Adam Smith, and the other "liberal" economists were vitiated by having been based on the false premises of "natural right" and "individualism." Adolf Wagner Against them, Wagner contended that the economic and the position of the individual, instead of depending on socalled natural rights or even on natural capabilities, is School of Econolargely conditioned by the national environment in mists which he is born, the national laws under which he lives, and the national state to which he belongs, and that all. these are historical products. Wherefore, economic phenomena cannot be isolated, or studied apart from national law and politics.

Wagner and other members of the "historical school" conducted many researches into the history of various phases of national economic life and produced many tomes which were not only erudite but also of practical utility in indicating how the contemporary state might forward national economic interests. In general, they counselled the coöperation of "conservative" landlords and "liberal" industrialists and the adoption of a program of tariff protectionism and social legislation as most likely to conserve and strengthen the whole nation. In 1872—one year after the erection of the German Empire—the leading German economists of the "historical school," together with sympathetic government officials, held a conference at Eisenach and The issued a manifesto, which, in declaring war on economic Eisenach liberalism, referred to the national German state as festo. "the great moral institution for the education of hu-1872 manity" and demanded that it speedily enact such legislation as "would enable an increasing number of people to participate in

manity" and demanded that it speedily enact such legislation as "would enable an increasing number of people to participate in the highest benefits of German kultur." The national state, according to the Eisenach conferees, was to be, not a "passive policeman," but a benevolent father and an economic and spiritual guide; it had a duty to foster national agriculture, national industry, national commerce, and national labor. The conference ended with the organization of a "Union for Social Politics,"

to make Germany the European pioneer of economic nationalism.

The "historical school" of political economy was strongest in Germany, but it gained influential disciples and imitators in other

whose energetic propaganda during the ensuing decade did much

countries.¹ It was actuated by patriotic, as well as historical or sociological, motives, and everywhere it served to emphasize the national character of industrial progress. Its program, sometimes contemptuously referred to as "socialism of the ism of the chair" or "parlor socialism," at once reflected and confirmed the widespread trend, at the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, toward neo-mercantilism.

The trend was most marked in Germany. Here it was promoted, not only by the agitation of the "historical school" of political economists, but also by the swift industrialization of the country and by the patriotic fervor which accompanied the successful issue of the struggle for political unity. And it was championed by Bismarck.

Bismarck, at the end of 1878, publicly avowed his faith in tariff protectionism as a national German policy. In his opinion, it would provide needed revenue for the federal gov-Tariff Protecernment, and, even more important, it would protect tionism in "infant" industries, safeguard agriculture, and raise Germany, the standard of living of the common people. Thereby, he thought, it would benefit the principal classes of manufacturers, farmers, and workingmen, increase the taxable wealth of the nation, contribute to the nation's military resources, and, in fine, render the nation more nearly self-sufficient both for war and for peace, and therefore stronger at home and more respected abroad. In 1879 Bismarck's faith was sealed by act of a majority of the Reichstag, and a protective tariff became law in Germany. Thereafter the German tariff was frequently revised, but the revisions were almost always "upward"—higher in 1885, still higher in 1887, and to unprecedented heights in 1902. Apparently, as industries ceased to be "infant" and grew up, the demand for their national "protection" only quickened; and the

¹ In addition to Adolf Wagner, the most famous member of the "historical school" in Germany was Gustav Schmoller (1838–1917), professor successively at Halle, Strasbourg, and, after 1882, at Berlin, who turned disdainfully away from economic theory and devoted his whole enormous energy to practical problems, sociological studies, and historical research. Outside Germany, the historical national approach to economics was made in the latter part of the nineteenth century by several English scholars, including Toynbee, Cunningham, and Ashley, and by significant scholars in many other countries.

greater the protection accorded to national industry, the more insistent were the pleas for corresponding "farm relief."

In the meantime, in 1879, Bismarck had his sovereign, the Emperor William I, solemnly declare in the annual "speech from the throne" that "there must be a positive advancement of the welfare of the working classes through the instrumentality of national legislation." In 1881, "in order to realize this object," Bismarck informed the Reichstag through the mouth of the Emperor that

Insurance of German Workmen.

"a bill for the national insurance of workmen against industrial accidents will first be presented, after which a supplementary measure will be submitted providing for a national organization of sickness insurance. But likewise those who are disabled in consequence of old age or invalidity possess a well-founded claim to a more ample relief on the part of the national state than they have hitherto enjoyed." To find the proper ways and means for making such provision, the Chancellor continued, "is a difficult task, yet it is one of the highest obligations of every community based, like ours, on Christianity and nationalism." "Proper ways and means" were soon found; and during the 1880's was elaborated a whole system of compulsory insurance of the nation's wage-earners, which, in conjunction with the tariff, with factory legislation, with the fostering of technical education, with the subsidizing of commercial enterprise, and with the "nationalization" of railways, telegraphs, and telephones, swept Germany from economic laissez-faire into economic nationalism.

Among the industrialized states of Europe (and America), Germany was only a pioneer in the pursuit of economic national-

ism. Others quickly followed. In the three decades from 1880 to 1910 almost every such state enacted neo-mercantilist legislation. Some, such as France, the United States, and Russia, specialized in tariff legislation in behalf of manufacturers and farmers and were relatively backward in labor legislation in behalf of

Similar Approaches to Economic Nationalism outside Germany

workingmen. A few, such as Britain and the Dutch Netherlands, abstained wholly from tariff legislation but adopted a

¹ The United States actually preceded Germany in the adoption of tariff protectionism and, after 1879, greatly surpassed Germany in the height of national tariff walls. France, too, had never been a completely free-trade country, but her moderate protectionism of the 1860's and 1870's was considerably stiffened in the 1880's and thereafter.

good deal of national labor legislation. The countries which imitated the example of Germany in stressing both major features of neo-mercantilism—tariff and labor legislation—were Austria-Hungary, Italy, Belgium, and the Scandinavian kingdoms.

In later chapters, we shall see in specific detail how and in what varying circumstances the several countries of Europe applied the new economic nationalism. What we are doing in this place is to point out the general fact that the *laissez-faire* principle which had been regarded as a natural and ideal accompaniment of industrial progress in Europe during the era from 1830 to 1870 was replaced to a large extent during the era from 1870 to 1910 by neo-mercantilism, by governmental attempts to treat industry and agriculture, commerce and labor, as "national interests."

We would likewise indicate in this place another (and related) characteristic of the era from 1870 to 1910—a revival and intensification of national European expansion (and rivalry) overseas. Revival of For, from the rapid advance of industrialization and Competitive Overseas Improgressive" nations received especially powerful perialism impetus to imperialism. During the preceding era, when laissez-faire had been most sincerely preached and had come nearest to being realized, and when liberals had talked most eloquently about the right of every people to national self-

determination, there had been a notable loosening of Reaction colonial empires, an abatement of colonial wars, and a against good deal of radical criticism of overseas imperialism. Earlier Liberalism France, it is true, had acquired Algeria, though in a hesitant manner and without any great popular enthusiasm, and then, under Napoleon III, had given several signs of renewed imperial pretensions in other parts of the world. On the other hand, however, the British Empire had apparently been weakened by the grant of self-government to many of its overseas areas;² the Spanish colonial empire had obviously been all but destroyed; 3 European reverses and losses of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires had boded ill for the fate of any imperial sovereignty in an age of nationalism; Dutchmen and Portuguese had had no

¹ See above, pp. 107-108, 194-195.

² See above, pp. 91-94, and below, pp. 505-506.

³ See Vol. I, pp. 777-781.

thought of adding to their colonial possessions; and certainly it had not occurred to Germans or Italians or Belgians or Americans that they should subject distant alien peoples to imperial rule.

Now, particularly after 1880, there was a strong reaction. By this time, in industrialized countries, there was need of a greatly augmented supply of raw materials and foodstuffs from "backward" areas, and, under the developing system of economic nationalism, it began to be argued that such a supply could be obtained more cheaply and would be more stable if a given "progressive" nation owned outright, or at any rate controlled indirectly, a large extent of "backward" lands.

Again, there was need of ever larger markets for surplus products of machine manufacture, and as "progressive" nations put up tariff barriers against each other their merchants sought compensatory markets in "backward" countries, and it was soon argued that sales could be speeded up if the "backward" countries were "colonies" or "protectorates." Unfavorable tariffs and other economic handicaps could then be gotten rid of in those areas. Through the "Europeanization" of such areas, the demand for European goods and the ability to pay for them could be enhanced. And requisite internal peace and trade prestige could be afforded by friendly officials of one's own nationality better than by natives.

Furthermore, and this was perhaps the most distinctive factor in the new imperialism, there was now a growing tendency to export surplus capital from "progressive" countries and to invest it in "backward" countries where rates Foreign of interest were usually higher than at home. Prior to Invest-1870, the "progressive" country par excellence had been Great Britain, and the "backward" countries in which she had made her foreign investments (amounting in 1870 to about five billion dollars) were principally the United States and the Continental states of Europe. After 1870, however, as these states underwent rapid industrialization, they in turn became "progressive," ceasing to depend on British capital and beginning to export capital of their own. It thus transpired that, during the era which we are now considering, Germany and France and Belgium and the United States (and Italy to a lesser degree) joined Great Britain as significant investors in "backward"

countries, and that the "backward" countries in which foreign capital was invested were not so much those in Europe and North America as those in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.¹ Such investments were apt to involve considerable risk to capitalists, and these, in order to diminish the risk, found it convenient to appeal to their respective national governments for protection of their property abroad and sometimes for the political annexation of regions in which they had valuable "concessions."

Besides, "progressive" nations toward the close of the nineteenth century, thanks to the rapid perfecting of means of com-

Industrialization an Aid to the New Imperialism munication and instruments of warfare, were in a vastly better position than nations had been in any earlier period to appropriate far-off "backward" areas and to police and administer them. In other words, the advance of the Industrial Revolution made it rela-

tively easy, as well as impelling, for industrialized states of Europe and America to found or extend overseas dominion, and simultaneously the intensification of nationalism among the masses in these states provided popular support for imperialist undertakings of their traders, investors, and governments.

Indeed, the advocates of national imperialism were inclined to buttress their undertakings less with strictly economic arguments than with broadly patriotic pleas. They talked about the defense of "national rights" and the promotion of National-"national interests" and the avenging of "national ism an Incentive honor." They talked about the signal genius which their own nationality had displayed in securing political unity and becoming an industrialized Great Power and which therefore warranted it as a "progressive" nation in controlling "backward" peoples. They talked, moreover, of the inevitability, the blind necessity, of imperialism; some of them labelled it "manifest destiny." They talked, too, about the problem of "surplus population," maintaining that part of the "surplus" could be supported at home if the industry of the mother-country were

¹ British foreign investments, particularly outside Europe, continued to multiply. By 1910 they amounted to about twenty billion dollars, distributed roughly as follows: one and a quarter billion in Europe (almost half of which was in Russia); three and three-quarters billion in the United States; two and three-quarters billion in Canada; four billion in Latin America; three and a quarter billion in Asia; two and three-quarters billion in Africa; and two and a quarter billion in Australia and other islands of the Pacific.

allowed freely to expand in colonial territory, and that the rest of the "surplus" could then emigrate, not to foreign countries, but to colonies wherein they would retain their national language and loyalty. They talked, also, about the "higher civilization," the solemn duty incumbent upon a great and civilized nation to instruct and prepare a less favored people for full participation eventually, perhaps remotely, in the blessings of the machine age, possibly to "Christianize" it, and certainly to endow it with mechanical devices, with sanitation and schools, with order and security. The duty was described in prose as "trusteeship" and in poetry as "the white man's burden."

To the pleas of patriots and the desires of investors and traders, the statesmen of the leading industrial countries responded. In Great Britain, Benjamin Disraeli did a good deal during his Conservative ministry from 1874 to 1880 to favor and Promo-tion of the foster the revival of imperial ambitions and to acquire new additions to the British colonial empire. In National France, a similar development took place under the Imperialleadership of a conspicuous "liberal" republican, Jules Ferry, in the early 1880's. In the late 1880's, Germany, with the sanction of the conservative Bismarck, acquired a considerable overseas dominion, and Italy, under the "radical" statesman Crispi, started to acquire one. In the 1890's and early 1900's, the United States, guided officially by William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, launched an overseas empire. And by this time, Belgium and Japan were likewise becoming imperialist Powers, and Spain was endeavoring to recoup losses in America by gains in Africa.

Between 1870 and 1910, European imperialism overspread the globe and contributed more than all previous ages to the real

Europeanization of the whole world. The entire African continent was partitioned among European Powers. The huge continent of Asia and the numerous islands of the Pacific were almost completely parcelled out into political dependencies, or economic "spheres of influence," of European Powers. Arctic and Ant-

Extent of the New Imperialism: Europeanizing the World

arctic regions were explored and much of their frozen expanse was claimed by Europeans. The American continents were fastened ever more firmly to Europe, not by political bonds, but by economic and cultural links. The fullness of the earth

seemed incontestably to be Europe's, and European shipping covered the seven seas. Everywhere, the customs and manners, the science and art, and, most of all, the mechanical contrivances of industrial Europe (and America) were becoming the central features of a novel and essentially material world civilization.

All this was being accomplished, let us remember, in the midst of intensified industrialization and nationalism—and intensified militarism—within Europe itself. Militarism, the idea Attendant that a state should ensure its security and fortify its National domestic and foreign policies by maintaining and Militarism perfecting large armaments, was especially popular after 1870 and quite characteristic of the era. Of course, some degree of "militarism" had always been an earmark of the European state-system, and most European states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had spent the main part of their public revenues on the upkeep of professional armies. Furthermore, certain states had attempted, on occasion, to make all their able-bodied men liable to military service: Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII; 1 Prussia under Frederick the Great and again during the "War of Liberation" in 1813-1814; ² and, most successfully, France under the First Republic and the First Napoleonic Empire.3 It was not until the 1860's, however, that the principle of the volunteer professional army commenced to be supplanted effectively and permanently by that of the conscript popular army, and not until then that national governments were in a position greatly to increase their financial expenditure for military "preparedness."

The intensified militarism was rendered practicable by industrial development. It was now practicable, as never before, Industriated to take a percentage of the total population of a alization and Aid to Militation of years, to feed and clothe and arm them, to transport and train them, and to pay the bills. In measure as a nation was industrialized, its machinery could relieve men from ordinary work, its factories could produce clothing and arms and military supplies of all sorts, its farms and foreign

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 268, 368.
² See Vol. I, pp. 343, 348, 68o.

³ See Vol. I, pp. 632-634, 668-669. It may be remarked that Russia employed a form of conscription from the time of Peter the Great and that the Russian army throughout the nineteenth century was—on paper—the largest in Europe. See Vol. I, pp. 363-364, 758.

shipping and canning industries could yield surplus foodstuffs, its railways (and later its motor cars) could carry soldiers en masse quickly and widely, and its industrial wealth could be utilized to provide necessary funds for maintaining a whole military establishment—officers and men, fortresses and firearms, artillery and engineering works, transportation and supply—in greater size and efficiency.

As industrial development furnished new possibilities for militarism, so the rise of popular nationalism led to the actual exploitation of those possibilities. From the ending Nationof the Napoleonic wars in 1815 down to the 1850's, while the Industrial Revolution was confined almost entirely to insular Britain and while liberals everywhere were becoming more vocal and imagining that their political, economic, and national ideals could be realized with comparatively little bloodshed, there had been a good deal of "pacifist" sentiment and propaganda. The France of Louis Philippe and Guizot had vied with the England of Cobden and Bright in pursuing pacific policies in Europe, and in most countries armaments had been somewhat neglected and military expenditure considerably lessened. But then had come, along with spreading industrialization, a series of sharp, explosive wars—the Crimean, the Influence Franco-Austrian, the American Civil, the German-Danish, the Austro-Prussian, the Franco-Prussian all occurring in the sixteen years between 1854 and 1870. And out of them appeared to emerge a new world, with big industry and big ambitions, with multiplying wealth, and with new Great Powers in Italy, the United States, and Germany. The very suddenness of the wars, the speed with which most of them were conducted, and the decisiveness with which they seemed to effect radical changes, were amazing novelties to Europeans and had profound consequences.

The Crimean and Franco-Austrian wars of the 1850's were fought by fairly large, but still "professional," armies. In the 1860's, however, both the United States and Prussia swelled their volunteer armies by resorting to conscription. The United States was enabled thereby to crush the Southern Confederacy and solidify itself, and Prussia, in turn, to defeat Denmark, Austria, and France and to erect the German Empire. Whence the lesson was obvious that, for warfare between modern "civilized"

states, general conscription was preferable to professional volunteering and quite as practicable. An even more consequential lesson was derived from the European wars of the 1860's, and particularly from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, namely, Apparent that a militarily "prepared" nation could make short Need of "Military Prepared" nation and that therefore every nation, for its own security, should be in constant state of military "preparedness," in peace-time as well as in war-time. These lessons were taken to heart, not only by European statesmen, but by the most influential classes and by a large part of the masses in Continental Europe.

Here, indeed, was an especially marked difference between the militarism of the new industrial era and that of earlier times. Formerly, military establishments had been the usual concern of monarchs and a professional class, and whenever conscription had been resorted to by a Russian tsar or a Prussian king, it had been met by their subjects with sullenness and sometimes with open hostility. Now, in an age of popular enthusiasm for nationalism and democracy, the masses could be counted upon to second, or at any rate to accede to, the military policies of their several

Popular Support and Participation national governments. If a nation, such as Germany or Italy, had recently won its freedom and unity by force of arms, then all its patriotic citizens, regardless of class, felt a responsibility for continuing an armed "pre-

paredness" which would preserve the nation's unity and freedom. If a nation, such as France, had recently lost territory and prestige through military defeat, then its patriotic citizens felt obliged to support a "preparedness" which would prevent further losses and eventually avenge defeat. If an empire, such as Russia or Austria-Hungary, had recently been threatened by revolts of "subject" peoples, then its ruling nationality more readily accepted a "preparedness" which would safeguard its supremacy.

In the circumstances it is not surprising that the majority of the Prussian parliament, who had bitterly opposed the extension of compulsory military training in their country in 1862, endorsed it with no little enthusiasm after it had proved its worth in the wars against Denmark in 1864 and against Austria in 1866. Nor is it surprising that the Prussian military "reforms"—based

¹ See above, pp. 239-240.

upon the principle of "the nation in arms"—were speedily adopted by the other German states, becoming a permanent feature of the new German Empire, and were likewise imitated by Austria-Hungary in 1868, by France in 1872, by Russia in 1874, and by Italy in 1875. Even distant Japan organized a national army, on the new German model, Adoption in 1873. Almost every country aspiring to be a Great Power now armed itself as it had never been armed before, and the lesser Powers on the Continent of Europe increased their armaments, made them more efficient, and spent larger sums of money on them. Great Britain, alone among the Great Powers of Europe, retained a relatively small, professional army,¹ but her expenditure on it rose from 87 million dollars in 1870 to 140 million in 1910.

Big armies and big military budgets thus became the order of the day in Europe from 1870 onwards. They were represented by statesmen and publicists, and accepted by the majority of people, as making for peace—as assuring "national defense." Actually, however, they rendered diplothe New matists more truculent in asserting the claims of rism their several nations to a share in the political and economic management of the world's affairs. They fed the spirit of public nationalism and incidentally enriched the private manufacturers of steel and firearms and explosives and other military supplies. And they produced an ever larger number of professional militarists—army officers or ex-officers, promoters of dependent industries, and super-heated patriots—who, by dwelling upon the armed strength of their nation's neighbors, heightened alarm and apprehension at home, or who, by bellicose utterances and boastful references to their own nation's "might," aroused distrust and hostility abroad. With the exception of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878,2 the major Powers of Europe really kept peace among themselves from 1871 to 1910, but the peace was an "armed peace." The new militarism was for Europe and for the world a sword of Damocles.

¹ The United States also, after the Civil War (1861–1865), reverted to the policy of maintaining a relatively small, professional army. It should be borne in mind that, alike in the case of Great Britain and in that of the United States, geographical location was an important factor in lessening popular feeling of need for big land armaments.

² See above, pp. 262-265.

To mounting national armaments on land were soon added huge national armaments on sea. These constituted the "navalism" which was a special nationalist response, from The New the 1880's, to the demands of neo-mercantilism and Navalism the new imperialism. To back up a merchant marine, to ensure the import of raw materials and foodstuffs and the export of manufactures, to "protect" traders and investors (and missionaries) in "backward" lands, to obtain and enlarge distant "spheres of influence," to advertise the goods and promote the prestige of a "progressive" people, it seemed highly desirable to the governments of industrialized countries, and to influential and interested patriots among their citizens, that the latest technological developments should be utilized for warships. In the 1880's France set out to "modernize" her navy, and at the end of the decade Great Britain, long the foremost maritime Power, acted upon the advice of a governmental commission of "experts" that "no time should be lost in placing the British navy beyond comparison with that of any two Powers." Germany, the United States, and Japan took to building large navies in the 1890's, and by the end of the century all the Great Powers had important fleets of warships. From 1870 to 1910, Great Britain's expenditure on sea-armaments rose from 55 million dollars to 200 million, and that of Germany and the United States from almost nothing to 120 million and 140 million respectively.

The new land militarism was menacing to Europe, but its sea counterpart, the new navalism, was disturbing to the whole world. Powerful navies were a threat not only; they were actually employed, especially after 1890, as the chief instrument in a series of imperialist wars in Asia, in Africa, in America, in the islands of the Pacific. They were the forceful means of "Europeanizing" the earth, and incidentally of aggravating the rivalry which ever larger armies made ever more acute among the Great Powers.

Thanks to the growth of nationalism, and thanks to the progress of industrialization and the accompanying accumulation of wealth, governments could go on increasing their armies and navies. By 1914 the "peace budgets" of the Great Powers called for military and naval expenditure representing an annual per capita payment by every person (man, woman, and child) of \$8.86

in Great Britain, \$8.67 in France, \$6.61 in the United States, \$5.23 in Germany, \$4.32 in Italy, \$3.48 in the Habsburg Empire, and \$3.04 in the (comparatively impecunious) Russian Empire. These figures, when we take the large populations of the several countries into account, are staggering and quite unprecedented. They witness to a significant aspect of the era in which industry expanded, liberalism waned, and economic nationalism and capitalistic imperialism came to the fore.

Heightening National Expenditure on rism and Navalism

3. PURSUIT OF SCIENCE

During the era from 1870 to 1910, no word in any European language was more widely used or more highly esteemed than "science." The word, to be sure, connoted several Impordifferent things. Basically, it meant factual "knowltance of Science edge," presumably of a precise and exact sort; and as in the most intellectuals of the era were intent upon gather-Era of Realism ing "facts"—about nature, about society, about politics, and about all kinds of phenomena—they talked about the knowledge they thus acquired as "natural science," or "social science," or "political science," or the "science" of medicine, psychology, history, comparative religion, or whatnot. All the arts and all branches of learning seemed to be in process of becoming "sciences."

In a more restricted sense, science meant "natural science" the knowledge of natural phenomena which could be derived from observation and experiment and coördinated by generalizations (or "natural laws"). But "natural science" involved at least three concepts more or less ings of "Science" distinct. There was, first, "experimental" or "pure" science: the observation and experimentation, the assembling and relating of data. There was, second, "applied" or "practical" science: the application of proven knowledge of physics and chemistry, for example, to the practical needs of technology, particularly to the advance of industry. There was, third, "philosophical" or "theoretical" science: the explaining of the nature of human life, and of the whole universe of matter and spirit, by reference to "natural laws."

"Pure" (or "experimental") science had been steadily developing since the so-called Intellectual Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. All that time, fundamental work had been done in mathematics, physics, and astronomy, and in the Continuing Vogue of "Pure" study of "natural history" had begun to yield significant data for chemistry, geology, zoölogy, botany, and medicine. Moreover, the rise of experimental science, especially the rise of Newtonian physics, had been attended by the vogue, in upper- and middle-class circles,

of a "philosophical" science which, as we know, had important bearing on the social and religious, as well as on the purely intellectual, aspects of the eighteenth-century "enlightenment." ²

"Applied" science had come to the fore more recently, as an accompaniment of the Industrial Revolution. Anyone who takes the trouble to re-read our chapter on the Industrial Revolution

New Vogue of "Applied" Science in Great Britain from 1770 to 1870 3 and the section in the present chapter on the strengthening of industry throughout the European world from 1870 to 1910 4 must be impressed with the manifold services rendered

to material progress by practical engineers, physicists, and chemists. From James Watt in the eighteenth century to Edison and Marconi in the twentieth, from the steam-engine to the cinema and the radio, every inventor and every mechanical contrivance was indebted to some professed scientist or to some accumulation of scientific data. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the record of applied science was imposing. Every industrial corporation was employing a staff of "experts" in engineering or chemistry. Every large-scale farmer was being advised by "authorities" on soils, crops, fertilizers, and stock breeding. Governments were calling for ever larger numbers of scientific practitioners in public works, public sanitation, and military and naval armaments. To meet the demand for scientists, new polytechnic schools were being established, while older universities were founding laboratories and faculties of applied science and institutes of industrial (and agricultural) research.

No longer was science an avocation of the upper and middle classes. It was now a most honorable, and fairly profitable, vocation for any person of talent; and the masses, as well as

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 497-505.

² See Vol. I, pp. 506-555.

³ See above, pp. 9-40.

⁴ See above, pp. 284-301.

the classes, were coming under the spell of science, at least of applied science. Everybody hailed each new device, each additional creature-comfort—electric lighting, the telephone, the Popularelectric tram, the bicycle, the sewing machine, the typewriter, the kodak, the motor car, the airplaneas still another triumph of "modern science." To intellectuals and would-be intellectuals, regardless of class, it seemed axiomatic that, through science, man was at last getting effective control of his physical environment and moving at accelerating speed toward the happy day when he would toil little in Science and play much. "Progress" had been a great, but somewhat vague, aspiration of "enlightened" persons in the eighteenth century. Toward the end of the nineteenth century it was a firm and generally accepted conviction. The nineteenth was enthusiastically described as the "wonderful" century.

The widespread popular interest in "science" arose primarily from the spectacular achievements of "applied" science. But as applied science manifestly depended more and more upon experimental science, it followed that the latter shared in the popularity of the former, and that pure scientists were venerated by many persons who did not fully comprehend the detailed subtleties of what scientists did.

At any rate, natural science, both experimental and applied, had many more professed exponents after 1870 than ever before, and their influence was appreciably greater. For, as the pursuit of natural science quickened, it not only enriched Quickthe content of physics and chemistry, geology and ening biology, but also stimulated a like development of Pursuit "social" studies-sociology and anthropology, economics and statistics, geography and history—which were now formally labelled, imitatively and a little ostentatiously, "social sciences." And incidentally it inspired some scientists and a goodly number of other persons to philosophize about "science" and to construct systems of thought which had even Ninewider and more profound consequences than the metteenthaphysics which had attended the advance of natural

Leaving philosophical science—and social science to be treated of in the following sections, we shall devote the present section to a summary of the major developments

science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Century Achievements in Pure Science

of experimental science during the nineteenth century. These developments are basic, not only to the applied science of which we have already treated in our accounts of European industrialization, but also to the newer currents of thought and action which flowed in upon Europe after 1870.

When the nineteenth century opened, two famous French professors—Lagrange and Laplace—were systematizing and developing in detail the work of preceding mathematics and astronomers since the time of Sir and Astronomy Lagrange (1736–1813), who had been official mathematician in turn to Frederick the Great of Prussia, to Louis XVI of France, and to the republican commission which in 1793 devised the metric system of weights and measures, had just perfected the calculus of variations and brought forth a fruitful theory of analytical functions (1797).

Lagrange Laplace (1749–1827), a close friend of Lagrange, ap-

Lagrange and plied his own mastery of analysis to astronomy: his Laplace Celestial Mechanics, published in five volumes from 1799 to 1825, provided convincing mathematical proof of the Newtonian doctrine of gravitation, and in another work he propounded the celebrated "nebular hypothesis" to account for the natural origin of the whole solar system.

In the footsteps of these French mathematical geniuses followed Urbain Leverrier (1811–1877), professor at the Polytechnic and director of the observatory at Paris. Leverrier showed by mathematical calculations that there must be a planet in the solar system beyond Uranus, and in 1846 a German astronomer actually observed through his telescope just such a planet, which was named Neptune, within a degree of the spot foretold.

In the main, research in mathematics and astronomy tended, throughout the nineteenth century, to be based on the Euclidean geometry of the ancient Greeks and to confirm the theories of Isaac Newton and other eighteenth-century scientists about the mechanical and demonstrably mathematical nature of the universe. Here and there, as early as the 1840's, questions were raised about the Euclidean geometry and foundations were laid for a different set of axioms, notably by a gifted German mathematician, Riemann (1826–1See Vol. I. p. 638.

1866).¹ But Riemann and the few who shared his views were voices crying in the wilderness. Not until the twentieth century were such unconventional ideas received with favor and utilized for an important revision of Newtonian physics and astronomy.

Physical and astronomical theory remained quite "Newtonian" throughout the nineteenth century. Experimental physics, however, underwent a much more specialized and utilitarian development, thanks largely to the concurrent Industrial Revolution from which it profited and to which it contributed. As the century proceeded, physicists devoted themselves more and more to practical problems in industrialization, to research in thermodynamics, in optics, in magnetism and electricity.

Thermodynamics, the physical science derived from the study of the motive power of heat, was essentially a nineteenthcentury product, an accompaniment of the use of steam-engines. Most earlier physicists had entertained dvnamics the idea that heat was a subtle imponderable fluid (called "caloric"), and it was not until the eve of the nineteenth century that the idea of heat as a mode of motion, rather than as a substance, was given an experimental basis. This was done by an interesting American—Benjamin Thompson (1753-1814) who as a "loyalist" 2 had quitted his native land in 1776 and after serving the British government had held high office in Bavaria and there received the title of "Count Rumford," by which he is commonly known. In 1798 Count Rumford Rumford presented to the Royal Society at London the findings and the of his Enquiry concerning the Source of Heat which is Nature excited by Friction. Rumford's contention was ably supported by Sir Humphry Davy,3 and later became the accepted premise of all thermodynamic theory. James Watt made some theoretical, as well as practical, contributions to the subject.4 and in 1824 N. L. S. Carnot, brilliant son of the famous French revolutionary war-minister, published a standard treatise, Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire and Machines fit to develop such Power, elaborating

¹Also by a remarkable Russian mathematician, Lobachevski (1793–1856), professor at the University of Kazan, who published a significant book on non-Euclidean geometry at Berlin in 1840.

² See Vol. I, p. 481.

³ See above, pp. 25, 31, 32.

⁴ See above, pp. 16-18.

⁵ See Vol. I, pp. 632, 634.

the thesis ("Carnot's principle") that the efficiency of a reversible engine depends exclusively on the temperatures between which it works.

Important researches in this field were made by two Britishers, Joule and William Thomson, and by a German, Helmholtz. James Joule (1818–1889), a wealthy brewer of Manchester and a master of experimentation, proved conclusively the invariable equivalence of heat, work, and chemical, electrical, and electromagnetic energies as measured in terms of their specifically appropriate units. He gave his name—joule—to the practical unit of energy. Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894), professor at various German universities, generalized Joule's results and established the "law" of the "conservation of energy," that the quantity of force which can be brought into action in the whole of nature is unchangeable, that it can be neither increased nor diminished. William Thomson (1824–Helmholtz 1907), best known by his later title of Lord Kelvin, and professor for many years at the University of Glas-Kelvin gow, generalized "Carnot's principle," in 1851, as the "law" of the "dissipation of energy," that, while the sum-total of energy is constant, the amount of available energy diminishes by a continual degeneration into non-available or "dissipated" heat.

As a further contribution to thermodynamics, Joule revived in 1857 the kinetic theory of gases, that they consist of minute Kinetic particles which move in straight lines with high average velocity, constantly encountering one another, and hence continually changing their individual velocities and directions. This theory was substantiated by ingenious experiments conducted by James Maxwell (1831–1879), the British physicist whose electrical researches we have already had occasion to note, and likewise by one of the greatest German physicists of the century, Rudolf Clausius (1822–1888), who concerned himself with many problems of thermodynamics.

Contemporaneously, physicists were studying the phenomena

Contemporaneously, physicists were studying the phenomena of light and advancing the science of optics. The pioneer here was a Frenchman, Augustin Fresnel (1788–1827), who as an engineer in the employ of Napoleon Bonaparte undertook optical researches in 1814 and later practically es-

¹ See above, p. 202.

tablished the wave-theory of light.¹ It was another Frenchman, however, Jean Foucault (1819–1868), who conclusively wave-validated the theory by showing, in 1850, that light Theory travels more slowly in water than in air and that its velocity in different media varies inversely as the refractive indices of the media.

The perfecting of lenses was an outstanding achievement of the 1840's and 1850's. To it, the development of photography contributed in no small measure. And from it came greatly improved cameras not only, but also telescopes of Lenses and microscopes and other optical instruments of inestimable service to chemistry and biology as well as to physics and astronomy. One of the most useful was the spectroscope, a telescope attached to a prism in such a way as to enable a person to study the spectrum. It was perfected in 1850–1860 through the joint labors of the distinguished German chemist, Bunsen,2 and Gustav Kirchhoff (1824–1887), professor of physics at Heidelberg and subsequently at Berlin. Their joint researches, moreover, showed how the spectroscope could be used for "spectrum analysis" of the chemical constituents of celestial bodies, and it was so used for the first time in 1868, revealing the presence in the solar corona of hydrogen, calcium, and helium.

Of all the developments of physical science in the nineteenth century, perhaps the most noteworthy, and certainly the most original, had to do with electricity. Electrical science Electricity really began in the second half of the eighteenth century with the work of Franklin,3 Galvani, and Volta.4 It was enormously forwarded in the first half of the nineteenth century by the researches, both theoretical and practical, of Ampère and Ohm and especially of Michael Faraday.⁵ Then, with the rapid exploitation of electricity for industrial purposes, there was correspondingly increased stimulus to scientific Magnetresearches into its nature and properties. About ism: Maxwell 1855 James Maxwell turned from his fruitful study of the kinetic theory of gases to an equally fruitful study of electro-

¹ This theory had been propounded by Huygens in the seventeenth century (see Vol. I, p. 499). Fresnel demonstrated it by experiments in refraction and by mathematical analysis.

² See above, p. 30, note.

³ See Vol. I, p. 502.

⁴ See above, p. 30. ⁵ See above, pp. 30-31.

magnetic phenomena. He conceived and gradually elucidated an epoch-marking theory of electromagnetism, relating optics to electricity and holding that light-waves are the same in kind as those by which electromagnetic oscillations are propagated through the ether. Maxwell's great treatise on the subject appeared in 1873.

In the 1880's, Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894), a pupil of Helmholtz, finally established Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light on an experimental foundation and derived from it, as we have already learned, the principles which were utilized by Marconi in his invention of wireless telegraphy. In the 1890's, Joseph Thomson, in his celebrated research laboratory at the University of Cambridge, was investigating the conduction of electricity through gases and sharing with a Dutch physicist, Hendrik Lorentz (1853–1928), the fame of formulating the "electron theory." Concerning "electrons," and also concerning "atoms" and "molecules"—those basic concepts of nineteenth-century physics—we shall presently say more when we deal with chemistry.

Quite as significantly, certain curious forms of radiation were discovered toward the close of the nineteenth century. Wilhelm von Röntgen (1845–1923), director of the physical institute at Würzburg (in Germany) discovered the highly useful "X-rays" (or "Röntgen rays") in 1895. Henri Becquerel (1852–1908), professor at the Polytechnic in Paris, discovered radio-active properties in uranium in 1896. In 1898 Pierre Curie (1859–1906), professor of physics at Paris, working in conjunction with his even more famous Polish wife, Marie Sklodowska Curie (1867–1935), managed to extract radium from pitchblende, and thereafter both the Curies did much to make the world marvel at this newly found chemical element and at the essentially new science of radio-activity.

In chemistry, significant work had been done by Robert Boyle in the second half of the seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth century by Cavendish, Priestley, and especially Lavoisier.² In the nineteenth century, however, chemical science, like electrical science, was powerfully stimulated by the Industrial Revolution and underwent a very great development.

¹ See above, p. 292.

² See Vol. I, pp. 502-503.

Basic to nineteenth-century chemistry (and physics also) was the hypothesis, convincingly tested at the very beginning of the century, of the atomic and molecular constitution of matter. Since the time of the ancient Greeks, various philosophers and scientists had toyed with an idea

Atomic
Theory of the "atom" as one of the minute indivisible particles of which the whole universe might be composed, but it was not until the first years of the nineteenth century that the idea was clearly defined and firmly fixed in scientific usage. At this time. John Dalton (1766-1844), an English Quaker schoolmaster of Manchester, argued conclusively from the facts of definite chemical composition that every bit of matter consists of "atoms" and that the atoms of one chemical element are distinguished from those of another by different relative weights. Almost simultaneously Count Amadeo Avogadro (1776-1856), an Italian nobleman and professor of physics at the University of Turin, demonstrated that gases consist of comparably minute particles, which he termed "molecules," and established the general fact, called "Avogadro's law," that "equal volumes of all gases, under the same conditions of temperature and pressure, contain the same number of smallest particles, or molecules."

For a time there was confusion, in chemical nomenclature, between the "atoms" of Dalton and the "molecules" of Avogadro. Gradually, however, the confusion was Atoms dispelled by using the word "atom" to define the and ultimate particles of simple elements, and the word Molecules "molecule" to denote gas particles and the ultimate particles of chemical compounds. Gradually, too, Dalton's conception of defining atomic weights as those of the definite combining weights determined by chemical analysis (or of chosen multiples of these) was carried into effect. And with gradually increasing knowledge of atomic weights as fundamental constants of chemistry, attempts were naturally made to connect them with the chemical and physical properties of the corresponding elements—valence, affinity, specific gravity, specific heat, etc. In 1869–1871 Dmitri Mendeléyev (1834– Mendeléyev's 1907), a Russian chemist and professor in the Uni-"Periodic versity of St. Petersburg, succeeded in relating such

data, and, on tabulating them, enunciated his "periodic law,"

in effect that there is a periodic sequence in the properties of elements arranged in the order of their atomic weights and that gaps in the sequence point to the existence of hitherto unknown elements. In fact, just as the prediction of Leverrier about another planet in the solar system had been fulfilled by the discovery of Neptune, so the "periodic law" of Mendeléyev was justified by the discovery of rare and hitherto unknown elements—gallium in 1871, scandium in 1879, and germanium in 1886.

Towards the close of the nineteenth century, the advance of electrical science served to complicate and modify prevailing ideas about atoms and molecules. As far back as 1756 Benjamin Franklin had spoken casually of "electric particles," and in the 1830's Michael Faraday had based some interesting experiments on an "atomic" theory of electricity, but the significance of this was long unperceived. Only in the 1890's did the "electron" appear as the ultimate particle of electricity, and then, through the researches of Lorentz and Joseph Thomson, arose the "electron theory," that the atoms themselves are not simple indivisible entities, but that they contain electrons. And not until the twentieth century, after 1910, was the "electron theory" fully worked out with revolutionary consequences to chemistry and physics—and to philosophy.

A specially practical achievement of nineteenth-century chemistry was the discovery of ways of making organic substances synthetically. This involved, of course, a repudiation of the conventional distinctions which had long obtained between inorganic and organic bodies, between the "kingdom" of minerals on the one hand and those of animals and vegetables on the other. Such a repudiation was clearly implied in the remarkable achievement of Friedrich Wöhler (1800–1882), physician and professor of chemistry in the University of Göttingen, who in 1828 demonstrated that urea, a substance hitherto thought of as purely animal, could be artificially produced by synthesis from the chemical elements of which it was composed. Wöhler collaborated with Liebig in many of the investigations preparatory to the latter's celebrated contributions to the science of soils and

¹The word "electron" was introduced by Dr. Johnston Stoney in 1891 to designate the elementary electrical charge.

fertilizers; ¹ and their work was fundamental to the subsequent expanding production of synthetic dyes, synthetic drugs, synthetic rubber, and synthetic goods of all sorts. Moreover, the great chemical laboratory which Liebig founded at Giessen in 1826 was the prototype of a host of chemical laboratories which governments and universities, industrial corporations and private "foundations," soon put up all over Europe and America, and in which the practical, as well as the theoretical, side of chemistry was stressed.

A characteristic development of nineteenth-century chemistry was in electrolysis and thermodynamics. Davy and Faraday, early in the century, had decomposed substances by electric current, and on the foundations of electrolysis which they thus laid, many chemists of the next generations built ever larger superstructures. Electroplating, electrotyping, and similar industries were steadily advanced by chemists as well as by physicists. Then, too, in the 1880's, Van't Hoff, a Dutch chemist, brilliantly applied the principles of thermodynamics to chemical reactions, and during the next two decades the scientific progress of the century in this field was gathered up and systematized by him and others.

Chemistry, let us emphasize, was intimately associated throughout the nineteenth century with manifold progress in the industrial arts. It contributed a vast deal to the efficiency of all forms of motive power, to the Industrial Chemistry bleaching and dyeing of textiles, to the utilization of cellulose, to agriculture and food preservation, to the refining of petroleum and the production of rubber goods, to the instrumentalities for waging modern war; and all these arts, in turn, stimulated the growth of chemical science. "Chemical engineering" gradually became an important branch of general engineering, and along with "physical chemists" and "electrochemists" emerged "bio-chemists." For chemistry in the nineteenth century was an ally, not alone of physics, but of biology, physiology, medicine, surgery, and Chemistry sanitation; and its findings were serviceable not only to industrialists and militarists, but likewise to promoters of public health and conservers of human life.

One of the greatest chemists of the century, Louis Pasteur ¹ On Liebig and his contributions, see above, p. 39.

this French scientist who first clearly explained the nature of, and gave the name to, bacteria, the microscopic organisms that are everywhere, in air, water, and earth, and that are the cause of many maladies. His painstaking observations and experiments really inaugurated aseptic surgery and revolutionized medical science. His studies of fermentation opened a new era in the brewing and wine-making industries. His practical researches enabled growers of silkworms to stamp out a dreadful plague which threatened the destruction of the French silk industry. And throughout the world, the success of his endeavors to reduce the mortality of infants and to find a cure for the dread disease of hydrophobia are today witnessed respectively in the "pasteurization" of milk and in the treatment of rabies at "Pasteur Institutes." Pasteur, as we shall presently see, was only one, albeit the greatest, of nineteenth-century scientists who related chemistry to biology and medicine.

Back in the eighteenth century, it had been usual to lump together all such natural sciences as were not strictly mathematical and physical (or chemical) and label them collectural tively as "natural history." In the second half of that century, there had been some specialization in botany and zoölogy, geology and mineralogy, but it was not apt to be the very detailed specialization which is nowadays common, and its exponents continued, well into the nineteenth century, to think of themselves as dealing with generic "natural history." Such was certainly the case with certain famous scientists of Outstanding "Natural the first part of the nineteenth century, who summarized and interpreted, and sometimes added to, the previously acquired knowledge of animals and plants and earth. Of these "naturalists," four are particularly noteworthy—Lamarck, Cuvier, Humboldt, and Agassiz.

Jean Baptiste de Lamarck (1744–1829) was a French nobleman who studied medicine at Paris, became interested in meteorology and chemistry, and eventually devoted his great talents to botany and zoölogy. In 1778 he published a learned essay on French Flora. In 1788 he was appointed assistant in botany, and in 1793 professor at the zoölogical garden

¹ Huxley estimated the money value of the results of these researches as equal to the whole war indemnity paid by France to Germany for the war of 1870–1871.

in Paris. The researches and observations of a lifetime he embodied in his Natural History of Invertebrate Animals (1815-1822), a work celebrated not only for its detailed scientific information but also for the general evolutionary theory underlying it, a theory of developmental relationship among all forms of life, a theory which was to exercise an ever greater fascination for nineteenth-century biological science and distinguish it markedly from that of earlier times. The doctrine of evolution as set forth by Lamarck comprised four "laws": (1) Life by its very nature tends continually to increase the size of every body possessing it up to a limit which life itself trine of Evolution sets; (2) A new need continually making itself felt in a body tends to produce a new organ in that body; (3) The development of organs is in constant ratio to their use; (4) Whatever has been acquired or changed in the organization of a living body is conserved by generation and thus transmitted to its descendants.1

Georges Cuvier (1769–1832) was another French naturalist of very great ability, with broad interests and extraordinary powers of observation and classification. Becoming professor of natural history at the Collège de France in 1799, under Napoleon Bonaparte, he was rewarded in 1831 with a peerage by Louis Philippe for the volumes which in the meantime he had published on geology and zoölogy, each a classic in its field: Researches on the Fossil Remains of Quadrupeds (1812), Discourse on the Changes in the Earth-Surface (1824), and The Animal Kingdom Classified according to Organization (5 volumes, 1817–1830).

Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859), Prussian nobleman and brother of the statesman Wilhelm von Humboldt,² was at once a product of eighteenth-century philosophical "enlightenment" and a forerunner of the nineteenth-century organizers and conductors of "scientific expeditions" in quest of "specimens" for botanical and zoölogical gardens. He made scientific trips to England and through Switzerland and Italy. He pursued scientific investigations for many years at Paris

¹ It should be noted that these "laws" of Lamarck are much vaguer and more general than the later evolutionary doctrine of Darwin, and that the fourth—the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics—is extremely questionable. See below, p. 348.

² See Vol. I, pp. 681, 698, 723.

and for many other years at Berlin. He led an especially famous scientific expedition in 1799-1804 all over South America, observing and collecting data about volcanoes, climate, manners and customs of the people, appearance and habits of birds, fishes. and reptiles, trees and shrubs. Humboldt was a father of the science of climatology, and the idea of "isothermal lines" in geography was his. But he was no narrow specialist, and the breadth of his knowledge, as well as the charm of his personality and the liberality of his purse, made him, next to Napoleon Bonaparte, the most famous European of his day. When he was an old man, between the ages of 76 and 90, he wrote and published a remarkable work, Cosmos, summarizing the whole scientific knowledge of the time and undertaking to demonstrate the existence of a supreme unity amid the complex details of natural phenomena. The *Cosmos* was at once a useful scientific encyclopedia and a highly imaginative conception of the universe; and its picturesque, almost poetical, style commended it to a romantic age.1

Louis Agassiz (1807-1873) was born in Switzerland, the son of a Protestant pastor. Educated at various German universities in medicine, he became interested in the study of fish, writing scientific treatises on the fishes of Brazil and on those Agassiz of central Europe, and then, turning to the study of fossil fishes, he wrote on them and presently on geology. His Study on Glaciers (1840) was particularly significant. In 1846 Agassiz removed to the United States, becoming an American citizen, professor at Harvard, and a recognized authority on the "natural history" of his adopted country. In the last year of his life, he obtained funds from a wealthy New Yorker for the establishment of the famous laboratory for research in marine zoölogy at Wood's Hole (in Massachusetts). This, of itself, was a sign that by the 1870's traditional "natural history" was being supplanted by systematic geology, botany, zoölogy, and physiology. Agassiz was among the last of the "naturalists" and the first of the "icthyologists."

Geology was raised to the status of an independent science,

¹ The first volume of Humboldt's *Cosmos*, it is interesting to note, inspired Edgar Allan Poe to write his "prose-poem" *Eureka*.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Alexander von Humboldt, from a painting by a German artist, Julius Schrader (1815–1890).





Arthur Tchopenhaucr.

and immensely forwarded, by Sir Charles Lyell (1797-1875), the son of a Scottish botanist and a Dante scholar. Lyell was trained as a lawyer, but showed a bent for natural science while he was still a student at Oxford. He definitely abandoned law for geology in 1827, and three years later he began the publication of his classic *Principles of Geology*, an attempt to explain the former changes of the Earth's surface by reference to causes now in operation. The central thesis of this work was not essentially different from that of James Hutton's book (published back in 1785), but it was expressed more entertainingly and supported by a much greater wealth of convincing data. Altogether, Lyell succeeded in persuading his scientific contemporaries that the continuous operation of observable geological processes—volcanoes pouring out vast masses of molten rock, rivers wearing away their banks and depositing strata which could naturally be transformed into sandstone, earthquake shocks producing faults in the rocks, vegetation preparing future coal-beds, land almost everywhere either rising or sinking—would suffice, over a very long period of time, to explain how the surface of the earth had assumed its present physical appearance. Lyell's Principles was extremely influential. Between 1830 and 1872 it went through eleven editions, each enriched with new material and with the results of riper thought. To Lyell's basic contributions to geological science were added

the work of Cuvier and Agassiz on fossils and the latter's study of glaciers (1840). And as more scientists devoted themselves to gathering information about fossil remains and their relationship to the rock or silt in which they were found, geology soon gave rise to the specialized branch of palæontology, and it became possible to reconstruct in rough outline the story of "prehistoric" geological ages in which now extinct species of animals and plants had flourished, or still ex-

tinguish a "palæolithic" age from a "neolithic."

Gradually, too, evidence came to light that man himself had existed in "prehistoric" geological ages. In 1846 a French customs officer, Jacques Boucher de Perthes (1788–1868), who de-

tant species had occupied wider habitats, and gradually to dis-

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 503-504.

Note. The portrait opposite is of Arthur Schopenhauer, from the painting by Julius Hamel (1834–1899). On Schopenhauer, see below, p. 366.

voted his leisure to somewhat amateurish geological investigations, announced that he had found, in the gravels Discovery of the Somme valley, along with fossil remains of of "Pre-historic" elephant and rhinoceros, certain flints bearing marks Man of human handiwork. In 1857 the actual remains of a "prehistoric" man-what Boucher de Perthes termed "antediluvian man"—were unearthed in the Neander valley near Düsseldorf (in Germany). In 1868, four skeletons of Boucher a different kind of "prehistoric" man-taller and with đe Perthes larger skulls—were discovered in a cave at Cromagnon (in southwestern France). Subsequent research demonstrated that both "Neanderthal" and "Cromagnon" races had been fairly widely distributed at different early ages throughout Europe. It should be borne in mind that all these discoveries and all this research stimulated a remarkable development of anthropology and at the same time strengthened the credibility of current evolutionary teachings of biology.

The word "biology" was introduced into scientific nomenclature by Gottfried Treviranus (1776-1837), a German physician and naturalist, and for many years professor of mathe-6. Biology matics in the gymnasium at Bremen, who published in 1802-1805 a work with the title Biology, or Philosophy of Living Nature. In this work the author maintained that simple forms, which he termed "zoöphytes," were "the primitive types
from which all the organisms of the higher orders had Treviarisen by gradual development," and he laid down as TATILS a fundamental principle "that all living forms are the result of physical influences which are still in operation, and vary only in degree and direction." In an effort to substantiate his theories, Treviranus assembled and systematized a mass of anatomical and physiological data and published the results in 1831 as Appearances and Laws of Organic Life.

A landmark in biology was provided by the work of a physician, Karl Ernst von Baer (1792–1876), in embryology. Baer, son of Baer and a German landlord in Russian Estonia and successively director of the zoölogical museum at Königsberg and librarian of the Academy of Sciences at St. Petersburg, studied the reproduction of mammals, and pointed out in a celebrated (and revolutionary) Letter on the Egg of Mammals and Man (1827) that human beings, in common with all other

mammals, reproduce by fertilization of eggs just like birds and fishes and reptiles. In 1828 Baer published the first volume of his History of the Development of Animals, the first important scientific treatise on comparative embryology, in which he described the human ovum as one two-hundredth of an inch in diameter and nowise different in appearance from other animal eggs in their earliest stages.

The accuracy and range of the later work of Baer and of all other biologists were greatly enhanced by the notable improvement which physicists effected in the 1830's in the Microcompound microscope and which we have already menscopic tioned in another connection. Just as the earlier invention of the telescope had enabled astronomers to explore the "infinitely great" in distant mysterious space, so now the development of the microscope enabled biologists to behold the "infinitely little" in nearby commonplace things. And the more the biologists beheld, the less commonplace did nearby things appear.

One of the outstanding scientists whose use of the new microscopy proved epochal was Theodor Schwann (1810–1882), a native of Rhenish Prussia, a disciple of Johannes Müller, and for many years professor of anatomy at the universities of Louvain and Liége (in Belgium). Schwann, with and the the aid of the microscope, discovered the organic nature of yeast in 1837 and formulated in 1839 the very important "cell theory," that all living things originate and grow in very small structural units, or "cells." Further investigation by other physiologists confirmed the cell theory of Schwann, but added to it, in the 1840's and 1850's, the conception of "cells" as not being ultimate entities in themselves but as containing vital entities—to the matter of which the suggestive name of "protoplasm" was conventionally accorded.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, microscopy and its attendant quickening of biological research had extraordinary consequences, not only for physiological theory but also for the practice of medicine and surgery. Before taking up these matters, however, let us consider another kind of epochal contribution which mid-century biology (including zoölogy and botany) made to subsequent scientific thought—a contribution conveniently designated as "Darwinism," and originating in the independent

labors of two eminent "naturalists"—Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) and Charles Darwin (1809-1882).

Darwin, born at Shrewsbury (in England) of middle-class stock ¹ and sent to Edinburgh to study medicine and thence transferred to Cambridge for training as a clergyman of the

Darwin
and His
Search
for Explanation
of the
Variation
of Species

Anglican Church, displayed in his youth but one ambition—to become a great scientist. In his twenty-third year, with the reluctant consent of his family, he abandoned the clerical calling and embarked as a "naturalist" on a surveying vessel, the *Beagle*. He was gone for five years (1831–1836) on a voyage through the South Sea islands and along the South

American coasts, observing and gathering "specimens." His observations led him to ponder upon the possibility of attributing variations of species to differences of environment and of natural needs. For several years after his return to England, Darwin was engaged in detailed study along the numerous lines of scientific enquiry suggested by the expedition of the Beagle. He was particularly struck by Lyell's Principles of Geology, which was already spreading the idea that vast changes could be brought about by natural processes and was thus paving the way for a natural explanation of biological evolution. He was also struck by Malthus's Essay on Population,2 which had argued that the increase (or decrease) of population is related to a struggle for existence among mankind. Why, thought Darwin, could not the principle of Malthus be extended to the whole organic creation and utilized to explain the variation of species? In 1842 he wrote out a sketch of such a theory of evolution, which two years later he expanded into a pretentious essay, but not until fourteen years thereafter did he publish his theory, and then only when Wallace had independently arrived at the same hypothesis.

Wallace, a considerably younger Englishman, had begun his career as a land surveyor and architect and then, becoming interested in plants and beetles, had served as "naturalist" on scientific expeditions to the Amazon (1848–1850) and through the East Indies (1854–1862). In

¹ His paternal grandfather was Dr. Erasmus Darwin, an eighteenth-century post and botanist, and his maternal grandfather was Josiah Wedgwood, the well-known porcelain manufacturer.

² See above, pp. 69, 70.

. 1858, while he was on the latter and was lying ill with fever at Ternate, in the Moluccas, he too began to think of Malthus's Essay on Population (which he had read several years previously); and the idea of the survival of the fittest flashed over him. In two hours he "thought out almost the whole of the theory," and in three evenings he embodied it in an essay, which he promptly mailed to Darwin as the best known naturalist of the day.

Darwin in England at once recognized his own theory in the manuscript which he received in June 1858 from the young scientist in the tropics. "I never saw a more striking coincidence," he wrote to Lyell; "if Wallace had my ms. sketch written out in 1842, he could not have made a better short abstract! Even his terms now stand as heads of my chapters." Darwin no longer hesitated to proclaim the theory. He read his own essay and that of Wallace before a learned society in London, and the so-called Darwinian hypothesis of evolution was launched.

Darwin's ideas were explained at length in his chief book, published in 1859, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life, and were subsequently elaborated in certain particulars in his Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871), and in numerous other publications by him in the 1860's and 1870's. The central idea of Darwin—his doctrine of "evolution"—was that animal and vegetable species, in their present very diverse forms and aspects, are not immutably fixed as results of separate special acts of creation but are different and changing natural outcomes of a common original source. Darwin's ideas as to how such change and differentiation took place were threefold: "natural selection," "sexual selection," and "inheritance of acquired characteristics."

Of these, the first—"natural selection"—was most stressed, and may briefly be summarized as follows. The pressure of the struggle for life favors those individuals in each species which possess particular variations from the normal type that are of direct advantage to them in their surroundings. Such individuals tend to survive at the expense of their fellows, and to produce offspring. The new generation shows variation also, and, once more, those individuals which depart from the ordinary in the most useful way have a better chance of survival than the others. Thus, gradually,

after the lapse of long periods of time, differences so far accumulate in the descendants of each one of the original type that really new types, or species, may be formed—an inevitable result of minute and almost imperceptibly accumulated variations.

As for "sexual selection," Darwin explained the development of colors and structures peculiar to one sex as the result of its natural selection by the preferences of the other sex. And, to strengthen his whole argument for evolution, he took over from Lamarck the notion that acquired characteristics are transmitted hereditarily.

We must here notice certain limitations to the novelty or accuracy of "Darwinism." The general idea of "evolution" was not new. No one could fail to perceive that there were "Darwinism" in resemblances among all forms of life; and that these Its Hisresemblances might be traced to some form of evolutorical tionary development had been urged, before Darwin or Wallace, by Lamarck at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and, for the matter of that, had been suggested very much earlier, for example, by St. Augustine in the fourth century A.D., and by Anaximander in the sixth century B.C. Moreover, Darwin's doctrine of the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics, which he borrowed from Lamarck, has been seriously questioned by later biologists, and his theory of "sexual selection" has been dismissed as unimportant. Even his hypothesis of "natural selection" has had to be refined and modified in the light of more recent studies. We now know that Darwin underrated the great complexity of the problem of life.

Yet we must point out, even more emphatically, that "Darwinism," unlike earlier concepts of evolution, was quite specific and vogue of Darwin- "scientific" and "materialist" age, just when the way to its reception had been prepared by a host of naturalists. It was sponsored by a most respected scientist and backed by his painstaking protracted researches. It not only assumed an evolution in nature but offered a plausible explanation of how such evolution takes place.

Darwin's work was soon supplemented by publications of Wallace—Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection (1871),

Geographical Distribution of Animals (1876), and Darwinism ¹ (1889)—and was reënforced by the researches and convictions of several contemporary scientists. Sir Charles Lyell, the geologist, accepted "Darwinism" in his Antiquity of Man (1863). Sir Joseph Hooker (1817–1911), director of the Kew Gardens in England, and Asa Gray (1810–1888), professor at Harvard University in America, were two leading botanists who became "Darwinian." And among particularly spirited and uncompromising apostles of "Darwinism" were two famous biologists: the Englishman Thomas Huxley (1825–1895) and the German Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919).

Huxley, after a training in medicine and surgery, earned a notable scientific reputation by accompanying an expedition of naturalists in 1846–1850 and making a careful study of the surface life of the tropical seas. Subsequently, he served as official naturalist to the English Geological Survey and carried on important original research in palæontology. With a good deal of sound knowledge about biology, Huxley combined an aggressive personality and a signal literary talent—all of which he utilized in defense of "Darwinism." He was "Darwin's bulldog," he said; and in Man's Place in Nature (1863) he emphasized, with square-jawed pugnacity, that aspect of the new evolutionary teaching which pointed to the purely natural development of man himself from lower forms of life.

Haeckel, trained also in medicine, and professor of zoölogy for many years at the Prussian University of Jena, was the first outstanding scientist on the Continent of Europe to adhere fully to Darwin's doctrine of organic evolution. His General Morphology (1866) represented a suggestive attempt to work out and apply the doctrine in detail, and for many years afterwards his studies, his lectures, and his fastflying pen alike contributed to the popularizing of "Darwinism." Haeckel presented to the international zoölogical congress at Cambridge in 1898 a "genealogical tree" of the relationship between the various orders of animals, tracing the descent of the human race in twenty-six stages from simple structureless bits of protoplasm through the chimpanzees and the "pithe-

¹ Against Darwin, Wallace contended that the origin of man, unlike that of other animals, cannot fully be explained by "natural selection." Wallace also expressed dissatisfaction with Darwin's hypothesis of "sexual selection."

canthropus erectus" 1 to "primitive man." Haeckel was quite dogmatic about his "tree," but other scientists have been more dubious.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the best-known biologists, botanists, and zoölogists-and, indeed, the majority of all scientists—were proceeding on general Darwinian Later assumptions. But already two lines of research were Scientific Questionraising serious questions about certain of those asing of sumptions. One line was that pursued by August Darwinism Weismann (1834-1914), professor of zoölogy at Freiburg (in southern Germany), who reached the conclusion, set forth in his Essays upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems (1889-1892), that heredity consists of the transmission of pure germ plasm in germ cells which have nothing to do with acquired characteristics. Weismann's germ theory, with Weismann and its attendant denial of the hereditary transmission of Acquired acquired characteristics, was hotly contested by Characteristics Haeckel and a goodly number of other strict "Darwinians." but the more it was investigated, the more it was accepted, so that gradually, and especially after 1900, it brought about widespread scientific dissent from that part of Darwin's evolutionary doctrine which he had derived from Lamarck.

The other modifying line of research was inaugurated earlier, and only a little time after the appearance of "Darwinism," by Gregor Mendel (1822-1884), a native of Austrian Mendel Silesia, an Augustinian monk, and eventually abbot of the monastery at Brünn (in present-day Czechoslovakia). Mendel, not satisfied that Darwin's view of natural selection was sufficient to explain the formation of new species, undertook a series of experiments in the garden of his monastery on the cross-breeding of peas. He published his results in the volumes of a local scientific society, where they lay buried De Vries and for more than thirty years. Their rediscovery in 1900 Bateson by a distinguished Dutch botanist and professor in the University of Amsterdam, Hugo de Vries (born 1848), and

^{1 &}quot;Pithecanthropus erectus" was the name given to a creature, then supposed to be the "missing link" between man and the anthropoid apes, which was imaginatively reconstructed in the 1890's from a thighbone, two teeth, and a skull-cap which were dug up in the East Indian island of Java by a medical officer in the Dutch army, Dr. Eugene Dubois. No one knows whether the disinterred remains belonged to one and the same skeleton.

their confirmation and extension by him and by other scientists, including an outstanding English biologist, William Bateson (1861–1926), had revolutionary consequences. De Vries published his Mutation Theory in 1901 and Bateson a brilliant summary of Mendel's Principles of Heredity in 1902. These works, together with Mendel's original contributions, established "Mendelianism" not only as a practical aid to scientific breeding of plants and animals but also as a very important amplification and amendment of evolutionary theory. For the essence of Mendelianism is that in heredity certain characters may be treated Invariable

as indivisible and apparently unalterable units, thus introducing into biology what may perhaps be termed an atomic conception ¹ and greatly complicating the prob-

Invariable Elements in Heredity

lem as to how an organic evolution of different species actually occurs. Such complication was not apparent, however, until after 1900, and in the meantime undiluted "Darwinism" had its day, and a very big day it was.

Second only to the development of the evolutionary aspects of biology, in nineteenth-century popular interest, was the parallel (and increasingly connected) progress of physiol-7. Physiogy and medical science. The founder of the newer ology and Medical scientific physiology was Johannes Müller (1801–1858), Science professor of anatomy and physiology at the University of Berlin and a peculiarly inspiring teacher. His Handbook (1833-1840) was a classic: it treated of the whole field of human physiology in a highly scientific spirit and with due attention to the latest discoveries in related fields; and it broke fresh ground in its detailed tracing of the nervous system and the functioning of the senses. Another eminent physiologist was Claude Bernard (1813-1878), a Frenchman, who gave up the writing of dramas to study medicine

and became professor at the Sorbonne and director of the laboratory at the Botanical Gardens in Paris. He discovered the vaso-motor system and also opened up the vast subject of glands and internal secretions.

A prime service to medical and surgical science (and dentistry) was rendered by the development of anæsthetics. The anæsthetic qualities of nitrous oxide (so-called "laughing gas") were discovered by Sir Humphry Davy in 1800, and those of ether by

¹ Related to that of the "chromosomes," on which see below, p. 1112.

Michael Faraday in 1818. These discoveries remained scientific curiosities, however, until 1842, when an American physician, by the name of Crawford Long, privately performed an operation under ether at a town in Georgia.¹ In 1847 James Simpson, a Scottish physician and professor at the University of Edinburgh, announced his discovery of the anæsthetic properties of chloroform. The use of all these anæsthetics spread speedily in Europe and America, and was later supplemented by the employment of cocaine for local anæsthesia.

It may here be remarked that dentistry became a science, as well as an art, in the nineteenth century. The filling of dental cavities with lead had been fairly prevalent since the seventeenth century and the making of plates of false teeth had notably developed in the eighteenth century. In 1855–1856 Charles Goodyear patented in England a process for constructing plates upon a base of vulcanized rubber. The first institution for the systematic education of dentists was established in 1840 at Baltimore, and bacterial origin of decay in teeth was established by scientific research at Berlin in 1884.

One of the greatest and most significant surgeons of the century was Joseph Lister (1827-1912), the founder of aseptic surgery. The son of an English scientist who improved Lister and the compound microscope, he studied physiology at Aseptic Surgery the University of London and began the practice of surgery at Edinburgh in 1853. Then, becoming professor of surgery at Glasgow, he proceeded in 1865 to experiment with carbolic acid as a safeguard against the infections which had usually attended surgical operations. His experiments were strikingly successful, and in 1867 he published an account of them to the world in a paper On a New Method of Treating Compound Fracture, Abscess, etc. In addition to this fundamental contribution to modern aseptic surgery, Lister introduced the use of carbolized catgut for surgical sewings and conducted important researches in bacteriology. He occupied the chair of clinical surgery at Edinburgh from 1869 and at London from 1877; in 1891 he helped to establish the celebrated Lister Insti-

¹The state of Georgia has commemorated Long's achievement by placing a statue of him in the Capitol at Washington.

tute of Preventive Medicine. A grateful British government honored him with a baronetcy in 1883 and with a peerage in 1897.

At the very time when Lister was experimenting with carbolic acid and laying the foundations for aseptic surgery, the great French chemist Pasteur was proving that the yeast plant is the agent of alcoholic fermentation and that and Bacteriology other small organisms are the agents of other familiar fermentations. Thence Pasteur was led to study abnormal and "diseased" fermentations, and thereby to discover microbes as the cause of disease and to inaugurate a veritable revolution in medical science. Pasteur's work in bacteriology was supplemented, in the field of preventive medicine, by the contemporaneous achievements of a distinguished German pathologist and politician, Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902). Professor of pathological anatomy and director of research in the Pathological Institute at Berlin, Virchow in his Cellular Pathology (1858) established what Lister described as the "true and fertile doctrine that every morbid structure consists of cells which have been derived from preëxisting cells as a progeny." Subsequently, he contributed much to our knowledge of particular diseases and took an active part in assuring to Berlin an excellent drainage system, scientific sewage disposal, and a pure water supply.

Some of the most startling triumphs of modern medical science were secured through the bacteriological researches of Robert Koch (1843–1910), a German physician, at Koch and first a medical army officer and afterwards a professor at Berlin. Koch found means of immunizing human against beings against certain dread diseases. One brilliant Disease step in this direction had already been taken by an English physician, Edward Jenner (1749–1823), who had discovered, at the close of the eighteenth century, that the scourge of smallpox could be gotten rid of by "vaccination," that is, by inoculating persons with the vaccine of cow-pox. On the sounder bacteriological basis provided by Pasteur, Koch was able to go much farther. In 1876 he obtained a pure culture of the bacillus of anthrax and in 1883 announced a method of preventive inocula-

¹ Virchow was a vigorous proponent of liberalism and a leading spirit in the "Progressive" party formed in Prussia in 1862 to defend political liberalism against the King and Bismarck. See above, pp. 228, 230–231, and below, pp. 602, 603.

tion against it. In 1883 he isolated the bacillus of Asiatic cholera.

The marvellous work of Koch stimulated widespread interest and much scientific practical progress in bacteriology. Within a comparatively short time, bacilli were detected of lockjaw, diphtheria, the bubonic plague, malaria, and sleeping-sickness, and methods were devised for inoculating persons against several such diseases. By the end of the nineteenth century, thanks to the development of bacteriology and aseptic surgery, medical science was concentrating upon the prevention even more than upon the cure of disease. Certain results were already obvious: a marked lessening of the scope and virulence of "plagues"; a sharp decline in infant mortality; and a considerable lengthening of the average span of human life.

All this advance in physiology and medical science, together with the rise of evolutionary conceptions in biology and the absorption of eminent naturalists in the behavior as well as in the structure of animals and plants, gave impetus to novel attempts to render human psychology a strictly phys-8. Physioical science. The leading figure in these attempts was logical Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), a native of Baden, a Psycholtrained physician and physiologist, and professor of philosophy successively at Heidelberg and at Leipzig. Wundt contended in his *Studies on the Theory of Sense Perception* (1852–1862) that the soul is not a separate entity or agent but ogy a particular class of bodily actions of a mechanical sort; and in his chief work, Foundations of Physiological Wundt Psychology (1872), he expounded at length the physical basis of thought and behavior, the affinity of human minds to those of the lower animals, and the experimental laboratory methods which should be pursued. These methods he exemplified and taught in the celebrated psychological laboratory which he opened at Leipzig in 1875, and before long they were common-places of the "science" of psychology in Europe and America.

Comparable with Wundt in range and influence was William James (1842–1910), an American physiologist and professor of psychology and philosophy at Harvard University. James was more interested in the dynamic than in the static aspects of physiological psychology, and in his Principles of Psychology (1890) he coined a famous phrase, aptly

describing the operation of the mind as "the stream of consciousness." He was not so rigidly mechanical as Wundt, and his broader interests were reflected in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), an original and suggestive "natural" interpretation of religious phenomena.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century the pervasive supposition that man's mind is biological and evolutionary was being industriously applied to animal psychology, to child psychology, to social psychology, and especially to the testing of "intelligence" and the treatment of criminals and Intellimadmen. The pioneer of "intelligence tests" was gence Tests Alfred Binet (1857–1911), who became director of the psychological laboratory of the Paris Sorbonne in 1894 and was called upon by the French government to devise tests for the investigation which it authorized in 1904 of the condition of mentally defective children in the public schools.

Among the growing number of psychologists—or "psychiatrists"—who concerned themselves with criminology, the most conspicuous was Cesare Lombroso (1836–1909), an Italian of Jewish extraction, professor of medicine, psychiatry, and criminal anthropology at the University of Turin. Lombroso referred all mental phenomena to biological causes, and held that the so-called "criminal" was not morally responsible for his acts, inasmuch as he was a special type of human being whom processes of degeneration and atavism placed midway between the lunatic and the savage. Though Lombroso's work has since been discredited, it gave marked impetus at the time to the extensive development of "psychiatry" and its practical application to problems of crime and insanity.

4. MATERIALISM, POSITIVISM, AND MARXIAN SOCIALISM

Just as the advance of natural science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had given rise to the metaphysical conceptions of the "Enlightenment," with significant consequences to social studies and political action,² so the proliferation of science

¹ James also sponsored a "natural" theory of "emotions"—that they consist ultimately of sensations. This theory, though still under experimental investigation, seems now quite definitely disproved.

² See Vol. I, pp. 497-555-

in the nineteenth century exerted no little influence upon the philosophy (and art), and upon political and social Philosmovements, current during the age of "realism" ophy in the Era of from 1870 to 1910. Of course, the "philosophical" Realism science of this latest era was much more complex, in formulation and in effect, than that of the eighteenth century, just as the "pure" science of the nineteenth century was much more elaborate than that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For, as may be gathered from the foregoing section, the nineteenth century witnessed not only a flowering of the mathematical and physical sciences which had budded previously, but also a novel swift growth, from seed to fruit, of the biological sciences.

If science in the nineteenth century was more elaborate, it was also more popular. There were more scientists, and greater opportunity for them to impress their spirit and findings on the public mind. Never before had there been such system tematic development of scientific instruction and retemporary search in universities and technical schools, such widespread teaching of science in secondary schools, such multiplication of scientific journals and scientific congresses, both national and international, or such profusion of articles on scientific subjects in encyclopedias, manuals, and the daily press. The era from 1870 to 1910 was "science-minded."

The "scientific realism" of the era was reënforced by ubiquitous evidences of rapid industrialization. Steel rails and steamship Connected lanes were girdling the earth. Factories and foundries and power plants, all with whirring machinery, were with Contemporary springing up like huge mushrooms. As mine shafts Industrialization went deeper into the ground, and exploitation of "natural resources" was carried farther afield, airplanes began to soar above the ground. Surely, man was acquiring a most marvellous mastery of nature. He was acquiring it, palpably, through natural science. And if he continued to cherish science, if he advanced it and applied it and resisted every temptation to minimize it, he could confidently expect that it would soon reward him with the millennial reign of material wealth and ease. Industrialization was the Cyclops of the age of science, and a direct begetter of the "materialism," with its creature-comforts, to which the science of the age gave birth.

"Scientific realism" received subsidiary support from certain political developments of which we have already spoken—neomercantilism, imperialism, and militarism. The military triumph and national unification of Germany in 1870–1871.

and national unification of Germany in 1870–1871 nicely synchronized with the development of large-scale industry within Germany and also with the rise of Germany's reputation as a leading scientific nation. In the circumstances, Germans would hardly

Connected with Contemporary Nationalism and Militarism

have been human if they had failed to ascribe their achievements not only to "Divine Providence" (as Bismarck was fond of doing) but also to their own merits and to the "natural law" of the "survival of the fittest." The war of 1870-1871 may have been accompanied by many symptoms of romanticism, but its outcome was connected, in Germany and elsewhere, with a novel "realism." It was not a dream but a reality, not an aspiration but a fact, that Germany by superior might had defeated France, appropriated Alsace-Lorraine, and become a Great Power. It seemed obvious, moreover, that only by the reality of big armaments could Germany (or any other Power) keep what she had taken, and France (or any other Power) recover what she had lost. And very "realistic" was the ensuing many-sided rivalry among industrial Powers, in armies and navies, in tariff-protectionism, in colonial expansion, in everything which would enhance the wealth of their respective nations and hence the strength and prestige of their respective governments. Such "realism" fed a state of mind responsive to "science." Not only did the new and forceful economic nationalism give wide currency to such biological slogans as "the struggle for existence" and "the survival of the fittest," but "progress"—
a most fascinating prepossession of the era—was interpreted, alike by scientists and by statesmen and publicists, as factual and essentially material. One could still dream about "progress," but it would be an earthly progress, a progress in science and in real, tangible things.

The word "materialism" may conveniently be used to designate the general nature of the philosophic thought which proceeded from nineteenth-century science, industry, and international rivalry and which exercised a very great rialism, influence during the era from 1870 to 1910. Materialism means a denial or ignoring of any spiritual conception of the

universe and an explanation of all phenomena by reference to the existence and character of matter. In this broad sense, many persons may be accounted "materialist" who were not at all philosophically minded and who ignored, rather than denied, the traditional dualism of "spirit" and "matter"—persons who were absorbed in "practical matters" of making money, directing banks, organizing industrial corporations, devising machinery, or otherwise "applying" science. Such persons had little time or inclination to think about the ultimates of human life and destiny.

Absorp—
Some of them might profess from habit a belief in the supernatural, but most of them were influenced, conphysical and sciously or unconsciously, by the materialism of the Natural "philosophical" science accompanying the experimental or applied science which they immensely (if somewhat vaguely) respected. Among them, and among most "scientific" philosophers too, it was not so much a question of dogmatically rejecting the spiritual as of exalting the physical and the material and confessing a complete agnosticism about the supernatural.

A considerable number of scientists carried on their researches and experiments without losing faith in the supernatural and without becoming "materialist." Indeed, there was never any sharp cleavage between "science" and "religion," and, as we shall presently see, several great scientists of the latter part of the nineteenth century were devoutly attached to the Catholic Church or to some other form of Christianity. Nevertheless, we must understand that many scientists of the period were frankly agnostic, and that their findings and publications gave impetus and direction, and no little authority, to philosophical speculation of a pronouncedly materialist sort.

Nineteenth-century progress in physics and chemistry seemed to confirm and illustrate with copious details the fundamental eighteenth-century notion of the universe as a huge machine functioning in accordance with immutable "natural laws"—laws at once mathematical and physical. It was now apparent that earth, sun, moon, and stars not only, but animals, vegetables, and minerals, light, heat, and electricity—all the phenomena of nature—were material things, composed of simple "elements" organized in atoms, molecules, cells, or other particles, and operating in a regular way under universal principles of gravitation, thermodynamics, periodicity,

etc. With telescope and microscope and spectroscope, the "matter," big and little, of the whole universe might be observed and its mechanical constitution demonstrated.

Beyond all this went the philosophical implications of nine-teenth-century "natural history." So long as "scientific" philosophy centred in Newtonian physics, as it had done during the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century, its apostles and disciples could marvel at the omnipotence and omniscience of the Deity who had been the Creator and Supreme Lawgiver of the universe and at the peculiar mental endowment of man which enabled him, alone among all God's creatures, to apply his "reason" to discovery of universal natural law. They could be "deists" and "rationalists." But now, in the and Irnineteenth century, evolutionary biology (and geology) shared with Newtonian physics the centre of the intellectual stage, and contributed to the rise of an even more radical philosophy, one more emphatically materialist, one which spurned deism and questioned rationalism.

It cannot be too emphatically stated that conceptions of historical growth and development, of "evolution," held a preeminent, and novel, position in nineteenth-century thought. This was exemplified by the writings on political and constitutional history, on legal and social and literary history, with which the century teemed and of whose "developmental" and "scientific" character we have already spoken. I It was exemplified, yet more tellingly, by the formulation and Evolving vogue of a whole series of evolutionary hypotheses Universe in the field of natural science. Laplace in his nebular hypothesis (1796) held that the solar system had been gradually evolved from a primeval hot nebula which, as it whirled in space, cast off parts that slowly cooled and shrank into the planets and moons, the sun remaining as a remnant of the original nebula. Lyell maintained (1830) that the physical features of the earth—oceans, continents, mountains, valleys had been formed by natural evolutionary processes and presented convincing proofs of the great antiquity of these processes and of man's existence on earth. Lamarck set forth (1815) an evolutionary doctrine of the common origin and gradual differentiation of all living things on the earth, and Darwin proposed

¹ See above, pp. 174-175, 179.

(1859) "natural selection" as the major explanation of how such evolution had actually taken place and had given rise, through a long lapse of time, to different species of plants and animals, including man. Baer showed (1827) that man, like other animals, grew from a tiny egg, and Wöhler lessened the distinction between the organic and the inorganic by demonstrating (1828) that animal substances can be created synthetically from mineral substances. As these and similar facts and theories gained ever wider and more influential acceptance, the tout ensemble was highly favorable to materialist philosophizing about man and the universe.

The so-called "social sciences" clearly revealed in the latter part of the nineteenth century a preoccupation with evolutionary investigations and a predilection for materialist explanations. We have already referred to the psychology of the period, Materito the teaching of Wundt that the human mind is alism and physiological and mechanical, and to the "scientific" the Social Sciences laboratory methods by which a host of succeeding psychologists sought to test evolutionary, materialist hypotheses of the behavior of animals, children, criminals, and madmen, society and religion. Lombroso, as we know, gave currency to the doctrine that both crime and insanity are natural evi-Psychology and Man's dences of physical disease or degeneration and that Man's "Animal criminals, not being responsible for their actions, Mind" should be treated in hospitals rather than punished.

Man's "animal mind" became a commonplace in "popular" psychology; and "pure reason" was toppled from the throne which it had occupied in eighteenth-century philosophy. Archæology and anthropology, like psychology, became "sci-

ences" in the nineteenth century and contributed much to the knowledge of "prehistoric" times and peoples and also to the confirmation of contemporary evolutionary philosophy and ophy. The honor of having been the "father" of Man's acceptance of the confirmation of contemporary evolutionary philosophy. The honor of having been the "father" of scientific archæology is usually ascribed to Winckelmann for his treatise (1762) on the excavations at Pompeii and Herculaneum; and on the eve of the nineteenth century an army officer participating in Napoleon's Egyptian campaign had discovered at Rosetta the famous stone with parallel Greek and Egyptian inscriptions by means of which Jean

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 534, 734.

Champollion (1790–1832) was enabled to decipher the latter and inaugurate the fruitful study of "Egyptology." As the nineteenth century advanced, archæological investigations were multiplied and greatly extended, accumulating a vast deal of information not only about classical Rome and Greece and ancient Egypt but also about early types of civilization in Mesopotamia and Palestine, Crete and Carthage, India and China, Mexico and Peru, and carrying back the story of mankind to hitherto unsuspected dates.

A particularly memorable stimulus to archæological research was supplied by Heinrich Schliemann (1822-1890), the romantic character of whose personal career gave added interest to the importance of his scientific discoveries. Schliemann, Schliethe son of a poor Protestant pastor in northern Gerand many, spent his youth as grocer's apprentice, as cabinboy on a boat plying to Venezuela, and as bookkeeper Troy in Amsterdam. With little or no formal schooling, he showed an aptitude and eagerness for pursuing linguistic and historical studies and for amassing a fortune which he could expend on such studies. He grew wealthy from business which he established at St. Petersburg, from military contracts which he made during the Crimean War, and from mining ventures which he embarked upon in California. In 1850 he became an American citizen, but in 1868 he settled in Greece and thereafter devoted himself and his large exchequer to the excavation of ancient remains. Schliemann identified and uncovered the site of legendary Troy, and he unearthed at Mycenæ and Tiryns ample evidence of a civilization in Greece antedating that of the historic "Greeks."

By the end of the nineteenth century, thanks to the labors of Schliemann and a host of other and abler (if less self-advertised) archæologists, it was possible to trace the material civilization of the Ægean lands, Egypt, and Mesopotamia back several thousands of years B.C. and to speak with some assurance of the history of India prior to the Aryan invasions. By this time, too, it was possible, thanks to the discoveries of "Neanderthal" and "Cromagnon" remains, to fashion some idea of human Neolithic life in a "neolithic age"—perhaps in a "palæolithic and Palæolithic age"—anywhere from 20,000 to 100,000 years B.C. The lithic discovery of "pithecanthropus erectus" in the 1890's Man only confirmed the tendency of the era. It seemed to indicate

that a half-human, half-apish being had existed half a million years ago; and archæologists intensified their search for "eoliths," for bits of stone so shaped as to suggest the rude handiwork of "dawn-men," of creatures descending from their ancestral trees and laboriously skilling themselves in the use of clubs and fist-hatchets. Archæology was a most helpful and fascinating handmaid to the geology of Lyell and the biology of Darwin.

It was similar with anthropology. In the eighteenth century there had been considerable interest in description and comparison of folk customs—an interest which was broadened and deepened by the ensuing romanticism and national-Anthroism—and there had been some "scientific" attempts pology and to differentiate the "races" of mankind and to connect Man's their peculiarities with their physical environment.1 In the nineteenth century, however, anthropology really flourished as an important specialized branch of science, dealing with "primitive" races and cultures, with heredity and environment, and maintaining a close liaison with archæology and philology—and, of course, with evolutionary philosophy. Among the numerous professional anthropologists of the century, mention may here be made of five: Prichard, Waitz, Galton, Tylor, and Frazer.

James Prichard (1786–1848), sometimes referred to as "the founder of modern anthropology," was an English physician who interested himself in ethnology and acquired scholarly reputation by his Natural History of Man (1843). Theodor and Waitz (1821–1864) became professor of philosophy in the University of Marburg (in Germany) in the year in which Prichard died; reacting strongly against Hegelian "idealism" and insisting that philosophy should be based on physiological psychology (of the Wundt variety), he was brought by his researches into touch with anthropology, and is chiefly remembered by his monumental treatise, in six volumes, on The Anthropology of Natural Peoples (1859–1864).

Francis Galton (1822-1911), a cousin of Charles Darwin, after study at the universities of London and Cambridge and extensive travel in Africa, was inspired by his cousin's Origin of Species to devote himself to anthropology, with special reference to heredity and the application of statistics to human attributes. Gal-

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 549, 813.

ton's researches provided a foundation for the subsidiary "science" of eugenics. By voice and pen he preached constantly the doctrine that heredity explains why some people are intelligent and "fit" while others are stupid and "unfit," and that therefore the "fit" should be encouraged to breed, while the multiplication of the "unfit" should be checked. He was a determined advocate of sterilization and birth-control—for the unfit and improvident. He believed that thereby man could direct his own evolution toward a higher plane and thus transform himself into superman. Galton was knighted in 1909, and with funds which he left a laboratory was founded for the scientific study of national eugenics.

Edward Tylor (1832–1917), the son of an English brassfounder and the brother of a distinguished geologist, was educated in Quaker schools and induced to become an anthropologist by a chance acquaintance he made while travelling in the United States for his health. His first book was a report on archæological and anthropological observations in Mexico. Gradually he widened the scope of his investigations; and the nature of his later interests is indicated by the title of his chief work, which he published in 1871 and which remained during the next forty years the standard textbook in anthropology, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Language, Art, and Custom. Tylor was the first professor of anthropology at Oxford and was knighted in 1912.

In Tylor's footsteps followed James Frazer (born 1854), a Scotsman, trained at Glasgow and Cambridge, a most persevering student, and a facile writer. Frazer specialized in primitive religion, collecting and presenting a prodigious number of bits of information about ancient ceremonies and beliefs and about popular superstitions (and suggesting an evolutionary relationship among them) in the comprehensive survey which he brought out under the title of The Golden Bough in 1890 and reissued subsequently in twelve volumes. Frazer was knighted in 1914.

By anthropologists like Tylor and Frazer, much was done to stimulate an interest in comparative religion and especially to spread the idea that all religion rests on myths. This idea was applied not only by anthropologists to primitive cults but also by a considerable number

of biblical scholars to historic Christianity. A conspicuous pioneer among such "scientific" critics of the Bible was David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874), a German, whose Life of Jesus (1835) assailed the inspiration of the New Testament and denied the miracles and other supernatural attributes of Christ. Strauss subsequently accepted Darwinism, and a group of his associates and disciples in the Protestant faculty of theology in the University of Tübingen (in Württemberg) became known as the "Tübingen school" of "higher critics" of the Bible and of all so-called revealed religion.

Another outstanding critic of Christianity and student of comparative religion was Ernest Renan (1823–1892), a Frenchman from Brittany, who was trained for the Catholic priesthood but abandoned Christianity in 1845 and devoted himself to science. He was impressed with the "certitudes" of physics and biology, and eager to apply the ideals of natural science to the study of oriental literature and comparative religion. He pursued researches in Palestine, a study of ancient languages, and drastic criticism of the Bible, gradually reaching the conclusion that the Scriptures and Christian creed and ritual were but a development—an evolution—of primitive folklore and superstition. The year after his appointment as professor of Hebrew in the Collège de France (1862), Renan published his celebrated *Life of Jesus*, lucid in exposition and felicitous in phrase, portraying the founder of Christianity as a pathetic self-deluded man.

Renan displayed none of the bitterness or sarcasm of an eighteenth-century Voltaire or Holbach. Rather, he heaved indulgent sighs for the beauty in what "science" must pronounce to be the "myth" of Christianity. Consequently, his attacks were more subtle and more influential. From his time, hundreds of scholars and thousands of students reckoned Christianity and all other existing "revealed" religions as evolutionary products of physiological psychology and viewed them as curious survivals of anthropological nature worship or "spirit" worship. Of certain effects of this tendency we shall say more in the next chapter.

In the meantime, we must emphasize the general philosophical bearings of what we have been sketching in this section—a mechanical universe, a physically evolving universe, an automatically forming solar system, earth, and life, a lessening distinction between the organic and the inorganic, an attribution of man's origin and of his mind, behavior, culture, and religion to physiological animal sources. One obvious deduction from all this was the philosophy of materialism, which reached its height during the ra from 1870 to 1910 and was most zealously propagated by Huxley, Haeckel, and Spencer.

Huxley was a scientist of no slight ability or achievement, but he was also a literary artist and much inclined to philosophize on the general significance of the "Darwinism" which Materialas a scientist he espoused. And he was particularly ism of Huxley irked by what he deemed the "obscurantism" of theologians who opposed Darwin's idea of evolution. Huxley was a caustic critic of theism and theology. He did not absolutely deny the possibility of a divine "First Cause," but he insisted that "doubt is a beneficent demon" and declared that "there is no evidence of the existence of such a being as the God of the theologians." He pronounced Christianity "a varying compound of some of the best and some of the worst elements of paganism and Judaism, molded in practice by the innate character of certain peoples of the western world"; he rejected its miracles and its morals as alike inconsistent with science. To Huxley, there was no world of "spirit" and no such entity as a "soul"; everything was material. Moreover, there was no special creation; everything was in a constant state of purely natural evolution. Wherefore, there is no freedom of the human will, only a kind of "scientific Calvinism" according to which everyone must behave as one's physiological processes and the laws of evolution direct. "The actions we call sinful," he averred, "are part and parcel of the struggle for existence."

Haeckel was more uncompromising in his materialism. He spent many years in expounding the philosophical implications of an extreme and dogmatic "Darwinism," and Material-when he was sixty-five he summarized his convictions ism of in a famous book, The Riddle of the Universe (1899). According to him, matter is everything, spirit is nothing. What purports to be spiritual is really physical. Organic nature is essentially one with inorganic nature, and "life" has sprung naturally from an arrangement of chemical elements. Man, to-

gether with all animal and vegetable species, has been evolved from protoplasm which arises from nitrogenous carbon compounds by spontaneous generation. Psychology is a branch of physiology. Man's body is animal, and his mind (or "soul") is a somewhat developed form of the minds (and "souls") of lower mammals and thence of birds and fishes, amæbas, plants, and carbon. And the whole universe and its evolutionary processes are strictly determined by natural, physical law, so that no man, any more than an amæba or a chunk of coal, can independently exert any influence on conduct.

The most comprehensive philosophy of evolutionary materialism was set forth by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), an Englishman
and one of the most typical figures of the ninetionary teenth century. Spencer was neither an experimental
materialist Phi
Scientist nor a university man. Born of a family of ist Philosophy of school-teaching Quakers and Methodists, he was Spencer largely self-educated and "self-made." In the early days of English railroading, he was an engineer on the London and Birmingham railway; and for several years after 1848, when economic liberalism was in the ascendant, he was an editor of the London *Economist* and an energetic advocate of individualism and liberalism. Gradually he turned his attention to liberal theorizing in the domain of sociology and to physiological aspects of psychology; and in 1857 he maintained, in *Progress, Its Law and Cause*, that all development—of the individual as cold the solution of the individual as cold the dividual as well as of the solar system—proceeds, like that of the nebular hypothesis, "from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous." Spencer applauded Darwin's Origin of Species and enriched its doctrine with the phrase, "survival of the fittest." And in 1860—the year following the appearance of Darwin's hash. and in 1800—the year following the appearance of Darwin's book—Spencer issued the prospectus of his Synthetic Philosophy, an enormous work in ten volumes, upon which he was engaged for the next thirty-six years, and in which he applied the principle of evolution to philosophy, psychology, sociology, and ethics.

The central feature of Spencer's philosophy was that every-

The central feature of Spencer's philosophy was that everything organic and inorganic had been naturally evolved, through a "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest," "from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous." Back of this evolution, Spencer reasoned, must be a Power or Cause, but it should be defined as the Unknowable and quite neglected in

speculations about matter and motion which alone are "knowable." In his Principles of Psychology (1870-1872), Spencer explained the phenomena of adult human mind by reference to its infant and animal ancestry. In his Principles of Sociology (1876-1896), he treated of society as an evolving organism, of religion as originating in the worship of ancestral ghosts, and of the struggle for existence as exemplified in the natural antagonism between nutrition and reproduction and between industrialism and warfare. He also utilized "Darwinism" to support the industrial competition and capitalism of the age and, indeed, to buttress the whole creed of political and economic liberalism. In his Principles of Ethics (1891-1893), he combined evolutionary conceptions with the liberal utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and concluded most optimistically that, as evolution proceeds, the moral sense must increase and lead on to a state of social harmony so complete as to wipe out the antagonism between altruism and egoism and render duty a pleasure.

The evolutionary materialism of Spencer, Haeckel, and Huxley might, and did, conduce to a very optimistic view of human progress, especially when its disciples thought Optimismainly of the continuity of evolution. If matter had tic Materialism man, then man's future evolution into a superman was bound to be quite as inevitable and (it was imagined) even more rapid.

But when thought was concentrated on man's animal and cave-man ancestry and on the earthy nature of his "reason" and "intelligence," pessimism might result. Man had so much of the beast in him and was misled by his mistic

so much of the beast in him and was misled by his imaginings into such gross superstition and such insane ism

"idealism" that there was little chance of improving him—at least within a calculable period or by usual means. It should not surprise us, therefore, that during the years from 1870 to 1914, a pessimistic, as well as an optimistic, philosophy found favor with a considerable number of persons who were excited by the reputed lessons of science. Nor should it surprise us that, whereas the optimists relied upon the fated "progress" of the human race for the realization of a kind of utopia in the not too distant future, pessimists invoked the arbitrary individual "will" of exceptionally gifted persons as the only possible escape from the prison of matter and unreason.

The philosophy of the "will" and of pessimism had been expounded before the rise of "Darwinism" by a German, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860). Schopenhauer was the hauer and son of a wealthy merchant and the life-long heir of mistre Will fortune and unhappiness. His parents quarrelled and separated, and his father went mad and committed suicide. His own education was intermittent and his existence a round of sensuality, melancholy, and philosophizing. He was widely read in philosophy and in 1811 attended the lectures of the "idealist" Fichte at Berlin. Nevertheless, the system of thought which he developed was a reflection primarily of his personal experience, and secondarily of his admiration both for traditional Hindu philosophy and for contemporary teachings of physiological psychology. This system he embodied in *The World as Will and* Idea, a work originally published in 1818 and subsequently revised and issued in two volumes in 1844. It was a protest at once against the rationalism of the eighteenth century and against the romantic idealism of the first part of the nineteenth century. It maintained that there is no reason except the human, and no intelligence save what is exhibited by animals. What sways animals (including man) is sheer vital "will" of each individual, acting not from any idealism but from a "realism" based on appetite, passion, will; in the light of such willful individualism, institutions like state, church, and family are only superficial. Schopenhauer was an æsthete and entertained a platonic fondness for asceticism. He held that the only peace which the world could give was to be found when the individual willed a life of art and when age exhausted his passions.

This kind of "realism" was developed further by another German, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Nietzsche came of a Saxon family of Protestant pastors and was expected to become a clergyman himself, but the reading of Schopenhauer and a special delight in the music of Wagner actuated him to abandon not only the pursuit of theological studies but also the profession of Christianity. After obtaining a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Bonn, Nietzsche taught at Basel from 1869 to 1879, when he resigned on account of ill health and took up his residence in northern Italy and on the French Riviera. In 1889 he broke down com-

¹ See portrait of Schopenhauer facing p. 341, above.

pletely, mentally as well as physically, and during his last mad years he was tended by members of his family at Weimar.

Nietzsche wrote much during the 1870's and 1880's. At first, he essayed the rôle of classical scholar and critic. Then, passing from mild criticism of political and democratic nationalism to furious criticism of romanticism in general, he penned several polemics against contemporary "illusions" of art, religion, and philosophy. At the last, in 1888, he brought out a series of savage attacks on Christianity and its Founder and on "Tudæo-Christian morality." In the meantime, in 1883-1885, he published his philosophical masterpiece, in the form of apothegms put in the mouth of a Persian sage, Thus Spake Zarathustra, a Book for All and None. Life, according to the author, has been retarded for thousands of years by an illusory worship of "the good, the true, and the beautiful." There are no such instincts as these in man, nor is there any foundation in nature for ideals of sacrifice, generosity, or gentleness. What does exist is another instinct, another basis for human excellence—the will to power, the will to a stronger and hence a higher life. If this instinct is obeyed, if the weak are ruthlessly trampled upon by the strong, an aristocracy of supermen will arise and possess the earth. Only by will and egotism, only by a complete reversal of traditional morality, can any "progress" be realized, and then it will be realized by the few.

The gospel of pessimistic realism had no such popular support as that which optimistic materialism obtained. Schopenhauer had almost no following during his lifetime, and Nietzsche's doctrine made its chief appeal to a coterie of young intellectuals who wanted to be "revolutionary" or were enamored by the literary form of Thus Spake Zarathustra as much as by its philosophical content. Yet we must not underestimate the significance of the Schopenhauer-Nietzsche development. Being Signifi-

compatible with a particular view of "science," and cance of becoming full-fledged in an age of mounting militarism and expanding imperialism, it could be utilized to explain, even to excuse and extol, the behavior of "super-

Materi-

men" among nationalist statesmen and industrial capitalists, and to justify specific assaults on supernatural religion and conventional morality. And it was so utilized by an increasing number of persons, especially after 1800. It became a factor not

only in literary "realism," but also in the "realism" of politics and philosophy which helped to pave the way to the World War and to post-war dictatorships.

Of far greater importance to the immediate thought of the era from 1870 to 1910 than the "willfulness" of Nietzsche or even the "pure materialism" of Haeckel, was the 2. Posi-"positivism" of Auguste Comte. Comte (1798-1857), tivism the son of a French tax official, received a scientific training at the Polytechnic in Paris and earned a precarious living by teaching mathematics, but his chief interest was in the field of social philosophy. Here his innate abilities and methodical habits enabled him, between 1830 and his death in 1857, to produce a large number of heavy, yet meaty, tomes which have won him the titles of "father of sociology" and and His "System" "founder of positivism." The "system" of Comte, as set forth in the four volumes of his Positive Philosophy (1851-1854), represented an attempt to treat "social science" as a "natural science."

An evolutionary conception was basic to Comte's sociology, as it was, contemporaneously, to the philosophy of Hegel, the astronomy of Laplace, the geology of Lyell, and the biology of Darwin. Comte's conception was expressed in the "law of the three states," that every human thought and every branch of human knowledge has passed successively through three historical phases: (1) the theological, or fictitious; (2) the metaphysical, or abstract; and (3) the scientific, or positive. In the first phase, man believed that all phenomena are the result of immediate volition either in the object or in some supernatural being. In the second phase—a transitional phase—man turned from capricious "spirits" to abstract forces and tried to find the causes of phenomena in "nature" and "reason." In the third phase, the dawning positive-phase of the nineteenth century, man no longer seeks for causes, whether natural or supernatural, but is content with facts. "What is now understood when we speak of an explanation of facts is simply the establishment of a connection between single phenomena and a few general facts, the number of which continually diminishes with the progress

¹ Comte's interest in social philosophy was quickened by Saint-Simon, the utopian socialist, with whom he was closely associated from 1818 to 1824. On Saint-Simon, see above, p. 108 and note.

of science." In other words, fact-finding was to be the pursuit and the goal of the new positivist age, the assembling and counting of facts, with only contempt for external explanation of facts. In freeing the "facts" of human relationships from abstrac-

In freeing the "facts" of human relationships from abstractions, Comte insisted that he was erecting a new "social science,"—that is, sociology, or, as he styled it, "social physics." Its content, according to him, Comte's Sociology comprised the facts and scientific generalizations relating to social order and stability (constituting "social statics"), and those relating to social progress and evolution (constituting "social dynamics"). In one or the other of these divisions could be grouped all positive knowledge of sociology. And the goal of sociology, Comte maintained, must be the reorganization of the moral, religious, and political systems of mankind in accordance with the dictates of "fact."

Comte was fertile with social and political ideas which he associated with his positivist philosophy. Some of these are noteworthy by reason of their later influence. One such was his criticism of the eighteenth-century principle of "natural rights": he deemed it "metaphysical," and prophesied that positivists would presently discover a scientific substitute for it. Another was his distrust of the masses, whom he thought too credulous, and his belief that society and government should be directed by an aristocracy of land owners, manufacturers, merchants, bankers, and engineers, in accordance with the advice of "scientific experts." Still another idea of Comte's was the glorification of force as the "scientific" corner-stone of the modern state. Force, he held, answers in sociology to tissue in biology; it is the cement of the social organism.

Finally, Comte sought to invest his positivism with religious garb. In place of a supernatural or metaphysical deity he would raise up humanity not only to be studied scientifically but also to be worshipped. Humanity was to him a mystical as well as a positivist conception, and he dreamed of a new religion which would inspire and guide the "social dynamics" of the future—a Catholic Humanitarianism evolving from Catholic Christianity, with high altars to mankind and side-altars to great scientists and human-

itarians, and with a hierarchy of philosopher-priests.

The positivist "church" of Comte did not materialize as

its founder ardently hoped. True, the "church" was duly inaugurated at Paris, and branches were established in London, Liverpool, and certain other cities in England and in Germany. It secured, however, no really popular following, and the number of "intellectuals" who constituted its membership and aspired to be "Catholic without being Christian" was very slight in comparison with the number of scientists who, on the one hand, remained Christian or, on the other hand, deemed any formal religion quite superfluous. Nevertheless, while the "church" of Comte did not become important, many influential persons acquired from Comte's positivism, directly or indirectly, a quickened faith in "progress" and "humanity," and in real blessings which fact-finding and the pursuit of scientific sociology would bestow on both. This faith was, indeed, a major mark of the period after 1870, and its intellectual and emotional roots were struck deep in positivism.

Positivism appealed to different types of persons and was utilized for a corresponding variety of purposes. Many scientists, and likewise many engineers and industrialists, including some who did not read Comte or know much about Appeal of Positivism the refinements of his doctrine, were essentially positivist in that they concentrated on fact-finding and confined their philosophizing about science to an optimistic faith in its all-sufficient utility for human progress. They helped to provide a soil and an atmosphere favorable to positivism.

Besides, a goodly number of liberal intellectuals turned directly to the gospel of Comte as a logical and up-to-date supplement to the earlier utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham.¹ They recognized that Comte had emphasized Bentham's devotion to humanitarianism and his insistence on practical utility as the criterion of scientific investigation and social and political reform. The more they studied Comte, the more they found his "scientific spirit" and his "idealistic" materialism in harmony with their own mental attitude and of service to that gradual modification of liberalism which they wrought during the era after 1870.²

One of the foremost "liberal" positivists was John Stuart Mill

¹On Bentham, see Vol. I, pp. 544-545.

² On pre-positivist liberalism, see above, pp. 65-74; and on the later modification of liberalism, see above, pp. 307-312.

(1806-1873), the son of James Mill, the "classical" economist whose career we have already noted. I John Stuart Mili began as a devoted disciple of Bentham and a brilliant exponent of economic liberalism, but gradually his interests broadened into the fields of natural science, psychology, and sociology, and he developed a peculiar

"Liberal" Positivism and Tohn Štuart

sympathy for certain aspects of Comte's teaching. He was too independent a thinker to become a mere follower of Comte, but it was in line with Comte's positivism that Mill in his later life changed the basis of his liberal philosophy (and ethics) from a priori reasoning and theorizing to scientific observation and experience and embodied in his practical program not only an earnest plea for individual liberty of thought and expression but also sweeping demands for sociological, even "socialist." reforms—the emancipation of women, the nationalization of land, the amelioration of the conditions of the working classes. John Stuart Mill was the herald of the "new liberalism"—the positivist liberalism—which after 1870 was intimately associated with "science," with industrial and material "progress," and with a gradual evolution toward "state socialism."

At the opposite extreme, some conservative intellectuals discovered in Comte's positivism an arsenal of arguments against liberalism and in favor of what they were pleased to term "realism." They liked Comte's criticism of the French Revolution and his strictures on popular sovereignty. They sympathized with his defense of aristocracy. Positiv-They agreed with him that force is requisite for social order and security. And they were not at all averse from employing the "facts" of science to fortify their own predilection for governmental dictatorship. Positivists of this sort were not so much in the public eye, between 1870 and 1910, as were those of the liberal type, but behind the scenes they were fostering an intellectual movement highly favorable to contemporary militarism and imperialism and to the later emergence of Fascism and similar manifestations of illiberal nationalism.

The outstanding significance of the rise of positivism was the impetus it gave to sociological studies. These studies took two chief forms. One was the synthesizing of data of history, economics, and politics with data of natural science and of the

¹ See above, pp. 69, 75.

new social sciences of psychology and anthropology into generalized statements of the "laws" and "trends" which Rise of presumably govern the behavior and evolution of Sociology human society. This was the form of sociology initiated by Comte and immensely forwarded by Herbert Spencer.


The other was the analysis, through detailed "field" investigation, of the life and labor of particular social classes or groups. This second form of sociology was suggested by Comte, but its principal exponent was another Frenchman, Frédéric Le Play (1806–1882). Le Play, a graduate (like Comte) of the Paris Polytechnic and long an official of the depart-Le Play ment of mines of the French government, spent five or six months every year for a score of years in first-hand study of some three hundred "typical" families in various parts of Europe, their income and expenditure, their mode of life, the problems confronting them and how they met them. The results of his investigations Le Play published in a series of monographs, European Workers, the first edition of which appeared in 1855. The next year he founded an international society "of practical studies of social economy," which proceeded to develop sociological "field work" on lines laid down by the founder. Among the numerous "social surveys" inspired by Le Play's example, special mention should be made of the monumental inquest into the "life and labor of the people of London," directed and financed by Charles Booth, a British capitalist and philanthropist, and reported by his staff of "experts" in ten huge volumes (1889–1903).

Sociological studies multiplied after 1870 and exerted an ever greater influence on the thought and action of the period. Not only did sociology become a recognized subject of research and instruction in many universities, but its aims and methods were

Sociological Influence on History and Political Science

increasingly adopted by disciples of the other and older "social sciences." Historians, for example, concerned themselves less with strictly individual biography and purely political narrative, and more with general social movements, with the "evolution" of social forces and social institutions. Political scientists. likewise, were moved to stress the practical, rather than the

Note. The portrait opposite is of Charles Booth, the patron of the sociological fact-finding survey of London in the 1890's, and is from the painting by Sir William Rothenstein (born 1872).





theoretical, aspects of government and to deal not so much with its structure and its relationship to the individual as with its actual functioning in and on society at large.

Economists, too, betrayed a sympathy for current sociology. Such a distinguished economist as John Stuart Mill was led by sociological interests, as we have seen, to supply Sociolog-ical Influ-"classical" economy (and economic liberalism) with a new social orientation. Moreover, the "historical" or ence on **Economics** "national" school of political economy, of which we have treated elsewhere, was quite sociological; its members were actuated by social considerations and absorbed in social problems and social reform. Besides, the emergence of still another "school" of political economy—the "statistical" or "value" school-nicely synchronized with the spread of the Le Play type of sociology and was affected by it. Of this "school" of economics, William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882) was one of the leaders.2 He was professor of logic and political economy at London and wrote extensively in both fields. In the latter, he defended the distinguishing theory of "value," that value depends entirely upon utility, and that the degree of utility of a commodity is some continuous mathematical function of the quantity of the commodity available. This theory he applied, with the aid of elaborate statistical calculations, to special studies of particular industrial and financial phenomena. Jevons thought he could demonstrate mathematically a connection between commercial crises and sun-spots.

Statistics, both as a "science" in itself and as a method for all the social sciences, assumed a new importance after 1870. Beginning with sociologists (particularly of the Le Play Statistics type), and following speedily with economists (especially of the Jevons persuasion), presently with political scientists, and eventually with social historians, the statistical method was exalted as the "exact" method of "social science,"

¹ See above, pp. 182, 314-316.

² Others were Walras, a Swiss, and Carl Menger, an Austrian. By reason of the relatively large number of Menger's disciples in Austria, the whole "school" is sometimes referred to as the "Austrian."

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The Hand of God," is an example of the "natural" art of the Age of Realism (and Positivism) by the distinguished French sculptor, Auguste Rodin (1840–1917). On Rodin, see below, pp. 412–413.

and as such it partially eclipsed the "genetic" or "historical" method which had been most prominent in the earlier part of the nineteenth century. By many social scientists, the new factual statistics was deemed "realistic," as the older history was pronounced "romantic." And, in response to sociological promptings, the notion was disseminated that by the mere collation of statistics man would be enabled not only to obtain "facts" but also to understand their relationship and significance. One would gather and sort data; the data would do the rest. This was the "science" of statistics, defined by an eminent German sociologist and economist as "the systematic statement and explanation of actual events, and of the laws of man's social life that may be deduced from these, on the basis of the quantitative observation of mathematical aggregates." Needless to say, the implication was mechanical and material.

Sociological and statistical studies were no mere academic exercises. They were patronized by municipalities and national governments as well as by universities and research foundations, and were utilized increasingly after 1870 by legislators and a great variety of social reformers. An obvious result was a shift in popular and political interest from the individual to society. If the first part of the nineteenth century was characterized by a trend toward individualism and laissez-faire, the latter part of the century was distinguished, indeed, by a socializing tendency. Comte had a plan for social reform. Le Play had another. Only Spencer, among leading sociologists, clung to an extreme individualism and a doctrinaire liberalism. James Stuart Mill advocated drastic social legislation, and so did both the "historical" and the "statistical" schools of political economy. Gradually, statesmen and great political parties, and religious bodies also, came to sponsor practical measures looking toward "state socialism" or "coöperative socialism" or "Christian socialism." What these measures were and how they were enacted in European

a. "Scientific Socialism":

Marxism

Here it remains to point out the general development of a specific "scientific socialism" during the era from 1870 to 1910, just when nineteenth-century natural science was reaching full fruition, when the "scientific" philosophies of materialism and positivism were flourishing, and when

governments and governed were alike concerned with industrial progress and social betterment.

The father of this "scientific socialism" was Karl Marx (1818-1883). He was a native of Trier (in Rhenish Prussia) and the son of an ambitious Jewish lawyer who, when Karl was six years old, had the family baptized in the Protestant church and the family name changed from "Mordecai" to "Marx." Karl was sent in due course to the univerof Karl sities of Bonn and Berlin to study law, but to his father's disgust he preferred philosophy and history and eventually took a doctorate at Jena. Unable to obtain an academic position, he embarked upon a journalistic career—of many vicissitudes. In his native Rhineland he edited a newspaper from 1841 to 1843, when it was suppressed by the Prussian government. Then for two years at Paris he edited a newspaper for fellow German exiles, until he was invited by Louis Philippe's government to leave France. At Brussels, for three years more, he did journalistic hack-work. Following the revolutionary upheaval of 1848, he returned to Germany and reëstablished his original newspaper, but with the collapse of the revolution his journal was again suppressed and he was exiled. From 1849 to his death in 1883 he resided in England, eking out a meagre living for himself and his own devoted family by translating books and serving as special correspondent for the New York Tribune. Marx's career was not externally brilliant, and, though he proclaimed the essential doctrine of "scientific socialism" in the revolutionary year of 1848, it was not until twenty or thirty vears afterwards, not until the age of romanticism was passing into that of realism, that any great fame attached to his ideas.

Marx derived his ideas from several sources. For his logical method and for a great vision of historical evolution and "progress," he was indebted to Hegel, the master of "idealsit" philosophy. Under the influence of the "Younger of Marx's Hegelians," with whom he studied at Berlin, he developed a strong sympathy for liberal and democratic political ideals; it was for vigorous advocacy of freedom of the press that his first newspaper was suppressed in 1843. Presently his interest was aroused in economics; and at Paris this interest

¹ On Hegel, see Vol. I, pp. 739-740.

was intensified and made fruitful by Marx's personal observations of the new factory system and industrial proletariat about him, by his discussions and debates with Louis Blanc, the "statesocialist," and with Proudhon, the "anarchist-socialist," by his own critical reading of the works of the "utopian socialists" (Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier, etc.)1 and of the "classical" economists (especially Ricardo),2 and, most significantly of all, by his close contact with Friedrich Engels.

Engels (1820-1805) was a German from Rhenish Prussia (like Marx himself), who, after coming under the spell of Hegelian philosophy, had been sent by his father, a wealthy cotton-spinner, to England to take charge of a branch factory near tion of Manchester and had there been so shocked by what he Engels saw of the condition of the working class that he with joined the radical "socialist" element in the Chartist Marx movement. In 1844, on a brief visit to Paris, Engels met Marx, and from this meeting dated the intimate friendship and uninterrupted collaboration which lasted during their lives, so that even some of Marx's subsequent writings which he published under his own name were more or less also the work of Engels. Engels, it may be added, participated (like Marx) in the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 in Germany, and then, returning to England (whither Marx also came), he superintended his father's business at Manchester from 1850 to 1869, when he settled in London and devoted himself entirely to lite ary labor. And it should be emphasized that both Engels and Marx were much influenced not only by contemporary industrialism but also by the growing materialism, positivism, and "scientific spirit" of the age in which they formulated their economic doctrines.

In 1848 Marx and Engels jointly issued a little pamphlet, the Communist Manifesto. It opened with caustic criticism alike of "bourgeois liberalism" and of "utopian socialism" and went on to expound a "scientific socialism" (or "communism," as the authors preferred to call it) of the following general tenor. The current economic conflict between capitalists and proletarians is but a phase of the age-long economic struggle be-tween social classes. History is simply the record of how one class has gained wealth and then secured political power only to be

¹ On Blanc, Proudhon, and the utopian socialists, see above, pp. 86, 109-110. ² On Ricardo and the other "classical" economists, see above, pp. 69-70.

overthrown and succeeded in wealth and power by another class. Recently the class struggle has been between aristocratic landlords and middle-class capitalists. Now, The Communist

the factory system is magnifying the wealth and political power of the capitalists at the expense of the landlords, but simultaneously it is creating a proletarian class by whom the capitalist class are to be fought

The Communist
Manifesto
(1848),
Epitome
of Marxism

and eventually destroyed. For, through factory exploitation of labor, capitalism will become concentrated, as time goes on, in fewer and fewer hands, while the proletariat will absorb the masses of the population and grow more and more "classconscious." The day must come when the many will be able to dispossess the few and usher in a solidly proletarian society and government under which the economic means of production and exchange will be owned and operated not privately but socially. On that day will disappear the essentially "bourgeois" institutions and mentality which dominate present society-middleclass economics and politics, middle-class religion and morality, the "middle-class family," and wars between nations. In the meantime, it is the business of "scientific communists" to prepare the proletarians for their inevitable victory: to inculcate "class consciousness" in them, and to urge them to the "class struggle" which they must wage with capitalists. The Manifesto concluded with a revolutionary and internationalist flourish: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!"

The Communist Manifesto attracted little attention in 1848, and awoke no immediate response even on the part of proletarians. Nevertheless, Marx continued to devote his Later major energies and every spare minute of his time Activity (usually in collaboration with Engels) to fortifying the doctrines of the Manifesto and trying to induce workingmen to organize themselves in support of its philosophy and program. For many years he toiled at a monumental study of economics with a view to showing theoretically and in fact just how the industrial worker was "exploited" by the industrial capitalist; the results were embodied in a bulky treatise, Capital, of which the first volume was published by Marx in 1867 and others by Engels after Marx's death. Parallel with such scholarly researches, Marx was engaging in innumerable polem-

ics with rival social reformers, giving frequent counsel to workingclass leaders, and never missing an opportunity to interpret events in the light of his faith in "economic determinism."

This faith—this philosophy—was fundamental to all his mature work and to the movement which he inaugurated. It may be

Marx's
Basic Insistence
on Economic
Deterninism

stated in three postulates: (1) that the distinctive civilization—culture, religion, morality, and art—of each age is determined by its material and economic conditions; (2) that the course of history is determined by a succession of class struggles for material supremacy; and (3) that present-day bourgeois capitalistic society ably be transformed into another society, proletarian

will inevitably be transformed into another society, proletarian and collectivist.

Such a philosophical approach to socialism proved "timely." It was advertised as "scientific." It was frankly materialist. It enshrined concepts of evolution and struggle. It appealed in a "realistic" age to a growing number of persons who perceived an affinity of "Marxism" in sociology to "Darwinism" in biology. All of which helps to explain why Marxian doctrines, unheeded in 1848, secured a large following after 1870.

The particular organization which Marx himself founded and directed was not very strong or influential. Formally established in 1864 as the "International Workingmen's Association," and

Organization of
Marxian
Socialists:
the "First
International,"
1864

usually referred to as the "First International," it comprised groups (or sections) of workers in various countries of Europe (and in the United States) and held several international congresses. It did spread a knowledge of "Marxism" and it did alarm the governments of the time. Its membership, however, was small and poor; and, despite the strenuous efforts of

Marx and Engels, it suffered from the passions attendant upon the Franco-Prussian War, from the disillusionment following the suppression of the Paris Commune in 1871,¹ and from internal dissensions arising from the expulsion of anarchist members who criticized Marx. The last real congress of the Association was held at Geneva in 1873, and its dissolution was decreed by a few of the faithful assembled at Philadelphia in 1876.

Nevertheless, the failure of the "First International" meant by no means the failure of Marxian Socialism. Some of the

¹ See below, pp. 534-536.

national "sections" of which the International had been composed continued to function. In particular, the German "section" forged ahead, partly because the industrial and intellectual circumstances were peculiarly favorable, partly because it had energetic leaders in Wilhelm Liebknecht, a scholarly bourgeois, and August Bebel, an eloquent workingman, and partly because it annexed in 1875 a rival socialist organization which had been founded in 1863 by Ferdinand Lassalle. Lassalle (1825-1864),

Marxian Socialism in Germany and Its Juncture with Lassalle's Socialism, 1875

a well-educated, well-to-do bourgeois, famed both as a man of decidedly fashionable and luxurious habits and as a veritable "messiah of the poor," was less doctrinaire and more "practical" than Marx. His organizing genius was a legacy, along with the gospel of Marx, to the united "Social Democratic" party which emerged in 1875. Thenceforth, until 1914, this party, committed to political democracy and Marxian socialism, grew in Germany by leaps and bounds.

The Social Democratic party of Germany became the model for similar political organizations of Marxian socialists in other countries. By the end of the 1880's there were such Spread of parties in almost every country of Europe (and in the Marxian Socialism United States), commanding the loyalty of many workingmen and a considerable number of intellectuals, and supported by affiliated trade unions, parliamentary representatives, newspapers, and salaried propagandists. In 1889 delegates of the several "national" parties met at Paris and formed an international federation—the so-called "Second International" which maintained a central office and held a series of congresses until the World War of 1914. So impressive "Second Internawas the growth of Marxism during the era from 1870 tional," to 1910 that it dwarfed all other types of socialism, and the word "communism" which Marx and Engels had employed to differentiate their "scientific socialism" from "utopian" or "Christian" socialism fell into disuse. In popular parlance and in the usage of Marxians themselves, "socialism" now connoted the economic and political movement associated with the teachings of Karl Marx.

Marxian socialism was an important factor in European history throughout the "era of realism." It represented a significant intellectual tendency of the era, and, though it was denounced and combatted by the majority of the upper, middle, and agricultural classes, by leading statesmen and zealous Signifipatriots as well as by capitalists and ecclesiastics, cance of though its disciples remained a minority in every coun-Marxian Socialism try, it made no mean contribution to the era's "socializing" achievements. It elicited from its adversaries not only enmity but emulation. To wean the industrial proletarians from it and to inoculate the masses against it, one group after another, one bourgeois party after another, one religious body after another, put forth rival programs of social reform, and one government after another, frequently with "liberal" support, enacted socialistic legislation—nationalizing railways and other public utilities, protecting trade unions and coöperative societies, and ameliorating the conditions of labor.

In the 1890's, a decade after the death of Karl Marx, the great movement which he had inaugurated was obviously advancing, but side by side with it were arising a "social nationalism" of rather different import, while within it were appearing divergent factions. Marxian socialists were always prone to quarrel with one another over tactics and doctrinal details or over personal questions of leadership, but the quarrels assumed a larger signifi-

Development of Movements within Marxian Socialism

cance in the 1890's when several "higher critics" of the gospel of Marx cast doubt upon the accuracy of the Divergent master's prophecies. He had foretold that, through the inevitable evolution of capitalism, the bulk of the middle classes would fall into the category of proletarians and that the class-conscious proletariat, thus becoming a numerical majority, would be enabled by

sheer weight of numbers to abolish private property and erect the new collectivist state and society. But it was now pointed out, with array of statistics, that while the management of capital was being concentrated in fewer hands, its ownership was being extended, that accompanying the descent of middle-class persons into the proletariat was a disconcerting ascent of proletarians into the middle class, and that there was no immediate prospect of a class-conscious proletariat's having the numerical strength of itself to capture any existing government.

If the critics were right, some revision or amendment of Marxian doctrines and tactics appeared necessary. But in what direction? Eduard Bernstein (born 1850), a prominent figure in the Social Democratic party of Germany and a most trenchant critic of orthodox Marxism, argued that Socialists should move toward the right. They should emphasize evolution and coöperation rather than revolution and class conflict. Instead of pursuing tactics in strict keeping with the philosophy of economic determinism, they should collaborate with democratically minded persons, even bourgeois political parties, in any action

Bernstein and the "Revisionist" Movetoward the Right

which would strengthen popular government and advance the socialization of industry. The right-wing Socialists who followed Bernstein were known as "revisionists" or "reformists." They were fairly numerous in trade unions (the "aristocracy" of labor) and among middle-class converts to socialism. Some of them formed "independent" socialist groups, as in France and England, but most of them remained within the regular socialist parties. as in Germany, and exerted a gradually growing influence upon them and also upon the Second International.

Other critics of orthodox Marxism urged a movement in the opposite direction—toward the left. According to them, Socialists, lacking a numerical majority, should intensify the class struggle, precipitate a revolution, and set up a ments dictatorship of the proletariat. Such counsels appealed toward particularly to unskilled workers in southern Europe,

who had a deep-seated distaste for parliamentary government, to radical extremists in an absolutist and industrially backward country like Russia, and to the heirs of the anarchistic tradition of Proudhon 1 (who had been bitterly assailed by Marx) and Michael Bakunin 2 (who had been expelled from the First International). In Russia, left-wing advocates of proletarian revolution and dictatorship managed in 1903 to get control of the Marxian Socialist party and expel the "orthodox" along with the "revisionists." Elsewhere, however, the "orthodox" usually read them out of the regular parties, so that they formed their own separate organizations.

In this way, a "syndicalist" or "direct-action" movement emerged in France, Italy, and various other countries Revoluin the late 1890's. It eschewed politics wholly, tionary and devoted itself to "economic" and "moral" prep-Syndicalaration of the proletariat for a "general strike"

¹ See above, p. 100.

² See below, p. 653.

and a social revolution, preparation involving the development of "industrial unions" of unskilled as well as skilled workers and frequent resort to strikes and sabotage. The outstanding philosopher of "syndicalism" was George Sorel (1847—1922), a French engineer and littérateur and a curious compound of positivist and mystic. Sorel called himself a "Neo-Marxist." In numerous writings, including his famous Reflexions on Violence (1906), he accepted Marx's ideas of the class conflict and the destiny of the proletariat, but he tinged them with pessimism and criticized Marx's concessions to political democracy and his faith in merely material progress.

In subsequent chapters on Britain, Latin Europe, northern and eastern Europe, we shall have occasion to illustrate what we have said here in general concerning the growth and influence of Marxian Socialism, with its "revisionist" and "syndicalist" wings, during the era from 1870 to 1910. Meanwhile, in order to complete our broad survey of this era of realism—this era of machinery, science, materialism, positivism, and Marxism—we must sketch its artistic and religious aspects.



CHAPTER XIX

ART AND RELIGION IN THE ERA OF REALISM



OW the first half of the nineteenth century was characterized not only by a rapid development of machine industry but also by the vogue of romanticism in thought and art, we have elsewhere indicated. Romanticism, no more than classicism, could be expected to cease in the latter part of the nineteenth

century. Both were too solidly established in European mind and experience. Both were too intimately associated with historic movements of continuing vitality. Both were too impressively exemplified in enduring monuments. Hence, as industrialization proceeded apace, as nationalism flourished and liberalism was transformed, the culture of Europe continued to be in part romantic, in part classicist.

In part, however, it was now something else. It was what certain leading artists and philosophers of the era described as "realist." Realism was a special mark of the period Rise of from 1870 to 1910, a cultural accompaniment of the prosaic search for "facts" in natural science, in sociology, in psychology, and of the absorbing interest in material well-being and social reform. It was defined by its champions as the basing of art, as well as of human activity and practical "progress," not on ancient models or "reason," as "classicists" had done, not on "emotion" and an idyllic state of nature or an idealized middle age, as romantics had tried to do, but on a veritably photographic representation of observable "facts" of the contemporary world. There would be in it no idealization of man, of his past, of his mind or "soul," of his aspirations or philosophizings. Indeed, it would tend in an opposite direction toward emphasizing the very gradualness of man's ascent from his savage animal origins and the atavistic, pathological, and

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 734-751, and Vol. II, above, pp. 151-183.

irrational features of his present existence. In the name of reality, it would utilize the ugly as the raw stuff of art.

Perhaps the ugly is no more "real," in an absolute sense, than the beautiful. Perhaps the so-called "realists" of the era from 1870 to 1910 were only a group of perverted romantics, getting quite as far away from "reality" by their grubbing as their predecessors had done by mooning. Yet grubbing was made to appear a more vital occupation than mooning, and its exponents, unmindful that they too might be victimized by a temporary fad and actually governed by a transitory conception of the universe, acquired the reputation of being true realists in contradistinction to imaginative romanticists. With "facts" these realists were as obsessed as the romanticists had been with fancies, and the realists were even more dogmatic about their "facts." For one set of dogmas, they substituted another: the sterner, stiffer creed of materialism and positivism and (in some instances) economic determinism.

I. LITERATURE

In literature, much of the earlier romanticism of both subject and style survived, and was exemplified, especially in English literature, by several "popular" writers. Romantic romantic adventure was the central concern of that Literature engaging Scottish writer, Robert Louis Stevenson in Age of Realism (1850-1894), and the theme of the series of delightful volumes which he published in the 1880's—Treasure Island, Prince Otto, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Then, too, a romantic idealism characterized the whole outlook Stevenson and output of that other engaging Scottish author, and Barrie James Barrie (born 1860), the touching humor and pathos of his novels, The Little Minister and Sentimental Tommy, and the fairy-like whimsicality of his plays, Peter Pan and Alice-Sit-by-the-Fire.

Romantic also was Rudyard Kipling (born 1865), in respect not only of his jungle tales and his stirring stories of adventure but likewise of his poetical praises of the new imperialism, the "white man's burden." Indeed, the contemporary interest in imperialism as well as the ever-heightening interest in nationalism was reflected in a good deal of romantic literature of the era from 1870 to 1910, in French and German,

Russian and Italian, as well as in English. It was quite obvious that such writers as Maurice Barrès in France and Gabriele D'Annunzio in Italy were literary heirs of the romanticism which had reveled in folk-manners and folk-lore, in national scenery and national "souls."

But in literature, while romanticism still flourished, "realism" cropped up fresh and more abundant. The new realist literature treated usually of one or both of two general subjects: Realist (1) psychological analysis of the individual, with spe-Literature, Psy-chological cial reference to his "fated" response to his domestic and social milieu and to traditional institutions and or Sociological ethics; and (2) sociological study of family, class, or social problems, with particular implications of the need for radical social reform—uplifting the laboring classes, emancipating women, ending war, redistributing wealth. It treated of its subjects preferably in prose, at great length, and with a wealth of petty detail, "factual" and ostensibly precise and "scientific."

In "atmosphere," and "style," realist literature displayed

In "atmosphere," and "style," realist literature displayed divergent tendencies. If it was "social," it was apt to be optimistic and journalistic. If, on the other hand, it was "psychological," it was likely to be pessimistic, or any rate faintly ironical, and to be most meticulously expressed. Some of the foremost "psychological realists," especially those in France, were quite "classicist" in the painstaking care they took to find just the right word, just the right phrase, just the right "proportion," to convey their meaning.

Of such realists, one of the most famous was Gustave Flaubert (1821–1880). An extremely neurotic son of a French physician, he refused to practice law in which he was trained and sought escape from chronic melancholy by applying himself most assiduously to literary labor. His first and greatest novel, on which he toiled constantly for five years, writing and rewriting and polishing, was Madame Bovary (1857), a coolly analytical story of the marital infidelity of a country physician's wife; and his last work, in the 1870's, was a half-finished literary assault on optimism. Flaubert's fame was much greater after his death than during his lifetime. Madame Bovary, when it first appeared, was generally regarded as salacious and scandalous, and its author was prosecuted for immorality. After 1880, in the age of realism, it was hailed as the highest art.

A somewhat different type of realism was exemplified by the brothers Goncourt—Edmond (1822–1897) and Jules (1830–1870). They worked always in collaboration until the death of the younger. They industriously conducted researches into French or Japanese life of the eighteenth century, and they wrote elaborate novels of contemporary manners. To the Goncourts, all humanity is pictorial; no character is solid or consistent, and the soul is a series of fleeting moods.

The witty impressionistic narration of "realistic" love-affairs was a specialty of Alphonse Daudet (1840–1897), who, in quite another vein, could specialize as well in the thoroughly romantic adventures of his *Tartarin of Tarascon*. On occasion, indeed,

Daudet was as romantic as Dickens; on other occasions he was as realistic as Flaubert. Somewhat similar to Daudet in style, though always realist in subject-matter and in the sardonic quality of his humor, was Guy de Maupassant (1850–1893), a peculiarly acute observer and a very great artist. Maupassant, by his writing during the 1880's, proved himself a supreme master of the short story.

Far less of an artist but far more serious in his realism was Emile Zola (1840–1902). The son of an engineer, he was intensely interested in the newer developments of natural science and quite obsessed with the "laws" of heredity; and, brought up in poverty, he was an ardent agitator for social reform. He was a "social" realist, half novelist and half journalist. In the years following 1871 he turned out some twenty sombre volumes on various situations and problems confronting several generations of an imaginary family, and other novels he wrote about population, about work, about alcoholism. Zola was a radical republican, and towards the end of his life he played no slight rôle in French politics. 1

In contrast with Zola, mention should be made of one of his younger contemporaries, Paul Bourget (born 1852). The realism of Bourget's novels was attested by their profoundly psychological character, and they were written with as much attention to artistic form as any work of Maupassant or Flaubert. At the same time they dealt with social problems, not at all from the standpoint of Zola, however, but rather from that of traditional society and religion.

¹ See below, pp. 562, 563.

Surpassing all these French writers in comtemporary vogue was Jacques Thibault (1844-1924), best known by his pen name of Anatole France. For thirty years, from 1885 to 1915, French literature (and indeed European literature) was dominated by his fame. No reputation since Voltaire's was comparable with his. He was the son of a Parisian bookseller and began his literary career by writing verse for self-amusement. His first novel, The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard (1881), was a brilliant success, and thenceforth for forty years he poured out a series of witty, mocking, and captivating works of most varied content: pungent and mischievous short stories; philosophical and critical books, such as The Opinions of Jérôme Coignard; novels like The Rotisserie of Queen Pedauque, Thais, and The Gods Thirst; a sceptical biography of Joan of Arc; a number of satires on politics and religion, including Penguin Island (1908) and The Revolt of the Angels (1914).

Anatole France was essentially what Voltaire would have been if he had lived at the end of the nineteenth century instead of in the eighteenth. He had all of Voltaire's cleverness and lucidity and all his pitiless scepticism about the stupidity and silliness of mankind, but the philosophy which he derived from the natural science of his day was more disillusioning and pessimistic. Whereas Voltaire had believed in Deism and in rational human progress, Antole France until at least 1900 gave no evidence of a belief in anything, either better or worse. He was the perfect sceptic and ostentatiously indifferent to everything except "art." After 1900 he did take some interest in political and social matters, allying himself at first with radicals and then with social revolutionaries.¹

Among English novelists who were esteemed as realists toward the close of the nineteenth century were Meredith, Hardy, and Henry James. George Meredith (1828–1909) inaugu- In Engrated his series of psychological novels as early as 1859 land: Meredith with the Ordeal of Richard Feverel, but it was not until much later, with the publication of The Egoist (1879) Hardy and Diana of the Crossways (1885), that he became famous for his realistic analysis of character and for his clipped epigrammatic style. Thomas Hardy (1840–1928) devoted his tal-

¹ A likeness of Anatole France, by T. A. Steinlen, appears as the tail-piece to this chapter, p. 451, below.

ents mainly to studies of the fateful workings of the "struggle for existence" in village and peasant life in the English country-side. His principal novels, such as The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886) and Tess of the D'Urbervilles (1891) are concerned not with civilization or manners but with animal aspects of human life; and his poetry, which is now esteemed more highly than his prose, shows the same concern.

Henry James (1843–1916), a brother of William James, the psychologist, was an American by birth and early training but he lived most of his life in England and France and displayed a marked fondness for the social life of the former and for the realistic literature of the latter. His numerous novels, including Daisy Miller (1878), The Awkward Age (1899), and The Ambassadors (1903), were psychological studies of members of the leisured class preoccupied with problems of ethical conduct; they were shadowy in plot and immensely involved in style. Between the realist novels of James, Hardy, and Meredith and the earlier romantic novels of Scott, Dickens, and Thackeray, a great gulf existed.

English drama, like the English novel, responded to the scientific realism of the age, less emphatically perhaps along the lines of individual psychology than in the domain of sociology. The outstanding dramatist of the age, with an international vogue and influence scarcely inferior to Anatole France's, was George Bernard Shaw. Shaw was born (1856) at Shaw Dublin of an Anglo-Irish Protestant family and was schooled at a non-conformist college in his native city. His chief early interests were in music and painting, and in 1876 he betook himself to London and earned a meagre living there by journalistic art-criticism. In the early 1880's a special interest in economic radicalism was awakened in him by Henry George,2 and presently he became a Socialist. With an enthusiasm for Marxism, he combined a faith in the beneficent rôle of science. mechanical progress, and materialist philosophy, and a caustic witty manner of viewing the obstacles in the way and preaching their removal. He wrote clever novels, brilliant essays, shrewd letters; but his forte was as a playwright. To the "realistic" drama he was impelled by his admiration for the Norwegian dramatist, Ibsen, and beginning in 1893 he produced

¹ See above, pp. 352-353.

² See below, p. 474.

an amazing number of plays, treating of a variety of social problems—prostitution, militarism, imperialism, socialism, the Nietzschean superman, the Salvation Army, etc.—all very didactic and all extraordinarily entertaining. Shaw had a genius for self-advertisement, and a multitude who were not always sure whether he was making fun of them, or not, swarmed to his plays and applauded his sallies. He was the bludgeoning British counterpart to the more rapier-like Anatole France.

A similar vogue attended the literary efforts of H. G. Wells (born 1866)—for rather different reasons. Wells came from the lower middle class, the son of a professional cricketer, and from the beginning he was devoted to "science." He obtained a scientific degree from London University and for several years as schoolmaster and private coach he taught science. Then, at a time when everybody was talking about the marvels of science, he took the world by storm with a series of "scientific romances"—The Time Machine (1895), The Stolen Bacillus, The War of the Worlds (1898), The First Men in the Moon (1901)—making the most romantic improbabilities seem real and assured. In the meantime he became a convert to socialism, and soon he was fusing his mechanical, "scientific" utopias with social utopias in which machines would work and men would play and from which would be eternally banished religious superstition and everything else inimical to the evolution and reign of supermen. This "utopian realism" Wells set forth in a swift succession of vivid writings from A Modern Utopia (1905) to The Research Magnificent (1915).

Norwegian literature was notably influential in the age of realism, thanks largely to the international repute of Björnsen and Ibsen. Björnstjerne Björnsen (1832–1910), the son of a Lutheran pastor and graduate of the University of Oslo, began as a romantic patriot, writing tales about the common folk and aspiring to create "a new saga of the peasant nation." In the 1870's, however, he became a radical agitator and composed a number of "realistic" dramas; and in the 1880's, attracted by contemporary philosophical science, he penned Zola-like novels on heredity and education.

Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906), though born in Norway, had little Norwegian blood in his veins; for five generations his ancestors had been Danish, German, or Scottish. He was an unhappy person. and his early dramas, intensely patriotic and quite romantic, were not well received. Forsaking Norway in the 1860's, first for Italy and then for Germany, he proceeded to become "realist" and internationally famous. His Brand and Peer Gynt (1867) were poetical satires on Norwegian life and religion; and in a series of grim dramas during the 1870's and 1880's—A Doll's House. Ghosts, An Enemy of the People, etc.—he mercilessly diagnosed various diseases of modern society, especially the disease of hypocrisy. In the 1890's his dramas grew increasingly symbolic and mystical until no clear content but only an esoteric "art" remained.

Ibsen exerted no little influence on younger men throughout Europe. We have already noted his influence on Shaw. It was also apparent in German literature of the era, particu-Germany: larly in the realistic social novels and dramas of Hermann and Hauptmann (1857–1928) and in the realistic peasant-life plays of Gerhart Hauptmann (born 1862). We may add that Hauptmann in his later years turned from "realism" to "dream poems" and dramatic fairy tales.

Italian literature of the period was represented by Fogazzaro and Pirandello. Antonio Fogazzaro (1842–1911) was more romanticist than realist. He commenced with a poetical romance of Wordsworthian simplicity and emotional pathos and went on with nationalist and religious novels. Gradually he became more intent on psychological analysis, on impressionistic "atmosphere," and on the reconciliation of traditional Christianity with modern science. One of his last novels, The Saint (1906), was condemned by the Fope for its "modernism," as it was acclaimed by non-Catholics for its "realism."

Luigi Pirandello (born 1867) was wholly realist. A Sicilian, he took a doctorate at the German University of Bonn in the Pirandello 1890's, and then, while teaching in a "progressive" girl's school at Rome, gave vent to the most bitter "realism" in verse, in some famous novels, and eventually in plays, of which he was a master mechanic. To him, there could be "no faith in the absolute, in objectivity, in any fixed thing outside individual personality." Everything was fated, and fate was ferocious.

Outside the main stream of the new "realism," yet parallelling

it, was the important work of an eminent Russian reformer and novelist, Count Leo Tolstoi (1828-1910). Tolstoi belonged to the Russian aristocracy, and during the Crimean War he served in the Tsar's army. Suddenly,

however, he evinced a great interest in the peasants and in their betterment. He freed the serfs on his own estate before the Tsar Alexander II issued the general edict of emancipation. conducted several educational experiments among the lower classes. In the 1860's he began his literary career by publishing War and Peace, a powerful pacifist novel. Thereafter he grew ever more philosophical and revolutionary, renouncing all private property and extolling a kind of communist and anarchist Christianity. His later novels, such as The Kreutser Scnata (1890) and Resurrection (1900), curiously combined a "realism" in presenting current problems of life with a profound mysticism in suggesting solutions for them.

Two other Russian writers acquired European fame during the period—Chekhov and Gorky. Anton Chekhov (1860-1904), the grandson of a serf, was trained as a physician at the University of Moscow but deserted the profession of medicine for that of letters. His early tales, very popular in Russia, were humorous sketches of peasant life. Subsequently he adopted a pessimistic, psychological "realism" in plays, such as The Seagull (1896) and The Cherry Orchard (1904), and in a series of extraordinary stories. Chekhov had a genius for portraying moods and states of mind and a deep-seated aversion for the strong and the efficient. He usually ended on a minor kev "not with a bang but a whimper."

Maxim Gorky was the pen-name of Alexis Peshkov (born 1868), a self-educated product of the urban working class, who became a provincial journalist. In the 1890's he wrote the short stories about tramps and social outcasts which made him famous. After 1900 he wrote longer and more ambitious novels and plays, dealing with Russian life in general and with social problems in particular, discursive and increasingly revolutionary. Gorky took an active part in the uprising of 1905 against the Tsar's autocracy. In 1914 he was a pacifist, and in 1917 a Communist.

It is noteworthy that the majority of the writers whom we ¹ See below, pp. 656-659. For a portrait of Gorky, see below, facing p. 928.

have been mentioning, especially those devoted to psychological analysis, associated with their "realism" a peculiar æstheticism.

This took the form, perhaps most typically, as with

"Impressionism" in Form with "Realism" in Subject

Flaubert, Daudet, Bourget, Anatole France, Meredith, Pirandello, and Chekhov, of a meticulous use of words and the studied creation of an "impressionistic" atmosphere, frequently tinged with irony. Occasionally, as with Shaw, the style, though exceedingly

direct, was startlingly paradoxical. Sometimes there was a marked straining for unusual expression, and an achievement of mysterious vagueness, as with the Goncourts and Henry James. In several cases, as with Ibsen particularly, and less so with Hauptmann, Fogazzaro, and Tolstoi, realism was supplemented, especially from the 1890's onward, by mysticism in content and a kind of "symbolism" in form. "Not sharp colors,

"Sym-bolism"

but pastel shades, not a literal exactness but a suggestive use of words," was the way in which one symbolist indicated the ideal of the new æsthetics. "Art for

art's sake" was the popular interpretation.

Such "symbolism" went naturally enough with mysticism, but the relevance of mysticism and symbolism to the age of machinery, big business, and scientific realism is not so clear. The mysticism was vague and varied, it is true, and not at all orthodox, and the symbolism which attended it was no simple phenomenon. Perhaps the new literary movement owed more to previous romanticism than its devotees would confess. Perhaps it was a reaction against the certitudes of science. Perhaps, on the other hand, it was a logical corollary to the latest propositions of science, a formulation of the notion that the only thing left for man to do, now that he was demonstrably a very minor cog in a universal machine of physics and chemistry, was to seek sensations and to express himself in an art which would have no other object than "art" itself. At any rate, by the 1890's, the most significant poetry in an essentially prosaic age was characterized, along with a growing amount of the prose, by "symbolism" and similar esoteric qualities, implying that form is more than content, sound is more than sense, and that the highest goal of human endeavor is "pure æsthetics."

In France, "symbolism" was established as a theory and

applied to poetry by Stephane Mallarmé (1842-1898), a mild-

mannered professor of English literature in a Parisian college. Mallarmé taught that beauty is sensuous and can best be felt through words mysteriously suggestive of color, sound, taste, and touch. He was very fond of Edgar Allan Symbolism in Poe's poetry, which he translated into French, and he held that the most perfect phrase in all literature was Poe's line about "the viol, the violet, and the vine." His own poetry, beginning with the celebrated Après-midi d'un faune (1876), he invested with a strangely jewelled magnificence and a vaguely haunting impressionism. As he grew older he grew more obscure and eventually abandoned punctuation.

Mallarmé for years presided every Tuesday evening over a salon to which young writers flocked and at which he held forth on æsthetic feeling and appreciation. It was very effective in forming a generation of "symbolists." By the late 1880's and throughout the 1890's a swarm of young men were vowed to "pure æsthetics," and the extremists among them, in the name of "art," were assuming "stained-glass attitudes," caressing Japanese prints and medieval tapestries, carrying lilies and sunflowers, indulging in absinthe and hashish and in the most singular amours. These were the "æsthetes" of the "fin de siècle"; the "decadents" they were called by their critics.

Of all the French "decadents," the greatest literary genius was Paul Verlaine (1844–1896). Born at Metz, the son of a Napoleonic army officer, he was initiated into "impressionism" while he was a student and clerk at Paris. In the late 1860's he published two volumes of captivating poetry betraying the influence of Baudelaire 1 and Victor Hugo 2 as well as much originality of his own. Then, in the early 1870's, he travelled around with a precocious youth, Arthur Rimbaud, quarrelled with him, and for firing a pistol at him was imprisoned for two years in Belgium. While he was in gaol, Verlaine was converted from a pagan into a Catholic, and some of his finest

³ Rimbaud (1854–1891), a vagabond from childhood, wrote in his teens some amazing "symbolist" verse. After his break with Verlaine he disappeared from view, and it was not generally known until after his death that, following the most varied adventures throughout Europe and the Dutch East Indies, he had settled in Ethiopia and become a wealthy merchant and powerful chieftain. Verlaine's publication in 1886 of the verse of Rimbaud (whom he thought dead) did much to forward the "symbolist" movement.

poetry, published after his release, was sincerely religious in subject-matter. But whether the attitude was pagan, as in Romances sans Paroles (1874), or Catholic, as in Sagesse (1881), the form was "symbolist" and the effect was mystical. And Verlaine's later life of poverty and disease, of alternating fits of drunkenness and repentance, rendered him, despite his chronic courage and cheerfulness, the typical "decadent."

In England, a parallel trend toward "pure æstheticism" was

In England, a parallel trend toward "pure æstheticism" was fostered by Walter Pater (1839–1894), whose position as an Oxford don enabled him to exert an influence on young English writers comparable with that which Mallarmé was contemporaneously exercising on young French writers. Pater was both "pagan" and "modern" in his admiration for the culture of ancient Greece and Rome and for the art of the classical renaissance and in his cult of sensuous enjoyment as opposed to asceticism. He had a fondness for beauty of word and phrase, and to select circles he communicated it in his Marius the Epicurean (1885).

Pater expressed the new æstheticism in sonorous prose rather than in poetry. The Englishman who inaugurated its vogue in poetry was Algernon Swinburne (1837–1909), an aristocrat and a neurotic, whose Poems and Ballads (1866) Swinmarked a revolution in the form of English verse. burne Their strange witchery of words and sound, their lilting impressionism, suggested Baudelaire, Poe, and the pre-Raphaelites 1 rather than Tennyson or Wordsworth or earlier English poets. In form, Swinburne was "symbolist," even "decadent." Yet in subject-matter he showed, as time went on, an ever closer adherence to the tradition of Byron and Shellev, the tradition of intellectual revolt against the conventions and restraints of politics, religion, and morality. This tradition he reënforced by his acceptance of an extreme "Darwinism" and especially by his sympathy with Nietzsche's virulence against Christianity. In his Songs before Sunrise (1871), in his second series of Poems and Ballads (1878), and in his later poetical dramas, he put a bitter hatred of priests and kings and traditional morality into a framework of alliterative rhetoric, peculiarly alluring to youth.

In Britain æstheticism of the "decadence" reached its zenith

In Britain æstheticism of the "decadence" reached its zenith in Oscar Wilde (1856-1900), with his extreme affectation of

¹ See above, p. 170.

"art for art's sake," with his sparkling plays and coruscating essays and fairy tales, with his bohemianism and fateful imprisonment and what he described as "dying beyond his means." Wilde was only one devotee, albeit the most notorious, of a literary fashion of the fag-end of the nineteenth century—the "fin de siècle." It seemed then as though both England and France specialized in minor poets and that these were all "symbolist."

Related to the æstheticism of the symbolist and "decadent" movements, and largely inspired by it, was a new concern with finding (or inventing) symbolic and mysterious features in folk literature. Ibsen ransacked collections of Norse sagas Mystical to find symbols of basic Norwegian character, and the Nationmysticism of his last period echoed an æsthetic appreciation of pre-Christian mythology. Lesser literary artists in other countries adopted similar methods and moods, evoking as beautiful and aboriginal (and always shadowy) the "soul" of Slav or Celt. A twilight of mystical nationalism seemed to descend upon Europe. Upon Ireland, for example, a peculiarly "Celtic" afterglow was shed in the 1890's by a group of youthful æsthetes, including Lady Gregory (1850-1932), William Butler Yeats (born 1865), and George ism Russell (1867–1935, writing under the initials "AE"), who accompanied their mystic poems and plays with erudite footnotes on the symbolism of legendary Gaelic beasts and gods.

Stylistic "symbolism" was employed not only by a new generation of nationalists and by so-called "decadents," but also by such a "psychological" artist as Maurice Maeterlinck (born 1862). Maeterlinck was a Belgian of Flemish extraction, who, after graduating from the University linck and of Ghent, lived several years in Paris, becoming the New Mysticism acquainted with Mallarmé and other members of the "symbolist" group, and, under their influence, beginning to write poetical plays in French. In 1892 appeared his Pelléas and Mélisande, and his reputation was made. During the next twenty years he sustained it with a succession of dramas and lyrics, treating of the "souls" of orphan princesses, blind persons, or pale Arthurian knights, who, in shadowy bodies out of time and space, mysteriously stir about and vaguely sigh according to the dictates of some inscrutable but thwarting fate.

Contemporary with Maeterlinck and the "Celtic twilight" and the last phase of Ibsen—contemporary also with Shaw and Wells, Chekhov and Pirandello, Bourget and Anatole France—were certain writers who peculiarly reflected (and at the same time directed) some of the most significant philosophic (as well as literary) tendencies of the latter part of the era of realism, say the two decades from 1890 to 1910. Four of these writers—Samuel Butler and George Moore, Barrès and D'Annunzio—merit special mention.

Samuel Butler (1835-1902) was the advocate of the "realism of frankness" in conforming one's conduct to the dubieties of modern science. Descended from a line of Anglican clergy-Butler men and expected to maintain the family tradition, he and the angered his father by developing religious doubts while New Frankness a student at Cambridge University and insisting that he would be a painter rather than a priest. To escape his sire, he emigrated to New Zealand, where he made a fortune from sheepraising. Following his return to England in 1864, he painted some pictures, composed some music, and engaged in a variety of literary diversions. He wrote a story of a modern "utopia," a satire on Christ's miracles, and a series of critical books on evolution. It was typical of Butler's robust independence of mind that he dissented vigorously from Darwin's theory of "natural selection" and insisted that variation of species was due not to "natural luck" but to the "cunning" of the individual in adapting itself to its environment, a "cunning" handed on by the inheritance of "unconscious memory" or "habit." The really memorable work of Samuel Butler, however, was The Way of all Flesh, written between 1873 and 1885 but not published until 1903, the year after his death. Largely autobiographical, it was a manifesto against sham and pretence, and against every attempt to take seriously either life or death. Sceptical and mocking throughout, and especially denunciatory of the handicap which religious faith was presumed to impose on human "cunning," it was immensely fascinating to Shaw and to the generation which applauded Shaw in the first part of the twentieth century.

George Moore (1852-1933) was the exponent of "pagan real-

Note. The picture opposite, a caricature of Oscar Wilde's lecturing to American farmers on æstheticism, is by Max Beerbohm (born 1872).





ism." He was an Irishman by birth but a Frenchman by choiceand he wrote beautiful English. He went to Paris to study art when he was eighteen and became so enamand the ored of Gallic life and culture that in France he re-New Paganism mained. When he was almost fifty he imagined that he was still enough of an Irishman to make life in his native land endurable, but his imagining proved vain. In a few years he was back in France. George Moore learned how to paint, but he preferred to write. His first literary ventures were in poetry-Flowers of Passion (1878) and Pagan Poems (1882)—in the manner of Baudelaire and the "symbolists." Then he turned to prose, a peculiarly crystalline prose, and to philosophical themes. In Esther Waters (1894) and Sister Teresa (1901) he transplanted into English gardens the philosophical (and pagan) French novel of a Flaubert or an Anatole France. Considerably later, in The Brook Kerith, he presented a pagan transcription of the story of the Christian Gospels. In the meantime, beginning with Confessions of a Young Man (1888) and extending to Hail and Farewell (1914), he featured himself as the perfect pagan, eschewing asceticism and avoiding extremes, deriving unashamed pleasure from the body and viewing self-expression as the noblest of the arts.

Barrès and D'Annunzio were "realists" of individual and national egotism. Maurice Barrès (1862-1923) was a French æsthete greatly influenced not only by the literary fashions of his day but also by the religious criticism of Renan Personal and by the philosophical positivism of Comte; and from dipping into the writings of Schopenhauer and Egotism: Nietzsche he brought up a firm belief in himself as one Barrès of the supermen. His first success was a trilogy of novels under the inclusive title The Cult of the Ego (1887-1891), written in a charming style and supporting an extreme individualism. From praise of personal egotism, Barrès passed to praise of national egotism in his second trilogy, The Romance of National Energy (1807-1903). Here and in his later writings, he preached the doctrine that the nation, like the individual, must will great things, feel great passions, and pursue its own ends as a selfsufficient unit. France in particular, he pleaded, must exemplify

Note. The portrait opposite is of George Moore by the French impressionist painter, Edouard Manet (1832-1883). On Manet, see below, p. 401.

the most intense nationalism. This she would do by encouraging a cult of the soil, by clinging tenaciously to her most glorious traditions (including Catholicism ¹ and imperialism), by supplanting weak-kneed republicanism with strong-arm dictatorship, and by developing popular enthusiasm for a "war of revenge" against Germany and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine.

Gabriele D'Annunzio (born 1863) resembled Barrès. He belonged to a family of Dalmatia, Italy's "irredenta," as Barrès sprang from the French "lost province" of Lorraine. Sent to school in Tuscany, D'Annunzio came under zio the influence both of the new æstheticism and of the Nietzchean philosophy and was soon producing much impassioned, colorful poetry in praise of the ego and the superman. Presently, however, again like Barrès, he turned from personal egotism to national egotism. He sought and found the origin of eternal Italian traditions in pagan Rome; he elaborated a "Latin" style; he assumed an oracular pose and an imperial bearing. He also, more gradually, discovered an æsthetic and national value in Catholic Christianity: he revelled in its vestments and rites; he pronounced it true because it was beautiful; he proclaimed it sacred because it was Italian and Roman. Besides, he developed and propagated a zeal for the conquest of Dalmatia, the Trentino, and other parts of "Italia irredenta." He alternated poetical eloquence with dramatic bombast in demands for war against Austria. Eventually, at the close of the World War, he became a national hero by his theatrical seizure of Fiume.² D'Annunzio and Barrès were typical literary fashioners (frequently quite "romantic") of the "realistic" nationalism which bore abundant fruit in the twentieth century.3

2. PAINTING, MUSIC, ARCHITECTURE, AND SCULPTURE

There was a vast amount of pictorial art during the "age of realism," but on the whole the painting was less distinctive than the literature of the age. Most of the literature, as we have seen, was not "classicist" or professedly "romantic,"

¹ Barrès was a religious sceptic in private thought but a defender of Catholic Christianity in public and national life. He held that while Catholicism was not absolutely true, it was an important part of the French national tradition and therefore an asset to French "national energy."

² See below, p. 868.

³ On this later phase of nationalism, see below, pp. 871-883, 1047-1053.

but ostentatiously "realist"; and in form much of it was very fine. On the other hand, a good deal of the painting was imitatively "classicist" or traditionally "romania in Age of Realism" realist.

only in the impressionistic manner of the literary symbolists. There was a quantitative increase of painting. Ever so many rising industrialists (at least their wives), with more money than taste, acquired a reputation for "culture" by collecting pictures, usually through "art dealers," who flourished as never before, and who, if there were not enough first-rate pictures to go around, could profitably dispose of second-rate pictures if their "style" was in fashion or their authors had "name." The private demand for portraits, landscapes, still-life scenes. human-interest episodes, was unparallelled. Besides, in an era of mounting national resources and intensifying national spirit, all the new public buildings—government offices, town halls, libraries, universities—had to be adorned with historical or allegorical murals. And for both the public murals and the private pictures the principal demand after 1870 was along the lines of the "romantic" or "classicist" development prior to 1870.1

The better sort of "classicist" painting after 1870 may be in-

The better sort of "classicist" painting after 1870 may be indicated by reference to Leighton and Alma-Tadema. Frederick Leighton (1830–1896), an Englishman by birth and classicist eventually raised to the English peerage as Baron Painting: Leighton, imbibed his "classicism" from extensive and protracted travel and observation on the Continent and expressed it, with exceptionally good draftsmanship, in such conventional subjects as Venus Disrobing for the Bath (1867), Captive Andromache (1888), and Garden of the Hesperides (1892). Lawrence Alma-Tadema (1836–1912) was a Netherlander, trained at Antwerp, who settled in England in 1870 and became a British citizen—and knight. His frescoes Tadema in the city hall at Antwerp (1859) betray a romantic mood, as does his later series of pictures of Merovingian history, but his much more famous scenes from Greek and Roman life are obviously quite "classicist" in inspiration as well as in theme. Another painter, chiefly classicist, though with a large admixture of romanticism, and one who enjoyed an immense vogue, was Arnold Böcklin (1827–1901), a

German Swiss, who was passionately devoted to Italy and spent a large part of his life there. Böcklin was first and foremost a landscape painter, but he centred each landscape, and tried to express its "soul," in an allegorical portrait or scene taken from pagan mythology.

Among the thoroughly romantic painters of the period, mention may be made of Edward Steinle (1810-1886), a native of Vienna and for almost forty years professor of the Romantic history of painting at Frankfurt, whose Violinist and Painting: Steinle fairy-tale illustrations appealed to the sentimental and and to enthusiasts about national folklore. The most Chavannes gifted romantic, however, was a celebrated Frenchman, Puvis de Chavannes (1824-1898), whose murals in the Paris Panthéon and in the Boston Public Library are justly famed for the poetical beauty of their composition, the decorative effect of their coloring, and the emotional quality of their mood.

At Paris, which was the recognized capital of European art throughout the nineteenth century, a type of painting known as

Rise and Vogue of "Impressionism" "impressionism" was evolved in the second half of the century. It was certainly not "classicist," and, though indebted for its dreamy poetical tendency to preceding romanticists (notably Corot), it was not so concerned

with pure naturalism, and not so forceful or vivid, as most romantic painting had been. Its sources were partly in romanticism but more specifically in a revived appreciation of Spanish painting of early modern times, particularly the subtle composition and coloring of Velasquez's canvases and the queer effect of distortion in El Greco's,² and also in a sudden new enthusiasm for the suggestiveness, the decorum, and the decorativeness, of Japanese art. Japan, it should be borne in mind, was opened up anew to Europeans in the late 1850's, and very shortly afterwards its art was influencing European art—literature as well as painting—even more than the Chinese had influenced it back in the eighteenth century.³

"Impressionism" in painting was akin to the new æstheticism and symbolism in literature, and each reacted on the other.

¹On Corot, see above, pp. 168-169.

² On El Greco and Velasquez, see Vol. I, pp. 116, 143 n., 266, 267 n., 561.

⁸On the influence of Chinese art at that time, see Vol. I, pp. 565-566. On the "closing" and "reopening" of Japan to Europeans, see below, pp. 714-717.

As Mallarmé and Pater were apostles of the novel movement in poetry and prose, so Manet was its pioneer in the pictorial arts. Edouard Manet (1832–1883), after completing his academic course in Paris, spent three years in South America and was so enamored by the old Spanish masters whose works he saw there that on his return he made a careful study of the examples of Spanish art in the Louvre and proceeded in the 1860's and 1870's to paint, in "impressionistic" style, a number of engaging pictures, including A Spaniard Playing the Guitar, Olympia, and The Music Lesson. Like Mallarmé, Manet was attracted to Edgar Allan Poe, and in his illustrations of Poe's Raven some Japanese influence was manifest.

Manet's "impressionism" soon inspired a notable group of French artists. Camille Pissaro (1831-1903) began as a student of Corot but presently threw in his lot with Manet. Curious effects of sunlight became almost an obsession with him, and his chief pictures—of boulevards and bridges of Paris and Rouen—he invested with a peculiar "atmosphere." Edgar Degas (1834-1917) painted dancers and ballets, workwomen and jockeys, portraits of criminals, and several likenesses of Manet, all in wistful and vaguely haunting moods. Claude Monet (1840-1926) in his paintings subtly suggested, rather than definitely depicted, cathedral towers in varying lights, and rocky cliffs along the seacoast, and architectural piles in Paris and London.² Auguste Renoir (1841-1919) tried his skill in almost every genre, in portraiture, landscape, scenes from contemporary life, excelling in his pictures of nude figures transfigured by lyrical feeling and plastic sense.

With these French "impressionists" must be classed the son of an American army officer, James McNeill Whistler (1834–1903), who studied with Manet at Paris in the 1850's Whistler and thereafter resided in England, with frequent trips to France. Whistler was fascinated by Japanese prints; and his own etchings and lithographs, as well as his "nocturnes" and "tone paintings," were eloquent not only of a sense of harmonious beauty original with him but also of a considerable bor-

¹ For an example of Manet's art, see his portrait of George Moore, facing p. 397, above.

² For an example of Monet's art, see the picture facing p. 533, below.

rowing from Japanese sources.¹ Whistler was a good deal of a poseur and dandy, and an especially faulty draftsman, but he was as influential as he was provocative, and in his *Gentle Art of Making Enemies* (1890) he proved that he was a master of charming prose.

One of the noteworthy painters of the age was Paul Cézanne (1839-1906). Cézanne was a schoolmate and lifelong friend of Zola; and, coming to Paris in 1863 to study art, he joined the group about Manet and for a time painted in a Toward "Postthoroughly impressionistic manner. Under the guid-Impresance of Pissaro, the best draftsman of the group, he sionism": gradually improved his technique; and then, gradually, he outgrew "impressionism." He wished to emphasize the "realistic" aspects of his art, and he felt that, to produce the needful psychological effects, he must give more solidity to pictures than the impressionists gave. Secluded in his native Aix (in southern France), he did his most distinctive work in the 1890's; with thick layers of paint he made simple, vivid, and slightly distorted portraits, landscapes, and pictures of card-games. At the very end of his career, we may remark, he reverted to a kind of extreme romanticism. Cézanne's painting was not particularly popular in his own day, but it was subsequently recognized as the starting-point of "post-impressionism" and of many artistic vagaries of the present age.2


A strangely barbarous extremity of "impressionism" was exemplified by two "revolutionary" painters—Gauguin and Van Gogh. Paul Gauguin (1848–1903), half French and half Peruvian, learned the impressionist technique from Pissaro, but exaggerated and transformed it by adopting an extraordinary subjectivity and by employing a "decadent" symbolism and the most startling colors. As one of his disciples said, "Gauguin freed us from all restraints which the idea of copying placed on our painter's instinct. . . . Henceforth we aspired to express our own personality. . . . If at any moment

¹ A typical etching by Whistler is reproduced below, facing p. 460.

² See below, pp. 1143-1145. For an example of Cézanne's art, see the picture facing p. 417, below.

Note. The picture opposite, "The Ballet Rehearsal," is by the French impressionist, Edgar Degas (1834-1917). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum, New York.





a tree looked reddish to us, we might paint it in vermilion; if a girl's shoulder struck us just right, we might stress its curve even to the point of deformation." Gauguin escaped not only from the canons of conventional art but also from the haunts of traditional civilization. The last decade of his life he passed in squalor and semi-insanity on South Sea islands, painting primitive native scenes.¹

Vincent Van Gogh (1853–1890), a Netherlander and the son of a Calvinist pastor, left the business of selling art objects at the Hague, Paris, and London to study theology; he left the seminary at Amsterdam to preach Christian communism and anarchism to Dutch workingmen; and he left Protestant radicalism to become a radical painter. He intermittently studied art at Brussels, Antwerp, and Paris, and for a short time collaborated with Gauguin—until he scared the latter off by trying to kill him and by mutilating himself. At the last, he was quite mad and he died by his own hand. Van Gogh painted blossoming fruit trees, sunlit fields, sunflowers, his own portrait, his simple room, his rustic chair; and whatever he painted he marked with Japanese-like decoration, with the most intense emotion, and with the wildest color.

Both as man and painter Van Gogh was deemed bizarre and of no account by his contemporaries. By them, too, Gauguin was adjudged a "wild man," though they grudgingly admitted that he was contributing something worth while to the art of colored posters. It remained for a later, and perhaps a more tired, generation to extol Gauguin and Van Gogh as founders of "modern art."

"Impressionism" flourished and "post-impressionism" arose in France. Indeed, the most significant painting of all the "schools" of the era from 1870 to 1910, whether "radical" or "conservative," was done by Frenchmen or by persons who studied in France. Among the latter, the most memorable, in addition to Whistler, in Painting (Sorolla and Zuloaga), an Anglo-American (Sargent), and a Russian (Vereschagin).

¹ One of Gauguin's South Sea paintings is reproduced below, facing p. 748.

Note. The picture opposite is the self-portrait of the unhappy and "revolutionary" painter, Vincent Van Gogh (1853–1890), which he dedicated to Gauguin.

Joaquin Sorolla (1863–1923), a native of Valencia, was halt romantic and half impressionistic. His first striking success was Another Margaret and one of his best-known pictures is The Fishermen's Return. He was popular as a portrait painter and a mural decorator. Ignacio Zuloaga (born 1870), a native of the Basque region, was considerably affected, while a youthful student at Paris, by Gauguin, and much more, on his return to Spain, by El Greco and Goya. He painted in a strong, decorative, rugged style.¹

Portrait painting, which had been exemplified in England by a distinguished line of artists, was best represented there in the "age of realism" by John Sargent (1856–1925), who was born in Italy of American parents and made his head-quarters at Paris until 1885 and thereafter at London. Sargent displayed, in the spirit of the age, a remarkable control of light and shade and a tendency to accentuate the less pleasing qualities of his sitters. "I chronicle, I do not judge," he said. His portraits are "psychological" and at the same time decorative; famous examples are Carmencita, Lady Hamilton, The Duke of Marlborough and His Family, Henry James.² Between 1890 and 1916 Sargent executed a series of huge murals on the History of Religion for the Boston Public Library, and after 1910 he abandoned portrait painting and went in for water colors.³

A kind of "social realist" in the domain of painting was Vassili Vereschagin (1842–1904), descended from a family of Russian landlords and trained as a naval officer. He was an indefatigable traveller—all over Asia as well as throughout Europe, and he loved adventure. He was with the Russian army, and seriously wounded, in the war of 1877–1878. He was with the American army in the Philippines. He lost his life in the sinking of a Russian battleship by the Japanese in 1904. Vereschagin knew enough of war to hate it, and in the spirit of Tolstoi he devoted his very real talents to propaganda against it. His A potheosis of War shows a pyramid of skulls dedicated "to all conquerors, past, present, and to

¹ See, for example, the picture facing p. 581, below.

² Another example, a Spanish priest, is reproduced below, facing p. 580.

³ Another artist who shared Sargent's popularity as a portrait-painter in Britain was Sir John Lavery (born 1856).

come"; his Left Behind depicts a dying soldier deserted by his fellows. Innumerable gruesome war pictures he painted, always with didactic aim.

More pronouncedly than in painting, the new "realism" was set forth in the art of caricature, which was highly developed and especially popular during the era. A large number Caricature of caricaturists found outlet for their work in the in Age of multiplying comic journals of the time; and, on the whole, their pictures were apt to be better drawn and to deal more directly with the "realities" of social and political life than the pictures of contemporary painters. Of the caricaturists (and illustrators) of the era, four may here be mentioned.

Perhaps the greatest of the caricaturists was a Frenchman, Jean Louis Forain (1852–1931), who in his drawings for various Parisian journals (usually of a conservative trend) Forain mercilessly exposed the weaknesses of republican politicians and the capitalistic bourgeoisie. He derived the scathing bitterness of his satire from Daumier, and his pictorial style from Manet and Degas (though his draftsmanship was superior to any of the "impressionists"). A close second to Forain was an Englishman, John Tenniel (1820–1914), associated with the London Punch for over fifty years. Tenniel's Work was characterized by an accuracy of drawing almost equal to Forain's, and by a greater geniality of satire; some of his political cartoons are classics.

The designing of "posters" was done with distinction by Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec (1864–1901), an admirer of Degas and of Japanese woodcuts, who, as something of a "symbolist" and "decadent," provided illustrations of Parisian night-life, specializing in types of Montmartre and in circus-scenes. Lautrec Another kind of illustrating—the drawing of fantastic and decorative figures in black and white—was done to perfection by a short-lived English "decadent," Aubrey Beardsley (1872–1898).³

In music, such outstanding romantic opera composers of the preceding era as Gounod, Wagner, and Verdi⁴ lived considerably

¹ On Daumier, see above, pp. 169-170. For examples of Forain's art, see the picture facing p. 833, and the tail-pieces on pp. 841, 904.

² Drawings by Tenniel are reproduced on p. 382, above, and facing p. 503, below.

⁸ See his self-portrait on p. 526, below.

⁴ See above, pp. 173-174.

beyond the year 1870 and exerted a strongly romantic influence on the succeeding generation. The tradition of a na-Music in tional French opera, firmly established by Gounod, was continued by Camille Saint-Saëns (born 1835), Age of Realism: Predomiwith his Samson and Dalila, first produced in 1877, and nantly Romantic by Jules Massenet (1842-1912), with his Manon, Thais, and Jongleur de Notre Dame. The tradition of distinctively German music, fathered by Wagner, was contin-Massenet ued by Richard Strauss (born 1864). Strauss composed songs in the romantic manner of Liszt and Mendelssohn and some early operas and orchestral pieces in that of Wag-Richard ner. Then, aspiring to be "modern" and "realist" Strauss (and coming under the double influence of Nietzsche and the "symbolists"), he produced the magnificent but somewhat bizarre Hero's Life and the sensational operas of Salome (1905) and Elektra (1910). In Italy, the romantic Verdi Puccini was supplemented and succeeded by the romantic Giacomo Puccini (1858–1924), whose La Bohème (1896), Tosca (1900), and Madame Butterfly (1904, with its "Japanese" flavor) enjoyed an immense popularity.

Indeed, the prevailing inspiration and mood of musical art, unlike literature and painting, continued, throughout the whole "era of realism," to be national and romantic. Such was the case with Johannes Brahms (1833-1897), an eminent German musician, long resident in Vienna, who wrote a Song Brahms of Triumph in celebration of German military victories in 1870-1871 and who in his later Hungarian Dances and his many other compositions displayed a lively appreciation of Hungarian and German nationalism. Such, too, was the case with a group of notable composers who, by utilizing and elaborating folk-melodies, sought to create a distinguished Folknational music for several lesser peoples in Europe: Music for example, Friedrich Smetana (1824-1884) and Anton Dvorák (1841-1904) for the Czechs, and Edvard Grieg (1843-1907) for the Norwegians. Such, also, was the case both with Johann Strauss "the Younger" (1825–1899) whose sparkling waltzes, such as the *Blue Danube*, and Light Opera: I. Strauss popular operettas, such as *Die Fledermaus*, were peculiarly "Viennese" and quite romantic, and with Sullivan Arthur Sullivan (1842-1900), whose songs were finely sentimental

and whose well-known light operas, including *Pinafore*, *Patience*, *Iolanthe*, and *The Mikado*, were as "English" and as genially satirical as the drawings of Tenniel.

Such, finally, was the case with the more sober "school" of music which arose in Russia. Peter Tschaikovski (1840–1893) based his opera of Eugen Onegin on a folk story by Pushkin, and composed his famous descriptive 1812 Overture in commemoration of his country's successful conflict with Russian Music Napoleon; while his "symphonic poems," and particularly his celebrated "sixth symphony"—the Pathétique—betrayed the sentimental and mystical leanings of his romantic heart. Modeste Moussorgsky (1835–1881) inaugurated the peculiarly "Russian opera" with his forceful, fateful Boris Godunov in 1874, and Nicholas Rimsky-Korsakov (1844–1908) not only continued and developed it in Sadko and Coq d'Or but displayed a genius for enshrining Russian folk-music in orchestral suites of strangely modernist conception and effect.

Some reaction against romanticism, some response to newer tendencies in literature and painting, was evidenced by a few first-rate musical composers between 1870 and 1910. At least in form, if not always in subject, both Rimsky-"Mod-Korsakov and Richard Strauss were increasingly em" Music "modern" and "realist." Moreover, Edward Elgar (1857-1934), an English composer, while displaying romanticism in his showy march, Pomp and Circumstance, and in most of his other instrumental music, reflected in his oratorios, Elgar and The Dream of Gerontius (1900) and The Kingdom (1906), current "realist" tendencies toward psychological analysis and a novel mysticism. A sharper break with romantic traditions was made by Max Reger (1873-1916), a gifted German composer, who thought of himself as a modern Mozart 1 and whose favorite type of composition was the fugue.

The outstanding innovator in musical art, however, was Claude Debussy (1862–1918), a Frenchman who studied under Massenet and began in the 1880's to experiment with unusual scales and "mystical" dissonances calculated to appeal to the sophisticated imagination rather than to the simpler emotions. The new style seemed quite in keeping with the "impressionism" of contemporary painting and with the

¹ See Vol. I, p. 575.

"symbolism" of current literature, and Debussy employed it in musical settings for poems of Verlaine and Baudelaire, for the Après-midi d'un faune of Mallarmé, and, most fully, for the Pelléas and Mélisande of Maeterlinck. Debussy's work was significant and influential in the transition from the music of the nineteenth century to that of the twentieth.

In architecture, both "classical" and "romantic" styles which had been employed from 1830 to 1870 1 con-Architinued to be utilized and adapted from 1870 to 1910. tecture In this later period, the romantic "Gothic revival" in Age of Realism slackened; few of the newer public buildings or private dwellings were dominated by it.2 Yet it by no means went entirely out of fashion. It was evidenced in a number of Slackenecclesiastical edifices, especially in Britain and the ing of Gothic United States, in a profusion of collegiate buildings, Revival and in numerous details of miscellaneous structures which were ostensibly "classical."

"Classicism" was, indeed, the prevailing mode in architecture after 1870, but it was an "eclectic classicism"—a decorative baroque classicism, varying from country to country in accord-

Prevalence of Eclectic Classicism ance with historic and national circumstance, and not disdaining to make use of novel materials, such as steel and concrete, and curious bits of embellishment suggestive less of purely Greek and Roman models

than of Egyptian or Hindu or Japanese or even Gothic. The eclecticism of the returning classicism was wide, and symptomatic of the rapidly broadening interests with which the rampant imperialism of the time was endowing Europe. Some of the best-known examples of this eclectic classicism are: the grandiose court theatre in Vienna (1871–1889), a crowning achievement of Gottfried Semper; the heavy Reichstag building (1882–1894) and Protestant cathedral (1888–1895) the at Berlin, and the similarly heavy German Supreme Court (1884–1895)

¹ See above, pp. 160-164.

² Notable among the exceptional public buildings which were erected in the Gothic style were the parliament buildings at Budapest in Hungary and at Ottawa in Canada.

⁸ See above, p. 163.

⁴The original designs for the Protestant cathedral at Berlin were Gothic (see above, p. 162), but they were discarded in favor of the massively baroque designs of J. C. Raschdorff.

at Leipzig; the colossal national memorial at Rome to King Victor Emmanuel II (1884–1911); and the lighter and more graceful "Little Palace of the Fine Arts" put up at Paris in connection with the international exposition of 1900. The "Little Palace" was the perfect flower of "official" French architecture and, by reason of the commanding position of French art in general, it was extremely influential at the beginning of the twentieth century as an inspiration for the designing, all over Europe and America, of art galleries and libraries and of mansions for industrial capitalists.

Two variants of "classicism" during the period should be mentioned. One was the revival of a Byzantine style, illustrated most monumentally in the Church of the Sacred Heart, designed by Paul Abadie (1812–1884) and reared atop Wariants of Classicism: following the Franco-Prussian War, and in the great the Catholic cathedral of Westminster (in London), begun in 1895 in accordance with the plans of J. F. Bentley.

The other variant was a new type of domestic architecture, based on classical models but aiming at "picturesqueness" in appearance and "livableness" in interior appointments. In France and Germany it was exemplified by suburban dwellings which betrayed the influence of the "Queen châlets of Switzerland, and in England (and the United Anne" States) by the "Queen Anne" house, representing an essentially modern combination of a variety of materials suggested by the "Gothic revival" with forms recalling the "Dutch" fashions which had flourished in England at the close of the seventeenth century, during the reigns of William III and Anne.

Thus, in greater or less degree, traditional classicism (and romanticism) entered into the prevailing "eclectic" architecture of the age of realism. But the age witnessed the beginning of quite a different movement in architecture—one which was not "eclectic" and which spurned tradition whether romantic or classical. This movement, to which the name of "functionalism" is sometimes given, was associated in spirit as well as "Functional" with the spread and intensification of industry, "Functional" with the vogue of machinery and science and material—architection painting and "realist" literature. Especially from Darwinian

biology it took its cardinal principle that form must be rigorously adapted to environment and function. Its exponents, chief among whom was a German, Otto Wagner (1841-1918), contended that the new age required a brand-new architecture which would conform the appearance of buildings to their actual use and purpose and at the same time give direct or "symbolic" expression to distinguishing elements in contemporary culture.

Before the emergence of full-fledged "functionalism," there had been a good deal of experimentation with new building materials: with iron, as in the reading-room of the National Library at Paris (1855–1861); with glass and iron, as in the Crystal Palace in England (1851) and in the buildings of the Paris Exposition of 1878; and with "reënforced concrete," as popularized in France in the early 1870's. Then, when "functionalism" did appear as a definite movement in the late 1880's and in the 1890's, it took over the new materials and utilized them as integral parts of its schemes for the new and "modern" architecture.

"Functionalism" bore fruit in the Eiffel Tower at Paris (1889), in the Bishopsgate Institute at London (1893–1894), and, most significantly, in a variety of structures in Germany and Austria, such as the stations of the urban railway in Vienna (designed by Otto Wagner), the Wertheim department-store in Berlin (1896–1904), and the turbine factory of the General Electric Company at Berlin (1909). In addition to the monuments here enumerated, "functionalism" inspired the so-called "new art" craze which temporarily seized Paris in the 1890's; and it exercised an ever widening and developing influence on the construction of bridges, factories, and shops. Eventually, after 1910, it would reach gargantuan proportions.

Sculpture was plentiful during the "age of realism," ² and the best examples of it reflected either the "classicist" baroque sculpture and "eclectic" tendencies in architecture or the naturalist and realist trends in literature and painting. An outstanding representative of the French baroque was Jules Dalou (1838–1902), a pupil of Carpeaux, ³ and such

¹ See below, pp. 1146-1148.

² Reasons for the increasing quantity of sculpture have been suggested above, p. 165.

³ On Carpeaux, see above, p. 165.

an ardent radical republican that he participated in the Paris Commune of 1871 and had to live in exile in England during the next eight years while royalists were dominant in his own country.1 Dalou consciously patterned his sculpture after the painting of Rubens,2 striving for a similar richness of content, vivacity of effect, and "realism" of anatomy and flesh. His first and most renowned achievement of this kind was the monument called The Triumph of the Republic in the Place de la Nation at Paris. Subsequently he executed a number of memorials, to Delacroix for example, in which the effigy was surrounded, usually at a lower level, by large related figures allegorical or historical—a type of memorial which became very common as a decorative adjunct to baroque gardens or buildings. In his last days Dalou forsook the pompousness of "classical" allegory, and, under the influence of Marxian socialism, projected a great "naturalist" monument to Labor.

Another distinguished French sculptor, Alexandre Falguière (1831–1900), fashioned a florid *Triumph of the Republic* (1881–1886) for the Arch of Triumph at Paris and notable "baroque" memorials to Lamartine, to Balzac, to Joan of Arc, to Lafayette (in Washington, D. C.). His chief distinction, however, was in the modelling of nude women.

Some elaborate and frequently "pretty" form of baroque was utilized by numerous sculptors for a multitude of patriotic memorials which were erected after 1870 in Italy, Patriotic England, and Germany as well as in France. They Memofitted in with the grandiose "eclectic" architecture of new public buildings. In Germany, particularly, there was a very pronounced revival of baroque sculpture, not so much "pretty" as exuberant and forceful, whose loud strains were evoked to celebrate Teutonic pride in recent triumph of German arms and creation of the German Empire. The "official" German sculptor of the new era was Reinhold Begas (1831–1911); his monument to the Emperor William I at Berlin was a complete baroque outburst; and the female figures with which he decorated many of his other monuments surpassed in sensuousness anything which the French school had done.

¹ See below, pp. 534-543.

² On Rubens, see Vol. I, pp. 261, 560-561.

² See the reproduction facing p. 508, below.

A reaction against the baroque was represented by Adolf Hildebrand (1847–1921), a South German who spent most of his life in Italy. He saw man as an animal and usually modelled him, after "primitive" Greek statues, in the nude, slender and bony. Two famous monuments by Hildebrand are those of Brahms (1898) at Meiningen and Bismarck (1910) at Bremen.

As Hildebrand reacted against the baroque in the direction of "primitive classicism," so another German sculptor, Max Klinger (1857–1920), reacted against it in an opposite direction—toward the novel, the subjective, the symbolic, the bizarre. An ordinary mind was apt to be perplexed by Klinger's intricacies and astonished by his use of multi-colored marbles, metals, even precious gems, in his statuary. The most talked-of example of his extraordinary conceptions is the highly "symbolic" polychrome Beethoven of the museum at Leipzig.

Contemporary with Klinger was a great American sculptor, Augustus Saint-Gaudens (1848–1907). Saint-Gaudens was born in Dublin, the son of a French father and an Irish mother, and taken to America in infancy. Apprenticed to a cameo-cutter, he studied art in New York; and from 1868 to 1873 he was a student at Paris and Rome. From the latter date he resided in the United States, and here he did his work, at once dignified and "realist," including the low-relief portrait of Robert Louis Stevenson (1887), the high-relief portrait of a president of Princeton University, Dr. McCosh (1889), the noble statue of Lincoln at Chicago, and the impressive equestrian statue of General Sherman at New York.

Of all the sculptors of the era, the most significant and influential were undoubtedly the Frenchman Rodin and the Belgian Meunier. Auguste Rodin (1840–1917) showed a revolutionary repugnance to classical form. He was essentially "modern," interested in psychological analysis, animal passion, and the Nietzchean "will to power," and expressing his interests, somewhat mystically and symbolically, in the blurred outlines of impressionistic painting but with a greater ruggedness and strength. His Man with a Broken Nose is dreadfully realistic. His Thinker suggests the evolution of man from the lower animals. His uncompleted masterpiece, The Gate of Hell, inspired by Dante's Inferno, is an impressionistic, heavily

tragic setting-forth of "modern" sufferings, doubts, and discontents.1

Constantin Meunier (1831–1905), after acquiring some fame as a painter of religious themes, turned his attention in 1880 to the sculptural representation of the Industrial Revolution, especially the rôle of labor in it. He discerned better than any other sculptor the æsthetic values of the workingman's body as moulded. muscularized, made lithe, and hardened by toil, and by his own masterful genius he did much to emphasize the dignity and idealism of labor. Among his distinguished figures were The Puddler, The Hammerer, The Sower, The Mower, The Smith, The Mincr.²

3. BASIC QUESTIONINGS OF SUPERNATURAL RELIGION

The large majority of Europeans continued throughout the nineteenth century to profess some form of Christianity, Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant. Christianity the Major was still, as it had been for centuries, a distinguishing mark of European, or "Western," civilization.

Christianity, the Major European Religion

In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, Christian leaders and believers were confronted with a wave-or a swift succession of waves-of criticism and opposition more varied and with deeper swell than any wave which had previously troubled Christianity. The question now was not whether Protestantism was preferable to Catholicism or whether Pietism was more appealing than Deism. Rather it was of Its Endurance whether, in the face of contemporary political, social, in Age of and intellectual developments, any sizeable group of Europeans would long retain a loyalty to any religious tradition of the past. To a rapidly growing number of persons, certainly among the masses as among the classes—religion appeared to be an anachronism in an age of progress and science. They were sure that the rising generation could live a more realistic life without the aid of supernatural dogmas and without recourse to miracles. Churches might be suffered to linger on awhile; they might even prosper anew if they would transform themselves and follow, rather than resist, the march of "modern civilization."

¹ For examples of Rodin's sculpture, see the pictures facing pp. 157, 188, 373, 832.

² For examples of Meunier's sculpture, see the frontispiece and the picture facing p. 294, above.

The developments which stressed the contrast and broadened the conflict between "modern civilization" and tradi-Elements tional Christianity were the major developments which in " Modern we have already indicated as especially characteristic of Civilizathe "era of realism" from 1870 to 1910. (1) Intensifytion" at ing industrialism promoted indifference if not hostility Variance with to the claims of religion. Not only did it hold out the Historic prospect of a mechanized Europe (and world) in which Christianity human comfort and happiness would be assured without recourse to creed or prayer, but also, in stimulating extensive migration, from field to factory, from one town 1. Industo another, from one country to another, it tended to trialism loosen the hold of the masses upon any ancestral tradition (including the practice of religion).

- (2) Liberalism in general minimized religion and fostered "anticlericalism." It insisted that religion is not at all a public concern, but a purely private matter. No governmental 2. Libfavors should be accorded to any particular religion eralism and Antior church, and the state should be strictly "neutral" and progressively "lay." Religious instruction should Clericalism have no place in public education; and clergymen should be restrained from exercising over the lives of the laity or on the politics of the state any influence which might forward "clericalism" at the expense of "liberalism." Economic liberalism, moreover, was decidedly (if somewhat unwittingly) un-Christian in its emphasis upon money-making and in its extolling of "enlightened selfishness."
- (3) Nationalism in the abstract was not necessarily inimical to historic Christianity. Indeed, the Protestant and Orthodox churches had always been markedly national, and the Catholic Church had recognized the principle of nationality and had frequently made concessions to it; and many nineteenth-century patriots were devout Christians. Nevertheless, the rampant nationalism of the latest age was subversive of Chris-3. Rampant Natian teaching and tradition. It was becoming a relitionalism gion itself, a kind of natural tribal religion in actual (if not theoretical) competition with supernatural, universal Christianity. Its chief concern was not with Christendom but with the nation, not with Christian ideals and civilization but with national ideals and culture, and, as time went on, not with

the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man so much as with the exclusive sovereignty of the national state and the forceful unity of a particular people. It was specially jealous of any ecclesiastical organization which was "international" or "supranational," or which might divide with the national state the loyalty of citizens, and hence it tended to join with liberalism in the furtherance of "anti-clericalism." Of course, wherever a particular form of Christianity had been so long established that it was traditional with a particular people, leading patriots were apt to entertain a sentimental regard for it and to encourage the masses to do likewise, but in such situations the appeal (for example, of Barrès in France or D'Annunzio in Italy) was not so much to the absolute truth of Christianity as to its value and "beauty" as a national asset.

- (4) If liberalism and nationalism were "un-Christian" in their general tendencies, Marxian Socialism was definitely anti-Christian. Its philosophy was dogmatically materialist and determinist; it repudiated the freedom of the inian Socialism dividual will and denied the efficacy if not the existence of any "spiritual" powers. Its goal was a strictly earthly, and not at all a heavenly, paradise; and its declared method of reaching its goal was not through social cooperation but through class conflict. Moreover, militant Marxists were prone to assail traditional society and the traditional family, as well as the institution of private property, and actively to abet "anti-clericalism." No wonder that Marxian Socialism, as it developed and attracted to itself an ever larger number of workingmen, was generally regarded as a most menacing foe of the Christian religion.
- (5) Science was invoked against Christianity. Of course, little or none of the applied science with which the nineteenth century teemed had any real bearing on Christian faith or dogma. At most it only indirectly lessened Christian devotion by concentrating popular attention upon the "marvels" of human achievement, by exalting engineers over preachers or priests, and by stimulating a greater ambition for creature-comforts than for personal holiness. Nor, as a matter of fact, did the experimental science of the century necessarily involve any conflict with Christian theology. The physicist or chemist, the geologist or botanist, might be enlarging human

knowledge about a material, finite world without subtracting anything from the beliefs of man about a spiritual, infinite universe. In fact, of the outstanding scientists whom we have elsewhere mentioned by name, about as many were Christian as non-Christian.

It was when certain philosophizing about natural science was indulged in, and when it was carried over into the so-called social sciences, that conflict was joined between "modern science" and "historic religion." Such a "conflict" was "Conflict" between the theme of many books and pamphlets written be-Science tween 1870 and 1910, and its reality was affirmed not and Theology only by proponents of science who took "pot shots" at the churches, the theologians, and religion in general, but also by defenders of religion who knew more about theology than about science or who knew little about either. The "conflict" was not very edifying, but it was heated and moving and, on the whole, quite natural. And, at least temporarily, it was more damaging to "religion" than to "science." It did serve, in the main, to confirm and extend the alienation of many Europeans (and Americans) from Christianity, and from any "revealed" or dogmatic religion.

To many professed Christians the new evolutionary conceptions of Lyell and Darwin, as explained by Haeckel, Huxley,

Supernatural Religion Questioned by Doctrines of Evolution and Higher Criticism and Spencer, and seemingly reënforced by scores of detailed scientific discoveries and observations, were particularly shocking. They clearly implied that the Biblical account of creation was erroneous, that man had not been created by special act of God a few thousand years ago but had been evolved from lower forms of life by entirely natural processes over a very long period of time. Parallel interpretations of re-

search in psychology and anthropology carried the even more devastating implications that man had no soul or moral responsibility, that his "sins" were attributable to physical disease or biological atavism, and that all his religions were so many evolutionary expressions of primitive myths and fears. And by way of confirming this last implication, a large number of stu-

Note. The portrait opposite is of Ernest Renan from an engraving by a Swedish artist, Anders Zorn (1860–1920). On Renan, see above, p. 362.





dents of "comparative religion" and "higher criticism," following in the footsteps of Strauss and Renan, argued that Christianity was a mere bundle of rites and superstitions borrowed from various older religions and philosophies, that the New Testament as we have it had been written (like the Hebrew Scriptures) long after the events it purported to relate and was hopelessly corrupt, and that Jesus had been an obscure mystic or deluded fanatic or, perhaps, had never existed at all.

By the last decades of the nineteenth century, moreover, all these evolutionary conceptions and implications were imbedded in that "metaphysics of science" which, since at least By Docthe eighteenth century, had conceived of the universe trine of Mechanas a cosmic machine operated by natural law. Such a ical metaphysics now retained its unquestioning allegiance Universe to Newtonian physics and added a deep faith in "Darwinism." Of a thoroughly mechanical universe, all the applied science of the nineteenth century seemed to be illustrative. And Me-With it, all the pure science of the century appeared chanical Man to harmonize. In final support of it, was now presented the teaching that man himself is mechanical, a little cog in an automatic world-machine.

This scientific hypothesis—or scientific metaphysics—of a mechanical, evolving universe, of which all life (including human life) is an integral part, provided the cornerstone for Bv Maseveral philosophies which flourished, as we have seen, terialist in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and which Philosophy were quite anti-Christian or un-Christian: the optimistic materialism of Haeckel; the pessimistic idealism of Schopenhauer; the positivism of the followers of Comte; and the struggle-for-existence and survival-of-the-fittest philosophy of Spencer. To one or another of these philosophies numerous European (and American) intellectuals (scientists, professors, engineers, physicians, lawyers, publicists, etc.) were drawn; and, as we have also seen, the same philosophies actuated, in greater or less degree, the majority of outstanding European men of

 $^{1}\,\mathrm{On}$ the "metaphysics of science" in the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 506–512.

Note. The picture opposite, "Man with Straw Hat," is by the French "post-impressionist," Paul Cézanne (1839–1906). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum, New York. On Cézanne, see above, p. 402.

letters during the period—Anatole France and Zola, Hardy and Swinburne, Shaw and Wells, Samuel Butler and George Moore.

In face of the advancement of materialism and Darwinism by scientists, philosophers, and literary artists, a large Radical number of Europeans (and Americans) repudiated or Dissent from profoundly modified their traditional Christian beliefs Historic and practices. An extreme group—chiefly of intellec-Christianity tuals and proletarians—broke away altogether from the churches and rejected Christianity entirely. These went to swell the minority of sceptics, agnostics, and "infidels" r. In-(or "pagans") who had been continuously in evidence crease of Agnostiin Europe (and America) since the "Enlightenment" cism and and French Revolution of the eighteenth century and "Paganism' who, now becoming numerous in many countries. put new energy into "anti-clerical" campaigns.

Another and less extreme group, particularly of the bourgeoisie, while endorsing with only minor qualifications the general trends of "modern civilization" and the special teachings of 2. Rise of "modern science," remained nominally within the Revolutionary churches and continued to profess Christianity, though "Modernism" seeking to supplant its traditionally fixed "deposit" of faith and morals with up-to-date evolutionary conceptions which would bring the historic churches abreast of "modern progress" and preserve them as carriers of the modern "scientific spirit." Such persons, advocates of a "progressive" Christianity without definite dogmas and with morals derived from experience rather than from revelation, came to be known as "modernists."

On the other hand, a sizeable number of persons who remained within the churches, resisted "modernism" and clung Defense to historic Christianity. The most extreme defenders Historic of traditional religion, including many clergymen and Chrismembers of the lower middle and agricultural classes, tianity especially of "evangelical" antecedents, assumed a rigidly uncompromising position, affirming that the Bible was the literally inspired "Word of God," denouncing the "higher r. Uncompromising "Fundacritics" of it, insisting that men could not be "descended from apes," and denying the whole doctrine mentalism" of evolution. The designation most appropriate to these extremists is the term originally applied to them in the United States—"fundamentalists."

Less extreme in opposition to "science," but no less desirous of preserving historic dogmatic Christianity, were numerous clergymen and laymen, especially in the Catholic Church and in the more "conservative" Protestant churches, who viewed the newer intellectual difficulties somewhat like this: That marvellous current discoveries about the material universe did not and could not disprove the existence of a greater and more enduring spiritual universe; that "Darwin- onciling" ism" was only an hypothesis which was being con-Chrisfessedly weakened in certain details, and which, if true, could explain only the evolution of man's material body, not the creation and life of immortal spirits; that there could be no "conflict" between science rightly understood and theology divinely inspired; that current "higher criticism" of the Bible and the church was "destructive" and displayed too much bias, but that, if pursued "constructively" in a thoroughly scholarly fashion, it would but confirm the essential uniqueness and truth of Christianity; and that the Bible, anyway, was not a textbook in science, and that parts of it, as foremost fathers of the church had recognized, were susceptible of allegorical, as well as literal, interpretation. It is noteworthy that among those who seemed to experience no difficulty in reconciling science with historic Christianity were a not inconsiderable number of first-rate scientists such as Pasteur, Mendel, and Schwann.

It should be borne in mind that active defenders of dogmatic Christianity and direct assailants of it constituted minority groups, and that the majority of Europeans (and Americans) went their usual way, evincing more and more interest in science, in nationalism, and in liberalism or socialism, but continuing to adhere formally to the religion of their ancestors. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, church attendance, especially on the part of men, gradually lessened Decline in certain countries (for example, in Britain, France, Italy, and Scandinavia). The urban proletariat became increasingly un-churched, and the universities Influence more "godless." Yet Christianity was so vital a part of European tradition and experience—it was so intertwined with the history and institutions and culture of every "Western" nation—that it could not suddenly be shorn of a widespread popular following, even in an age of "realism." At least in the crises of life, the

masses still went to church, to be baptized, to receive "first communion," to be confirmed, to be married, to attend funerals. Sundays and church holidays were still almost universally observed, and no little social prestige still attached to church-members and church-goers. Moreover, the number of "practicing" Christians was still relatively large all over Europe (and America), and there was a noteworthy growth of Christian missionary enterprise overseas and of Christian "social work" in Europe.

So far, we have spoken in general terms of Christianity in the nineteenth century—its continuing vitality, and its accumulating difficulties. Christianity, however, was no unit. It was represented, in the nineteenth century as in the sixteenth, by the Catholic Church, by the Orthodox Church, and by a variety of Protestant Churches and sects. Now each of the major divisions of Christianity-Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox Different —had distinctive traditions of its own, and therefore Forms of Chrisnot only felt the effect of contemporary social, polittianity ical and intellectual movements in peculiar ways Variously Affected but also responded to them somewhat differently. It accordingly behooves us, if we would understand the religious situation in developing industrial society, to pass from general discussion of "abstract" Christianity to specific consideration of its churches and then to say something of non-Christian minority groups (Moslem and Jewish) which survived in traditionally Christian lands.

4. THE CHURCHES—CATHOLIC, PROTESTANT, AND ORTHODOX; MOSLEMS AND JEWS

The Catholic Church covered the widest territory and embraced the largest membership of any religious organization. It held to its claims of being the one and only true Church of Church deposit of faith transmitted by the Man-God to the apostles. It retained the theology which had been elaborated from the fourth to the eighth century and during the middle ages, and the doctrines and discipline which had been decreed by the Council of Trent. It maintained its historic organization of "secular" and "regular" clergy under a far-flung hierarchy of bishops and archbishops headed by the

pope, bishop of Rome, successor of Saint Peter, and vicar of Jesus Christ.¹

Against the Catholic Church, as the largest body of Christians and the one most intransigent in its devotion to tradition and most authoritarian in its manner of speaking, all the antireligious and irreligious tendencies of the nineteenth century seemed to converge. Bourgeois merchants complained that it was "unprogressive" or "utopian," idealizing asceticism and generosity rather than comfort and thrift, and quite too much concerned with aristocracy on the one hand and with peasants and laborers on the other. Liberals combatted its illiberalism and "clericalism," and democrats criticized its monarchical constitution and "medieval" trappings. Nationalists opposed its "alien" headship and international organization and labored to deprive it of its independence and make it serve strictly national ends. Marxian socialists denounced it as a tool of capitalism and an opiate of the people. Materialists and positivists and disciples of the Nietzschean will-to-power invoked "modern science" as a final curse against it.

Nor was the chorus lessened by any obvious sign that the church was changing front. On the contrary, the official words and actions of the three popes of the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth—

The Pius IX (1846–1878), Leo XIII (1878–1903), and Popes of Pius X (1903–1914)—tended, on the whole, to emphasize the contrast and intensify the conflict between historic Catholicism and the most characteristic new "isms" of the period. These popes differed considerably from one another in manner and outlook and in the seeming success of their policies, but they were at one in directing a vigorous counter-offensive against "the errors of modern society and thought."

Pius IX began his pontificate with a reputation for friendliness to liberalism and nationalism, but the reputation was short-lived. The behavior of liberals, such as Mazzini, in the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 and the steadily growing threat of Italian nationalism against the sovereign 1846–1878 independence of the supranational Papal State of Rome shocked him and filled him with forebodings about the

¹ On the organization and doctrine of the Catholic Church, see Vol. I, pp. 136-144, 184-197.

ultimate consequences of the whole modern complex of "liberalism" and "individualism," political, economic, and intellectual. From 1849 he combined a zealous churchmanship with an uncompromising conservatism. While negotiating friendly agreements (concordats) with the reactionary governments of Spain (1851) and Austria (1855), he relied upon French troops to preserve his temporal régime at Rome; and while reëstablishing Catholic hierarchies in the predominantly Protestant and "liberal" countries of England (1850) and the Dutch Netherlands (1853), he issued a series of documents against liberalism. This series culminated in a famous encyclical, Quanta Cura, and an accompanying Syllabus of Errors (1864).

In the encyclical, Pius IX condemned the modern liberal ideas of extreme individualism and of the supremacy of the secular state over the church, and lauded the earlier ideal of the "Christian state" in which the church, though independent of secular authority, would be supported by it. The Syllabus "of the principal errors of our time" reproduced in abbreviated form all the specific doctrines, political as well as strictly "Syllabus philosophical and religious, which had latterly reof Errors," ceived papal condemnation. The listed "errors" were 1864 of several different groups: "freethinkers" and "agnostics," who denied or doubted the divine origin and mission of the church; "materialists" and "naturalists," who repudiated the spiritual or subordinated it to the physical or the temporal; "anti-clericals" and "nationalists," who aimed at restricting the freedom of the church, exalting the secular lay state, and overthrowing the temporal dominion (and hence weakening the spiritual independence) of the papacy; "liberals" and Freemasons and "indifferent" persons, who imagined that one religion was as good (or as bad) as another, or who sought to reduce the church to the condition of a private voluntary association, or who thought that the pope should reconcile himself with "modern society" and "modern civilization."

The Syllabus was not issued as ecclesiastical dogma, and several leading Catholics, including Newman, took pains to explain that it was in the nature of counsel against peculiar developments of the time in Italy and against the "abuses"

 $^{^{\}rm 1}$ It was compiled by a committee of cardinals and was neither signed nor promulgated by the Pope personally.

of modern liberalism. Nevertheless it strengthened the impression in the minds of most non-Catholics and some Catholics that the papacy was conducting a crusade against modern society and civilization, and it evoked storms of criticism from "liberals" and protests from prominent statesmen.

In 1869, while discussion of the Syllabus was still heated, Pius IX convened at the Vatican a general council of the Catholic Church, the first such council since that of Trent three centuries previously. The Vatican Council, attended by nearly eight hundred prelates from all over the world, reaffirmed and deepened the traditional teaching of the church on the relationship between faith and reason, but its most sensational achievement was the definition, in July 1870, despite earnest preliminary opposition from a minority of its members, of the dogma of papal infallibility. It was solemnly proclaimed as "a dogma divinely revealed, that the Roman pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra—that is, when in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Infalli-Christians, he defines, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal church—is possessed, by the divine assistance promised him in Blessed Peter, of that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining faith or morals; and that therefore such definitions of the Roman pontiff are per se immutable and independent of the consent of the Church."

While the Vatican Council was still in session, the Franco-Prussian War broke out. The French garrison which had been protecting the temporal sovereignty of the Pope at Rome was withdrawn, and in September 1870 Italian troops of King Victor Emmanuel II seized the city by main force and effected its transformation from the age-long supranational city-state of the popes to the new national capital of united Italy. Pius IX protested, immured himself as a "prisoner" in the Vatican, and in October 1870 prorogued the general council on the plea that it could no longer deliberate in requisite freedom.

Critics of the Catholic Church were elated by the overthrow of the Pope's temporal power but pained by the si-

¹ See above, p. 247, and below, p. 573.

multaneous definition of papal infallibility which, they feared, would give him a dangerous new weapon in his warfare against

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liberalism and nationalism. Over the doctrine of papal infallibility, therefore, the storm which had been brewing since the Syllabus of Errors raged with unusual violence. The majority of Catholic intellectuals, to be sure, defended the doctrine and the mass of Catholics adhered to it. All the bishops accepted it,

and only a small minority of professors and other laymen, chiefly in Germany and Switzerland, actually left the church and formed a dissident "Old Catholic" sect. On the other hand, non-Catholics assailed the doctrine-Protestants and agnostics, liberals and patriots, scholars and publicists, scientists and men of letters. And in the doctrine, a number of conspicuous statesmen (including some nominal Catholics) perceived an astute scheme to exalt the papacy above all secular governments and to enable it to interfere in national politics, thereby restoring the reign of "medievalism" and checking modern progress. In Prussia, and eventually throughout Germany, Bismarck waged a Kulturkampf—a "struggle for civilization"-with the Catholic Church. In England, Gladstone indited a fiery pamphlet in support of the thesis that Catholics could not be "good citizens." In France, Gambetta arrayed the republican party under the banner of "anti-clericalism." In Spain, the revolutionary government of the day nullified the existing agreement with the papacy. In Italy, the liberal régime of Victor Emmanuel II took "defensive" measures against the church. In Austria, a liberal ministry of the time prevailed upon the Emperor Francis Joseph to repudiate his concordat with Pius IX.1

When Pius IX died in 1878, after the longest and one of the most remarkable pontificates in history, the Catholic Church appeared to be at losing feud with almost every European government. And the succeeding pontificate, almost as long, of Leo XIII (1878–1903) was the very period in which the rising philosophies of materialism and posi-

¹ More detailed accounts of these "anti-clerical" developments are given in succeeding chapters. Especially, see below, pp. 603-605, on the German Kultur-kampf, and pp. 542-543, on Gambetta's activities. The most interesting—and important—reply to Gladstone's pamphlet was Newman's Letter to the Duke of Norfolk.

tivism and the researches in anthropology and comparative religion bade fair to undermine, at least with intellectuals, the fundamental faith of historic Christianity.

Yet the period proved not so disastrous for the Catholic Church as was anticipated by unbelievers and anti-clericals. Leo XIII himself was especially able and gifted. He was a man of slow and calm deliberation, a first-rate diplomatist, a sincere sympathizer with democratic and social-reform movements, and a scholar of considerable erudition. Moreover, he was not content to denounce the "errors" of the time. He perceived "good" as well as "evil" in modern civilization, and he had a genius for fostering a constructive program of Catholic action.

In the intellectual domain, Leo XIII stood by the historic dogmas of Catholic Christianity, and not only renewed his predecessor's condemnation of materialism, agnosticism, and indifferentism, but also extolled, as a special corrective of the "vagaries" of modern philosophy, the medieval philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and promoted its revived study in Catholic seminaries and universities. At the same time he was anxious to demonstrate that there was no basis for a conflict between theology and science. He encouraged the study of church history and opened to scholars the valuable archives of the Vatican. He procured an eminent scientific staff and the best scientific instruments for the astronomical observatory at the Vatican. He appointed to his college of cardinals a number of persons, including John Henry Newman, who, while thoroughly devoted to the church and its teachings, were quite aware of the force and sincerity of the doubts which alienated many other intellectuals from Christianity.

Of the political principles of Pius IX, Leo XIII professed not to change a jot or a tittle. He expressed in a series of encyclicals the same ideal of the "Christian state" and similar condemnations of certain features of liberalism and "anti-clericalism." Again and again, he insisted that the church was a "perfect society" in itself, whose authority in its own spiritual realm was, by divine institution, independent of, and superior to, the authority of any temporal state or sovereignty. Again and again, he asserted the "right" of the church to a privileged position in the state, and especially its right to maintain schools and carry

¹ See above, pp. 155-156, and below, pp. 436-437.

on its "mission" without let or hindrance from the state. Yet Leo XIII was no partisan of any particular form of government. He was never a "reactionary" in the earlier sense, and he was as willing to negotiate with governments nominally "liberal" as with those nominally "conservative." He was inclined, indeed, to sympathize with the democratic trend of the time. He thought it quite as compatible with Christian philosophy and tradition as absolutism or oligarchy, and imagined that it might be more effectual in enlisting popular support in defense of the church. He looked with favor upon the development of Catholic political parties, popular and democratic, in Germany, in Austria, and in Belgium. He counselled French Catholics to accept and coöperate with the republican government of their country. He expressed admiration for the constitution of the United States.

Leo XIII was fully aware of the social problems which the Industrial Revolution was creating or accentuating. He commended the efforts of clergymen and laymen to build up a

Catholic Social Movement and the Papal Encyclical of 1891 Catholic "social" movement which, combatting economic liberalism on the one hand and Marxian socialism on the other, would aim at the "Christianizing" of modern industrial society. Such a movement gathered headway in the 1870's and 1880's, and in 1891 Leo XIII gave it a guiding charter in his famous en-

cyclical, Rerum Novarum. Against Marxian Socialism, this document defended private property as a natural right, emphasized the importance of the family, protested against the exalting of the state, condemned the doctrine of economic determinism, and declared that "class is not naturally hostile to class." On the other hand, against economic liberalism, it held that "labor is not a commodity," that "it is shameful to treat men like chattels to make money by," that the state has both a right and a duty to prevent the exploitation of labor, to encourage collective bargaining, and to enact social legislation. The encyclical specifically urged a wider distribution of private property, a fostering of industrial trade unions and agricultural coöperative undertakings, a restriction of the hours of employment, especially of women and children, and the assurance of a "living family wage." It stressed the "dignity" of labor and pointed out that "everyone has the right to procure what is required to live." It dwelt upon the part which religion in general and Christianity

in particular should perform in bringing about a better social order, and it besought the coöperation of Catholics everywhere.

The encyclical *Rerum Novarum* not only won for Leo XIII the

The encyclical Rerum Novarum not only won for Leo XIII the title of "the workingman's pope" but also secured for the Catholic Church a surer hold on the European masses. It inspired the formation of Christian trade unions, which in certain countries, for example in Germany, Belgium, and France, soon counted a following second only to that of the Socialist trade unions. It likewise stimulated in several countries the extension of Catholic coöperative societies among the peasants and the creation of Catholic "guilds" of professional men. In Germany, Austria, and Belgium, all these "social" agencies proved valuable allies to Catholic political parties; and elsewhere, in greater or less degree, they exerted an indirect influence upon national legislation and public policy.

Altogether, it may be said that, during the pontificate of Leo XIII, while some type of materialist philosophy was widespread among European (and American) intellectuals, and while religious agnosticism and political "anti-clericalism" were much in evidence in most countries, Catholic Christianity at least held its own. In several traditionally Catholic countries, it is true, the church seemed weaker in 1903 than in Some Set-1878. In Italy, there was no settlement of the "Roman backs for Catholic question" between king and pope, and only increasingly embittered relations between state and church. under Leo XIII In France, where the most ardent Catholics were apt to be anti-republican, there was a marked growth of "anticlerical" agitation and legislation. In Spain and Portugal, and in countries of Latin America, there were sporadic, and sometimes very tempestuous, attacks on ecclesiastical property, schools, and monasteries. On the other hand, Catholics put a stop to the Kulturkampf in Germany, regained an ascendancy in Austria, and obtained control of the Belgian government. Moreover they notably increased their numbers and influence in Switzerland, in the Dutch Nether-

lands, and, most strikingly, in English-speaking countries.

Here the increase was attributable in some part to conversion but in chief part to an unprecedented nineteenth-century migration of European Catholics, particularly of the Irish, to England, Scotland, the United States, Canada, Australia, etc. In all these

countries, by the end of the nineteenth century, Catholicism was represented by firmly established hierarchies, by fairly large numbers of both "secular" and "regular" clergy, by schools, journals, and charities, and by an augmenting minority of the lay population.

Besides, the church redoubled its missionary undertakings. Catholic hierarchies were reëstablished in eastern Europe, and bishops were sent anew into Denmark and Norway. Converts were obtained once more in China and Japan, as well as in India. An "archbishopric of Carthage" was erected and companies of monks and nuns went out to Catholicize the "Dark Continent." There was a distinct revival of monasticism: despite the handicaps put in the way by "anti-clerical" governments, the total membership of such famous religious orders as the Jesuit, Dominican, Franciscan, etc., increased while several newer communities, such as the Christian Brothers, the Marists, the Madames of the Sacred Heart, the Little Sisters of the Poor, and the Sisters of Charity, rose and flourished. There was a signal development of new, as well as old, popular devotions, and in 1881 was inaugurated a series of international eucharistic congresses.

During the pontificate of Pius X (1903–1914) the Catholic Church was troubled by several acute conflicts with national governments and also by the rise of "modernism" within its own ranks. In Italy, to be sure, there was a slight easing of the strain between church and state. Pius X, though continuing (like Leo XIII and Pius IX) to regard himself as a "prisoner of the Vatican" and to demand the restoration of the temporal sovereignty of the papacy at Rome, withdrew the prohibition which his predecessors had put on the participation of Italian Catholics in the politics of the Italian kingdom and encouraged the formation of a Catholic "popular party" to safeguard their economic, as well as ecclesiastical, interests.² In France, however, a bitter conflict led to the abrogation of the concordat which had regulated the

¹ Notably, devotions of the Rosary, the Sacred Heart, etc. The dogma of the immaculate conception—that the Blessed Virgin was conceived without stain of original sin—was defined by Pope Pius IX in 1854; and Catholic devotion to the Virgin, as well as faith in the miraculous, was quickened by the apparitions at Lourdes (in France) in 1858. A great basilica was erected here to "Our Lady of Lourdes" in the 1870's, and by the first decade of the twentieth century some half a million persons annually were making pilgrimages to it.

² See below, p. 570.

relations of church and state since the time of Napoleon Bonaparte and to the enactment by the state of especially drastic "anti-clerical" legislation.¹ Almost simultaneously, legislation hardly less drastic was enacted against the church in Portugal, Spain, and Mexico.²

Complicating the political difficulties, moreover, was the persuasive contention on the part of a considerable number of Catholic priests and laymen—themselves obviously influenced by "Darwinism" and by the "higher criticism" of the Bible—that the church must "modernize" its teachings and discipline if it would recover its popular prestige and stop the leakage of intellectuals. Although these so-called "modernists" differed among themselves about many details, they generally held that dogma is not immutable but evolutionary, that the basic apology for the

church is less its divine origin than its human utility, that ecclesiastical authority should be reformed and restrained, that "science" should be independent of the church and the findings of the former superior to the dictates of the latter, that religion should be viewed as a private matter and kept separate from the positive conduct of public politics and government, and that the papacy should not attempt to "tyrannize" over individual conscience.

Against the "modernists," Pius X was adamant. He had the Inquisition (or "Holy Office") publish a Syllabus of their errors (1907), and concurrently he issued an encyclical, Pas-Papal cendi, denouncing "modernism" as a "summation of Condemnation of heresies." He excommunicated several leading "mod-"Modernists"—in Italy, France, Germany, England, and ernism." elsewhere—and put their writings on the Index of 1907 Prohibited Books; and he obliged all Catholic priests throughout the world to take a special oath against "modernism." As a result of these strenuous measures, the Catholic Church was purged of "modernism," and its traditional beliefs and papal authority were reasserted. There was some loss to the church of individual priests and laymen, but there was no mass secession in any country.3 "Modernism" ceased to be an important move-

¹ See below, pp. 564-567.

² See below, pp. 586, 589, 706.

³ In Bohemia and Austria, a so-called "Los von Rom" ("Away from Rome")

movement reached large proportions early in the twentieth century, but it was

motivated by nationalism more than by modernism, and it was eventually stayed.

ment within Catholic Christianity, at the very time when it was becoming an ever more influential movement within Protestant Christianity.

Protestantism displayed throughout the nineteenth century—and increasingly in the first decade of the twentieth—two divergent tendencies. The one involved a marked decline of dogmatic teaching about faith and morals in Age of Realism (a tendency diametrically opposed to that of contemporary Catholicism). The other involved a notable development of "good works" and "ritualism" and, in extreme instances, of what was described as "neo-Catholicism."

In certain respects, Protestantism seemed more adaptable than Catholicism to "modern civilization." The Industrial Revolution began in overwhelmingly Protestant Britain, and spread most spectacularly in predominantly Prot-Protesestant Germany and America. Protestant apologists tant delighted in identifying the ideal of material "prog-Adaptability ress" and capitalistic "prosperity" with the "rugged individualism" and "sober thrift" of traditional Protestant ethics. The individualism of Protestantism, especially of its more radical forms, appeared to be peculiarly compatible with the individualism of modern economic liberalism and likewise of modern political democracy. Then, too, the major Protestant churches had always been national churches-the Anglican in England, the Presbyterian in Scotland, the Dutch Reformed in Holland, the Lutheran in Scandinavia, etc.—subservient to secular governments and responsive to patriotic emotions. They could accept and forward the nationalism of the nineteenth century more naturally and more unquestioningly than could the international, supranational Catholic Church. Protestants could invoke the "right of private judgment" to justify themselves in putting their own interpretations on the relationship between religion and science and in still remaining "Christian" while rejecting the creed of any church.

Wherefore, Protestantism was not seriously disturbed by conflicts between state and church; and "anti-clericalism," common in traditionally Catholic countries, was exceptional in countries traditionally Protestant. What did disturb Protestantism very seriously—far more so than Catholicism—was the questioning of its distinctive historic principle of religious au-

thority. For Protestantism, in rejecting the papacy as the divinely established and inspired custodian of religious tradition, interpreter of the Bible, and supreme ecclesiastical authority, had insisted that the Bible itself Problem was the sole rule of faith for Christians and their concerning Bibsole guide of conduct. And now, in the nineteenth lical century, doubts about the divine origin of church or papacy were eclipsed by the doubts which "Darwinism" and "higher criticism" cast upon the authenticity of the Bible. These doubts, troublesome enough to "modernist" Catholics, were bound to shake Protestantism to its very foundations.

The first reaction of most Protestants to "Darwinism" and "higher criticism" was, generally speaking, one of hostility and abuse. But shortly, as the "new science" progressed and was popularized, it produced more complex reactions, so that, by the end of the nineteenth century, three distinct movements were obvious in nearly all

Protestant churches. (1) A minority of nominal Protestants, including a relatively large proportion of "intellectuals," were moving toward an agnostic position. Unable to square the Bible with "science," they threw over the former, and, unable to accept Catholicism, they repudiated hisnostic toric Christianity altogether. Some of them sought refuge in positivism (the "religion of humanity") or in "ethical culture" or in "unitarianism" or in a vague "pantheism." Some extremists among them displayed a fanatical zeal in preaching against religion, priding themselves on being "infidels," "godless," or "atheists," and dwelling on the "errors" of the Bible and the shortcomings of clergymen. Most of the agnostically inclined, however, ceased to participate in any religious services or to profess any but the haziest kind of religious belief.

(2) At the opposite extreme, considerable numbers of Protestants—relatively more numerous among the masses than among the classes—were impelled to take a fundamentalist position, holding to the Bible as the literally inspired "Word of God" and denouncing any "scientific" explanation 2. Fundamentalist which contradicted or questioned their own traditional interpretation of the Bible. "Fundamentalists" were to be found among Lutherans and Calvinists and in the so-called

"low" or "evangelical" section of the Anglican Church, but they were especially influential in English-speaking countries and in such sects as the Methodist and Baptist.¹

(3) While some Protestants became frankly agnostic and left their respective churches, and while others fortified their abiding faith with "fundamentalism," a gradually growing number became modernist. That is, they remained "Protestant Christians" in name and in actual church membership but 3. Modthey subordinated church creeds and the Bible itself ernist to the latest fashions in scientific speculation and "higher criticism." They tended to stress the "beauty" rather than the "truth" of the Bible and the Christian religion, to prize the Holy Scriptures not as the inspired "Word of God" but as "great literature," and the Founder of Christianity not as God but as a moral teacher or poetical idealist or social reformer. Indeed, they were disposed to admit that the Bible was a collection of purely human and hence fallible stories and sermons and that historic Christianity, representing a syncretism of folkmyths and pagan cults, was but one, though probably the best, of evolving, uplifting world religions. "Modernists" of this sort had their most natural home in an "intellectual" and "unorthodox" Protestant sect like the Unitarian, but they gradually made fruitful homes for themselves in leading theological schools, whether Lutheran, Calvinist, Anglican, or "evangelical." And as there was no central authority in any of the Protestant churches capable of combating "modernism"—as the papacy combated it in the Catholic Church—it was fairly rapidly communicated from Protestant professors to the rising generation of Protestant clergymen and thence, ever more widely and deeply, to Protestant laymen. By the twentieth century, a

¹The Christian Science Church, which was founded by Mary Baker Eddy (1821–1910) at Boston in 1879, and which subsequently secured a considerable following in America and Europe, was nearer to "fundamentalism" than to "modernism." Though "scientific" in name and "modern" in its practical solicitude for physical health, it was quite "evangelical" in origin and, in its faith healing and in its central doctrine of the reality of mind and the unreality of matter, quite antithetical to "Darwinism" and all other materialist science underlying "modernism."

Note may be taken, too, of an earlier and even more conspicuous nineteenth-century American offshoot of "evangelical" Protestantism, the Church of Latter-Day Saints (commonly called the Mormon Church). Revering its founder, Joseph Smith (1805–1844), as a prophet and his Book of Mormon, along with the Bible, as the literally inspired Word of God, it was denounced by "orthodox" Protestants but its general attitude was as "fundamentalist" as theirs.

"modernist" change was being wrought in Protestantism far more revolutionary than that religious upheaval of the sixteenth century in which Protestantism had originated.

Innumerable, of course, were the gradations and shades of "modernism" within the Protestant churches. What distinguished it as a whole was its evolutionary attitude toward religion

in general and Christianity in particular. It perceived in history a steady, ever higher evolution of man's religious experience, from primitive worship to early Christianity, from "superstitious" Catholicism to tion in "enlightened" Protestantism, and it pointed to a future in which man's religious experience would reach

"Modtantism

still higher stages of evolution. Such an attitude was as opposed to the traditional attitude of Protestantism as to that of Catholicism. It involved a sharp reversal of the Protestant habit of seeking "pure religion" in an old volume and identifying "ecclesiastical reform" with a return to primitive Christianity.

It also involved a curious shift of emphasis from "faith" to "good works." Originally, as we know, Protestants had repudiated the Catholic doctrine of "good works" and had insisted that "salvation" is by "faith alone"; and for a long time all the various Protestant churches had been insistently dogmatic. This stressing of dogma had been somewhat lessened in the eighteenth century as a result of the development of Pietism and Deism,² and now in the latter part of the nineteenth century, contemporaneously with the growth of "modernism," it fell into notable disrepute. To a rapidly growing number of Protestants, "dogmatic" and "theological" became words of reproach, connoting ideas as repulsive as the word Decline of "superstitious." But these same Protestants, as they Faith and ceased to dwell upon particular dogmas, evinced a special regard for "good works," not of course the theological "good works" of medieval Catholicism, but the "good life" of modern humanitarianism: social "uplift," popular education, public health, organized recreation, and special campaigns against alcoholism, political corruption, tion of "Good Works" juvenile delinquency, and physical disease. And as dogmatic theology receded, moral theology receded likewise. "Good works," according to the "modernists," were

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 153-155, 103-105.

² See Vol. I, pp. 512-519.

to be judged, not by any "absolute" standard which the fathers of Protestantism or even the Bible had established, but by the "relative" standard of experimental utility.

Altogether, "modernism" was providing a lowest common denominator for numerous Europeans (and Americans) who were Protestant in background and name, who still "felt"

religious, and yet who were hostile or indifferent to the theology in which they had been reared. Whether they were traditionally Methodists or Baptists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, or "broad-church" Episcopalians, they could stand together against "outworn dogmas" and, a little more vaguely, in support of "the good life." Standing together—coöperation—became indeed a characteristic (and essentially novel) ideal of Protestantism in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

To the realization of such an ideal the "modernist" movement certainly contributed; and to it contributed also the synchronous development of several comprehensive organizations half religious and half social. One of these was the "Young Men's Christian

Association," founded in England in 1844 by George Y.M.C.A. Williams (1821–1905) for the union of youthful "evangelical Christians" in social and religious comradeship. It held its first "world conference" at Paris in 1855, and especially after 1870 it throve in the United States, Canada, Australia, and, to a lesser degree, all over the Continent of Europe. Everywhere it retained its Protestant and "evangelical" designation, while minimizing the differences among Protestants and drawing their attention to social service, industrial goodwill, physical recreation, and inter-racial conciliation.

Another organization was the "Salvation Army," established in England in 1880 by William Booth (1829–1912) for "saving"

Salvation Army slum-dwellers. Though earnestly "evangelical," it was as opposed to sectarianism as to "modernism"; and though derided at first for its military pretensions and vulgar methods, its social work eventually won the respect of multitudes in Europe (and America) and elicited praise from

¹ The Y. M. C. A. now (1935) has national organizations, under a World Committee at Geneva, in fifty-six countries, with a total membership of 1,750,000 and with property and funds valued at 250 million dollars. In 1887 a similar "Young Women's Christian Association" was formed through the fusion of two earlier English societies. The Y. W. C. A. now has a total membership of half a million.

such different types as King Edward VII and George Bernard Shaw.

Mention should here be made, too, of Freemasonry. It had taken root, as we know, in the eighteenth century,1 but in the latter part of the nineteenth century it flourished as never before. Its lodges were more widespread, and its membership more numerous. It was primarily a social and benevolent organization, though it had no slight religious significance. Inasmuch as it had been condemned by a succession of popes, its membership was now practically restricted to non-Catholics; and among these-Protestants, Jews, and agnostics-it was peculiarly influential. On the Continent of Europe, particularly in traditionally Catholic coun- On Contries, Freemasonry provided a common platform and tinent of a common program for various critics of Catholic Christianity. Here it was markedly "liberal" and "anti-clerical," very potent in "radical" politics, and strongly inclined toward materialistic atheism. In English-speaking countries, on the other hand, it was more conservative, less directly political, not professedly anti-religious or anti-Christian, and hence Englishremarkably effective as a solvent of sectarianism. In Speaking these countries, moreover, Freemasonry was imitated by a host of "secret orders" and "benevolent fraternities," which shared, surely if unconsciously, in popularizing the idea that Christians should be vague in what they believe and progressive in what they do.

It must not be gathered from what we have said that there was any marked decline in activity or membership of the several Protestant churches. On the contrary, just as many persons in Europe (and America) were affiliated with Protestant- Continuism in 1910 as in 1870 or at any earlier date (in many ing Protestants more persons were so affiliated in 1910); and most of the Protestant churches were far more active in social work and missionary enterprise than ever before. What we have been pointing out is that within these Protestant churches a veritable revolution was taking place. Their historic creeds were being blurred or cast aside, and, despite the energetic resistance of "fundamentalists," an increasing proportion of their members were adopting a "modernism" at variance with

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 525-527.

historic Protestant ideas of the Bible and of dogmatic and moral theology. Protestantism remained, but it tended to be a different thing from the Protestantism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Its one tight link with the past was its continuing insistence on "the right of private judgment," and this in turn amply justified the retention of the name "Protestant" by "modernists." They could go on "protesting" against the Roman Church and do some new "protesting" against "fundamentalist" beliefs and practices of their own churches.

The outstanding development in nineteenth-century Protestantism was undoubtedly the "modernist" revolution. there was another subversive development, less extensive though almost as sensational—a "Catholic" counter-revolution. For in the nineteenth century some Protestants took to "Catholic "protesting" against Protestantism and trying to "re-Counter-Revolu-Catholicize" it. The impetus to such a counter-revolution" in tion was furnished in first instance by romanticism-Protesparticularly the emotional sympathy it engendered for tantism the middle ages and the resulting appreciation of the historic character and services of the Catholic Church—and eventually by the intellectual conviction that Protestantism, by departing too far from Catholic tradition and authority, was ceasing to be a bulwark against agnosticism.

The "Catholic" counter-revolution especially flourished within the Anglican Church. Here it was inaugurated by the so-called

Especially in the Anglican Church: the Oxford Movement "Oxford movement," an agitation of a group of brilliant young clergymen, graduates or tutors of the University of Oxford, including John Henry Newman (1801–1890)¹ and Edward Pusey (1802–1882). These men, beginning as "evangelicals," were disturbed by the progress of rationalism and the rise of liberalism, perceiving in the one a threat against religion in gen-

eral, and in the other a menace to the privileged position of the Church of England. The more they thought about the danger of "national apostacy," the more certain they became that it was but a natural outcome of the Protestant principle of "private judgment" and the Protestant practice of ecclesiastical subserviency to the lay state, and that the only remedy was for the church to recover its independence and reassert its authority.

¹ A portrait of Newman as a young man is reproduced above, facing p. 156.

But what was "authority"? In a series of famous tracts in the 1830's, the leaders of the "Oxford movement" set forth the thesis that "authority" was not alone in the individual or the Bible but preëminently in the church itself, and not in any particular Protestant body but in the "undivided Catholic Church" of the early centuries of the Christian era. Any modern ecclesiastical body which enjoyed unbroken "apostolic succession" from that church was a branch of the Catholic Church, and as such was under an obligation to be Catholic in fact as well as in name. It followed that the Anglican Church was not only Protestant but also Catholic. It should pursue a via media, a happy mean between the extremes of "Rome" and "reform."

For some of the Oxford leaders (or "Tractarians," as they were also styled), the via media was hard to find and keep. Newman, for example, the most conspicuous and gifted among them, could not rest content with individual interpretation of Christian tradition any more than with individual interpretation of the Bible. He felt the need of a con-

and Conversions to Rome

tinuing authoritative voice, and his studies convinced him that the Pope's had been just such a voice in the early church and was the same today. In 1845 Newman formally left the Anglican Church and joined the Roman Catholic Church. His example was followed, then and afterwards, by a considerable number of Anglicans in Britain, in the United States, and elsewhere. Indirectly at least, the "Oxford movement" was an important factor in revivifying and extending the Catholic Church in English-speaking countries.

The majority of the "Tractarians," however—including such a leader as Pusey-remained within the Anglican Church; and, despite the unsympathetic attitude of bishops, the frowns and restraints of secular government, the taunts of "modernist" intellectuals, and the fanatical opposition of spokesmen of the "evangelical" masses, they succeeded in implanting in many Anglican clergymen and a considerable number of Anglican laymen an admiration for Catholic principles and a devotion to Catholic practices.

Pusey and High-Church Anglo-Cathol-

In this way an Anglo-Catholic "high church" party arose and entered into rivalry with two other parties in Anglicanism—the severely Protestant "low church" and the loosely modernist "broad church." Moreover, the Anglo-Catholics, though a

minority within the Anglican Church, were a steadily growing minority, and, in the face of some unpopularity associated with their "Romanizing" tendencies, they grew more ostentatiously "Catholic" in ritual as well as in creed. By the first decade of the twentieth century, thousands of Anglican priests and tens of thousands of Anglican laymen (and a few Anglican bishops) were obviously intent upon "undoing" the Protestant reformation of the sixteenth century and restoring to the Church of England (and its sister-churches 1) the characteristic features of medieval Catholicism save only the actual papal headship.

This "Catholicizing" trend within modern Protestantism was evidenced most clearly and fully in the Anglican Church. But it was evidenced to some extent also by contemporary high-church developments in the Lutheran churches of Scandinavia and Germany, and, more strangely perhaps, by a new vogue of ritualism among many Protestants who were not at all "high

Increasing Ritualism among Protestants church" in belief. "Evangelical" Protestants evinced a gradually lessening repugnance to the ornamental and ceremonial aspects of historic Christianity, and "modernist" clergymen discovered that religious rites and observances could provide a strong attraction for

persons whose religious dogmas were nebulous or non-existent. There was a widening observance of ecclesiastical holy days and seasons such as Christmas, Good Friday, and Lent. There was a marked tendency to adorn church edifices with crosses, stained glass, and statues of saints, to elevate the "communion table" into an "altar" and embellish it with flowers and candles, and to enrich church services with vested choirs, elaborate organ music, and set forms of prayer and praise.

To what we have been saying about Protestantism and Catholicism a few words should be added concerning the other great historic division of Christianity—the Orthodox communion of

Orthodox Church in Age of Realism eastern Europe. This was not a single ecclesiastical organization (like the Catholic Church), nor was it a merely nominal bond (like Protestantism) for discordant beliefs and practices. Rather it was a federation of

churches in close communion one with another. Originally, of

¹ These, constituting with the Church of England the "Anglican communion," are the Protestant Episcopal Churches of Ireland, Scotland, the United States, Canada, India and Ceylon, the West Indies, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

course, it had been a single ecclesiastical organization headed by the Greek patriarch of Constantinople, but the nationalizing of the part of it in Russia 1 served as a model during the nineteenth century for the nationalizing of other parts of it in countries which now became politically independent of the Ottoman Empire. In this way, so-called "autocephalous" Orthodox churches were established, usually with the reluctant consent of the patriarch of Constantinople, for Greece in 1850, and in the 1870's for Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria,2 while cephadistinct organizations were maintained for Orthodox lous" Churches Christians among the several "subject" nationalities of Austria-Hungary. One distinguishing feature of Eastern Europe Orthodox Christianity, then, was its organization on strictly national lines and in frank subserviency to secular governments. Another distinguishing feature was its doctrinal unity and conservatism. All the several national "churches" which composed it vied with one another in the ardor with which they clung to the historic creeds, ritual, and observances of the motherchurch at Constantinople. They frowned on the Catholic Church, but they held aloof from the Protestant churches.3

Orthodox Christianity was less obviously troubled by nineteenth-century developments than Catholicism or Protestantism. The countries in which it was the prevailing religion were relatively "backward." The great mass of its adherents were still agricultural and illiterate, accustomed not "Backto question but to conserve their ancestral cult. Nor wardness" was there any serious conflict in these countries between church and state, between Christianity and nationalism. Practically, each Orthodox Church was a national institution and an agency of a particular state, controlled by it and helping to forward its ends and to protect it against revolution. Naturally, the sovereigns and leading patriots of the state were especially intent upon maintaining and fostering the church.

Beneath the surface, however, lurked dangers for Orthodox

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 190-194.

² The Bulgarian Orthodox Church was established without the consent of the patriarch of Constantinople, and has been denied full communion with the other Orthodox churches.

³ "High churchmen" in the Anglican Church—the Anglo-Catholics—emphasized the similarities between their position and that of the Eastern Orthodox Churches. The Orthodox responded politely but with no great enthusiasm.

Christianity. There was danger in the steady indigenous growth of dissenting sects in the Russian Empire, and much graver danger in the gradual importation, from the West, of machine industry and its novel intellectual attendants—liberalism, materialism, "higher criticism," "realism," Marxian socialism. These novelties did not immediately affect the mass of peasantry, but they did contribute to the spread of religious indifferentism among the middle classes and to more or less open manifestation of hostility to the Orthodox Church on the part of "intellectuals" and urban workingmen. And the very fact that the church was the devoted ally of the existing régime signified that any social revolution was almost certain to involve a revolt against Orthodox Christianity.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Europe still harbored, as in previous centuries, two religious minorities of considerable importance—the Jewish and the Moslem. The Moslem minority was concentrated in southeastern Europe and comprised the governing classes (and a portion of the masses) in what The remained of the Ottoman Empire and smaller and less Moslem influential groups in adjacent (and predominantly Minority in Europe Christian) countries which had latterly been freed from Turkish dominion-southern Russia, Hungary, and the Balkan states. The Moslem minority had dwindled as the military fortunes of the Ottoman Turks ebbed, but it was still an important minority, more important than its actual numbers would signify. It was resolute, even fanatical, in its loyalty to Mohammed and the Koran, and seemingly impervious to reasoned conversion; and it was backed up by the much larger, and still expanding and aggressive, Islam outside Europe—in Asia, Africa, and the East Indies. Moreover, all Islam was treated with increasing tenderness and circumspection in Age of Realism by so-called Christian Powers of Europe (notably Great Britain, France, and Russia) as these, in pursuit of the "new imperialism," enlarged their extra-European territories and acquired more and more Moslem subjects.

At least until 1910, Islam as a whole showed few signs of decline or disintegration. There were, to be sure, the same internal dissensions as had long characterized it: continuing differences

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 364, 517.

about the caliphate between Sunnites and Shiites. 1 chronic quarrels among various sects, recurrent disputes among theologians and legists. More recently and more ominously, there was considerable infiltration of Western ideas and practices conducive to laxity in observance and scepticism in belief. Especially, the spread of liberalism and nationalism among the younger generation of Moslems threatened to undermine the conservative laws and customs of Islam and its traditional cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless the realization of such threats was still largely in the future. Not until after 1910 did the impact of "modern civiliza-

tion" on the Moslem world produce revolutionary consequences. The Jewish minority was dispersed all over Europe, and in America, northern Africa, and western Asia.² In eastern Europe, where the Jews were most numerous, they maintained a community life of their own—social and cultural as Jewish Minority well as religious—sharply differentiated from the life in Europe of the Christian peoples among whom they resided; and here they continued to suffer (especially in Russia and Rumania) from galling restrictions on their personal freedom of occupation and education, from spasmodic persecution, and from occasional mob violence. On the other hand, the Jews of central and western Europe had undergone, since the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century and in harmony with the liberalism of the nineteenth century, a gradual "emancipation" Gradual from restrictive legislation and had adapted themselves Jewish Emancito "modern civilization." 3 Particularly in western pation and southern Europe (in Great Britain, the Nethersince 18th Century lands, France, Italy, etc.), and only a little less so in Germany and Austria, they had come by 1870 to enjoy full rights of citizenship and to be hardly distinguishable from their fellow

citizens except that they were still called "Jews" and were still

3 On the beginnings of Jewish emancipation in the era of the "Enlightenment," see Vol. I, pp. 529-532.

¹ On Sunnites and Shiites, see Vol. I, p. 13, and on the early history of Islam in general, see Vol. I, pp. 9-17, 32, 66, 136n., 223, 232-233, 259-260, 325-327, 377-381. ² In 1910 the total Jewish population of the world was estimated at 11,500,000, distributed as follows: 5,215,000 in the Russian Empire (mainly in the Ukraine and Poland); 2,085,000 in Austria-Hungary; 1,785,000 in the United States; 607,000 in the German Empire; 463,000 in the Ottoman Empire (including 78,000 in Palestine); 275,000 in northern Africa; 250,000 in Rumania; 240,000 in Great Britain; 110,000 in the Dutch Netherlands; 95,000 in France; 55,000 in Italy; 50,000 in Persia; and 270,000 widely scattered elsewhere.

attached, at least sentimentally, to the Jewish religion. These Jews exerted an influence from 1870 to 1910 out of all proportion to their actual numbers. Many of them were conspicuous in business—in capitalistic industry, trade, and banking; others, in science, in education, in the arts, in journalism, or in patriotic or humanitarian undertakings; others, in Freemasonry and "liberal" politics. Some among them took an active part in "radical" movements, notably in Marxian Socialism. And, whether socialist or liberal, they were apt to be "anti-clerical" and hostile to anything savoring of "reaction."

In the novel circumstances of the nineteenth century, the traditional Jewish religion was greatly troubled-even more so, on the whole, than Christianity. Historically, Judaism Judaism was a tribal religion, based not only on the ancient and "Modern Hebrew Bible with its story of God's marvellous deal-Civilizaings with His "chosen people" and its prophecy of a wondrous national "messiah," but also on the progressive elaboration, written and oral, of an essentially tribal way of life social, ceremonial, and dietary. For centuries, Jews had been regarded, alike by themselves and by others, not only as adherents of a peculiar religion, but also as members of a separate nationality. Now, Judaism was confronted with two distinct, yet related, problems: that of preserving its "tribal" character and separate community life in the face of spreading liberalism and mounting nationalism throughout Europe; and Kinds of that of preserving its "religious" faith against the rising flood of materialist philosophy, biblical criticism, Jewish Reaction and "modernism." On these problems, Jews divided into three camps.

(1) Some, chiefly in eastern Europe, remained rigidly "orthodox," resisting "higher criticism" and holding to all the traditional Jewish laws and observances. (2) Some, including the majority in central and western Europe (and in America), became "reformed" (which was another name for "modernist"). In various ways, these rationalized and universalized their religion, lessening its ceremonial observances, softening or neglecting its special laws, and approximating it to the contemporary Unitarian and "Ethical Culture" movements in Protestant Christianity. (3) A small but perceptibly growing number

in almost every country, while still thinking of themselves as Jews in "race," drifted away from the Jewish religion whether orthodox or reformed, severed any connection with the synagogue, and became frankly agnostic or enthusiastically Marxian.

In general, the Jews seemed to be losing whatever unity and cohesion they had possessed. The earlier cleavage over "purity of race" between Sephardic Jews (those of Spain and Portugal) and Ashkenazic Jews (those of Germany and eastern Europe) was now complicated by dissension between orthodox and reformed, between believers and agnostics, between friends and foes of absorption into the national life of the countries in which Jews resided.

Complicating the Jewish situation still more was the external development, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, of nationalistic anti-Semitism. We have indicated that Rise of European "liberalism" had been favorable to Jewish Anti-"emancipation" and "absorption"; and so long as European nationalism was preponderantly "liberal," fairly rapid progress was made (at least in central and western Europe) in breaking down political and cultural barriers between Jews and non-Jews and in accustoming both to submerge religious and "racial" differences in a common patriotism. But gradually, as we have also indicated, nationalism was intensified and liberalism waned or was modified. By the 1880's an extreme and essentially illiberal nationalism was not only directing the public policies of European states toward neo-mercantilism, imperialism, and militarism, but also inspiring popular agitation within each state against any minority of its citizens who were presumed, by reason of racial or social peculiarities or international affiliations, to be lacking in perfect devotion to the national institutions and ideals of the majority. In the circumstances, it was but natural, for example, that German nationalists who waged a Kulturkampf against the Catholic Church, campaigned against Marxian socialism, and strove to "Germanize" subject Poles, Danes, and Alsatians, should also react against Jews. Such reaction was by no means confined to Germany. It was amply evident, simultaneously, in Russia, in Rumania, in Austria, in France, and it was echoed elsewhere.

Of particular phases of anti-Semitism in the several countries,

we shall speak in later chapters. Here we may remark its general character and some of its general effects. It did not The Raprofess to oppose the Jewish religion as such. Rather, cial Note its concern was with the Jewish "race." With much in Anti-Semitism parading of "scientific" theory about biology and eugenics, it preached the doctrine that the "Semitic" inheritance of Jews endows them with physical and mental traits different from, and repugnant to, the traits inherent in Aryans or "true Europeans," 2 and hence renders them a permanently "alien" and potentially corrupting body in the several European nations. To this basic "racial" doctrine were related certain nationalist and economic charges against the Jews: that they were "international" and cowardly, and disposed to sacrifice national interests and national honor to their own ambitions; that in their eagerness to make money they were thoroughly unscrupulous and largely responsible for the exploitation of workingmen, the impoverishment of peasants, and the high cost of living; and, somewhat paradoxically, that in their hatred for European civilization they were active in such a revolutionary movement as Marxian Socialism. However preposterous these charges were in themselves, especially when levelled at the whole Jewish people, they were accepted, in an age of mounting nationalism and of much loose talk about "race," as substantially true not only by unbalanced agitators but by some "intellectuals" and by sizeable groups among the masses; and the attendant propaganda quickened anti-Jewish prejudice in the minds of many persons (including some statesmen) who were not expressly "anti-Semitic."

The rise of anti-Semitism in the 1880's did not actually lead to any legal discrimination against Jews, except in Russia and Rumania. Yet it complicated the domestic politics of other (and more democratic) countries, and it widely fostered a social discrimination against Jews. Its most significant consequences, however, were for the Jews themselves. Suffering from social ostracism and from imputations against their "racial" character,

¹ See below, pp. 561-563, 608, 635, 646-647, 649, 677.

² This doctrine was "scientifically" formulated before Weismann had cast grave doubt on the inheritance of acquired characters. It should also be noted that neither "Semites" nor "Aryans" constitute "races" in the strict biological sense. Basically, both are linguistic and cultural groups, with much "mixed" blood.

they became acutely "race-conscious" and thereby were attached to an idea of ethnic unity transcending religious and cultural differences. Suffering, too, from actual governmental oppression in eastern Europe, numerous Jews emigrated thence to regions where at least there were no legal handicaps, to Germany for example, and, in largest numbers, to the United States. Suffering, moreover, from nation-

numbers, to the United States. Suffering, moreover, from nationalist taunts that Jews everywhere were "aliens," some of them—the so-called Zionists—formulated a nationalism of their own, maintaining that the Jews were a distinct nationality and that an independent national state should speedily be erected for them in Palestine.

The leading apostle of Zionism was Theodore Herzl (1860-1904), an Hungarian Jew, who enunciated its principles and program in 1896, convoked its first general congress at Basel the following year, and soon obtained for it an enthusiastic popular following among Jews in many lands. Zionism was political and cultural rather than religious; by seeking to draw together Orthodox and Reformed Jews and Jews who were such only by "race," it clearly subordinated religion to nationalism. And it proved to be still another source of dissension to Judaism. For most Jews had no thought of settling in Palestine, and many of them were hostile to Zionism elsewhere, either on principle or on the tactical ground that espousal of it might compromise their existing citizenship. On the whole, nevertheless, if nineteenth-century developments were emphasizing Jewish differences in religion, politics, and economics, they were bringing Jews into new prominence and were reuniting them in sentimental bonds of race and nationality.

5. MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE

To the foregoing account of historic religious groups in nineteenth-century Europe—Catholic Christians, Protestant Christians, Orthodox Christians, Moslems, and Jews—must be added a few words about the religious significance of the contacts which the Industrial Revolution and capitalistic imperialism were multiplying in the nineteenth century between Europe and the other Continents. This significance was twofold: first, outside Europe, a remarkable invigoration and extension of Christian missions; and second, within Europe, a less obvious

but by no means negligible response to Asiatic religions and philosophies.

Christianity had always been a conspicuously missionary religion, and ever since its beginning successive waves of proselyting zeal and labor had expanded its professed follow-Chrising ever more widely: throughout the Mediterranean tianity Always a world in the first five centuries, into England in the Missionsixth century, into central Europe in the seventh and Religion eighth centuries, into northern Europe in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth, throughout the American continents and into the Philippines and India (and temporarily into China and Japan) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The nineteenth century, however much or little it may have Especially So in 19th weakened Christianity in Europe, witnessed at any rate a new wave of Christian expansion outside Europe—in Asia, Africa, and Australasia—and in this latest wave Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox participated.

The Catholic Church, under whose auspices and in whose behalf the greater part of earlier missionary work had been done, played an important part in nineteenth-century missions. Under the continuing central direction of the papal "Congregation of the Propaganda," which had been established at Rome by Gregory XV back in 1622, and with more liberal financial aids from the laity, particularly from the "Society for the Propagation of the Faith," which was founded at Lyon (in France) in 1822 and soon had branches in many other countries, an increasing number of Catholic missionaries went out from Europe to convert the "heathen."

In the training of missionaries, the famous Society of Foreign Missions at Paris (which had been founded in 1658) held first place, but was supplemented more and more, not only by the renewed activity of Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, etc., but also by the creation of new societies and institutions—in Italy (1850), in Belgium (1863), in England (1866), in Germany (1875). A new and notably effective French society—that of the "White Fathers"—was established by Cardinal Lavigerie in 1868 for special work in Africa. By 1910 Catholic missionaries in Africa, Asia, and Oceania numbered about 41,000, comprising (in round figures) 8,000 European priests, 6,000 native priests, and 27,000 sisters and lay brothers.

This new wave of Catholic missionary endeavor produced results. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Philippine Islands were the only part of the world outside Europe and America where the Catholic Church was established firmly and with as large a native following as it had ever had. Japan and China had been closed to it. The number of Catholics in India had shrunk to barely 350,000. There were no Catholics in Indo-China or Oceania and hardly any in Africa. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, a remarkable change Resulting occurred. Catholic missionaries reëntered China in Catholic 1842 and Japan in 1861; they settled in Korea, Indo-China, Oceania, and Africa; and they redoubled their efforts in India. Catholic hierarchies were newly created for China in 1875, for India in 1886, and for Japan in 1891. When the century closed, Catholics numbered about two and a quarter million in India, slightly over a million in China, some sixty thousand in Japan, close to sixty thousand in Korea, and two and a half million in Africa.2

Protestant Christians had evinced, prior to the nineteenth century, comparatively little interest in foreign missions.³ Just on the eve of this century, however, an awakening of interest was indicated and stimulated among English-speaking Protestants by the organization of a "Baptist Society for Propagating the Gospel among the Heaprise Then" (1792),⁴ a Presbyterian and Congregationalist "London Missionary Society" (1795), and an Anglican "Church Missionary Society" (1799). Other Protestant churches and sects, in Britain and the United States and also on the continent of Europe, speedily caught the contagion, and by the middle of the century dozens of Protestant missionary societies were competing with one another and with Catholic missionaries in efforts to

¹ On the closing of these countries to Christian missionaries, see below, pp. 714, 722.

² For a summary view of general religious statistics about the year 1910, see Appendix 3.

³ Exceptional was the missionary enterprise of the Moravian Brethren in the eighteenth century and of the Anglican "Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts" (founded in 1701).

⁴The leading spirit in this society—and the most influential pioneer of Protestant missionary enterprise—was William Carey (1761-1834), an English Baptist, who was notably successful as a missionary in India and eminent as a scholarly student of Indian languages.

Christianize the peoples of the non-European world. By 1910 the number of active Protestant missionaries totalled over 18,000, comprising 13,000 Europeans and Americans (5,700 clergymen, 2,800 laymen, and 4,500 unmarried tant women) and 5,000 native clergymen. And by this time Protestantism in one form or another was the religion of one and a half million persons in India, a quarter of a million in China, eighty thousand in Japan, and two and a half million in Africa.

Since the sixteenth century the Orthodox Church of Russia had been steadily expanding over northern Asia, in measure as Russian emigrants settled in Siberia and Russian tsars extended their political sway and ecclesiastical patronage. In the nineteenth century, it became more zealously ary Enterprise proselyting. It sponsored missions not only among the natives of eastern Siberia, the Aleutian Islands, and Alaska, but also in China and, beginning in 1863, in Japan. In the last-named country it fathered the creation of a native and nominally independent Orthodox Church. By 1910, Orthodox Christianity had fifteen million followers in Asia.

Altogether, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Christianity was professed outside the traditionally "European" or "Western" world by some forty-one million persons, of whom the majority were the fruit of ninetcenth-century missionary activity. But there were other, and more incalculable, fruits of such activity. For, while the number of actual converts to

Christianity as popular Factor in "Europeanizing" the World

Christianity constituted a very small proportion of the populations of India, China, Japan, and even Africa, it should be remembered that Christian missionaries were a most effective agency (along with traders and industrial capitalists) for spreading at least the externals of "Western" civilization among a large part

of those populations and thus contributing to the "Europeanization" of the whole world. Especially through the numerous schools and hospitals which missionaries established, many natives who did not become Christian acquired at any rate a taste for the education, the science, the machinery, the clothing, and the sports of contemporary Europe.

Besides, many natives who retained an attachment to the religion of their ancestors—to Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, or

Shintoism, as the case might be—tended more and more, under the influence of Christian teaching and example, to interpret

their own religion in "modern" terms and to invest it with ethical principles borrowed more or less consciously from Christianity. It would be going too far to assert that Hinduism or Buddhism was transformed; these great historic religions remained for the mass of their disciples what they had previously been. But for "intellectuals," the impact of Christianity and "West-

Influence of "Western" Christianity on "Eastern" Religions

ern" civilization on the "East" gradually wrought a veritable revolution: a few accepted Christianity; a larger number became agnostic; and some turned to "reform movements," seeking to reconcile their traditional faith with modern developments.

The multiplying contacts of "West" and "East," through nineteenth-century Christian missions (and the Industrial Revolution), had results for the East, and for the West also. Undoubtedly the most important, of which we shall speak later in considerable detail, was the resurgence of economic and political imperialism among the Great Powers of Europe (and America). Noteworthy here, however, was the heightening interest of "in-

tellectuals" of the "West" in the civilizations of the "East." This was evidenced by European artists—by literary men,¹ and by painters like the French impressionists and Whistler who tried to be "Japanese," or by a "modernist" painter like Gauguin who preferred "primitive" Tahiti to sophisticated Paris. It was evidenced, too, by European scholars who produced

Influence of "Eastern" Religions on "Western" Christianity

learned tomes, ever bigger and more abundant, about the languages and customs, religions and antiquities of the Orient and who, through extensive translation, made available to Western readers the "classics" of India and China and the Moslem world. It was evidenced likewise by a novel vogue in "Christian" Europe (and America) of Oriental philosophies and religions.

¹ A notable example was Pierre Loti, the pen-name of Julien Viaud (1850–1923), a French naval officer who wrote between 1876 and 1903 a series of autobiographical romances famous for their exotic style and for their sympathetic treatment of exotic peoples—Turks, Senegalese, Moroccans, Tahitians, Japanese, and Hindus. Another notable example was Lafcadio Hearn (1850–1904), who, born in the Ionian Islands, the son of an Irish soldier and a Greek mother, served a journalistic apprenticeship in the United States and thence betook himself in 1891 to Japan, where he "went native," married a Japanese wife, adopted Buddhism, and won international fame by a series of charming books about Japan.

In the "West," there was little or no organized propaganda by Moslems, Buddhists, or Hindus, such as Christians were conducting in the "East." Yet many "Westerners," as they grew sceptical or "modernist" about Christianity, developed a high appreciation, perhaps more romantic than realist, of the "spirituality" and "profundity" of traditional Oriental thought and an enthusiasm for the "beauty" and "nobility" of the ancient sacred books and cults of the East. In some extreme cases, a special adaptation of non-Christian religion was made and preached. For example, Helena Blavatsky (1831–1891), a Russian lady and inveterate traveller, founded at New York in 1875 a "Theosophical Society" to promote the "universal brotherhood of humanity" through the Theosophy study of comparative religion and philosophy and particularly through the propagation of the "occult wisdom" of the East. Under Madame Blavatsky and her celebrated disciple and successor, Annie Besant (1847–1933), an Englishwoman who had been an ardent atheist and socialist, Theosophy became a modified Hinduism, with headquarters in India and with a hundred thousand followers in Europe and America. Or, again, a somewhat smaller number in Europe (and America) adhered to Baháism, a sect which originated with a Persian Baháism Moslem in 1844 and which gradually evolved the doctrine that Christ and Mohammed (and other great religious teachers, including the founder of Baháism) are all equally manifestations of a Holy Spirit intent upon assuring world unity.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, most metropolitan centres of Europe and America had groups of intellectuals or would-be intellectuals who curiously combined with a devotion to science and material ease and "social uplift" a penchant for religious novelties—for Theosophy or Baháism, for spiritualistic séances with mediums, for personal attachment to mysterious mahatmas and yogis, or for more nebulous worship of what was termed "New Thought." Simultaneously, in ethical-culture societies which were arising and in "radical" Protestant churches which were becoming ultra-modernist, respect was being inculcated for all the great "prophets" of the human race—for Confucius, Gautama Buddha, Laotse, Moses, and Mohammed, no less than for Jesus—and their collective moral teach-

ings, divorced from their several "dogmas," were being drawn upon to provide a spiritual and ethical setting for contemporary material progress. "Progressive" people were apt to perceive in these urban religious novelties, as well as in the advance of science and in the multiplication and extension of machineindustry, sure signs of the passing of narrowly Christian European civilization into a broadly humanitarian world civilization.



CHAPTER XX

BRITAIN, 1867-1914

I. THE WORKSHOP AND BANKER OF THE WORLD



ROGRESS in machine industry was more marked in Great Britain than in any other country. The Industrial Revolution had begun in Britain and had there produced significant effects a generation or two before it spread to other countries. The lead which Britain thus obtained in manufacturing, com-

merce, and banking, she kept throughout the nineteenth century and throughout the "age of realism," down at least to 1914.

Other countries, to be sure, underwent progressive industrialization after 1870: Germany and the United States, most notably; France and Austria and Italy, considerably; and, in varying degrees, all the countries of western and central Europe—and Russia and Japan, Canada and Australia, and even India. But while Britain no longer had a monopoly of industrial ma-

Britain's Industrial Leadership chinery, while she felt the increasing competition of industrial rivals, while her commerce and capital constituted a gradually lessening proportion of the world's commerce and capital, the loss to Britain

was relative and not absolute. From 1870 to 1910, Britain went on producing more and more goods, selling them farther and farther afield, and accumulating more and more wealth. Despite new competition, she continued to be, *par excellence*, the workshop and the banker of the modern world.

In Britain, factories and foundries, mine-shafts and collieries, were ever multiplying; the network of roads and railways, telegraph and telephone lines, was becoming ever more intricate; and to and from her seaports was borne an ever mounting tonnage of imports and exports. Every year from 1867 to 1914 witnessed a larger British production and export of coal, iron,

¹ Except Belgium, which was very much smaller.

machinery, cottons, woollens, linens, hardware, pottery, glass, boots and shoes, hosiery, and machine-made lace, while at the British ports of Glasgow and Belfast were the world's biggest shipbuilding yards.

Britain's population grew and shifted proportionately with her industrialization. In the island of Great Britain (embracing England, Wales, and Scotland), where the bulk of big Growth industry was carried on, the population increased by of Population strides, from ten and a half million in 1801, to sixteen and a quarter million in 1831, to twenty-six million in 1871, and on to almost forty-one million in 1911.

In the other island of "Little" Britain (that is, Ireland), only industrialized Belfast greatly increased in population. The population of Ireland as a whole, largely agricultural and once almost as numerous as that of Great Britain, Agriculdeclined from eight million in 1841 to five and a quarter in 1871 and to four and a quarter in 1911. All this decline is accounted for by the stream of emigration which flowed from agricultural Ireland to industrial centres in America not only, but also in Scotland and England. That Ireland remained chiefly rural only intensified the urbanizing and industrializing of Great Britain.

For in this larger island, too, industrialization was attended by an incessant migration from farm to factory, from country-side to city. Instead of a relatively even distribution of population all over Great Britain, there was now Population as significant concentration of the entire nineteenth-century increment (and some besides) in seven distinct regions:

(1) London and its environs (with a population in 1911 almost equalling the whole of England's in 1801);

(2) South Lancashire, including Manchester and Liverpool;

(3) Northumberland, with Newcastle as focus;

(4) West Yorkshire, around Leeds and Sheffield;

(5) the Midlands, with Birmingham as centre;

(6) South Wales, with its coal fields and port of Cardiff; and

(7) the Scottish region centring in Glasgow.

One British industry—and only one—suffered serious loss, not only relatively but absolutely, during the period from British 1867 to 1914. That was agriculture. Of the early Agrieffects of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution on British agriculture, we have elsewhere spoken: how it was

"industrialized" by capitalistic investment and enterprise, by "enclosures" and farm machinery and scientific fertilizers; how it was stimulated by the growth of cities and their mounting demand for its products and simultaneously by the increasing ease with which its products could be transported to the cities; and how, despite the diminution of farm labor and the repeal of the protectionist corn laws, it flourished abundantly for the three decades after 1840 and netted British landlords a handsome profit. About 1874, however, the tide of British agricultural prosperity turned, and rapidly ebbed.

At first, the ebb was viewed as a temporary phenomenon, a natural but passing effect of the widespread economic "depression" of 1873-1874, which was itself a result of over-speculation, of the Franco-Prussian War, and of the American Civil War, and which adversely affected manufacturing as much as agriculture, on the Continent of Europe and in America as much as in Britain. But while British manufacturing and commerce soon recovered and again forged ahead, the ebb of British agriculture became chronic. From the 1870's British farmers were staggered by an astounding rise of grain-growing in the United States Damag-ing Efand Argentina, Canada and Australia, and by still fects of more astounding expansion of overseas shipping Foreign whereby the plentiful cheap grain of those hitherto Competidistant countries came flooding into British cities and underselling British-grown grain. In the circumstances, the grain area of England and Wales shrank from eight and a quarter million acres in 1871 to five and three-quarters in 1901; and the

For a time, the decrease of grain-growing was partially offset by an increase of pasturage and animal husbandry. But by the 1890's, thanks to the development of refrigeration for long-distance shipments, British cities were obtaining most of their meat, as well as their grain, from the United States and Argentina, Canada and Australia. Not even British dairy products—or the woollen staple of Britain—were proof against foreign competition: the importation of cheese rose in twenty years by more than a third, that of butter was doubled, that of wool was more than doubled. By the end of the nineteenth century, Great Britain was depending on the outside world—chiefly on America

financial profits from what remained tended to disappear.

¹ See above, pp. 35-40.

-not only for cotton and the bulk of other raw materials for her factories, but also for most of the food for her congested industrial population. British farmers simply could not meet the newer foreign competition. They were handicapped by a soil less naturally fertile, and, even more seriously, by an aris-Special tocratic landholding system under which most of them Handicaps to were mere tenants rather than real owners 1 and hence British were expected to make enough money from farming

Agricul-

large rents to noble landlords. And the one advantage which they had possessed of proximity to their markets was now being overcome by the speed and cheapness of oceanic transportation.

not only to support themselves but also to pay fairly

The decline of British agriculture was platonically lamented, but little or nothing was actually done to arrest it. Already when it began, the agricultural population was too small a fraction of the total population of Great Britain—about a sixth—to be able to exert any great or decisive influence, as a class, upon governmental policy or legislation. The landholding aristocracy, though still very influential in government, was now as much identified with banking, trade, or manufacturing as with agriculture. Landlords complained that they could not make their ancestral estates "pay," but the persons who suffered most were usually their tenants and farm laborers. These persons might better their lot only by migrating to industrial centres or foreign fields. Landlords, on the other hand, could continue to derive pleasure, if not profit, from their country estates; they could transform them into parks and hunting grounds with the profits which they reaped from urban business. Indeed, the decline of British agriculture only emphasized the rôle of Britain as the world's capital workshop and banker. It seemed but a natural

division of labor among the nations that Britain Concenshould manufacture for the others and, in turn, be tration in fed by them. The survivals of historic agriculture in

Industrial

Britain would be largely recreational and picturesque, a sideattraction of cottages and hedges, manor houses and flower

¹ The number of persons in England and Wales owning more than one acre of land was about 150,000, or less than 1/170 of the total population, and of this number 2,250 were landed aristocrats who owned almost a half of all the cultivated land. It is noteworthy that at the same time France, with a population only a third larger, had some 5,600,000 landed proprietors, and Belgium, with a population of but 7,000,000, had as many as 1,000,000 landowners.

gardens, golf links and game preserves, for the British capitalist and the visiting tourist.

British noblemen and gentlemen—and social pretenders among the middle class—might play on country estates, but their work was more and more in urban offices, in the management of factories, collieries, foundries, railways, steamship lines, public utility corporations, insurance companies, banks and brokerage houses, in the maintenance of Britain's premier position in the industry and trade and capitalism of the modern world.

For Great Britain was the leading commercial as well as industrial country; and the value of her foreign commerce steadily rose. Already in 1865 it was 418 million pounds ster-Britain's ling, much in excess of any other country's. In 1800 it Commerwas 600 million, and in 1910 it amounted to 1,085 milcial Supremacy lion. London was the greatest commercial port in the world, and Liverpool did the greatest exporting business. Moreover, the bulk of the shipping to and from Great Britain, together with the largest part of the whole world's carrying trade, was in British hands, and it showed a similar gain. The net tonnage of the British merchant marine went up from five and a half million in 1870 to eight million in 1890 and to eleven and a half million in 1010; and whereas sailing vessels constituted over fourfifths of the tonnage in 1870, steamships accounted for over ninetenths of the tonnage in 1910.

Great Britain was the wealthiest country in the world, with the largest accumulations of capital at home and the largest investments abroad. Her domestic wealth was roughly Britain's estimated at 6,000 million pounds sterling in 1865, Increasing at 10,700 million in 1805, and at 14,000 million in Domestic 1910, 1 representing a rate of increase considerably in Wealth excess of the rate of population increase. And she was the chief lending country in the world, the foremost exporter of capital. By 1913 her external investments aggregated at least 3,760 million pounds sterling, comprising 1,825 million in the British overseas empire, 755 million in the United States and a like Her Inamount in Latin America, 110 million in Russia, 65 creasing Foreign million in Japan, 25 million in the Ottoman Empire, Investand 225 million elsewhere. Of the total of 3,760 milments lion, 1,125 were invested in government loans, 1,530 in railways,

¹ For corresponding estimates at earlier dates, see above, p. 45.

185 in other "public utilities," 325 in industrial plants, 275 in mines, 245 in land companies, and 75 in banks. Wherefore from all parts of the world and from a variety of public and private undertakings flowed to Britain a stream of annual tribute in the form of interest on stocks and bonds. London was the unquestioned financial capital of the world, the pivot of the world's money and banking and stock exchange.

As the national wealth increased, the British government could and did increase its revenues and expenditures. The central government more than doubled its expenditure from 71 million pounds in 1867-1868 to about 150 million in 1910, while local authorities multiplied their expenditure almost fivefold from 36 million in 1867-1868 to about 168 million in 1910. Of the strictly national expendi-

Expendi-

ture between these dates, payments on the national debt decreased from 26 ½ million to 22 million, while the cost of army and navy rose from 28 1/2 million to nearly 64 million and of all other governmental services from 16 million to slightly over 64 million. The expense of past wars and of preparedness for future wars was still the principal item in Britain's annual public budget, but it was not increasing quite as fast as the expense of the civil service. The state was obviously being called upon to do more for its citizens than to protect them against armed aggression of foreigners. In fact, by the twentieth century, many inmates of the "workshop of the world" were becoming "socialistic," and even English liberals were being accused of catering to "socialism." How this came about, we shall presently see.

Meanwhile, let us note briefly but with emphasis certain peculiar, almost paradoxical, facts about Britain—facts intimately associated with her position as workshop and banker of the world and fundamental to any detailed account of her political and social development from 1867 to 1914. One was the striking contrast between the waxing industrial wealth of the country as a whole and the continuing poverty of the majority of its inhabitants. It is true that the dire misery prevalent among the masses during the earlier stage of industrialization 1 was somewhat mitigated. But it is also true that there was no general diffusion of wealth at all

Significant Paraabout Britain

1. National Wealth vs. Individ-บลใ Poverty

¹ See above, pp. 46-51.

comparable with its quantitative increase. The economic condition of farm tenants and agricultural laborers grew steadily worse; and, if the lot of urban workingmen as a class showed some improvement, most of them still owned no property, had no permanent homes, and were expected to work long hours for mere subsistence wages, while some of them remained chronically idle and on the verge of starvation. The unprecedented profits of British industry, we must remember, went on accruing primarily to a minority of Britishers rather than to the majority; and when we talk about Great Britain as the wealthiest country in the world—the leader in money-making and money-lending, in manufacturing, trade, and shipping—we must simultaneously recall the gist of some impassioned but true words which a famous British statesman [David Lloyd George] addressed to his fellow countrymen in 1913: "You have hundreds of thousands of men working unceasingly for wages that barely bring them enough bread to keep themselves and their families above privation. Generation after generation they see their children wither before their eyes for lack of air, light, and space, which is denied them by men who have square miles of it for their own use. . . . We forget that divine justice never passed by a great wrong. You can hear, carried by the breezes from the north, the south, the east, and the west, ominous rumbling."

A second curious fact about Britain was the evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, character of her politics and society. She had had no "French Revolution." Side by side 2. Induswith her impressive and very modern machine industrial Revolution vs. try, she retained a form of government and a class so-Political ciety which dated from the middle ages and which a Evolution series of compromises had adapted, slowly and imperfectly, to changing circumstances. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, "compromise" was a specially sacred word in the English language, and "muddling through" a favorite way of describing the process by which compromises were practically effected. There was a monarch who reigned "by grace of God," but did not rule. There was a privileged national church whose communicants constituted only a fraction of the nation. There was a small privileged nobility which prided itself on landholding but profited mainly from bondholding. There was a powerful House of Commons, elected by the masses but actually dominated by the classes. And, despite a persistent tradition of individualism and personal liberty, despite an extraor-political dinary frankness of discussion and criticism, the great majority of Englishmen were wont to respect their social social "betters" and obey their political rulers. On Aristocthe whole, they were intensely patriotic, and, however poor or romantic they might be individually, they were prone to glorify the "wealth of Britain" and British "common sense." They might demand "reform," but they were not likely to participate in "revolution." All of which gave internal solidity and external fame to the "workshop of the world" and to its political and social institutions.

A third remarkable fact was that Great Britain, as workshop and banker of the world, seemed to be so small a part of the world. We say, "seemed to be." In a literal sense, "Great Britain" was one of two relatively small islands lying off the coast of the smallest of the five continents, and its population, even when reaching the figure of forty million, was dwarfed by the sixty-five million in Germany, the ninety-three million in the United States, the hundred and forty million in Russia, the three hundred million in India. In a metaphorical and truer sense, however, "Great Britain" was not a mere island with a puny population; it was a huge imperial domain. And this domain was not only the political British Empire where the British flag waved over a fourth of the earth's habitable area and a fourth of the human race. It was also an economic empire of all lands and seas and of all peoples wherever British shipping and trade or British investment extended. We must bear in mind that without her vast empire, economic as well as political, Great Britain would not have been the workshop and banker of the modern world.

2. OPERATION OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT AND GROWING DEMAND FOR SOCIAL REFORM

The year 1867—the year of the second great parliamentary reform ¹—marked the close of the earlier Victorian compromise between noble landlords and bourgeois capitalists and the beginning of a new compromise between aristocracy and democracy. On the one hand, the upper and wealthier classes retained their

¹ See above, pp. 273-276.

prime position in public life. They monopolized the House of Lords. They occupied most of the seats in the House New of Commons and nearly all cabinet offices. They sup-Political plied the heads and much of the staff for the govern-Compromise, 1867 mental services, military, naval, and civil. They provided the leadership for both Liberal and Conservative parties. On the other hand, all this abiding political ascendancy of the classes was newly and radically conditioned by the enfranchisement of the masses. Aristocratic government had to function within a democratic framework, with the result that while it remained predominantly aristocratic in personnel it became increasingly democratic—even demagogic—in method and policy. Prime ministers and their cabinets, members of Parliament, and leaders of the political parties, in quest of necessary electoral support, catered more and more to popular opinion and demand.

Despite the fact that the Reform Act of 1867 had been sponsored by the Conservative party, the majority of workingmen whom it enfranchised gave their first suffrages, in 1868, to the Liberal party. They distrusted Disraeli, the Conservative leader, and they were less sympathetic with a party traditionally identified with the landed aristocracy and the Anglican Church than with the party of Gladstone and Bright, the party especially devoted to industrial progress, to freedom of trade, and to nonconformity in religion. In 1868, therefore, the Liberal party returned to power, with a cabinet under the premiersione's ship of Gladstone and with a parliamentary majority


First Liberal comprising a group of "Whig" aristocrats, a larger Ministry, number of strictly "liberal" industrialists, and some "radicals" like John Bright who, by reason of the size of their working-class following in the country at large, enjoyed a greatly enhanced prestige in Parliament.


This first Gladstone ministry—this first "democratic" ministry—lasted from 1868 to 1874. It stuck to the Liberal tradition of "peace and retrenchment," economizing on expenditures and

¹ On the earlier career of Disraeli, see above, pp. 99-100.

² On Gladstone, see above, pp. 98-99.

NOTE. The picture opposite is from an etching of a scene on the River Thames by James McNeill Whistler (1834–1903). On Whistler, see above, pp. 401–402.





obtaining necessary revenues from free-trade budgets, and pursuing a pacific policy in foreign and colonial affairs. It preserved a strict neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. It submitted to arbitration the claims for damages of the United States

"Peace and Retrench-

growing out of the depredations of British-built Confederate vessels during the American Civil War.1 It fostered local selfgovernment in several regions of the overseas British Empire. Gladstone's government was truly "liberal" in its lack of imperial ambitions and its pursuit of a "little-England" policy.

In its dealings with contemporary unrest and disaffection in Ireland,2 Gladstone adumbrated a policy which was to characterize the Liberal party during the rest of the nineteenth century. While insistent that Ireland should remain in close political union with Great Britain and intolerant of revolution or violence in the lesser island, he was anxious to conciliate the Irish and to remedy their worst grievances. In 1869 he prevailed upon Parliament to disestablish and disendow the (Anglican) Church of Disestab-Ireland—that is, to separate church and state in Irelishment of Angliland—so that henceforth religion there, Protestant can as well as Catholic, would be purely a private and Church in Ireland voluntary matter. Gladstone himself was a pious Anglican, but the majority of his Liberal supporters were Non-Conformists (Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers, Methodists, etc.), and these, less interested than Gladstone in Ireland itself, were naturally more interested in withdrawing public support from the Anglican Church. Another Irish reform, and one in behalf of which Gladstone and the mass of urban Liberals could make common cause against "Tory landlordism," was the Land Act of 1870, prescribing that no Irish landlord should evict a tenant or arbitrarily raise his Land Act of 1870 rent without reimbursing him for whatever improvements he had made on his holding. At the same time, true to

² A fuller account of Irish unrest and disaffection, with a general survey of remedial legislation, is given below, pp. 488-501.

Note. The picture opposite is of the Palace of Westminster-the seat of the British Parliament—and is reproduced from an etching by a popular French artist who spent much time in England, Felix Buhot (1847-1808).

¹ The most famous of these vessels of the Southern Confederacy was the Alabama. The arbitration of the so-called "Alabama claims" resulted in the payment (in 1872) of damages of \$15,500,000 by Great Britain to the United States.

principles of "law and order," the Liberal majority in Parliament passed a Coercion Act, authorizing drastic measures for the suppression of disorder and political crime in Ireland.

The most significant legislation of the Gladstone régime from 1868 to 1874, however, was in response to demands of the recently enfranchised workingmen of Great Britain for popular education and for full legalization of trade unions. The former demand was met by the Education Act of 1870. Since 1833 the state had been subsidizing elementary schools Act of 1870 maintained by the church (chiefly by the Anglican Church), and the subsidies had gradually heightened.1 Until 1870, nevertheless, there had been no real state schools in Britain, and almost half the children of Britain still had no regular schooling. Now, provision was made, not only for larger public subsidies to private schools (both Anglican and Catholic), but also for the establishment of a supplementary system of state schools ("board schools," as they were called) which would be financed entirely by public taxation and managed by public "boards of education" and in which no denominational religion would be taught. Under the operation of these new "board schools" and of the continuing church schools, and with the added requirement (in 1880) that every child Developmust attend some school, the percentage of illiting a National eracy in England rapidly decreased from 24 in 1871 School System to 7 in 1891 and to 1 in 1911. By 1911 more than 5,500,000 English children were attending school (3,000,000 in "board schools" and 2,500,000 in "church schools"), and governmental authorities (central and local) were expending £25,000,000 on elementary education.

The other major demand of British workingmen was partially met by the Trade Union Act of 1871. This formally and finally

legalized trade unions, by empowering them to hold property and to maintain and defend actions at law.

Act of 1871
Indirectly, at least, it involved a recognition of the right of collective bargaining and a limitation on the freedom of contract. But such departures from the economic theory of liberalism were made easier for manufacturers in the Liberal party by Gladstone's insistence that with the legalization of trade unions should be coupled especially drastic provisions

¹ See above, p. 82 and note.

against "picketing" and every form of "violence" in connection with strikes and other labor disputes. Trade unionism grew rapidly in Britain after 1871, but its rank and file were by no means satisfied with the Liberal Act of that year. Dissatisfaction of British workingmen with the Trade Union

Act of 1871 and opposition of Anglican churchmen and British

landlords to the ecclesiastical, educational, and agrarian legislation of Gladstone were capitalized by the Conservative party and associated by its adroit leader, Benjamin Disraeli, with Dissatisthe "higher patriotism" which he sedulously preached faction with in lieu of the "inglorious" foreign and colonial policy Gladstoof the Liberal government. By 1874 Disraeli was in a nian Liberalism position to profit politically from an intensified nationalism—and imperialism—which was taking possession of Britishers. There was popular reaction against the government which had stood aside while Germany and Italy became unified Great Powers, while Russia repudiated the results of the Crimean War,2 while the United States collected "damages," while the British Empire continued to "disintegrate." A feeling spread that Britain, if she would retain an international polit-Surge of

ical prestige commensurate with her economic supremacy, must play a bigger and more active part in world politics and imperial sway, and that "patriots" could perialism expect more from Disraeli and the Conservative party than from

politics and imperial sway, and that "patriots" could perialism expect more from Disraeli and the Conservative party than from Gladstone and Bright and the other Liberals. A general election had to be held in 1874, and when the votes were counted they showed that Gladstone must go out of office and Disraeli come in.

The Conservative ministry of Disraeli lasted from 1874 to 1880. It had Parliament repeal in 1875 the restriction which the Trade Union Act of 1871 had imposed on "peaceful Disraeli's picketing" and in 1878 enact a comprehensive code of factory laws. But while it thus catered to British Ministry, workingmen, its chief interest—and significance—1874-1880 was in the nationalist domain. It was extremely patriotic, even jingoistic, and it displayed a tender regard for the unity, the

¹ Gladstone catered to his democratic working-class constituents not only with the Education Act of 1870 and the Trade Union Act of 1871 but also with the enactment of the secret ballot for electing members of Parliament (1872) and with a regulatory code for labor in mines. On previous labor legislation, see above, pp. 87-89, and on the secret ballot, see above, pp. 275.

² See above, pp. 247-248.

dignity, and the greatness of the British Empire. Disraeli not only knew how, by flattery and cajollery, to manage his somewhat difficult sovereign, Queen Victoria, but also did much to render the crown the outstanding symbol and object of British patriotism. And he did much, too, to reassert and revivify Britain's imperial traditions. He emphasized the union of Ireland with Great Britain and positively refused to make any further concessions to what he termed the "rebellious elements" in that island. He stressed the importance Imperialof India to Great Britain by adding to the titles of his sovereign that of "Empress of India." He sponsored an aggressive policy in South Africa and waged imperialist war in Afghanistan. He obtained for Britain the financial control of the recently constructed Suez Canal 2 and paved the way for British occupation of Egypt. He intervened decisively in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, helped to dictate the terms of peace at Berlin,3 and, as a kind of brokerage-fee, secured for his own country the island of Cyprus in the Mediterranean.

Disraeli's government was turned out of office by the general election of 1880, and he himself died the following year. But Gladstone—whose second Liberal ministry extended from 1880 to 1885—was unable to breast the current of national-Gladstone's ism and imperialism which Disraeli had set in motion Second and which the Conservative party now exploited to Ministry, the full. Though the Liberal prime minister was a shrewd politician and a resonant orator, his principles and prejudices were more consonant with mid-century liberalism than with late-century nationalism. He was still a "little Englander," dubious about foreign entanglements and distant undertakings and sure that the noble ends of peace and material prosperity could best be attained through a continuous proliferation of such domestic "reforms" as had been effected by Liberal governments in the 1830's and 1840's.4 And he was enough of an aristocrat to know, of course, what "reforms" were good for the people. Gladstone talked so much and so eloquently about "reform," that he

¹ For a fuller account of the nineteenth-century development of the British Empire, see below, pp. 502-526.

² See below, p. 519, and the cartoon facing p. 503, below.

³ See above, pp. 264-265.

⁴ See above, pp. 81-83, 84-85, 88.

acquired the reputation of being more radical than he really was. He alarmed many conservatively minded persons, and Queen Victoria not only disliked him on personal grounds (she said he talked to her as if she were a mass-meeting) but also deemed his "principles" highly dangerous. Yet it was the irony of fate that the only memorable domestic "reform" which Gladstone actually accomplished during his second ministry was the extension of the parliamentary suffrage to farm tenants and agricultural laborers (1884)—and this he accomplished her of only through an understanding with the Conservative party that there should be a new and equitable rearrangement of electoral districts (1885).1

It is doubtful, as we have intimated, whether Gladstone would have sponsored any large social reform within Great Britain, if he could have done so. As a matter of fact, he had little opportunity after 1880 to think about social problems at home. Foreign, colonial, and Irish questions which had come to the fore in the preceding Conservative administration now absorbed his attention and his great energy. He would make his own government and the Liberal party the knights-errant of subject peoples and oppressed nationalities, the merciful avengers of Conservative injustice abroad (and in Ireland). In this spirit, he withdrew British troops from Afghanistan and halted British expansion in South Africa. He permitted, it is true, an Imperialarmed intervention in Egypt, but he insisted that it would be only temporary and he so weakened it that it came perilously near to disaster. And he pondered, day and night, how he might alleviate the situation in Ireland. This situation had grown steadily worse during the ministry of Disraeli, and now, in the early 1880's, Irish peasants were resolutely demanding a veritable revolution in landholding, while Irish members of the British Parliament were constituting themselves a separate Irish Nationalist party with the avowed purpose of undoing the Union of 1800 and reëstablishing "home rule" for Ireland. Gladstone and his fellow Liberals could not bring themselves quite yet to favor any political change in Ireland. They con- Irish Land tented themselves with enacting a second Land Act Act of (1881), which guarantied to Irish peasants as against their landlords the so-called "three F's"-fair rent, fixity of

On the parliamentary reform of 1884-1885, see above, pp. 275-276.

tenure, and free sale. Simultaneously they renewed the coercion acts and the reign of martial law in Ireland.

All these policies were distasteful to an increasing part of the British electorate. Workingmen complained that the Liberal government did nothing to improve their lot. Patriots denounced its concessions abroad and in Ireland as weak and undignified, if not traitorous. Men of means were alarmed by the restrictions which its Irish Land Act placed upon the rights of private property. Not even the Irish were satisfied; they wanted a Salismore radical land reform, they opposed coercion with bury's Conservaredoubled violence, and they intensified their agitative tion for "home rule." In 1885 Gladstone, outvoted in Ministry, 1885-1886

1885-1886 the House of Commons, resigned; and until a new general election could be held, a Conservative ministry under the Marquess of Salisbury took office.¹

The first general election in which the agricultural as well as the industrial masses participated was held in 1885. Alliance It returned a slightly greater number of Liberals than of Libof Conservatives but a sufficiently large number of erals with Irish Na-Irish Nationalists to give them the balance of power tionalists: between the two major parties. Gladstone at once Gladstone's perceived the advantage of "home rule" to Ireland Third Ministry. and to his own political fortunes. In alliance with the 1886 Irish Nationalists, he voted Salisbury out of office and

in 1886 formed his third ministry, pledged to set up a separate Irish parliament at Dublin.

Gladstone's third ministry was very brief. Its one proposal was a home-rule bill for Ireland, and the bill was defeated in the House of Commons. Though the Irish Nationalists and a majorDefeat ity of the Liberals voted for it, a minority of Liberals of Irish Home-Rule proved themselves "Liberal Unionists," and who proved themselves more nationalist and imperialist than liberal, joined the Conservatives in rejecting the bill. Gladstone immediately resigned, and Salisbury, with

¹ Robert Cecil, third Marquess of Salisbury (1830-1903), was an aristocrat of the aristocrats. He had been a bitter opponent of the Reform Act of 1867 but had subsequently accepted it as "irrevocable" and had been one of Disraeli's chief colleagues in the Conservative ministry from 1874 to 1880. His principal interest was in foreign affairs, and he succeeded to the leadership of the Conservative party on the death of Disraeli in 1881. See his portrait, facing p. 475, below.

Liberal Unionist backing, formed his second and more lasting Conservative ministry.

The year 1886 thus registered a schism within the Liberal party as significant for British politics and as symptomatic of a social and intellectual shift as the schism of 1846 within the Conservative party had been. Back in 1846 economic and political liberalism had been so much in the ascendant that a considerable number of Tory Conservatives (including their leader, Sir Robert Peel) had repudiated the traditional agrarian policies of their party and had cooperated with the Liberals in repealing the corn laws and instituting the régime of free trade. And during the forty years from 1846 to 1886, the Liberal party, reënforced by the "Peelites" (of whom, we may recall, Gladstone himself was one), was usually the major political party in the realm and was in power most of the time. Now, in 1886, nationalism and imperialism were so much in the ascendant that a considerable number of professed Liberals cooperated with the Conservatives to prevent Gladstone from tampering with the Union between Britain and Ireland. And during the ensuing twenty years, the Conservative party, supported by Liberal Unionists, controlled the government almost continuously. For only three years (1892-1895) out of the twenty were the Gladstonian Liberals in office, and then with a most precarious majority in the House of Commons.

Nationalistic imperialism was not the only factor in the disintegration of the Liberal party. A goodly number of professed Liberals, especially among the younger generation, were impatient with Gladstone's "old-fashioned" leadership and ideas, and desirous of a "new liberalism" which should be less doctrinaire and which should realistically face the practical social and economic problems of the day. The most conspicuous

economic problems of the day. The most conspicuous of such Liberals, and the leader of the "Liberal Unionists," was Joseph Chamberlain (1836–1914), a highly successful manufacturer of Birmingham and a "radical" in religion, in the advocacy of political democ-

Joseph Chamberlain and the Liberal Unionists

racy, and in the cause of social reform. Chamberlain made

¹It was in power 1846–1852, 1852–1858, 1859–1866, 1868–1874, 1880–1885, 1886—a total of about thirty years as contrasted with about ten years of Conservative ministries, 1852, 1858, 1866–1868, 1874–1880, 1885–1886. On the Conservative schism of 1846, see above, pp. 84–85.

a special reputation for himself as a "socialistic" mayor of Birmingham in the 1870's: he cleaned up the city slums and established municipal ownership of gas and water supply. Gradually, as he became more active in national politics, he evinced an ever greater interest not only in social legislation but in imperialism and tariff protectionism; in other words, in the neomercantilism which was spreading out from Germany and which was obviously at variance with the economic liberalism that had long been the guiding principle of British public policy. The question of "liberating" Ireland and loosening its ties with the British Empire was the occasion, rather than the basic reason, for the secession of Chamberlain and his followers from the Liberal party of Gladstone.

The Conservative ministry of Salisbury from 1886 to 1892 conducted the British government along the nationalist and Salis- imperialist paths already pointed out by Disraeli. It celebrated in 1887, with befitting pomp, the fiftieth anniversary of Queen Victoria's accession to the throne bury's Second Ministry, 1886-1892 and utilized the occasion to inaugurate a series of semi-ceremonial, semi-advisory "colonial conferences," in which the chief ministers of the overseas self-governing colonies discussed with representatives of the home government matters of general concern to the British Empire as a whole. It sponsored in 1889 a sensational strengthening of the British navy, Promoting Naostensibly for the protection of the Empire, and it tionalism greatly enlarged the territorial extent of the Empire and Imby securing, through treaties of 1890-1891 with Gerperialism many, France, and Portugal, the principal share in the pending general partition of Africa.² In respect of Ireland, it consistently opposed all "home rule" and "separatist" agitation, but in an effort to reconcile the Irish peasants to political union it sponsored a type of land reform more fundamental in character and eventually more beneficent in operation than the Gladstonian land reforms of 1870 and 1881. Whereas Gladstone had under-

Land Purchase Acts for Ireland

taken merely to restrain landlords from oppressing their tenants, the Salisbury government would enable peasants, by borrowing money from the government on easy terms, to buy out their landlords and transform themselves from tenants into small landed proprietors. By

¹ See above, p. 326.

² See below, pp. 738-739.

a series of "land purchase acts," under the auspices of Conservative British governments, the number of peasant proprietors in Ireland was very considerably increased.¹

Salisbury was scarcely more interested than Gladstone in social reform within Great Britain. The Conservative party was still more agrarian than the Liberal, though by the The Con-1880's—thanks to the striding industrialization of the servatives and Socountry—many Conservative landlords were as much cial Legisidentified as any Liberal with manufacturing, commerce, and banking, and quite as reluctant to endanger capitalistic profits by legislation in behalf of workingmen. Nevertheless. the Conservative party, unlike the Liberal, had a tradition of noblesse oblige, a memory of the stand which some of its most honored members, such as Sadler, Shaftesbury, and Disraeli, had previously taken in behalf of factory legislation. This tradition, this memory, was kept alive by the agitation of a special group of young Conservatives—the so-called "Tory Democrats" under the leadership of the brilliant Lord Randolph Churchill (1849-1895),² and was reënforced by the pressure of Joseph Chamberlain and his Liberal Unionists. In the circumstances, the Salisbury ministry was induced to grant some working-class demands. It put through a mines act in 1887, forbidding the employment of children under twelve years of age. In 1801 it practically abolished tuition fees in elementary schools and thus rendered mass education not only compulsory but free.

The general election of 1892 gave the Liberals, in combination with the Irish Nationalists, a slight majority in the House of Commons. Gladstone, now a very old man, formed his fourth ministry and tried again to realize the one and only "reform" which filled his mind: home rule for Ireland. This time he got a home-rule bill through the House of Commons, but it was thrown out by the House of Lords, and in 1894 the "Grand Old Man"

¹ The first important measure of the kind had been enacted in 1885. Another followed in 1891, and still others in 1896 and 1903. See below, p. 497.

² Churchill was a younger son of the seventh Duke of Marlborough and a strenuous advocate of the doctrine that the Conservatives ought to adopt, rather than oppose, reforms of a popular character and to challenge the claims of the Liberals to pose as the champions of the masses. He was Secretary for India in the first Salisbury cabinet of 1885–1886, and for a short time at the beginning of the second Salisbury ministry in 1886 he was Chancellor of the Exchequer and Conservative leader in the House of Commons.

of nineteenth-century British liberalism turned over the premier-

Gladstone's Fourth Ministry, 1802-1894: Defeat of Second Irish Home-Rule Bill

ship to a younger and more imperialist colleague, the Earl of Rosebery, and withdrew, at the age of eighty-four, to his country estate. Here he lingered on, charming visitors with his conversation and edifying them with his piety, and bursting into the public limelight once more, and for the last time, with a clarion call to Britain to aid Armenians against the Turks. He died in 1898. Already in 1895, with the fall of the Rosebery government, the rout of the Lib-

eral party seemed complete.

In the general election of 1895, the coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists won an overwhelming victory. Salisbury

Decade of Conservative and Unionist Government. 1895-1905 resumed the premiership and Joseph Chamberlain entered the cabinet as colonial secretary. In 1900 another election prolonged the coalition's sway, and, though Salisbury's age and infirmity caused him in 1902 to surrender the headship of the cabinet to his kinsman, Sir Arthur. Balfour, a placid academic person and former disciple of Lord Randolph Churchill.

the régime endured until 1905. These ten years of Salisbury and Balfour government witnessed some social legislation, inspired mainly by Chamberlain and including, most notably, a

Social Legisla-

"Workmen's Compensation Act," the insurance of workingmen against accidents in certain specified trades. They also witnessed an important Education Act (1902), increasing the facilities for popular schooling and

especially strengthening the church schools. But what the decade preëminently witnessed was an extraor-

dinary advance of nationalism and imperialism and a startling agitation for tariff protectionism. It was the time when Impeeconomic—and imperial—rivalry was fast developing rialist Activity among the Great Powers, when Great Britain was feeling acutely the industrial competition of Germany and the United States and was becoming alarmed by the ambitious projects of Russia in Asia, France in Africa, and Germany in the Near East and in the Pacific. It was the time, too, when Cecil Rhodes 1 was dreaming about an Africa which would be solidly British, when Rudyard Kipling was composing poems about

¹ See below, p. 737.

"the white man's burden" and "the manifest destiny" of imperial Britain, when Joseph Chamberlain was zealously enlisting popular and governmental support in furtherance of just such dreams and just such a destiny.

The Boer War (1899–1902), with its culminating incorporation of the two Dutch republics of South Africa into the British Empire,1 was the outstanding monument of the imperialist régime of Chamberlain and Salisbury. There were other similar monuments, however, in the forceful expansion of British political dominion or economic supremacy in India, in China, in Persia, in Egypt, as well as in the diplomatic—and imperialistically advantageous—entente with France (1904).2 And the government which busily concerned itself with imperial projects abroad neglected no opportunity to enhance patriotic pride at home. It celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of Oueen Victoria's reign in 1897 as a magnificent national fête; and with emotional intensity, colorful processions, and a grandeur reminiscent of antique Rome, it buried the Oueen in 1901 and crowned her son and successor, Edward VII (1901-1910). Edward, it is interesting to note, added to the sovereign's titles of "King of Great Britain and Ireland, Defender of the. Faith, and Emperor of India," the new and peculiarly appropriate title of "King of the British Dominions beyond the Seas."

In 1903 the restless Joseph Chamberlain began a campaign for "tariff reform." Alike as an imperialist and as a manufacturer, he felt that the circumstances of the twentieth century necessitated a departure from those "liberal" policies of the nineteenth century which had involved free trade, a comparatively slight expenditure on national armaments, and a progressive loosening of ties. eco-

Chamberlain's Campaign for "Tariff Reform"

nomic and political, between the mother-country and her colonies. Instead, he would have Great Britain reëstablish import duties on foodstuffs and manufactures, according preferential treatment to foodstuffs coming from other parts of the Empire as these lowered their tariffs on her manufactures. He prophesied that such all-around "imperial preference" would cement the Empire and profit both British industry and colonial agriculture. Simul-

"Imperial Preference, Defense, and Conference"

taneously he called upon the colonies to share with the mother-

¹ See below, pp. 512-514.

² See below, p. 764.

country in the maintenance of armaments sufficient to assure the unity and integrity of the Empire as a whole. "Imperial preference," "imperial defense," and "imperial conference" were convenient slogans for ideas which were closely intertwined in Chamberlain's mind, and among these ideas, the substitution by Great Britain of tariff protectionism for free trade was central.

Joseph Chamberlain had disrupted the Liberal party in 1886. In 1903–1905 he weakened, if he did not disrupt, the Conservative party. For, while most of the Liberal Unionists and a considerable number of their Conservative allies endorsed his tariff proposals, a somewhat larger number of Conservatives Conflict were so accustomed to free trade or were so fearful of within the effect of protectionism in raising the cost of living, Conservaand hence the wages of industrial workers and agricultural laborers, that they denounced his proposals as unsound and "radical" and practically forced him out of the cabinet. In vain, Balfour, the prime minister, tried to keep peace within the coalition and prevent party warfare. There was a growing enmity between "free traders" and "tariff reformers"; and at

length, late in 1905, Balfour resigned, and King Edward VII invited the Liberal leader, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, to

Parliamentary Revolution of 1906: New Liberal Régime

form a ministry. The ensuing general election, early in 1906, was a "landslide" for the Liberal party, the acknowledged party of free trade. The Conservatives and Liberal Unionists together 1 secured only 157 seats in the House of Commons, while the Liberals obtained 390, the Irish Nationalists 83, and a new party—the Labor party-40. Campbell-Bannerman had the biggest backing in the country and in Parliament that

any British minister had ever had. Chamberlain was rebuked, tariff reform was shelved, and the Conservative party was discredited. It was a peaceful kind of democratic revolution.

The triumph of the Liberal party was not attributable solely to the factional fight within the Conservative party over Chamberlain's "tariff reform," nor did it betoken a complete popular endorsement of the older liberalism. Free trade was still a guiding principle with the masses, as it was with the Liberal party, but what the masses were now chiefly interested in was

¹ The two groups were now formally joined as the "Unionist party."

social and democratic legislation, state action looking toward limitation of the privileges of landlords and Anglican

Church, positive improvement of living and working conditions of the common people, regulation and broader distribution of industrial wealth, and removal

Popular Demand for Social

of political checks upon the exercise of the popular will. And for such a program, the masses obviously expected more sympathy and support from the Liberal party than from the Conservative.

The expectation of the masses was not mistaken. For the Liberal party represented in 1906 a different kind of "liberalism" from that which Palmerston had personified in the middle of the nineteenth century or Gladstone in the latter part of The New the century. The retirement and death of Gladstone had brought new and younger leaders to the fore; and

Liberal-

these, while the Conservative governments of Salisbury and Balfour were fostering imperialism abroad, were being more and more impressed and influenced by the development of varied but widespread agitation for social—even "socialistic"—reform at home. Three varieties of such agitation, which had been emerging since 1870 and which proved influential with the younger generation of Liberals, merit special mention.

First, there was the activity of prominent intellectuals who in one way or another helped to undermine the older faith in "classical" economics, in individual competition and govern-

mental laissez-faire, and to substitute for it an interest in sociology, in collective undertakings and democratic ical Intercontrol. Tames Stuart Mill gave a new slant to "liberal" political economy by distinguishing between

Sociolog-

the production of wealth, governed by "natural laws," and the distribution of wealth, susceptible of regulation by state law.1 John Ruskin stimulated an æsthetic reaction against purely mechanical "progress" and a special regard for the human element in industry.2 Herbert Spencer, though a militant individualist himself, aroused the interest of others in sociological problems and research; and Charles Booth, a wealthy manufacturer of London, was foremost among numerous patrons of detailed investigations into the conditions under which the masses actually worked and lived.3 Still other intellectuals familiarized the British public

¹ On J. S. Mill, see above, pp. 370-371. ² On Ruskin, see above, pp. 156, 161.

On Spencer, see above, pp. 364-365, and on Booth, see above, p. 372.

with what foreign or colonial governments—such as Germany or Australia—were doing to ameliorate the condition of workingmen and dwelt upon the "backwardness" of Britain in this respect. Some rising literary lights, including Shaw and Wells, were zealous and clever propagandists of "socialism."

Second, there was mounting discussion (and criticism) of "landlordism" in Britain-not only the monopoly of agricultural land by titled nobles and country gentlemen, but also the ownership of urban land and congested urban tene-Campaign ments by a relatively small number of wealthy aristoagainst crats. Discussion of the problem, with denunciation of Landlordism the evil effects of landlordism on the working classes in town and countryside, was forwarded by John Stuart Mill and the "Land Tenure Reform Association" which he founded in 1870; by the parliamentary debates on Gladstone's Irish land bills of 1870 and 1881; and, perhaps most effectually, by the campaign of an American reformer, Henry George.

Henry George (1839-1897), a self-made, self-taught native of Philadelphia, had observed, as a journalist in California, the "boom" in real-estate values attending the rapid Henry growth of San Francisco and had concluded that the George worst social ills arose from land speculation which rendered a few persons inordinately rich and the multitudes miserable. In a cogent and eloquent book, Progress and Poverty (1879), George exposed the problem of land monopoly and proposed to solve it by having the state levy on landowners a "single tax" so high as to oblige them to surrender their ownership. The book and its author became famous not only in America, where George almost succeeded in being elected (in 1886) as mayor of New York City on a "single tax" platform, but also in England, where he travelled and lectured and where he exerted no little influence. A young Welsh Liberal, David Lloyd George, was much impressed by Henry George, and so was the distinguished evolutionist, Alfred Russel Wallace, 1 who in 1882 published an influential book of his own on Land Nationalisation, Its Necessity and Its Aims.

¹ See above, pp. 344-346.

Note. The portrait of Henry George, opposite, is from a painting by an American artist, George De Forest Brush (born 1855).





Many English Liberals, in fact, were naturally disposed to favor "land reform," even if they did not accept the "single-tax" idea of Henry George. Discomfiture of landed aristocrats would be pleasing to the masses, embarrassing to the Conservative party (most of whose leaders were landlords), and not at all harmful to the manufacturing and commercial classes which bulked large in the Liberal party. Gladstone himself flirted with the idea of "land reform" in England as well as in Ireland, and after Gladstone's death not only David Lloyd George but all the other "radical" leaders of the Liberal party obtained popular followings by

forensic assaults on "landlordism."

Third, and most effective, there was extraordinary agitation, political as well as economic, on the part of urban workingmen. Among these, especially among skilled factory oper-Political atives and miners, trade unions had been steadily Activity developing since the 1850's; 1 and they had already of Urban Workmen been influential, as we know, in securing the extension of the parliamentary franchise to workingmen in 1867 2 and the legalization of labor organizations in 1871 and of "peaceful picketing" in 1875. The holding of annual trade-union congresses began in 1868, and in 1872 there were eighty-three major trade unions in England, with a membership of 203,000 and an annual income of £125,000. For some time, the leaders and the rankand-file were under the spell of Liberals like John Bright; "liberal" in philosophy and mainly so in political affiliation, they sought amelioration of their lot less through state action than through direct bargaining with employers. At the end of the 1880's and at the beginning of the 1890's, however, British trade unionism was influenced by two novel movements. One was an unprecedented activity among "unskilled" workers-dock laborers, etc.-who, under young "rad-Trade Unionism ical" leaders, such as John Burns, participated in a series of "great strikes" involving much violence against employers, repeated defiance of the government, and no little criticism

¹ On earlier trade unionism in Britain, see above, pp. 88-90.

² See above, pp. 274-275.

Note. The portrait opposite is of the Marquess of Salisbury, Conservative leader from 1881 to 1902, by Violet, Duchess of Rutland. Salisbury was prime minister, we may recall, in 1885–1886, 1886–1892, and 1895–1902.

of the "conservative" tactics of earlier trade unionism. The other was an advance of Marxian Socialism in Britain.

In 1881 a group of intellectuals, including William Morris, the artist, and Henry Hyndman (1842-1921), a scholar and man of fashion, formed the "Social Democratic Federation" Socialism for the propagation of revolutionary Marxian Socialism in England among the masses. In 1883 the "Fabian Society" came into being, and presently, enlisting the talents of such persons as George Bernard Shaw, Annie Besant,² and Sidney Webb (a government employe and the historian of British trade unionism), and without adhering strictly to "Marxism," it conducted a brilliant literary campaign in behalf of the socialization of industry, land, and government. In 1893, Keir Hardie (1856-1915), a Scottish miner, founded the "Independent Labor party," which adopted a program in harmony with "revisionist" Marxism and put up candidates of its own for election to Parliament in opposition to those of the Liberal and Conservative parties. At the general election of 1895, the Independent Labor party failed to elect any of its candidates but it polled 50,000 votes, almost entirely of trade unionists.

Professed Socialists were only a minority among British trade unionists, but they were very active and increasingly influential with the majority. And trade unionists, as they became more "radical" and more politically minded, grew in numbers and resources. The number of major English unions mounted in 1800 to 400, with a membership of 650,000 and an annual income of £1,000,000; and in 1906 to 675, with a membership of 1,720,000 and an annual income of £2,700,000. In the meantime, an event of first-rate importance brought the whole trade-union movement into active politics. For, in 1901 the House of Lords, in its capacity as the supreme law court of the realm, decided that a trade union was legally liable for damages resulting The Taff from any strike conducted by its members. Vale Decision iudicial decision—the so-called Taff Vale decision imperilled not only the "right to strike" but the whole tradeunion organization and its financial resources. Almost immedi-

¹ On William Morris, see above, p. 167. The "Social Democratic Federation" was supported for a time by John Burns, and, though it obtained only a small following among the working classes, it was particularly active—and indirectly influential—in the "great strikes" of 1888–1889.

² On Annie Besant, see above, p. 450, and on Shaw, see above, pp. 388-389.

ately, trade-union leaders, despairing of any redress from the Conservative government then in power and of any near prospect of the Liberal party's return to power, effected a political coalition with the Independent Labor party, the Social Democratic Federation, and the Fabian Society. The coalition became known as the "Labor Party." It was semi-Socialist and semi-trade-unionist. While declaring its willington of ness to coöperate with any other political party which Party would forward labor legislation, it strove to be a dis-

tinct working-class party. In the general election of 1906, it succeeded in electing twenty-nine workingmen to seats in the House of Commons.¹

The rise of the Labor party was important in itself, and also for its effects on the other parties. It gave the final impetus to the conversion of the Liberal party from *laissez-faire* to the championship of social legislation, and it contributed to the debacle of the Conservative party in the election of 1906. The Conservative leaders were too intent upon foreign and colonial affairs, too divided over tariff protectionism, and too compromised by the Taff Vale decision to keep their hold on the British masses. On the other hand, the Liberal leaders could now win a broad popular following. A "radical" group among them, including David Lloyd George 2 and Winston Churchill, 3 vied

¹ In addition, eleven workingmen were elected by the Miners' Federation (which was not formally affiliated with the Labor party until 1908), and thirteen workingmen were elected as candidates of the Liberal party; a total of 53 workingmen in the Parliament of 1906.

² David Lloyd George (born 1863), a Welsh lawyer of the lower middle class, Baptist in religion, had come into prominence in the 1890's as a flaming antagonist of the landed aristocracy, the Anglican Church, and the imperialism of Joseph Chamberlain. A zealous Welsh nationalist, he was ardently pacifist during the Boer War; and coming from the "common people," he thought of himself as their special spokesman. By reason of his popular following and his gifts as a debater in the House of Commons (of which he had been a member since 1890), he was given a place in Campbell-Bannerman's Liberal cabinet in 1905. Before long, he was the most influential member of the Liberal government.

³ Winston Churchill (born 1874) was an extraordinary person. The son of Lord Randolph Churchill and his American wife, the young Churchill was a natural heir to "Tory democracy"; and with great intellectual talents he combined a forceful impetuosity. After experiences in the army and in journalism (he was a brilliant press correspondent during the Boer War), he entered Parliament in 1900 as a Conservative, but his enthusiasm for free trade and social reform soon caused him to break with his party and join the Liberals. In 1905 he was appointed undersecretary for the colonies in the Liberal ministry and speedily became a "radical" ally of Lloyd George.

with Laborites in espousing social reform and attacking "landlordism," while an "imperialist" group, embracing Twofold Herbert Asquith, 1 Sir Edward Grey, 2 and Richard Appeal Haldane,³ promised that in the pursuit of domestic of New Liberalreform a Liberal régime would not neglect British ism: interests abroad. And binding the two groups together "Radical" and "Imwas the common advocacy of free trade. This still reperialist" mained a vital tradition of British Liberals—and the

British public—at the very time when nationalism and imperialism and "socialism" were transforming all the other tenets of historic liberalism.

For ten years, from 1905 to 1915, the Liberals were in office. At first the "radical" Campbell-Bannerman was prime minister, Decade of with the "imperialist" Asquith as Chancellor of the Liberal Exchequer and chief assistant. Then, in 1908, when Campbell-Bannerman fell sick and died, Asquith be1905-1915 came prime minister, with the "radical" Lloyd George as Chancellor of the Exchequer and chief assistant. Free trade was sedulously maintained throughout the period. Much social legislation was enacted, with the coöperation of the Laborites and, usually until 1909, with that of the Conservatives. An

¹ Herbert Asquith (1852-1928), the son of a manufacturer, liberal and non-conformist, had entered Parliament in 1886 and been a member of Gladstone's cabinet in 1892, and, following the lead of Lord Rosebery, had become an apologist for the "new imperialism." At the same time, however, he clung to the traditional free-trade tenets of the Liberal party, and bore the brunt of the fight against Chamberlain's tariff proposals. In 1905, as first lieutenant to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, he became Chancellor of the Exchequer; and in 1908 he succeeded his chief as prime minister. Much later he was raised to the peerage as Earl of Oxford and Asquith, by which title he is now known.

² Sir Edward Grey (1862–1933) belonged to a famous family of Whig aristocrats, one of whose members had sponsored the Reform Act of 1832 (see above, pp. 75–77). He was a country gentleman with a taste for sport, and his very respectability gave him a position in Liberal politics which his actual achievements in Parliament from 1885 to 1905 hardly warranted. He was recognized as an "imperialist" disciple of Lord Rosebery, sympathetic with the Boer War and with the foreign policies of the Conservative government; and as such he was named foreign minister in Campbell-Bannerman's Liberal cabinet of 1905. This post he continued to occupy during the momentous years from 1905 to 1916, when he was honorably retired and elevated to the peerage as Viscount Grey of Fallodon.

³Richard Haldane (1856–1928) was a highly gifted Scotsman, a serious student of German philosophy (especially the idealism of Hegel), a devotee of natural science and positivist sociology, and an apostle of "efficiency." He had been a political follower of Gladstone and then of Rosebery, and in 1905, as "the scholar in politics," he was made secretary for war in the Liberal cabinet. For his management of the war office, he was rewarded in 1911 with a peerage as Viscount Haldane.

important constitutional change was effected in 1911, with the partisan backing of Laborites and especially of Irish Nationalists. Moreover, to the satisfaction of Tories and of patriots in general, there was no radical departure from foreign or colonial policies already established and no sacrifice of "national honor." Indeed, it was this same Liberal régime which carried Britain into the World War. Let us briefly review the major political accomplishments from 1905 to 1915, beginning with the social legislation.

Favors were accorded to trade-union activity, both economic and political. A "trade disputes act" in 1906 practically reversed the Taff Vale decision by protecting the funds of trade unions against suits for damages and expressly allowed trade-union "pickets" to employ "peaceful Legislation persuasion" in strikes. In 1911, in order that trade unionists might better afford to sit in the House of Commons, Parliament authorized the payment of regular salaries to its members. In 1913 it went still farther and legalized the use of trade-union funds for electoral and other political purposes.

A series of enactments extended the scope of state intervention in industry and of state help to workingmen. A "workmen's compensation act" of 1906 applied the principle of State employers' liability on a much larger scale than the Help to act which Joseph Chamberlain had sponsored in 1897. It required almost every employer to insure his workingmen against accidents and against certain industrial diseases. A "labor exchange act" of 1909 set up a system of free public employment bureaus to inform unemployed workmen where work might be had and, if necessary, to pay for their transportation thither. A "trade boards act" of 1909 established special boards (composed of representatives of employers and employes in equal numbers) to fix a "minimum wage" which should be paid to workers in "sweated industries." In 1912 minimumwage legislation was enacted for the benefit of coal miners.

In the meantime, the government was assuming special responsibility for children, for old people, and for the employment and health of the whole nation. An "education act" of 1906 enabled local boards of education to furnish under—Children's nourished school children with free meals; and a Act of comprehensive "children's act" of 1908 sought to regulate in considerable detail many phases of child life, provid-

ing free medical attendance at child-birth and free medical examination and care of infants and young children, prescribing exceptional treatment of juvenile offenders, facilitating the removal of children from homes where they were abused to public institutions where they would be cared for, and enlarging the opportunities of young persons for recreation and for part-time

schooling. At the other extreme of human life, an "old-Old-Age Pensions" age pensions act" of the same year obligated the state to pay a subsidy to every needy old person; by 1913 a million elderly Britishers were receiving old-age pensions from the public treasury. To improve the living conditions of the urban masses, a "housing and town planning act" of 1909 authorized public authorities to condemn and tear down insanitary tenements and replace them with parks and "model dwellings." And capping the whole series of social enactments was the "national insurance act" of 1912. This compelled employers and employes to contribute to funds, to which the state made a special contribution, for the insurance of almost all industrial workers "against loss of health and for the prevention and cure of sickness" and, simultaneously, for the insurance of certain specified categories of workingmen against unemployment.

To most of this social legislation, there was (surprisingly, perhaps) comparatively little opposition in Parliament or in the country at large. The Laborites complained that it did not go far enough, and a handful of individualistic Liberals (survivors of an earlier day) denounced it as going much too far. The Conservative minority in the House of Commons was apt to be

Coöperation of
Conservatives with
Liberals
in Social
Legislation

critical in debate—not so much of the measures themselves as of the Liberal ministers who sponsored them—and then to concur in voting them, though in a few instances the overwhelming Conservative majority in the House of Lords succeeded in imposing amendments which weakened the measures and rendered them less "radical." In general, however, stren-

dered them less "radical." In general, however, strenuous partisanship was not manifest until David Lloyd George brought forward, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, his budget proposals of 1909 for meeting the greatly increased public expenditure necessitated in part by the new social legislation and in part by the mounting costs of military and naval "preparedness."

Lloyd George was faced with the problem not only of getting more money but of getting it by direct taxation, for the freetrade principles of himself and of the whole Liberal party (and the whole Labor party) precluded him from resorting to indirect taxes in the form of tariff duties (as Joseph Chamberlain and a section of the Conservative party urged). The solution which Lloyd George offered was sensational; and to aristocrats and the well-to-do, to the leading lights of the Conservative party, it was shocking in the extreme. He frankly proposed, in his budget of 1909, to put the financial burden of social George reform on the shoulders of the rich and to make the Budget taxation of landlords a means of effecting still more radical social reform. Specifically, he asked Parliament to levy, in addition to customary stamp taxes and excise taxes, a steeply graduated income tax (with a seemingly confiscatory "supertax" on very large fortunes), a heavy inheritance tax, and special taxes on motor cars, on undeveloped land, and on the "unearned increment" of land values. He would force the landlords, he said, to disgorge their "ill-gotten gains," and he would expedite a more equitable distribution of national wealth. The Laborites and "radical" Liberals acclaimed the budget and the motives in back of it, and most of the other Liberals acquiesced in it for the sake of party unity, though with slight personal enthusiasm. On the other hand, the Conservatives, almost to a man, denounced it as unprecedented, unjust, and downright revolutionary; and, curiously enough, they found temporary allies in the Irish Nationalists, who objected to the proposed excise taxes.

The famous Lloyd George budget passed the House of Commons by a strict party vote in 1909, and then by a strict party vote it was defeated in the House of Lords. This action of the Lords was almost as startling as the budget itself, inasmuch as it had long been customary for the upper house of the British Parliament to give perfunctory assent to finance bills adopted by the House of Commons. The Conservatives defended the Lords on the ground that the budget of 1909 was not an ordinary finance bill, but an extraordinary "socialist" measure on which the whole nation should be consulted through a general election. The Liberal government responded with the declaration that the Lords had "violated the British Constitution," and with an

appeal to the country not only to endorse the budget but also to rebuke the Lords.

New elections were held in January 1910 amid great excitement and floods of passionate oratory. The Liberals lost a

Election of Jan. 1910 and Enactment of Lloyd George Budget considerable number of seats, so that in the new House of Commons they were almost exactly balanced with the Conservatives. Nevertheless, the Liberal ministry of Asquith remained in office. It had the support of the Laborites, and it regained that of the Irish Nationalists by making some concessions in respect of the budget and by evincing a revival of

interest in home rule for Ireland. It was thus enabled in 1910 to put the Lloyd George budget (with necessary minor modifications) anew through the House of Commons. This time the Lords confined their opposition to speech-making, and the budget became law. It did yield the promised revenue, but it exacerbated the feelings between political parties and between social classes. From 1910 to 1914, along with multiplying social legislation, went a rising tide of partisanship and angry recrimination. Some there were who saw Britain headed straight toward civil war.

Close on the heels of the fight over the budget, followed a constitutional conflict over the House of Lords. Liberals were annoyed by the fact that however strong they might Constitube in the House of Commons, all their legislation had tional Conflict to be reviewed and could be amended or emasculated over by an upper house where, thanks to its hereditary House of Lords character, the Conservative party was always dominant, and they were particularly nettled by the latest action of the Lords in throwing out a finance bill and precipitating a general election. Moreover, "radical" Liberals and all the Laborites regarded the House of Lords as an aristocratic anachronism in an age of democracy, as a stronghold of "privilege," of "landlordism," of "reaction," of "ecclesiasticism," of "plutocracy." 1 Furthermore, Irish Nationalists knew very well that

¹The membership of the House of Lords in 1910 totalled more than 600, and comprised: (1) hereditary English peers (dukes, marquesses, earls, viscounts, and barons), (2) 16 elected representatives of the Scottish nobility, (3) 28 elected representatives of the Irish nobility, (4) 26 prelates of the Anglican Church, (5) 4 "law lords," ranking as barons and appointed for life to exercise the judicial functions of the House of Lords. Ordinarily, only a small percentage of the Lords attended the meetings of their House.

however difficult it might be to pass a home-rule bill through the House of Commons, it would be impossible to get one through the House of Lords. The entire coalition of Liberals, Laborites, and Irish Nationalists pressed Asquith's government to rebuke the House of Lords and to deprive it of its power.

In 1910, therefore, the Liberal government submitted a "parliament bill," with three main provisions: (1) finance bills passed by the Commons would automatically become law one month after being presented to the House of Lords, whether the Lords approved them or not; (2) other public bills might become law, despite repeated rejection by the Lords, if they were passed by the House of Commons in three successive sessions and if at least two years elapsed between the first and the third passage; (3) a general election of members of the House of Commons would have to be held at least every fifth year, instead of every seventh year as had previously been the rule. The third provision aimed at making the lower House more responsive to the will of the general electorate, and was of minor significance. The first and second provisions were major. The first would establish the exclusive authority of the democratic House of Commons in matters of finance and taxation. The second would leave the aristocratic House of Lords with only a two-year "suspensive" veto over any other legislation which the Commons might adopt.

Against the "parliament bill," the Conservatives were furious. Their leaders, realizing that they must seek to conciliate the democratic electorate (with whom the final fate of the bill would rest), proposed an alternative scheme which would leave purely financial measures to the determination of the Commons and would refer such other measures as the two Houses could not agree upon to a joint session of Lords and Commons or to a national plebiscite. The Conservatives could not prevent the parliament bill of the Liberal government from passing the House of Commons, but in the House of Lords they could—and did—reject it and at the same time they endorsed their own scheme as a substitute. Whereupon, the Liberal government had the King dissolve Parliament and call for a second general election in the year 1910, this time on the constitutional fate of the House of Lords.

The election of December 1910 produced about the same politi-

cal results as that of the previous January. Again, the Liberals and the Conservatives obtained about the same num-Election ber of seats in the House of Commons; and again, the of Dec. balance of power was held by Laborites and Irish 1910 and Enact-Nationalists, both intent upon enacting the "parliament of ment bill" into law. As soon as the new Parliament Parliamet, in 1911, Asquith, the prime minister, put the bill again through the Commons and then announced that unless the Lords accepted it without further ado the King would name a sufficient number of Liberal peers to outvote the existing membership of the aristocratic House. A great hubbub ensued. Conservatives protested vehemently against the prime minister's "threat" and tried to arouse popular feeling against the Liberal government by accusing it of "dragging the crown in the mire." They declared that the "parliament bill" had hastened the death, in 1910, of King Edward VII and that his inexperienced son and successor, George V, had been forced to begin his reign by taking sides in a constitutional conflict against his true friends and his best judgment. A large number of Conservative peers—the so-called "die-hards"—insisted that, come what might, they would oppose the bill to the bitter end. The Liberal government, however, was adamant, and the country at large was more amused than alarmed by the attitude of noble "die-hards." Eventually, the Conservative leaders decided that acceptance of the Liberal bill by the existing House of Lords would be a lesser evil than flooding the House with hundreds of new peers. Consequently, in April 1911, enough Conservative nobles absented themselves from the House of Lords to enable the Liberal peers to outvote the remaining "die-hards" and thus finally to assure the enactment of the "parliament bill." The Parliament Act of 1911 was almost, if not quite, as epochal in British constitutional history as the Reform Act of 1832.

Political acrimony which had attended the controversies over the Lloyd George budget and the Parliament Act was intensified by the attempts which the Liberal government of Asquith and Lloyd George made immediately after 1911 to pay off its debt to Laborites and Irish Nationalists and other "radicals" for the support which these were giving it in the House of Commons. (1) To please the Laborites, and advanced democrats generally, the government introduced into the Commons in 1912 a bill to abolish

"plural voting," that is, the right which Britishers still enjoyed of exercising the parliamentary franchise wherever Intensifithey could satisfy certain property qualifications and cation of which permitted a landlord or other person of wealth Political Strife: to cast several ballots in a general election while a Three workingman could cast only one. (2) To satisfy the Controversial demands of religious non-conformists (who constituted a large and influential section of the Liberal party). and particularly to humor David Lloyd George, the government also introduced into the Commons in 1912 a bill to disestablish and disendow the Anglican Church in Wales. 1 (3) Simultaneously to reward the Irish Nationalists, the government prepared and presented to Parliament a new "home-rule bill" for Ireland.

These three bills—for Irish home rule, for Welsh disestablishment, and for strictly democratic voting-were strenuously opposed by the Conservatives, and, though passed by the Commons, were rejected by the Lords. The Liberal government was resolute, however. Taking advantage of the Parliament Act, the government reintroduced all three bills in 1914; again they were passed by the Commons, and again they were rejected by the Lords. One more passing of them by the Commons would automatically make them laws, without further consultation of the House of Lords. And in 1913—in the midst of extremely angry debates over these measures—David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill launched a peculiarly provocative campaign against Cam-"landlordism." The whole land system of the realm must be reformed, they said; the state must actively intervene between the owners and the users of the Reform land, protecting the latter and gradually dispossessing the former. No wonder that the landed nobility and gentry were frightened, and no wonder that the Conservative party, to which most of them belonged, clamored for the downfall of a government which seemed bent not only on revolutionizing the British Constitution but also on pulling down the traditional pillars of British society. Lloyd George's land campaign (on top of his famous budget) added fuel to the fire of Conservative indignation.

The indignation was at fever heat by 1914. And while landlords were being warned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer

¹Only a relatively small minority of Welshmen were Anglicans. The great majority were non-conformists (Methodists, Baptists, or Congregationalists).

that "the chariots of retribution are drawing nigh," Conservative leaders were ready to seize any opportunity which promised embarrassment for the Chancellor and a distancing of his "chariots." Such an opportunity seemed to present itself in connection with Irish "home rule." The Protestant majority in northeastern Ireland (that is, in Ulster) were definitely hostile to home rule, and their leaders, Conservative (or "Unionist") in Conflict politics, proceeded to enlist and arm a force of "Ulster and Imvolunteers" with the avowed purpose of fighting for the maintenance of the "union" between Ireland and passe over Irish Home Rule Great Britain, and with the active encouragement of leading Conservatives in Britain. In the spring of 1914 it was obvious to everyone that the Liberal government, if it persisted in enacting the home-rule bill, would have to face an armed rebellion in "loyal" Ireland, and that most Englishmen would be impelled by their patriotism and their religious sympathies to side with the "rebels" against the government. Asquith began to temporize and to seek some compromise between Irish Nationalists, on the one hand, and Irish Unionists and their Conservative English allies on the other hand. But all in vain. The Conservatives and Unionists, only too anxious to embarrass Asquith (and particularly his Chancellor of the Exchequer), demanded the withdrawal of the home-rule bill; and the Irish Nationalists made it clear that if the bill were withdrawn or materially weakened, they would turn the Liberal government out of office. Nothing seemed to remain but civil war.

At this moment, in the midsummer of 1914, the apparent impasse in Britain's domestic affairs was suddenly and dramatically cut through by the opening of a vast foreign war-the World War-in which Britain was speedily engulfed. World War and In the face of foreign danger, patriotism rose superior the Politto political partisanship and class consciousness. Conical Truce servatives and Unionists immediately pledged their in Britain support to Asquith and his Liberal cabinet in waging the war. and in return Asquith's government agreed, with the consent of Laborites and Irish Nationalists, to postpone Irish home rule, Welsh disestablishment, the abolition of plural voting, and all other "debatable" legislation until after the war. Lloyd George and Winston Churchill turned from denouncing landlords to assailing Germans, and transferred their abounding energies

from social reform to military endeavors. The "chariots of retribution" were truly nigh, but they proved to be quite different "chariots" from what Lloyd George had foreseen, and the "retribution" which they wrought was not primarily on landlords or the Conservative party.

We must bear in mind that the furtherance of British nationalism and imperialism was no monopoly of Conservatives. Indeed, from 1905 to 1914, during the very years when Imperial "radical" Liberals and Laborites were seemingly Element engrossed in social legislation and democratic reform, number lib-"imperialist" Liberals were manning important offices eralism, in the government and pursuing foreign, colonial, and 1905-1915 military policies hardly distinguishable from those which a Disraeli or a Salisbury might have pursued and yet which now evoked very little criticism from "radicals." The foreign minister throughout the period was Sir Edward Grey, and he was no "little Englander." He strengthened the entente which his Conservative predecessor had made with Foreign France in 1904, and he supplemented it in 1907 with an entente with Russia. He promoted British imperial interests in the Far East, in Persia, in the Near East, and in Africa. He saw to it that British national interests were upheld and respected in the counsels of the Great Powers.

The foreign policies of Sir Edward Grey were backed, moreover, by a rapidly growing "preparedness" of British armaments, for which Liberal colleagues of his were directly responsible. As war minister, Richard Haldane effected a noteworthy reorganization of the British army. While keeping it on Haldane's a professional rather than a popular basis, he rendered Military it more efficient by creating a general staff and more expansive by establishing "officers' training corps" in connection with schools and universities and by building up a trained "reserve." He also did much to relate, in practical ways, the latest advances in science to the art of warfare, and to forward plans for military coöperation, in the event of war, between Britain and her overseas Empire, and between Britain and her "friends" on the Continent of Europe—France and Russia.

Even more significant than the army reforms of Haldane was the contemporaneous strengthening of the British navy. This was motivated, in general, by a popular conviction, in which Liberals fully shared, that naval supremacy was essential to the protection of the far-flung British Empire and to the British assurance of vital trade between industrial Britain and Navalism the rest of the world on which she depended for raw materials, foodstuffs, and markets. And it was specifically motivated by the obvious fact that Germany was becoming a great naval Power and a potential rival of Britain for naval supremacy. In the circumstances, the Liberal government of Asquith showed itself quite as anxious as any Conservative government could have been to maintain Britain's lead in the race of naval armaments with Germany. British expenditure for social reform rose fast between 1905 and 1914, but expenditure on the British navy rose faster—from 33 million pounds sterling in 1905 1 to 40 million in 1910 and to almost 50 million in 1913.

It is not without interest that from 1911 Winston Churchill was minister of the navy ("first lord of the admiralty") in the Liberal cabinet, and that he applied to his new responsibilities even more energy and enthusiasm than he had previously displayed in the cause of social reform. By 1914 Churchill was sure that Great Britain must fight Germany, and Churchill when the great crisis came in midsummer of that and the War year this "radical" Liberal stood at the forefront Spirit of the "imperialist" Liberals—Asquith, Grey, and Haldane—in counselling British intervention in the World War. Nor was Lloyd George far behind. Presently this "pacifist," this most bitterly denounced of all the Liberal ministers, would become most bellicose and most indispensable. Within two years Lloyd George would be practically the "war dictator" of Britain.

But that is a later tale. It belongs to the story of the war and its aftermath. For the World War not only closed a decade of reforming Liberal government in Britain, but also opened a new era of very different character, political and economic, from that which marked the period from 1867 to 1914. Of the period now under review, it remains for us to outline two special developments: one, the rise of Irish nationalism; and the other, the growth of the British Empire.

¹ It had hovered around 6 million annually from 1820 to 1855 and around 10 million from 1855 to 1885, and had then gradually risen to 20 million in 1896.

3. IRISH NATIONALISM

For more than a century after the "Act of Union" of 1801, the British Isles constituted a political unit—the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland," with a common sover-

eign and with a single Parliament at Westminster. Within this centralized state were several nationalities-notably English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irisheach of whom cherished special cultural traditions and the memory of an erstwhile political independence. Only in the case of the Irish, however, did such tradi-

"United Kingdom of Great Britain and Tre-

tions and memory become associated with an active movement to break the unity of the state.

Wales had been incorporated in England since the sixteenth century, and Scotland had been integrated with England since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Besides, both Wales and Scotland had undergone religious and industrial changes similar to England's: all three were largely Protestant, and latterly all three had been directly and profoundly affected by the Industrial

Integration of Wales and Scot-land with England

Revolution. The traditional differences which survived among them were preëminently sentimental; and real differences between capital and labor, city and countryside, liberalism and conservatism, were no more peculiar to England than to Wales or Scotland. The three formerly distinct nationalities were being ever more obviously merged into a "British" nationality.

It was otherwise with Ireland-or, at any rate, with threefourths of Ireland. Geographically, Ireland was somewhat more isolated. Politically, too, it had had, as late as the Cleavage eighteenth century, a parliament of its own, which, Great though legally subordinate to the Parliament at Britain Westminster, had actually been autonomous in local and Ire-Moreover, the mass of its population, legislation. instead of becoming Protestant, had remained Catholic, and, instead of becoming industrialized, had remained agricultural. Alike in economics and in religion, Ireland was set off from the rest of the "United Kingdom."

The situation was complicated by chronic friction not only between Ireland and Great Britain but also within Ireland. Ever since the sixteenth century, English (and British) governments had regarded the native Irish as an inferior race, superstitious, unprogressive, happy-go-lucky, and utterly lacking in thrift, and had therefore pursued policies tracted Attempts calculated to Anglicize them or, failing in this, to peat Annalize them. On the one hand, every effort had been glicizing Ireland made to establish and spread Protestantism in Ireland and to encourage the settlement of English and Scottish colonists in the country. A Protestant "Church of Ireland," similar to the Anglican Church, had been erected and richly endowed as the official state church, and toward its further financial support all Irishmen, whether they participated in its worship or not, were obliged to contribute. Likewise, special favors had been accorded to such Irish landlords as turned Protestant and to the Anglican and Presbyterian "colonists" who were transplanted in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in fairly large numbers from Scotland to Ireland, particularly to the northeastern province of Ulster. On the other hand, drastic measures had been taken to overcome recalcitrance and subdue insurrection on the part of the native Irish. The Catholic Church was deprived of its historic edifices and any legal status, and its adherents suffered serious abridgement of rights of citizenship, property, education, and even life. Simultaneously, a series of equally drastic economic statutes of the British Parliament had destroyed the bulk of Ireland's historic industry and shipping 1 and consigned the mass of Irishmen to a precarious existence as agricultural tenants or laborers on the estates of Anglo-Irish noblemen who spent most of their time in England.

It thus transpired that Ireland was governed from the sixteenth century primarily according to the religious predilection and in the economic interest of Englishmen and Scotsmen and secondarily for the well-being of such inhabitants of Ireland as shared that predilection or profited from that interest. These

¹ This economic legislation was part and parcel of the general "mercantilist" policy which the English government pursued during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ireland, as a "colony," was not allowed to compete with the mother-country, and the commercial preëminence of Liverpool, for example, was assured by the commercial ruin of Cork and Limerick. Such Irish industry as supplemented rather than competed with British industry was encouraged. Its most important elements in the nineteenth century were the brewing and distilling industries, centring in Dublin and directed by "Anglo-Irish" companies, and the linen and ship-building industries, centring in Belfast and operated chiefly by "Scotch-Irish."

inhabitants were chiefly "Anglo-Irish" and "Scotch-Irish." By the opening of the nineteenth century the latter constituted almost a majority of the population of Ulster Garrison" (the northeastern quarter of Ireland), and the former in Ireland comprised the social élite of Dublin and the well-to-do and governing class throughout the country. Together they composed a relatively small minority of the total population of Ireland (hardly a fourth), and yet they long monopolized political and economic power in Ireland. They manned the established church, the learned professions, the schools, the army offices, the courts and civil administration; they owned most of the land; and, until the enactment of Catholic emancipation in 1820,1 they alone were eligible to represent Ireland in the Parliament of the United Kingdom at Westminster. They were truly a "British garrison," the basic link between Great Britain and Ireland.

Despite the long-continued endeavors of the English (and British) government and despite constant social and economic pressure of "Anglo-Irish" and "Scotch-Irish," the mass of the native Irish proved remarkably obdurate. They did not become British or Protestant. They interpreted the well-meant attempts to convert them as persecution and the thrifty or punitive economic legislation as exploitation. They had a habit of sympathizing with the foes of Britain with Spaniards in the sixteenth century, with French- Part of

men in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the American and French revolutionaries at the close of the eighteenth century. Occasionally they offered armed resistance to régimes which were especially popular with Englishmenfor example, to those of Queen Elizabeth and Oliver Cromwell —and the horrible penalties meted out to them on such occasions seemed to teach them no improving lesson. Indeed, the doings of British soldiery in Ireland only served to intensify among the natives a hatred of their "conquerors" and a longing for their own national freedom.

In respect of language, some real progress was made in Anglicizing Ireland. The Gaelic language of the natives was gradually supplanted by English, and by the nineteenth century the former was fast disappearing and the latter was becoming the usual

¹ See Vol. I, p. 764, and above, p. 76.

speech throughout the country. Yet the decline of the distinctively national language did not betoken a lessening Except in of national spirit. For the nineteenth century was Respect of Lantoo replete with nationalism in all other parts of guage Europe not to be characterized by noteworthy nationalist developments in Ireland. And it should be remarked that some of the most conspicuous nationalist leaders in nineteenth-century Ireland came not from the "native Devel-Irish" but from the "Anglo-Irish" or "Scotch-Irish," oping Irish Nathat they were Protestant members of the so-called tionalism "British garrison" rather than Catholic and "con-In other words, the descendants of seventeenthcentury immigrants, instead of Anglicizing the Irish, were actually becoming Irish themselves. Many of them, especially in Ulster, continued to detest and despise the religion of the "native Irish," but they had now come to think of themselves as "Irish" and to resent arbitrary interference of the British Parliament in domestic Irish affairs.

An early sign of the newer nationalism in Ireland was the organization, toward the close of the eighteenth century and under the influence of the French Revolution, of "United the society of "United Irishmen"—termed "united" Irishmen" because it included both Catholics and Protestants. and the The rebellious movement which it produced in 1798 Rebellion of 1708 was hardly popular and was easily suppressed by the British government. It was followed, as we know, by the "Act of Union," which abolished the Irish parliament at Dublin and provided that henceforth all laws for Ireland should be enacted by the British Parliament at Westminster in which were seated twenty-eight Irish peers and a hundred Irish commoners.

Then ensued the famous agitation of Daniel O'Connell (1775–1847), a gifted lawyer, who formed the bold design of combining O'Connell and Catholic Emancipation, 1829

Then ensued the famous agitation of Daniel O'Connell (1775–1847), a gifted lawyer, who formed the bold design of combining the Irish Catholic millions into a vast league which by orderly means would induce the Parliament at Westminster to right the wrongs of Ireland, religious, social, and economic. The "Catholic Association," which he accordingly created, grew rapidly and proved most effective in securing parliamentary enactment of Catholic

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 711-712.

Emancipation (1829).1 Catholics were relieved of many civil disabilities and were admitted to seats in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons. This meant that the Catholic masses of Irishmen could henceforth elect persons of their own kind to represent them in the British Parliament. It was a stimulus to nationalism, as well as to democracy, in Ireland.

O'Connell, now styled the "Liberator," entered the British House of Commons in 1820, and for several years thereafter he was the leader not only of the expanding "Catholic Association" in Ireland but also of an Irish nationalist group at Westminster. He prevailed upon the British government to relieve Irish Catholics of the necessity of paying direct tithes for the support of the Anglican "Church of Ireland" (1838), and to appoint Catholics to important public offices. At the same time, with characteristic energy and oratory, he demanded that the Act o'conof Union be repealed and an autonomous parliament Agitation be reëstablished at Dublin. In this demand, he was for Repeal unsuccessful. Although O'Connell was a sincere foe of of Union revolution and violence and as conservative as any English Whig in economic matters, the British governing classes took fright at the prospect of the social changes which a democratic Irish parliament might make. In 1843 the British government dissolved the "Catholic Association" and imprisoned O'Connell.

With the failure of O'Connell's program of peaceful repeal of the Act of Union, a group of more radical and violent Irish nationalists formed a "Young Ireland" society, akin "Young Ireland" Ireland" to Mazzini's "Young Italy" and pledged to work for and the an independent Irish republic. In 1848 they attempted Rebellion of 1848 a revolution in imitation of the revolutions of that year on the Continent.2 They lacked the popular support which O'Connell had had. The uprising was speedily put down, and its leaders were executed or exiled.

One of the participants in the revolt of 1848 who managed to escape was John O'Mahony (1816-1877), who proceeded to organize in the United States about 1858 another society of Irish nationalists, the "Fenian Brotherhood." 3 It was a secret

¹ See above, p. 76. For a portrait of O'Connell, see above, facing p. 84.

² On Mazzini's "Young Italy," see above, p. 215, and on the revolutionary movement of 1848 or the Continent, see above, pp. 117-139.

³ The word "Fenian" was romantically derived from the Gaelic word for a legendary band of ancient Irish warriors.

society, whose members took an oath of allegiance to the "Irish Republic" and a vow of strict obedience to their officers, and it adopted a national "republican" flag-a tricolor of Fenian green, white, and orange. It never gained much hold on the Irish peasantry and was denounced by the Agitation and Riots in the Catholic clergy. It secured, however, a fairly large т8бо'я following among Irish emigrants in urban centres of the United States, Canada, and Australia, and in British cities such as Manchester, Glasgow, and London. Irish-American "Fenians" made an alarming but unsuccessful military raid on Canada in 1866, and in the following year the English government had to employ troops to suppress Fenian riots in Lancashire, while in Ireland itself Fenian agitators, returning from America and England, committed a series of depredations which caused panic among Irish landlords and anxiety in the British government.

In the midst of the Fenian troubles, Gladstone and his fellow Liberals took charge of the British government in 1868 and adopted a twofold policy in respect of Ireland. On the Gladstone one hand, they would repress disorder and destroy "Fenianism." On the other hand, they would seek to and the Irish restore quiet and contentment among the "native Irish" by redressing two of their major grievances, the one religious and the other economic. Accordingly, Gladstone carried through the British Parliament in 1869 the measure for disestablishing and disendowing the Anglican "Church of Ireland". and putting it on an unprivileged legal equality with the Catholic and Presbyterian churches in Ireland. Then in 1870 followed the first of his "land acts," which forbade landlords to raise agricultural rents at will or arbitrarily to evict a peasant from his holding without compensating him for whatever improvements he had made. The religious reform was effectual, but the agrarian reform was not. The Land Act of 1870 merely sanctioned a principle of agrarian reform and gave currency to the slogan of the "three F's"—fair rent, fixity of tenure, and free sale. It did not adequately apply the principle, and its net effect was to arouse the hostility of landlords and the hope of peasants without disarming the one or satisfying the other.

The decade of the 1870's brought to the fore two new apostles of Irish nationalism. One was Charles Stewart Parnell (1846–1891), an "Anglo-Irish" landowner, aristocratic and Protestant,

who imbibed from his mother, an American woman, an almost fanatical hatred of England, and who, elected to Par-Parnell liament in 1875, organized among his Irish colleagues and the Irish Nain the House of Commons a political party—the Irish tionalist Nationalist party—with the avowed purpose of insist-Party ing upon the reëstablishment of "home rule" as prerequisite to any real cure of Irish ills. The other was Michael Davitt (1846-1906), a lowly untutored Catholic peasant, who after his father's eviction from the land had worked in cotton mills in Lancashire, Davitt joined the Fenian Brotherhood, participated in the disturbances which it encouraged, and been jailed for Land seven years. Released in 1877, Davitt went to the League United States, where, in concert with other revolutionary exiles. he worked out a plan for organizing the Irish peasants into a "Land League" which should agitate for radical agrarian reform. Then, returning to Britain, he prevailed upon Parnell to accept his ideas, and in 1879 he formally launched his Land League.

At once the Irish nationalist movement assumed new vigor and prominence. In the British Parliament of 1880, nearly eighty of the hundred Irish Commoners belonged to Parnell's "home-rule" party and strictly obeyed his orders to render themselves such nuisances at Westminster, in obstructing debates and general governmental business, that their British colleagues would be glad to get rid of them by granting their demand. At the same time, in Ireland, the peasant masses were being organized through Davitt's Land League as well as through Parnell's Nationalist party, not only to support the latter's political aims but also to forward the former's economic purposes. And from Irish-Americans across the Atlantic was coming invaluable financial aid for the interconnected causes of home rule and land reform.

In 1881 Gladstone sought to halt the movement by putting through Parliament the second of his Land Acts. It practically conceded the "three F's": fair rents were to be determined by a special land court; definite provision was made against unjust evictions and in behalf of free Question, sale of land. But, though the land court actually reduced the average rents in Ireland by a fourth, Davitt and the Land League were by no means satisfied. They were now insisting that the peasants should own, rather than rent, the land.

The Act of 1881, they said, was only a sop, and it did not touch the central problem of home rule. So both the Land Leaguers and the Nationalist party redoubled their protests, and in Ireland peaceful agitation was succeeded by systematic "boycotting" and an epidemic of acts of violence. Gladstone's only response for the next five years was coercion. Ireland was put under martial law. Parnell and forty other Nationalist members of Parliament were arrested and temporarily jailed. Davitt spent two years in prison.

In 1886, by a strange balancing of political forces in Great Britain, Gladstone had to choose whether he would retire from office or try to remain in office by conciliating the Irish Nationalists. He chose the latter alternative, and submitted to Parliament a home-rule bill acceptable to Parnell. It was a very modest measure, which would transfer Irish Rule Bill of 1886 administration to an Irish ministry appointed by a and Its separate local parliament at Dublin, but which would Defeat leave all "imperial" matters and most of the taxing power to the central Parliament at Westminster. Nevertheless it aroused furious opposition both in England and in Ulster. A large group of Liberals—the so-called Liberal Unionists—deserted Gladstone, and Ulster threatened violent resistance. The bill was rejected in the House of Commons. Gladstone was compelled to retire from office. The Conservative party, foes of "home rule," dominated the British government during the next six years. And, as a seemingly final blow to the cause of "home rule," a domestic scandal clouded the career of Parnell and split his Nationalist followers into two quarrelling factions.

In 1893 Gladstone, again in office, introduced into the Parliament at Westminster a second "home-rule" bill, which passed the Commons by a close vote but was overwhelmingly rejected by the Lords. It was the last serious effort of England's veteran Liberal statesman. His colleagues advised him that it would be suicidal to their party to appeal to the country at large on the question, and he withdrew from public life. The extended sway of Conservatives and

¹The word "boycott" was first employed in 1880, when a certain Captain Boycott, an agent for an Irish landlord, was made to suffer for refusing demands of the landlord's tenants. His life was threatened, his servants were compelled to leave him, his fences torn down, his letters intercepted, and his food supplies interfered with. In a word, he was "boycotted."

Liberal Unionists from 1895 to 1905 appeared to seal the doom of Irish nationalist hopes.

In fact, however, these very years of Unionist domination proved a most fertile seed-time for a luxuriant new crop of Irish nationalism. Something of an agricultural revolution occurred in Ireland, attributable in part to the series of land acts which transformed numerous tenant-farmers into peasant proprietors, and in part to the tireless activities of Sir Horace Plunkett and the Irish Agricultural Organization Society which he founded in 1894 for the development of coöperative enterprises among Irish farmers. Peasant proprietorship and the coöperative movement combined to improve the condition and to promote the solidarity of the

Simultaneously, a literary renaissance began. In 1893 Douglas Hyde inaugurated the Gaelic League for the preservation and extension of the native Irish language, and around it soon clustered a galaxy of poets, essayists, and dramatists. These included George Russell (best known sance in Treland by his pen-name of Æ) who was also very active in Plunkett's Agricultural Society; Lady Gregory, founder of the famous Abbev Theatre in Dublin (1904); and William Butler Yeats, distinguished poet and playwright.² They wrote mainly in English, but they dealt largely with Irish themes, and, in conjunction with the Gaelic League, they were intent upon reviving among the masses of the Irish people a knowledge of the national Gaelic language and an appreciation of traditional Irish character, customs, and culture. Gradually it became fashionable for the vounger generation to receive some instruction in Gaelic.

Neither Plunkett's agricultural society nor Hyde's Gaelic League was political in character or purpose. Both sought to weld together the whole Irish people, regardless of their religious affiliation or "racial" stock, and regardless of their attitude toward "home rule." The one organization was economic; the other was cultural. Both Plunkett and Hyde were Protestants, and Plunkett in politics was thousand a Unionist rather than a Nationalist. Unwittingly, in Ireland nevertheless, the fruitful labors of these men in the fields of

rural masses of the country.

On these land-purchase acts of the Unionist government, see above, pp. 468-469.

² On these Irish writers, see above, p. 395.

economics and literature served to stimulate a new kind of political nationalism in Ireland, a kind which was not content with representation in the British Parliament at Westminster, or even with ordinary "home rule," but which demanded full national autonomy for Ireland.

The man with the fullest vision of the new Irish nationalism and with the greatest resourcefulness in advocating it was Arthur Griffith (1872-1922). A native of Dublin and a printer by trade, he began his political career as a and "Pas-sive Re-sistance" fervent disciple of Parnell, but the factional quarrels among Irish Nationalist members of Parliament following Parnell's downfall led Griffith to despair of achieving "home rule" or any other radical reform for Ireland by parliamentary means. The more he reflected on the failure of the home-rule bills of 1886 and 1893, the more nationalistic he became. He helped to form the Gaelic League. He espoused the Irish Agricultural Organization Society. And he joined the "Irish Republican Brotherhood," a petty survival of the Fenianism of the 1860's. In 1800 he established a newspaper, the United Irishman, in which he urged not only a cultural and economic nationalism but also a political nationalism quite different from that of the official Nationalist party. His goal was a united Irish nation, with a constitution of its own making, and with a government entirely independent of Great Britain's except for a "personal union" (like Austria and Hungary after the Ausgleich of 1867 1) under a common sovereign. The means which he urged of realizing the goal should be neither parliamentary pressure on Britain nor forceful insurrection in Ireland but rather such "passive resistance" on the part of Irishmen as Hungarians had successfully employed in 1866-1867. The Irish people should not recognize or participate in the British government; they should refuse to serve in its army or pay taxes to it; and their elected members of Parliament should absent themselves from Westminster and constitute a governing council at Dublin. In a word, national self-reliance should be both the means and the end of Irish politics.

In 1906 was formally launched a new political party in accordance with Griffith's doctrine and under his leadership. It took the name of "Sinn Fein"—Gaelic for "we ourselves."

¹ See above, p. 242.

At first it was small, and, although it attracted a number of youthful intellectuals and secured allies in the radical element of the urban working class, its electoral successes prior to the World War were limited to placing some of its members on the local governing bodies of Dublin and a few other towns. The golden opportunity for Sinn Fein—and the fame of Arthur Griffith—came with the World War and afterwards.

Meanwhile the overwhelming majority of the Irish people outside Ulster continued in the tradition of Parnell to vote for Nationalist candidates and to expect them to obtain from the British Parliament a measure of home rule for Ireland. Indeed, by 1900 the position of the Nationalist party seemed to be improving again. In that year the factions which for almost a decade had been bitterly quarrelling among themselves over a successor to Parnell finally united on John Redmond Redmond (1856-1918), an able lawyer and an experienced parliamentarian. Redmond's Nationalists claimed credit for prevailing upon the Conservative majority in the British Parliament to enact in 1898 a significant law entrusting town and county government in Ireland to popularly elected officials, and to sponsor the even more significant land-purchase acts of 1896 and 1903. Apparently, important reforms could be gotten from the British Parliament by Irish Nationalists even when the unfriendly Conservatives were in power. Then, in 1906, when the more friendly Liberals took office, great expectations possessed Redmond and his followers. The expectations were slow of realization, for the Liberals, so long as they did not need the votes of Irish Nationalists in the House of Commons, contented themselves with establishing a national university in Ireland (1908) and were quite deaf to Redmond's pleas for "home rule"

Redmond was patient, however, and awaited the time when the Liberals would need the support of his party. The time came in 1910–1911 with the balancing of electoral strength between Liberals and Conservatives over the Lloyd George budget and the parliament bill. Both these measures were enacted into law by aid of Redmond and his Irish Nationalists, and in return for such decisive aid the Liberal ministry of Asquith introduced in the House of Commons in 1912 a "Government of Ireland"

Bill"—the third of the definite "home-rule" proposals—providing for the establishment of a special Irish parliament at Dublin, which, however, would be subordinate to the British Parliament at Westminster in military, financial, and certain other matters. The bill did not go as far as Redmond and his followers desired, but they decided to accept it as a step in the right direction. It passed the House of Commons but was rejected by the House of Lords. Reintroduced in 1913, it again passed the House of Commons and was again rejected by the House of Lords. One more passage by the House of Commons, in 1914, would operate, under the provisions of the Parliament Act, to make it the law of the realm.

While Redmond and the Irish Nationalist party were coöperating with British Liberals in behalf of the home-rule bill of 1912, opposition to it developed in Ireland from two opposite camps. On the one hand, Griffith's Sinn Fein party criticized it as a sorry compromise of the principle of Irish nationalism. On the other hand, the Unionist party in Ireland, especially strong among Ulster Protestants and now finding a militant leader in Edward Carson, denounced the bill as a treasonable Carson attempt to destroy the unity of the British Empire and put "progressive" Protestant Ulster under the yoke of "backward" Catholic Ireland. Griffith's foland Unionist Opposition in Ulster lowers as yet were not numerous enough to make serious trouble, and besides, like the majority of Nationalist Irishmen, they were willing to give Redmond a final chance to demonstrate what could or could not be done through the British Parliament. It was otherwise with the Ulster Unionists. These, aroused by the organizing genius and fiery eloquence of Carson and backed by the moral support of British Conservatives, held imposing mass meetings, bound themselves by a "solemn covenant" never to submit to an Irish parliament, and raised a volunteer army of some 100,000 men.

Faced with the threat of armed revolt in Ulster, the Liberal government at Westminster wavered and vainly tried to find some generally acceptable compromise, while Irish Nationalists and Sinn Feiners joined in raising a force of "Irish volunteers" to resist the "Ulster volunteers." Civil war clearly threatened, and most ominous was the obvious sympathy of officers of the British regular army for the Ulstermen. Just as affairs reached

a seeming impasse, the World War broke out. At once, Liberals and Conservatives and Irish Unionists, in a burst of common patriotic emotion, rallied to the defense of the Empire, while John Redmond, still most conciliatory and optimistic, evoked a round of applause from the whole British House of Commons by declaring that "the coast of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen."

Such unexpected unanimity brought rewards to all concerned. Redmond and the Irish Nationalist party had the satisfaction of seeing the home-rule bill enacted into law in September 1914. Carson and the Unionists had the satisfaction of seeing the simultaneous enactment of a "suspensory bill," whereby the execution of the homerule law would be suspended for the duration of the

Enactment and Suspension of Home-Rule, 1014

World War, and of hearing the Liberal prime minister assure Parliament that any coercion of Ulster was "absolutely unthinkable."

Carson had the better of the immediate bargain. Redmond's was but a paper victory, and the only way by which he could hope to make it real was to trust to the good intentions of the British government at the close of the war and in the meantime to give convincing proof to Ulstermen and the British people at large that nationalist Ireland was not separatist and would wholeheartedly support Great Britain in foreign mond's war. Such proof, however, Redmond could not give.

Personally, he did his best to encourage Irish enlistment in the British army, but his outspoken critics in Ireland were no longer The mass of Irish Nationalists were confined to Unionists. bitterly disappointed and disillusioned about obtaining any measure of home rule from the British Parliament. They came to feel that Redmond had been duped by Carson and the British politicians, and they evinced little enthusiasm for fighting Britain's battles. In the circumstances, the more radical nationalist

agitation of Griffith and Sinn Fein gathered headway in Ireland. The more Redmond strengthened his position at Westminster, the more he weakened it at Dublin. The future of Irish nationalism was to be, not with

Sinn Fein's Opportu-


Redmond and the parliamentary party of Parnell, but with Griffith and the revolutionary movement of Sinn Fein.

4. THE EMPIRE

The "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" was the core of the hugest imperial domain which the world has ever known. In 1914, on the eve of the World War, the British Empire embraced approximately a quarter of the earth's land surface and a quarter of its entire population. Within this Empire, subject to Great Britain, were territories in of British every continent and every ocean of the globe, in the most diverse climates from frigid to tropical, and inhabitants of every race and of every phase of culture from cannibalism to Cambridge. The British Empire was much more extensive and populous than any earlier empire, and its closest contemporary rival, the Russian Empire, possessed in 1914 only three-fourths the area and three-tenths the population.

The hugeness of the British Empire is even more impressive when contrasted with the smallness of the mother-country. In area, the United Kingdom constituted less than a Relative hundredth part of the Empire; in population, about a Smallness of tenth. Shorn of its overseas domain (including Ireland) Mother-Great Britain would have been a comparatively small country, only slightly more extensive than Minnesota or Kansas and less than half as populous as the United States. Besides, the entire English-speaking people, if we exclude the United States, numbered no more than sixty millions, about the same as the French-speaking people, and the number of Englishspeaking people in the far-flung British Empire, outside the United Kingdom, was barely twelve million. This meant that for every one of the British colonists, more than thirty duskyskinned "natives" were subject to British rule. The strictly British population of the Empire was engulfed by its colored inhabitants—300 million Asiatic Indians, 40 million Negroes, six million Arabs, six million Malays, one million Polynesians, one million Chinese, and 100,000 red (Canadian) Indians. The Empire as a whole was British politically, and in lesser degree British economically. Racially and culturally it was amazingly heterogeneous and but slightly British.

Note. The portrait opposite is of Parnell from a painting by Frederick Hall (born 1860).





"MOSÉ IN EGITTO!!!"

The British Empire was a creation of modern times, almost wholly since the seventeenth century; and its greatest expansion and development occurred in the nineteenth century.

and development occurred in the nineteenth century. At the beginning of this century, the Napoleonic Wars markedly enlarged it. In the middle of the century, though English liberals seemingly weakened its bonds

British Empire, a Modern Creation

by according self-government to important parts of it and by adopting a censorious attitude toward imperialism in general, it actually suffered no diminution in size, and at least in the case of India was expanded by conquests and solidified by the transference of control from commercial company to crown. Especially after 1874, when the government of the mother-country passed from the liberal Gladstone to the imperialistic Disraeli and when the advance of industrial capitalism was prompting an unprecedented scramble for trade and investment in "backward" areas and thus revitalizing colonial politics, the British Empire grew by leaps and bounds.

The growth of the British Empire during the forty years from 1874 to 1914 was partially a growth of such colonies as were peopled mainly by persons of European stock—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa—a growth of the Empire after political federation. Much more, however, it was a growth of British political and economic sway over non-European peoples in Asia, in the Malay archipelago, and in Africa, a growth by military conquest or by diplomatic negotiation whereby the number of "crown colonies" and "protectorates" and "spheres of influence" was swiftly increased.

British India was designated an "empire," and Queen Victoria proclaimed Empress of it, in 1877; in the 1870's Baluchistan, to the west of it, was finally conquered and annexed, and in the 1880's Burma, to the east. The Malay states adjoining Singapore were obtained in 1874. From China were taken Hongkong in 1842 and Wei-hai-wei in 1898, and presently Tibet was treated as a British "sphere of influence." In 1907, by agreement with Russia, the British also delimited a "sphere

¹ See above, pp. 94-96.

NOTE. The caricature opposite was drawn by Sir John Tenniel for *Punch*, just after Disraeli's purchase of the majority stock in the Suez Canal Company (1875). On Tenniel, see above, p. 405.

of influence" in southeastern Persia. In the Pacific Ocean, the Fiji Islands were appropriated in 1874, southeastern New Guinea (Papua) in 1884, northern Borneo (Sarawak) in 1888, In the Tonga (or the Friendly Islands) in 1900. Nearer Pacific and Medhome, in the Mediterranean, Cyprus was occupied iterrain 1878. And with amazing rapidity the British nean Empire expanded in Africa. Here, prior to 1880, it comprised only Cape Colony and Natal in the extreme south and a few trading posts on the west coast. After 1880, a large part In Africa of the continent came under British rule. Egypt was occupied in 1882, and protectorates were established in Bechuanaland in 1885, in Somaliland in 1887, in Zanzibar in 1890, in Uganda in 1896. Chartered commercial companies acquired Nigeria in 1886, British East Africa (Kenya) in 1888, and Rhodesia in 1889. Conquest was made of Zululand in 1887, of Ashanti in 1896, of the Egyptian Sudan in 1897, and of the Dutch republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State in 1902. An all-British railway was projected, lengthwise across the whole continent. from Cairo to the Cape of Good Hope.

It was but natural that an empire so large and heterogeneous should not be administered according to any one pattern. Indeed, the British Empire, as it expanded, displayed a growing differentiation in government, so that in the latter part of the nineteenth century at least three distinct types of dependency in Parliament at Westminster: (1) the self-governing colonies, or "dominions"; (2) a miscellany of crown colonies, naval stations, and "protectorates"; and (3) the so-called "empire" of India. We shall treat of these three types in turn, pointing out, as we proceed, significant developments in the respective dependencies.

The self-governing colonies, or "dominions," included by 1914 a trifle more than half of the territory in the British Empire. It 1. Self-would be most misleading, however, to infer that half Governing Colonies and Doment; for in respect of population the "dominions" minions constituted only a twentieth part of the empire. Self-government was a special privilege conferred by Great Britain upon a small minority of her colonial subjects, not a natural right granted freely to all. It is noteworthy, moreover, that

the privileged minority was almost exclusively of European

stock, that the colonies enjoying home rule were precisely the colonies in which relatively large numbers of Britishers The had settled—Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New "White" Zealand, and South Africa. In none of these colonies did the native population amount to more than five per cent of the whole except in South Africa, and even South Africa had over a million white inhabitants. Outside the self-governing colonies, there were but a few thousand white men in all the colonial domain of Britain. Self-government, in short, was exercised by almost all the "white" colonies, and by none other.

How the principle of colonial self-government was set forth in the "report" of Lord Durham on Canada in 1839, and how, with the sanction of the British government, it was applied in the 1840's to Lower Canada (Quebec) and Upper Canada (Ontario), and very shortly afterwards to the other North American colonies of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, we have elsewhere related.¹

By 1860 self-government had likewise been accorded

by the British Parliament to Newfoundland, British Columbia, and the Australasian colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, New Zealand, and Queensland. Subsequently added to the self-governing roster were Cape Colony (1872), Western Australia (1890), Natal (1893), Alberta (1905), Saskatchewan (1905), Transvaal (1906), and Orange River (1907). When Queen Victoria ascended the throne in 1837, there was no self-governing colony in the British Empire. When her son, Edward VII, died in 1910, there were twenty-one.

As Canada had been the first colony to obtain self-government, so also it was the pioneer in another important movement, the formation of confederations among self-governing colonies. In 1867 the hitherto separate colonies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick joined with Quebec and Ontario to form a confederation styled the "Dominion of Canada." The Dominion ion was technically created by enactment of the British of Canada and Serica Act of 1867—but the plan had originated in Canada and been formulated by a convention at Quebec in 1864. The government of the Dominion was modelled after that of the mother-country,

¹ See above, pp. 92-94.

with a governor-general acting for the monarch, a Senate in place of the House of Lords, and a democratically elected House of Commons, to which the cabinet of ministers was rendered responsible. Although each of the four provinces preserved its separate legislature, there was little question of "states' rights" in Canada. With the terrible example close at hand of the United States in civil war over "states' rights," the framers of the Canadian constitution carefully limited the powers of the several provinces. Nova Scotia, it is true, sought to repudiate the Act of 1867 and to withdraw from the Dominion, but the British government refused to countenance any such secession, and the unity of the Canadian confederation was assured.

For a long time the dominant political party in Canada was the Conservative, strongly British in sympathy, though resolved

Mac-donald's Conservative Government in Canada

to promote an economic nationalism within the Dominion; and its leader, Sir John Macdonald, was prime minister from 1867 to his death in 1891 (excepting the five years 1873–1878). The Dominion organized its own militia and police, civil service, and system of banking, currency, and posts. It established a

protective tariff for the fostering of Canadian industries. And it promoted agricultural settlement in the great Northwest.

The growth of the Dominion was remarkably swift. First, from the Hudson's Bay Company were purchased extensive lands from which the new province of Manitoba was carved (1870). Then British Columbia (1871) and Prince Edward Island (1873) were brought into the confederation. Finally a decree of 1878 proclaimed that the Dominion of Canada should have jurisdiction over all British territory north of the United States—with the sole exception of Newfoundland (and its dependency of Labrador), which remains to this day a separate colony. The fertile prairies and rich mines of western Canada attracted a steady stream of settlers, particularly after the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (1886), some from Great Britain and others from the United States, and the ensuing economic development of the west received political recognition by the creation (1905) of two new prairie provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan. The population of Canada more than doubled between 1871 and 1911, reaching a total of seven and a quarter million in the latter year.

Meanwhile, following the death of Sir John Macdonald, the Conservative party declined and was supplanted in power by the Liberal party, whose gifted leader, Sir Wilfred Laurier, held the premiership continuously from 1896 to 1910. Laurier was a native of the province of Ouebec. French in nationality and Catholic in religion, and he amply proved that a French Canadian like himself could be as loyal both ment in to the British Empire and to the Dominion of Canada as anyone of English or Scottish extraction. While he lowered the protective tariff and sought to promote closer commercial relations with the United States, he was a staunch supporter of British imperial interests. He sympathized with Joseph Chamberlain's proposals for "imperial preference," 1 and he despatched a Canadian army to South Africa to help the English in the Boer War (1899-1902). He had to contend, not only with a general prejudice on the part of Protestant British Canadians against the Catholic French in Canada, but also with a special militant nationalism among French Canadians themselves. He contended successfully in both respects, and his success did much to foster a new spirit of coöperation in bilingual Canada and to create a distinctively Canadian nationalism.

Notwithstanding the evident success of the confederating movement in Canada, the Australian colonies hes-Australitated three decades before they finally decided to asian Colonies form a similar union. During the course of the nineteenth century, six self-governing colonies had appeared in Australasia beside the original colony of New South Wales, which had been founded as a penal station back in 1788 and had since developed into a free, prosperous community of sheep farmers, mechanics, and miners, endowed with self-government (1855). Two daughter-colonies had been separated from New South Wales—on the south, Victoria (1851), and on the north, Queensland (1859). Two other colonies, South Australia (1836), and Western Australia (1820), had been founded independently, thus making five colonies on the island continent. A sixth was the neighboring island of Tasmania (or Van Diemen's Land), which had been divorced from New South Wales in 1825. And the more distant islands of New Zealand, colonized in the first half of the century and erected as a separate colony in 1840, might be

¹ See above, pp. 471-472.

counted as a seventh. In the early part of the nineteenth century the introduction of sheep-raising, and in the middle of the century the discovery of gold, had attracted an increasing number of British emigrants to these island-colonies of the South Pacific and enabled them to mature rapidly.

The Australian colonies would doubtless have been federated as early as 1885, had they not been divided on the tariff question. Victoria and most of the other colonies had adopted the policy of tariff protectionism, while New South Wales clung stubbornly to free trade. The younger colonies, moreover, were reluctant to surrender the revenues which they obtained from their separate customs duties. But the advantages to be gained from confederation—especially the advantage of concerted action in excluding Chinese immigrants and in maintaining British supremacy in the South Pacific against French and German intruders 1finally outweighed the disadvantages. After long discussion, the

Commonwealth of Australia. 1000

colonists agreed upon a plan of confederation which was enacted by the British Parliament as the Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900. New Zealand, physically separated from Australia by 1,200 miles of water, refused to join the Commonwealth, just as the island of Newfoundland had held aloof from the Dominion of Canada.

The six Australian colonies became states in the Commonwealth, 2 under a constitution resembling that of the United States in some respects, and that of Great Britain in other re-The federal or Commonwealth legislature, like the American Congress, was composed of a Senate, in which each state had the same number of seats, and a House of Representatives, in which the seats were distributed according to population. The High Court of the Commonwealth, like the American Supreme Court, was the guardian and interpreter of the constitution. Besides, in delegating only specified powers to their federal government and reserving all others to the respective states, the Australians imitated the political structure of the United States rather than the more centralized system of Canada. In two important respects, however, the Australian Commonwealth was essentially British. First, its highest magistrate was a governor-

¹ See below, pp. 548, 610, 713.

² Subsequently the Commonwealth took over the government of two "territories" -Papua or British New Guinea (1905) and Northern Australia (1911).

general, appointed theoretically by the British crown, really by the British ministry, and empowered, like the monarch whom he represented, to reign but not to rule. Secondly, its cabinet of ministers was responsible to the parliament rather than to the chief magistrate. Australia preceded both Great Britain and the United States in the enfranchisement of women.

An outstanding characteristic of Australian development was the rapidity and extent of its industrialization and urbanization. Sheep-farming and agriculture in general, which, along with mining, had originally been the basis of the continent's economic and social life, were eclipsed after 1871 by manufacturing and commercial enterprise. One result was that, while the population tripled between 1871 and 1914, reaching a total of about five million in the latter year, the country as a whole remained sparsely settled and urban centres absorbed the entire increment. Four cities had a population in 1914 of over 150,000 each, and two (Sydney and Melbourne) had a combined population of a million and a half. Another result was that the governments of the several states, and the government of the Commonwealth after its creation in 1900, had to cope with a serious land problem and with even more serious labor problems.

Much attention was given to rural development. Irrigation works were constructed, "dry farming" experimented with, railways built into the interior, and many inducements offered to prospective farmers, in the hope not only of bringing undeveloped land under cultivation, but also of creating a rural population commensurate with the overgrown and trouble-giving towns.

Even more attention had to be bestowed, however, on increasingly radical demands from the masses of urban workingmen. After a furious but futile fight for the principle of the "closed shop" (in a great wide-

Social Legislation in Australia

spread strike of 1890), workingmen had become convinced that they must use the ballot box as well as the trade union to better their lot. Labor parties sprang up, therefore, in the several states and demanded socialistic legislation. Between 1890 and 1910 the state of Victoria, coming under the control of the Labor party, enacted a series of laws providing, among other things, for the creation of trade boards to regulate the wages and hours of industrial labor. Labor influence and legislation soon spread to Queensland, South Australia, and New South Wales.

The Commonwealth government followed the lead of the states, establishing in 1904 a federal arbitration court for the settlement of interstate industrial disputes, and in 1908 a system of old-age pensions. In the general election of 1910 the Labor party swept the country, and their leader, Andrew Fisher, a former Fisher's Scottish coal miner, formed a ministry which, with a Labor Governbrief interruption and some changes in personnel, enment in dured for the next seven years. It failed to induce Australia the people to pass constitutional amendments which would have enabled it to forward its socialistic program, but it succeeded in introducing, in 1911, compulsory military training for all young Australian men—a significant innovation in the army traditions of the British Empire—and it was the same Labor government which with enthusiasm and energy carried Australia into the World War in active support of the mother-country. Nationalism, as well as economic radicalism, was obviously overspreading all Australia, even its workingmen.

New Zealand, the Australasian colony which remained apart from the Commonwealth, had been self-governing since 1856, and in 1907 was styled a "Dominion" and accorded equal rank with the confederations of Canada and Australia and Dominion the colony of Newfoundland. Its internal developof New Zealand. ment was strikingly similar to neighboring Australia's. 1907 There was a similar increase of population, from 300,000 in 1871 to over a million in 1914, with the majority settled in cities, largely in Auckland and Wellington.¹ There were similar efforts to promote agriculture and rural settlement, and similar legislation of democratic and socialistic sort. respect of this legislation, New Zealand was even more radical than Australia. Not only were women enfranchised; not only were old-age pensions provided, workingmen insured against accident, and special courts set up to arbitrate disputes between employers and employes; but the government, in the spirit of "state socialism," undertook to own and operate railways, life-

¹ The native population of New Zealand—the Maori tribesmen—were more numerous and much more civilized and warlike than the natives of Australia. The British in Australia easily overcame the natives there (who are now a fast-disappearing and practically negligible group of primitives), whereas the British in New Zealand had to wage intermittent but fierce war with the Maoris. The number of Maoris has remained during the past fifty years about 50,000; but they are being gradually absorbed into the white population of New Zealand.

and fire-insurance, and coal mines. Nor was New Zealand much if any behind Australia in adopting the principle of compulsory military training, in giving effective aid to the mother-country in the World War, and in evidencing otherwise both a proud nationalism of its own and an intense loyalty to the Empire.

The union of four British colonies in South Africa followed

nine years after the establishment of the Australian Commonwealth. In another place we have mentioned how Cape Colony, the oldest of the South African settlements, was wrested by Great Britain from the Dutch Netherlands. 1 The Dutch inhabitants-farmers, who were called "Boers"-resented the transfer of sovereignty, particularly when the British British government obliged them in 1833 to free their negro and Dutch slaves,² and a large number of them quit Cape Colony. (Boers) "trekking" (emigrating) to Natal, and thence northin South ward to lands along the Orange River (where they founded the Orange River Territory in 1836) and on to the region across the Vaal River. The British tried to extend their sway wherever the Boers "trekked." They Republics of Trans-vaal and annexed Natal in 1843, and in 1848 they claimed the settlements on the Orange and Vaal rivers. There Orange were enough British soldiers and settlers in Natal to make the annexation of this territory effective, but the Boers were sufficiently numerous and resolute in the more northern lands to withstand the British. In 1852, by the "Sand River Convention," Great Britain acknowledged the independence of the Boer republic of Transvaal, and in 1854, by the "Convention of Bloemfontein," the full freedom of the other Boer republic, the Orange River Free State. Thus came into Colonies

Colony and Natal—and two Dutch republics—Transvaal and Orange River Free State. To Cape Colony the British Parliament granted self-government in 1872, and to Natal in 1893.

existence in South Africa two British colonies—Cape

In all four South African states was a numerous and troublesome native population, and in each the "native problem" bulked large, involving recurrent insurrections and repressions. For a long time, however, the "native problem" was dwarfed, in white men's eyes, by the rivalry between the two European

of Cape

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 713, 725.

² See above, pp. 81-82, 93-94 note.

stocks—the British and the Dutch—for supremacy in South

Hostility
between to sovereignty over the Transvaal. The Dutch
Boers and Boers again resisted, and, following the defeat
which they administered to a small British force at
Majuba Hill (1881), Gladstone recognized anew the virtual
independence of their country. Elated by this success, the Boers
increased their truculence toward the British, and some of their
leaders dreamed of uniting the Dutch-speaking minorities in
Cape Colony and Natal with the forces of the two republics in
a war to expel the British and make all South Africa Dutch.

On the other hand, British imperial ambitions were simultaneously stimulated by the activities of the Unionist party, especially Joseph Chamberlain in England, and by the sensational projects and achievements of Cecil Rhodes in Africa. Relations British of the Boers with the British were not improved when Pressure against flocked into Transvaal following the discovery there Republics (in the Rand region, 1886) of the world's richest gold mines, or when the British shut off Transvaal from all access to the sea by annexing Zululand and the territory just south of Delagoa Bay (which was Portuguese), or when Dr. Jameson, an associate of Rhodes and a fanatical imperialist, led a filibustering expedition into Transvaal (1895) with the avowed intention

of overthrowing its Boer government and incorporat-The ing it in the British Empire. The "Jameson raid" Jameson Řaid, failed of its immediate purpose, and its leader, captured 1895 by the Boers and turned over to the British government, underwent a brief imprisonment at London. But the raid greatly embittered the situation in South Africa. Jameson was lauded by Britishers in measure as he was reprobated by Boers. From 1895 to 1899 the Transvaal government, headed by Paul Kruger, a hardened old Dutch pioneer, assumed an Boer Restrictions ever more implacable attitude toward the British and on British especially toward the "Uitlanders," the British im-Immimigrant miners within Transvaal. These immigrants grants were very vocal in criticism of the oligarchical character of the Transvaal government and stentorian in demands for recog-

¹ On the concurrent rise of imperialist sentiment in England, see above, pp. 470-471, and on Cecil Rhodes, see below, p. 737.

nition of their own political rights under it. The refusal of the Boers to enfranchise the "Uitlanders" (except after seven years' residence) was the grievance which these most fully exploited.

In 1800, the republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State, feeling that peaceful measures had failed to check British pressure and aggression, formed an alliance and went to war with Great Britain. At the outset, the Boers took the offensive, invading Natal and striking at the Kimberley diamond fields in Cape Colony, and they won several brilliant Britain, victories. Their armed forces were not large, probably fewer than 40,000 men, but they had resourceful commanders in such men as Louis Botha and Christian De Wet, and the rank and file knew how to get about the country and to shoot straight. In time, however, they were borne down by weight of numbers. The regular British army was reënforced by volunteers from England and Scotland and by detachments from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, until the British had some 350,000 men in the field under the able command of Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener. In a year the Boers seemed to have lost the war: they were compelled to retire from Natal and Cape Colony; Pretoria, the capital of Transvaal, fell; President Kruger fled to Europe; and the British annexation of both Transvaal and Orange River Free State was proclaimed. Nevertheless. Boer resistance was not vet broken, and two years of fierce and trying guerrilla warfare ensued. Not until May 1902, by the treaty of Vereeniging, did the Boer generals agree to lay down British Conquest their arms and then on condition that the British of Boer government should respect the Dutch language in Repub-South Africa and grant self-government to the former lics, 1902 Dutch republics. The promise which the British thus made was carried out in 1906 as regards Transvaal and in 1907 as regards Orange Free State.

The way was at last prepared for the union of South Africa. Earlier projects of the kind had met shipwreck either by reason of British distrust or because of Boer hostility. But Britain was now willing, Boer resistance had been overcome, and union appeared necessary for the establishment of uniform tariffs, for the administration of interstate railways, and for the adoption of a vigorous native policy. An intercolonial convention for the discussion of tariff questions was speedily followed by

agreement upon a plan of political confederation, which was ratified by the British Parliament in 1909. Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State became provinces in the Union of South Africa, a union modelled after the Dominion of Canada.

In a sense, the creation of the Union of South Africa was a triumph for the Boers. They outnumbered the British in the Union as a whole, and inasmuch as they enjoyed equal political rights with the British they elected a majority of the members of the Union parliament, and one of their number, General Louis Botha, who had fought valiantly against Great Britain Botha's during the Boer War, became the first premier of the Boer Govern-Union. Botha loyally accepted the new order. While ment in safeguarding Boer interests in respect of language, South Africa education, agriculture, and the subject native races, and maintaining that South Africa was a "nation," he was conciliatory toward the British inhabitants of the Union and fully determined to keep it within the British Empire. He had some difficulty with extremists on both sides, but the masses applauded his policy of moderation; and this statesman who had been in arms against the British Empire during the Boer War lived to bear arms in behalf of the Empire during the World War.1 Botha remained prime minister of South Africa, vigorous and

With the Union of South Africa, the Commonwealth of Australia, Newfoundland, and the Dominions of Canada and New Zealand, Great Britain by 1910 was mistress—or ally—of five "colonial nations" whose vast territorial extent and rich natural resources promised them a great future. Politically, the ties between them and the mother-country were rapidly loosening. They managed their own internal affairs as they saw fit through

Political Relations of Dominions with Great Britain parliaments and ministries of their own choosing, and the governors-general whom the British government at Westminster sent out to reside in their midst were symbols, rather than directors, of imperial rule; they occupied in the several self-governing "dominions" about the same honorary position which the King

himself occupied in Great Britain. The mother-country still claimed certain rights over the dominions: to pass upon their

tactful, until his death in 1919.

¹ See below, p. 814.

constitutions; to veto acts of their parliaments; to control their foreign relations; and to decide in its own Privy Council at London judicial cases which might be appealed from their law courts. In practice, however, the dominion constitutions were usually framed in the colonies and their enactment by the British Parliament became quite perfunctory. The British government interfered less and less with the legislative freedom of the dominions and permitted them more and more to negotiate commercial and other treaties of their own with foreign countries. And the right of judicial appeal was severely curtailed by Canada, Australia, and South Africa.

Economically, too, the self-governing dominions went their own way, sometimes against the interests and policies of the mother-country. To forward their own industrial development, they levied tariffs on imports not only from foreign countries but also from Great Britain. To raise the standard of living of their own citizens, as well as to ensure that they would remain "white" countries, they imposed ever more drastic restrictions on immigration, particularly of Orientals, even where the immigrants might be from British dependencies such as India and Hongkong.

Despite the growing political and economic cleavage between mother-country and her self-governing colonies—or, as some persons said, because of the lessening sources of friction—there was a marked increase of sentimental devotion on the part of these colonies to the British Empire. Significant of the new spirit of voluntary, but very real, coöperation was the fact that Canada could have a French prime minister in Laurier, Australia a social—stic premier in Fisher, and South Africa a Dutch premier in Botha and yet all be proud to own themselves "British" and ready and glad to give the utmost military succor to Great Britain in the World War.

Before the World War many projects were adumbrated, especially in England, for establishing some "system" of interdominion relationship. One of the most celebrated was Joseph Chamberlain's triple scheme of "imperial conference, imperial preference, and imperial defense." ¹ Formal imperial conferences were actually inaugurated by the one in London in 1887, and

¹ See above, pp. 471-472.

henceforth, at more or less regular intervals, the prime ministers of the several dominions met personally with the Imperial Conferprime minister of the United Kingdom and discussed ences matters of mutual concern. "Imperial preference" was recognized by some of the dominions in lowering their tariffs on commodities imported from Great Britain, though the rigid adherence of the mother-country to free trade pre-Imperial vented her from favoring colonial imports and hence Preference militated against the full fruition of "imperial prefer-"Imperial defense" remained a matter of voluntary ence." action on the part of the several self-governing sections of the British Empire; in peace times it was sluggish, but at **Imperial** critical moments, as in the Boer War or in the World Defense War, it was remarkably cooperative and prompt. It was out of the practical experience and exigencies of the World War that a "system" of inter-dominion relationships finally emerged—the formal erection of the "British Commonwealth of Nations." To a later chapter belongs the description of this development,1 but it would have been impossible without the highly important preliminary stages recounted here and characterizing the era from 1867 to 1914.

In addition to the self-governing colonies confederated in the 2. Miscellary of the British Empire embraced a miscellary of crown colonies, naval stations, protectorates, and other possessions which were as far-flung and considerably more numerous but which were inhabited chiefly by non-European stocks and were ruled more or less despotically by agents of the British government at Westminster.

The "crown colonies" represented a continuation of the type of colonial administration which had flourished in the earlier days of the British Empire, before the revolt of the United States and the grant of self-government to Canada. They were presided over by governors who were named by, and responsible to, the colonial ministry in London and who might be "advised," but could hardly be dictated to, by assemblies or councils elected or appointed from British residents in the several colonies.

The oldest group of crown colonies comprised the remaining ¹See below, pp. 870-880.

British possessions in tropical America-British Honduras, British Guiana, the West Indian islands of Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, the Windward Islands, the Leeward Islands, In Tropthe Bahamas, and Bermuda—the large majority of ical America whose inhabitants were descendants of Negro slaves, and the West African coastal lands (almost wholly Negro) which Britain had held since the eighteenth cen-In West tury-Gold Coast, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. As crown colonies were administered, also, the series of naval stations which Britain had gradually acquired in the Mediterranean-Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus. Of these, the native population was respectively Spanish, Italian, Mediterand Greek, and at least in the cases of Malta and Cyranean prus there was such a lively local nationalism that the British government thought it unsafe to entrust them with selfgovernment. Still other crown colonies were Ceylon, Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, Mauritius, the Fiji Islands, the Falkland Islands, and British East Africa (or Kenya).

The "protectorates" represented, as a rule, larger areas, more recently acquired and less civilized, in which native princes (sultans or rajahs or tribal chieftains) were allowed to retain the trappings of power but were obliged to exercise it in harmony with instructions or "advice" of a resident British agent (commissioner or minister or "advisor"). In some instances, a crown colony acquired a protectorate over its hinterland; such was the case with the crown colonies in West Africa. In other instances, a commercial company, specially chartered by the British government, gained and exercised a protectorate. Such was the case with Cecil Rhodes's "British South African Company" (chartered in Those 1898), which, by virtue of wars and treaties with Chartered native chieftains, opened up and actually governed Comthe huge territory of Rhodesia until after the World panies War. Such, too, was the case with the "Royal Niger Company" (chartered in 1886) whose activities added the equally huge tract of Nigeria to the British Empire. In 1900, we may note, the protectorate of Nigeria was transferred from the Roval Niger Company to the British government, and in 1906 the

¹ Another instance of the same kind was the acquisition of a protectorate in Borneo by the "British North Borneo Company" (chartered in 1882).

territory was reorganized as the "crown colony and protectorate" of Nigeria. In still other instances, protectorates were established directly and exercised from the outset by the British government. Such was the case with the Federated Malay States, with Sarawak (whose rajah was an Englishman), with Tonga, with Zanzibar and Bechuanaland and Somaliland and Uganda and British Central Africa (renamed Nyasaland in 1907).

A kind of informal protectorate Great Britain established in Egypt. This country, in theory, was still a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, but in the first half of the nineteenth century an ambitious and bellicose Turkish governor (or pasha), the famous Mehemet Ali, had ottoman wrung from the government at Constantinople the recognition of a privileged, practically independent, position for Egypt and for himself; the governorship of the country would henceforth be hereditary in his own family.

For a time, under Mehemet Ali's grandson, Ismail (1863-1879). Egypt appeared to be advancing toward full independence and national well-being. Ismail, with the consent of the Ottoman Sultan, assumed the title of "Khedive" (1867); and, Egypt under full of admiration for European material civilization, Khedive he labored to "modernize" his country. He remodelled Ismail, 1863-1879 the administrative system. He established schools. He promoted cotton culture. He employed European engineers to build railways, telegraph lines, a breakwater at Alexandria, and harbor works at Suez. He subsidized the researches of European scholars in Egyptian antiquities and founded a great museum at his capital city of Cairo. In 1860 he celebrated with gala fêtes the opening of the Suez Canal, which had been financed by a French company (with liberal aids from the Khedive) and constructed by a distinguished French engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps. Unfortunately, all these undertakings were expensive. Ismail was notoriously prodigal, while Egypt was notoriously poor. The result was a rapid accumulation of indebtedness to foreign bankers, especially French and British; a crushing burden of taxation on the Egyptian peasants in order to meet the interest-charges to foreigners; and, eventually, national bankruptcy and foreign intervention.

¹On Mehemet Ali, see above, pp. 106-107.

In 1875 Ismail sought relief by selling to the British government for about twenty million dollars the block of stock which he owned in the Suez Canal Company. The canal thus came permanently under British control, but the financial relief to Egypt was transitory. In 1876 Ismail submitted Egyptian finances to a "dual control" of British and French agents, and when, three years later, he tried to get rid of the foreigners, he was deposed. His successor had to submit anew to the "dual control," but some of his subjects resented it and in 1882, under the leadership of Ahmed Arabi, they revolted. British The French declined to use force against the rebels, tion in but a British fleet bombarded Alexandria and a Brit-Egypt, ish army occupied the country, suppressing Arabi and restoring the Khedive to nominal rule while imposing upon him the duty of doing what Great Britain told him to do.

From 1882 to the World War, Egypt was virtually a British dependency. It continued to have a native khedive, but a British army remained and British will was law. There can be no doubt that under the guidance of British "advisors," no-Egypt tably Lord Cromer and Lord Kitchener, many helpful reforms were instituted. Finances were gradually put Protecon a solid footing. The administration of justice was bettered. The Egyptian Sudan, long a seat of disorder, brigandage, and religious fanaticism, was reconquered and policed. Important irrigation works were undertaken, culmi-Conquest nating in the construction of the magnificent Assuan of Egypdam (1898-1902). Moreover, a representative advitian Sudan sory assembly was created in 1883, and in 1913 it was entrusted with limited legislative powers. Notwithstanding all these benefits, and the promise of greater benefits to come, many Egyptians, particularly young men who had studied in Europe and learned lessons in nationalism, were profoundly discontented. Arabi's insurrection of 1882 had been crushed, but the echoes of his slogan, "Egypt for the Egyptians," resounded Egyptian ever louder. British rule might be benevolent, but it was foreign and hence intolerable; such was the faith which fired a growing number of Egyptian nationalists. Their opportunity would come with the World War.

¹ See the cartoon by Tenniel facing p. 503, above.

India, the greatest of all British imperial possessions, remains to be considered. Within this one Asiatic dependency were included (in 1914) four-fifths of the population of the whole British Empire. For every square mile of territory in the United Kingdom, India could show fifteen; and as the British Isles had only 45 million inhabitants as against India's 315 million, every man, woman, and child in the former might be thought of as having seven subjects in the latter. While the area of India was less than half of Canada's, her population was almost double the combined population of North and South America. And it is of special significance that no other colony or country in the world purchased so large an amount of British merchandise as did India.

The foundation of British supremacy in India had been laid, and much of its superstructure reared, by a succession of merchant-adventurers and empire-builders of the English East India Company during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries.¹ Not until the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and the resulting passage of the "Better Government of India Act" by the British Parliament in 1858 ² did the East India Company cease to function and the British government assume direct and full responsibility for India. Eighteen years later—in 1876—Parliament enacted that British India should be designated an "Empire" and that the British sovereign should be styled "Empress (or Emperor) of India."

British India was extraordinarily heterogeneous in geography, race, language, religion, and culture. It was truly an Diver-"empire" and not a "national state." Geographisities in British cally it comprised four fairly distinctive areas: the India triangular peninsula-plateau of southern India (usually called the Deccan); the broad belt of lowlands forming the Ganges and Indus river valleys to the north of the Geo-Deccan; the mountainous region still farther north graphical reaching into the Himalayas and extending westward past the frontiers of Afghanistan into Baluchistan; and the northeastern area of Burma.

Racial divisions corresponded roughly with the geographical,

¹On the history of the British in India during these centuries, see Vol. I, pp. 389, 398-399, 410-418, 491, 713, 760.

² See above, pp. 95-96.

the so-called Dravidians dwelling in the Deccan, the Hindu Aryans in the lowland belt, the descendants of Moslem invaders (Arab, Afghan, and Persian) in the northern hill region, and Mongoloid peoples in Burma. In many localities, however, different races lived side by side in neighborly hostility, and everywhere was plentiful evidence of racial intermixture.

Religious differences and antagonisms accentuated the racial and cultural contrasts. About two-thirds of the entire population adhered to the Brahmanic or Hindu religion, with its polytheistic theology, its sacred laws, its distinctive ceremonies and pilgrimages, its hierarchy, and its rigid caste system. Three sizeable religious groups derived originally from Hinduism but had long been quite separate: Buddhists, numbering about eleven million, chiefly in Burma; Jains, a million and a quarter, recruited principally from the commercial class in cities on the Malabar coast; and Sikhs, some three million, compactly settled in that part of the Indus valley known as the Punjab. Over against the majority of Hindus and small related groups was a fairly large minority of militant Moslems-some seventy million—whose stronghold was in northern India, though influential Moslem princes were to be found elsewhere in the country. Among Moslems, and even more among Hindus, were innumerable sects; while the religious hodge-podge was increased by the activity of Christian missionaries, Catholic and Protestant, whose converts by 1914 totalled about five million, mainly from the Hindu lower classes, although the cultural influence of Christianity in India undoubtedly permeated far beyond the ranks of its professed adherents.

To the confusion of religion was added the confusion of language. Over two hundred languages were spoken in British India, and while three-fourths of the whole population employed Aryan languages derived from ancient Sanskrit (akin to Latin, Greek, German, and Slavic), there were wide dialect differences among them, and, in addition, certain languages of basically different derivation, such as the Dravidian (spoken by sixty million persons in the Deccan), the Tibeto-Chinese (in Burma), and the Munda (spoken by nearly four million inhabitants of the hills and jungles of the north-central Deccan).

It was but natural, in the circumstances of divergent lan-

guages, religions, races, and geographical features, and in the face of a widespread and deeply rooted caste system, that cultural contrasts should be strikingly sharp. Some natives were highly cultured. Others were extremely primitive. Some, among the Moslem aristocracy and the Hindu upper classes, were inordinately wealthy and lived a life of luxury. Others, the vast majority of the native population, worked hard in field or shop for bare subsistence and had first-hand experience with direst poverty, sometimes with black starvation.

In other words, "India" was a merely geographical and political expression. Even in the realm of politics, even after the British had created their "Empire of India," govern-Major mental uniformity was notably lacking. There were Political two major parts of British India—two major methods Divisions in India by which the British government dealt with the heterogeneous country. On the one hand was the "Empire of India" in its technical sense, the portion ruled directly by British officials. It embraced three-fifths of the area and seven-ninths of the population of British India, and was divided into nine provinces,1 comparable in size with countries in Eu-(a) The "Emrope, each presided over by a governor and all subject pire." to central direction by the "Viceroy of India" named Governed by Britain by the government at Westminster, holding court at Calcutta,² and responsible in turn to the "Secretary of State for India" in the British ministry. The Viceroy was practically a dictator, and through the governors in the several provinces and also through a vast staff of civil and military officials he ruled the "Empire." On the other hand were some 600 "native states," including several fairly large ones 3 and many very small

¹ Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Burma, Central Provinces and Berar, Madras, Punjab, and the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. In 1912, six other provinces were delimited and put more directly under the control of the central government: the two strategically important provinces of Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan, and the four minor provinces of Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg, Delhi, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

² Until 1912, when the seat of government was transferred to the ancient capital-city of Delhi.

³ Such as Hyderabad, Mysore, Kashmir, Gwalior, and Baroda. The Himalayan native states of Nepal and Bhutan also fairly large, were recognized by the British as fully independent though they were in practical alliance with British India. Ceylon, a part of "India" geographically, was not accounted a part of the "Empire of India" but was administered, we may recall, as a crown colony.

ones, each governed directly and usually quite despotically by a Hindu or Moslem prince (with some such title as "rajah" or "gaekwar"), though all these princes were obliged to acknowledge British suzerainty, to live on friendly terms with the "Empire of India," and to submit to more or less "supervision" by the Viceroy and his agents.

(b) The Native States, Allied with Britain

As a part of the British Empire, India experienced an internal peace and an economic development which it had not known for centuries. The British civil service was generally of a high order of intelligence, integrity, and conscientiousness, and British officials displayed no little resourcefulness in coping with the traditional animosities and conflicting interests of the vast and heterogeneous native people. Roads and railways were built, agricultural production was stimulated, industrial machinery was introduced, harbor works were undertaken, and throughout the huge territory sanitation and public health were promoted and some educational opportunities provided. And an Indian army was organized with British officers.

and utilized to protect as well as to extend India. Nevertheless it seemed as though the more the British tried to do for the well-being of India, the more the natives found fault. To be sure, most of the princes, favored by British rule, were undoubtedly devoted to it, and the vast masses of the ignorant peasantry were as indifferent to it as they had been to the less benevolent despotism of native potentates. But many of

the younger generation of Indian intellectuals, especially those who were educated at European schools in their own country or at universities in England, gradually adopted and propagated a kind of nationalism.

Indian National-

Why not India for the Indians? Why not a welding together, through their own efforts, of Hindus and Moslems, of Aryans and Dravidians, of high-born and low-born castes, of rich and poor, of the cultured and the untutored, to fashion a real and free Indian nation? Why not a fairly rapid transition to selfgovernment? In 1885, three years after the viceroy, Lord Ripon, had announced that natives would be privileged to participate in the local government of cities and vil-Congress. lages, ardent nationalists formed an "All-India Congress" whose subsequent sessions were ever more largely attended and ever more vociferous in demanding self-government and preaching national unity.

Eventually in 1909, in an attempt to reconcile the nationalist Indian desire for self-government with the British determination to rule, the British Parliament enacted the Indian Councils Act, providing for native election (by a very restricted suffrage) of a minority of members of the advisory councils which Reorganwere set up in six of the nine provinces and of the ization of British "legislative council" which would advise the Viceroy. Govern-This act did not satisfy the Indian nationalists. They ment in India: termed it a sham, a mere caricature of representative Councils government, and they redoubled their agitation for Act of 1909 radical constitutional reform. In order to stifle the rancorous criticism, the government curtailed the freedom of the press, censored the mails, and forbade "seditious" meetings. Extremists replied with attempts at rioting and terrorism. Opposition was undoubtedly intensifying, though it had not reached such proportions in 1914-1918 as to disturb the existing régime in India or to hamper the coöperation of Indian troops with the armed forces of Britain during the World War.

We must not forget that important economic considerations incalculably strengthened the determination of Great Britain to retain India and exercise real authority over it. Economic Advan-India was predominantly an agricultural country, a tages of cheap producer of foodstuffs and raw materials for India to export to Britain and a big consumer of manufactured goods imported from Britain. Of the country's rapidly growing trade, which increased fivefold from the Mutiny in 1857 to the World War in 1914, Great Britain had almost a monopoly. On the eve of the war, the United Kingdom exported to India ten times as much merchandise as did the rival industrial nation of Germany; and three-fourths of India's seaborne commerce was carried under the British flag. British shipping interests were naturally enthusiastic about British political supremacy in India.

[·] ¹ One of the major imports was cotton goods. That India, instead of selling cotton goods to Europe as in previous centuries, should now be importing such large quantities from Great Britain, may be ascribed in part to the British policy of taxing Indian exports of cotton cloth in order to protect the cotton industry of Lancashire. The decline of the cotton industry in India, it need hardly be added, spelled ruin to thousands of Indian spinners and weavers.

So, too, were many industrialists in Great Britain, particularly in the cotton and iron industries, who derived profits from the Indian market. India purchased annually 200 million dollars' worth of cotton goods, and 125 million dollars' worth of iron and steel, machinery and railway equipment, mostly from England. There was also a large number of Britishers who drew their livelihood from civil or military service in India; they were likely to be apologists and propagandists for the British régime. There was an even larger number of Britishers who invested savings, much or little, in Indian government securities (of which some 600 million dollars' worth were held in England), or in Indian railways (which represented a capital of over fifteen million dollars, partly advanced by the government), or in some of India's 241 cotton factories, 61 jute mills, or 22 breweries, or in her promising oil fields and coal mines.

These investors, together with all the other interested Britishers, were prone to dilate upon the civilizing "mission" of Great Britain in India. Some persuaded themselves—and others —that Britain was a kindly schoolmistress, teaching material well-being and the higher Anglo-Saxon virtues to her "Civilizing Misclass of rather backward Hindu students and preparsion" of ing them for the noble but difficult task of establishing Britain in a parliamentary government and a capitalist prosperity according to English models. In justice to India, however, it should be remarked that Great Britain as yet appeared more anxious to promote her own economic interests than to educate the native population. The British "Empire of India" spent almost sixty million dollars on railways and canals and almost a hundred million on army, but only thirty million on schools. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that of the total population of the immense Indian Empire more than 94 per cent could neither read nor write.

On the whole, nevertheless, Great Britain had been amazingly successful in gaining and holding overseas dominion. The only important exception had been the loss of the United States in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Colonial Success

Throughout the nineteenth century and down to the World War Britain was rapidly extending her imperial sway

World War Britain was rapidly extending her imperial sway and successfully resisting separatist movements not only in India but also in Ireland and South Africa. The grant of self-government to "white dominions," while loosening her legal control of them, appeared to confirm their sentimental attachment to her and to give her coöperative allies instead of rebellious colonies.

No other colonizing nation owned such vast areas suitable for European settlement as did Great Britain. No other empire possessed such populous dependencies. There was no Britain's such aggregation of economic resources within any Imperial other empire. The British Empire, altogether, con-Supremacy trolled a half of the world's supply of gold, a third of the world's supply of wool, a third of the coal, a fourth of the cotton, a fifth of the wheat, and a sixth of the pig iron. Its navy and its merchant marine were by far the largest in the world; the tonnage of the latter in 1914 was twice the combined tonnage of the merchant marines of Germany and the United States. As Great Britain was the workshop of the world, so her Empire was the premier economic and political association in the whole world.



CHAPTER XXI

LATIN EUROPE, 1870-1914

I. THE LATIN TRADITION



ROUPED as Latin nations are those whose languages are derived from the Latin of the ancient Roman Empire. They include France, Italy, Spain, Portu-Europe gal, and Rumania, together with French-speaking Belgium ¹ and the southern (French- or Italian-speaking) cantons of

Switzerland. They include also the daughter-nations of Portugal, France, and Spain in the New World: Portuguese-speaking Brazil, French-speaking Haiti (and Quebec Latin America in Canada), and the Spanish-speaking countries of Mexico, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Central America, and South America. The former constitute "Latin Europe," and the latter "Latin America."

The fact that all these nations employ closely related languages has served, especially under the influence of nineteenth-century romanticism with its gospel that a community of cul-Common ture emanates from a community of language, to give Linguistic currency to the phrase "sister Latin nations" and to foster a mutual sympathy among them, particularly among their intellectuals and on occasion among their statesmen and warriors. A multitude of volumes were written in the middle and latter part of the century about the "Latin spirit," the "Latin genius," the "Latin tradition." Italians, Frenchmen, and all the others, including Rumanians, were reminded Classical Tradition that they were direct descendants of the ancient Latin-speaking people, immediate heirs of the Roman Empire, natural custodians of Roman law and classical civilization.

¹ The upper classes throughout the country and the masses in southeastern Belgium speak French. Flemish, or Dutch—a Germanic language—is spoken by the masses in northwestern Belgium. Belgium is thus a bilingual nation, half Latin and half Teutonic, but it is conventionally reckoned a Latin nation.

Such romantic considerations helped to provide a sentimental background for much of Napoleon III's foreign policy: his war with Austria in 1859 for the liberation of the Italians, his diplomacy in 1862 in behalf of the union Собрегаof the Rumanian principalities, his intervention in tion 1863 in Mexico, his negotiations in 1867 for French annexation of Belgium, his formation in 1863 of a Latin monetary union.1 They were not without influence, moreover, on Garibaldi's eagerness to fight for the Uruguayans in South America and for the French in the Franco-German War of 1870-1871, as well as for the freedom and unity of his own nation. They were significant also in stimulating a common feeling throughout Latin America against any cultural, economic, or political aggression on the part of the "Anglo-Saxons" of the United States.

The Latin tradition, however, was not wholly or even chiefly a matter of language. For, in addition to the more or less romantic recollection of linguistic and presumably racial kinship, it involved certain specific institutions and practices which have long been, and still are, manifestly characteristic of most, if not all, of the Latin nations.

One important element in the Latin tradition is the long and steady adherence of Latin nations to the form of Christianity

which their ancestors were among the first to adopt Common back in the days of the Roman Empire. None of them Religious Tradition: underwent at the time of the Reformation any general Roman conversion to Protestantism, and all of them, in so far Catholicism as they profess any religion, have remained overwhelmingly Catholic (except Rumania, which has remained overwhelmingly Orthodox). Only in France (and French Switzerland) has Protestant dissent been considerable, and here it is much less vital in the twentieth century than it was in the sixteenth. Indeed, so formally Catholic have been the Latin nations that some moderns, neglecting the preponderance of Catholicism in Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, and Ireland, mistakenly identify Catholic Europe with Latin Europe.

With traditional adherence to the faith of Catholic Christianity

¹ The Latin Monetary Union was formed for the standardization of the coinage of France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy. Subsequently Spain and Rumania adhered to it, and so did the non-Latin nations of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. It lasted until the World War.

has been associated a traditional regard for certain of its distinctive external manifestations—its emphasis upon the formal and the ceremonial aspects of social living, its patronage and stimulation of the fine arts, its gala observance of fête days, its eschewal of puritanism, its paradoxical tendency to nourish concepts of individual equality and dignity while distinguishing between the classes and the masses and stressing "authority."

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the lapse of many individuals from the previous unquestioning faith in Christianity has brought to the fore in overwhelmingly Catholic nations, and therefore in Latin nations, a sharper cleavage between agnostics and sceptics, on the one hand, and devout Christians, Cleavage on the other, than has occurred in other European countries. In Latin countries there has been no middle and Faithground, as Protestantism has elsewhere furnished, between the extremes of belief and disbelief; and, inasmuch as "Latins" by tradition are notably doctrinaire, the extremes partake of an earnestly dogmatic, authoritarian character. "Latins" are less inclined in religion, and likewise in politics, to "muddle through" than to "fight through."

The phenomenon of "anti-clericalism," the general nature of which we have previously explained 1 and specific illustrations of which we shall have repeated occasion to set forth in the present chapter, is far more usual in Latin Clericalcountries than in others. This is because, in Latin countries especially, the church for centuries was intimately associated with the state, exercising political as well as moral sway and enjoying corresponding political privileges, with the result that demands for revolutionary political change have usually been accompanied by attacks on the church. Wherefore it has arisen in modern times that determined foes of the intellectual and dogmatic position of the church have frequently obtained assistance for their anti-Catholic campaigns from numerous fellow citizens who profess themselves to be Catholic and more or less regularly practice their religion and yet are "anti-clerical," critical of the Catholic clergy and anxious to restrict ecclesiastical activity in political and public life.

The ubiquitous Latin conflict between "clericalism" and "anticlericalism" has, in fact, been part and parcel of a contest between

¹ See above, pp. 414-415.

the tenets of the French Revolution and those of the "old régime." We must bear in mind that the old régime had been most substantial in Latin countries, and also that the French Revolution occurred in a Latin country and made "Revolutionaries" deepest impression on other Latin countries. Whence vs. "Reit follows quite naturally that many Latins, devoted actionaries " to the Revolution and to "modern civilization," have perceived a hateful "reaction" in every surviving institution of the old régime-monarchy, aristocracy, industrial guild, Catholic Church—while many other Latins, equally devoted to the old régime and historic civilization, have perceived a destructive "radicalism" in the novelties of the Revolution and of more recent times, in republicanism, democracy, economic individualism, and anti-clericalism. In this sense there have latterly been two Frances, two Italies, two Spains, two Portugals, two Belgiums, the one, in each case, being conservative, royalist, and clerical, and the other, radical, republican, and anti-clerical. There have been, to be sure, many gradations from the one to the other, and variations in the relative strength of the two in the several countries. Not all clericals have been royalist, and not all republicans have been anti-clerical; and "radicals" have been more numerous and more influential than "conservatives" in France, and less so in Spain and Belgium.

What principally has held together the two Frances, and the two hostile factions in each of the other Latin nations, has been the rise of a paramount nationalism, to the development of which both radicals and conservatives, both clericals and anti-clericals, have contributed, and in loyalty to which they both share. And reënforcing nationalism among them has been the Latin political tradition, the abiding and revivifying memory of the institutions and prac-

tices of the ancient Roman Empire—a highly centralized and almost deified state, the great conserving and consolidating system of Roman law, a tendency toward dictatorship, a pride in military show, and a successful achievement of imperialistic expansion.

Characteristic of every one of the nations of Latin Europe (except Rumania) has been its overseas expansion. The leading explorers and discoverers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were Italian, and in recent times Italy has been expanding anew

in Africa and the Levant. The great colonial and commercial empires of the sixteenth century were Spanish and Latin Portuguese, and, though largely separated politically Impe-rialism from their respective mother-countries in the nineteenth century, they have continued to cherish the culture and to spread the influence of Spain and Portugal. France built an extensive colonial empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and yet another, even more extensive, second only to Great Britain's, in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Belgium, too, has latterly acquired a huge imperial domain in central Africa. Much of this imperialism has been motivated by economic developments common to capitalistic Europe rather than peculiar to the Latin nations, but capitalistic motives have been more strikingly obvious in the case of Dutch or British expansion, while in the case of Latin imperialism they have been more clearly supplemented by missionary and conquering zeal inherent in the Catholic and Roman traditions.

It should be borne in mind that none of the Latin nations, except Belgium, underwent in the nineteenth century such swift and intensive industrialization as was experienced by Great Britain, Germany, or the United States. The Industrial Revolution, of course, permeated France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, and produced significant changes

among their populations. Yet the changes here were neither as sudden nor as sweeping as in non-Latin countries. The majority of Latins continued to live in rural communities, to cultivate the soil, to be farmers and, in relatively large numbers, peasant-proprietors; and numerous Latin artisans managed to keep out of factories and to go on with handicrafts. Even Belgium maintained some balance between her industry and her agriculture and between her machine and hand production; her valuable lace industry, for example, remained preëminently a hand industry, and a large proportion of her population owned small farms. Despite the fact that the Latin peoples were traditionally and notoriously thrifty, they acquired, in an age of industrialization and industrial capitalism, the reputation of being "backward" and "unprogressive."

This reputation for "backwardness" seemed to be further substantiated, at least in the minds of "Anglo-Saxon" critics, by the difficulties which Latin nations encountered in trying to operate the modern instruments of representative, parliamentary government. Every Latin nation, at some time in the nineteenth century, consciously imitated the political institutions of Great Britain or the United States, framing written constitutions, erecting parliaments and responsible ministries, enfranchising the masses, and, in general, providing on paper for the conduct of government as it was conducted in England or America. Yet something in the

Latin tradition was always threatening to thwart the Handsuccessful operation of the "Anglo-Saxon" type of icaps to political democracy, not only in Italy, Spain, and Functioning of Portugal (and the republics of Latin America); but Political also in France and Belgium. Perhaps it was the Catho-Democracv lic element in that tradition. Perhaps it was the imperial Roman element. Perhaps it was the deeply conflicting elements of "reaction" and "revolution." At any rate, while the countries of Latin Europe employed the form of parliamentary government, its substance was modified by certain characteristics which distinguished all of them in greater or less degree.

Latins had a less lively personal sense of political responsibility than "Anglo-Saxons." They were less interested in self-government and more indifferent to its prosaic results. They were less inclined to form large and well-organized political parties, regularly alternating with each other in the administration of public affairs. On the other hand, they were prone to follow this or that personal leader, who would represent a "group" rather than a "party" and would consequently have to rely for the exercise of political power upon constantly shifting alliances with other "groups."

Besides, there were more fundamental differences among Latins than among "Anglo-Saxons" concerning the constitution and the Basic objects of government. Englishmen were generally Differences committed to royalty and a state church, and Americans to republicanism and the separation of church and state. Each Latin people, on the other hand, was split into quarrelsome factions of royalists and republicans, of clericals and anti-clericals, and in each the rise of Marxian socialism evoked especially militant partisanship.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "First Communion in a Peasant Village," is by a popular French painter, Jules Breton (1827-1905).





Finally, among the Latins there was a greater expectation of what government could and should do, and at the same time a greater reluctance to pay direct taxes to the state and a greater impatience with the drab operation and Little Patience of democratic institutions. Wherefore, revolutionary demonstrations were fairly frequent, if not always serious, and dictatorship was ever a possibility and sometimes a reality.

Despite reputed "backwardness" in material and political progress, there was in the abiding traditional civilization of the Latin nations an elegance, a richness, a color, an interest in ideas, an artistic sense, which fascinated other Civilizing Tradition peoples and attracted an ever-increasing number of tourists to Paris and the French Riviera, to Rome and Florence, to Seville and Madrid, to Brussels and Antwerp. France, as the foremost Latin nation, the one most famed for its rôle in modern history and for its contemporary art and scholarship, was particularly alluring to foreigners. The French might be "irresponsible," as Englishmen said, or "decadent," as Germans averred, but France was regarded by millions outside her own borders as the most truly civilized country, and her of French capital Paris as the most beautiful and most sophisticated city in Europe and probably in the world. To France we shall give first attention in our survey of the history of Latin Europe from 1870 to 1014.

2. THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC

How the Empire of Napoleon III (the "Second French Empire") came to an inglorious end with his defeat by the Germans at Sedan, and how at Paris on September 4, 1870, a self-constituted "provisional government" proclaimed France a "republic," we have explained in an earlier chapter. The provisional government" was led by Léon Gambetta and Jules Favre, staunch republicans, who had been ment of conspicuously opposed to Napoleon III's régime and Sept. 1870 who were most eager to ensure the permanence of a "Third Republic" in line with the Jacobin tradition of the First French

Note. The picture opposite, of a boulevard in Paris, is by a famous impressionist painter, Claude Monet (1840–1926). On Monet, see above, p. 401.

¹ See above, pp. 212-213.

Republic of 1792 1 and the Second of 1848; 2 and, so long as the war with Germany lasted and the mass of Frenchmen perceived the necessity of presenting a united front to a common enemy, royalists and other conservatives joined with republicans and radicals in support of the "provisional government."

In January 1871, when Paris surrendered to the Germans and a truce was agreed to in order that the French people might elect a National Assembly to decide whether peace should be made or the war continued, a cleavage appeared between republicans and royalists. The former, inspirited by the flaming patriotism of Gambetta and sharing his conviction that peace could be made with Germany only on terms humiliating to France and inauspi-

The National Assembly and Its Rovalist Majority. 1871

cious for the endurance of the Third Republic, were bent on continuing the war. The royalists, on the other hand, counselled the making of peace. On this issue the first electoral campaign under the Third Republic was waged in February 1871, with the result that, of the 650 deputies elected to the National Assembly by

universal manhood suffrage of the French nation, about 400 were royalists and only about 250 were republicans.

The National Assembly, meeting at Bordeaux, naturally refused formally to sanction the Republic, contenting itself with

Temporary Headship of Thiers

naming as "head of the executive power" Adolphe Thiers, the liberal royalist who had been prominent in the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe.3 Having thus supplanted the "provisional government" of Gambetta with a more conservative temporary government, the

National Assembly with its royalist majority removed Peace to Versailles and in due time ratified the treaty of with Germany, Frankfort (May 1871). Thereby, as we have learned,4 1871 France ceded Alsace and the greater part of Lorraine

to the newly created German Empire and promised, in addition, to pay a war indemnity of five billion francs.

By this time, however, the National Assembly had had to cope with a serious insurrection of the Commune of Paris. The Commune had been formed, while Paris was besieged by the Germans and hence cut off from the rest of France, through a

¹ On the First French Republic (1792-1804), see Vol. I, pp. 628-657.

² On the Second French Republic (1848–1852), see above, pp. 113-117, 186-189.

³ See above, pp. 103-104, 106-107.

⁴ See above, pp. 244-245.

fusion of a "central committee" of workingmen, some Socialist and some Anarchist, with another "central committee" of middle-class republican guardsmen. It was obviously not a homogeneous body, and yet its discordant elements had experienced like sufferings during

The Commune of Paris and Its Griev-

and immediately after the siege, and they shared a like resentment against the National Assembly. Though they might quarrel among themselves as to what brand of republicanism was ideally most desirable, they were all hostile to the principle of monarchy and particularly inimical to the National Assembly-its royalist majority, its sitting at Versailles instead of at Paris, its willingness to conclude peace with Germany, and its unwillingness to do anything to relieve the continuing economic distress of the Parisian lower classes. These had endured proportionately greater hardship and privation during the Franco-German War than any other section of the French people, and now, with the cessation of war, their lot was still worse. Not only was the Parisian labor market glutted by the stoppage of war industries and the demobilization of the French armies, but the National Assembly. decreed that the payment of rents and debts, which had been suspended during the war, should be resumed, and simultaneously that the wages which the government had been paying to national guardsmen should no longer be paid. No doubt these decrees were. urgently demanded in view of the exhausted condition of the national treasury, but they were interpreted by the Commune as plain evidence of the Assembly's partiality for the rich creditor class as against the poor debtor class.

So the Commune at Paris led a revolt against the National Assembly, repudiating its authority, declaring that the city was self-governing, and summoning radicals in other local- Revolt of ities to establish similar communes and to federate Commune against them with the capital's. "Communes" were actually National set up at Lyons, Marseilles, and a few other towns, Assembly in imitation of Paris, but they were soon overthrown. Indeed, the mass of the French people throughout the provinces were even more eager to suppress domestic strife than they had been to end the foreign war; they solidly backed Thiers in ordering regular troops to capture Paris and end the Commune.

For two months—April and May, 1871—Paris underwent a second siege, this time at the hands of French soldiers, and this time with unparallelled ferocity on both sides but with success ultimately attending the national arms of France. The defending "Communists" fought furiously, but, overpowered by numbers and outplayed in generalship, they gave way little by sign of little. In desperation, they slew the hostages they

little. In desperation, they slew the hostages they sion of Paris held (including the archbishop of Paris) and set fire Comto public buildings (destroying the City Hall and the mune, May 1871 palace of the Tuileries). On the heights of Montmartre they made their final stand. Nor did the victors display any leniency. Frenzied by the stubborn resistance they encountered, the troops of the National Assembly killed many of the prisoners they took. And after the Commune was ended and order restored, a kind of judicial terrorism continued. "Communists" who survived the insurrection and failed to escape from the country were tried, found guilty, and banished to Guiana in South America.

The horrible episode of the Paris Commune had significant consequences in France for at least a generation afterwards. It greatly weakened extreme radicalism, not only by intensifying the dread of socialism and anarchism among the upper and middle classes and the peasantry, but also by silencing in death or banishment the chief propagandists of revolutionary violence among the urban working class. At the same time, it somewhat lessened the popularity of the royalist cause. The royalist Assembly and ministers had done a good work, it was generally conceded, in suppressing the Commune, but their continuing vindictiveness against radical suspects came gradually to be deemed unjust and to react against them. On the other hand, the republican cause profited both from the fact that it was purged of its Triumph extremist element and rendered "moderate" and likeof "Moderates" wise from the fact that its leading protagonist, Gambetta, had no part in the Commune and no part in the slaughter of Parisians. In a later generation, Marxian socialism and revolutionary anarchism would grow anew in France and recall to workingmen the Communist "martyrs" of 1871 and elicit the sympathy and coöperation of groups of republicans. Meanwhile, however, republicans were generally "moderate," which means quite bourgeois in sentiment and interest.

By the end of May 1871, Thiers and the National Assembly had made peace with the Germans and restored order in France.

The republican minority contended that the Assembly had now complied with its mandate from the people and should therefore authorize the election of another assembly to formulate a constitution for the Republic. The royalist majority were not so anxious for new elections, however, and in August 1871 they passed the Rivet law, whereby the National Assembly assumed full power to prepare a constitution and conferred on Thiers the interim title of "President of the French Republic." From 1871 to 1875 the Assembly remained the supreme

Work of National Assembly. 1871-1875

Thiers. President of Republic

governing and constitution-making body in France, and some very important things it did.

In the first place, under the direction of the National Assembly, the government reorganized the public finances and floated additional loans, so that in 1873 the final installment of the war indemnity was paid to Germany and foreign troops were withdrawn from French soil. Secondly, army reforms Payment of Indemwere effected. Following the example of victorious nity and Prussia, the principle of universal compulsory service Reform was adopted, the term being fixed as five years in the active army and eleven years in the reserve. 1 New fortifications were constructed along the German frontier and the defenses of Paris were strengthened. Nor was the navy neglected. It was apparent that France, though lately defeated, was resolved to maintain her position as a Great Power, and that many Frenchmen were already thinking of a "war of revenge" for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine.

Thirdly, the National Assembly devised a constitutional government for France. This it did most painfully and after much delay. There was no serious division in the Assembly about continuing the highly centralized local government, under prefects and sub-prefects, which Napoleon had organized for France at the beginning of the nineteenth century,2 but as to what form the central government should take difference of opinion prevailed,

Constitutional Differences among Royalist Majority

not only between the royalist majority and the republican minority, but also within the royalist majority itself.

¹ The principle was not fully applied, however. It proved impractical to enforce a five-year term, and there were numerous exemptions.

² See Vol. I, p. 652.

The royalists in the Assembly (and in the country at large) were split into three factions. (1) The "Imperialists" were still loyal to the Bonapartist family and to the imperial r. The idea as personified by Napoleon I and Napoleon III. Imperial-Thanks to the recent disastrous war, they were the least numerous and the least influential of the monarchical (2) More important were the "Legitimists," dyed-infactions. the-wool royalists, who comprised most of the old 2. The Legitinobility, many socially prominent persons in Paris and other towns, especially of northern France, and a large following among the Catholic clergy all over the country and among the peasants in certain regions, particularly Brittany and Vendée. They were faithful to the memory of the old régime. devoted to aristocracy and the Catholic Church, and vehemently hostile to the whole political and social heritage of the Revolution. Their candidate for the throne of France was Henry, Count of Chambord (1820-1883), grandson of Charles X.1

(3) At least as numerous as the Legitimists were the "Orleanists" (or "Liberal Royalists"), recruited mainly from liberally minded aristocrats, conservative bourgeois, and relatively well-to-do peasants, who were anxious to find a compromise—a "just mean"—between revolution and reaction, between democracy and monarchy, between clericalism and modern society, and who thought it could be attained through a liberal, constitutional régime similar to Great Britain's and presided over by the Count of Paris (1838–1894), grandson of King Louis Philippe.²

Between the Count of Chambord and the Count of Paris no love was lost, for the grandfather of the one had not so long ago been chased out of France by the grandfather of the other; and between them and likewise between their respective partisans there was an obvious incompatibility of principles. It is not to be wondered at that the National Assembly, with its fundamentally divergent elements, made slow progress in framing a constitution for the Third French Republic. Republicans seemed to be hopelessly outnumbered by royalists, and royalists to be irreconcilably rent between factions of Legitimists and Orleanists.

For a time in 1873 a royalist agreement appeared likely. Legitimists and Orleanists were alike angered by the public con-

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 768-769, 785-788.

² See above, pp. 113, 208 note.

fession of the supposedly royalist President, Thiers, that a republican form of government was the only practicable way out of the impasse. They united to force his resignation and to elect Marshal MacMahon, an unbending royalist, as his successor. Shortly afterwards, moreover, the Count of Paris paid an expiatory visit to his cousin, the Count of Chambord, then residing in Austria and childless, and reached an agreement with him whereby the latter should succeed immediately to the French throne as "Henry V," while the former would be next in line of succession. Royalist hopes quickened, and plans were laid for the speedy supplanting of the Third French Republic by a second restored Bourbon monarchy.

Temporary Truce between Legitimists and Orleanists

Mac-Mahon. President of Republic, 1873

Intransigence of Royal Pretender and Renewed Discord among Royalists

But royalist harmony was short-lived. A pronouncement by the prospective "Henry V" in October 1873 that he was unalterably determined to maintain the principles of divineright monarchy and to bring back to France the lilied white flag of the Bourbons shocked the liberal royalists and caused them to draw away from the legitimists. Marshal MacMahon, the soldier-president, acutely interpreted the sentiment of many royalists, as well as republicans, by remarking that at the sight of the

white Bourbon flag of absolutism "the rifles in the army would go off automatically." And with renewed friction between rival groups of royalists, the republicans won several by-elections for the filling of vacancies in the Assembly and thus increased their representation in that body. The majority of the French people were clearly too steeped in the democratic doctrines of the Revolution to "restore" a very obstinate prince, just as he was, with his old-fashioned principles and his moth-eaten flag.

Henceforth but one practicable course presented itself to the liberal royalists, and that was to collaborate with the republicans in organizing a government which would serve as a makeshift until such time as the Count of Chambord should carry his white flag to the grave and leave the way open to the more conciliatory Count of Paris. Royalists The first step in such a course was taken by the National Assembly in November 1873, when a bill was passed bestowing upon Marshal MacMahon the title of President of the Republic for a definite term of seven

Cooperation between Republi-

years. So great, however, was the distrust between the factions of Republicans and Orleanists, on whose joint action the adoption of even a makeshift depended, that the next step was not taken until January 1875. Then, by the slender margin of one vote, the Assembly made provision for the election of future presidents of the Republic. Two other "constitutional laws" Constitufollowed more rapidly in February, and a third in tion of Third July 1875. These laws, thus voted piecemeal by a French National Assembly which had been elected four years Republic, earlier and in which royalists still outnumbered republicans, proved to be, with few subsequent amendments, the permanent constitution of the Third French Republic.

Unlike earlier instruments of government in France, the constitutional laws of 1875 were of an essentially practical nature. Setting forth no political theories and containing no declaration of individual rights, they merely prescribed what the machinery of government should be and how it should operate. In many respects they revealed conscious imitation of the British practice of parliamentary government, and in other respects utilitarian compromise between the republican and royalist politicians who framed them. The system which they established may be sketched as follows:

The legislative power was vested in a parliament, consisting of two elective chambers, a majority vote of both being required for the enactment of laws. The two chambers Senate and would combine in one body-called the National Chamber Assembly—to elect the President of the Republic of Deputies or to amend the constitution; otherwise, they would meet separately. The upper chamber, the Senate, would comprise 300 members, chosen by indirect election for nine years.1 The lower and more numerous chamber, the Chamber of Deputies, would be elected by direct universal manhood suffrage every fourth year (or oftener, if its dissolution should meanwhile be decreed by the President and the Senate).2

¹The Senators are chosen in each département of France by special electoral colleges which consist of the deputies and the members of the general council of the département, and the members of the councils of the arrondissements, together with delegates from the councils of the communes. Until 1884, the number of Senators elected for nine years was 225, and the remaining 75 were elected for life.

² The number of Deputies was gradually increased, reaching 602 in 1914. The mode of electing them has also been modified several times since 1871. The scrutin

The executive power was entrusted nominally to a President, elected by the National Assembly for seven years and eligible for

reëlection, but actually to a Cabinet of Ministers. The ministers, who not only exercise most of the functions of the President but likewise direct the whole machinery of local government throughout the country, must have the backing of a majority in the Parliament; if they fail to carry the measures they

President and Ministry: Responsibility to Parliament

propose or if either chamber passes a vote of "lack of confidence," they must resign and leave to the President the task of forming a new ministry which can command the chambers' confidence. This was virtually the British system of parliamentary government with its ministerial responsibility. It rendered the Parliament omnipotent and the President a kind of elective "king" after the British model. It appealed to French republicans as being democratic and as safeguarding the Republic against a too-powerful president who, like a Napoleon, might make himself a dictator. And it appealed to French royalists as a convenient means by which, when they secured a majority in Parliament, they could easily substitute for the president a king according to their own heart, a king who would reign but not rule.

With the drafting of the constitutional laws, whose major provisions have just been indicated, the National Assembly brought its manifold labors to a close in 1875; and the first parliamentary elections under the new constitution Indecisive of the Third Republic were held. The outcome was the return of a republican majority to the Chamber of Deputies and of a royalist majority to the Senate, of 1876 and the continuation of fierce partisan strife between republicans and royalists for the control of the government and the country.

The President, Marshal MacMahon, with the support of the Senate, retained his office and utilized it along with his personal prestige to advance the royalist cause. He encouraged army de liste, under which each elector votes for as many Deputies as the entire département has to elect, was introduced in 1871. In 1876 it was replaced by the scrutin d'arrondissement, under which each département is divided into electoral districts, each elector voting for one Deputy only. In 1885 there was a return to the scrutin de liste, and in 1889 to the scrutin d'arrondissement, which remained the mode until after the World War. As in most Continental countries, elections are held on a Sunday; if no candidate receives a majority of all votes cast in a first balloting, a second balloting is held two weeks later, at which time a plurality of votes suffices

for election.

officers to participate actively in propaganda for the restoration of the monarchy, and, in order to stimulate ecclesias-Royalist Policy of tical cooperation to the same end, he appointed (under President the Concordat) persons of strongly royalist convic-Maction to high church office and did what he could to Mahon satisfy Catholic requests. He contributed liberally to the fund for erecting, "as an expiation for the sins of revolution," the great basilica of the Sacred Heart on the heights of Montmartre, where crowds of Communists had been shot down in 1871, and he gave moral support to the agitation of prominent Catholics for French intervention in Italy in behalf of the Pope.

Against the President, the republican majority in the Chamber of Deputies had a redoubtable leader in Léon Gambetta (1838-

Gambetta and the Republican Majority in the Chamber

Gambetta had won popular favor by his prophetic criticism of the now discredited régime of Napoleon III, by his patriotic labors during the Franco-German War, and by his skill as a politician and his brilliancy as an orator. By his neutrality during the Commune and his compromises in the National Assem-

bly, he had not wholly alienated extreme radicals while he had reassured moderates and drawn them toward republicanism. Now, in 1876-1877, when MacMahon was seeking to make the Catholic Church in France a principal prop of the royalist cause,

Gambetta proceeded to stir up opposition to the politi-Issue of cal activity of churchmen and to ally the forces of Clericalanti-clericalism with those of republicanism. In the Chamber and in the country at large he assailed the royalists because they aided the church, and he attacked the church because it was directed by royalists and for royalists. An especially bitter diatribe which he delivered in the Chamber early in May 1877, in the course of which he uttered the memorable phrase, "Clericalism, there is the enemy," was the immediate occasion for a test of strength between himself and the royalist President.

Dissolution of Chamber, and Critical Election of 1877

On May 16, 1877, Marshal MacMahon appointed a royalist (and clerical) ministry under the Duke de Broglie and adjourned the Chamber of Deputies for a month; then, with the sanction of the Senate, he dissolved the Chamber and ordered the holding of new elections throughout France. The resulting electoral campaign was exciting and spectacular. Both Gambetta and the President undertook speech-making tours. None could doubt MacMahon's sincerity, but few could withstand Gambetta's oratory. The republicans won a decisive victory, and as soon as the new Chamber met it forced the resignation of the royalist ministry of Broglie and the appointment of a republican ministry.

For another year Marshal MacMahon doggedly struggled on against a hostile Chamber and ministry, but partial elections to the Senate, early in 1879, assured republican control of the upper house as well as the lower, and left the royalist President in a hopeless situation. He resigned, and in his place the Repubrepublican majority of the combined Chambers elected lican Triumph Jules Grévy, one of their own number. Thus, nine vears after its beginning, the Third French Republic was at last in republican hands. In the following year (1880), as tokens of republican triumph, the seat of government was transferred from Versailles to Paris, and the fourteenth of July—the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille and a day dear to French revolutionaries—was formally proclaimed the national holiday.

Gambetta did not long survive the triumph; after a brief term as prime minister he was accidentally killed in 1882. But though his following was already breaking up into a number of factional groups, France continued to be dominated by men loyal to the republican form of government. Royalists remained, but they lacked capable leaders and they gradually lost a good deal of their popular following. With the death of Royalist Decline "Henry V," Count of Chambord, in 1883 the hopes of the Legitimists were dashed, and the Orleanists were already too dispirited, and the masses too used to the Republic, to admit of any immediate attempt to enthrone the Count of Paris. This prince had to content himself with being a mere "pretender" against republican France.

In following the history of the French Republic from the year 1879, when it came completely and finally under the control of professed republicans, one is struck by the continuously preponderant rôle of bourgeois politicians. The working majority

¹ Similarly, the prospects of the "Imperialists," or Bonapartists, which had been improving somewhat since 1875, were darkened by the death in 1879 of the Prince Imperial, "Napoleon IV," the youthful son and heir of Napoleon III. See above, p. 214, and the genealogical table at p. 182.

in Chamber and Senate, the presidents of the Republic, the ministers, the chief officers of local administration, all Third were "politicians" and almost all were of the middle French Republic class—lawyers or physicians, teachers or journalists, Predomiindustrialists or financiers—well educated and comnantly fortably well-to-do. There were no noblemen or clergy-Bourgeois men among them, and, perhaps more surprising, few peasants or urban workingmen. The latter classes voted for bourgeois office-seekers who promised them most, but otherwise they took little part in government.

One is struck by the perpetual factionalism among the politicians. Despite the fact that the Republic had been established only after a nine-year political struggle with royalists and was chronically threatened with subversion, its protagonists failed republican and, instead, formed a bewildering variety of "groups" under rival "leaders." Seldom were French republicans welded together, and then only in the face of acute common peril and temporarily.

The republican "Union of the Left," which had been formed under Gambetta's guidance to oppose Marshal MacMahon and turn him out of the presidency, dissolved as soon as victory was achieved. Several personal followings, or groups, emerged, representing divergent tendencies which were labelled "Moderate" and "Radical" respectively. The Moderates sought "Moderates" to reassure the propertied classes with the slogan of and "liberalism truly conservative." The Radicals made "Radspecial appeals to "the people," lauding the Jacobinism icals" of the French Revolution and the First Republic. Both were intensely patriotic, the Moderates evincing somewhat greater enthusiasm for colonial expansion, and the Radicals for national concentration at home. Both were anti-clerical, the Moderates

less so and the Radicals more so. For two decades, from 1879 to 1899, the Moderates usually outnumbered the Radicals, and one of the Moderates, Jules Ferry (1832–1893), a lawyer and journalist, was particularly influential in shaping the legislation of the Republic during the years from 1879 to 1885.

The outstanding leader of the Radicals was Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929), a physician who developed "radical" ideas

about religion and society from a study of John Stuart Mill 1 and Auguste Comte,2 and "radical" ideas about democracy from three years' observation in the United ceau and the "Rad-icals" States (1866-1869) and first-hand experience with the Paris Commune of 1871, and who, by aid of peppery remarks in the Chamber and in the newspaper which he founded in 1880, exerted a gradually growing influence. Clemenceau was a bitter foe of Ferry and most other moderate republicans, as well as of royalists and conservatives, and he repeatedly declined to enter any ministry with them. There were not enough Radicals to take over the government themselves, but there were enough to embarrass other republicans that might. This fact, in conjunction with the further fact that minority groups of royalists and clerical conservatives continued to array themselves on the "Right" of the Chamber 3 and to make all the trouble they could for republican min-terial Instability istries of the "Left," explains why "ministerial instability" was a characteristic of French public life under the Third Republic. Ministries succeeded each other in kaleidoscopic fashion. From 1871 to 1014, while Great Britain had nine different ministries, France had not fewer than fifty!

Nevertheless, the vast administrative personnel of the centralized state remained and gave real continuity and stability. Moreover, a change of ministry did not usually involve a change in policy. One set of politicians might quickly succeed another in high office, but general tendencies would remain about the same in the omnipotent parliament and would be reflected in continuity and consistency of legislation over a relatively long period. For example, all republican groups and some royalists could and did unite to enact in 1881, and to retain thereafter, some important guaranties of individual antique liberty: a law establishing freedom of speech and the Individual Liberties

right of holding public meetings without any preliminary authorization on the part of the government; and a very liberal press law.

¹ See above, pp. 370-371.

² See above, pp. 368-369.

³ The most gifted leader of the "Right" during this period was Albert de Mun (1841-1914), a nobleman, an ex-army-officer, a brilliant speaker, and an ardent apostle of social reform in accordance with the teachings of the Catholic Church. He was accustomed to say of himself and his royalist and clerical allies, "We are the counter-revolution."

There was less unanimity about satisfying the demand of urban workingmen that they be allowed full freedom to organize and conduct trade unions, but, largely through the efforts of Waldeck-Rousseau, an influential member of the Moderate cabinet of Jules Ferry, a law was put through parliament in 1884 Legalizing according full recognition and protection to labor combinations. Under this law, French trade unions (syndicats) grew until by 1913 they numbered more than 12,000 with some two million members, many of the unions possessing employment bureaus, libraries, insurance funds, and even professional and technical schools.

The conferring of material benefits upon the largest and most influential classes of the electorate was a constant care of the bourgeois politicians in the parliament and the various ministries of the Third Republic-because they were especially interested themselves in economic "prosperity" and Promotbecause they wanted the approval and votes of their ing Bourgeois Prosconstituents. The republicans, no less than Napoleon III, perceived the desirability of encouraging perity commerce, industry, and agriculture. Between 1879 and 1904 the government expended money equal in amount to the German war indemnity on public works within France. Some 200,000 kilometers of highway were built. Some 200 kilometers of canal were added to the existing 1,000, and all were freed from public dues (1880) and private tolls (1880). Some 30,000 kilometers of new railway were constructed. Harbors were deepened at Dunkirk, Dieppe, Rouen, Nantes, and Bordeaux, and spacious new ones were provided at Le Havre and St. Nazaire. The beautification and expansion of Paris went on, and here great international expositions were held in 1878, in 1889, and in 1900.

To the agricultural classes, still numerically preponderant in France and hence peculiarly alluring as a vast reservoir of votes for republican politicians, the parliament and the ministries were noticeably tender. With one hand, they conAgriculture cealed from them the burden of taxation by substituting a host of indirect taxes for direct taxes on land; and with the other hand they extended many positive favors. A special

¹ A partial legalization of trade unions had been enacted in 1864 under Napoleon III. See above, p. 192. The French act of 1884 was analogous to the British acts of 1871 and 1875. See above, pp. 462–463.

ministry of agriculture was created (1881). Financial grants were made in aid of vine-growers (beginning in 1879). Bounties were repeatedly voted for the culture of silk, flax, and hemp, and for the breeding of horses. Farmers were encouraged to form coöperative societies for collective buying and selling. Mutual loan banks and insurance agencies were established under state guaranties to assist peasant proprietors (1894). Agricultural schools were opened and endowed. And a system of tariff protection for French agriculture, which was partially constructed by a law of 1885, was capped by a comprehensive tariff act of 1802. That these measures had no little efficacy is indicated not only by the fact that the mass of the peasants, especially in southern and central France, became staunch advocates of the Republic but also by the fact that the annual value of the country's agricultural product, which between 1800 and 1860 rose from four to six billion francs, mounted in 1913 to over eleven billion.

But the relative growth of French machine industry, and of French urban centres, was even more remarkable under the Third Republic. Machines in factories increased in number from 30,000 to 90,000 and multiplied tenfold in horse-power, from 870,000 to 8,600,000. The output of coal mines was doubled, and that of blast furnaces sextupled. Though the principal market for French manufactures was the domestic market, foreign exports increased by 25 per cent. It was to protect infant industry, no longer quite infant, as well as to promote agriculture, that the tariff act of 1892 was devised and adopted.

The accumulation of capital went on apace in France. The wealth of the country, roughly estimated at 200 billion francs in 1872, was calculated at 300 billion in 1913. This increase represented in part the growing profits of industrial enterprise accruing to a comparatively small number of wealth manufacturers, and in considerable part the savings of a host of peasants, artisans, and shopkeepers—the proverbially thrifty Frenchmen—who habitually invested in government bonds of their own country and of foreign countries too. Indeed, one reason for the "backwardness" of French industry as compared with that of Great Britain or Germany was the preference of French investors, both great and small, for putting their

money into government securities rather than into business. France had the largest public debt of any country in the world, but practically all of it was owed to her own citizens, who thus, in the receipt of their interest, were pensioners of the state. Besides, French citizens drew more and more tribute from other countries, for the total of French foreign investments rose from twelve billion francs in 1871 to forty-five bil-Foreign lion in 1014, a rate of increase much higher than that Investments of the national wealth. All this redounded to the financial advantage of French bankers, through whom the investments were made, and also to the international advantage of the French government, which could occasionally obtain political concessions from foreign governments in return for permitting them to borrow money in France.

Another highly significant development under the Third Republic was the reëmergence of France as a colonial Power second only to Great Britain in the extent and richness of overseas dominion. When the republicans took over the government in 1879, France possessed a few remnants of her empire French of the eighteenth century,1 together with Algeria, Colonies in 1870 which had been "occupied" under Louis Philippe and subsequently "annexed" and "subdued," 2 and certain other territories appropriated by Napoleon III in the Pacific and southeastern Asia-New Caledonia (1853), Cochin-China (1858), and Cambodia (1863).8 Some of the republicans, especially Clemenceau and his Radical following, were indifferent to this colonial heritage, and inimical to further colonial expansion. They thought it would fritter away the energies of the mother-country, arouse hostility abroad, and distract attention from radical reform at home

But Jules Ferry and his Moderate associates were bent on Ferry, and Colonial Expansion after 1879 pursuing a vigorous colonial policy. The extension of imperial dominion outside Europe would do much, they argued, to restore French power and prestige, sadly lowered in Europe by the outcome of the recent Franco-German War, and it would provide French patriots with

¹ Some islands in the West Indies and the Gulf of Newfoundland, the island of Réunion in the Indian Ocean, five commercial posts in India, a strip of Guiana in South America, a foothold on the Senegalese coast of Africa.

² See above, pp. 107-108, 194-195.

⁸ See above, p. 195.

a new object of pride and business men and bankers with new fields for profitable trade and investment. In this matter Ferry and the moderate republicans found allies in clerical conservatives, who perceived in French colonial expansion an opportunity not only to resuscitate the glory which had attended the old Bourbon monarchy overseas but also to open up new areas for the activity of Catholic missionaries.

Jules Ferry was the chief champion of the "new empire." While he was prime minister in 1881 he despatched a French expedition from Algeria into the troublesome neighboring state of Tunis and obliged its Moslem ruler—the bev—to submit to a French protectorate. Then, in 1883-1885, when he was again prime minister, he shipped to the Far East another expeditionary force, which compelled China to consent to the establishment of a French protectorate over her vassal states in Indo-China-Annam and Tongking. Likewise, by directing a bombardment of the chief port of Madagascar, he frightened the native sovereign into signing a treaty whereby that huge island in the Indian Ocean became virtually a French protectorate. By similar means he brought under French control a part of Somaliland, on the African coast at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Ferry, moreover, patronized French exploratory expeditions and trading companies in the interior of Africa, particularly along the Congo and Niger rivers.

The methods employed by Ferry in the acquisition of colonies were denounced by Clemenceau and other Radicals in France, but once colonies were actually acquired no French political group thought seriously of abandoning them. Indeed, from Ferry's active beginnings the expansion of the French colonial empire proceeded with accelerating speed as time went on, and, while many Frenchmen were accused of indifference to the heightening grandeur of their overseas dominion, outright opposition to it seemed to grow ever weaker. French Indo-China was steadily enlarged, mainly at the expense of Siam and China, and rapidly consolidated into a prized dependency with an area larger than the mother-country's and with a population half as large. In Africa, during the 1880's and 1890's French empirebuilding was especially ambitious and successful. Vast stretches of the Sahara and the western Sudan were explored and linked up with Algeria and Tunis on the north and with the Congo, Niger, and Senegal territories in the south and west. In 1892 the Negro kingdom of Dahomey on the west coast of Africa was conquered. In 1896 a revolt in Madagascar was suppressed and the island was transformed from a protectorate into a colony. In 1912, after protracted international negotiations and armed intervention, a French protectorate was established over the greater part of Morocco.¹

By 1913 the "empire" of republican France included not only the scattered minor colonies which were French before 1871


French
Colonial Madagascar, and Somaliland, but also a huge block Empire of territory in northern, western, and central Africa, constituting the five great administrative divisions of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, French West Africa, and French Equatorial Africa, and comprising an area of three and a quarter million square miles (almost fourteen times the area of France)

and a population of approximately thirty million (about three-

fourths the population of France).

This colonial empire of France was even less French in population than the British Empire was British. In not a single French dependency did persons of European stock outnumber persons of non-European stock. The large majority of French subjects on the African continent were Negroes, Berbers, or Non-French Arabs, mainly Moslem in religion; in Indo-China, Popula-Annamese and Chinese, almost wholly Buddhist in tion of religion; in Madagascar, Tahiti, and New Caledonia, Polynesians; and in the West Indies and Guiana, Negroes and mulattoes. Most of the colonies were sparsely inhabited, relative to the density of population in France or any other European country, and many of them, by reason of climate or soil, were unfit for European settlement. Moreover, the practically stationary population of France after 1871, together with a remarkable reluctance of Frenchmen to leave home, helps to explain why, even in regions suitable to European colonization, immigration from the mother-country was comparatively slight. In northern Algeria, the best developed of the French colonies and the most attractive to immigrants, some 500,000 Frenchmen settled between 1871 and 1914, but even here they were out-

 $^{^1}$ On the international aspects of the Moroccan and other French colonial developments, see below, pp. 761–768.



NOTE. All French territories are shown in white. The administrative region of "French West Africa" is made up of Mauretania, Senegal, French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and the French Sudan. "French Equatorial Africa" comprises the French Congo.

numbered six to one by native Berbers and Arabs. In Tunisia, the 75,000 colonists from France were fewer than those from Italy, and both together were outnumbered by the natives twelve to one. Elsewhere in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, there were hardly any French settlers at all—only French administrators, army officers, missionaries, and commercial agents, sojourning temporarily.

There can be no doubt, however, that France surpassed Great Britain in the success with which she stamped her own "Galliimpress of language, manners, and culture upon alien cizing" the "backward" peoples and gained their loyalty and cooperation. If France did not colonize her empire, she at least went far to "Gallicize" its indigenous population. She was assiduous in establishing French schools for her distant subjects, as well as in providing them with roads and railways and telegraph lines and other material things which would bring them within the orbit of European, and French, civilization. And French colonial governors were usually tactful in handling the natives; they were not so prone as British administrators to fix a gulf between "white" people and "black," between "God's people" and "lesser breeds without the law."

While no French colony was "self-governing" in the sense that British "Dominions" were self-governing, certain French colonies were treated as integral parts of France, and Govern-French colonists and "citizens" within them were ing the privileged to elect Senators and Deputies to the central parliament at Paris. Colonies thus privileged were those which had been longest in French possession and were most "Gallicized" or had a proportionately large number of settlers from the mother-country: Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Guiana, in America; the trading posts in India; the island of Réunion; and northern Algeria. Together, they were represented in the national parliament by seven Senators and eighteen Deputies. In each of these colonies, moreover, a local council was elected to advise and assist the governor sent out from Paris in the conduct of internal affairs. Elsewhere, throughout much the larger part of the French colonial empire, the authority of the republican government at Paris was exercised either indirectly through a native prince, as in the "protectorates" of Tunisia, Morocco, Annam, and Cambodia, who took orders from a

"resident-general"; or directly through a "governor-general," as in West Africa, Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar, who ruled without any native intermediary. "Governors" and "Residents" were alike appointed by, and responsible to, the French ministry, one of whose members bore the title, after 1894, of Minister of the Colonies.

From her overseas empire, France reaped considerable advantage, especially for her industrialists and financiers. The colonies were not permitted to levy tariffs against imports Economic from the mother-country, but were required to give Advantagespreference to French manufactures, trade, and investand Dis-The value of the annual commerce between advan-France and her colonies steadily increased from 350 million francs in 1879 to nearly two billion in 1913; and by the latter year French capital investments in the colonies amounted to four billion francs. To be sure, the financial income which France derived from her colonies was exceeded by the expenditure which she made to acquire and hold them-expenditure on distant and frequent military expeditions, on police, on civil service, on Yet there was at least an emotional and sentimental compensation to the mass of patriotic Frenchmen in regarding the latest colonial achievements of their nation, and Patriotic there was some prospect and much hope that in the future, when the colonies were more fully developed, Military they would be a financial as well as a moral asset to France. That they were a military asset, instead of liability, was eventually proved during the World War, when Algerians, Senegalese, and Annamese fought bravely and died heroically

The imperialistic policy of the Third French Republic had been shaped, as we know, by the activity of Jules Ferry and the parliamentary support given him by moderate republicans, and also by royalists and "clericals," against the forensic criticism and electoral opposition of Radicals. The Moderates, however, were staunchly republican and inclined, as disciples of Gambetta to be "anti-clerical"; and they were none too proud of appearing to be in alliance with royalists and "clerical and Anti-clerical". On one issue, that of "clericalism," they could heed the chief demand of their fellow republicans, the Radicals, and coöperate with them in safeguarding the Republic

on European battlefields in defence of France and her empire.

against ecclesiastical advocates of monarchical restoration. Hence the same Jules Ferry, at the same time, in the early 1880's, when he was alienating Radicals by advocating imperialism abroad, was conciliating them by launching a special campaign against clericalism at home.

Education was the specific objective of the anti-clerical campaign. Since the time of the first Napoleon, Catholic religious instruction had been given in most French schools, and under Napoleon III there had been a marked increase in the number of elementary and secondary schools conducted by Catholic teaching orders—Jesuits, Assumptionists, Christian Brothers, etc.¹ Now, under the Third Republic, two demands for educational reform were insistently voiced. One, eloquently put forth by Demands Gambetta and endorsed by patriots generally, includfor Extending ing conservatives as well as radicals, was for a comand Laipulsory extension of the country's school system to cizing Education the end that every French boy and girl, like every German boy and girl, should be rendered literate and trained in citizenship. As Gambetta explained, the Prussian schoolmaster had won the last war, and the French schoolmaster must win the next. The other demand, also championed by Gambetta and accepted by moderate republicans, though most militantly insisted upon by Clemenceau and extreme Radicals, was for the supremacy of lay (and republican) over clerical (and royalist) influence throughout the whole primary school system, to the end that every French boy and girl should be inoculated with republicanism and immunized against "reaction."

In the early 1880's Jules Ferry, as minister of public instruction, heeded both demands and, through a coalition of radical and moderate republicans against the protesting minority of royalists and conservatives, obtained parliamentary enactment of a series of educational laws. Compulsory attendance at some school was prescribed for all children. Parents might still elect to send their children to "free" (church) schools, but if they did they would have to

¹ This increase was an outcome of "freedom of education" as guarantied and applied by the so-called Falloux Act of 1850, concerning which see above, pp. 116-117. On the Jesuits, see Vol. I, pp. 187-188, 528-529, 743, 769, and the present volume, above, p. 428. The Christian Brothers had been founded by Jean Baptiste de La Salle in 1682 to conduct schools for poor children. The Assumptionists, who were active in journalism as well as in education, dated from 1847.

support such schools out of their own pockets. On the other hand, a complete system of "public" or "national" schools was established, to be financed and directed by the republican government. Attendance upon them would be free, but in them none but laymen acceptable to the government might teach and no religious instruction might be given.

Ferry and his allies accompanied the reform of primary education with other anti-clerical measures. To remove a group of Catholic clergymen who were particularly violent in denunciation of the public schools as "godless" and "atheistical" and further to handicap the free (church) schools, the government decreed the dissolution of the Society of Jesus Clerical (the Jesuit Order) and its expulsion from France. Legisla-Moreover, it revived obsolescent eighteenth-century statutes against religious congregations of monks and nuns which had not been formally "authorized" by the state, ordering their dissolution and forbidding their members to conduct schools. And, in accordance with the demand of Radicals for a thorough laicizing of national life, the republican majority in parliament enacted a law prescribing that all marriages, to be legal, must be performed by civil magistrates, and another law empowering civil courts to grant divorces and annulments of marriage.

All these educational and marital measures became known as "laic laws." By Frenchmen of the "Left" they were deemed necessary to check the reactionary influence of the Catholic Church in national life and to ensure the "Laic Laws" permanence of "progressive" republican institutions, while by Frenchmen of the "Right" they were interpreted as purely partisan manœuvres dictated by a "sect" of radicals and Freemasons ¹ and designed to spread a hatred of religion and especially of Catholicism under the cloak of "anti-clericalism."

The majority of the French electorate seemed to acquiesce in the adoption and enforcement of the laic laws, but many Cath-

¹ Freemasonry in France, and in other Latin countries, was of no little intellectual and political significance in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Repeatedly condemned by the Catholic Church, it attracted the church's most doctrinaire critics and most active foes who utilized its organization to build up political machines of radical and violently anti-clerical nature. In France, where Freemasonry was frankly atheistic in principle and practical tendency, almost every Radical politician was a Freemason. On the earlier history of Freemasonry, see Vol. I, pp. 525–527. Also see above, p. 435.

olic clergymen and lavmen were now more than ever convinced that the whole republican régime must be overthrown Catholic if the church in France was to be saved from the Opposition to destructive process of laicizing. These, therefore, re-Laicismdoubled their efforts to discredit the Republic, at and to Republic the very time, in the late 1880's, when labor leaders and socialist agitators, returning from exile (for participation in the Paris Commune of 1871) or springing up afresh in the wake of contemporary industrial progress, were prevailing upon urban workingmen to resent their economic plight and to blame it upon the bourgeois politicians of the Republic. There was Rising Socialist little likelihood of any agreement between such "so-Criticism cialists" and the "clericals" except in general faultof Repubfinding, but herein lay a serious danger to the Republic. Socialists and clericals might jointly create such widespread disaffection as to prepare the way for a dictatorship if not for a rovalist restoration.

This danger loomed large with the advent of Boulanger on the Boulanger (1837-1891) was a general in the political scene. French army who had fought in the Franco-German Boulan-War and in Tunis and who, almost unique among his ger, the General fellow army officers, had been an outspoken foe of in Politics monarchy and friend of republicanism. Professing devotion to radicalism in general and to the cause of radical social reform in particular, he was appointed in 1886, on the recommendation of Clemenceau, to a seat in the cabinet as minister of war. He proceeded to use his public office for personal aggrandizement. He assumed a histrionic pose at military reviews. He talked about a war of revenge against Germany. He endeared himself to the rank-and-file of the French army by fraternizing with them and liberalizing the regulations governing them. The increasing popularity of "the general on horseback" and his obviously mounting ambition alarmed Clemenceau and many other republican leaders. Recalling how Napoleon Bonaparte had risen to power, they forced General Boulanger to resign his office (1887) and quit the army.

By opponents of the government the General was now acclaimed a "martyr" to corrupt bourgeois politicians, and about him quickly crystallized a "revisionist party," demanding that he assume a dictatorship and "revise" the constitution. The

Bonapartist faction was prominent in the new party, and to it rallied most royalists and clericals, and many Moderates and even some Radicals whose nationalism was ger's Nationalist temporarily superior to their republicanism. and Revimovement toward Boulanger was quickened by contemporaneous disclosure of serious financial scandals touching the family of the President of the Republic, Jules Grévy, who had been reëlected to his high office in 1886 for a second term of seven years. Thoroughly frightened, the various republican groups, radical and moderate, united, forced the resignation of Grévy (December 1887), and elected to the presidency of the Republic Sadi Carnot, an eminently respectable man who had held aloof from narrow political partisanship and who possessed the additional advantage of being the grandson of the very famous Lazare Carnot who had organized the armies of national defense in the dark days of the First Republic.1 For some time longer, nevertheless, the Boulanger excitement continued. The General stood for election to the Chamber of Deputies wherever a vacancy occurred and proved his widespread popularity by carrying one département after another, the climax being reached in January 1880 when he rolled up a huge majority in Paris.

It was thought by his followers that had Boulanger acted promptly after his electoral victory in Paris, he might have overthrown the Republic by a coup d'état. But he preferred talk to action, and let slip the chance to make himself dictator. The republican government was more resolute; it immediately ordered his arrest and trial on charges of conspiracy. Whereupon Boulanger fled ignominiously across Movement border into Belgium, and was tried and condemned in his absence. In the ensuing general elections, the popular reaction was evident in the return of 366 anti-Boulangist republican deputies out of a total of 576. Still further disillusionment and discredit came to the pro-Boulangist groups—royalist, clerical, and "nationalist"—when their "brave General" committed suicide at Brussels in 1891.

Several results of the Boulanger episode deserve mention. First, the Republic was unquestionably strengthened in public esteem, both in France and abroad, and the haunting fear or hope

On Lazare Carnot, see Vol. I, pp. 632-633.

that the Third Republic would go the way of the First and SecStrengthening of Republic ond and be speedily supplanted by a military dictatorship, was largely dispelled. Second, the republican
government adopted new policies in respect of the
army and foreign affairs. By reducing the period of active service
in the army from five years to three (1889) and by retiring reactionaries from high command in the army and replacing them
with loyal republicans, it reassured radical Frenchmen who had
been fearful of the subversive influence of the military.¹ On the
other hand, by contracting a close alliance with Russia

[1801–1804], it countered the charge of zealous nation-

Foreign Alliance with Russia other hand, by contracting a close alliance with Russia (1891–1894), it countered the charge of zealous nationalists that the Third Republic was friendless and cowardly in foreign policy and forgetful of its obligation

to recover Alsace-Lorraine.² Third, the prospect of monarchical restoration, whether of Bourbon king or of Bonapartist emperor, receded definitely into the background. It had failed to materialize when the opportunity was seemingly most favorable, and the recurrence of a like opportunity was now ren-

Weakening of Royalists among the "clericals," who, up to this time, had been almost a unit in support of monarchy.

For in 1802 Fope Leo XIII, convinced that French Catholics were making a grave mistake in identifying their religion with royalist politics, addressed to them a famous encyclical Papal Intervenletter urging them to desist from attacks upon the Retion in public, to accept the existing form of government, and Behalf of Republic to concentrate upon obtaining from it in constitutional manner the repeal of the laic laws and other legislation unfavorable to the church. This advice served to split the French Catholics. It was spurned by many of them, especially among the religious orders, the secular clergy, and the nobility, Catholic Repubwho merely reëmphasized their devotion to the royalist licans: cause. But on the other hand, the papal advice was the Ralliés heeded by a considerable number of Catholics, including their chief spokesman in the Chamber of Deputies, Count

¹ The reduction of the term of service did not reduce the peace-strength of the army, for several classes of persons who had been exempt from five-year service were now obliged to perform three-year service. The Radicals were concerned with republicanizing the army rather than with reducing its strength.

² On the Franco-Russian alliance, see below, p. 760.

Albert de Mun, who renounced monarchy and "rallied" to the Republic.

Finally, the outcome of the Boulanger "affair" produced a temporary reaction against republican radicalism as well as against monarchy. The Radical groups were relatively strong and influential as long as the Republic was in obvious danger, but, as soon as the Republic appeared to be "saved," radicalism at least of the Clemenceau variety lost a good deal of Reaction backing in parliament and in the country at large. against The feeling spread that, to allay partisan passions Radicalwhich the Boulangist movement had aroused, domestic peace and concord should be promoted and that mild Moderates could do this better than belligerent Radicals. Then, too, the simultaneous rise and spread of Marxian Socialism in France dealt a double blow to conventional radicalism. Some Defense of its working-class followers deserted it to join outagainst right socialist groups, while some of its bourgeois disciples united with moderates and conservatives to form a common front against socialism.

Marxian Socialism was not indigenous to France as it was to Germany, and its development had been retarded in France by several other handicaps—the bloody suppression of the Paris Commune of 1871, the comparative sluggishness of French industrialization, the continuing predominance of agriculture and peasant proprietorship, the abiding tradition of individualism among French workingmen, and the tendency of professed French Socialists as of other Frenchmen to split into factions rather than to constitute a unified party. In spite of handicaps, however, Marxian principles were gradually propagated among the proletariat in industrial centres by a considerable number of middle-class intellectuals and radicals. One of the first and most tireless of such propagandists was Jules Guesde (1845-1922), a Parisian clerk and journalist, who, returning from the exile to which he had been condemned for participation in the Commune, founded in 1876 a "Labor Party," which, four years later, adopted a characteristically Marxian platform. In the 1880's appeared several other Socialist groups, but Guesde was unable to unite them with his personal following, and not until the early 1890's did the movement

¹ On Marxian Socialism in general, see above, pp. 375-382.

achieve any noteworthy advance. By this time, Guesde's agitation was reënforced by the conversion of several brilliant young intellectuals, including Jean Jaurès (1859–1914), professor of philosophy in the University of Toulouse; Alexandre Millerand, lawyer and journalist, who had been closely associated with the Radical group of Clemenceau; and Aristide Briand (1862–1932), another lawyer and journalist, who now, with Jaurès, founded at Paris a famous Socialist newspaper, L'Humanité. In the general elections of 1893, the various Socialist groups together obtained fifty seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Some significant labor legislation was adopted by the French parliament in the 1890's. It fell far short of the demands of

Labor Legislation in 1890's Marxian Socialists and likewise short of the proposals of Count Albert de Mun and his group of Social Catholics among the Ralliés who had recently swung from support of monarchy to support of the Republic.

But without pressure from both extremes, Catholic and Socialist, and also from a section of radical republicans who, sharing in the popular drift toward socialism, took the name of Socialist Radicals, the moderate republican groups who at this time were most largely represented in parliament and in the ministries would hardly have sponsored the measures of social reform which they did. Five of these measures were especially important. (1) The "great act" of 1892 regulated the employment of women, forbade the employment of children under thirteen years of age, prescribed a maximum working day of ten hours for all laborers, prohibited manual labor on one day every week, preferably Sunday, and provided safeguards for miners. (2) Another act of 1892 set up machinery for official but voluntary arbitration in industrial disputes between employers and employes. (3) An act of 1893 provided for governmental supervision of the hygiene and safety of workers in industrial establishments. (4) Another act of 1893 ensured free medical attendance to workingmen and their families. (5) An act of 1898 obliged employers to pay compensation for personal injuries sustained by employes.

The "era of good feeling" which succeeded the collapse of the

¹ The French name for the group is *Radical Socialiste*, which is usually but faultily translated into English as "Radical Socialist." The emphasis is clearly upon Radical rather than upon Socialist.

Boulangist movement and which was characterized by practical coöperation between Moderates and Ralliés and by the labor legislation just indicated, proved brief. It was rudely interrupted by the rise of anti-Semitism, and the disruptive development of the "Dreyfus affair." A certain Édouard Semitism Drumont, already of some notoriety as the author of diatribes against the Jews and their "pernicious" influence on French political and social life, founded at Paris in 1892 a sensational newspaper, La Libre Parole, whose stock-in-trade was frenzied appeal for "national union" against the "Jewish peril." Its appeal was adroit and many-sided. It was "socially minded," preaching to workingmen that their real oppressors and the real foes of labor legislation were Jewish capitalists who dominated French industry and politics. It was "clerical," blaming the irreligious and anti-Catholic legislation of the Republic upon the influence of Jewish members of parliament and the ministries. Above all it was "patriotic," insisting that France could not wage a glorious war of revenge for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine so long as Jews were suffered to honeycomb the French army and betray its secrets to their kinsmen in Germany. Fairly quickly, this hysterical anti-Semitic agitation became

the means of reviving and extending the motley Nationalist party which had waxed and waned with Boulanger. Revival of And two notable events in 1804 gave impetus to the Nationalist Party agitation: first, the exposure of grave financial scandals in connection with a corporation which had been chartered by the French republican government to construct a canal across the isthmus of Panama, involving several Jewish bankers and parliamentarians; and second, the disclosure that a certain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain of artillery Scandal and Dreyattached to the general staff of the French army and fus Case in politics a radical republican, had been convicted by court-martial of selling military secrets to agents of the German government and consequently had been sentenced to degradation and to penal servitude for life on Devil's Island off the coast of Guiana. Here, apparently, was convincing substantiation of the charges of corruption and even of treason which Drumont and his kind were making against Jews and against the republican politicians. To the anti-Semitic Nationalist party flocked not only the elements which were traditionally hostile to the Third Republic—royalists, churchmen, army officers—but also many middle-class patriots and a considerable number of workingmen. The assassination of the President, Sadi Carnot, by an anarchist in the same eventful year of 1894, appeared to symbolize the fate that was closing in upon the republican régime.¹

Of the Panama scandals no exculpation could be advanced by ardent republicans; these had to admit that the scandals, though most regrettable, were true. In the matter of the Dreyfus case, however, there was a different outcome. In 1897, after carefully investigating the matter, the head of the espionage section of the French army, Colonel Picquart, who was also a radical republican, expressed his belief that the original court-martial had made a mistake, that the officer who had sold military secrets to Germany was not the republican Jew, Dreyfus, but a certain Major Esterhazy, an avowed royalist and a frequent Drevfusards contributor to Drumont's newspaper. Immediately, vs. Antiradical republicans backed Picquart's demand for a Dreyfusards reopening of the case, while the higher military officers, feeling that the "honor" of themselves and the whole French army was at stake, refused to question the verdict of the original court-martial and some of them took to forging documents not only to strengthen the case against Dreyfus but also to incriminate Picquart. Indeed, on the evidence of these documents, new military courts-martial tried both Esterhazy and Picquart, acquitting the former and disgracing the latter. Whereupon Émile Zola, the radical republican novelist,² entered the lists in defense of Picquart and Dreyfus, by publishing a scathing denunciation of the anti-Semitic press and party, the alleged forgers of incriminating documents, and the army officers concerned. Though Zola was promptly convicted of libel, his open letter was a most effective means of arraying "Dreyfusards" against "anti-Dreyfusards." As against the latter, embracing royalists, clericals, and extreme nationalists, and threatening to subvert the existing republican government, the former soon comprised

¹ Sadi Carnot was succeeded in the presidency by Casimir-Périer, a wealthy conservative, the grandson of the famous finance minister under Louis Philippe. See above, pp. 102–103. Casimir-Périer encountered so many difficulties with the republican groups in parliament that he resigned in 1895. His successor was Félix Faure, a moderate republican, rather empty-headed though imposing in appearance and inordinately fond of ceremony and show. Faure died in office in 1899.

² On Zola, see above, p. 386.

those who would preserve the democratic, laic republic—moderates, radicals, socialist radicals, socialists.

The several groups of "Dreyfusards" in parliament proceeded to create a political alliance, or bloc, agreeing to avoid subjects of controversy among themselves and to utilize their combined majority in "republican defense." The victory of their cause, foreshadowed by the zeal of Zola, was of Republittle in doubt after the confession and suicide of one lican Defense of the army forgers and after Esterhazy's flight from France in 1898. In 1899 a bloc ministry was formed, including Moderates, Radicals, and Socialists, and presided over by Waldeck-Rousseau, who had been the friend of Gambetta and Ferry and the leading advocate of the trade-union act of 1884. Simultaneously, the bloc elected to the presidency of the Republic Émile Loubet, a sturdy son of peasant stock and a convinced republican of Radical proclivities. In the same year, moreover, the French supreme court decreed that Dreyfus should be tried anew; and the resulting second court-martial, though still pronouncing him guilty, recommended, in view of "extenuating circumstances," that he be pardoned. The pardon was at once granted by President Loubet, and Rehabilin 1906 the supreme court annulled unconditionally itating the verdict of the courts-martial and restored Dreyfus to office in the army. Picquart also was vindicated and reinstated, and in 1908 was made minister of war. Zola, who died in 1902, was given a state funeral and buried in the

The republican bloc was not content with rehabilitating Dreyfus and discrediting his detractors. With passionate earnestness, it took advantage of popular reaction against the evident bad faith or bad judgment of royalists and conservatives, and, while the iron was hot, struck furiously and finally at those particular agencies in army and in church which had been employed repeatedly—under Marshal MacMahon, in alliance with Bou-

Pantheon.

¹The Socialists, though quite willing to endorse and support the major program of the *bloc*, were divided about participating in its ministry. Guesde and Jaurès and the majority were opposed to any such direct collaboration with "bourgeois" groups, and when Millerand accepted the post of minister of commerce in the Waldeck-Rousseau cabinet they expelled him and his followers (including Briand) from the Socialist party. Millerand and his personal followers thus became "Independent Socialists."

langer, and most recently in connection with the Dreyfus affair—to embarrass and subvert the Republic. As for the army, the Repubprocess of transferring the higher offices from royalists licanizing to republicans, from conservatives to radicals, was speeded up; the military establishment was strictly subordinated to the civilian ministry; a spirit of pacifism was encouraged, and in 1905 the term of service in the army was further reduced from three years to two.

In respect of the church, the bloc, impelled by its Radical and Socialist members, pursued an ever firmer policy of anticlericalism and repression. In 1901 the ministry of Repress-Waldeck-Rousseau put through parliament an Assoing Cler-icalism: ciations Act, providing that every religious order or Associacongregation which wished to continue its work in tions Act of IgoI France-in "free" schools, hospitals, missions, or in any other way-must obtain specific authorization from the government and submit to continuous governmental regulation. Loud was the protest from the religious orders, from zealous Catholic laymen, and from the Pope. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority which the bloc obtained in the general elections of 1901 indicated that many professed Catholics, as well as agnostics and radicals, could be counted upon to back anti-clerical policies of the republican coalition. In the circumstances the anti-clericalism of the bloc became more pronounced. The moderate Waldeck-Rousseau resigned the premiership in favor of Émile Combes, a very active Freemason and doctrinaire Radical, under whose rigorous enforcement of the Associations Act almost all the religious orders (excepting only those Expulsion of Reliengaged in hospital work or in the training of foreign gious missionaries) were denied governmental authorization Örders and formally dissolved, thousands of their members leaving France and seeking refuge in Spain, Belgium, Great

leaving France and seeking refuge in Spain, Belgium, Great Britain, or the United States. It was the boast of Combes that thereby he not only exiled and silenced the Republic's most inveterate critics but also deprived church schools of their ablest and most numerous teachers.

Still another step was taken against Catholic education by the enactment, under Combes's direction, of a supplementary provision (1904) that within ten years every member of a religious association, whether authorized or unauthorized, would be denied the right of teaching in any school, public or private. This made it extremely difficult to maintain church Blow at schools in France. There was an alarming shortage Church of lay teachers who would or could take the place of the religious; time was required to train such lay teachers as might be secured, and greater financial support was needed for them. The result was, as Combes expected and planned, a steady growth of the non-religious (frequently anti-religious) state schools at the expense of the religious "free" schools, so that by 1913–1914 four and a half million French children were attending the former and only one million the latter.

But meanwhile, Combes was inducing the bloc in parliament to give serious attention to an even more startling proposal the abrogation of the concordat which had regulated Proposal the relations of France with the Catholic Church ever for Sepsince its original negotiation by Napoleon I and Pope Church Pius VII in 1801, and the adoption by the French Republic of a substitute scheme for the "separation of the churches from the state." Such a proposal was bound to concern the whole Catholic Church within the country, and the Pope also. To clear the way for favorable action on the proposal, Combes had President Loubet pay an official visit to the King of Italy at Rome in April 1904, in full knowledge that such a visit must offend the pope, who since the seizure of Rome by Italian troops in 1870 had refused to accord recognition to the King and had requested Catholic sovereigns not to visit him. Pius X, who had recently been elected pope, duly protested. Whereupon Jaurès, the leader of the Socialists in the French parliament, speaking in behalf of the majority of the bloc, de-Rupture manded "reprisals" for what he termed foreign interference in the political affairs of France; and Théophile Delcassé, the foreign minister in the cabinet of Combes, recalled the French ambassador from the Vatican.

Already another Socialist, Aristide Briand, had been at work with a parliamentary commission drafting a bill "for the separation of the churches [Protestant and Jewish, as well as Catholic] from the state." Now that diplomatic relations with the papacy were ruptured, the time appeared ripe to bring the bill into parliament and have it enacted by the nation's representatives

¹On the Concordat of 1801, see Vol. I, pp. 653-654.

without seeking the consent of the Pope. There was somewhat more opposition to the bill than had been anticipated, and debate on it was bitter and protracted. But, despite the fact that the stubborn Combes was forced out of the premiership while the bill was in its early stages, the Radicals and Socialists were strong and determined enough to retain control of the ministry and eventually, late in 1905, to enact the Separation Law.

Under this law, the concordat of 1801 was formally denounced. State support of bishops and priests of the Catholic Church, and of Protestant pastors and Jewish rabbis, was ended, Separaexcept that pensions might temporarily be paid to tion Act of 1905 aged clergymen. Title to all property of the churches was vested in the state, though associations of laymen were authorized to make arrangements with state officials for the use of church edifices for public worship. And, of course, the state would no longer nominate bishops as it had done under the concordat. The Protestants and the Jews accepted the Separation Law more or less cheerfully; they were traditionally allied with the Radical political groups in opposition to the Catholic Church, and they now proceeded to create the authorized associations of laymen and otherwise to conform with the provisions of the law. To the Pope and to leading French Catholics, however, the law appeared very objectionable. In its preparation the ecclesiastical authorities had not been consulted. It was contrary to canon law in that it entrusted the management of ecclesiastical affairs to laymen. It was unjust in that it confiscated church property, and, by withdrawing state financial support from the church, virtually repudiated a debt which the state owed the church ever since the wholesale secularization of ecclesiastical property in the days of the French Revolution. For these reasons, Pope Pius X condemned the law and forbade its observance; and French Catholics formed no associations for public worship.

Two years of chaos ensued in the affairs of the Catholic Church in France. Extremists in the republican bloc urged that Catholic Separabuildings should be closed and Catholic worship stopped, while zealous Catholics proclaimed their anxiety to die on the thresholds of the churches as martyrs in defense of Christianity and religious liberty. At length, in 1907, through the tactful efforts of Briand, who the year before had been read out of the Socialist party for accept-

ing membership in the ministry, and who was only mildly anticlerical, the French parliament enacted an important amendment to the Separation Law. It provided that clergymen might use church edifices for public worship even if the previously authorized associations of laymen were not formed. In other words, the Catholics, though obliged to submit to the separation of church and state and to the cessation of state contributions to the clergy, were suffered to keep their churches and to manage ecclesiastical affairs in harmony with canon law.

There can be no doubt, nevertheless, that the central purpose of the anti-clerical legislation of the bloc from 1899 to 1907 was largely achieved. By the Associations Act, the educational legislation, and the Separation Law (with Clerical Success its amendment), the possibility of utilizing the Catholic Church for political propaganda against the Republic was greatly lessened. Bishops and priests, while continuing to protest against the "laic laws" and what they termed the "persecution" of the church, and to urge an eventual change of attitude on the part of the government, were faced with the immediate necessity of adapting ecclesiastical organization and efforts to existing conditions. And while some bishops and priests remained militantly royalist in sentiment and thought, 1 a growing number of the clergy, and of faithful laymen also, accepting the Republic, turned their attention from political to social action and undertook, with no little success, a strictly religious and moral apostolate among workingmen and intellectuals.

By 1907 the bloc of "republican defense," which had been an outcome of the "Dreyfus affair" and which was responsible for the latest and most drastic anti-clerical legislation, was already disintegrating. In vain its leader of the time, Clemenceau, prime minister from 1906 to Clerical 1909, tried to hold it together by stressing anti-clericalism and advocating still more drastic measures "to protect the

¹ Some of these and a considerable number of Catholic laymen, especially among the nobility and among the youths, were sympathetic with a new royalist movement which crystallized in the first decade of the twentieth century about the society and newspaper of L'Action Française, founded by Charles Maurras, an extreme nationalist and privately a disciple of the positivism of Comte and a disbeliever in Christianity though publicly a defender of Catholicism as a most glorious tradition of the French nation and the old French monarchy. It is noteworthy that the founding of L'Action Française was rendered possible by a munificent financial contribution from the widow of Marshal MacMahon.

Republic against the priests." Most of the Radicals loudly seconded the counsels of Clemenceau, but many other members of the *bloc*, especially among the Moderates, were becoming a bit tired of anti-clericalism as a political slogan and a bit sceptical about any further danger to the Republic from priests. Moderates were now less inclined to fear the groups of the Right than those of the Left—Marxian Socialists, Independent Socialists, and Socialist Radicals.

Besides, two practical questions came to the fore, creating new divisions in parliament and in the country at large, and serving to push anti-clericalism into the background. One had to do with domestic policy in the face of rising socialist agitation, and the other with foreign policy in the midst of unprecedented international complications.

The intensification and extension of socialist agitation were phenomenal. In 1905 hitherto separate groups of Marxians managed to surmount their differences and to establish a Unified

Socialist party, under the joint leadership of Jaurès Socialist and Guesde; and so effective among the French elec-Advance torate was the campaign of the Unified party that its representation in the Chamber of Deputies mounted from 28 to 54 in 1906, to 76 in 1910, and to 101 in 1914. Simultaneously, both a left-wing and a right-wing socialist movement gathered headway. The left wing, consisting of "revolutionary syndicalists," expected no favor from a "bourgeois" parliament and relied on "direct action" of labor unions to bring about a dictatorship of the proletariat. The right wing, comprising "independent socialists" like Millerand and Briand, who had been expelled from the regular socialist party for participating in bourgeois ministries, sought to effect gradual but drastic social reform through collaboration with other groups in the democratic parliament. Between 1905 and 1914 the Independent Socialists increased their representation in the Chamber from 13 to 26, while the number of Revolutionary Syndicalists in the country rose to half a million. Besides, many Catholic leaders were busily engaged in organizing trade unions and in advocating far-reaching social reform according to Catholic principles, while, on the other side, a considerable group of Radicals—the so-called Socialist Radicals—evinced a willingness to join Millerand and Briand in championing labor legislation.

Against the rising tide of social unrest, Clemenceau unrelentingly set his face, and in this he was supported by Moderates and Conservatives and by a majority of the Radicals. neither Conservatives nor Moderates liked his ecclesiastical policy, and when his finance minister, Joseph Caillaux, proposed the imposition of a progressive income tax, they united with the advocates of social legislation to throw Clemenceau out of the premiership (1909) and to bring Briand in. Briand put through parliament one significant piece of social legislation, establishing a system of old-age pensions for the mass of wage-earners, but in the country he had to cope with extraordinary demonstrations and disturbances inspired by Revolutionary Syndicalists and culminating in a general strike of railway men. It was curiously ironical that Briand, by utilizing the army to suppress the strike, should become the hero alike of the Right and of Clemenceau's Radicals and the villain of the extreme Left. The republican bloc was clearly a thing of the past, and as it receded, ministerial instability reappeared in an aggravated form. In the three years, 1911-1914, just before the World War, nine ministries succeeded one another.

The bloc during its heyday from 1899 to 1905 had been so absorbed, we know, in safeguarding the republican form of government within France, in waging war with French clergymen, and in weeding royalists out of the French army that it had had little time or inclination to concern itself with foreign affairs. Indeed, a large part of the bloc-Socialists and Radicals-seemed to forget about Alsace-Lorraine and to content themselves with decrying "militarism," deprecating the alliance with Tsarist Russia. and espousing a vague but optimistic "internationalism." doubtless the very indifference of the governing ma-French Foreign Policy of Delcassé, jority to foreign affairs which enabled a brilliant statesman, Théophile Delcassé, to remain the foreign minister of France continuously from 1898 to 1905, 1898-1905 first in a Moderate cabinet, next in the bloc cabinet of Waldeck-Rousseau, and then in the still more Radical cabinets of Combes and his successor.

Delcassé sedulously cultivated the alliance of France with Russia, and adroitly supplemented it with agreements with other Powers. He gained from Italy in 1902 a secret written pledge that she would not join her ally, Germany, in any war against France. He negotiated with Great Britain in 1904 an entente

cordiale, which assured British backing for French occupation of Morocco. Then, in 1905, a tempest arose in international relations and in French politics. Germany insisted that she must be consulted about Morocco's fate and that Delcassé must be removed from the French foreign office. A grave crisis had come in Franco-German relations, and how it would be met depended upon France: she might accede to the German demands or she might fight. Delcassé favored the latter alternative. But his Radical colleagues in the cabinet, awakening suddenly to the terrifying possibilities of their foreign minister's policies, decided to sacrifice him and to seek a peaceful settlement with Germany.

The international crisis of 1905 served to arouse French concern about foreign affairs and gradually to develop differences of opinion in parliament and within the bloc itself on foreign policy. One opinion, voiced by Caillaux and shared by the Unified Socialists and by many Radicals, was that France should Caillaux effect a rapprochement with Germany in order to ensure the peace of Europe and to lighten the grievous and the Pacifist burden of militarism for the French people and for Moveother peoples. Another opinion, held by more nationalistically minded members of parliament, including not only those of the Right and the Centre but also Clemenceau and his personal following of Radicals on the Left, was that German aggressiveness constituted a standing threat against French security and prestige and could be met only by "preparedness" on the part of France.

For a time the rival tendencies appeared to be so nicely balanced as to neutralize each other. In 1911, however, occurred a second crisis in Franco-German relations over the fate of Morocco, and Caillaux, who was premier and foreign Poincaré minister at the moment and quite conciliatory, had and the Nationto purchase the Moroccan protectorate for France by alist agreeing to cede to Germany a large slice of French Move-Equatorial Africa. This gave sudden weight and vitalment, 1911-1914 ity to nationalism and tipped the balance against the "pacifists" and in favor of the advocates of "preparedness." Caillaux was forced out of office and was succeeded in the premier-

¹On the resulting Algeciras Congress, and on the general international relations of the period, see below, pp. 766–768.

ship and ministry of foreign affairs by Raymond Poincaré, a native of Lorraine, lawyer and scholar, a man of substance and intense patriotism. Under Poincaré's leadership, anticlericalism and socialism and even radicalism became matters of relatively less importance to parliament and to the country at large than matters of national defense.

In 1913 Poincaré was elected President of the Republic, and Delcassé was appointed French ambassador to Russia. In the same year the parliament was prevailed upon to enact, despite the lively protests and opposition of Caillaux and his Radical and Socialist associates, new military measures, lengthening the period of compulsory service in the French army from two years to three and increasing the financial appropriations for its equipment and maintenance. The stage was being set, in France as elsewhere, for the World War.

3. THE KINGDOM OF ITALY

The kingdom of Italy, we must remember, was in 1871 a very recent creation. It represented the successful realization of Cavour's scheme for Italian unification, involving the forceful extension of the constitutional rule of the King of Sardinia over all the other, formerly separate, states of the Italian peninsula. King Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia had actually taken the title of King of Italy in 1861, just after the of Italian French army had helped him to expel Austria from Kingdom, Lombardy and the duchies of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, and the "redshirts" of Garibaldi had enabled him to appropriate Naples and Sicily. Then, in 1866, the kingdom of Italy had obtained Venetia by joining Prussia in the Seven Weeks' War against Austria; and in 1870 it had utilized an opportunity afforded by the Franco-Prussian War to overpower the Pope and annex Rome.1

Formal political unity was thus achieved, but not a unity of society or political aspiration or even culture. Localism and sectionalism were rife, partly because the physical Surviving features of the country were divisive, and partly Section-because different historical traditions had developed in the several regions through centuries of political separation and rivalry. Especially between North and South the contrasts

¹ On the unification of Italy, see above, pp. 214-225, 234-236, 247.

were great. Italy as a whole was overwhelmingly agricultural, but what machine industry there was had been introduced into the North and was almost wholly confined to the North. The majority of the Italian people were illiterate, but the percentage of illiteracy was three times greater in the South than in the North. Judged by current standards of the time, the North was "progressive," and the South "backward."

The government of the Italian kingdom represented a continuation and extension of the Sardinian constitutional régime, which had been copied from that of Great Britain and established by the written constitution, or Statuto, of 1848.¹ The

The Italian Constitution:
Government by
Liberal
Minority

King reigned but did not rule, and his theoretically great powers were practically exercised by a ministry responsible to an omnipotent bicameral parliament consisting of a Senate, partially hereditary and partially appointive, and an elective Chamber of Deputies. But though the King was "limited" and the Chamber

of Deputies "elective," the government was not democratic. It was essentially an oligarchy of those elements of the middle and upper classes that sympathized with the liberal nationalist philosophy of Cavour and his kind. For many years no one was permitted to vote or hold office who did not own property and could not read and write. The vast majority of peasants and urban workingmen were thus disfranchised, for many of them were without property and most of them were illiterate.

The liberal kingdom of Italy had difficulties with the Catholic Church. The minority of Italians who constituted the governing class and directed the parliament and ministries of the Relations kingdom were strongly inclined toward religious sceptibetween cism and radical anti-clericalism, by reason both of Church and State the general intellectual fashion of the time all over Europe and of the particular ecclesiastical complications attending the political unification of Italy. On the other hand, the Italian nation was Catholic by habit and tradition, and the large majority, however critical they might be of the administration and secular policy of the church, were sincerely attached to its cult and sacraments. In the circumstances the royal government saw fit to maintain Catholicism as a kind of national

¹ See above, pp. 124-125.

institution. It continued the previous Sardinian practices of paying the salaries of the clergy, passing upon the appointment of bishops, permitting religious instruction to be given in the schools, and declining to sanction divorce. At the same time, following Cavour's example in Sardinia, it gradually reduced the number of monastic establishments throughout the country, repeatedly confiscated church property, and tolerated, at times actively promoted, anti-Catholic demonstrations and propaganda.

Special difficulty the kingdom had with the papacy. In 1871, shortly after the seizure and occupation of Rome by troops of King Victor Emmanuel II,1 the royal government sought to reconcile the position of the supranational Roman Question papacy with that of nationalist Italy by having the parliament enact a "law of papal guaranties." The law accorded to the pope the government of the Vatican and Lateran palaces and grounds and of the villa of Castel Gandolfo, the honors due a reigning sovereign, the right to communicate freely with governments and peoples abroad, the use of Italian telegraphs, railways, and mails, and an annual subsidy of three and a quarter million lire from the national treasury as compensation for the loss of temporal pos-But Pope Pius IX promptly condemned the law, insisting that approval would involve his recognition of a government which had unjustly invaded Rome and despoiled the papacy of needful temporalities and freedom, and furthermore that "papal guaranties" should be made by international treaty rather than by parliamentary act of Italy. So Fius IX would not accept any money from the Italian govern- Hostility ment or soften his hostility to it. He persisted in regarding himself as a "prisoner" and in calling upon foreign nations to intervene in his behalf. By the so-called non expedit, he forbade Italian Catholics to vote or hold office under the royal government.

This uncompromising attitude of the Pope was undoubtedly advantageous to his international prestige, for so long as he was not on friendly terms with the kingdom of Italy, foreigners could not suspect him of undue subservience to Italian interests, and his "imprisonment" elicited special sympathy from Catholics

¹ See above, p. 247.

throughout the world. But in Italy the enmity between kingdom and papacy had unfortunate results for both. The Pope alienated from the church a large number of patriotic Italians who resented his opposition to the nation's political unity and disregarded his injunctions, while the kingdom was deprived of the public services of many Italians among clergy, nobility, and bourgeoisie who, obedient to the Pope, removed themselves from the nation's political life. Gradually, it is true, the successors of Pius IX somewhat relaxed his severity. Leo XIII (1878–1903) allowed Catholic participation in certain local elections, and Pius X (1903–1914) virtually abrogated the non expedit. Yet from 1870 to 1929 no pope set foot outside the Vatican and St. Peter's, and mutual unfriendliness prevailed between the papacy and its supporters on the one side and the Italian government and its following on the other.

The Italian government and its electorate were, as we have said, a minority, but the minority, though for two decades remarkably homogeneous in its preponderantly bourgeois complexion and its uniform devotion to liberalism, nationalism, Political and anti-clericalism, was not a political unit. Rather, Groups in Italy:
"Right" it broke up, like the bourgeois republicans in France, into a large number of "groups," each forming about and "Left" some particular politician. In general, there were two conventional categories of such "groups," those of the "Right" and those of the "Left." The former were a trifle more aristocratic and a trifle less anti-clerical than the latter, but perhaps the significant differences were sectional and occupational. The leading politicians of the Right came mainly from the industrial upper and middle classes of Piedmont, Lombardy, and Tuscany, while those of the Left hailed principally from the professional and intellectual bourgeoisie of Sicily and Naples.

From 1870 to 1876 groups of the Right were in power. Then for two decades, from 1876 to 1896, groups of the Left usually controlled the government, at first under the leadership of Agostino Depretis, a native of Lombardy rather than of the South, who was prime minister, with two short interruptions, from 1876 to 1887, and afterwards under the direction of Franceso Crispi, an ambitious Sicilian, who presided over several ministries between 1887 and 1896. From 1896 to 1903 groups of the Right again predominated, and thereafter until the eve of the World

War the kingdom was administered most of the time by a coalition of Left groups under the guidance of Giovanni Giolitti. The politicians mentioned—Depretis, Crispi, and Giolitti—were influential not only in fashioning Left groups into something like a party-machine (in the American sense) but also in determining major policies for the Italian nation. The difference between Left and Right about major policies, however, was more theoretical than real. Hardly appreciable change occurred, except in respect of political patronage, when a ministry of the Right succeeded a ministry of the Left, or vice versa.

The royal government, whether of Right or of Left, was sympathetic with industrial and commercial interests and did much to foster them. Thousands of miles of railway were built. Old roads were repaired and new ones constructed. Harbors were developed. Governmental bounties were given to merchant shipping and other commercial enterprise; and, to encourage Italian industry and increase its financial profits, a system of tariff protection was adopted and elaborated. In spite of the fact that Italy had no coal or iron of her own and had to import these basic necessities of modern industry, the solicitude of her government was helping forward slowly but surely an economic transformation, most noticeably in the North but to some extent throughout the entire peninsula. The annual value of Italy's foreign trade, hovering around 440 million dollars from 1870 to 1807, rose steadily thereafter until it reached 1,200 million in 1913. Between 1897 and 1913, exports of manufactured goods almost tripled: Milan surpassed Lyons as the chief silk market in the world; and Italian cotton factories not only captured the home market but increased their foreign sales from five to fifty million dollars' worth. By 1914, moreover, the Italian merchant marine was tied with the Japanese for sixth place among the commercial fleets of the several nations of the world.1

While the Italian government, both of Right and of Left, was industrially minded, it was also nationalistically minded. It was the heir of that patriotic spirit which had possessed Cavour and Garibaldi, and which beckoned imperiously on to a great

¹ The merchant marine of Italy, which comprised 1,060 ships of over a hundred tons each with a total tonnage of 1,668,296, ranked next after the merchant marines of Great Britain, Germany, the United States, Norway, and France.

destiny not merely for the Italian people in a united and independent state of their own but also for Italy in
the world at large. Now that Italy was a sovereign
Power, she must be a Great Power. What Germany
and France were doing with army and colonial empire, Italy likewise must do.

The Italian army was reorganized and enlarged, at least on paper, through the adoption of the principle of compulsory military training (1875). Large sums of money were spent on military equipment and fortifications and on the construction and maintenance of a navy. In 1881 Italian nation-Militarism alism—and imperialism—was markedly stimulated by and Imperialism the French occupation of Tunis, which was nearer to Italy than to France, which had more Italian than French residents, and which, as the land of ancient Carthage, possessed a greater sentimental interest for Italy than for France. Why had Italy, her patriots asked, been behindhand in appropriating Tunis? Because of Italy's international isolation, her government replied; and to put an end to that and to prevent any repetition of French "aggression," Italy in 1882 contracted with Germany and Austria-Hungary the famous Triple Triple Alliance, Alliance, which endured until 1915. Almost immedi-1882 ately Italy proceeded to establish a colonial empire in eastern Africa along the Red Sea. By commercial and military occupation and by treaties with native chieftains and with Great Britain, she acquired, between 1882 and 1890, the sparsely peopled, blisteringly hot tracts of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, and thence set out to subdue the Negro kingdom of Abyssinia (Ethiopia). The Abyssinians, however, put up such a stiff resistance and at Adowa in 1896 routed an Italian army so decisively that Italy agreed to make peace and respect Abyssinia's independence.

To elevate Italy to the position of a Great Power, to defray the expenses of army and navy, public works and colonial ventures, and incidentally to support the financial corruption which was fairly prevalent in Italian politics, the government imposed a heavy burden of taxation upon the nation and still and Illiferound itself faced with recurrent threats of bankruptcy and with the necessity of economizing on expenditure for social and educational betterment. Thus, a law which the

Italian parliament enacted in 1877 for compulsory schooling of children between the ages of six and nine was only partially and half-heartedly enforced because the government preferred to devote its financial resources to other objects. Illiteracy declined very slowly among the masses of the Italian people.¹

The economic condition of the mass of peasants and urban workingmen was indeed sorry. The standard of living was relatively low. The taxes were relatively high. Population increased at a faster rate in Italy than in any other European country, and at a faster rate than did the opportunities for employment. In the circumstances, there was a good deal of popular unrest in Italy at the close of the nineteenth century and in the first decade of the twentieth. Some of it was registered in a remarkable emigration of Italians, seeking a happier economic lot and an escape from military conscription in foreign lands, chiefly across the ocean in the United States, Argentina, and Brazil. In 1900 the number of emigrants was 350,000, and in 1010 it was 530,000. Not all these emigrants left home permanently. In fact, a large portion of them, in some years almost a half, returned to Italy after earning money abroad. Nevertheless, it was officially stated in 1910 that through emigration the kingdom of Italy had permanently lost to countries of the New World as many as five and a half million citizens, eighty per cent of whom were peasants, mainly from southern Italy.

Popular unrest was evidenced not only by this large-scale exodus of Italian peasants from the South, but also by the spread of Marxian socialism and revolutionary violence among the industrial proletariat in the cities, especially of the North. A Socialist party was founded at Milan in 1891 Rise of Socialism and, taking advantage of a somewhat broadened suffrage which had been enacted in 1882, it managed to elect twelve members of the Chamber of Deputies in 1895. The party, however, was more influential outside parliament than inside, and outside among the proletarians its propaganda was supplemented, and surpassed in extreme radicalism, by that of anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists, who would have nothing to do with any parliamentary régime and would concentrate, instead, on

¹ The percentage of illiteracy in the country at large declined from 73 in 1871 to 51 in 1911.

"class warfare," organization of labor, and acts of violence against employers and government. In 1900 King Humbert, who had succeeded to the throne on the death of his illustrious father, Victor Emmanuel II, in 1878, was assassinated by an anarchist, and in 1904 the government of the succeeding monarch, Victor Emmanuel III, had to employ the army to put down a general strike at Milan which was being conducted with much violence and obvious revolutionary purpose by anarchists, syndicalists, and left-wing socialists.

The governing classes and the professional bourgeois politicians were alarmed by the multiplying forces of opposition. Revolutionary syndicalism was taking possession of or-Manifold Opposiganized labor. Marxian socialism was gaining a foottion to Bourgeois hold in parliament 2 and inspiring popular demands Monarchy for thoroughgoing political democracy and radical social legislation. Moreover, the republican party, which had had a continuous though precarious existence among middleclass "radicals" since the days of Mazzini, now redoubled its faultfinding with the monarchy and its efforts to capture the masses.3 Besides, in 1905, Pope Pius X practically rescinded the non expedit by which Catholics who were obedient to the church and critical of the existing government of the state had long been deterred from participating in national elections or seeking public office. These promptly availed themselves of their new liberty; and the members whom they elected to parliament tended to champion not only the rights of the church but also the social amelioration of peasantry and proletariat.

Impelled from all sides, the Italian government, soon after the set-back to its imperialistic designs on Abyssinia and the resulting retirement of Crispi (1896), began to devote more attention to internal reform, and gradually evolved a protory Regram of labor legislation. In 1898 old-age pensions were provided, and workingmen were compulsorily insured against accidents and sickness. In 1902 an impor-

members in 1895 to 43 in 1909.

¹ On the royal succession in Italy, see the genealogical tables above, pp. 132-133.

² The number of Socialist Deputies in the Chamber increased gradually from 12

³ The republican group elected 23 Deputies in 1906 and the same number in 1909. In the Chamber, its representatives usually coöperated with the Socialists and with "Radicals" from the bourgeois groups and thus helped to constitute an "Extreme Left," which from 1900 to 1912 comprised about a fifth of the Chamber of Deputies.

tant factory law was enacted. In 1908 a weekly day of rest was prescribed for labor. In 1912 private insurance companies were nationalized. And during this period, other Social measures of social significance were adopted. The Legislastate took over from private companies the operation of the railways. Municipalities were authorized to own and operate public utilities. Trade unions were legalized and their funds and activities safeguarded. Some progress was made in the arbitration of labor disputes. Coöperative societies for banking and for wholesale buying and retail selling were fostered, particularly in the rural districts.

There was response, moreover, to the insistent popular demand for the supplanting of restricted class government by full political democracy. Back in 1882 an electoral reform had somewhat broadened the suffrage by reducing the property qualification, but until 1912 the retention of a literacy test and of Political some property qualification served to restrict the Democelectorate to a comparatively small minority of the Italian nation. 1 Now, at this latter date, Giolitti and his coalition of groups of the "Left" were moved to enact a really drastic electoral law, establishing universal manhood suffrage as the method of choosing the Chamber of Deputies. In the general election of 1913—the first under the new democracy—the Socialist party increased its representation in the Chamber from 43 to 78, and the specifically Catholic group elected 35 Deputies besides securing from some 200 others a pledge not to favor anti-Catholic legislation. The republicans lost six seats, and the traditional anti-clerical bourgeois "Left" was so weakened that Giolitti resigned the premiership. A new "nationalist" ministry was formed under the leadership of Antonio Salandra, with Baron Sidney Sonnino as minister of foreign affairs.

Nationalism was arising anew in Italy. It was being stimulated among the masses by the concurrent rise of democracy and among the younger generation of intellectuals by literary and philosophical currents of which Gabriele D'Annunzio was the leading representative.² It was already evident, side by side

¹ In 1904, for example, the number of enrolled electors represented 29 per cent of the male population over twenty-one years of age, and 7 per cent of the total population. Of the enrolled electors, moreover, 38 per cent did not vote—in part because of the papal non expedit and in part because of general indifference.

² On D'Annunzio, see above, p. 398.

with socialist agitation, during the first decade of the twentieth Intensified Nationalism and Imperialism, rigiri-1914 in the country at large for greater armaments, larger colonies, more vigorous foreign policy, and more serious and sustained efforts to "redeem" those provinces of Italia irredenta—Trent, Trieste, and the eastern coast of the Adriatic—which were peopled by Italians but still ruled by Austria-Hungary.

Then, in the second decade of the new century, this extreme nationalism advanced rapidly toward fulfillment. In 1911–1912, under the ministry of Giolitti, Italy waged war with the Ottoman Empire ¹ and subjugated its African provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, between Tunis and Egypt. In 1912–1913 Italy played an important diplomatic rôle in the Balkan Wars ² and brought Albania, across the Adriatic, within her "sphere of influence." In 1915, under the ministry of Salandra and Sonnino, Italy, for the sake of *Italia irredenta*, denounced her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary, and plunged into the World War as an ally of France, Great Britain, and Russia. One of the journalists most vigorous in urging this step was a former left-wing Socialist, Benito Mussolini. In nationalism Italy was seeking a solution of her many social and political problems.

4. THE KINGDOMS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

Side by side in the Iberian peninsula were the two countries


of Spain and Portugal whose histories and cultures, and whose nineteenth-century political developments, were strikingly similar. The whole peninsula had an area double that of the Italian peninsula and somewhat larger than that of France, though its total population was only about two-thirds the population of Italy or France. Of the Iberian peninsula, Spain embraced six-sevenths of the area and four-fifths of the population; Portugal, the remainder.

Both Spain and Portugal were national states of long duration. Both had founded huge colonial empires oversea, and if the ¹ See below, pp. 673-674, 683-684.

² See below, pp. 685.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of a priest—Padre Sebastiano Albera—by the Anglo-American painter, John Sargent (1856–1925). On Sargent, see above, p. 404.





mother-countries had been bled of men and resources by their imperial undertakings they had the satisfaction of Expanknowing that on the American continents were a sion Overseas Greater Spain and a Greater Portugal, whose populations retained the respective national languages and constituted. together with the population of the Iberian peninsula, aggregates of Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking peoples larger than those that spoke Italian or French.

In the nineteenth century, both Spain and Portugal experienced similar vicissitudes. Both were aroused from the somnolence of eighteenth-century usages in government and society by the impact of Napoleonic soldiers, bringing to them with the sword the French revolutionary principles and practices.¹ Both struggled to get rid of French soldiers if not of French principles, and in doing so a threefold fate awaited of "Revoboth: (1) a quickening of national patriotism; (2) the loss of a large part of their colonial dominions; 2 and (3) at home a sharpening cleavage between extremes of "reaction" and "revolution."

lution" and "Reaction" at Home

Both countries, it must be borne in mind, continued throughout the nineteenth century to be predominantly agricultural, with a land-owning aristocracy and a privileged clergy as the most influential classes, and with a land-working peasantry comprising the majority of the population. The peasant masses were largely indifferent to the conflict between "reaction" and "revolution." They were quite used to the leadership of noblemen and clergymen, and as a rule, unless their own vital interests were touched or their habits too seriously interfered with, they left politics to their "betters." The politically minded persons in both Spain and Portugal, and consequently the persons who were exercised about "reaction" or "revolution," were drawn almost wholly from the minority of nobility, clergy, bourgeoisie, and urban proletariat, though we should remember that some members of these classes were as indifferent to ordinary political events as any peasant. Among the bourgeoisie, professional men and intellectuals were relatively numerous and chronically

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Victims of the Fiesta," is by the Spanish painter, Ignacio Zuloaga (born 1870). On Zuloaga, see above, p. 404.

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 674-677.

² A much larger part of Spain's than of Portugal's. See Vol. I, pp. 713, 776-782.

inclined to political activity. Only with the advent of the Industrial Revolution did manufacturers and bankers become important and influential, and this occurred in the latter part of the nineteenth century and in particular parts of Spain and Portugal—in Catalonia, at Madrid and Lisbon, in mining areas and shipping centres. The urban proletariat, too, comprised for long merely shop-keepers and workers in domestic hand industry. Only with the slow development of large-scale mining, manufacturing, and commerce was the proletariat swelled by numbers of day laborers in foundry and factory and on railway and dock.

Throughout the century, extremes of political and intellectual viewpoint were especially evident in Spain and Portugal. "Reaction" represented one extreme: a cherishing of the "good old times," an anxiety to maintain or to restore the strenuous Catholicism, the social stratification, the governmental absolutism, which had characterized the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and a fierce hostility to every tendency in another direction. The opposite extreme was represented by "revolution": an extolling of modern "progress" and "reason," a determination to promote the laicizing of the state, the levelling of society, the democratization of government, and the material prosperity of the country, all in line with the latest fashions abroad, and a hot hatred of any group which might stand in the way, such as "clericals," "aristocrats," or "conservatives."

Extreme "reaction" was typified politically in Spain "Reaction" in by the policies of that Bourbon King, Ferdinand VII Spain: (1814-1833), who had been restored to the throne of Ferdinand VII his ancestors after the defeat of Napoleon and the and the expulsion of the French,1 and afterwards by the re-Carlists peated attempts of "Carlists" to secure the throne to the male heirs of Ferdinand-Don Carlos and his son and "Reacgrandson—who presumably would continue the same tion" in Portugal: policies.² In Portugal it was likewise typified by the "Miguelists," the adherents of the uncle of Queen Miguel-Maria II (1834-1853), Don Miguel, who intrigued and warred against the "liberal" tendencies of her reign.3

At the other extreme, "revolution" was represented in the

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 769-773.

² See above, pp. 277-278, and the genealogical table at p. 586.

³ See Vol. I, pp. 774-775, and the present volume, above, p. 277.

second half of the century by the rise of republicanism and labor radicalism. In Spain republicans participated in the "Revoluuprising of 1868 against Queen Isabella II and utilized tion": Repubthe ensuing quarrels among royalists to establish licans a republican form of government (1873).1 Though and Labor Radicals this first Spanish Republic was speedily supplanted by a monarchical restoration in the person of Isabella's son, Alphonso XII (1875), republicans remained and republican propaganda continued in Spain, and spread thence to Portugal. In the latter country a republican party was definitively organized in 1881. Republicanism in both countries was intellectually radical—that is, democratic and anti-clerical; but it was essentially bourgeois and therefore hardly "radical" in economics. Economic radicalism appeared toward the close of the century in several different but related movements-Marxian Socialism, Syndicalism, and Anarchism-which, usually piloted by intellectuals, gathered some headway among the industrial proletariat.

Between extremes of "revolution" and "reaction," government of Spain and Portugal was troublously carried on during the period with which we are here dealing. Sometimes it Comleaned a little to the "left," and sometimes to the promise "right." In name it was normally "constitutional" between "Revoluand "liberal," as well as monarchical, but in reality it was a cabal of political and military chieftains who and "Reaction," rested their rule on the indifference of the masses, the 1875-1910 support of the army, and the interesting custom of agreeing among themselves on a more or less regular alternation of office-holding and distribution of patronage. The royal governments of Spain and Portugal were probably less "corrupt" than that of Italy, but they were more frank and systematic in

In Spain, the political and military chieftains who supported the constitutional monarchy and in turn filled its offices grouped themselves in two "parties": the Conservative, organized by Canovas del Castillo (1828–1897), lawyer and journalist, and allied with a set of army officers headed by Marshal Campos; and the Liberal, constituted by

Mateo Sagasta (1827-1903), an engineer, and supported by

their corruption.

¹ See above, pp. 277-279.

another set of army officers including Marshal Serrano.¹ Difference in policy between Conservatives and Liberals was slight. The former were a little more favorable to the church and the aristocracy, while the latter harbored some anti-clericalism and paid at least lip service to the principle of political democracy. On major policies they were practically a unit; and, throughout the reign of Alphonso XII (1875–1885) and the regency of his wife, Maria Christina (the mother of Alphonso XIII), from 1885 to 1902, Canovas and Sagasta nicely alternated their ministries and their parliamentary majorities without appreciable change of general tendencies.

Internal order was maintained. Republican criticism, on one hand, and Carlist agitation, on the other, were repressed. Catholic support was obtained by respecting the concordat of 1851 with the papacy, by not restricting the religious orders, and by leaving public education largely under the control of the clergy.² A large army and a fairly large civil service, tasting the bounty of the central government, were seemingly quite loyal to it. "Regionalism"—the separatist movement for home rule which persisted in certain parts of the kingdom among its subnationalities, particularly among Catalans and Basques—was held in check.

To serve agricultural and industrial interests, a policy of tariff protection was elaborated, mainly by Canovas and the Conservatives, though eventually acquiesced in by the Liberals. To meet a political demand of "progressive" intellectuals and workingmen, universal manhood suffrage for elections to the Congress Introductor of Deputies was inaugurated by Sagasta and the ing Political Democtation interested urban dwellers with those of the more indifferent rural population, the exercise of the suffrage was made compulsory for all male citizens by enactment of the Conservatives in 1907.

Externally, the principal effort of the royal government, whether Conservative or Liberal, was directed toward retaining

¹ On Serrano's part in the revolution of 1868, see above, p. 278. Canovas del Castillo and Marshal Campos were chiefly responsible for the overthrow of the Republic and the "restoration" of the Bourbon monarchy. Sagasta had opposed Isabella II but made his peace with her son, Alphonso XII.

² Though the percentage of illiteracy in Spain was considerably lowered after 1875, it still stood in 1910 at the high figure of 63.

the remnants of the once great Spanish empire overseas-Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, the Carolines, and a Spanish foothold in Morocco. The effort was very costly to Colonial Empire Spain in men and money and it repeatedly invited disaster. Yet national pride and the prestige of the monarchy seemed to demand that the effort be made. In 1878 Spanish armies and the tact as well as the prowess of Marshal Campos managed to put an end to a stubborn revolt which had raged in Cuba for ten years. In 1893 Marshal Campos, at the head of a large expeditionary force, suppressed a native outbreak in the Spanish zone of Morocco. In 1895 a second revolt began in Cuba, and presently the difficulty of putting it down was enhanced by an uprising in the Philippines and, more ominously, by the intervention of the United States. In the ensuing Spanish-American War (1898), Spain lost her navy, sacrificed Destroyed the lives of several thousand of her citizens, and piled in War of up a big national debt; and by the treaty of Paris which concluded the war, she recognized the independence of Cuba and ceded Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the United States. The next year she sold the Caroline Islands to Germany.

At the turn of the century the Spanish kingdom began to totter. Partially it was an outcome of the Spanish-American War, the substantial losses and even more the blow to patriotic pride and to faith in the existing government which ing of the Spanish people thereby suffered. Partially it was Spanish Monarchy a result of the passing of those veteran politicians who had had long experience in managing the country: Canovas del Castillo was assassinated by an anarchist in 1807, and Sagasta died in 1903. Partially it was a rather sudden fruit-Alphonso age of social unrest and partisan strife. Alphonso XIII, nominal King since birth in 1886, came of age in 1902 and was crowned with all the traditional pomp of his Bourbon and Habsburg forbears, but how long he would reign was quite problematical.

Republicans increased their following in parliament and throughout the country, and the virulence of their criticism of the monarchy and the church. Carlists and their reactionary sympathizers, especially among the Basques tionary and among the religious orders, protested anew the legitimacy of Alphonso's régime and redoubled their assaults

on its compromise with "revolutionary" constitutionalism. Socialists and Syndicalists came to the fore in industrial centres, combating employers on one hand and the government on the other, and staging strikes and demonstrations. Regionalists grew more vocal and violent than ever tionary" Agitation before; in conjunction with Socialists and Syndicalists they engineered at Barcelona in 1909 a rebellion which was put down by the army with some difficulty and much vindictiveness. Anarchists committed outrages and resorted to assassination; bombs were thrown at the King from time to time, the career of the Conservative Canovas was ended by one, and the career of Sagasta's Liberal successor was terminated by another. over in Morocco-in the one remaining fragment of Spain's imperial domain—native rebellion was becoming chronic and exacting an ever larger toll of Spanish soldiery—with increasing prospects of military mutiny.

The royal government was moved to attempt certain reforms. Some social legislation was enacted, regulating factories, authorizing the formation of coöperative societies, legalizing trade unions, and establishing employers' liability. An educational law of 1902 provided for state supervision and direction of elementary schools, and another of 1909 prescribed attendance at them for all children. The exercise of universal manhood suffrage was made compulsory in 1907, and in 1909 a reform of local government was voted.

In 1909–1910, an attempt was made, under the auspices of a Liberal premier, José Canalejas, and with the backing of anticlericals and revolutionaries, to alter the relations of church and state in Spain. A so-called "padlock act" prohibited the establishment of any more Catholic religious houses without governmental sanction, and diplomatic relations with the papacy were broken off, preparatory, it was believed, to a separation of church and state like that in France. At once there was such loud outcry, and such organized opposition to the government, from clergy, ardent laymen, and the conservative and reactionary groups generally, that diplomatic relations with the papacy were resumed in 1912 by a Conservative premier, Count Romanones, and anti-clerical projects halted. On this matter, however, few Spaniards were

satisfied. "Reactionaries" were outraged that an anti-clerical campaign had been begun. "Revolutionaries" were disgusted that it had been stopped. And supporters of the constitutional monarchy, compelled to take one side or the other, indulged in mutual recriminations.

The King himself, Alphonso XIII, and the government, under pressure from him, persevered in an imperialist policy in Morocco. perhaps to distract attention from troubles at home. By treaties with France and Great Britain, Spain secured a definitive protectorate over the northern coast of Morocco istic Reand outright ownership of an extensive though not very valuable tract of territory-Rio de Oro-on the western coast of Africa south of Morocco.1 But in order to possess and administer the portion of Morocco allotted to her, Spain was obliged to maintain large military forces in that country and to employ them in an exceedingly trying kind of warfare against native tribesmen. The King and his ministers were resolute, but a growing number of Spaniards were critical. There were serious mutinies in the army, and anti-militarist demonstrations by civilians. And, as a further portent, a republican revolution occurred in Portugal in 1910.

The Portuguese kingdom had been governed during the second half of the nineteenth century in much the same way and with much the same difficulties as had the Spanish kingdom Constitusince the accession of Alphonso XII in 1875. There Monarchy were two parties of constitutional royalists, "Regenerators" and "Progressives," corresponding respectively tugal to Spanish Conservatives and Liberals, and, like the Spanish parties, manipulating local officials and popular elections so as to take turns in holding office and dispensing patronage. There were the same opposition groups: reactionary Miguelists, corresponding to Carlists; revolutionary Republicans; and a slowly growing number of Socialists, Syndicalists, and Anarchists. There was the same indifference to politics on the part of the mass of peasants, and the same reliance on army and navy for vital support of the régime.

¹ In 1900 Spain had obtained title to another and smaller African colony—Rio Muni, on the central west coast between German Kamerun and French Equatorial Africa. Altogether the Spanish colonies in 1912 were confined to Africa and comprised an area of 140,000 square miles and an estimated population of less than a million.

Under the two sons and successors of Queen Maria II—Peter V (1853–1861) and Louis I (1861–1889)—the constitutional monarchy seemed to function fairly well. There was a respite from civil strife and an orderly operation of government. Nevertheless, the prevalence of political corruption and the exigencies of maintaining a colonial empire far larger than Spain's, and one now quite beyond Portugal's resources, gravely embarrassed the national finances and served to divert the attention of the government from other matters. Taxes were burdensome, popular education was neglected, needed social reforms were postponed, and tens of thousands of the most industrious and ambitious inhabitants of the country emigrated to the more prosperous and attractive Portuguese-speaking land of Brazil.

Under Charles I (1889-1908) financial crises recurred with alarming frequency and growing intensity, opposition to the régime gathered headway, and factional quarrels de-Charles I veloped among its professed supporters. The King and the Weakenhimself was licentious and extravagant, and primarily ing of Porintent, it seemed, on getting all the money he could tuguese Monarchy from the national treasury to spend on personal pleasures. On several occasions, when he failed to get what he wanted from parliament, he dissolved it and ruled without it by means of "ministerial decrees." The last such occasion, and the most flagrant, was in May 1907 when, following fierce factional strife between Regenerators and Progressives and rioting by Republicans, the King entrusted his faithful prime minister, João Franco, with dictatorial powers. Franco was Attempted determined to effect sweeping reforms, as well as Royalist Dictatorto please the King in financial matters, but against him and his master the forces of opposition now combined. In vain he suppressed newspapers and filled the jails with political prisoners. In February 1908 King Charles and the crown prince were assassinated while driving through the streets of Lisbon; and Franco's dictatorship came to an inglorious end.

¹ Portugal still possessed in 1910 a colonial empire surpassed in area only by those of Great Britain, France, and Germany. It covered 800,000 square miles—almost twenty-five times the area of the mother-country—and comprised the following territories: in or near Africa, Portuguese Guinea, Angola, Portuguese East Africa (or Mozambique), and the Cape Verde Islands; in India, Goa, Damaun, and Diu; in China, Macao; and in the Malay archipelago, part of Timor. Between 1870 and 1900 Portugal spent some 75 million dollars on colonial maintenance.

Emmanuel II, the inexperienced youth who succeeded Charles on the damaged Portuguese throne, was unable to cope with the situation. Franco had fied. The Progressive and Regenerator chieftains were unable to agree upon any common policy. The Republicans were extremely active and were making converts in army and navy. The murder of a prominent Republican physician in October 1910 was the signal for a guese Revolution. Soldiers in Lisbon, coöperating with tion of armed civilians and with sailors from warships in the 1910 Tagus, overthrew the monarchy and proclaimed the Portuguese Republic. King Emmanuel sought refuge in England, and a provisional government was formed at Lisbon under the presidency of Theophilo Braga, a distinguished scholar and poet.

A constitution was adopted in 1911, patterned rather closely after that of the Third French Republic, and Manoel Arriaga, another distinguished scholar and long a leader of the The Por-Republican party, was elected the first constitutional tuguese Republic President of Portugal. The new régime was different in name from the old, and was manned by a different set of politicians. And in the one matter of religion it attempted to pursue a different policy. For eight years, from 1910 to 1918, it was pronouncedly anti-clerical. Religious orders for men and women were expelled from the country and their property confiscated for the benefit of the state treasury. Separation of state and church was decreed: the state ceased to pay salaries to clergymen, and, under the guise of safeguarding the Republic, drastic restrictions were placed upon the church. Diplomatic relations with the Vatican were broken off, the patriarch of Lisbon was exiled, and priests who protested against the anti-clerical activities of the government were imprisoned or banished. Meanwhile the Republican party broke up into quarrelsome

factions. Royalists and reactionaries provoked insurrections. Socialists and radical revolutionaries inspired riots. Groups of military or naval officers employed their of Republican Government whom they disliked or to put themselves in office. The Republic could achieve no lasting constructive reforms and could hardly preserve order. President Arriaga resigned in disgust before the expiration of his term of office, and his successor was deposed by a military coup and exiled. The

Portuguese Republic was less stable than the Portuguese Kingdom had been, and a more ready victim to the indifference of the masses and the ambition of political and military chieftains. It was not really a democratic republic, but only a stage-setting before which petty dictators came and went to the cheers of the Portuguese people, whose ordinary life went on about as usual.

5. THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

How the southern provinces of the Netherlands separated themselves from the northern (1830–1839) and became the independent state of Belgium, under international guaranties, has been related in an earlier chapter.¹ The nation thus newly established was distinguished from other Latin countries throughout the ensuing century in three noteworthy respects. First, Belgium was more quickly and more thoroughly industrialized than any other Latin nation. Indeed, she experienced the Indus-

Industrial Revolution in Belgium trial Revolution earlier and more profoundly than any other country on the continent of Europe; and, as we have said elsewhere, her industrialization kept pace with that of Great Britain.² Thanks to her rich min-

eral resources, her tradition of craftsmanship, her geographical position, her splendid harbor of Antwerp, and her network of canals and railways, and thanks also to the business instincts of her government, Belgium produced an ever-increasing quantity of machine-made goods and her foreign trade grew by leaps and bounds. By 1911 some 28,000 steam-engines were operating in Belgium, with a horse-power of 2,750,000; the kingdom possessed a greater railway mileage in proportion to its area than any other country in the world, and the value of its imports and exports exceeded one and a half billion dollars—a third more than Italy's and more than five times the amount of Spain's. Nor did the industrialization of Belgium betoken any such relative decline of agriculture as was the case with Great Britain. Belgian farmers gradually diminished in number, but a fairly large class of peasant proprietors remained, and, thanks to the intensive cultivation which they employed and the cooperative enterprise which they developed, the yield of their little farms did not decline in quantity or financial profit. And associated with industrial and agricultural prosperity was the remarkable increase

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 788-789.

and comparative contentment of Belgium's population. Though embracing an area barely one-third the extent of diminutive Portugal, Belgium had in 1910 a population larger by two millions. Moreover, unlike Portuguese or Italians, very few Belgians left their native land; indeed, immigration into their country exceeded emigration from it.

A second peculiarity of Belgium was the absence of any Belgian "nationality," in the correct sense of this term. Strictly speaking, there was no Belgian nationality, as there was a French nationality in France, an Italian in Italy, a Portuguese in Portugal, or a Spanish in Spain.² Approximately half of the Belgians, those in the northern sections of the country, spoke Nether-Two Nalandish or Dutch (it was called "Flemish" in Belgium), tionalities while the other half, known as "Walloons," in the in Belgium: Dutch southern sections, spoke French. In other words, if the Belgians were grouped politically according to French the principle of linguistic nationality, there would be no Belgium; half of what we call Belgium would belong to the Dutch Netherlands, and the other half to France. Yet, despite the fact that in speech and "nationality" Belgium was only half "Latin," we are justified in regarding it historically as a Latin nation. Not only was French the native speech of all persons in the southern half of the country, but it was the customary language, all over the country, of the upper and middle classes, of intellectuals, industrialists, professional men, and of the government; and the Flemish-speaking peasants and workingmen of the north were as uniformly accustomed to Latin Christianity as Italians or Spaniards or the mass of Frenchmen. The historic and still living traditions of Belgium as a whole were much more "Latin" than "Teutonic."

The third feature distinguishing Belgium from other Latin nations was the marked stability of her government during the whole century succeeding her establishment as an independent nation and the comparative orderliness of her political life. In politics, as well as in industry, she kept pace with Great Britain. She was disturbed by no revolutionary upheaval or military coup

² By Spanish nationality, we mean Castilian. There were also in Spain the nationalities of Catalan and Basque.

¹The area of Belgium was 11,373 square miles, with a population in 1910 of 7,423,784. Belgium's density of population was the greatest in Europe.

and by no serious conflict between royalists and republicans. The liberal constitutional monarchy which had been Orderly instituted in 1831 in conscious imitation of the Constitutional British—with a king who reigned but did not rule, Governwith a bicameral parliament representing the upper ment in and middle classes (but not the masses) and making Belgium the laws, and with a cabinet of ministers conducting the administration and responsible to the parliamentary majority—this régime actually went on functioning more nearly like the British than did any of the other governmental systems which Latin nations copied from the "mother of parliaments." As in Britain, so in Belgium, there were two or three major political parties rather than a bewildering variety of "groups," there was comparative stability of ministries, and there was gradual broadening of the franchise, with transition from oligarchy to democracy. within the general framework of the constitutional monarchy.

The principal controversy in domestic politics, for a long time, was over the relations of church and state, particularly in regard Relations to education. In the original movement for national independence and in the preparation of the constitution of 1831 faithful Catholics and sceptical Liberals had coöperated; and between them, therefore, it was fairly easy to effect generally acceptable arrangements for the Catholic Church in Belgium. The King was required to profess the Catholic faith, but otherwise complete religious liberty would obtain. The church was promised freedom from state control or lay interference, and the state undertook to contribute to the financial support of the Catholic clergy, and likewise of Protestant ministers and Jewish rabbis.

Presently, however, as the need for more schools grew apparent and the state attempted to meet the need, the ques-Education arose as to whether religious instruction should tion, a be given in public schools. On this question were Party **Ouestion** formed, as early as 1847, two major political parties: the Catholic party, seeking to prescribe moral and religious instruction in the schools and to entrust it to the Predomi-Catholic clergy; and the Liberal party, espousing the nance of Liberal idea of neutral schools and inveighing against the Party, intellectual and political influence of "clericalism." 1847-1884 1847 and 1884 Liberals controlled parliament and

presided over ministries for terms aggregating twenty-eight years, and during this period of their supremacy they abolished religious instruction in the schools and for a time severed Rise of diplomatic relations with the papacy. In the latter Socialist part of the nineteenth century, however, the Liberal Party party lost heavily to a rising Socialist party, which, formally organized in 1885, soon attracted to its standards not only a multitude of urban workingmen but also a good many intellectuals eager to democratize the country and to effect radical social reform.

The Catholic party, benefiting from the rivalry between Socialists and Liberals and from its own championship of social reform, obtained a parliamentary majority in 1884 and retained it, together with the responsible cabinet, for the next thirty vears and until the World War. Partly on their own initiative and partly from Socialist or Liberal pressure, Party. the Catholic ministers and parliamentarians sponsored much reform legislation. Not only was religious instruction restored in most of the public schools, but elementary education was so extended and fostered as greatly to reduce the percentage of illiteracy in the country. Under Catholic auspices, moreover, the government was largely democratized. In 1894 the property qualification for exercising the suffrage was removed, and every male Belgian who was over twenty-four years of age and had resided a year in the same commune was accorded the right to vote in national and local elections. At the ratizing same time the principle of plural voting was introthe Government duced by according one or two extra votes to an elector in possession of certain financial or educational qualifications. In 1898, in furtherance of popular democracy and to remove a handicap and grievance of the lower classes in northern Belgium who knew Flemish but not French, the former language was put on an equal footing legally with the latter; henceforth both were "official" and both had to be used side by side on street signs, on public buildings, and in the publication of laws and other governmental transactions. In 1899, by another electoral reform, proportional representation was instituted, whereby the

¹ According to official figures, the proportion of the population of Belgium above eight years of age who could neither read nor write was 30 per cent in 1880; 25 in 1890; 19 in 1900; and 13 in 1910.

parliamentary seats to be filled by a given district would be distributed among the several parties or candidates in proportion to the number of votes polled by each. In their opposition to the Catholic party, which had sponsored these reforms, both Socialists and Liberals attacked especially the clerical influence in education and the system of plural voting. In 1913 the Socialists, particularly vehement with their slogan of "one man, one vote," conducted a general strike in behalf of electoral reform, but the elections of 1914 preserved a Catholic majority.

Some significant social legislation was enacted by the Belgian parliament, especially after 1890. Factories were regulated.

Social Trade unions were fully legalized and their funds safeLegisla- guarded (1898). A system of old-age pensions was adopted (1900). Considerable progress was made, moreover, in decently housing the working classes and in otherwise providing for their material well-being.

In a somewhat singular manner Belgium became a colonial power. Her second King, Leopold II (1865-1909), was an astute and none too scrupulous business man, to whom an Anglo-American journalist and explorer, Henry Stanley, pointed out in the 1870's the rich rubber resources of the huge Leopold II's Congo Congo region in central Africa. The King proceeded Domain to organize a private commercial company with himself as president and chief stockholder, to beguile native chieftains into turning over their lands in the tract to the company, and then to obtain international sanction (1884-1885) for the erection of the company's lands into the "Congo Free State," with himself as its personal sovereign. Leopold II invested heavily in the undertaking, but presently he reaped his reward. For himself and his family he carved out of the Free State a vast private estate, embracing the choicest rubber, and yielding rich returns from the forced labor of natives who collected the rubber. Some idea of the profits eventually accruing to Leopold may be gathered from the fact that, whereas the export rubber from the Congo was valued at only \$30,000 in 1886, it was valued in 1908 at ten million dollars. By the latter date, however, there were numerous disclosures of outrages and practical slavery visited upon the natives of the Congo to make them get rubber for the

¹For the royal succession in Belgium, see the genealogical table of the Saxe-Coburg family at p. 489, above.

King and his "company," and insistent demands inside and outside Belgium for sweeping reforms in the Free State. Leopold II yielded to the pressure of public opinion sufficiently to propose in 1908 that the Congo Free State should be transformed into a Belgian colony—with liberal financial ferred to compensation to himself for his "sacrifice." The Belgian government, against the energetic opposition of a minority in parliament, accepted the proposal, and thus, in 1908, Belgium acquired an overseas empire with an area almost eighty times her own.

The royal successor of Leopold II, his nephew Albert I (1909–1934), was destined not only to preside over the reformation of the Congo but also to command the Belgian army in action. For Belgium was the first country to be invaded in force in the World War.



CHAPTER XXII

NORTHERN AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1871-1914



N the countries of northern and eastern Europe were greater contrasts than among the Latin nations of southern Europe. The latter spoke closely related languages, traditionally adhered to the same religion, and shared much the same culture. Among the former were seven distinct language-

families: (1) the Teutonic of Germans, Dutch (Netherlanders), and Scandinavians; (2) the Slavic of Russians, Ruthenians Contrasts (Ukrainians or "Little Russians"), Poles, Czechs, in Culture: Slovaks, and Yugoslavs; (3) the Baltic Aryan of Lithunians and Latvians; (4) the Turanian of Magyars, Turks, Finns, and Estonians; (5) the Romanic (Latin) of Rumanians; (6) the Greek; and (7) the Albanian.

Among them, too, were wide differences of religious tradition. Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and Lithuanians were overwhelmingly Catholic, and Magyars largely so. Scandinavians, Finns, and Estonians were overwhelmingly Protestant, and Dutch and Latvians chiefly so. Russians, Rumanians, and Greeks Religious were overwhelmingly Orthodox. Germans were divided about evenly between Catholicism and Protestantism, and Yugoslavs and Ruthenians between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The Turks were Moslem, and the Albanians mainly so. Moreover, between Orthodox Christian peoples, on the one hand, and Catholic and Protestant, on the other, survived a special cultural distinction: the latter were "western" in that they had taken their civilization from Rome, had learned to write their several languages in Latin characters, and had long felt an intellectual kinship with all peoples of western Europe, while the former were "eastern" in that they had derived their culture from Constantinople, had put their languages in Greek characters. and for centuries had been less touched by intellectual currents of the West.

Contrasts were further sharpened among the nations of northern and eastern Europe in the nineteenth century by the differing intensity with which the Industrial Revolution affected them. They presented no such general uniformity in this respect as did southern Latin Europe, which underwent some industrialization—France and Italy considerably more than Spain or Portugal-but which, with the single exception of Belgium, remained preponderantly agricultural. For, while the Industrial Revolution swept swiftly over most of northern and central Teutonic Europe, transforming Germany almost overnight from economic backwardness to technological leadership, and assuring conspicuous commercial importance to the Dutch Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, its progress in eastern Slavic Europe was slower and more fitful. Bohemia as a whole was largely industrialized, and so, gradually, were parts of Poland and western Russia, and lesser scattered areas elsewhere. Yet the mass of Russians (and of Magyars also) continued to be agrarian and rural and to earn their daily bread without aid of machinery, and all the Balkan peoples, excepting only the commercially minded Greeks, remained "peasant nations" down to the World War.

Finally, there survived in northern and central Europe a contrast, which had ceased to exist in southern Latin Europe, between imperial states and national states. Latin Europe was now composed entirely of national states, each, with the exception of Belgium, embracing a distinctive nationality and each the object of a common patriotism; it contained no polyglot empire. In northern and eastern Europe, similar national states were to be found: the long-established Dutch Netherlands and Scandinavian nations in the far northwest; the emerging states of Greece, Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria in the far National States southeast; and the recently founded national state of the Germans. But the German Empire was not so completely a national state as was, for example, the French Republic or the Italian Kingdom. Included in it were fractions of dissident nationalities-Poles, Danes, and Alsatians-whose paramount patriotism was not German; and excluded from it were not only the small German cantons of Switzerland but also one of the most populous and famous of all German states—Austria.

The greater part of central and eastern Europe was still cov-

ered by three sprawling "old-fashioned" Empires—the Habsburg for Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, and the Ottoman-each attempting with varying degrees of success to hold together an agglomeration of peoples. And whereas Extensive written constitutions and forms of liberal or democratic Imperial government were now usual in every country of Latin Europe, they were restricted in northern and eastern Europe mainly to the group of national states in the far northwest and in the far southeast. The Russian and Ottoman Empires made no pretense of being "constitutional" or "popular" until just before the World War, and in Austria-Hungary and Germany the democratic features of written constitutions were counterbalanced in practice by the abiding power and influence of dynasty, aristocracy, army, and civil bureaucracy. Undoubtedly there was progress toward political democracy, as well as toward middle-class supremacy, thoughout northern and eastern Europe during the forty years from 1874 to 1914, but it was more halting

1. THE GERMAN EMPIRE OF THE HOHENZOLLERNS

than in southern Europe or in Britain.


The German Empire, as fashioned under the nominal leadership of Prussia's Hohenzollern King, William I, and the actual guidance of his chief minister, Prince Bismarck,¹ represented a nice compromise between nationalism and federalism and between divine-right monarchy and popular government. In the Empire were twenty-five states, besides the "imperial territory" of

Alsace-Lorraine, each a sovereign state 2 with a government of its own and with control over many local matters, such as direct taxation, education, public health, police, and regulation of landholding. For the Empire

¹ On the creation of the German Empire, see above, pp. 245-246.

² Of the twenty-five states, four were kingdoms (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg); six were grand-duchies (Baden, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, and Saxe-Weimar); five were duchies (Brunswick, Anhalt, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg and Saxe-Coburg); seven were diminutive principalities (Schwarzenburg-Sondershausen, Schwarzenburg-Rudolstadt, Waldeck, Elder Reuss, Younger Reuss, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Lippe); and three were "free cities," or republics (Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck).

Note. The statuary group opposite is by the German sculptor, Reinhold Begas (1831-1911). The main figure is Emperor William I; the figure at the left is Moltke, and at the right, Bismarck. On Begas, see above, p. 411.





as a whole, no law could be enacted without the consent of a Bundesrat (Federal Council) composed of personal agents of the several state governments; and the detailed execution of national legislation rested normally with officials of the state governments rather than with those of the imperial government. At the same time, broad national jurisdiction was conferred upon the central government of the Empire not only over the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of interstate commerce, but also over criminal and civil law and all matters affecting trade and communication within the several states.

Popular—and democratic—participation in the central government was guarantied by the constitutional provision that all male citizens of the Empire, over twenty-five years of age, Restricted should have the right to vote for members of a Democracic Imperial Parliament), whose consent, as well as that of the Bundesrat, was requisite to the enactment of laws. Nevertheless, the democratic Reichstag could exercise no such control of the administration and major policies of the central government as the British or French parliament might exercise. It was restricted by the regulation that the national ministry, headed by a Chancellor, was responsible not to it but to the Emperor and, more fundamentally, by the rôle which undemocratic Prussia was privileged to play in the Empire.

Prussia, it must be remembered, continued to be governed internally in accordance with the constitution which Frederick William IV had promulgated in 1850, with its formal recognition of the "divine right" of the King to choose his ministers at will and with its practical limitation of the diet, or state parliament, to mere acceptance or rejection of royal proposals by representatives of the upper and middle classes. This same Prussia was now become the most powerful and influential state in the German Empire. Prussia had made the Empire. Of the area and population of the Empire, Prussia embraced almost two-thirds, while the other twenty-four states together contained barely one-

¹ On the Prussian constitution, as distinct from that of the German Empire, see above, p. 138.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "In a Berlin Café," is by a German "impressionist" painter, Paul Hoeniger (1865–1924).

third.¹ Naturally, Prussia—not so much its people as its government—occupied a commanding position in the government and administration of the Empire. The Hohenzollern King of Prussia headed the Empire; he bore the title of "German Emperor" and appointed or dismissed at will the Chancellor of the Empire. The Prussian military system had to be the Empire's military system. And enough votes were accorded to the agent of the King of Prussia in the Bundesrat to enable him to veto any reduction of army or taxes or any amendment to the imperial constitution which a majority in the Reichstag might approve.²

For almost twenty years after 1871 William I was Emperor, and Bismarck was Chancellor, of the German Empire. Throughemperor out this period Bismarck was the chief figure in the domestic politics of his own country and in the international politics of Europe. In the first years of his chancellorship, a large majority of the Reichstag (and, of course, the Bundesrat) supported the measures which he advocated for welding the states and people of Germany together in the Empire.

The legal systems of the several states were supplanted by uniform codes of law for the entire Empire. An imperial coinage took the place of the diverse coinages of the states. An act of 1873 created an imperial railway bureau, which did much to unify the various state railways and to coördinate them with the military, postal, and telegraphic organizations of the Empire. A Bank Act of 1875 transferred the control of banking from state governments to the Bundesrat, and the establishment of the Imperial Bank (Reichsbank) in 1876 expedited the financial operations of the central government and contributed to its stability and prestige.

To assure the general security of the Empire and specifically to prevent France from waging a "war of revenge" for the

¹ Of the total area of Germany from 1871 to 1918—208,780 square miles—Prussia covered 134,616 square miles; and of the total population of 65,000,000 in 1910, Prussia's was 40,200,000. Bavaria, the second state in the Empire, had an area of 29,292 square miles and a population in 1910 of 6,900,000. The other states were much smaller.

² On certain states other than Prussia the German constitution conferred special, though minor, privileges. For example, Bavaria was to manage her own railways, post offices, and army (in time of peace); in Saxony was to be located the supreme court of the Empire; and of the five members of the Bundesrat's committee on foreign affairs, one each was to be from Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg.

recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck pursued a twofold policy of "preparedness," diplomatic and military. On one hand, he kept France isolated by arranging friendly "understandguarding the Emings" between Germany and the two other conservative Empires of Austria-Hungary and Russia, by pire in Europe negotiating subsequently the defensive Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, and by taking constant care to cultivate cordial relations with Great Britain. On the other hand, he kept Germany heavily armed. As the German Empire had been established by "blood and iron," so by iron at least it must be preserved. Accordingly, compulsory military service, which had been extended in Prussia in 1862, was applied now, in 1871, to the whole Empire, the "peace strength" of the German army being fixed at 400,000. On this matter Bismarck had some trouble with the Reichstag by reason of his proposal that the necessary financial appropriations be made a permanent charge on the treasury. This the majority of the Reichstag refused to sanction, and Bismarck eventually accepted a compromise whereby appropriations for the army were voted for a definite term of years—seven at first, and later five. From time to time, therefore, the government had to submit its military policy to debate by the nation's representatives, but Bismarck soon learned that by utilizing a "war-scare" on the eve of any such debate, he could usually get from the Reichstag what he wanted for the army. Subsequent chancellors were prone to employ similar methods, and the German military machine was always enlarging, never shrinking, from 1871 to 1914.

All this early legislation which Bismarck sponsored tended to assert and emphasize the predominance of the central, imperial government over the governments of the several states, and in enacting it the Chancellor had the active support of the political parties in the Reichstag and in the country which were the most nationalistic. These were: (1) the National Liberal party, the party of the industrial and intellectual bourgeoisie whose nationalism (and devotion to material concerns) was fast eclipsing their liberalism, and whose popular following was the largest of any German party in the 1870's; and (2) the

marck's Political Allies: National Liberals and Free Conservatives

¹ On Bismarck's diplomacy from 1871 to 1890, see below, pp. 753-759.

Free Conservative party, a party of "enlightened" landlords, chiefly Prussian but glad to forward nationalizing tendencies and willing to follow Bismarck in making some concessions to democracy.

Of the two other political parties which had been in evidence in Prussia during the 1860's,1 the Conservative party was still the representative of numerous "old-fashioned" landed nobles and squires, Lutheran clergymen and army officers, eminently respectable and quite wedded to the "old Conservatives régime," while the Progressive party was a gradually diminishing party of doctrinaire middle-class radicals whose liberalism was still superior to their nationalism. The Conservatives were too narrowly Prussian to sympathize fully with Bismarck's all-German mood after 1871 and too devoted to divine-right monarchy to evince any enthusiasm about his flirtations with democracy, but inasmuch as they had long been in the habit of regarding Bismarck as one of themselves, they were not inclined to guarrel openly with him, and on some matters, notably on his army policy, they backed him vociferously. The Progressives, however, were a thorn in Bismarck's side. Not at all

opposition of Progressives

satisfied with the German constitution of 1871, they demanded its drastic revision in accordance with the British system of parliamentary government and ministerial responsibility. Being pacifist, too, they strenuously opposed Bismarck's pet army plans. And, with their lengthy high-flown discourses in the Reichstag, they wearied the Chancellor, who was more given to action than to speech.

The opposition to Bismarckian policies was not confined, in the Reichstag, to the Progressive party. Quite irreconcilable in one way or another to the imperial régime and chronically

opposition of Special Groups

voting against the Chancellor's proposals were several minor groups: (1) a few Socialists, working-class disciples either of Karl Marx or of Ferdinand Lassalle; 2
(2) a few "Guelfs," deputies from the former kingdom

of Hanover which Prussia had annexed in 1866 and who, led by Ludwig Windthorst, the last prime minister of that kingdom,

¹ On the four parties prior to 1871—Conservative, Free Conservative, Progressive, and National Liberal—see above, pp. 143, 228, 240.

² On the beginnings of Socialism in Germany, see above, p. 379. The two separate groups of Marxians and Lassalleans united in 1875 to form the Social Democratic party.

were anxious to restore its autonomy; ¹ (3) a Dane or two from northern Schleswig, demanding the retrocession of this province to Denmark; ² (4) a group from the Polish-speaking areas of Posen and West Prussia whom the rising German nationalism of the time only served to fire with a fiercer Polish nationalism; (5) the fifteen deputies from Alsace-Lorraine, who, on their first appearance in the Reichstag in 1874, made solemn protest against the incorporation of their territory with the German Empire, and subsequently were quite critical of the Empire and its legislation; and (6) a somewhat larger group of deputies who, coming principally from the traditionally freer states of South Germany, were anxious to safeguard "states' rights" against too much Prussianizing or nationalizing, and who, being Catholic in religion, were fearful of intolerant interference from the Protestant majority in the Empire.³

Bismarck was particularly nettled by the Catholic states' rights group, and his desire to repress it by striking at the Catholic Church was shared by the majority both in The the imperial parliament and in the Prussian parlia-Catholic Question National Liberals and Free Conservatives thought the Catholics lacking in German patriotism and too much disposed to follow the dictates of a "foreign power"—the papacy—which, now fortified by the dogma of infallibility,4 might be more dangerous than ever to German independence and unity. Many Conservatives, staunchly Lutheran, were ready to seize any opportunity to resume battle with Rome. And the Progressives, intent upon stressing the liberal, lay, scientific, and materialistic aspects of modern civilization and hence critical of "clericalism" in general and of Pope Pius IX's "Syllabus of Errors" in particular, found themselves in the curious position of supporting Bismarck in his hostility to the Catholic Church. Indeed, it was a Progressive leader who ap-

¹ On the annexation of Hanover by Prussia, see above, p. 237 and note.

²On the dispute between Germany and Denmark over Schleswig, see above, pp. 231-232.

³ Though the German-speaking people as a whole were about evenly divided between Protestantism and Catholicism, the exclusion of Catholic Austria from the German Empire served to ensure to the Empire a Protestant majority. The chief Catholic areas within the German Empire were Bavaria, southern Württemberg, and, in the kingdom of Prussia, the Rhineland, Westphalia, Silesia, and the Polish provinces.

⁴ See above, pp. 423-424.

plied the high-sounding phrase *Kulturkampf*—"battle for civilization"—to the struggle which was waged during the 1870's in Prussia and throughout the German Empire between the government and the church.

In 1872 Bismarck fired the first guns in the Kulturkampf by expelling the Jesuits from Germany and breaking off diplomatic relations between Prussia and the Vatican. Then followed, in May 1873 and May 1874, rounds of Kulturkampf against form of anti-Catholic enactments, sometimes styled the "May laws," and sometimes cited, from the name of the Prussian minister of education, the "Falk laws."

The most significant of them prescribed that every official of the Catholic Church in Prussia—every bishop and every priest must be a German citizen, a graduate of a German public school and of a German university, and duly certified and "authorized" by the government; all ecclesiastical seminaries were placed under state control, and all Catholic preparatory schools for the clergy were banned; and, as a special measure against Polish Catholics, all religious instruction must be given in German. Catholic bishops in Prussia, with the express approval of their colleagues elsewhere in Germany and of Pope Pius IX, at once protested against the May laws and refused to obey them. Whereupon the Prussian parliament passed still more drastic laws, forbidding the exercise of ecclesiastical functions by "unauthorized" persons, making refractory clergymen liable to loss of citizenship and to imprisonment or exile, and authorizing the suspension of financial aid for the church in any diocese whose bishop proved recalcitrant. With such severity were these laws enforced, moreover, that within a single year six Catholic bishops were jailed, and in over 1,300 parishes Catholic worship ceased. By 1877 every German bishop and hundreds of priests were either in prison or in exile, and Catholic laymen were being rapidly weeded out of the civil service.

Against the Bismarckian anti-Catholic legislation, German Catholics fought back with unexpected unanimity ¹ and increas-

¹ The German government had counted not only on a good deal of indifference among the Catholic masses but also on a large active secession from the Catholic Church to the so-called "Old Catholic Church," which had been set up by a few disaffected Catholics shortly after the definition of the dogma of papal infallibility in 1870 and which the government did its utmost to foster. The "Old Catholic

ing effectiveness. Encouraged by the papacy and by their "martyred" bishops, they rallied in support of the ecclesiastical "administrators" who by stealth took the place of the bishops and preserved a church organization in Defense: Windt-Germany, and likewise in support of political leaders, horst and such as Windthorst, the "Guelf" and also a devout the Centre Catholic, who built up a distinctively Catholic party the so-called Centre party—to work openly at the polls and in parliament for the repeal of the anti-Catholic legislation. The Centre party championed not only religious liberty but also social reform, and soon commanded the suffrages of Catholic workingmen as well as of other Catholics. In the general election of 1874 it polled one and a half million votes and increased its representation in the Reichstag from 60 to 90. And before long, within the Reichstag, Windthorst was skillfully aligning with the Centre party most of the minor groups which for one reason or another were inimical to Bismarck-Poles, Alsatians, Guelfs, Danes, even Socialists. Eventually, when a section of the Conservatives took fright at the general anti-religious implications of some of the specifically anti-Catholic legislation and began to cooperate with Windthorst and the Centrists, Bismarck himself grew alarmed and decided that the time had come to halt the Kulturkampf. Too many of his other policies were now endangered by the coalition forming against him on his religious policy, and in Marxian Socialism he began to perceive a greater menace to what he held dear than in Roman Catholicism.

In 1880 the Prussian parliament, on Bismarck's recommendation, empowered the government to use its own discretion in administering the May laws. Diplomatic relations Failure of were presently resumed with the Vatican; and in 1886 Kultur-the most oppressive anti-Catholic measures were formally repealed. Bismarck thus confessed that his Kulturkampf had been a failure. From his standpoint, in fact, it was worse than a failure. It served to raise up and solidify a Catholic party which, under able leadership, persevered in what was to Bismarck an unholy alliance with democrats and socialists and all the other dissident groups who sought radical political changes.

Church," however, simply could not be nursed into vigorous life: its total membership in Germany reached a peak of 52,000 in 1878 and then steadily declined, by 1882 to 35,000.

On the heels of the Kulturkampf came Bismarck's campaign against Socialism. As the Industrial Revolution began to affect Germany in a large way in the 1860's and 1870's—as mining and the metal industries developed in Westphalia and Silesia and the textile and other machine industries Marxian Socialism in Saxony and the Rhineland and Alsace-Socialist propaganda made headway among the urban working classes.¹ In the general election of 1874 Socialists obtained nine seats in the Reichstag. In 1875 they formed a compact "Social Democratic" party through the fusion of two previously rival groups. In the ensuing general election of 1877 they polled half a million votes and increased their representation in the Reichstag to twelve. The principles which the party preached—revolution, class conflict, thoroughgoing political and social democracy, abolition of private property, anti-nationalism, and anti-militarismwere the very antitheses of Bismarck's and were calculated, in his opinion, to subvert the state, the family, and civilization. He was outraged by the obviously propagandist speeches of Social Democrats in parliament and by their consistent opposition to every proposal he made, even to his "anti-clerical" measures. He resolved to repress them.

Making use of public excitement and horror attending two unsuccessful attempts by madmen in 1878 to assassinate the venerable Emperor William I, and claiming that the mad-Bismen were Socialists, Bismarck dissolved the existing marck's Fight Reichstag and secured the election of a new one whose against majority shared his opinion of Social Democrats and of what should be done with them. At once, despite the protests of a minority composed of Centrists, Progressives, and the minor dissident groups, the majority of Conservatives and National Liberals passed a severe law against Socialist propaganda. This law, originally enacted for a term of four years, was subsequently reënacted several times and remained in force until Bismarck's retirement from office in 1890. It forbade the circulation of Socialist books, pamphlets, and newspapers, empowered the police to break up meetings and suppress publications of Socialists, and removed the trial and punishment of Socialist offenders from the jurisdiction of the regular courts to that of the police.

¹ On the Industrial Revolution in Germany, see above, pp. 56-57, 301-302; and on the rise of Socialism in Germany, see above, p. 379.

Yet here again Bismarck failed of his purpose. The more rigorous was the enforcement of the anti-Socialist legislation, the more effective became the "martyrdom" of Socialists and the more solidified and influential became the Social Democratic party. The party preserved its organization in Germany, conducted energetic propaganda from neighboring countries, and increased its representation and volubility in the Reichstag.¹

Socialists and Catholics were not the only groups that aroused Bismarck's ire and evoked repressive measures from him. He had the average Prussian noblemen's contempt and dislike for the Polec—because they were Catholic and even more

the Poles—because they were Catholic and even more because they were Poles—and not only did he try to force upon them the use of the German, instead of the Polish, language during the *Kulturkampf* in the 1870's, but he sponsored in the 1880's certain enactments of the Prussian parliament directed, on the one hand, toward the curbing of Polish political activity and, on

Bismarck's Repression of Poles, Danes, and Guelfs

the other hand, toward the transfer of farms from Polish to German ownership. Similar legislation he advocated in respect of the Danes in Schleswig; and against the Guelfs, those Germans of Hanover who were discontented under Prussian rule and desirous of recovering their historic autonomy, he employed a large secret fund of the government—the so-called "reptile fund"—to seek out "conspiracies" among them and otherwise to harass them. He did witness a gradual waning of Guelf agitation, though it was probably a result less of his repression than of a natural adaptation of Hanoverians. But as for Poles and Danes, his attempts at repression only served to intensify their discontent and counter-agitation.

Alsace-Lorraine, which he had taken from France in 1871, Bismarck did his best to Germanize. He encouraged immigration into it from other parts of the Empire, and he secured from the Reichstag large appropriations for making the University of Strasbourg an important centre of German intellectual life and cultural influence. Yet the attitude of the elected representatives from Alsace-

¹ The Social Democratic party obtained 12 seats in 1881; 24 in 1884; 11 in 1887; and 35 in 1890. Its progress was naturally more marked after the lapse of the repressive legislation: it obtained 44 seats in 1893; 56 in 1898; 81 in 1903; 43 in 1907; and 110 in 1912.

Lorraine in the Reichstag was not reassuring, and throughout his whole chancellorship of the Empire Bismarck persisted in treating the provinces as conquered territory and denying them equality with the other German states.

Toward Jews, too, Bismarck was none too kindly disposed, though for political and financial reasons he refrained from public

Anti-Semitism in Germany: Stöcker and National Socialists

attacks upon them and actually rebuked a prominent Lutheran clergyman and chaplain to Emperor William I, Adolf Stöcker, for some of his anti-Semitic activities in the 1880's. Nevertheless, the bitterly anti-Jewish agitation of Stöcker and the National Socialist party which he founded, and which elected several

members to the Reichstag, was quite consonant in principle with the illiberal attitude and policies of Prince Bismarck toward most minority groups in Germany.

A very important change in national policy Bismarck wrought with the aid of Conservatives and Centrists during the last decade of his chancellorship, and that was a change from laissez
faire liberalism to economic nationalism. The move-

Nationalism in Germany faire liberalism to economic nationalism. The movement in behalf of such a change did not originate with Bismarck or with any particular person. It was a natural outcome of the studies of German economists,

of the demands of German industry and agriculture, of the popular reaction to rising Socialism, and of the heightening political nationalism of the 1860's and 1870's in Germany. 1 It manifested itself toward the close of the 1870's in the relative decline of those German political parties, National Liberal and Progressive, which had borrowed their economic doctrines from the English liberals and stood for laissez-faire, and a corresponding gain of those parties, Conservative and Centrist, which were less inclined to individualism and more to paternalism. The resulting change in national policy which Bismarck was brought to favor was threefold. From being an essentially free-trade country, Germany became a leader in tariff protectionism. From being a purely European Power, Germany became a World Power with extensive overseas dominion. From being ostensibly unconcerned with relations between capital and labor, Germany became the chief exemplar of governmental intervention.

¹On the rise of the newer economic nationalism, or "neo-mercantilism," see above, pp. 312-317.

Tariff protectionism was inaugurated by act of the Reichstag in 1879. Bismarck's purpose in sponsoring this measure was not only to protect German "infant industries" against the competition of the older and more developed industries of Great Britain and to increase the taxable wealth of Germany, but also to get enough income for the federal government from customs duties to relieve it of the necessity of levying assessments on the several states, as it had been obliged to do since 1871. The tariff act of 1879 did give new financial independence and strength to the federal government, and, even more clearly, a marked impetus to Germany's industrial development. Indeed, the agrarian classes complained that the tariff of 1879 was too favorable to urban industry, and in order to redress the balance between industry and agriculture and to promote self sufficiency for the Empire in foodstuffs as well as in manufactures, they secured by supplementary tariff acts of 1885 and 1887 greatly increased protection for agriculture without lessening the protection of industry.

Before the adoption of the policy of tariff protectionism Bismarck had opposed overseas imperialism. In 1871 he had dismissed with a sneer the French offer to cede colonies to Germany in lieu of Alsace-Lorraine; and throughout the 1870's he stuck to his belief that Germany should devote all her energies to strengthening herself internally and on the continent of Europe and should avoid colonial undertakings which would almost certainly complicate and embarrass the Empire's foreign relations. But the merchant's desire to sell his goods and the capitalist's desire to make lucrative investments and the Overseas Christian missionary's desire to convert heathen peoples and the patriot's desire to exalt Germany as a Great World Power, all contributed to an irresistible national yearning for German colonies. Merchants led the way; missionaries soon followed. In 1879 a German trading company acquired privileges in the Samoan Islands. In 1882 an important German colonial society undertook, with much success, to unite business men in support of colonial ventures and to arouse popular patriotic interest in them. Within an amazingly brief time, commercial companies of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen obtained concessions from native chieftains, and established trading posts in several areas in Africa-Southwest Africa, Togoland, Kamerun, and East Africa—and in several islands of the Pacific—the Marshall Islands, a part of New Guinea (flatteringly labelled Kaiser Wilhelmsland), and the group of islands presently christened the Bismarck archipelago.

Prince Bismarck, in his new rôle as champion of German commerce and industry, conquered his earlier scruples and now followed the merchants and missionaries with his official blessing.

German In 1884–1885 he prevailed upon the Reichstag to sanction formal protectorates over the distant trading posts in Africa and in the Pacific. In 1886 he secured governmental subsidies for regular steamship service between Germany and the protectorates. And before his retirement in 1890 the process was far advanced of delimiting the mercantile protectorates through negotiation with native chieftains and other colonial Powers and of transforming them into crown colonies, administered by imperial officials and policed by German troops. By this time Germany was in possession of a colonial domain of close to a million square miles—almost five times the area of the mother-country—though its population was relatively slight and almost entirely aboriginal, either Negro or Polynesian. The pursuit of imperialism and the adoption of protectionism

The pursuit of imperialism and the adoption of protectionism were obviously intended primarily to increase the profits of German manufacturers and traders, and incidentally of German landlords, though it was frequently alleged that they served also to raise the wages of German workingmen and to open to them new forms of employment. For the express benefit of workingmen, however, significant social legislation was enacted

Legislain Germany in the 1880's. Bismarck advocated it not
only as a means of lessening the economic grievances
on which the Social Democratic party was thriving but also in
order to attach the masses more loyally to the state and to promote the physical fitness and high morale of the citizen-army.
In his advocacy of social legislation, he was backed by the latest
school of political economists, by the old Prussian tradition of
benevolent paternalism, and by the party pledges and deciding
votes of the Catholic Centre party.

In 1883 a bill was passed insuring workingmen against sickness, and in 1884 employers were compelled to insure their employes against accidents. In 1887, laws were enacted dras-

¹ See above, pp. 314-316.

tically limiting the labor of women and children, establishing a maximum number of working hours for employes in various industries, prescribing elaborate governmental regulation and supervision of factories and mines, and setting Sunday apart as a day of rest. In 1889 provision was made for insuring workingmen against old age and invalidity. There can be no doubt that all this labor legislation, together with a noteworthy system of labor exchanges which the government shortly set up, and with the rapid solid development of trade unionism, prepared the German people from below, as protectionism and imperialism and governmental fostering of technological advance prepared them from above, to become one of the most efficient and productive industrial nations in the world.

Before his new economic policies were fully matured, the long

period of Prince Bismarck's domination came to an abrupt close. He lost a sturdy ally and loyal friend when his Hohenzollern sovereign, the aged Emperor William I, died in March 1888. William's son and successor on the Reign of thrones of Prussia and the Empire was Frederick III, Who was reputed to be "liberal" and to desire a remodelling of German government along the lines of the British, but whether he deserved the reputation and would have acted in accordance with it no one really knows, for he was a very sick man when he succeeded his father and he died in June 1888 after a reign of only ninety-nine days. Whereupon his son, the grandson of William I, became King of Prussia and German Emperor with the title of William II.

of age at the time, imbued with the same ideas of divine-right monarchy and the same predilection for militarism as had characterized William I, but with a vanity, a volubility, Accession and an impulsiveness which were engaging to some of William people but peculiarly irritating to Bismarck, who was now an elderly man quite set in his own ways and thoroughly used to handling the reins of government without much direction or advice from his sovereign. From William II's standpoint it soon became a question, as he subsequently expressed it, "whether the Hohenzollern dynasty or the Bismarck dynasty should rule." In March 1890 differences between the young

William II (1888-1918) was a young man, twenty-nine years

¹ Frederick III's wife was a daughter of Queen Victoria.

Emperor and the old Chancellor reached a climax. Bismarck was anxious to retain the close ties between Germany and Russia, while William II thought them incompatible with the alliance between Germany and Austria. William II refused to sanction Bismarck's plan to renew the repressive legislation against the Socialists and, if necessary, to cow parliament and people into submission by armed force. Bismarck declined to accede to an order from William II which would have given to all cabinet ministers access direct to the Emperor instead of indirect through the Chancellor. So William II Bisdemanded Bismarck's resignation, and the Iron Chancellor withdrew to his large private estates in Lauen-Dismissal burg. There the man who had done more than anyone else to create the Hohenzollern Empire of Germany and for twenty years to shape its foreign and domestic policies lived in more or less open criticism of the Emperor and the new ministers until his death at the advanced age of eighty-three, in July 1898.

From 1890 to the World War the Emperor-King William II occupied the chief position in Germany and in Prussia, preserving Prussia's leadership in Germany and Germany's prestige in Politically, the basic ideas of William II were not Europe. essentially different from Bismarck's, though he Maintetalked about them more often and more loftily. He nance of Biswas fond of reaffirming with picturesque metaphors marck's the historic Hohenzollern ideal of monarchy, estab-Major lished by God and in constant communication with Him, and like Him both benevolent and strong. Militarism he constantly extolled-asserting on one occasion, in true Bismarckian style, that "the soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities, have welded together the German Empire —my confidence is placed in the army." He accepted and forwarded all the major domestic policies which Bismarck had developed; and, though he allowed the anti-Socialist legislation to lapse, he remained, like Bismarck, a pronounced foe of Socialists and "radicals," and an indulgent patron of army officers, land-owning aristocrats, conservative university professors, and the newer industrial and commercial magnates.

The reign of William II was especially marked by the accelerating tempo of Germany's industrialization. In 1882 the number of Germans engaged in manufacture and commerce was about

twenty million; in 1910 it was thirty-five million. In 1890 less than five million tons of pig iron were produced in Germany; in 1913 fifteen million tons were produced. In 1890 Ger-Growth of man coal mines yielded 70 million tons, and in 1913 Industry almost 200 million tons. The number of spindles in German cotton mills doubled between 1897 and 1912. Germany's share in the world's shipping grew from six per cent in 1890 to eleven per cent in 1913, while the annual value of her export trade rose in the same period from 800 million dollars to 2,500 million.

Parallelling the industrial development which these figures bespeak was a remarkable growth of population. Germany. which was not much more populous than France in Growth of 1871, had three inhabitants to every two of France's Populain 1913. The Empire had a population of 41 million in the former year and of over 65 million in the latter, and the increase went to swell the size of industrial centres. In 1913 there were forty-eight cities with over 100,000 inhabitants each, five with over half a million, and one—the capital city of Berlin—with almost two million. Besides, emigration, which had been heavy in the middle of the nineteenth century and which still amounted in the 1880's to a quarter of a million annually, decreased steadily after 1890 until in the years just before the World War it averaged only about 25,000. Industrialized Germany was nourishing an ever larger population and contenting it to remain at home.

The forms of political action remained much the same under William II as under Bismarck. There were no important constitutional changes, though there was a good deal of agitation for the democratizing of the Prussian government. Of the Political five major political parties of the Empire, the Centrists, Conservatives, and National Liberals almost, if William not quite, held their own; the Progressives decreased II and the Social Democrats increased. In the general election of 1912 the Social Democrats polled four and a quarter million votes to two million polled by the Catholic Centre, one and three quarters million by the National Liberals, and one and a half million each by the Progressives and the Conservatives.²

¹ The percentage of rural population decreased from 64 in 1871 to 40 in 1910.

² The seats thereby secured in the Reichstag by the several parties were: 110 Social Democrats, 90 Centrists, 45 National Liberals, 42 Progressives, and 57 Conservatives.

The extraordinarily large number of Social Democratic voters did not necessarily signify, however, that a Socialist revolution Growth was imminent. Many such voters were trade unionof Social Democratic overturn of the existing régime but hoped rather to verturn of the existing régime but hoped rather to convince it that it should grant more demands of organized labor, while many others were middle-class "radicals," who, though not enthusiastic about the professed economic doctrines of the Social Democratic party, had come to feel that in the political sphere the party was the most promising agency for reforming imperial institutions and introducing real democracy into Germany. Which helps to explain why, as the German Socialists grew more numerous, most of their leaders and the majority of the rank and file were more prone to talk about reform than to engage in revolution.

Between 1890, when Bismarck retired from office, and 1914, when the World War began, the German Empire had four Chancellors: Caprivi (1890–1894), Hohenlohe (1894–1900), Bülow (1900–1909), and Bethmann-Hollweg William (1909–1917). None of them had any such personal determination or popular prestige as Bismarck possessed. They experienced more difficulties with the Reichstag than Bismarck had experienced, and they were spasmodically interfered with and dictated to by the mercurial William II, who appointed and dismissed them at will. It was but natural that many different, and even contradictory, tendencies were displayed by the German government from 1890 to 1914.

Count George von Caprivi, who succeeded Bismarck in 1890, was a Prussian army officer who had served with some distinction in the wars of 1866 and 1870–1871. Not being a great andowner like his predecessor, however, he was somewhat despised by the Prussian aristocracy and was inclined, perhaps for that reason, to like business men and to admire England. For political support in the Reichstag he relied less on the Conservatives than on the National Liberals and Progressives, in harmony with whose wishes he allowed the anti-Socialist laws to lapse, negotiated an important treaty with Great Britain, and modified the German tariff. By the treaty with Great Britain (1890), Germany abandoned certain colonial claims in Africa and obtained the cession of the island of Heligoland in

the North Sea. By the new tariff enactment, the principle of reciprocity was approved; and in accordance with it commercial treaties were negotiated with Austria-Hungary, Tariff Russia, Rumania, and Italy, whereby Germany low-Reciprocered her import duties on grain from these countries ity in return for the reduction of their tariffs on her export manufactures. This arrangement was as unprofitable to German farmers as it was profitable to German industrialists and merchants; and the Prussian Conservatives, or "Agrarians," were moved mightily against Caprivi. In vain the Chancellor sought to humor them. They demanded his dismissal by the Emperor, and William II complied in 1894.

Caprivi's successor was Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, a fine old aristocrat from South Germany, who in his younger years had been the leading advocate in his native Hohen-Bavaria of national unification under Prussian aus-1894-1900 pices, and who had then served successively in the Franco-German War, in the diplomatic service, and as governor of Alsace-Lorraine. Now, at seventy-five years of age, he was not much more than a distinguished figure-head, the actual conduct of the government being less in his hands than in those of the Emperor and of Prince von Bülow, secretary of state for foreign affairs and a polished versatile Prussian landlord. In domestic matters the government persevered in resolute independence of the Agrarians and leaned heavily on the industrial and commercial classes for support in the Reichstag and in the country at large. It was in response to pressure from these classes as well as in furtherance of a policy which Bismarck had inaugurated that Hohenlohe and Bülow-and William II-devoted chief attention to the extension of German dominion, trade, and investment overseas. The tion of Imperial-Emperor himself declared in 1805 that "the German Empire has become a world empire." And under

his auspices the German government did much within the next few years to prove the truth of his declaration.

In 1897 the murder of two Christian missionaries of German

nationality in China provided the pretext for landing German troops in the bay of Kiaochow and wresting from China some economic concessions for German merchants and bankers and the lease to Germany (for ninety-nine years) of some 200 square

miles of territory on the peninsula of Shantung. In 1899, following the Spanish-American War, Germany purchased from Spain the Caroline Islands in the Pacific. In 1899–1900, by agreement with Great Britain and the United States, Germany acquired the two largest islands of Samoa. In 1900 a German expeditionary force coöperated, somewhat ostentatiously, with military units from other European Powers and from Japan and the United States in suppressing an anti-foreign ("Boxer") insurrection in China and occupying Peking.

In the meantime the German government was interesting itself in the Ottoman Empire. William II made a great show of his visit to the Sultan at Constantinople, and presently the Turkish army was being reorganized and drilled by German officers, and Turkish war materials were being purchased in Germany. In 1899 a group of German bankers obtained from the Sultan a concession for the building of a railway across Asiatic Turkey from the Bosphorus to Bagdad. In Brazil also, organized private enterprise, backed by the moral support of the German government, established a considerable settlement of German immigrants; and here, and elsewhere in South America, German investment and German trade were greatly increased.

Several factors conspired at this time to embark Germany on a policy of navalism, supplementary to her already highly developed militarism: the contention of many merchants and pub-Promo- licists that a powerful navy constituted the best surety of extended commerce and investment; the tion of practical lesson of the importance of sea power learned from American triumph over the Spaniards and from British victory over the Boers; the specific propaganda of patriotic societies, especially the German Navy league; the personal enthusiasm of William II, whose art of phrase-making did excellent service to the cause in such pithy sayings as "Germany's future lies upon the water" and "the ocean is essential to Germany's greatness"; and, last but not least, the organizing and persuasive powers, and the persistence, of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, who was appointed secretary of state for the navy in 1897 and retained that post until 1916. In 1898 was enacted the first, and in 1900 the second, of the important measures which built up for Germany an imposing navy of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, with a total tonnage second only to the British navy's,

and which cost the German people an annual sum of money rising from 30 million dollars in 1898 to 120 million in 1913.

The retirement of the aged Prince Hohenlohe in 1900 and the advancement of Prince von Bülow to the Chancellorship served to promote more cordial relations between the imperial government and the Prussian Conservatives. Bülow had a suavity in handling Prussian reactionaries and the Emperor likewise, which Hohenlohe and Caprivi lacked: he was fundamentally more sympathetic with them; and he was freer to do what he wished as Chancellor than as a subordinate minister. He managed to yoke the agrarian Conservatives with the industrial National Liberals in a parliamentary coalition, or bloc, by prevailing upon the latter to consent to the abandonment of the policy of commercial reciprocity, which had been followed since the advent of Caprivi, and the adoption of a new tariff law, in 1902, imposing high protective duties on the importation of foreign foodstuffs.

In the Prussian parliament, moreover, to the delight of extreme German nationalists, Bülow sponsored the enactment of measures, more drastic than Bismarck's, against the Poles, Antilimiting the use of their language, suppressing their Polish newspapers, and compelling them to sell land to German buyers. Yet, in spite of Bülow's best efforts to enforce his anti-Polish legislation, in spite of appropriations of a hundred million dollars to enable Germans to dispossess Poles in Prussia, the provinces of Posen and West Prussia actually contained a larger percentage of Polish-speaking inhabitants in 1910 than in 1880—inhabitants who were more militantly Polish than ever before and more thoroughly embittered against Germany.

As Bülow's domestic policy was dictated chiefly by Prussian Conservatives, so his foreign policy was determined mainly by imperialistically minded business men (particularly influential in the National Liberal party) and directed toward enlarging Germany's "place in the sun"—territorial and economic. Germany tightened her economic grip and military hold on the Ottoman Empire. She sought economic concessions in Morocco and attempted to frustrate French political designs there. She encouraged Russia to fight Japan in 1904–1905, and four years later, under threat of going to war

herself, she forced Russia to accede to Austrian aggression in the Balkans. These activities, accompanied by William II's striking references to Germany's "mailed fist" and by the rapid growth of the German navy, evoked apprehension in Russia and France and also in Great Britain. Italy, too, showed signs of weakening in her attachment to Germany. Showy pursuit of an ambitious world policy was multiplying foreign dangers.

Within Germany, critics of the newer imperial policies were

not wanting. Neither Socialists nor Centrists nor Progressives had ever taken kindly to the enormous financial outlays for army and navy; and in 1906, when Bülow asked the Reichstag for additional appropriations for the suppression of a native insurrection in German Southwest Africa, these parties seized the opportunity to put Bülow and his policies to a national test. Domestic They rejected the request, and, as they constituted for the moment a majority of the Reichstag, Bülow Critics and the Election then ordered its dissolution and the election of a new Reichstag. The ensuing electoral campaign of 1907 was hotly contested, but so stirring were the patriotic appeals addressed to the German people by the Emperor himself, and so clever were the political manipulations of the Chancellor, that, though the Centrists about held their own and the Socialists actually increased their popular vote, the government parties obtained a majority of the seats in the new Reichstag, the Socialist representation being cut from 81 to 43. Henceforth, while individual criticism continued, the opposition of the Centrist, Failure of Progressive, and Socialist political organizations was the Critics considerably chastened. And it was an ironical commentary on the election of 1907 that the resignation of Bülow two years later was brought about by the hostility of patriotic Conservatives to his taxation schemes and by the clamor of a militarist group, led by the Crown Prince, against the Chancellor's "lack of forcefulness" in checking the French in Morocco.

Bethmann-Hollweg, who succeeded Bülow in the Chancellorship, came of a wealthy family of Prussian landlords and, trained in law, had made his career in the Prussian civil service. He maintained his predecessor's foreign and domestic policies essentially intact, though for legislative assistance he relied chiefly on a coalition of Conservatives and Centrists. He displayed no lack of forcefulness in

asserting Germany's right to be considered a World Power of the first order, and in 1911 he had the satisfaction of securing, in settlement of the Moroccan dispute with France, the addition of 100,000 square miles of French Equatorial Africa to the German colony of Kamerun. Then, too, despite the fact that the Socialists again increased their representation in the Reichstag by the general election of 1912—this time from 43 to 110—Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded in obtaining the support of all the major political parties, the Social Democratic alone excepted, for his great army bill of 1913, raising the peace footing of the Empire from 656,000 men to 870,000 and involving an extraordinary expenditure of a quarter billion dollars. Even the Social Democrats voted for the special "war levy" when the Chancellor consented to make it in the form of direct taxation of incomes and inheritances.

The unanimity in the Reichstag of 1913 was an augury of the unanimity—and enthusiasm—with which the German nation the next year would follow William II and Bethmann-Hollweg into the World War. There would be an undercurrent of misgiving and criticism among some Germans, but ing Nathat Germany as a whole would hold out for four tional unity years against an encompassing league of powerful nations would prove conclusively that national unity—as well as material progress—had been enormously advanced by the Hohenzollern German Empire. The Hohenzollerns would eventually fall; Social Democrats and Centrists would have a brief day of real power; but German nationalism and a German Empire would abide.

2. THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, THE DUTCH NETHERLANDS, AND SWITZERLAND

To the north, west, and south of the German Empire was a fringe of small nations, Teutonic in speech, preponderantly Protestant in religion, and, with the exception of Switzerland, traditionally conservative and monarchical in politics. All of them had stirring histories of national independence; and the commercial importance which most of them had long enjoyed was enhanced in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the industrial development of their powerful neighbors and by their own geographical location on the quickening trade routes

between Great Britain and Germany or Great Britain and Russia.

The Scandinavian peoples—Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians -were much alike in origin, language, religion, and conditions of life, and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Scanthey passed through a similar social and political dinavian Countries evolution. All three lived more by agriculture, commerce, and fishing than by machine industry; in Denmark and even more in Sweden the landed aristocracy was relatively important, while Norway was a "peasant nation." Among all three some industrialization occurred, and socialism arose and spread its radical teachings. Gradually, in all three, political institutions were modernized and liberalized. Gradually, too, religious uniformity and intolerance were lessened by the growth of scepticism and indifference and by the infiltration of foreign influences; and in each of the Scandinavian countries, while the Lutheran Church remained the state church, dissenters from it were slowly but surely relieved of political and civil disabilities. Popular education was markedly fostered in all three countries, under ecclesiastical supervision. Each of the three peoples developed a noteworthy national literature and a lively sense of nationalism.

Denmark, by ceding Norway to Sweden in 1814 and by surrendering the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein to Germany in 1864,

Denmark was restricted to the peninsula of Jutland and its adjacent islands, and thus became, in European area, the smallest of the three Scandinavian countries.¹ Alone of these countries, however, Denmark possessed a colonial empire outside Europe: Iceland, Greenland, the Faroë Islands, and the West Indian islands of St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John.² By the constitution of 1849,³ revised in 1866, the King of Denmark shared his supreme political power with a bicameral parliament, the upper house consisting in part of persons named by the King and in part of persons chosen by indirect election, and the lower

¹ The area of Denmark from 1864 to 1919 was about 15,000 square miles (approximately the size of Massachusetts and New Hampshire), with a population (in 1911) of 2,755,000. At the same dates Sweden had an area of 173,000 square miles and a population of 5,522,000, while Norway had an area of 125,000 square miles and a population of 2,400,000.

² This colonial empire embraced an area (including only a small part of Greenland's) of some 87,000 square miles, almost six times the size of the mother-country. Its population, however, was very much smaller than Denmark's.

⁸ See above, pp. 126-127, 137-138.

house comprising representatives of "popular" electors over thirty years of age and in possession of certain property qualifica-

tions. Throughout the long reign of King Christian IX (1863-1906) a political contest was carried on between the lower house, on one side, and the monarch and upper house, on the other. The former sought to liber-

Christian IX, 1863-

alize the government by making the royal ministers responsible to parliament, and the King, intent upon strengthening the Danish army, long refused to make concessions to a body which would not vote the military appropriations requested by himself and his personally appointed ministers. From 1872 to 1901 the constitution was hardly more than waste paper. Public funds were repeatedly obtained and spent by the government without authorization of parliament.

During these years, however, the Danish peasants were steadily improving their economic condition through intensive cultivation of their small holdings and noteworthy development of dairy farming and cooperative enterprise. As they improved their economic position they took a more lively interest in Liberalizpolitics, gradually swelling the complaints of middleclass Liberals against arbitrary government, with the Constituresult that in 1901 the aged King finally yielded to tion, 1901 popular pressure and installed a ministry representing the majority in the lower house of parliament.

The Danish government was now liberal but not yet democratic, and agitation for extending the suffrage and democratizing Danish political institutions was forwarded by the death of Christian IX in 1906 and the accession of his less conservative son, Frederick VIII, and likewise by the rise of a Socialist party in Denmark. After protracted debates and several exciting elections, after the death of Frederick VIII in 1912 and the succession of his son as Christian X, constitutional amendments were ultimately adopted in 1914-1915, reducing the age limit of voters from thirty to twentyfive, extending the franchise for the lower house of the parliament to all men and most women, and abolishing

Democratizing the Dan-ish Constitution. 1914-1915

the appointive seats in the upper house. Already, measures of home rule had been enacted for the Faroë Islands and in 1903 for Iceland. In 1917 Denmark sold her West Indian islands, collectively called the Virgin Islands, to the United States.

Sweden had emerged from the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the loss of Finland to Russia, with the gain of Norway from Denmark, and with a new royal dynasty stemming from Marshal Bernadotte of France who

Bernadotte Union of Sweden and Norway, 1818-1905 became King Charles XIV (1818–1844).¹ All these happenings had important consequences for Sweden throughout the century. The Bernadotte dynasty, despite its French and revolutionary origin, proved to be even more stubbornly attached to royal prerogative and reactionary policies than were the Danish


sovereigns. The loss of Finland stimulated popular apprehension about Russia and led to a more pronounced militarism in Sweden than in Denmark. And the artificial union of Norway with Sweden produced an unhappy feud between the two nations.

Sweden and Norway were incompatible socially and politically. Sweden was a country of large landed estates with a proud and well-to-do nobility and a dependent peasantry. Nor-Contrasts between way was a country of small farms, with a peasantry Sweden and fisher-folk accustomed to economic independence and Norand to a feeling of contempt for titles of nobility. Moreover, as the nineteenth century advanced, Sweden underwent considerable industrialization with attendant growth of urban classes of capitalists and proletarians, while Norway remained overwhelmingly agricultural and commercial.² Then, too, the political institutions of the two countries were widely divergent. Norway had a typically liberal constitution, which had been prepared just before the union with Sweden and which vested supreme authority in a parliament elected indirectly by taxpayers. In Sweden, on the other hand, the only constitutional check upon royal absolutism until 1863 was the clumsy oldfashioned Estates General with its four houses of nobles, clergy-

 $^{^1\,\}mathrm{See}$ Vol. I, pp. 663–665, 684, 687–688, 703–704, 794. See also the genealogical table at p. 183, above.

^{· 2} Norway, naturally a sea-faring nation, became very important commercially in the nineteenth century. In 1913 she possessed a merchant marine whose total tonnage of two and a half million was exceeded only by the tonnage of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. The Swedish merchant marine, we may add, outranked the Russian and the Austrian.

NOTE. The picture opposite is a view of Stockholm, the Swedish capital, from an etching by a British artist, Muirhead Bone (born 1876).





men, burghers, and peasants; and though in 1863 a modern bicameral parliament was substituted for the medieval Estates General, the aristocratic classes controlled it and the King retained an absolute veto over its acts. Thus it befell that Charles XIV and his Bernadotte successors were "divine-right" monarchs in Sweden and "limited" monarchs in Norway. Naturally they preferred Sweden to Norway and viewed the liberal and democratic tendencies in the latter with disfavor.

By the terms of the union of 1815, Norway had been formally recognized as "a free, independent, and indivisible kingdom, united with Sweden under one king." But while the Norway ioint King observed the letter of the agreement by under the tolerating the Norwegian parliament and allowing it Union to exercise jurisdiction over strictly local affairs in Norway, he insisted on his own centralizing control of the army, the foreign relations, and a good deal of the civil administration of both his realms. To the most responsible and lucrative posts in the joint services he usually appointed Swedes rather than Norwegians, and, backed by Swedish popular sentiment, he urged again and again a closer union between the two states. The union was already too close to suit the Norwegians, who proceeded in the latter part of the nineteenth century, under the influence of a patriotic and literary quickening, to clamor for a national flag and a consular service of their own, separate and distinct from Sweden's. This last demand finally ruptured the union. Following the stubborn refusal of Oscar II (1872-1907) to sanction the appointment of Norwegian consular agents in foreign Separacountries, the Norwegian parliament in June 1905 tion of Norway unanimously decreed the complete separation of Norfrom way from Sweden and the dethronement of the Berna-Sweden. 1905 dotte King. The decree was ratified by a plebiscite of the Norwegian people and grudgingly agreed to by the Swedish government. Whereupon the second son of the King of Denmark, on the invitation of the Norwegian parliament, endorsed by another national plebiscite, accepted the crown of Norway and assumed the title of Haakon VII (1905).

The dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway

Note. The portrait of Oscar II, opposite, is from an etching by the Swedish artist, Anders Zorn (1860–1920).

gave impetus to democratic agitation in both countries. In Haakon Norway, universal manhood suffrage had already been introduced (1898); direct elections were substituted for indirect (1906); the suffrage was extended to women, at first with property qualifications (1907) and presently (1913) on the same broad basis as to men; the royal veto was abolished (1913) and the crown rendered purely honorary.

In Sweden, shortly after the death of King Oscar II and the accession of his son, Gustavus V (1907), important constitutional amendments were adopted, providing for proportional representation in both chambers of parliament, establishing Democuniversal manhood suffrage for elections to the lower ratizing of Sweden chamber, and easing the property qualifications for under members of the upper chamber. A government bill Gustavus V of 1912 which proposed to enfranchise women was temporarily shelved, however, by reason of an acute conflict between King Gustavus and the Liberal ministry concerning a military program which the former championed and the latter opposed, a program involving heavy financial burdens for the enforcement of universal army service and the construction of extensive fortifications along the Russian frontier. The ensuing general election of 1914, influenced by the outbreak of the World War, returned to parliament a majority favorable to the King and military "preparedness," though opposing Socialists obtained more than a third of the seats in the lower chamber.

Such a large number of Socialists indicated the presence of a large body of urban workingmen in Sweden, just as the imposition of a protective tariff in 1888 witnessed to the presence of capital-

istic business men and landlords. Sweden, more than Indusany other Scandinavian country, was undergoing ecotrializanomic transformation and entering into rivalry with tion in Sweden industrialized nations, and she was paying a price for it in the dislocation and discontent of her lower classes. Some remedial social legislation was enacted in Sweden, and in Denmark and Norway likewise. But that the masses continued to need and to desire economic betterment was attested not only by the spread of Socialism among them but also by the large Scandinavian emigration to America. Sweden, the worst sufferer in this respect, lost between 1870 and 1914 one and a half million citizens, most of whom settled permanently in the United States.

The kingdom of the Dutch Netherlands—or "Holland," as the country is commonly but incorrectly styled 1—reverted, after the loss of Belgium in 1830, to its previous position as one of the very small independent states of Europe, with an Netherlands less than Denmark's and less than half of Portugal's and with a population slighter than Belgium's. Unlike Belgium, moreover, it experienced no intensive industrialization but continued to be a little land of burghers, farmers, and fishermen. Yet it retained throughout the nineteenth century an economic importance in Europe—and the world—out of all proportion to the number of its square miles or of its factories and inhabitants. The Dutch Netherlands, we must remember, still possessed a large part of the colonial and commercial empire which had been acquired in the seventeenth century.

Even after the loss of colonies to which the Dutch had been subjected by Great Britain during the Napoleonic wars,2 they maintained an East Indian Empire-Java, Sumatra, the Spice Islands (Celebes, etc.), most of Borneo, and half of New Guinea—fifty-eight times as large as the mother-Colonial country and six times as populous, and, in addition, the colonies of Guiana (Surinam) in South America and Curação in the West Indies. This whole imperial domain, especially the major part of it in the East Indies, was an unfailing source of wealth, as well as prestige, to the Dutch. It provided handsome financial remuneration for many Dutch citizens who carried on its administration and exploitation; and it was so developed and regulated as to secure to Dutch merchants and bankers a practical monopoly of its valuable foreign commerce and of lucrative investments for its internal development. Wherefore Amsterdam continued to be the great international market for the especially rich produce of the Spice Islands and the other Dutch Indies, East and West, and withal an important financial centre, while Rotterdam rose to new commercial greatness.

¹Holland is but one of the eleven provinces composing the "Dutch Netherlands." The phrase "Dutch Netherlands" is here employed to designate the whole Kingdom of the Netherlands in contradistinction to the "Belgian Netherlands" (or Belgium). It should be borne in mind, however, that half the inhabitants of the Belgian Netherlands speak Flemish, which is just another name for Dutch, and hence the phrase "Dutch Netherlands" might designate, linguistically though not politically, not only the whole kingdom of the Netherlands but half of Belgium also.

² See Vol. I, pp. 713, 725–726.

The commercial—and agricultural—significance of the Dutch Netherlands was further enhanced in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the country's proximity to nations Dutch which were now becoming highly industrialized.1 It Commerce was at the very crossroads of Great Britain, Germany, and Belgium, whose mutual exchange of wares, often effected across Dutch territory, was profitable to Dutch carriers and middle-men, and whose rapidly growing urban populations provided an enlarging and increasingly gainful market for the produce of Dutch truck-gardens, dairy farms, and deep-sea fisheries. In the circumstances, it was advantageous for the Dutch Netherlands to remain a free-trade country at the very time when policies of tariff protection and economic nationalism were being adopted by all other countries of Continental Europe.

Perhaps because of the economic prosperity of the Netherlands, the Dutch readily acquiesced in a political régime which was extraordinarily conservative and showed themselves very reluctant to embark on democratic experiments. Not even the revolt and secession of liberal Belgium in 1830 shook the absolutism of the Orange monarch or altered the subservience of the old-fashioned Estates General. It was not until 1848 that the King, William II, was impelled to "liberalize" the political institutions

Restricted "Liberalism" of Dutch Government of the country by the grant of a constitution,² transforming the Estates General into a bicameral parliament and making the royal ministers responsible to it, and also getting rid of serious limitations on religious liberty. At the same time, however, an absolute veto over all legislation was retained by the monarch, while

the imposition of heavy property qualifications rigidly restricted the parliamentary electorate to the wealthiest class of citizens. Although the qualifications for voting were subsequently lowered, doubling the number of electors in 1887 and again in 1896, political democracy made slower and more halting progress in the Netherlands than in any other country of western Europe. Down to 1917 only a bare majority of the male population over twenty-five years of age was privileged to vote or hold public

¹ The foreign and colonial commerce of the Netherlands in 1913 had a value of nearly three billion dollars, only a little less than that of France. More than a third of Dutch commerce was with Germany.

² See above, pp. 127, 137-138; and on the Belgian secession of 1830, see Vol. I, pp. 788-789, 795.

office, and the sovereign still exercised the right of initiating and vetoing legislation.

During the long reign of King William III (1849-1890), the chief political debates had to do with popular education. On one side, a Liberal party contended for a system of free. public, secular schools in which no religious instruction should be given. On the other side, a Protestant Conservative party and a Catholic party 1 made common cause in behalf of a system of public schools to be directed by the churches and supported by the state. For a time the Liberals appeared to have the upper hand; the state established and financed a system of "neutral" public schools. In 1889, however, Conservatives and Catholics secured governmental financial support for their respective denominational schools. And in 1900, in the nature of a compromise between the opponents and proponents of religious education, every Dutch child was required by law to attend either a private "religious" school or one that was public and "neutral."

William III was succeeded on the Dutch throne by his daughter, Wilhelmina, who came of age in 1898 and three years later married a German prince, Henry of Mecklenburg. Wilhelmina marriage, in conjunction with the close commercial and cultural relations between Germany and the National Netherlands, aroused some apprehension among Dutch Defense patriots and stimulated a popular movement for "national defense." The Queen put herself at the head of this movement: she kept Prince Henry in the background; and under her guidance the Dutch parliament reorganized the army on the basis of general conscription and spent large sums on fortifications.

The Kings of the Netherlands, of the House of Orange, had also been, from 1815 to 1890, Grand-Dukes of Luxemburg, a diminutive state bordering on France, Belgium, and Germany. According to an arrangement within the Orange family, the grand-duchy did not pass with the death of William III in 1890 to his daughter, as

¹ The majority of the population of the Dutch Netherlands were adherents of the Reformed (Calvinist) Church, though the Catholic Church, benefiting from the full toleration accorded it in 1848 and from the reëstablishment of the Dutch hierarchy by Pope Pius IX in 1853, comprised a gradually growing minority. The official census of 1920 recorded 2,400,000 Catholics; 2,800,000 Dutch Reformed and 800,000 other Protestants; 100,000 Jews; and 600,000 of no religion.

the kingdom of the Netherlands did, but rather to a male kinsman, Adolphus of Nassau. The grand-daughter of this Adolphus, Marie Adelaide, was ruling in Luxemburg in 1914 when the grand-duchy, despite an earlier international guaranty of its territorial integrity and neutrality, fell victim to the World War and was overrun by German troops.

Switzerland differed in certain respects from the other "Teutonic" countries which we have just mentioned. It was a land of mountaineers, without seacoast or merchant marine. It was not a "national state," but a confederation of diverse peoples. It was one of the most democratic countries in the world.

Perched high upon the common Alpine watersheds of the Rhine, the Danube, and the Rhône, Switzerland was hardly larger in area than the Dutch Netherlands and actu-Switzerally smaller than the two American states of Vermont land, a and New Hampshire. Included in it, however, were Federal State some twenty-two republics, or "cantons," differing among themselves in language, religion, and customs, according to their geographical proximity to Germany, France, or Italy. In fifteen cantons, embracing two-thirds of the population of the whole confederation, the German language prevailed. Of the remaining seven cantons, five were predominantly French in speech and two were Italian. Protestants were in a majority in twelve cantons, and Catholics in ten.

That such diverse populations, in an age of intensifying nationalism, could constitute a single and substantial political union and evince a common patriotic devotion to it is attributable in part to the force of the old and well-established tradition of Swiss independence and confederation and in part to the nature and practical operation of the confederation itself. The population of any one canton was fairly homogeneous in nationality—it was German, or French, or Italian—and each canton National had a government of its own and managed its own State domestic affairs. The powers of the federal government were limited, and were usually exercised so as not to wound the sensibilities of any canton or any linguistic group: German,

¹Luxemburg was a member of the German Confederation from 1815 to 1867, when it was "neutralized." See Vol. I, p. 727, and the present volume, above, p. 207. See also the genealogical table at p. 610, above.

French, and Italian were equally "official" languages of Switzerland; and the presidency of the Confederation was rotated among the different nationalities.

Of the Swiss confederation as a whole, and likewise of the several cantons which composed it, political democracy was an outstanding feature. For the confederation, democratic institutions were established by the constitution of 1848 1 and extended by the constitutional revision of 1874. The latter, though making no important change in the structure of government, introduced the principle of the popular "referendum" in legislation and at the same time somewhat enlarged the powers of the confederation, authorizing it, for example, to establish and supervise a system of free elementary schools for all Swiss children. In 1801 was adopted, as a corollary to the referendum, the "initiative," that is, the right of a specified number of Swiss citizens to demand the submission of any measure of which they might approve to a referendum of the entire citizenry. By means of initiative and referendum, as well as through parliamentary action, much popular legislation was enacted for the whole of Switzerland, especially from 1890. In 1891 tariff protectionism was substituted for free trade. In 1808 the federal government was directed to prepare and enforce uniform codes of civil and criminal law and to purchase and operate the hitherto privately owned railways. In 1908 the development of the immense water-power resources of the country was entrusted to the federal government. In 1912 a plan for the compulsory insurance of workingmen against sickness and accidents was approved by popular referendum.

In the matter of military defense, the Swiss people, in view of the mounting armaments of all the surrounding Great Powers, and fearful lest their own neutrality, despite the solemn pledges of the Congress of Vienna (1815), might Swiss Militia not be respected in case of a general European war, deemed it necessary to authorize the compulsory training and service of all able-bodied young citizens for a certain number of days every year. This "militia," originally sanctioned in 1874 just after the Franco-Prussian War, was confirmed and strengthened by several laws during the years just preceding the World War, particularly by a law of 1907. By this time, military ex-

¹ See above, pp. 137, 277.

penditure was costing the Swiss government a third of its total income from taxes.

Throughout the forty years from 1874 to 1914 several factors contributed to the economic development of Switzerland. One, of

Swiss Economic Development long standing, was the habitual thrift of the hardy natives who still in considerable numbers herded flocks upon the mountain-sides or practiced the science of intensive cultivation in the narrow valleys. Second was

the more recent but now steadily augmenting influx of foreign tourists who interspersed their Alpine-climbing and sight-seeing with liberal expenditure to innkeepers and to purveyors of Swiss souvenirs. Third was the still more recent growth of manufacturing—and of industrialization in general—which was doubtless stimulated by tariff legislation and which was represented in 1913 by numerous establishments for the making of textiles, gloves, pottery, watches and clocks, and milk chocolate. The Swiss had no colonies, but they had a foreign trade valued at almost two-thirds of a billion dollars.

3. THE HABSBURG EMPIRE: THE DUAL MONARCHY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The great prestige and the commanding conservative influence which the Habsburg Empire of Austria had had in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century were seriously impaired by the internal revolutionary upheaval of 1848–1849 ¹ and by the external military assaults of France and Italy in 1859 and of Prussia and Italy in 1866.² During the second half of the century the Empire continued to exist and to be generally recognized not only as the oldest and most famous European state—an extraor-

Historic Empire and Great Power dinary extension_into modern times of the Roman Empire of the middle ages and of antiquity—but also as one of the six or seven Great Powers of the contemporaneous world. Yet its expulsion from the

temporaneous world. Yet its expulsion from the Italian peninsula and its exclusion from the German Empire had ended its historic predominance in central Europe. Simultaneously the rapidly mounting ambition of Russian tsars and Balkan nationalities limited its opportunities for compensatory sway in eastern Europe. And from within, it was palpably being subverted, or threatened with subversion, by a rising tide of

nineteenth-century novelties-industrialization, liberalism, democracy, and, most portentous of all, cultural and political nationalism.

The history of the Habsburg Empire from 1867 to 1914 is a story of stubborn attempts to maintain as many of its old traditions as possible, while making some concessions to the new forces of nationalism and liberalism. During all these years, the chief responsibility for major policies, domestic and foreign, continued to rest with the Emperor Francis Joseph (1848–1916), an especially stubborn monarch, ex- Francis tremely proud of being the head of the Habsburg 1848-1016 family—the oldest and most renowned of all princely German lines and of all European dynasties—very meticulous about court ceremonial and the proprieties of social distinction, firmly convinced of his divinely bestowed prerogatives, untiringly conscientious and diligent in daily attention to details of public business, but notably lacking in intellectual breadth and imaginative powers. Francis Joseph, when faced with the necessity of departing from some cherished tradition of the Empire, would always hesitate and eventually choose a path which diverged least from the tradition in question.

Thus in 1867, when it became clear even to him that he had to transform his centralized polyglot realm into some sort of a federation of national states, Francis Joseph chose to transform it, not into a five-state federation which would have given each of the principal subject peoples a national state of its own, but rather into a two-state federation, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. This seemed to him more con-Concessonant with precedents of the past and more condusions to Hungary: cive to the abiding supremacy of himself and the

customary ruling classes. True, he thereby made almost revolutionary concessions to Magyar nation-

promise" of 1867

alism and admitted, somewhat reluctantly, the Magyar aristocracy to a partnership with his preponderantly German entourage in the management of the Habsburg Empire. Yet the "Compromise" of 1867 had its advantages. It preserved the unity of military and diplomatic services, in which Francis Joseph was most interested, and guarantied the supreme direction of them

¹ By the Ausgleich, or "Compromise," of 1867, concerning which see above, pp. 241-242.

to himself, now jointly "Emperor of Austria" and "Apostolic King of Hungary." It prevented either Austria or Hungary from becoming a strictly national state.

Similarly, the government within each half of the Dual Monarchy, while being put definitely on "constitutional" and "parlia-

Continuation of Undemocratic Government mentary" bases in 1867 in accordance with widespread liberal demands, was constructed in such a way that the parliament (whether Austrian or Hungarian) was dominated by nobility and upper middle-class, while the Emperor-King was permitted to exercise an absence of the proposed logislation, to retain ministries

solute veto over all proposed legislation, to retain ministries which might not have the support of a majority in parliament, and to control a large portion of the civil as well as military service of the entire realm.

Between the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the realm some economic differences existed and some political disputes occurred

Economic Differences between Austria and Hungary after 1867. Austria experienced a progressive industrialization, especially in and around Vienna and in the provinces of Bohemia, Silesia, and Galicia, with the result that manufacturing, commercial, and banking interests, and an urban industrial proletariat, became very important and vied with agricultural

interests and a rural peasantry in influencing Austrian policy. Hungary, on the other hand, remained overwhelmingly agricultural, and hence relatively backward in accumulating industrial capital and in developing either a strong middle class or a numerous proletariat; the masses consisted chiefly of a dependent peasantry, and opposition to the predominance of the landed aristocracy came almost wholly from the professional classes.

In view of the economic disparity between the two parts of the Habsburg Empire, there was recurrent haggling between them over the proportional contribution which each should make to

¹ The parliament of the "Empire of Austria," as reorganized in 1867, consisted of two chambers: a House of Lords, comprising Habsburg princes, hereditary nobles, ecclesiastical dignitaries, and certain other persons appointed by the Emperor for life; and a House of Representatives, elected at first by a very restricted class suffrage. The parliament of the "Kingdom of Hungary," as originally provided for in the Hungarian constitution of 1848, and now revived in 1867, consisted likewise of two chambers: a Table of Magnates, similar in composition to the Austrian House of Lords; and a Chamber of Deputies, representing an even more restricted electorate than did the Austrian House of Representatives.

the joint governmental expenses.¹ There were difficulties also about tariff policy: Austria inclined to protection of industry and free trade in farm products; Hungary demanded protection of agriculture and free trade in manufactured commodities. Here a compromise was worked out between 1881 and 1887, partially but not wholly acceptable to either party, whereby tariff protection was accorded to both industry and agriculture.

Political Friction between Austria and Hungary: Taxation and Tariff

The adoption of military reforms in 1868, based on universal conscription, led to many additional bickerings between the two governments when they had to agree, from time to time, on the size of the contingent to be provided by each and on the regulations which should govern the common army. The Hungarian government was particularly insistent that its contingent should be officered exclusively by Magyars and that commands should be addressed to it in the Magyar language. Failing to secure this latter concession, Hungary in 1807 refused to renew the military agreement with Austria. By annual decrees of the Emperor-King, however, the joint army was maintained and the use of German as the general language of command was continued. In 1907, confronted with special foreign dangers, Hungary formally renewed the military agreement without express settlement of the question of language.

Still another source of friction between Austria and Hungary was the establishment of a centralized Austro-Hungarian bank at Vienna in 1878. (This was in harmony with Austrian interests and wishes, but it was combated by Hungarians, who demanded in its stead the establishment of separate "national" banks for Austria and Hungary with, at most, common superintendence. Although in the matter of banking, as in that of the army, the Hungarians failed to realize their demands.

¹ These and other debates between Austria and Hungary took place officially in a curious kind of joint parliament, called the "Delegations," which was established by the Ausgleich of 1867 to supervise the joint ministries of foreign affairs, army, and finance, and to regulate certain matters of common concern, such as trade, tariffs, public debt, and railways. The "Delegations" consisted of sixty delegates from the Austrian parliament and sixty from the Hungarian. They met alternately in Vienna and in Budapest. The Austrian delegates, using the German language, and the Hungarians, employing Magyar, normally sat in separate chambers and communicated with each other in writing; only in the event of a failure to agree after a third exchange of written communications might all the delegates meet in joint session, and then simply to vote, not to discuss.

they obtained a promise that after 1917 every commercial treaty of the Dual Monarchy with a foreign nation should be signed, not merely by the joint minister of foreign affairs, but also by separate representatives of the Austrian and Hungarian governments.

Notwithstanding periodic disputes, the governments of both Austria and Hungary perceived some advantages in the intimate

Mutual Advantages of Austro-Hungarian Union alliance between them in the Dual Monarchy and were accordingly quite loyal to it. In combination they could count for more in the world, materially and in prestige, than either could count separately. Their joint fiscal arrangements served to keep an extensive area in east-central Europe free from internal tariff

barriers and at the same time, by means of a common external tariff, to provide privileged markets for Austrian industry in Hungary and for Hungarian agriculture in Austria. Their joint military forces served, moreover, not only to maintain the position and reputation of the Habsburg domain as a Great Power, but also to double the resistance which Austria or Hungary might offer to rebellion of subject nationalities at home or to aggression by Russia or other belligerent power abroad.

The partners in the Dual Monarchy were especially fearful of Russian influence, and intent upon counteracting it, in Ottoman and Balkan lands, as well as among the Austro-Hungarian Slavic minorities in their own lands. Wherefore they Coöpcoöperated in supporting a big military establishment, eration in building a strong navy in the Adriatic, in forming close defensive alliances with the German Empire, Italy, and Rumania, and in attempting to curb the expansionist ambitions Especially of the Yugoslav state of Serbia. In 1878, in temporary in Foreign Policy league with Great Britain, they managed to deprive Russia of some of the fruits of her victory over the Turks ¹ and Policy simultaneously to obtain the assent of the European Great Powers to Austria-Hungary's "occupation" of three provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the Yugoslav provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina. and Novibazar. Then, thirty years later, taking advantage of a revolution within the Ottoman Empire and of serious troubles within the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908), while returning Novibazar to Turkish rule. This forceful and spectacular annexation of two pop-

¹ See above, pp. 264-265.

ulous Yugoslav provinces, which Serbia coveted, was of immediate advantage to the prestige of the Dual Monarchy but eventually led to the World War, the supreme test as to whether Austria-Hungary should survive or give way to Serbia and Russia.¹

In the meantime, the internal politics of the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy, as distinct from the Hungarian part, were reflecting the march of the Industrial Revolution and undergoing noteworthy transformation. Alongside the old aristocracy and professional bureaucracy appeared rapidly increasing numbers of business men and proletarians, successively clamoring for participation in government. industrial and financial bourgeoisie, as well as members of the learned professions, had been enfranchised in 1867, and during the 1870's, through the Liberal party to which most of them adhered, they exerted no little influence on Austrian legislation. They promoted policies favorable to big business and high finance, and in the "liberal" tradition of the Party Continent they displayed equal anxiety to establish public schools and to banish ecclesiastical influence. They were "enlightened" and "anti-clerical," and, recruited mainly from the German (and Jewish) element in Austria, they were prone to emphasize the German character of the state and the desirability of Germanizing its dissident and "inferior" populations.

In the 1880's the influence of the bourgeois Liberals was weakened by the rise of the Christian Socialist party. This was a Catholic party, organized by Karl Lueger, a Viennese Christian lawyer of lower-class origins who by impassioned at-Socialist tacks on "Tewish capitalism" and earnest pleas for political democracy, social legislation, and justice to Austria's subject nationalities, attracted a large following among the lower middle class of the cities and among the peasantry of the countryside and also won allies among Catholic Poles and Czechs. One significant result was the enactment of several measures designed to better the lot of workingmen. Thus, in 1884-1885, factories and mines were regulated; Sunday labor was forbidden, and the hours of labor on other days were restricted; and the employment of women and children in industry was limited. In 1887-1888, trade unions were legalized and safeguarded, and a system of

¹ For a fuller account of the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy, see below, pp. 753, 755-758, 768-777.

insuring workers against accidents and sickness, similar to Germany's, was adopted. Karl Lueger himself presently became mayor of Vienna and for ten years utilized his position and personal popularity to make the capital city a leading exemplar of the municipal ownership and operation of public utilities.

Another significant result was the passing of the "liberal" state, with its narrowly restricted franchise, and the coming of the "democratic" state. A law of 1896 more than Democratizing tripled the number of parliamentary electors in Austhe Austria, and an even more important act of 1907 adopted trian Conuniversal manhood suffrage and rendered its exercise stitution By this time, however, the Christian Socialist compulsory. party was waning, relatively if not absolutely, not so much because of any marked revival of bourgeois liberalism as because of rapid conversion of young intellectuals and urban workingmen to the tenets of Marxian Socialism and the newly formed Social Democratic party. In the general election of 1907—the first really democratic election in Austria—the Social Dem-Social ocrats increased their representation in the lower Demochamber of parliament from 11 to 87, while the Chriscratic Party tian Socialists obtained 115 seats and the Liberals 62.

And more ominous in the long run than this evidence of Socialist strength was the evidence which the election of 1907 afforded of the extent of nationalist dissent within Austria. As against the total of 264 seats now occupied by the "German" parties of Christian Socialists, Social Democrats, and Liberals, dissident nationalist groups secured 246: Czechs, 82; Poles, 72; Slovenes, 37; Ruthenians, 30; Italians, 15; Rumanians, 5; Jewish Zionists, 5.

Here was the cardinal difficulty with which Austria had been persistently confronted ever since the Ausgleich of 1867, a diffi-

Problem of Subject Peoples in Austria culty which had complicated the "liberal" experiments of the 1870's, and which now, after 1907, complicated still more the operation of democratic government.

It was the difficulty of reconciling an imperial state with the nationalism of its several peoples. Apparently, in the existing circumstances, a solution of the difficulty was beyond the comprehension of the Emperor and statesmen of Austria; and yet, lacking a solution, Austria was ever more seriously menaced by disintegration from within and by dangers from without. During the latter part of the nineteenth century and

the first decade of the twentieth, nationalism was being progressively propagated among Austria's non-German subjects, not only by their own local intellectuals, publicists, and political leaders, but likewise by zealous spokesmen of their kinsmen in Russia, Serbia, Rumania, or Italy.

Of all Austria's subject peoples, only the Poles seemed fairly content. There was no free Poland to which they might gravitate, and they were better treated than were the Poles in Russia or in Prussia. Ruthenian patriots, however, disliked the Poles and thought fondly of rescuing the Ruthenian peasantry from the "oppression" of Polish landlords—and of the Austrian government—and joining them with their own "nation" in the Russian Ukraine. In similar vein, Rumanian nationalists dreamed of incorporating the Austrian province of Bukovina in independent Rumania; Slovene nationalists, of uniting with Croats and Serbs to recreate a Rumadimly remembered Yugoslav empire; and Italian na-Slovenes. tionalists, of completing the political unification of and the kingdom of Italy by annexing to it the Italian-Italians speaking districts of Austria-Trent, Trieste, and Istria. Czech patriots were especially furious because the Austrian government had not conferred on the once independent "kingdom of Bohemia" a full autonomy and admitted it to equality with the kingdom of Hungary and the empire of Austria. Czechs constituted, indeed, the forefront and spearhead of all the dissident nationalist opposition to the existing Austrian régime, and on occasion they did not hesitate to avow the liveliest friendship for foreign foes of Austria, particularly for Russia. At first only a very small number of the most fanatically

minded among Austria's Czechs, Italians, Slovenes, Rumanians, Ruthenians, and Poles worked consciously to disrupt the Empire. What the vast majority of them long demanded was cultural freedom and some degree of political autonomy within the Empire. The Austrian government, in fact, did make concessions to them, especially during the 1880's and 1890's, in Some respect of cultural nationalism, permitting them the free use of their respective languages, splitting the University of Prague into two—a German university and a Czech university—and allowing the local ad-

Concessions to Cultural Nation-

ministration of such cities as Cracow, Prague, and Trieste to be

conducted respectively by native Poles, Czechs, and Italians. But the more cultural concessions were granted, the more their beneficiaries expected and demanded; and against demands of political nationalism the Austrian government was adamant. There were too many influential Germans in Bohemia No Concessions to be arbitrarily subjected to a Czech government to Politthere; too many in the Slovene province of Carniola ical Nato be put under Yugoslav rule. Poles would object to tionalism an autonomous Ruthenia, and Ruthenians to a Polish-governed Galicia. An Italian-directed Istria would be likely to oppress resident Yugoslavs, and a Yugoslav-directed Istria would be resented by Italians. Besides, it was difficult enough to harmonize the relations of a single Austria with a single Hungary. How enormously more difficult it would be to harmonize the relations of the six or seven states into which Austria would be divided if the same measure of independence were given to each of its peoples as had already been given to the Hungarians. And to the staid and unadventurous mind of the Emperor Francis Toseph, the idea of subdividing Austria further was fantastic.

So, conflict between the Austrian government and its subject peoples became ever sharper, on an ever widening front. The more the former tended toward democracy, the greater was the

Austrian
Democracy Paralyzed by
Conflicting Nationalisms

opportunity for the latter to voice their grievances and their demands. Repeatedly, the parliamentary institutions of Austria were paralyzed by fights, both verbal and fistic, in the House of Representatives. Czech representatives for several years absented themselves from the House, and when they did appear they

displayed much skill in hurling ink-bottles at the presiding officer and in otherwise provoking the wildest tumult. Poles and Rumanians were not so obstreperous, but Ruthenians, Slovenes, and Italians required no instruction from Czechs to learn how to annoy and outrage German members of parliament and of the ministry. The recourse which the latter had was to suspend parliament and to govern without it through decrees of the Emperor. For years at a stretch the Emperor and his ministers felt obliged to impose taxes and carry on the administration without express parliamentary sanction. Thus after 1907, while appearing to be a constitutional state with universal manhood

suffrage, Austria remained essentially absolutist. Political democracy proved inoperative in a country of diverse populations.

The internal politics of the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy were not so complicated, for the simple reason that the Magyar aristocracy made no pretense of sharing the management of Hungary with the masses of their own garian Internal people, to say nothing of sharing it with any subject nationality. They preserved their hold on large landed estates throughout the realm. They forced the use of their own language in the public schools of the whole kingdom. They did their best to Magyarize the Slovak peasantry in their northern provinces and the Serb population in the south. They abolished all traces of local autonomy in the large Repres-Rumanian-speaking province of Transvlvania, in the sion of Slovaks, east. In the west, they put more and more restrictions Rumanion the partial autonomy which they had granted in ans, and Croats 1868 to Croatia. They kept the Hungarian parliament and the ministry at Budapest under their own domination. They persistently refused to extend the suffrage for parliamentary elections; and so high were the property qualifications for its exercise and so intricate were the electoral laws that in 1910, out of a total population of over twenty million in the Hungarian kingdom, fewer than one million were cratic voters, and, though the total population was about Governevenly divided between Magyars and non-Magyars,

The subject nationalities in Hungary were thus even more discontented than those in Austria, although their wholesale exclusion from the Hungarian parliament at Budapest deprived them of a central place, such as the parliament at Vienna provided for dissident Austrian nationalists, where they might collaborate against the existing régime and advertise their grievances and their demands to the world. But if the subject peoples of Hungary were less vocal in politics than those of Austria, they were more ready to welcome a disruption of the monarchy.

almost all the seats in the parliament were occupied by Magyars.²

¹On Croatia, see above, pp. 131-133, 242.

² In 1910 the Magyars in Hungary numbered about ten million, while the other ten million inhabitants of Hungary consisted of three million Rumanians (in Transylvania), two and three-quarters million Slovaks, half a million Ruthenians, one and a quarter million Yugoslovs (in Croatia and the Serbian Banat), and some two and a half million Germans.

The poorer classes of Magyars as well as the subject peoples suffered from the aristocratic character of the Hungarian government. Though much was done by the Hungarian parliament to foster popular education, and though some of the worst grievances of the peasants against their landlords were redressed, Peasant the remarkable agricultural development which Hun-Unrest in gary experienced between 1867 and 1914 redounded chiefly to the financial advantage of the great land-owners and governmental oligarchy. This fact was evidenced by a startling emigration from the country, amounting to over a million for the years from 1896 to 1910, and by a widespread popular agitation for electoral reform, an agitation which in the first decade of the twentieth century brought the kingdom to the verge of civil war. These domestic difficulties were still unsurmounted when the Hungarian government, in concert of mind and arms with the Austrian government, precipitated the World War.

Among the governing classes of Hungary, as of Austria, and also among very large sections of the masses in both parts of the Dual Monarchy existed still a deep-seated veneration for the Emperor-King Francis Joseph, whose long reign since A Vener-1848 had been replete with historic significance—the able Emperorthe wars of 1849, 1859, and 1866; the establishment of King the Ausgleich; the economic and political transformation of the Habsburg Empire. Francis Joseph bridged the years between Metternich and the World War. He had witnessed the rise and fall of Napoleon III, the coming and going of Disraeli and Gladstone, the beginning and the end of the exploits of Bismarck. And with something like awe for the seeming changelessness of the Habsburg monarch in the midst of an otherwise swiftly changing world was mingled a very real sympathy for him in the succession of domestic tragedies which attended his reign: the execution of his brother Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, in 1867; the mysterious suicide of his only son Rudolph in 1889; the assassination of his wife by an anarchist at Geneva in 1897; and the murder of his nephew and heir, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, at Sarajevo in 1914. Close upon this last domestic tragedy came to the old Emperor-King, now in his eighty-fifth year, the World War, the ultimate catastrophe of his long and eventful reign.

4. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

The Russian Empire was the largest state in Europe and, next to the British Empire, the largest in the world. Like the British Empire it was a creation of modern times. Taking its rise in the sixteenth century from the grand-duchy of Muscovy, it had expanded during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries east, south, and west, until it reached from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic Ocean to the Black and Caspian Seas and into central Asia. In the nineteenth century it continued to expand, obtaining Finland and the greater part of Poland as an outcome of the Napoleonic wars, securing Bessarabia and part of Armenia as fruits of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878,² and, by incessant pressure

and frequent military expeditions, appropriating 19th Cennumerous territories in Asia. In the Far East, the

pansion in

Amur district was wrested from China in 1858; the city of Vladivostok was founded in 1860, looking out upon the Sea of Tapan; the island of Sakhalin was occupied, despite Tapanese pretensions to it, in 1875; and in 1898 Port Arthur, at the head of the Yellow Sea, was leased from China. In west-central Asia, the vast plains of Turkestan were penetrated in the 1850's, Bokhara was annexed in 1868, Khiva in 1873, Samarkand in 1876, and Pamir, bordering on British India, in 1895; and meanwhile the native peoples of the Caucasus region, including Georgians and Circassians, were subjugated. At the opening of the twentieth century the Russian Empire embraced onesixth of the land surface of the globe and one-twelfth of all the inhabitants of the earth.

Unlike the British Empire, the Russian Empire was a solid block of contiguous territory, essentially an extension by land rather than by water, and much the largest part of its territory was preponderantly inhabited by people of the same stock and nationality. For the Russian people, that is, the

"Great Russians," had spread as the Empire extended, Bussians so that they now constituted not only the whole population of the central and eastern provinces of the Empire in Europe but also a large majority of the inhabitants of its provinces in northern Asia.

To be sure, the Russian Empire as a whole was not a national ¹ See Vol. I, pp. 663-665, 683, 702-703, 724. ² See above, pp. 263-265.

Of its estimated total population of 125 million (in 1900), state. the Great Russians comprised barely a half, while Lesser the other half consisted of an amazing array of 22 1/2 Peoples in million "Little Russians" (or Ukrainians, or, as their Russian Empire kinsmen in Austria were called, "Ruthenians"), 6 million "White Russians," 8 million Poles, 11/2 million Lithuanians, 1 1/2 million Letts, 1 million Estonians, 2 million Germans (chiefly in the Baltic and Black Sea provinces), 3 million Finns, 5 million Jews, 1 million Rumanians (in Bessarabia), 1 million Armenians, 1 million Georgians, 1 million Circassian and other tribesmen in the Caucasus, 13 million Turks (in Turkestan), half a million Mongols, and dozens of less numerous and very primitive peoples-Lapps, Samoyeds, Esquimaux, etc. Most of the subject nationalities in Asiatic Russia and the Caucasus, however, were too "backward," too remote from the economic and political life of western Europe, to evince a nationalism which might be troublesome to imperial Russian sway. Only in the extreme west of the Empire, in the belt of lands separating the Great Russians from Sweden, Germany, and Austria, were there fairly compact and self-conscious peoples with divergent

languages and traditions—Finns, Estonians, Letts, Nation-Lithuanians, Poles, and Rumanians—and these toalism gether numbered but some 16 million, in contrast with among Lesser the 56 million Great Russians and with the 28 ½ million Peoples Little Russians and White Russians who, though in Western differing in dialect from the Great Russians, had long Russia been intimately associated with them and were not now disposed to voice demands of separatist political sort.

Unlike the British Empire, moreover, the Russian Empire as a whole, and particularly in respect of its central part, was a laggard rather than a leader in the essentially nineteenth-century

"Backwardness" of
Russian
Empire

movements of industrialization, liberalism, and constitutional parliamentary government. The vast mass
of Russians remained rural and agricultural. The
Industrial Revolution came relatively late to the
Russian Empire, and when it came it affected first and most the
subject peoples in the western provinces and afterwards, to a
lesser degree, the Great Russians.

Early in the nineteenth century the Tsar Alexander I, "Autocrat of all the Russias," had professed to sympathize with

"Western" ideas and practices; and in the third quarter of the century, his nephew, the Tsar Alexander II, had done something, as we know,1 to "liberalize" the Empirehe had emancipated the serfs, effected judicial reforms, established the zemstvos as agencies of local self-government, and planned to promulgate a constitution. Alarmed by the Polish revolt of 1863, however, Alexander II soon retreated from his advanced liberal

Tsar Alexander II, 1855-1881: Reand then tionary

position, abandoning the "Westernizers" and joining the camp of the "Slavophiles"; 2 and during the latter part of his reign he proved the sincerity of his conversion by silencing critics of autocracy within Russia and by leading "holy" Russia into war against the Moslem Turks and in behalf of Orthodox Christian Slavs in the Balkans. These activities were undoubtedly popular with a large majority of the governing classes in Russia nobility, Orthodox clergy, military and civil bureaucracy—and also with many journalists and publicists. The peasant masses dumbly acquiesced, and the urban middle and lower classes, whatever dissent they may have expressed in conversation among themselves, generally refrained from expressing it in public. That there was some dissent and that it inspired the formation of revolutionary secret societies and found vent occasionally in acts of terrorism, was attested three years after the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War by the hurling of a bomb which ended the career of the Tsar Alexander II (1881).

The assassination of Alexander II elevated to the imperial Russian throne his son, Alexander III (1881-1804), rough-hewn in mind and physique, devoid of polish and sentimentality, glorving in the idea of being of the same rugged character as the Russian peasantry, and thoroughly devoted to the principles of Slavophilism. His first Resolute acts as Tsar were to inflict summary vengeance upon

Alexander III. 1894: Autocrat

his father's assassins and to proclaim to the world that "the Voice of God orders Us to stand firm at the helm of government with faith in the strength and truth of the Autocratic power, which We are called to consolidate and to preserve for the good of the people from every kind of encroachment." In carrying out this program, Alexander III called to his assist-

¹ See above, pp. 256-260.

² On the "Westernizers" and the "Slavophiles," see above, pp. 253-254.

ance, and retained throughout his reign in important governmental positions, two energetic men of like purpose with himself, Viatscheslaf Plehve and Constantine Pobêdonostsev. The former, a lawyer of Lithuanian stock and of university training at Warsaw and St. Petersburg, who had entered the government service as a member of the department of justice, was entrusted with the direction of the state police; and so thoroughly did he organize the police throughout the Empire and so vigorously did he employ it to enforce obedience to the Tsar's will that the reign of Alexander III was marked by a seeming lull in revolutionary propaganda.

The practical work of Plehve was supplemented by the counsels of Pobêdonostsev, an older man, who had been professor of law in the University of Moscow and court tutor to Alexander III, and who was now appointed to the influential and Pobêdolucrative post of "Procurator of the Holy Synod," lav chairman of the governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church. From this post he ordered the life and thought of Orthodox clergymen all over the Empire in strict accordance with the doctrines which he expounded in speech and publication and which endeared him to the Tsar. To him, parliaments were nothing but breeding-places of the most selfish and sordid ambitions; freedom of the press meant license to disseminate falsehood; secular education was both dangerous and immoral; limited monarchy was a "vain fancy," and trial by jury "an invitation to the arts of casuistry." "If all representatives of the people were saints," wrote this apologist of reaction, "a parliamentary régime would be the very best kind of all; but as the morality of popular representatives is usually more than dubious, a parliamentary régime is the worst." He concluded that the government of the Russian Empire must quarantine its subjects against revolutionary infection from the "West" and inculcate in them an unquestioning loyalty to "Eastern" traditions, to political Autocracy and religious Orthodoxy.

Centralization of administration, with repression of "liberal" dissent, was one of the policies systematically pursued by Alexander III and his chief ministers. He placed the previously autonomous government of the peasant communities, or *mirs*, under the supervision of landed proprietors designated by the imperial ministry. He abridged the authority granted by his

father to the provincial zemstvos and municipal dumas. The constitution of all these local assemblies he revised by increasing the representation of nobles and officials mental and decreasing that of peasants and by excluding the Centralprofessional classes altogether; and over the acts of the "reformed" assemblies he strengthened the veto power of the imperial governors. He frowned upon secular schools and upon popular education in general; over what elementary schooling there was he fortified the control of the state church; and over the curriculum and teaching staff of the universities his agents exercised a direct and drastic state control. He reënforced. likewise, the governmental censorship of publications, associations, meetings, and even private correspondence. And for infractions of any of these repressive measures, the sion of police under Plehve were empowered to make arbitrary arrests and mete out arbitrary penalties, while waste spaces of Siberia were made to share with insanitary fortress-prisons of European Russia as detention camps for thousands of "political offenders," some "convicted" and others merely "suspected."

"Russification" was another of the policies pursued by Alexander III and his ministers. It represented an attempt to realize the cultural ideal of Slavophile Russian patriots, and it involved repressive measures against any language other than the Great Russian and any religion other than Russian Orthodoxy. It was aimed primarily, of course, at the subject peoples in the Russian Empire, who were now perforce to abandon their distinctive national traditions and to become "good Russians," obeying the Tsar, employing his speech, and adhering to his faith. Both Pobêdonostsev and Plehve were zealous agents of "Russification." The latter directed the state police to break up public meetings and to ban publications which betrayed any nationalist sentiment at variance with the Great Russian. The former, in charge of ecclesiastical affairs, conducted a virtual persecution of sident Russian sectarians who dissented from the Orthodox Church,² and of "uniates" in Lithuania and White Russia whose

¹ At the end of the reign of Alexander III in 1894, the percentage of illiterates throughout the Russian Empire was from 50 to 90 in rural communities and from 40 to 65 in urban centres—a higher average than in any other country of Europe.

² On the Russian Dissenters, see Vol. I, pp. 364, 517.

ancestors had been converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism, and at the same time he oppressively interfered with the Catholic Church in Poland and neighboring western provinces and with the Lutheran Church in the Baltic provinces. The Tsar himself issued decree after decree, bidding his officials to extend the campaign of "Russification" in a dozen different ways.

In Poland the harsh edicts of Alexander II following the suppression of the revolt of 1863 were now confirmed and rendered more harsh. The country's secondary schools were wholly Russianized. Polish literature and even the Polish lan-Of Dissiguage had to be taught to Polish children in Russian. dent Nationalities Poles were excluded from public office in Poland. From 1885 to 1807 no Pole was permitted to sell land to a non-Russian. In White Russia and Lithuania, the "uniate" Catholics were discriminated against and their marriages and children were treated as illegitimate. In the Ukraine the Little Russian language was pronounced a "dialect," and its use in printing, reciting, or singing was prohibited. In the Baltic provinces of Estonia and Latvia, Russian was prescribed as the official tongue in 1885, and simultaneously the approval of the Procurator of the Holy Synod was required for the construction of any Protestant church building; presently the use of German was forbidden in university lectures and even in private-school instruction, local law courts were suppressed, and German place-names were changed to Russian.

Persecution of the Jews was a phase of "Russification." The Russian Empire had some five million Jewish inhabitants, settled mainly in cities of Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Bessarabia, and marked off from other citizens by religion, national traditions, and a peculiar language. They were especially disliked because of their clannishness and their somewhat Antiparadoxical reputation for making financial profits Jewish Measures and engaging in revolutionary agitation; and Alexander III, backed undoubtedly by widespread popular approval, instituted a series of repressive measures against them. In 1882 he forbade Jews to acquire land. To keep them out of the liberal professions, he restricted the admission of Jews to secondary schools and universities, at first fixing their "quota" at ten per

¹ The Yiddish language, a German jargon intermixed with Hebrew words and written with Hebrew characters.

cent, and later reducing it to three per cent. In 1890 he promulgated a sweeping decree against them: all Jews who lived in the interior of Russia were obliged to emigrate to the western provinces unless they should obtain individual licenses from the government; and in the districts where they were henceforth concentrated—the so-called Jewish Pale—they were forbidden to own or lease land and were kept in towns under governmental surveillance. What was still worse for the Tews, many governmental officials, taking their cue from the attitude of the Tsar and his chief ministers, gave free rein to the anti-Tewish prejudices of an ignorant and bigoted peasantry and townsfolk and tolerated, if they did not incite, more or less organized anti-Jewish riots-pogroms-attended by plundering and burning and in some instances by massacre. From pogroms, as well as from repressive legislation, the Russian and Polish Jews suffered greatly; and, despite the efforts of the Tsar's government to make them stay within the Empire, some 300,000 Jews emigrated from it in the single year 1801. Here was the beginning of large-scale immigration of Polish and Russian Tews into the United States.

Alexander III was not so absorbed in combating liberalism and forwarding autocracy and "Russification" within his Empire as to neglect any opportunity to extend its territorial boundaries or to heighten its international influence. He pushed forward the conquest and occupation of Turkestan and its border Imperial states to the south. He established an effective mili-Expantary régime throughout the Caucasus. He laid the sion in Asia foundations for Russian supremacy in Persia. While preserving formal peace with his European neighbors, he was ever alert to advance Russian influence among the Slavic peoples in the Balkans and likewise within the Habsburg Empire of Austria-Hungary. Through his nephew who was Prince of Bulgaria, he sought to make this most recently created Imperial Balkan state a dependency of the Russian Empire. Ambitions in Europe He tied the little state of Montenegro tightly to Russia. He encouraged the development of anti-Austrian sentiment in Serbia. He tolerated the subversive propaganda of Russian Slavophiles among the Czechs, Ruthenians, and Yugoslavs of Austria-Hungary. And when it became clear to him that the German Empire was backing Austria rather than Russia in

southeastern Europe, he heeded the anti-Teutonic agitation of

Slavophile publicists and grew cold to that intimate friendship which had endured between the Romanov dynasty of Russia and the Hohenzollern of Prussia ever since the days of Catherine the Great and Frederick the Great back in the eighteenth century.

By 1890 Alexander III was prepared to welcome the lapse of any formal understanding with Germany and to enter into particularly friendly relations with France. In his opinion, and in that of the majority of Russian patriots, an alliance between the chief Slavic nation and the chief Latin nation would have the triple advantage of curbing Teutonic pretensions Alliance in Europe, strengthening Russia in her duel with Great with Britain for predominance in Asia, and opening up the France money market of Paris for loans needful to the internal development of the Russian Empire and to the maintenance of its heavy armaments. The Franco-Russian alliance was negotiated in the last years of the reign of Alexander III, and probably the most distasteful thing about it to the autocratic Tsar of All the Russias, and the most ridiculous to the world at large, was the necessity now incumbent upon him of standing at attention and looking pleased when the revolutionary Marseillaise was played.

The death of Alexander III in 1894 did not change matters particularly. His son and successor, Nicholas II (1894-1917), was a weak man, inclined to fatalism and religious Nicholas mysticism, but with a streak of petty obstinacy char-П, 1894-1917: Weak acteristic of weak men and with a special deference to his wife, a neurotic, hysterical woman, who, though a granddaughter of Queen Victoria and quite English in upbringing, displayed in Russia an almost insane devotion to autocracy and the Orthodox Church. Nicholas II let it be known from the outset that he considered any lessening of the Tsar's authority a "senseless dream." He reposed the utmost confidence in Pobêdonostsev and retained him as procurator of the Holy Synod until 1905. He kept Plehve in office and promoted him in 1902 to the post of minister of the interior with almost dictatorial powers.

For eleven years—from 1894 to 1905—Nicholas II persevered in the policies which his father had developed. He maintained the same centralization of administration, the same repression of liberal dissent, the same arbitrary system of arresting and punishing political offenders, the same foreign policies, the same "Russification." In this last respect,

he eased, it is true, the persecution of Russian religious dissenters and softened the application of the laws against the Catholic and Protestant churches. Yet under his auspices the Armenian Church in the Caucasus was interfered with and despoiled; the legislation against the Jews was rigorously enforced, accompanied by pogroms such as that at Kishinev in 1903 in which several thousand Tews were massacred and to which Plehve himself was credited with being accessory; the imposition of Russian language and Russian schools was sternly continued in Poland. Lithuania, and the Baltic provinces; and to the grand-duchy of Finland, whose separate constitution and nationality even Alexander III had respected, Russification was now applied. In 1899 Nicholas II substituted Russians for Finns and Swedes Russifiin the civil administration of the grand-duchy. He in-Finland troduced a Russian police. He conformed the Finnish army with the Russian. He prescribed that all Finnish legislation should be drafted by Russian ministers in conjunction with the secretary of state for Finland and that only such laws as concerned Finland alone should be submitted to vote of the Finnish parliament. Presently he appointed as secretary of state for Finland the most redoubtable protagonist of autocracy and Russification, Plehve.

Nicholas II maintained, too, the Franco-Russian alliance, though he was peculiarly susceptible to the flattery and sometimes to the advice of the personal letters which his "dear cousin Willy" of Germany regularly penned in English to "Nicky." The Tsar liked to think of himself, in a dreamy mystical way, both as an avenger of the Slavs throughout the world and as a promoter of the peace of the world. It was Nicholas II who Nicholas convoked at the Hague in 1899 a great international "Paccongress for the limitation of armaments and the assurance of peace among all nations. It was also Nicholas II who, in the pursuit of aggressive expansionist policies in the Far East, allowed the Russian Empire to break the peace and to drift into a bloody and fateful war with Japan. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 proved to be of unimagined significance for the Russian Empire and we shall say more about it presently.

Meanwhile we must note a very important development which had been going on in European Russia during the reigns of

¹ See below, p. 748.

Alexander III and Nicholas II, at first unobtrusively, but by 1904 very clearly. This was the development of the Industrial Revolution. Not only in Poland, where Industrial Revoluthere was already a good deal of industrialization, but tion in Russia also in other parts of European Russia, industrial and commercial activity quickened and multiplied. Coal fields and iron mines began to be extensively worked in the Ukraine and in the Urals. Oil wells began to be exploited in the Caucasus and about the Black and Caspian Seas. Factories became numerous in Kiev, in St. Petersburg, in Moscow. Shipping rapidly increased in the ports of Riga and Odessa and likewise in those of Vladivostok and Archangel. Between 1881 and 1904 the annual output of pig iron was quadrupled, reaching a total of three million tons and putting Russia in fourth place (after Great Britain, the United States, and Germany) among iron-producing nations. During the same period the annual output of coal multiplied sixfold, from three million tons to eighteen million. The number of factory operatives in the larger industries doubled, and the value of machine-made goods more than tripled.

This phenomenal growth of Russian industry towards the close of the nineteenth century was due in part to a cheap and plentiful labor supply provided by the influx of ex-serfs and poverty-stricken peasants into the cities, and in part to the loans of capital by foreign investors, especially French. With the aid of foreign capital and cheap native labor, railway construction was rapidly prosecuted in Russia, and railways stimulated trade and industry. In 1885 railway mileage within the Russian Empire totalled 16,000; in 1895, it was 22,500; in 1905, it was 40,500; and in 1913 some 51,000 were built or building. The trans-Siberian and trans-Caspian railways not only quickened the migration of Russian peasants to Siberia and the Far Eastern trade with China and Japan, but also brought to the Russian industrial centres the petroleum of the Caucasus, the cotton of central Asia, and the minerals, timber, and foodstuffs of Siberia.

The Russian Empire as a whole, we must remember, remained predominantly agricultural. In 1914 six-sevenths of its total population were engaged, directly or indirectly, in agriculture; and its industrial production was overshadowed by its production

¹On the condition of the Russian peasantry emancipated from serfdom by Alexander II, see above, pp. 258-259.

of wheat and cattle. Nevertheless, the percentage of urban population had risen from a tenth in 1874 to a seventh in 1914; 1 and a seventh of the total population of 130 million was not a small number. By this time the Russian Empire had one city of over two million inhabitants (St. Petersburg), another with almost two million (Moscow), and more than a hundred others with over fifty thousand each. The Empire had as many town dwellers as France and many more factory towns than Italy; and its industries were far from pygmies in comparison with French or Italian industries.

The development of Russian industry, with attendant machinery, factories, foundries, and big cities, served to increase the size of the middle classes and still more of the urban Industrial proletariat, and hence to add to the difficulties of the Capitalistŝ and autocratic government. Plehve did what he could to Urhan oppose the industrial development, contending that Proletarians it would create an urban society inimical alike to the autocracy and to the rural classes upon which the autocracy ultimately rested. But Plehve and his many Slavophile Plehve's partisans were unable to check the newer economic Alarm and social tendencies; and in another Russian statesman of the time, Count Serge Witte, Russian industrialists, as well as Russian patriots, found a friend and champion.

Witte was a native of Tiflis in the Caucasus, where his father (of Dutch extraction) was an imperial administrator. Educated at the University of Odessa, he was identified for a time with reactionary journalism, and then for a long time with railway construction and finance in southern Russia. Thus, while he was a staunch apostle of Slavophile political conservatism, he became an interested advo- trializacate of "Western" commercial and industrial develop-

Witte's Championship of Indus-

ment. Appointed head of the department of railways in the imperial ministry of finance by Alexander III, he was promoted to be minister of communications in 1892 and minister of finance in 1893. For ten years he retained this post under Nicholas II and used his official and personal influence with the Tsar to promote policies favorable to big business in Russia, policies of economic nationalism analogous to those which Bismarck had adopted in Germany. He sought to develop home industries by

¹ A third of the population of Russian Poland was urban at this time.

means of tariff protectionism and financial reforms. While encouraging foreign investments, he gave bounties to domestic infant industries and imposed high customs duties on the importation of foreign manufactures. He stabilized the Russian currency and put it on a gold basis. He strengthened the state banks, rapidly extended the state system of railways, and, in keeping with the newer economic imperialism, fostered Russian expansion, commercial and capitalist as well as military and political, in Persia and Manchuria. At the same time Witte was anxious to increase the "efficiency" of Russian labor, and with this end in view he undertook to reduce drunkenness and promote temperance by making the liquor business a state monopoly. He also provided for governmental mediation in labor disputes and for governmental regulation of mines and factories, and he prepared a plan for insuring workers against accidents.

Witte's policies elicited much criticism and opposition from reactionaries of the type of Plehve and Pobêdonostsev. There Reacwas widespread complaint that he was sacrificing agricultural to industrial interests and that his tariff opposition and protectionism was especially costly to peasants and Criticism workingmen; and, in substantiation of the latter complaint, evidence was adduced that in 1903 the retail price of cotton and sugar was almost three times higher in Russia than in Germany. Besides, there was the obvious fact that the industrialization which Witte encouraged was being attended, just as Plehve had prophesied, by the growth of urban movements menacing to the traditional autocracy—liberalism among the bourgeoisie and socialism among the proletariat.

In the circumstances, public criticism of the Tsar's government and actual opposition to it, which, under the watchful eye and vigorous repression of Plehve and the state police, had lain dormant since the days of Alexander II, notably revived and spread in the first years of the twentieth century. One of the most curious features of the new criticism was the participation of many otherwise ultra-conservative land-owners and peasants in it. These had no thought of revolution, nor were they lacking in personal loyalty to the Tsar, but they were annoyed and angered by what they deemed the disproportionate emphasis which Nicholas II permitted Witte to put upon industry and commerce. To appease them Witte in 1902–1903 invited com-

mittees of the zemstvos, in which they were heavily represented, to recommend what reforms, particularly what agricul-Demands tural reforms, should be undertaken by the Tsar. The for Politresult was that, of the seven hundred reports which ical Rewere accordingly submitted, four hundred found some fault not only with Witte's economic policies but also with the political system which had sanctioned such policies, and an appreciable number of the reports asked for national representation in the government, freedom of the press, and guaranties of individual liberty. It was the blame heaped by Plehve and Pobêdonostsev upon Witte for the hostility to autocracy implied in these reports that caused Nicholas II in 1903 to retire his distinguished minister of finance. The landed classes were glad to see Witte go, but the "liberal" element among them was only strengthened by the Tsar's apparent determination to retain most of Witte's policies.

Nor were the bourgeoisie content with the merely economic measures which an autocratic government had taken in their behalf but which it might rescind as arbitrarily as it had dispensed with Witte. The growing class of merchants, factoryowners, and bankers came to believe that their security Developdepended upon the limitation of autocracy and the ment of "Westestablishment of a constitutional government in which ernizing" they would have direct say, and hence they swelled the Liberalnumbers and enhanced the influence of liberal. "Westernizing" intellectuals. A group of these intellectuals began in 1902 the publication of a paper called Liberation at Stuttgart in

Germany; and in 1904 they organized a definitively liberal political party, the "Union of Liberators."

To complaints from the conservative land-owning class and to demands of the liberal bourgeoisie were added an extraordinary unrest among peasants and a notable development of extreme revolutionary movements among urban proletarians. Anarchist ' The revolutionary anarchism which Michael Baku-Propanin 1 had preached in the middle of the nineteenth century and the "mutual-aid" anarchism which Prince Peter

¹ Bakunin (1814-1876) had been a Russian army officer until observation of Tsarist methods in Poland led him to resign from the service and to become a revolutionary. He derived his anarchism principally from Proudhon (see above, p. 109), but he infused it with a peculiarly atheistical and violent character. Bakunin was less a theorist than a man of action. In the 1860's and 1870's, from Geneva Kropotkin ¹ championed in the latter part of the century were stealthily propagated in Russia and had no little influence on the formation of secret societies of extremely radical (and frequently unbalanced) intellectuals, workers, and peasants who had a penchant for conspiring against the government, assassinating its officials, and suffering martyrdom.

More significant, however, was the penetration of the gospel of Karl Marx into Russia in the 1880's and its effect during the

Marxian
Socialism
in Russia:
Social
Democratic
Party

1890's on the rise of two distinct revolutionary movements. One of these was represented by the Social Democratic party, formed in 1898, adhering to the precepts of Marxian Socialism in all their "Western" rigidity, and securing disciples almost exclusively from among doctrinaires and urban workingmen. The

other was the Socialist Revolutionary party, founded about 1900, which tried to adapt Marxian Socialism to the traditional communal life of the mass of Russian peasants; it advocated socialization of the land and its distribution among those who actually

Socialist Revolutionary Party tilled it. The Socialist Revolutionaries gained a large following of peasants and idealistic intellectuals and soon vied with middle-class Liberals and aristocratic Constitutionalists for leadership in the demand for

political and social reform in the Russian Empire. At first, the Social Democrats were not as numerous or as influential, and their split on a question of tactics in 1903 into two quarrelling factions—a left-wing majority party (Bolshevik), and a right-wing minority party (Menshevik)—further weakened them, at least temporarily.

Still another fruitful source of opposition to the existing régime in Russia was the intense nationalist reaction which the process of "Russification" aroused among its victims—Poles, Jews, Finns, Georgians, Armenians, and other subject peoples. These, resolved that they would not be Russified, were prepared to as his headquarters, he was constantly organizing and inflaming appropriate ground.

as his headquarters, he was constantly organizing and inflaming anarchistic groups of workingmen in France, Italy, Spain, and Russia. For the spirit and teachings of the man, see especially his *God and the State* (1882).

¹ Prince Kropotkin (1842–1921), a Russian nobleman and scholar, and for a time an army officer, became in turn a Liberal, a Socialist, and eventually an Anarchist. He was imprisoned in Russia from 1874 to 1876 and in France from 1883 to 1886. He advocated the development of a system of close but voluntary coöperation which should render government from above superfluous. See his Fields, Factories and Workshops (1899) and his Memoirs of a Revolutionist (1900).

coöperate with any Russian group that promised respite or relief from persecution. Many Jews drifted into the Social Democratic or the Socialist Revolutionary party. Dissident Many Poles made common cause with the "Libera-Nationtors." Georgians and Armenians supplied several alists in Revoluleaders and sizeable followings to the Socialist Revtionary olutionaries. In the case of Finland, the native pop-Movement ulation, whether Finnish or Swedish, joined with Russian liberals in demanding that the Tsar respect the Finnish constitution and cease his interference in the internal affairs of the grand-duchy.

Against all these various forms of opposition and criticism, Plehve and other loyal agents of the autocracy kept up a tireless and seemingly effectual fight. From 1900 to 1904 Plehve's Plehve's "system" was in full swing throughout the Empire. Police search of private houses, suppression Revolution newspapers, and arbitrary arrests, jailings, and tion banishments were daily occurrences. Any person was liable to seizure and imprisonment who was merely suspected of harboring anti-Russian, liberal, or socialist opinions. And the "system" might have gone on indefinitely, had not a foreign war supervened—the Russo-Japanese War.

Japan, anxious to put a stop to Russian advance in the Far

East, particularly in Manchuria and Korea, went to war in February 1904. She had the advantage of naval superiority, rapidity of mobilization, and relative prox-Japanese imity to the scene of hostilities. She also had the War, 1004-1005 advantage of national unity and popular enthusiasm for the war. To the consternation of the Russian government and the surprise of the world at large, the Japanese won victory after victory. In May 1904 they drove Russian armies from the Korean border and north of Port Arthur. In July they destroyed Russian fleets venturing out from Port Arthur and Vladivostok. In September they forced the main Russian army back into Manchuria. In January 1905 they brought the long siege of Port Arthur to a successful issue. In February and March they won the protracted but eventually decisive battle of Mukden. In May 1905 they annihilated Russian Defeat the last Russian warships, which had made a despairing voyage all the way from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan.

By the treaty of Portsmouth (New Hampshire), in September 1905, which was signed for the Tsar by Count Witte, Russia acknowledged her reverses by surrendering to Japan Port Arthur, the peninsula of Liaotung, and the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, and by agreeing to leave Korea to Japan and Manchuria to China.

Contributing immeasurably to the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War was the inability of the Russian government, on the one hand, to marshal all its forces against far-away Japan while revolution was threatening it at home, and, on the other hand, to silence its domestic critics while it was losing battle after battle in foreign war. As one telegram followed another from the distant fighting front in Manchuria, admitting a succession of Russian defeats, it was borne in upon the Russian people as never before that the autocracy must be responsible.

Under it, officials were corrupt, generals incompetent, common soldiers needlessly sacrificed, national wealth wasted, and national honor stained. This feeling of national humiliation was manifest almost at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War in a vague uneasiness throughout the country, and presently, as the parties of criticism and opposition became more active and outspoken, in popular mutterings and disorder. In July 1904 Plehve, the most conspicuous symbol and most energetic agent of the autocratic régime, was blown to pieces by a bomb. In November an informal assembly of

Assassination of Plehve prominent members of local zemsivos and municipal dumas petitioned the Tsar to reform the political system by guarantying individual liberties, extending local self-government, and instituting a national parliament.

Nicholas II ignored the petition and appointed General Trepov, a man of the same mold as Plehve, to head the police. But Trepov soon had his hands full. Middle-class Liberals held political banquets and delivered provocative speeches. Workingmen staged political strikes at Moscow, Vilna, and other industrial centres. At St. Petersburg a procession of strikers, headed

Bevolutionary
Uprising of 1905

Sunday."

by an Orthodox priest, Gapon by name, was fired upon by troops on its way to present a petition to the Tsar, the "Little Father"; and the resulting bloodshed earned for the day (January 22, 1905) the title of "Red Sunday."

under Socialist Revolutionary leaders, pillaging and burning the mansions of noble landlords and country gentlemen. The Tsar's uncle, the Grand Duke Serge, was assassinated at Moscow in February 1905; and numerous other political murders ensued. Armed outbreaks occurred in Poland and in the Caucasus, and were put down only by vigorous action of Russian soldiery. The state railways could not be operated except under martial law. The universities were closed. Faced with growing disorder, the Tsar slowly and falteringly

made concessions. Hoping to appease the subject peoples, he promised religious toleration, licensed the use of Polish in private schools, and relaxed the enforcement of anti-Jewish legislation. Hoping to quiet the peasants, he remitted the arrears owing by them for their shares in the communal lands. Pressed by liberals, he consented to respect legal formalities in the trial of political offenders and to work out a plan for constitutional government. Then, after further hesitation and delay, and after further rioting in the country and pressure upon him, he announced in August 1905 that he would constitute a parliament—an imperial Duma—to counsel with the government in the making of laws. This he followed up, continually under pressure, by dismissing Pobêdonostsev, Trepov, and other ultra-reactionary ministers, by summoning Count Witte to be premier of a new constitutional régime, and by issuing in October 1005 a kind of constitution in the form of a "manifesto." The October Manifesto guarantied personal liberties of conscience, speech, and association, established a moderately popular franchise for the election of the Duma, and clearly stated that henceforth no law should be valid without the Duma's consent. Subsequently Nicholas II was prevailed upon to concede practically universal manhood suffrage for

"October Manifesto," 1905: ment for Russia

sions of

Nicho-

Duma elections (December 1905) and to provide for a bicameral parliament by designating the Duma as the lower chamber and by transforming the old Council of State into an upper chamber. styled Council of the Empire, half of whose members should be named by the Tsar and half elected indirectly by certain privileged classes (March 1006).

Meanwhile, in November 1905, the Tsar was moved by a general strike in Finland to restore the autonomy of that grandduchy. The Finnish Estates General accordingly met at Helsingfors in December 1905—for the first time since 1899—and
proceeded to draft a "modern" constitution for Finland, substituting for the medieval Estates General a
single-chamber parliament chosen by universal suffrage,
female as well as male, with provision for proportional
representation. This democratic constitution Nicholas II ratified
in 1906 in his capacity as Grand Duke of Finland.

In Russia, however, the great revolutionary wave of 1905 soon spent its main force and in 1906 began slowly but surely to recede. The conclusion of peace with Japan in the Ebbing of autumn of 1905 put an end to the series of disgraceful Revoludefeats abroad and enabled the government to utilize tionary Tide the army for the restoration of order at home. Then, too, after nearly two years of foreign war and domestic rioting, many Russians began to long for peace and quiet and for the economic advantages which public order would bring. Moreover, the revolutionary elements commenced to disintegrate and to waste their strength in factional quarrels. Bolshe-Divisions among vik Communists quarrelled with Menshevik Com-Radical munists, and both with Socialist Revolutionaries. Revolutionaries Socialist Revolutionaries were distrusted by Liberals, and Liberals-professional men and zemstvo members-divided and disputed about the constitution and the policies which the Duma should pursue.

A radical group of Liberals, organized as the Constitutional Democrats (popularly known as the "Cadets") under the leadership of a professor of history, Paul Milyukóv, refused to recognize the finality of the Tsar's decrees and demanded that the first Duma should act as a constitutional convention and devise a form of government in which the Tsar should be a mere figure-

Divisions among Liberals: "Cadets" and "Octobrists" head and the whole administration should be entrusted to a ministry responsible to parliament. Another group, the "Octobrists," comprising more conservative Liberals, especially the zemstvo men, were content to accept as definitive the Tsar's "October Manifesto," with its provision for a Duma as a check upon, but not

as a complete substitute for, the traditional autocracy. The Cadets thus stood for constitutional government based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty; the Octobrists, for constitu-

tional government based on the voluntary consent of a divineright monarch. Generally, too, the Cadets favored concessions to the demands of subject peoples for cultural and political autonomy and suggested a federal form of government for the Empire, while the Octobrists were more influenced by Slavophile ideas and more inclined to approve of some "Russification."

In measure as the revolutionary elements in Russia disintegrated and fell to quarrelling, the reactionary elements plucked up courage, closed their ranks, and prepared to do battle for the preservation of the autocracy, the large landed estates. and all the traditional practices and policies of the old régime. Such elements, made up of great nobles and landlords, courtiers and bureaucrats, army officers, Orthodox clergymen, and Slavophile patriots, organized a "Union of the Russian People," which early in 1906 inaugurated a counterrevolutionary movement. "Black bands," or "black hundreds," as the agents of the Union were popularly styled, engaged in reactionary terrorism, committing outrages against radical sympathizers and especially inciting mob violence against Jews. Leaders of the Union also exerted pressure on the Tsar to withdraw the concessions he had made, and Nicholas II showed himself more amenable to pressure from this quarter than

II on Side of Reac-

excluded from parliamentary discussion the constitutional laws of the state, asserted the Tsar's unrestricted control of army, navy, and foreign affairs, authorized the imperial ministers to promulgate laws when the Duma was not in session, and provided that if the parliament should not approve the budget in any year, the government might continue in force the budget of the preceding year. Then in April Nicholas II dismissed from

the premiership Count Witte, who was not much of a Liberal but was quite distasteful to agricultural reactionaries, and appointed in his stead an old bureaucrat with Peter Stolypin, an energetic reactionary, in the strategic position of minister of the interior. In July, Stolypin

from the other. In the decree of March 1906, by which

he set up the Council of the Empire as the upper chamber of the promised national parliament, he expressly

> Stolýpin, Prime Minister. 1006-1011

was formally installed as prime minister.

Stolypin repressed revolutionary agitation with a severity that resembled Plehve's and treated quite cavalierly the Duma, which had been elected and assembled at St. Petersburg in May 1906. The Cadet and Socialist Revolutionary majority in The First the Duma proposed parliamentary control of the Duma imperial ministry and a land reform looking to the expropriation of landlords and the partition of their esand Its Fate, 1906 tates by the peasants. Stolýpin brusquely rejected the proposals, dissolved the Duma, and ordered new elections. Whereupon, some two hundred Cadet members of the Duma, in imitation of the celebrated meeting of dispossessed French deputies in the tennis court at Versailles in 1789,¹ met at Viborg in Finland and drew up a manifesto calling on the Russian people to refuse taxes and military service to the Tsar's government until it should respect the Duma. The Viborg manifesto produced but feeble response. Its authors were disfranchised, the Cadet clubs were closed, the few attempts at insurrection were suppressed, and special courts martial, under orders from Stolypin, put many revolutionaries to death and banished many others.

The opponents of autocracy, despite governmental interference at the polls, obtained a majority in the second Duma, which

Second Duma and Restriction of Suffrage, 1007

met in March 1907. Again there was an impasse. Again the government dissolved the Duma. This time, however, Nicholas II issued a new "constitutional law," clearly intended to assure the election of future Dumas which would not oppose the government. The suffrage was elaborately restricted. The provinces of central Asia were disfranchised altogether. representation of Poland, Siberia, and the Caucasus was greatly


reduced. The electoral districts were so delimited as to swamp the votes of radically inclined cities with the votes of conservative rural communities. And by means of a class system of voting, akin to Prussia's, 2 greater weight was given to landlords than to other classes in Russia.

The new electoral arrangements operated as Nicholas II and Stolýpin intended. The third Duma, chosen in October 1907, was composed mainly of landlords with a sprinkling of bourgeois capitalists and intellectuals. The overwhelming majority, made up of Conservatives and Octobrists, were quite resigned to the

¹ See Vol. I, p. 600.

² See above, p. 138.

Note. The picture opposite, "Peasant Bargemen of the Volga," is from a painting by a popular Russian artist, Ilya Repin (1844-1930).





maintenance of the Duma as a purely consultative body; and even the Cadet minority were willing to abandon obstructionist tactics and to play the rôle of polite critics. Outside the Duma, Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats and the disaffected subject nationalities persevered in opposition, but "Constithey no longer terrified the government as they had tutional Monarchy recently done nor swerved it from its purpose of under Aumaintaining the autocracy. The revolutionary uptocratic heaval of 1905 had subsided, and the only apparent outcome, aside from the democratic reform in Finland, was a slightly altered form of imperial government, appropriately described in the official almanac of 1907 as "a constitutional monarchy under an autocratic tsar."

From 1907 to 1914 the Russian government and administration seemed to have slipped back into the old grooves. The Duma, it is true, was suffered to remain, and in some notable instances its advice was accepted. Certain moderate land reforms were effected. A scheme of workingmen's insurance was adopted. Elementary education was extended under the supervision of the Orthodox Church. But in general the government led and the Duma followed. Indeed, Stolýpin was as really free of parliamentary dictation and as determined to maintain the system of reaction as Plehve had been. He repressed revolutionaries, and imprisoned or banished suspects. He enforced the laws against the Jews and sponsored new legislation against the Poles. He meditated fresh assaults on the autonomy of Finland. The dagger thrust of a Jewish lawyer in a theatre at Kiev removed Stolypin in September 1911, but not the régime which he represented and faithfully served. This went on, though in the hands of men less competent and probably less honest.

Meanwhile the Tsar was growing ever more mystical, ever more responsive to his wife's fancies. The emotional Tsarina, in turn, sought providential guidance from a strange assortment of religious fanatics and charlatans, the most notorious and sinister of whom was Rasputin. This untutored Siberian peasant, with powerful physique and magnetic personality, and with a dubious reputation for saintliness, was

Note. The portrait of the Tsar Nicholas II, opposite, is from a painting by the Russian artist, Valentine Syerov (1865-1911).

presented at court in 1907 and soon contrived, through faithcure treatments of the Tsar's sickly son and heir, to
obtain a psychical domination over the Tsarina. She
came to regard him as a loved friend and divine counsellor, and
to ensure that no important governmental appointment should
be made, or policy adopted, without his approval. In the direction of policy Rasputin was usually but a tool of extreme reactionaries, although the most unexpected persons were named to
the highest offices through his favor.

The best efforts of the reactionary statesmen of Russia were expended on restoring the Empire's international prestige which had been so badly damaged by the Russo-Japanese Efforts to War. In 1907 was negotiated a friendly understanding Regain Internawith Great Britain, which had the effect of supplementing the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance with a Triple Entente. Then in 1910, following Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serge Sazonov, a brotherin-law of Stolypin, was entrusted with the conduct of foreign Meanwhile, the government undertook a needful rcaffairs. organization of the Russian army, planned an addi-Military tional network of strategic railways (to be completed Preparations in 1917), approved the construction of a new and powerful navy, and in 1913 secured the sanction of Tsar and Duma for lengthening the term of service in the infantry. It was apparent that Russia, repulsed in the Far East, was preparing to resume an ambitious policy in the Near East.1

When the storm of world war broke in August 1914, the Tsar Nicholas II, deigning to convoke and appear in person before the Duma, testified to "the tremendous outburst of patriotic sentiment, of love and loyalty to the throne, which, like a tempest, traverses our entire land," and went on to declare, "Not only are we defending the dignity and honor of our country, but we are also fighting for our Slavic brothers, the Serbs, our co-religionists and kinsmen, and at this moment I behold with joy how the union of all the Slavs with Russia is being forcefully and unremittingly carried to completion." But the government that helped to make the war did not remain to end it. As the Russo-Japanese War had served to shake the Tsar's throne, so the vaster World War would serve to topple it.

¹ On Russian foreign policy, see below, pp. 769-779.

5. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BALKAN STATES

In spite of territorial losses to which it had been repeatedly subjected from 1774 to 1878, the Ottoman Empire was still, at this latter date, a truly imperial domain. In Europe it stretched across the Balkan peninsula from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, including Albania, Macedonia, Thrace, and, of course, the ancient imperial capital of Constantinople. In Asia, it reached from the Ægean Sea to the Persian Gulf and from the Black to the Red Sea, embracing Anatolia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and coastal Arabia. Between

Europe and Asia it owned most of the Ægean islands, including Crete, and in northern Africa the provinces of Tripoli and Barca (Cyrenaica). In addition to these outright possessions the Ottoman Empire still preserved a nominal suzerainty over Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Novibazar (now administered by the Habsburg Empire), over Bulgaria (now under a prince of its own) and Bulgarian Eastern Rumelia (with a Christian governor), over Cyprus (now governed by Great Britain), and over Egypt (since 1866 under a practically independent ruler).

Yet this Empire extending into three Continents was no longer the menacing and awe-inspiring Great Power which it had been back in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For A Second-more than a hundred years it had palpably been declining in strength and prestige, until now it was quite outranked by at least six European states (Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Austria-Hungary), and fear of what it might do to Europe was lost in the prospect of what Europe could, and in all likelihood would, do to it.

In an age when the Industrial Revolution was profoundly affecting most other European countries, increasing the size and taxable wealth of their populations, promoting the consolidation and democratizing of their governments, and enabling them to strengthen their armaments, the Ottoman Empire remained exceptionally backward in economics and politics and material force. Relative to its

¹ On the losses of 1878, resulting from the Russo-Turkish War, see above, pp. 265-268. On earlier losses, see Vol. I, pp. 377-378, 379-381, 704-708, 782-785, and the present volume, above, pp. 250-251, 256.

territorial extent, or to the population of most other European Powers, the population of the Ottoman Empire was sparse and practically stationary, hardly exceeding twenty-five million between 1878 and 1914 and depending almost wholly on agriculture, much of which was of a primitive sort. There was some important growing of grain, cotton, and tobacco, and some significant production of wine and opium, but in a comparatively small foreign trade imports greatly exceeded exports. Altogether the population of the Ottoman Empire was not only sparse but poor, and utterly unable to furnish the increment of financial resources requisite to keep the country in step with the political and military progress of populous industrial nations.

Then, too, in an age when most of the Great Powers of Europe were national states, commanding the enthusiastic loyalty of their dominant peoples, the Ottoman Empire still harbored the anomalous religio-military imperialism of a much earlier period. Its emperor—the Sultan—was not merely a secular autocrat like the Russian Tsar. He was also both a Turkish A Nontribal chieftain and the "caliph," a kind of honorary National State pope, for all orthodox (Sunnite) Moslems throughout the world—in Arabia and Africa, in British India, in Russian Turkestan, in the Dutch East Indies. As Sultan, his sway was based on his "tribesmen," the Ottoman Turks, who constituted a compact and fairly homogeneous population in Anatolia (Asia Minor) and who supplied him with the majority of his civil and religious administrators and, what was of prime importance, with the backbone of his army. But the Turks were only a minority of the inhabitants of the Empire as a whole,2 and they were slow to develop the nationalism which became characteristic of Europe in the nineteenth century. They, and their "chief-

¹The value of the foreign trade in 1905–1906, for example, was 220 million dollars, of which 140 million represented the value of imports, and 80 million, of exports. Of the imports, 35 per cent were from Great Britain and 20 per cent from Austria-Hungary, while of the exports 32 per cent were to Great Britain and 25 per cent to France. Foreign loans were required to maintain the "balance of payments."

²Of the 25 million inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, barely 10 million were Turks (and of these only one and a half million resided in Europe), the other 15 million consisting of Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, Greeks, Yugoslavs, Albanians, Gipsies, and Jews. In religion, approximately 50 per cent of the entire population were Moslem; 41 per cent, Orthodox Christian; 6 per cent, Catholic Christian; and the remaining 3 per cent, Oriental Christian or Jewish.

tain" too, were Moslem first, and Turkish afterwards, and less inclined to nationalism than to localism or imperialism. As Moslems they were subject to the law of the Koran, which for them therefore, and likewise for their fellow Arab and Albanian Moslems within the Empire, was the law of the state. As heirs, moreover, to the medieval Byzantine Empire as well as to the medieval Moslem Caliphate, they clung to political ideas and practices which had been abandoned and almost forgotten by the modern peoples of western Europe.

The Turkish idea of empire was the military and social predominance of one tribal nation over several other tribal nations without destroying the entity or the distinctive culture of any of the latter. This idea the Ottoman Sultans had translated into practice, not only by giving Turkish Moslems a generally privileged status in the army, the landholding, and the lucrative tax collecting of the entire Empire, but also by granting to non-Moslem elements in the Empire a specially privileged Millets position as "millets," religious and national groupings, and Capiteach being endowed with the right to observe its own religion and customary law and to manage its own internal affairs. Thus the millets were states within the state, and as long as they respected the supreme authority of the Sultan, paid proper homage to their Turkish and Moslem overlords, and dutifully bore the burden of taxation imposed upon them, they might freely exercise a considerable autonomy. In addition to the millets, and in accordance with the principle underlying them, the privilege of the so-called "capitulations" had been granted to foreigners sojourning in the Ottoman Empire of being tried in courts of their own under their respective national laws.

Such a backward, old-fashioned régime was bound to experience extraordinary difficulties, internal and external, in attempting to survive alongside the industrial nationalist Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909) had begun his reign by making a pretence at "mod-

¹The legally recognized millets in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were the Latin (or Catholic), the Greek (or Orthodox), the Catholic Armenian, the Gregorian Armenian, the Syrian, and the Chaldæan, Maronite, Protestant, and Jewish. Each of the millets had an important politico-ecclesiastical head—the Greek Patriarch, the Grand Rabbi, the Armenian Patriarch, etc.—who exercised wide administrative and judicial powers.

ernizing" the Ottoman Empire; he had promulgated a liberal constitution of the current Western type. But so vociferous was the opposition of ardent Moslems to any such novel substitute for the venerable traditions of the Empire, Abdul Hamid II and so temperamentally arbitrary was the Sultan himself, that the constitution of 1876 was promptly "suspended," and for more than thirty years it remained a dead letter. Then, too, far more seriously, Abdul Hamid early in his reign had tried by force to put down insurrections of Bosnians and Bulgarians within the Empire and to halt Russian Threats against aggression from without. But the resulting Russo-Ottoman Integrity Turkish War of 1877-1878 only brought into lurid light the strength and the many-sided character of the forces operating against the integrity and the very existence of the Ottoman Empire.

First was the force of foreign ambition and aggression, the vaulting desire of European Great Powers to profit politically and financially from the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. Russia took territory from the Empire in 1878, and 1. Aggresthe only way by which the Sultan could keep her from sion of taking more was to invoke the outside aid of Great Great **Powers** Britain and Austria-Hungary and to pay a price to each: Cyprus to the former, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novibazar to the latter. Furthermore, the Sultan had to agree, by the peace treaty of 1878, to collaborate with the Great Powers on a program of "reforms," whose execution would be almost certain to arouse the hostility of his own Turkish subjects and yet the failure of whose execution would afford foreigners a chronic excuse for intolerable interference. Besides, the public finances of the Ottoman Empire, already in confusion, were so completely disordered by the Russo-Turkish War that in 1881 the Sultan was obliged to place them under the direction of a commission of foreign bankers. And this in turn not only mortgaged heavily the income of the Turkish treasury and added greatly to the taxation and hence to the unrest within the country, but also put foreign capitalists, particularly those of Britain, France, and Germany, in a strategic position to obtain profitable concessions of trade and investment for themselves and to clinch the stranglehold of their several governments on the economics as well as on the politics of the Empire.

A second disrupting force was the development of nationalism among the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire. This had been operating in the European provinces of the Em-2. Napire since the opening of the nineteenth century. It had tionalism of Balkan produced revolts of Greeks, Serbs, Rumanians, and Peoples latterly Bulgarians, and had eventuated in the establishment of a national Greek state in 1832 and now in 1878 in the enforced recognition by the Sultan of the complete independence of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the full autonomy of Bulgaria, and the partial autonomy of Eastern Rumelia. None of these states was satisfied with the settlement of 1878, and what each had gained only heightened its ambition to draw to itself fellow nationals who were left under Ottoman rule. Hence from each proceeded an increasingly inflammatory propaganda of publications, armed bands, and secret societies, inciting the Serbs of Macedonia, the Bulgarians of Macedonia and Thrace, the Greeks of European Turkey and also of the Ægean islands and the coast cities of Asia Minor, to be content no longer with the out-moded "millets" but to rebel against the Sultan and to realize their national destiny by union respectively with Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece.

Such nationalist incitement could not be confined to the Christian Balkan peoples. It proved contagious, and was presently communicated to Armenians, to Albanians, 3. Rising and even to the Arab populations of Syria, Mesopo-Nationalism tamia, and Hejaz. Nor were the Turks wholly imamong mune. Some of their intellectuals, attending the Asiatic Subjects universities in France or Germany, or otherwise coming into contact with "Western" civilization, were thereby infected with nationalism, but most Turks caught it while attempting to suppress subject peoples feverish with it. more the Greeks and Serbs and Armenians insisted that they were equal or superior to the Turks, the more the Turks sought to put them in their proper inferior place. The more violent the former grew, the more vindictive became the latter. Massacres, which had been infrequent and sporadic while the Ottoman Empire embraced Moslems and Christians, became common-place in the nineteenth century when the Empire comprised a variety of self-conscious and self-secking nationalities.

The Sultan Abdul Hamid II, with no little skill and cunning, managed to stave off the seemingly inevitable dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. He played off one Great Power against another, and one Balkan state against another. Hamid's At first he relied mainly upon Great Britain to check Russian aggression. Then in turn he utilized French jealousy of Britain and Austrian fear of Russia. Even-tually he came to regard Germany as the most depend-Policies: 1. Playing Off One Threat against Another able prop for his Empire; Germany seemed to be comparatively disinterested, at least politically and territorially, and she was strong enough to serve as a counterpoise to either Russia or Britain. So the Sultan employed German army officers to reorganize his army and German financial experts to advise him on matters affecting the treasury. He welcomed somewhat the-atrical visits of the German Emperor, William II, 2. Lookto Constantinople in 1889 and 1899. He granted ing to to German bankers important economic concessions, German Assistance including the construction of a great railway across Asiatic Turkey from the Bosphorus to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf (1899). At no time, however, did Abdul Hamid put all his eggs in one basket. While he was seeking German aid for the economic development of Anatolia and Mesopotamia, he was favoring British interests in the Persian Gulf, allowing French companies to build railways in Syria, and inviting contributions from the Moslem world for the construction of a "native" railway to far-away Hejaz, to the Moslem holy cities of Mccca and Medina. His constant care was to foster jealousies and enmities among the Great Powers to the end that if one of them should lay violent hands upon the Ottoman Empire some other would rush to its defense.

In respect of internal affairs Abdul Hamid employed trickery and cruelty to uphold his absolute power, to get rid of political and cruelty to uphold his absolute power, to get rid of political enemies and disloyal army officers, to promote the centralization of administration, and to overcome the disaffection or rebellion of subject nationalities. Through a system of delation and espionage which he claborated, and through a kind of terrorism which his swift cruel punishments caused, a semblance of loyalty was maintained in the Turkish army and among the Moslem population. And when Christian peoples grew too restive and threatened open revolt,

he slyly encouraged fanatically Moslem tribesmen, Kurdish or Albanian, to fall upon them and engage in massacre.

Despite all the precaution and cleverness of the Sultan, despite the paralyzing mutual jealousy and rivalry of the Great Powers and the Balkan nations, the disintegration of Continthe Ottoman Empire proceeded apace. In 1882 Great uous Disintegra-Britain, already in occupation of Cyprus, effected a tion of military occupation of Egypt and established a virtual Ottoman Empire protectorate over that nominal dependency of the Ottoman Empire. In 1885 the Bulgarians in Eastern Rumelia drove out their Turkish governor and secured the incorporation of their partially autonomous province with the fully Union of autonomous principality of Bulgaria, which thereby Eastern Rumelia was almost doubled in size and likewise in potential with Bulmenace to the Empire. In 1896 the Greeks in Crete garia. ī88≾ revolted, and the next year in their behalf the kingdom of Greece went to war with the Ottoman Empire. This time, the Sultan's army put up a stiff fight: it overwhelmed the Greek army on the mainland and advanced on Athens. Græco-Whereupon the "protecting Powers" of Greece-Turkish War of Russia, Britain, France, and Italy-intervened and 1897 and ended the Græco-Turkish War. Greece had to pay a Cretan Autonomy war indemnity and consent to a "rectification" of her northern frontier advantageous to the Ottoman Empire. though Greece was not permitted to annex Crete, the Ottoman Empire practically lost it; it was to enjoy autonomy under the protection of the four Great Powers, and these named a son of the Greek King as its governor. The Cretan demand for closer union with Greece led to another insurrection in 1905 and to another intervention by the protecting Powers, who still insisted on retaining the fiction of the Sultan's suzerainty over the island but conceded that its governor should be appointed by the Greek government and its militia should be drilled and commanded by Greek army officers.

Meantime, in the 1890's, nationalist agitation had become violent among the Armenians. There were minor riots in 1892 and a rebellion in 1894. The rebellion was ruthlessly suppressed by Turkish arms and Kurdish ferocity. Kurds and other furious Moslems slaughtered at least

¹ See above, pp. 518-519.

100,000, and perhaps 200,000, Christian Armenians. The Great Powers expostulated with the Sultan, but obtained only one of his facile promises that "reforms" would be instituted. No real reform was forthcoming, however, nor could it be in the circumstances of excited Armenian nationalism and aroused Moslem fanaticism. Henceforth the surviving Armenians were more bitter than ever against the Ottoman Empire, and public opinion in Europe, outside Germany, more solidly arrayed against the Sultan's government.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, domestic as well as foreign criticism of the Sultan's government reached unprecedented proportions. It affected Moslems as well as

Growing Domestic Criticism of Sultan's Régime

Bagdad.

Christians, Asiatic provinces as well as European, and created a widespread revolutionary unrest. In part it was a sign of the nationalist spirit which was beginning to take possession of the Turks and a herald of the coming of a like spirit not only to Albanians along the Adriatic but also to Arabs in Mesopotamia, in Hejaz, and in Syria. In part it was a reaction against a government which permitted foreigners to exploit the country and put intolerable financial burdens on its own subjects, and yet which could not preserve order at home or prevent the loss of territory and prestige abroad. In part, also, it was an outcome of the closer contacts which railway construction—one of the most notable achievements of Abdul Hamid's régime—enabled the peoples of the Ottoman Empire to develop with one another and with western Europe. Whereas the total railway mileage of the Empire in 1885 was only 1,250, most of it being in the European provinces, it amounted in 1908 to 4,400, of which almost three-fourths were in Asia, serving to carry "Western" ideas as well as commodities to Angora and Damascus and Mecca, Aleppo and

In Albania, the Sultan's officials encountered new resistance to the collection of taxes and the enforcement of imperial law.

In Macedonia, they could hardly cope with the in-Rising
Turkish
Nationalism

Arabia they despaired of reëstablishing order. In
Syria and in Mesopotamia, they faced a mounting popular
opposition. And among Turks themselves—the traditional Rising Turkish

mainstay of the Empire and the Sultan-voices were raised in support of such "Western" novelties as nationalism and liberalism.

One of the most respected of Turkish statesmen, Kiamil Pasha,¹ had reached the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire should be constitutional and liberal after the British model. Kiamil For urging the adoption of such a policy he had been Pasha retired from the office of chief minister ("grand and the Liberals vizier") in 1896, but around him gathered a sizeable party of enlightened "liberal" Turks. More radical than Kiamil Pasha—and more nationalist—were a group of comparatively young men, the "Young Turks" as they were popularly styled, who formed secret societies and spread clandestine propaganda, especially within the Turkish army, preparatory to a revolution which should transform the Ottoman Empire into a national state whose whole population would be infused with a common patriotism and a common desire for "progress." One of the most active "Young Turks" was Enver Bey, an army lieutenant stationed at Salonica, who with fellow Bev and the Young officers there organized the strongest and most famous Turks of the revolutionary societies, the so-called "Committee of Union and Progress." Another interesting "Young Turk"

was Mustafa Kemal, a native of Salonica and a graduate of its military school, who, banished to Damascus for political activity, founded in Syria in 1905 another secret society, called "Fatherland." Subsequently Kemal returned secretly to Salonica and federated the "Fatherland" society with the larger "Union and Progress."

In July 1908 the Committee of Union and Progress, headed by Enver Bey and assured of adequate army support, executed a military coup at Salonica. It proclaimed in force "Young Turk" the long-suspended constitution of 1876 and threat-Revoluened the Sultan with deposition if he should offer tion of resistance. Abdul Hamid II, thoroughly frightened, made haste to accept the new order. He endorsed the "restoration" of the constitution. He decreed abolition of censorship

¹ Kiamil Pasha (1832-1915), an Egyptian by birth and a soldier by training, was taken into Ottoman governmental service in 1861. He was governor successively of Jerusalem, Beirut, Kossovo, and Aleppo; grand vizier from 1881 to 1887, and again in 1806; governor of Smyrna from 1806 to 1908; and then grand vizier in 1008 and again in 1012-1013. He was a warm admirer of Great Britain.

and espionage. He called the liberal Kiamil Pasha to be the first grand vizier of the constitutional régime. Only a few Establish persons attempted open opposition, and they were speedily despatched. In December 1908 a duly constitutional elected parliament met at Constantinople and began to debate proposals of general reform.

ment By this time, however, the Empire was in tumult. Fighting broke out in Albania between revolutionaries and reactionaries, Kurdish troops in Asia revolted against the liberal gov-

ernment and committed fresh depredations against the Armenians, mutinies occurred in Arabia and Mesopotamia, and among the Christian nationalities in Macedonia conditions were anarchical. A sharp cleavage appeared, moreover, between the liberal Grand Vizier and the nationalist Enver Bey; and, to cap the climax, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria took advantage of the internal difficulties of the Ottoman Empire to detach territories from its suzerainty and to impair still more its external prestige. In October 1908 Austria-

Hungary proclaimed the end of Ottoman sovereignty Austrian over Bosnia and Herzegovina and the incorporation of Aggression and those provinces with the Dual Monarchy. 1 Simul-Bulgarian taneously the autonomous Prince of Bulgaria de-Independепсе clared the complete independence of his country (including Eastern Rumelia) and assumed the title of King. Helplessly though haltingly the Turkish government acquiesced in what it could not prevent and for comparatively small financial indemnities surrendered Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina without a struggle.

Affairs were obviously going from bad to worse, and at Constantinople the differences between Liberals like Kiamil Pasha and Nationalists like Enver Bey were being complicated by reactionary intrigues on the part of the Sultan Abdul Hamid. At length in April 1909 Enver and the Committee of Union and Deposi-Progress, with the support of the army, executed a second coup. This time Abdul Hamid II was deposed and imprisoned, his mild elderly brother was made nominal Sultan with the title of Mohammed V (1909–1918), the liberal cabinet of Kiamil Pasha was supplanted

¹ As a sop to Turkish pride, Austria-Hungary handed back to the Ottoman Empire the other province of Novibazar which she had been occupying since 1878.

by a Young Turk ministry, and the parliament was transformed into a National Assembly.

From 1909 to 1918 the government of the Ottoman Empire was practically a military dictatorship of the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress, in which Enver Bey Young Turk Dic-(soon promoted to the dignity of Enver Pasha) was tatorship the most vigorous and influential figure. The central purpose of the Young Turks was to regenerate the Empire by nationalizing it, and to nationalize it they believed they had to make it Turkish. So they prescribed Turkish as the official language of the Empire, planned a system of Turkish national schools, and proclaimed that henceforth the Turkish army would be based on the principle of compulsory service for all citizens— Arabs equally with Turks, and Christians equally with Moslems. They had the existing army in back of them and used it to enforce their will, not only on disaffected minorities, but also on the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the attempt to Attempted "Turkify" the Ottoman Empire proved disastrous. "Turkification" There were altogether too many non-Turks to be of Otto-"Turkified," and the non-Turks were now too nationman Emalistic themselves. Moslem Arabs in Asia as well as Christian peoples in the Balkans resented the Young Turk régime, especially its efforts to force them into the army. The more they were forced, the more they prepared to resist. In the case of the Balkan peoples, resistance was ever more actively abetted by kinsmen in the adjacent states of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. And the more resistance the Turkish government encountered, the more interference it invited from abroad.

In September 1911 Italy suddenly announced her intention of appropriating the Ottoman provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica The Young Turk government in northern Africa. Turcoreplied with a resolute declaration of war and des-Italian War, patched Enver Pasha to organize and conduct the de-1911-1912 fense of the provinces. But the ensuing hostilities involved a double loss for the Empire. Not enough Turkish forces could be supplied to prevent Italy from despoiling the Empire in Africa, and yet enough were sent across the Mediterranean to encourage the Balkan nations to attempt a spoliation of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. For before the Turco-Italian War was concluded, the Balkan War of 1912-1913 began, and from this issued the World War of 1914–1918. In other words, the Ottoman Empire, under Young Turk leadership, was almost continuously at war for seven years, from 1911 to 1918. It was the death-throe of the Empire.

Postponing a more detailed account of the Tripolitan and

Balkan Wars, we may now turn our attention to developments in the several Balkan states between 1878 and 1912. We begin with Greece, which, it will be remembered. ment of Balkan had obtained her formal independence in 1832,1 a States, new royal dynasty in 1863 in the person of King George I,2 and in 1864 a new constitutional democratic government.3 The actual operation of parliamentary government was handicapped by inexperience of the masses and by factionalism and political corruption of the leaders, but despite political and financial difficulties the country made noteworthy Greece progress, intellectually and materially, in the latter under George I, part of the nineteenth century. Agriculture, on which 1863-1913 almost three-fourths of the population depended, was promoted, and the production of olive oil, currants, wine, and grain considerably augmented. At the same time, a thousand miles of railway were built; a hundred factories sprang up at Athens; and Greek merchant vessels secured a gradually increasing portion of the carrying trade of the eastern Mediterranean.

The kingdom of Greece, as it existed from 1832 to 1913, embraced but a minority of the Greek nationality. The majority were still under Ottoman rule-in Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, at Constantinople, in Smyrna and other towns along the seacoast of Asia Minor, in the Ægean islands and Crete. Ionian Islands, which Great Britain had acquired in 1815, were turned over to Greece in 1864,4 and Thessaly was ceded by the Ottoman Empire in 1881.5 In 1897, as we know, Greece made an effort to wrest Crete from the Empire. The effort failed of its immediate purpose, but it brought to the fore an Venizelos and Greek outstanding Greek patriot and statesman, Eleutherios National Venizelos. Venizelos, a Cretan by birth, had been a Unification leader of the revolutionary movement for the union of Crete with Greece, and was largely responsible for the manage-

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 705-707, 782-785.

² See above, p. 256.

³ See above, p. 277.

⁴ See above, p. 256.

⁵ See above, p. 268.

ment of the island's autonomous government which issued from the war of 1897. By 1910 his popularity was so great in the kingdom of Greece that King George I, somewhat against his own personal wishes, was impelled to invite Venizelos to the mainland and to entrust him with the premiership of Greece. Venizelos reformed the Greek government, improved its finances, effected a reorganization of its army and navy, and negotiated with Serbia and Bulgaria a Balkan League against the Ottoman Empire. He thus prepared Greece, internally and externally, just as Cavour had prepared Sardinia, or Bismarck had prepared Prussia, for wars of national unification.

The Rumanian provinces of Moldavia and Walachia had been accorded autonomy in 1856 and permitted in 1862 to form the united principality of Rumania. In 1866, its native prince was deposed and in his place, with the consent of the Great Powers, a member of the German family of under

Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was installed as Prince Charles I.² Then in 1878, as an outcome of the Russo-

under Charles I, 1866-1914

Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin, the principality was recognized as a completely independent state, and in 1881 it was designated a "kingdom," Prince Charles I becoming King Charles I and crowning himself with a steel crown wrought from Turkish cannon captured at Plevna.³

This kingdom of Rumania, like the Greek kingdom, was ambitious to extend its sway over the large portion of its own nationality that dwelt outside its restricted frontiers. Unlike the Greeks, however, the "unredeemed" Rumanians were not confined to the Ottoman Empire. There were villages of them, the so-called Kutzo-Vlachs, scattered here and there throughout Macedonia, but far more numerous were the Problem Rumanian populations of the Russian province of Besof Rumanian sarabia, the Hungarian principality of Transylvania, National and the Austrian crown-land of Bukovina. In other Unification words, the problem of national unification confronting

Rumania was much more complex than that facing Greece; the

¹ See above, pp. 198 note, 203.

²This family was related to the Hohenzollern Kings of Prussia and German Emperors. Charles I of Rumania was a brother of that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen whose candidacy for the Spanish crown in 1870 had been the pretext for the Franco-Prussian War. See above, pp. 210-211.

⁸ See above, p. 263.

latter would have to reckon with the Ottoman Empire, the former with the Russian and Habsburg Empires also.

In the circumstances, Rumania, though militantly nationalist, was not single-minded about foreign policy. Some of her statesmen thought she should ally herself with Russia, forget about Bessarabia, and concentrate upon obtaining Bukovina and Transylvania from Austria-Hungary. Others thought she should ally herself with Austria-Hungary, forget (for the time being) about Bukovina and Transylvania, and concentrate upon regaining Bessarabia from Russia. These latter statesmen were in the ascendancy from 1881 to 1914. They were favored by preponderant public opinion, which had been rendered bitterly anti-Russian by the Tsar's insistence on appropriating Bessarabia for himself in 1878, and by the Hohenzollern King Charles I (1881-1914), who by family tradition and training was doggedly pro-German and hence pro-Austrian. In 1883 Rumania concluded a secret alliance with Austria-Hungary and thus became a satel-

Rumania's Alliance with

lite of the famous Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy. For the next thirty years German influence was dominant in Rumania. The political institutions of the country were modelled after Prussia's, with a parliament elected by a class system of voting which assured to the well-to-do upper classes the complete control of

the government. Prussia's military system was likewise imitated, so that Rumania possessed the largest, and presumably the most efficient, army of all the Balkan states.

During the reign of Charles I, Rumania made noteworthy economic progress. Agricultural production was stimulated by

Economic Development in Rumania

the introduction of modern farm machinery and the development of accessible foreign markets in industrialized Austria and Germany. Rumania, with her rich black soil, rose to high rank among the grain-

growing countries of the world. Simultaneously, through investment of foreign capital, began the profitable exploitation of the country's rich mineral resources, its coal and especially its petroleum. Some factories were established; and the first railway, a short line opened in 1869, was the forerunner of the 2,100 miles of railway owned by the Rumanian state in 1913.

The mass of Rumanian peasantry did not share proportionately, however, in the wealth which accrued to foreign investors

or to domestic landlords and middle men. Rumania was a country chiefly of large landed estates, whose owners were Plight of very reluctant to countenance any social or political Rumanian Peasantry reform which might endanger their own economic interests, and very prone to deflect peasant criticism from themselves to the considerable number of Tews who dwelt in the towns of Rumania and constituted a large part of her trading and money-lending class. This economic situation, in combination with traditional religious fanaticism, resulted in the particularly virulent anti-Semitism which characterized Rumanian society and politics during the era. But anti-Semitism was only one symptom of poverty and unrest among the Rumanian peasantry. Emigration was another, and periodic rioting was still another. In vain the governing classes made minor concessions confiscating the landed property of the Orthodox monasteries (1864), and arranging for the sale of public lands to the peasants (1889). In 1907 an agrarian insurrection assumed alarming proportions, and only with difficulty was it put down by the army.

Between the Rumanians at the north and the Greeks at the south, the central Balkan territories were inhabited by Slavicspeaking peoples. All of these might be termed Yugoslavsthat is, "Southern Slavs"—in contradistinction to the "Eastern Slavs" (Russians) or "Western Slavs" (Poles and Czechoslovaks). Conventionally, however, the term "Yugoslav" was confined to the Southern Slavs in the western half of "Yugothe Balkan peninsula: Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro slavs": Serbs. and in the Banat of Hungary and in the western Croats, Macedonian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Croats Slovenes in the Hungarian crown-land of Croatia, and Slovenes in the Austrian province of Carniola. The remaining Southern Slavs, in the eastern half of the Balkan peninsula, were customarily styled "Bulgarians" rather than "Yugo-

that the linguistic differences between "Yugoslav" and "Bulgarian" were greater than between Serb and Croat.

slavs." Such a distinction was justified on the ground

¹ Rumania had agreed by the treaty of Berlin (1878), as a condition of her national independence, to grant full religious toleration and to admit Jews to civil and political equality with other inhabitants. Subsequently, however, the Rumanian government, backed undoubtedly by public opinion, practically nullified the agreement. Only a very few of the quarter million Rumanian Jews were granted citizenship or permitted to yote or hold office.

though it should be borne in mind that in religion, in written language, and in culture Serb and Bulgarian were much more akin than was either to Croat or Slovene. Serbs and Bulgarians

alike were Orthodox Christians, used the Greek alpha-Similarity bet, and derived their historic civilization from the of Serbs "East." Croats and Slovenes, on the other hand, were and Bulgarians Catholic, employed the Latin alphabet, and belonged culturally to the "West." For centuries, moreover, Serbs and Bulgarians had been subject to the Ottoman Empire, while Croats and Slovenes had been included in the Habsburg Empire.

In the nineteenth century, the cleavage between Serbs and Bulgarians became more marked as each people grew nationalist, erected a state of its own, and aspired to territorial expansion at

National Cleavage between Serbs and Bulgarians

the expense of the other. In the case of the Serbs, two independent states were erected: Montenegro and Serbia. Montenegro, or "Black Mountain," near the Adriatic, was a very diminutive state, which had long been governed in a patriarchal fashion by native

princes and whose full independence of the Ottoman Empire was finally acknowledged by the treaty of Berlin in 1878.1 The Prince of Montenegro at the time was Nicholas I (1860-1018), a rude but often benevolent despot of the fighting type

Montenegro under Nicholas I, 1860-1918

and something of a poet withal. He was a warm admirer of Russia and a firm friend of the Tsar. He intrigued sometimes with Serbia and sometimes against Serbia in order to effect a union of the Serbs under his own rule. In 1905 he granted a democratic constitution, and in 1910 he assumed the title of King in place of Prince.

His state was small in area and population, but its hardy mountaineers constituted a remarkably patriotic fighting force.

Serbia, the larger and more important of the two Serb states, had been autonomous since 1830 and became an independent principality in 1878.2 It was a country of peasants, Serbia backward, even primitive; and it was long a prey to the rivalry of opposing claimants to its throne and to the interference of jealous foreign Powers in its internal affairs. The rivalry was between the partisans of the family of Karageorge, the

¹ See above, pp. 262, 263, 265.

² See Vol. I, pp. 707-708, 782, 784-785, and the present volume, above, pp. 263, 265.

original peasant leader of Serbian rebellion against the Ottoman Empire, and partisans of the family of Miloš Obrenović, the soldier who had secured autonomy for Serbia. The latter were in power from 1817 to 1842,

when they were replaced by the former, and again from 1859 to 1903, though the relatively long sway of the Obrenović dynasty was punctuated by occasional insurrections of the Karageorge faction and by two brutal assassinations—one in 1868, and the other in 1903. This constant dynastic feud not only kept Serbia in a disorderly condition but also tended to make Serbia a kind of football in the game of international politics and intrigue between Russia and Austria-Hungary. If an Obrenović prince was pro-Austrian, his Karageorge rival was likely to be pro-Russian.

The Prince of Serbia during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 was Milan Obrenović, a man of some natural talents and of notoriously scandalous life. He was passionately addicted to personal pleasure and likewise to the exercise of autocratic power. Pro-Austrian by inclination, he was especially angered by Russia's greater solicitude

for Bulgaria than for Serbia in the peace settlement of 1878, and in 1881 he formed a close secret alliance with Austria-Hungary. In 1882, with Austrian backing, he transformed his state from a principality into a kingdom; and in 1885 he utilized Bulgaria's annexation of Eastern Rumelia as the pretext for going to war

with his Slavic neighbor. The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 was a series of victories for Bulgarian arms, and Serbia would have been utterly crushed had not Austria-Hungary intervened and stopped the war.

Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885

The result was that Serbia passed more completely under the tutelage of the Habsburg Empire, and King Milan lost whatever popularity he had hitherto commanded in Serbia. To defray the expenses of his ill-starred war against Bulgaria, he had to impose the most burdensome taxes; and in a last effort to regain popular approval he promulgated in 1889 a liberal and democratic constitution. Two months later he abdicated in favor of his young son, Alexander I (1889–1903).

Alexander's reign was even more troublous than Milan's had been. The new King was quite as despotic as his father; he set aside the constitution and ruled through favorites and intriguc. He alienated the extreme nationalist party—now intent upon incorporating the Yugoslav provinces of the Habsburg Empire with Serbia—by adhering to the alliance with Austria-Serbia Hungary; and when, towards the close of his reign, he under suddenly expressed pro-Russian sentiments, he was Alexander Ohredeemed whimsical and insincere. Then, too, he aliennović ated a large part of the nation by his mad infatuation with an ambitious elderly woman of unsavory reputation, Draga Masin, by his marriage with her, and by the favors he showered upon her relatives. A group of army officers, members of a secret society known as the "Black Hand," conspired with the Kara-Dynastic george faction to overthrow the Obrenović dynasty. Revolution of In June 1903 the conspiracy eventuated in the murder 1903 in Serbia of King Alexander, Queen Draga, and some fifty of their ministers and attendants, and in the accession to the bloodstained throne of Serbia of the grandson of Karageorge, Peter I (1903-1921).

King Peter's accession marked a turning-point in Serbian history. It definitively ended the Obrenović dynasty and hence the feud which had impaired the internal unity and strength of the nation. With equal definitiveness, it ended the Serbia subservience of Serbia to Austria-Hungary and thus under Peter I gave free rein to the development of a Serbian nationalism in harmony with Russian desires and zealous to make the kingdom of Serbia the centre and core of a Yugoslavia which should embrace not only all Serbs still under Ottoman rule but also all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the Habsburg Empire. King Peter was very much of a soldier-patriot, and also something of a democrat in manner and inclination. He restored the democratic constitution of 1889 and chose his ministers from the majority party—the ultra-patriotic Radical party—in the parliament. The leader of this party, and the statesman on whom the King mainly relied, was Nicholas Pašič, an engineer who had been educated in Switzerland, an ardent patriot, able and unscrupulous. While the King devoted his chief ener-Pašič and Yugoslav gies to army reform, Pašič reorganized the national National finances at home, encouraged nationalist propaganda Unificaabroad, and negotiated alliances with other Balkan tion states. The way was prepared for expanding Serbia, first at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, and second at the expense of

Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian annexation of the Serb-speaking provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, which Serbia was then unable to prevent, served only to intensify anti-Austrian feeling among the Serbs and to quicken the determination of the Serbian government to seek territorial compensation, as soon as possible, wherever it might be found.

The Bulgarians, who comprised the Slavic population in the eastern half of the Balkan peninsula—and a majority of the Slavic population throughout Macedonia—had been promised a comprehensive national state of their own by the treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey in 1878, but the ensuing Congress of Berlin, fearful lest the projected Bulgaria should be a mere appendage of the Russian Empire, seriously reduced its territory and split what was left into two states: the autonomous "principality of Bulgaria," and the semi-autonomous "province of Eastern Rumelia." The sop to Russia was that a Bulgaria nephew of the Tsar Alexander II, Alexander of Battenburg, was chosen to preside over the principality. For Alexana time, this Prince Alexander was obediently proder, 1879-1886 Russian. In accordance with his uncle's dictation, he suspended the democratic constitution which Bulgarians had devised and appointed Russians to high office in his army and civil administration. Presently, however, he tired of Russian tutelage and decided to put himself at the head of those Bulgarian patriots who resented any foreign interference whatsoever. In 1883, consequently, he defied the Tsar by dismissing his Russian officers and advisers and establishing constitutional government. Then in 1885 a revolt of Bulgarians against the Ottoman government in Eastern Rumelia enabled him to incorporate this province with his principality; and when Serbia attempted to seek "compensation" from him, his Bulgarian army roundly trounced the Serbian army.

Unfortunately for Prince Alexander, there was delay in getting the Ottoman Sultan and the Russian Tsar to agree to Bulgaria's annexation of Eastern Rumelia, and when Alexander abjectly appealed to the Tsar for assistance, a group of impatient and infuriated Bulgarian nationalists forced him to abdicate (1886). In selecting as his successor (1887) Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a clever German prince, related to the reigning families in Great Britain, Belgium, and Portugal, the Bulgarian parliament

¹ See the genealogical table at p. 489.

angered the Russian Tsar still more. For several years the Tsar treated Ferdinand as a usurper and connived at military conspiracies against him. Nevertheless, Ferdinand clung to Bulgaria his throne, and with the aid of a resolute and patriunder Ferdinand otic prime minister, Stefan Stambolov, he gradually of Saxestrengthened his position both inside and outside Coburg Bulgaria. Eventually Stambolov became so dictatorial that he was forced out of office and assassinated (1895), but by this time Ferdinand was so firmly entrenched in power that the Russian Tsar finally recognized him as rightful ruler of Bulgaria. Some years later, in 1908, Ferdinand, with the connivance of Austria-Hungary and the permission of Russia, utilized the Bulgarian opportunity afforded him by the "Young Turk" revo-Independence, 1908 lution within the Ottoman Empire to sever the nominal bonds between Bulgaria and the Empire and to elevate himself from the status of an autonomous Prince to that of an independent King.

In the meantime neither Ferdinand nor his patriotic subjects had forgotten the Greater Bulgaria which had been projected in 1878. Macedonia and Thrace, still within the Ottoman Empire, contained a large number of persons who spoke Bulgarian dialects, and therefore, according to Bulgarian nationalists, those regions should be united with Bulgaria. For many years, however, such a prospect seemed remote. The Great Powers would Problem of Bulnot agree to Bulgarian aggrandizement on a large scale, garian National and the Bulgarian army alone was considerably smaller and weaker than the Ottoman army. Besides, Greece Expansion and Serbia had designs of their own on Macedonia or Thrace or both, and they were resolved that their fellow nationals in those regions should not be subjected to Bulgarian rule. There were, in truth, no hard-and-fast lines between Serbs and Greeks and Bulgarians within Macedonia. Villages of one nationality were interspersed with villages of another, and some Maccdonians really did not know whether they were Bulgarian or Serb. In the circumstances propagandists and marauders from Bulgaria came face to face in Macedonia with agitators and armed bands from Serbia or Greece. The result was chronic disorder and occasional massacre throughout the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire and bitter rivalry and enmity among the Balkan states.

The revolution of 1908-1909 within the Ottoman Empire, the

deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and the seizure of power by the "Young Turks," with their determination to reform and nationalize the Empire, paved the way for at least a Turkish temporary change in the traditional relationships of Revolu-

the Balkan states—a change from quarrelling among themselves to coöperating against a common foe. For the more the Young Turks tried to "Turkify" the Christian peoples of Macedonia and Thrace, the more

tion an Incentive to Balkan Coöperation

the several Balkan states perceived the advantage of united resistance. Then, in 1911, the outbreak of the Turco-Italian War seemed to provide an excellent opportunity for the Balkan states to act. Italy was despoiling the Ottoman Empire in Africa. Why should not they despoil it in Europe? If they warred together they could put a larger army in the field than could the Empire.

King Ferdinand of Bulgaria was the prime mover in creating the Balkan League. Satisfying himself that Austria-Hungary would not oppose him, he tactfully employed the good offices of Russia to persuade Pašič and King Peter of Balkan Serbia to form an alliance with Bulgaria in March 1012, and shortly afterwards he negotiated with Venizelos a similar Graco-Bulgarian alliance. Thus concerted action against the Ottoman Empire was arranged for by Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, with Montenegro acceding, and between Bulgaria and Serbia a tentative division of the spoils was outlined. Northern Albania and the extreme western part of Macedonia would

go to Serbia; the rest of Macedonia and Thrace would pass to Bulgaria; and the Russian Tsar would be invited to arbitrate any differences that might arise. Feverish military preparations ensued throughout the Balkans, the Albanians rose in revolt, and in October 1012 a declaration of war by tiny Montenegro was the signal for

First Balkan War, against Turkey, 1912-1913

The Empire made heroic efforts to overawe and overcome the allies. The liberal statesman, Kiamil Pasha, reinstalled as grand vizier, obtained an express pledge from the Great Powers that they "would not permit any modification of the territorial status quo in European Turkey." The Turkish army was mobilized, and Enver Pasha and other officers were summoned from Tripoli to Thrace. And, to concentrate all its energies in the Balkans, the Ottoman government terminated the Italian war by signing

joint attack of all the Balkan allies on the Ottoman Empire.

the peace-treaty of Lausanne (October 1912), formally ceding Tripoli and Cyrenaica to Italy and allowing Italy to occupy and administer twelve of the Ægean islands, the so-called Dodecanese, pending the final withdrawal of Turkish forces from Tripoli.¹

Despite frantic endeavors, the Turks proved unequal to the emergency. To the surprise of the Great Powers, and even of the Balkan allies, Ottoman resistance all but collapsed. While Serb and Greek armies were capturing Salonica and Monastir and overrunning Macedonia almost at will, the Bulgarians were investing Adrianople and hammering the main Turkish army back through Victory of Balkan Thrace to within a few miles of Constantinople. In December 1912, less than two months after the beginning of the war, the Ottoman government sued for peace, and peace negotiations were opened at London under the auspices of the Great Powers.

The negotiations were interrupted in January 1913 by a frenzied revolution at Constantinople which overthrew the pacific Kiamil Pasha and put the bellicose Enver Pasha in the saddle. But the resumption of hostilities brought no consolation to the Turks. In March Adrianople capitulated to the Bulgarians, and in April Scutari, the last Turkish stronghold on the Adriatic, surrendered to the Serbs. Finally, in May 1913, even Enver

Pasha consented to accept the peace terms of the Balkan allies as amended by the Great Powers and incorporated in the treaty of London. The Ottoman Empire thereby formally yielded all its European territory except Constantinople and a narrow strip along the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora.

It was one thing to despoil the Ottoman Empire, and quite another thing to divide the booty. Here, the greed and mutual jealousy of the Balkan allies came into full play, and were further stimulated by conflicting policies and ambitions of the Great Powers. The triumph of the Balkan allies against the Turks was

¹ The Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912 had been confined to irregular but fierce fighting in Africa between an Italian military expedition on the one side and the Turkish garrisons and native tribesmen under the leadership of Enver Pasha on the other, and to an Italian naval expedition in the Ægean. Italy, after obtaining title to Tripoli and Cyrenaica (Barca) by the treaty of Lausanne, gave them the collective title of "Libya." The difficulty which Italy experienced in establishing order in Libya gave her an excuse for retaining the Dodecanese.

generally interpreted as a gain for the prestige of Russia and correspondingly as a blow to the prestige of Austria-Hungary and Germany. An enlarged pro-Russian Serbia would be particularly menacing to the continuing integrity Conflictof the Habsburg Empire with its large Yugoslav ing Ambitions in population in Bosnia and Croatia. Consequently Balkan the Austro-Hungarian government was determined to League and prevent Serbia from reaping the fruits she expected among from her victory over the Turks. In this determi-Great Powers nation, Austria was backed by Germany and Italy and opposed by Russia and France. For a time it seemed likely that a vast world war would immediately issue from the Balkan War, but a compromise was shortly arranged by the Great Erection Serbia was allowed to expand southward, but she was barred from the Adriatic by the erection of an independent state of Albania, over which a German prince would rule and in which Italy would have a privileged position.1

But thereby, if a world war was staved off, another Balkan war was precipitated. For Serbia, deprived of the portion of Albania promised her in her treaty of alliance with Bulgaria, demanded "compensation" in that part of Macedonia which had been tentatively allotted to Bulgaria. This demand King Ferdinand was encouraged by Austria-Hungary and pressed by his own army-chiefs to refuse. In vain the Russian Tsar attempted to arbitrate between Bulgaria and Serbia. Both were unbending, and, complicating their feud, a bitter quar-Second rel developed between Bulgaria and Greece over the Balkan War, disposition of Thrace. In June fighting began between against Bulgaria on one side, and Serbia and Greece on the Bulgaria, other; and soon the latter were reënforced by Rumania and the Ottoman Empire. Rumania was fearful of being overshadowed by a Greater Bulgaria and desired to expand her own territory if the other Balkan states were expanding theirs, while the Turks perceived an opportunity to regain at least a portion of what they had lost by the treaty of London, especially the city of Adrianople.

¹ In 1914 Prince William of Wied ascended the shaky throne of Albania, but his reign was abruptly terminated by the outbreak of the World War, and he fled to Germany. Italy's grip on Albania was not so easily loosened.

This second Balkan War was as brief as it was sorry. Within the single month of July 1913 the Turks recaptured Adrianople while armies from Rumania, Greece, and Serbia invaded Bulgaria and closed in upon Sofia. Unable to elicit any assistance from the Great Powers, who could not agree among themselves as to what should be done, King Ferdinand bowed to the inevi-Defeat of table and early in August concluded with the other Balkan states the treaty of Bucharest. Thereby the Bulgaria spoils of the previous war were distributed. To Serbia Treaty of Bucharest was assigned the greater part of Macedonia, including the towns of Istib and Monastir. To Greece were allotted Crete, southern Epirus, southern Macedonia (including Salonica), and a section of western Thrace (including Kavala). To Bulgaria was left a bit of Macedonia (including Strumitsa) and the region of central Thrace down to the Ægean, though she was forced to cede her northeastern territory of Dobruja to Rumania and subsequently to relinquish Adrianople to the Ottoman Empire.

Altogether, the two wars of 1912-1913 served to enlarge the territory and population of the several Balkan states. Serbia increased her area by 82 per cent, Greece by 68 per Enlargecent, Bulgaria by 29 per cent, and Rumania by 8 per ment of cent. As regards population, Rumania now had a total Balkan States of about seven and a half million, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia about four and a half million each, Montenegro some half million, and the newly created state of Albania approximately three-fourths of a million. The Ottoman Empire preserved in Europe an area barely equal to Albania's and a population less than half as numerous as Bulgaria's or Serbia's. The Empire, to be sure, still held intact its Asiatic provinces, but nationalism was already promoting the same sort of disruptive process in Mesopotamia, Syria, and Hejaz as had already occurred in Macedonia and Thrace.

The Balkan Wars also served to intensify the nationalism and stimulate the predatory ambitions of the several peoples and Stimulate governments involved. The Bulgarians, embittered by the knowledge that they had contributed most to the defeat of the Turks and yet had gotten least from it, were doubly eager to avail themselves of any opportunity to take revenge on Serbia and to appropriate Macedonia

for themselves, and in the circumstances it was but natural that King Ferdinand should seek a close alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany and even with the Turks. The Turks, too,



SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, 1914 Compare with maps on pages 206-267, above.

became rapidly more nationalist. Enver Pasha tightened his dictatorship, speeded up the process of "Turkification," and cemented the military and economic alliance with Germany.

Most ominous, however, was the impassioned attitude of the Serbs. Elated by their successive victories over Turks and Bulgarians, they now evinced a fierce hostility against Austria-Hungary, which had snatched from them some of the fruits of their victory in the recent war and which stood squarely in the way of their ambition to unite Croats and Slovenes with themselves in a great national Yugoslavia. And in such hostility they were heartened by the prospect of Russian assistance, and perhaps of Rumanian and Greek.

It thus transpired that nationalism in the Balkans, as soon as it had despoiled and disrupted the Ottoman Empire, menaced the Habsburg Empire with spoliation and disruption. Vainly the statesmen of Austria-Hungary struggled to remove or lessen the menace. It became truly alarming in June 1914 when the heir of the Habsburg Emperor Francis Joseph was assassinated at Sarajevo, the chief town of Bosnia, by members of the Serbian "Black Hand" society possessed of fanatical nationalism.



PART VI

AN EMBATTLED AND NATIONALIST WORLD

XXIII. THE PROMISE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

XXIV. THE WORLD WAR

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CHAPTER XXIII

THE PROMISE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

1. ENLIGHTENED PROGRESS



ELIEF prevailed at the opening of the twentieth century that the world was making progress at a rapidly accelerating rate. Once upon a time—and indeed for countless centuries—humanity had been enslaved by childish fears and superstitions, ground down by violence and tyranny, and hopelessly

committed to a veritable prison of habit and tradition. But in modern times all this was changing, and changing swiftly. An "enlightenment" had dawned in the seventeenth Optimism and eighteenth centuries, disclosing the bright prospect of "progress" by which man could and would 20th Cenescape from the trammels of the dead past and advance and be uplifted intellectually, socially, and politically. For the age of science was at last come, the age of reasoned observation and experimentation, of increasing control over nature, of broadening personal liberty, of expanding democracy, of growing brotherhood of individuals and of nations.

"Enlightenment" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was an idea and a goal of revolutionary intellectuals. From the French Revolution at the close of the eighteenth century on through the entire nineteenth century, it "Enlightenment" more and more affected action in Europe as well as thought, the masses as well as the classes. Under its influence, the struggle between "reaction" and "revolution" gradually turned in favor of the latter, and respect for the past gave way to faith and confidence in the future. So multiple and impressive became the evidences of "progress" that the twentieth century promised an apotheosis of enlightenment-of science, of industry, of material case, of education, of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Already in the first decade of the new century the Era of the Enlightenment seemed clearly to be drawing to a climax. The fondest dreams of Francis Bacon and Jean Jacques Rousseau were being realized.

Science was at length triumphant. Its immutable mathematical laws were now discovered and taught and exploited for the welfare of mankind. Under its beneficent sway, men could fly in the air, swim under the water, converse with one another wherever they might be, escape physical pain, lengthen their span of life, and possess knowledge and enjoy creature-comforts beyond the experience of any philosopher or prince of previous ages.

Machine industry was concurrently ascendant. It was now a common European phenomenon, and from Europe it was spreading out to the farthest corners of the earth, conferring inestimable benefits upon mankind. By aid of machinery human beings might produce more food than they could eat, more clothing than they could wear, more buildings than they could inhabit. They need fear famine and inclem-Material Comfort ent weather no longer. They might have, indeed, not only the bare necessities of life but an abundance and range of luxuries which no king of earlier times, not even Louis XIV, had possessed, and a still more extraordinary leisure in which they might rest from toil and engage in play. Europe, once reputed a poor and sparse continent, was now rich and populous. Exclusive of an unprecedented emigration to America and Australasia, the number of Europeans doubled within a century until in 1910 they totalled over 400 million, representing a density of popula-tion more than twice that of Asia and ten times greater than America's or Africa's. Nor did the prediction seem too sanguine that under the new industrial dispensation at least 800 million persons would be living comfortably in Europe before the twentieth century should close.

There appeared to be no longer any serious problem about the production of wealth. Machinery had solved it. There were, admittedly, some minor problems about the distribution of wealth wealth. But these, too, it was confidently believed, and Benevolence becoming enlightened. Bourgeoisie was vying with nobility and clergy in seeking a reputation for benevolence. Proletariat and peasantry were ceasing to be dumb, and statesmen to be deaf. Where there was a will, there would be a way.

The economic nationalism which Bismarck had championed in Germany and which was now being developed all over the Continent promised at least a partial solution of the problem of equitable wealth distribution, and the social legislation which Lloyd George and his fellow British Liberals were sponsoring pointed to a similar outcome. Marxian Socialism was cocksure that it had a complete solution of the problem, and the rapid increase of its following in every country of Europe during the first decade of the twentieth century was special proof of the optimism and millennial enthusiasm of the time.

Education, not merely of the classes, but of the masses, was being fostered as never before in the world's history. Universities were being reorganized and expanded, new ones founded, and attendance at them was multiplying. A host of professional schools and technical institutes were springing up. Public libraries were bulging with books and magation and zines. Newspapers were being printed and circulated Literacy in enormous quantities. Elementary schooling was compulsory in most countries, and secondary schooling becoming popular. By the first decade of the twentieth century illiteracy was seldom encountered in Great Britain, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, or Austria, and it was declining in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and eastern Europe. In the next generation, it was prophesied, every European would be able to read and write; and with new leisure for self-improvement and new facilities for higher education, what an intelligent and informed race would issue forth! Enlightenment would be universal and progress assured.

Liberty was surely broadening out, and all those personal rights which had been denied men for centuries were now being written into solemn constitutions and sworn to as a permanent legacy of the enlightened age. Slavery was gone. Serfdom was gone. Even passports for travellers were going. True, the state was newly interfering in private business and abridging certain economic liberties; economic nationalism, as we have elsewhere observed, was not really liberal. Yet the trend toward basic personal liberties of conscience, worship, speech, publication, association, meeting, and profession was uninterrupted and apparently inevitable. It was

¹ See above, p. 312.

most manifest in western Europe, but with the spread of constitutionalism (and industrialization) it was making notable headway in the Habsburg Empire and even in the Empires of Russian Tsar and Turkish Sultan. The Europe of the twentieth century must be a constitutional liberal Europe.

It seemed also that the Europe of the twentieth century must be democratic. Kings might remain as ornamental figureheads. but whatever the nominal form of government might be, whether royal or republican, it would almost certainly represent Triumph of Democ- and be guided by the majority of the whole citizenry of the several nations. Universal manhood suffrage had been adopted in the second half of the nineteenth century by France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Norway, Greece, and Bulgaria, and, with minor restrictions, by Great Britain and Denmark. In the first years of the twentieth century, the democratic trend was even swifter. Universal manhood suffrage was instituted in Serbia (1903), in Austria (1907), in Sweden (1909), and in Italy (1912). In Britain the hereditary aristocratic House of Lords was subordinated to the democratic House of Commons (1911), and elsewhere special steps were taken to perfect the operation of democracy. The devices of initiative and referendum were employed in Switzerland. Voting was made compulsory in 1907 in Belgium, Austria, and Spain, and at about the same time Finland and Norway enfranchised women equally with men. Agitation for electoral reform and thorough-going democracy reached almost revolutionary proportions in Sweden, the Dutch Netherlands, Prussia, Hungary, and Rumania. Democratic revolutions, more or less successful, occurred in the Russian Empire in 1905, in the Ottoman Empire in 1908-1909, and in Portugal in 1910.

All this democratic movement was hailed as happy fruition of centuries of effort to get rid of despotism, dictatorship, and oligarchy, and as unmistakable evidence that in the enlightened Europe of the new century the will of "the people" would everywhere prevail. It would be exercised ever more perfectly through orderly balloting without distinction of class, economic status, or sex, and it would be utilized ever more successfully to promote social reform and international peace. The rapidly rising "reformist" element in Marxian Socialism was enthusiastically committed to political democracy, and so likewise were the growing

"popular" parties of Catholic Christians and the waxing number of "feminists," while bourgeois politicians, "liberal" or "conservative," made haste to comply with the democratic demands of peasants and trade unionists. Democracy was fashionable in mansion and cottage as well as in tenement, and the new fashion, it was ardently believed, was one which had come to stay.

There still were wars—the Spanish-American, the South African, the Russo-Japanese, the Turco-Italian. But these were outside Europe or in "backward" regions of Europe. There still were some internal tumults—"revolutions" in War, a Russia, in Turkey, in Portugal. But these too were in "Backward" countries, and were accounted a result "Phenomof temporary resistance to democratic progress. By and large, Europeans were now too intelligent and too well educated and too humane to wage vast destructive wars among themselves, and besides, under the new industrial order, any such war would be altogether too expensive. Just as the duel and the blood feud had disappeared, just as local warfare had ceased and civil war was ceasing, so eventually in an enlightened democratic age there would be an end to the causes of revolution and a surcease of international war.

Such, in brief, were the principal items in the optimistic creed and program of influential leaders—and presumably of the masses—of Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. The items were especially impressive and convincing, not only because they were obviously being realized in Europe, but also because the whole world was being Europeanized and with almost magical swiftness was undergoing conversion to the same optimistic creed. Imitation has always been the sincerest form of flattery, and enlightened Europe was not reluctant to be the object of flattery.

2. EUROPEANIZATION OF THE WORLD

The process of Europeanizing the world—of making Europe the model for material and intellectual development in all the other continents—had been going on since the sixteenth century. Not until the second half of the progress, nineteenth century, however, did it gather great momentum and give promise of speedy and universal realization. Toward providing the whole world with a common

pattern of life and ideals, essentially European, greater progress was made during the forty years from 1870 to 1910—and, indeed, during the twenty years from 1890 to 1910—than during the two or even four centuries previous.

The explanation of this phenomenon lies partially in the revival and intensification of Christian missionary enterprise, but far more in the Industrial Revolution and its attendant galvanizing of European economic (and political) activity. Both the capitalistic and the religious foundations of the European imperialism of the latter part of the nineteenth century we have indicated and discussed elsewhere. Here we may content ourselves with sketching its course and summarizing its achievements, taking care to distinguish three major types of "Europeanization." One was represented on the Types of Euro-American continents and in Australasia, South Africa, peanizaand northern Asia. This involved a large-scale colonization by European peoples and hence a transplanting of all the peculiar features of European culture. It was literally an "expansion of Europe." The second was exemplified in Asia and in northern Africa, where European civilization came into contact with other long-established and highly developed civilizations, superimposing itself upon them and modifying them without destroying them. The third type of Europeanization appeared in central Africa, in the Arctic, and in South Sea Islands. Here the indigenous cultures, quite primitive or barbarous, were undermined by European political domination and economic exploitation with relative rapidity and yet without assistance from any considerable influx of European colonists.

If Europe is anything more than a, geographical expression, then the American nations—and likewise Australia and New Zealand and South Africa and even Siberia and the Philippine

¹ On the economic aspects of the "new imperialism," see above, pp. 318-322, and on its religious aspects, see above, pp. 445-448.

Note. The picture opposite, entitled "Promenade in the Forest," is from a typical painting by Henri Rousseau (1844–1910). Rousseau, a petty French customs official (douanier), without any formal training in art, painted many "primitive" pictures, which were frequently ridiculed but which have had a vogue and considerable influence on "modern art." Rousseau's fondness for tropical forests, evinced in almost all his pictures, was derived from his experience as a young soldier with the French army in Mexico in the 1860's.





Islands—are, and for a long time have been, as much a part of Europe as Britain, Spain, or Russia. Their languages are European. So are their religious beliefs, their social customs, their cultural traditions. Their histories are inextricably interwoven with Europe's. They have thought similar Type: Expansion thoughts, cherished similar ideals, followed similar of Europe fashions, experienced similar vicissitudes. In the main they are European in blood; and if it be insisted that one or another of them includes such alien breeds as Negroes, Indians, Maoris, Mongols, or Malays, it should be recalled that these are Europeanized in every other respect and that Area of "Westracial purity does not exist in any nation on the continent of Europe. Altogether, the American countries ern" Civilization -and the other regions mentioned-constitute with Europe a common area of Western, or European, civilization.

In 1914 the population of the American continents was little short of 200 million, half that of Europe. Of the total, a little more than fifty per cent were English-speaking— American 100 million in the United States and 6 million in Continents

Canada, Newfoundland, and other British colonies— while the remaining 94 million were "Latin Americans": 65 million in some eighteen Spanish-speaking republics, 26 million in Portuguese-speaking Brazil, and 3 million French-speaking people in Canada, Hayti, and Guiana.

Of self-governing Canada and Newfoundland, we have spoken elsewhere.¹ Here we merely remark the essentially European character of their society, politics, and culture. Of the United States, we shall speak only of outstanding developments which were strikingly similar to Europe's. The United States grew enormously in population during the nineteenth century, partly because of natural increase of the States European stock that had come to it as colonists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, partly because of a similar increase of the African stock that had been imported as slaves, partly because of a swelling stream of new immigrants from Europe, partly because of a territorial expansion and an

¹ See above, pp. 92-94, 505-507.

Note. The picture opposite, "Building the Panama Canal," is from the painting by the American artist, Jonas Lie (born 1880). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum, New York.

industrialization which provided space and livelihood for a greatly increased population.¹ The territorial expansion was extensive and rapid. In 1803 Louisiana, with the whole western half of the valley of the Mississippi, was purchased from France. In 1819 Florida was obtained from Spain. In 1845 Texas was annexed, and from the ensuing war with Mexico (1846–1848) and by a subsequent purchase (1853) title was secured to the land now constituting the states of California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, and a part of Colorado. In 1846 the Oregon territory (including the present states of Oregon and Washington) was acquired. In 1867 Alaska was purchased from Russia. In 1898 the United States reached out into the Pacific Ocean and established its sway over Hawaii.

Meanwhile the United States—at least the northeastern part of it—was being transformed by the Industrial Revolution almost as rapidly as Great Britain. Factories and foundries were springing up like mushrooms. Railways were spreading like a huge spider-web. Thanks to its vast natural resources, to the "rugged individualism" and self-seeking of its native citizenry, to the investment of European capital, and to the plentiful cheap labor supply of European immigrants, the United States emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century as one of the great industrial nations of the world.

Like Europe, the United States was nationalistic. It sought, with noteworthy success, to "Americanize" all its inhabitants—immigrants and Negroes as well as original white stock—which meant that they were Europeanized in a particular English fashion and with special devotion to their own national government and history. English was the unifying language, and English were the common literary traditions, though at the same time the political and social developments were regarded as peculiarly "American." Like western Europe, moreover, the United States evolved and applied on a gigantic scale a system of free public schools, by means of which illiteracy was almost

¹ The number of European immigrants, amounting to 400,000 for the forty years from 1790 to 1830, totaled almost 20 million for the forty years from 1870 to 1910. The original stock, and most of the early immigration, was British. Beginning in the 1840's, large numbers came from Germany and Ireland, and, in the latter part of the century, from Scandinavia, Italy, Hungary, and the Slavic countries. In 1914, 15 per cent of the total population of the United States were foreign born, and 10 per cent Negroes.

completely done away with and patriotism promoted. Like Europe, furthermore, the United States became ever more democratic in the form and operation of its political institutions. Qualifications of religion and property were gradually abolished and universal manhood suffrage was introduced about the same time as in France. Two major political parties alternated in the conduct of the national government, just as in England, though the United States was more sluggish than England in giving rise to a third, "Labor," party. And the United States, like Germany and Italy, was doomed to fight, at about the same time, a great war of national unification—the Civil War, or "War between the States," of 1861–1865.

The United States felt the same intellectual currents as did Europe, and almost if not quite at the same periods. First, it shared in the mid-century vogue of liberalism and romanticism, under whose twin influence it inaugurated a distinctively "American" literature, realized the ideal of "free churches in a free state," elaborated the freedom of education, and waged a crusade against Negro slavery. Subsequently, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it participated in the European drift toward "realism" and economic nationalism, adopting high tariff protectionism, enacting some labor legislation, going in for the newer navalism and overseas imperialism, and in its literature beginning to indulge in "muck-raking," in sociology and psychology.

Following the example of European Great Powers—Britain,

Following the example of European Great Powers—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—the United States at the end of the nineteenth century embarked on definitely imperialist policies. Hawaii was appropriated, as we have said, in 1898. In 1899—1900 the Samoan Islands were partitioned with Germany and Britain. In 1898 was brought on the Spanish-American War, eventuating in the annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines and in a virtual protectorate over Cuba. In 1900, in coöperation with European Powers, a military expedition was sent into China. In 1901 a native revolt in the Philippines was suppressed by force. In 1903, the separation of Panama from Colombia was engineered, and across the isthmus a "zone" was acquired in which the Panama Canal was speedily built. From 1906 to 1909 Cuba was occupied and administered. In 1912 Nicaragua was subjected to control by the United States; in 1915, Haiti; and in 1916, Santo Domingo. In 1915 occurred an armed inter-

vention in Mexico. In 1917 the Virgin Islands were purchased from Denmark.

Simultaneously the United States vied with other leading nations of the Western European World in promoting trade and investment and missionary enterprise both in the Far East and in the Near East. In China and Japan, and in the Ottoman Empire and Persia also, the process of Europeanization was being carried forward not only by Britishers and Russians, Frenchmen and Germans and Italians, but also by Americans.

The Latin American nations were essentially European too, though their cultural ties were with another part of Europe from that with which the United States was most inti-Latin America mately connected. In one respect they were less "European" than the United States; that was in respect of blood. Whereas the vast majority of the inhabitants Latin of the United States (and Canada) were immigrants, or direct descendants of immigrants, from Europe, a very large proportion of the inhabitants of Latin American countries (except Argentina, Uruguay, and southern Brazil) had aboriginal Indian or Negro blood in their veins. There had not been in Latin America the wholesale extinction of Indians or the strong feeling against racial intermixture which characterized "Anglo-Saxon" America. Throughout the West Indies and along the coasts of the Caribbean, Negro blood actually predominated, while in Mexico, Central America, and the greater part of South America most of the "common people" were full-blooded Indians or else crossbreeds of Indian or Negro, or both, with European. The wealthy upper classes were more apt to be "pure" Spanish or Portuguese.
Yet, though many Indians preserved their tribal speech and

Yet, though many Indians preserved their tribal speech and customs and repeatedly evinced hostility toward their conquerors and rulers, the prevailing civilization all over Latin America was unmistakably European and Latin. The language of officialdom, of the schools, the armies, the courts, the newspapers, and of polite society, was Spanish or Portuguese, and the only publicly professed religion of any importance was Catholic Christianity. Like Latin Europe, too, Latin America was predominantly agricultural, and in politics it presented marked resemblances to Spain and Portugal. There was the same indifference of the masses to ordinary political action, the same supremacy of particular classes and professional politicians,

the same cliques of "liberals" and "anti-clericals," or of "conservatives" and "clericals," the same preponderant influence of army officers, the same tendencies toward dictatorship and sudden revolution. All the Latin-American governments were republican in form and democratic in theory, but presidents were usually superior to constitutions and rifles more decisive than ballot-boxes.

The Latin tradition was sustained and reënforced, moreover, by a steady immigration from Latin Europe, especially from Portugal, Spain, and Italy, and also by an habitual sending of the sons of the upper classes to be educated at institutions of higher learning in Spain or in France. As Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay were economically attractive to peasants and townsmen of Latin Europe, so Paris was a mecca for well-to-do or exceptionally ambitious Latin Americans. This meant a strengthening of cultural ties between Latin Europe and Latin America, and more particularly a familiarity of the governing groups in most Latin-American countries with the latest Parisian ideas and fashions.

Then, too, Latin America was increasingly dependent on Europe—and on the United States—in the economic sphere. It remained overwhelmingly agricultural at a time when the rest of the "Western" world was undergoing intensive industrialization. It grew surpluses of coffee, wheat, cattle, sugar, tropical fruit, etc., the markets for which were in North America and Europe; and for the development of its agriculture, for the exploitation of its natural resources—notably its mines and oilwells-and for the development of its armies and public works, it sought loans in Paris, London, or New York and granted "concessions" to European or North American corporations. By 1914 Great Britain had long-term investments in Latin America totalling three and three-quarters billion dollars; the United States, two and a half billion; France, one and one-fifth billion; and Germany almost a billion. Agents and advisors, engineers and prospectors, from all these countries were busily engaged in collecting tribute or securing pledges from Latin America, and their respective governments stood ready to lend them diplomatic and, if necessary, military support.

Latin America was thus part and parcel, culturally and economically, of the "Western" world—of "Pan-America," and in

a larger sense of "Pan-Europe." Yet despite its traditional cultural ties with Europe and its close commercial relationships with the United States, it established and maintained its political independence of Europe and regarded the United States with no little aversion. To this it was impelled by fear of the power and envy of the wealth of the United States, by what it deemed the insolence and bad manners of its northern neighbor, as well as by natural differences in language and social usage and by the rise of nationalism.

Nationalism, to be sure, played a somewhat different rôle in Latin America—at least in Spanish America—from what it played in the United States or in Latin Europe. Instead of uniting a linguistic nationality in a single national state, it confirmed the political separatism of an earlier day and fostered rivalry among a gradually increasing number of Nations proudly sovereign states. The Portuguese-speaking of Latin people of South America managed to hold together and to emphasize their unity in the federal state of Brazil, but the Spanish-speaking population of the New World had begun their independent political career as eight distinct nations, and within a century the number swelled to eighteen. The eight which emerged from the Wars of Independence of 1810-1825 were: Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile. In 1828 Uruguay revolted against Argentina, and after resisting Brazilian aggression established its independence in 1830. From Colombia seceded Venezuela in 1829, Ecuador in 1830, and Panama, much later, in 1903. In the 1840's Central America broke up into the five separate republics of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, and Costa Rica, while Santo Domingo became a state distinct from Haiti. Cuba. after repeated revolts and the intervention of the United States. gained general recognition as an independent republic in 1899. Each of the eighteen Spanish republics, thus established, had a distinctive nationalism of its own, and likewise the Portuguese republic of Brazil and the French Negro republic of Haiti.

The largest and in many ways the most important of the Latin-American nations was Portuguese-speaking Brazil. Its

Brazil area exceeded that of continental United States (exclusive of Alaska), and its population rose from 4 million in 1830 to 14 million in 1890 and, during the next thirty years,

to over 30 million. Its economic resources and development were remarkable. By 1914 it was furnishing almost three-fourths of the world's coffee, exporting large amounts of timber and minerals and meat, and producing manufactured goods of an annual value of half a billion dollars.

The political foundations for this economic progress had been laid by a monarchical régime, which had been established by a branch of the Portuguese royal family in 1822,1 and which lasted, as the Empire of Brazil, from that date to 1889. Especially helpful was the long reign of the Emperor Pedro II (1831-1889), a scholarly and enlightened prince, a firm but benevolent ruler, and an inveterate reformer. Under Pedro II the country was honestly administered and effectively advanced. Its public revenue increased fourfold, and the value of its products tenfold. The slave trade was abolished in 1853, and Negro slavery, lessened in 1871, was ended, without civil war, in 1888. In 1889, however, the Empire of Pedro II was abruptly overthrown. Influential landlords resented the loss of their slaves, and army officers chafed at the subordinate position in which the Emperor kept them. The latter therefore flocked to the support of the Republic which one of their number, Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, proclaimed in November 1889, and the former offered no resistance to it. Pedro and his family were exiled. State and church were separated. A republican constitution, modelled closely after that of the United States, was adopted in 1891.

Fonseca might profess liberalism and democracy, but actually his régime was a military dictatorship and one of scandalous corruption. In 1891 he was overthrown by another and similar army chieftain, Marshal Floriano Peixoto, who in turn had to deal in 1893 with a stubborn insurrection of still other military and naval officers. Following the retirement of Peixoto in 1894, the republican government passed into civilian hands and gradually gained stability and respect.

Of the Spanish-American states, the foremost, in one way or another, were Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Argentina, during the first half of the nineteenth century, was a prey to civil war and military dictatorship, but from 1862, under

¹ On the establishment of the Brazilian Empire by Pedro I in 1822, see Vol. I, pp. 781-782. On the relationship of the Brazilian Emperors to the Portuguese royal family, see the table, in the present volume, at p. 587.

a more orderly republican régime, it significantly gained in population (from 1,800,000 in 1870 to 7,500,000 in 1914) and in material well-being. It became a great grain-growing and meat-producing country, and its capital city of Buenos Aires became the metropolis of the southern hemisphere and one of the most beautiful and cultured urban centres in the world. In military and naval strength, Argentina ranked with its neighbors, Brazil and Chile, forming with them the so-called group of A-B-C Powers.

Chile, occupying the long narrow strip of territory along the Pacific west of Argentina and the Andes, achieved fairly early a kind of political stability. The civil government, republican in form, was actually conducted most of the time by the conservative upper classes in harmony with the military. Education was fostered, agriculture and commerce promoted, art cultivated, and the cities of Santiago and Valparaiso developed. As an outcome of a war with Bolivia and Peru in 1879–1883, Chilean rule was extended northward over the provinces of Tacna and Arica, with their rich nitrate deposits. Under two "liberal" presidents—Santa Maria (1881–1886) and José Balmaceda (1886–1891)—anti-clerical policies were pursued, but Balmaceda's dictatorial methods provoked a revolution in 1891 resulting in the succession of a conservative naval officer, Admiral Jorge Montt. Thenceforth internal peace prevailed, with only slight interruption, until 1931, while in foreign affairs, to offset the abiding enmity of Peru, particularly friendly relations were promoted with Argentina.

Colombia, despite the secession of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama, despite the wild and mountainous nature of most of its remaining territory, and despite a long period of internecine strife, appeared at the opening of the twentieth century as one of the more steady and promising states of Spanish America. It had a population close to six million, a constitutional republican government of conservative tendencies, a capital city (Bogotá) famed for art and culture, and a rapidly developing economic importance. Colombia's coffee production was second only to Brazil's. Its banana trade was impressive. Its wealth of petroleum, gold, platinum, and emeralds was considerable.

Mexico was the most populous of all the Spanish-American states; though exceeded in area by Argentina, it had twice as

many inhabitants.1 Yet Mexico was relatively "backward," exemplifying in an extreme form the traditional social cleavage which to some extent characterized all Latin America. Most of the country's basic agriculture was conducted on extensive plantations, veritable manors, which were owned and exploited by an upper class of cultured well-to-do persons, Spanish in descent and tradition and influential in state and church, and on which lived and toiled a lower class of ignorant, poverty-striken peasants-or "peons," as they were calledlargely Indian in blood and servile in condition. Among the upper class emerged the usual divisions of conservative and liberal, clerical and anti-clerical, but such divisions ordinarily meant little to the lower class. In the 1850's and 1860's, it is true. Benito Juarez, a full-blooded Indian and a declared champion of the lower class, led a revolutionary movement and made many promises, and he succeeded in overcoming French interference and in putting the intruded Emperor Maximilian to death (1867).² Juarez, nevertheless, displayed far more energy in fighting "reactionaries" and promulgating decrees against the Catholic Church than in improving the lot of the peons. And his successor, Porfirio Diaz, who was virtual dictator of the country from 1877 to 1911, was less hostile to the church and not at all concerned with social reform.

In certain respects Mexico made progress under Diaz. Internal order and security were enforced. Foreign capital was employed for the construction of railways and the development of the country's mineral and oil resources. Fiscal reforms were instituted and general administration improved. Some Mexicans waxed wealthy, and likewise a considerable number of American, British, and other foreign investors. But in measure as Mexico was brought into contact with the outside world and as Diaz aged and became more despotic, Mexican "liberals" and "democrats" and "revolutionaries" multiplied and became more restless, while the Indian masses were moved to make unprecedented demands alike of land-owners and of government. Pent-up

 $^{^1}$ In 1930 Mexico, with 16½ million inhabitants, ranked fifteenth in population among the 76 nations of the world; Brazil ranked tenth, Argentina twentieth, Colombia twenty-sixth, and Chile thirty-ninth. In area Mexico ranked ninth, Brazil fifth, Argentina eighth, Colombia fifteenth, and Chile twentieth. See Appendix 1.

² Sec above, pp. 204-206.

revolution at length found vent in 1910, when Francisco Madero, a wealthy land-owner himself, raised the standard of constitutionalism and agrarian reform and, with several disaffected army officers, took the field against Diaz. Diaz resigned and fled to Europe in 1911, and Madero was made president-without accomplishing any agrarian reform, however. Then a counterrevolutionary movement ensued; General Victoriano Huerta overcame Madero and had him put to death in 1914. Next, revolutionary satellites of Madero, with the support of the United States, overthrew Huerta (1915), and, after much quarrelling and fighting among themselves and an armed intervention by the United States, one of them, Venustiano Carranza, got the upper hand and retained it until overthrown by General Alvaro Obregón in 1920. Under Carranza's auspices, a new constitution was drafted and promulgated in 1917, and drastic anti-clerical legislation was enacted. But serious attempts at social reform were delayed until after Obregón's advent in 1920, when the "Mexican Revolution" took on a more radical complexion.

Conditions similar to those in Mexico existed in most of the lesser Latin American states. In the Negro republic of Haiti, which by the way received its language and what culture it had from France rather than from Spain, ordinary life went on in the Haiti and traditional manner, while political life was confined to Santo factions and consisted of one "revolution" after Domingo another—often complicated by foreign (chiefly United States) bondholders and investors. Such, also, was the case with Santo Domingo, the Spanish republic to the east of Haiti and in the same island of Hispaniola.

In the five Central American republics of Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, internal conflict between "conservatives" and "liberals" and alternation of "revolution" with "dictatorship" were specially complicated by attempts to revive the confederation of the five states and by intrigues of foreign adventurers and capitalists. In 1885, for instance, a "liberal" president (and dictator) of Guatemala, Rufino Barrios by name, was restrained by domestic and foreign arms from subjecting all five states to his rule. Again in 1906 most of Central America was greatly disturbed by revolutionary fights, which were abetted, at least

¹ See below, pp. 1082-1085.

in part, by foreigners. It is noteworthy, however, that while factional strife and economic backwardness continued to characterize Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, and, in lesser degree, Salvador, comparative peace and considerable material progress were gradually secured in Costa Rica, the one Central American state in which the aristocratic Spanish element was relatively strong and united.

In South America, Venezuela, nominally a federal republic, was ruled by a succession of ambitious and unscrupulous military dictators—Antonio Blanco (1870–1889), Cipriano Castro (1900–1908), and Juan Vincente Gomez (from and 1908). Ecuador had a famous "clerical" dictator in Garcia Moreno (1861–1875), but following his assassination an "anti-clerical" reaction set in and revolutions grew in frequency.

Peru ranked in area, population, and natural resources ahead of Chile and close to Colombia, and its capital, Lima, was one of the oldest and most cultured cities in America. Yet the potentialities of the country were frittered away in chronic fights between rival generals and politicians, aspiring to enrich themselves and to win glory in foreign wars. Peru at first warred with Ecuador, then annexed Bolivia, then was compelled by Chile to relinquish Bolivia, and at length was engulfed in a disastrous four-year war with Chile (1879–1883). This war cost Peru her provinces of Tacna and Arica, a protracted civil war, and public bankruptcy, and yet her politicians and army officers continued to plan a "war of revenge."

Bolivia for three generations shared the sorry lot of Peru,

Bolivia for three generations shared the sorry lot of Peru, and as Peru's ally in the war of 1879–1883 she lost her seacoast on the Pacific (south of Tacna) to Chile and thus became an entirely inland state. From 1884, however, there was a more orderly succession of presidents, accompanied by a gradual improvement in economic conditions, although new troubles were brewing for Bolivia in the aggravation of her dispute with Paraguay over the ownership of Chaco, an extensive but sparsely peopled intermediate territory. Paraguay, an equally backward and landlocked state, had been despotically ruled from 1814 to 1870 by a single family, one member of which, Francisco Lopez, had involved the country in a terribly disastrous war with Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay that lasted from 1864 to 1870, exterminating a majority of the population and bankrupting

the state. Paraguayan recuperation after 1870 was slow and painful. Uruguay, the smallest independent state in South America, suffered also through the nineteenth Uruguay century from foreign war and internal tumults, but early in the twentieth century it acquired political stability, advanced notably in material prosperity, and undertook some interesting experiments in political democracy and social reform.

We must not allow the preceding references to economic backwardness and political revolutions to overshadow the very real European civilization which obtained throughout European Civiliza-Latin America. By the first decade of the twentieth tion century, it was obvious that certain Latin-American throughcountries-Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and America perhaps Colombia-were making political and economic progress comparable with other nations of European stock, whether in Europe itself or in America or Australasia.1 And it was freely prophesied that the newer political stability in such a country as Bolivia, the newer financial reorganization in such a country as Peru, the newer social revolution in such a country as Mexico were harbingers, like the newer "benevolent" tutelage of the United States over the Caribbean countries, of an assured future of democracy and prosperity for even the "backward" states of Latin America.

All America, then, was "European," not only in traditional culture and civilization but also in latest economic developments, political trends, and currents of thought. This was true, in greater or less degree, of the twenty-one independent republics that comprised the major part of the American continents and likewise of the much smaller part that was still politically de-

European Political Depend-

pendent on one or another European country: selfgoverning Canada and Newfoundland, and the crown colonies of British Honduras, British Guiana, the Baencies in hamas, Bermuda, Jamaica, Barbados, the Leeward and Windward Islands, Trinidad, and Tobago, dependent on Great Britain; French Guiana, Martinique and

Guadeloupe, St. Pierre and Miquelon, on France; Dutch Guiana (Surinam) and Curação, on the Netherlands. Outside the American and European continents, it was similarly true of Australia,

¹ On the Europeanization of Australia and New Zealand (and South Africa), see above, pp. 93-94, 507-516.

New Zealand, South Africa, Siberia, and the Philippine Islands. The first two of these were thoroughly British in culture; the third, mixed British and Dutch; the fourth, Russian; and the fifth, Spanish with a recent overlay of English-American. All were traditionally Christian, and all were responsive to democratic agitation and eager for the products of machine industry. In Asia, the greatest of all the world's continents, European

In Asia, the greatest of all the world's continents, European influence had been continuously exerted since the sixteenth century, but in only two parts of Asia did it produce such a fundamental Europeanization in language and culture as was simultaneously produced in America. Two Parts One part was the northern plain—the vast expanse of Asia of Siberia—into which Russian colonists trickled during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and poured during the eighteenth and nineteenth, bringing with them Russian speech, Russian customs, Russian Christianity, and the rule of the Russian Tsars. In the frozen "far north" of Siberia and in the desert regions to the south, primitive tribes remained; but by the latter part of the nineteenth century Siberia as a whole was quite Russian and was rapidly expanding in the Far East. In 1858 the Chinese Empire was compelled to cede all its territory north of the Amur River and in addition its province south of the Amur and east of the Ussuri. Here, overlooking the Sea of Japan, the Russian city of Vladivostok was founded in 1860. In 1875 Japan was prevailed upon to surrender her claims to the island of Sakhalin to the northeast, and thus the Pacific coast from Bering Strait to the border of Korea became solidly Russian.

The other fundamentally Europeanized part of Asia was the Philippine archipelago, which, subject to Spanish rule from 1565 to 1898, experienced a development similar to Spanish America's. Spanish administrators, colonists, and clergymen constituted an upper class; the natives, the middle and pines lower classes. There was much racial intermixture, and the emerging "Filipino" nationality, though predominantly Malay in blood, was Spanish in speech, Catholic in religion, and Latin European in culture. Some Moslem and some pagan tribesmen remained, it is true, in out-of-the-way islands of the archipelago, and its conquest by the United States introduced

According to the census of 1918, nine-tenths of the total population of 10,314,000

a new and alien rule. Yet neither of these circumstances could alter the basic fact that on the whole the Philippines were as European as, say, Mexico or Peru or South Africa.

The vast region of India and the East Indian Islands of Sumatra, Java, and Celebes had been in contact with European Powers—Portugal, the Netherlands, France, or England—for as long a time as the Philippines had been subject to Spain, or Siberia to Russia. Until the nineteenth century, however, the contact was primarily commercial, and secondarily political. With the exception of certain centres on the Malabar coast

Second Type of Europeanization: Superimposing European on Other Civilizations of India, whither Portuguese colonists and missionaries came in the sixteenth century, familiarizing natives with the Portuguese language and law and converting them to Catholic Christianity, there was no real Europeanization of a cultural sort. The population of India was altogether too numerous and too deeply rooted in its own elaborate culture—its languages and literature, its Hindu or Moslem religion,

its art forms, its social usages, its philosophy of life—to be much affected in these respects by the presence of European merchants or "governors" in a few coastal cities.

In the nineteenth century, European influence was enormously extended and quickened in India-and in other parts of Asia too—as an accompaniment of the Industrial Revolution. With the rapidly increasing eagerness of the industrialized Stimulated by nations of Europe to secure raw materials, to sell Industrial manufactured commodities, and to invest surplus Revolucapital, and with their greatly improved means of estion tablishing and exercising overseas imperial sway, European merchants were no longer content with limited coast traffic in Asia or with cumbersome dealings of chartered commercial companies with native princes and potentates. They must penetrate inland, building railways, stringing telegraph wires, accustoming natives to machine-made goods and machine-age civilization; and all these things they could accomplish more expeditiously and more thoroughly if their particular national state in Europe acquired political supremacy throughout the

professed Christianity (very largely Catholic), while the one-twentieth of Moslems and the one-twentieth of pagans were found chiefly in Sulu and the interior of Mindanao.

economically backward area. Industrialized European nations now had naval and military establishments and financial resources adequate to bring Asiatic rulers to terms.

Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a new European imperialism was inspired and expedited in India and indeed over the greater part of the huge Asiatic continent and its adjacent large islands. It involved, in many areas, an expansion and intensification of direct European on Large rule, and, on a wider front and even more significantly, it served to spread European material civilization and European political ideas on top of the abiding linguistic, religious, and social cultures of the several Asiatic peoples. In a word, there was now a material Europeanization of Asia.


How the British constructed and ruled the Empire of India has elsewhere been explained.1 Here we shall merely catalogue the acquisitions of Asiatic territory by European Powers, and then pass on to a summary consideration of the Europeanization of Japan and China, with a few supplementary words about Siam and the Moslem regions of the "Middle East."

Great Britain added to her Indian Empire in the 1880's Burma and Baluchistan. In southeastern Asia she bordered Singapore and Malacca with the Federated Malay States (1874, 1909) and across the sea to the east appropriated a third of the island of Borneo (1881-1888). In southwestern Asia, she acquired between 1830 and 1901 a series of protectorates from Aden at the foot of the Red Sea to Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf, and by agreement with Russia in 1907 a "sphere of influence" in southern Persia. From China she wrested Hongkong in 1842, leased Weihaiwei in 1898, and shortly afterwards obtained a privileged position in Tibet and the Yangtze valley. At the opening of the twentieth century, Britain governed a third of the whole population of Asia.

France, besides continuing to hold five of her former trading posts on the coast of India,² built up an empire of Indo-China, embracing Cochin-China and Cambodia (1867), Annam and Tongking (1884), and extensions at the expense of Siam (1893). In 1896 she delimited with Great Britain

See above, pp. 94-96, 520-525.
 These posts were Pondicherry, Karikal, Chandarnagar, Mahé, and Yanaon, aggregating about 200 square miles and some 250,000 inhabitants.

"spheres of influence" in Siam, and in 1899 she leased Kwangchow from China and obtained a privileged position in the Chinese provinces of Kwangsi and Hainan. By 1914 France ruled twenty million Asiatics, the majority of whom were Buddhists.



NOTE. The Dutch islands are in solid black. Burma, the Straits Settlements, and northern Borneo are British possessions; Indo-China and Kwangchow are French.

The Dutch East Indian empire, whose administration had been transferred from the Dutch East India Company to the government of the Netherlands in 1798, had suffered some diminution during the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but subsequently it was greatly extended and solidified through the conquest and exploitation of the interior of the islands of Sumatra, Java, Celebes, of two-thirds of Borneo, and of a half of New Guinea. Java alone had almost four times the area and population of the Netherlands. Sumatra

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 418, 713.

was about as large and populous as Sweden, and Celebes as Greece. The Dutch portion of Borneo was larger than Spain. Altogether the Dutch Netherlands in 1914 dominated fifty-four million Asiatics, the majority of whom were Moslems.

Portugal still maintained a few trading posts in India-Goa, Diu, and Daman—and the port of Macao in China, aggregating 200 square miles and half a million inhabitants. Germany in the 1880's took possession of 70,000 square miles of northeastern New Guinea, rechristening it Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and in 1898 leased from China the port of Kiaochow, with 200 square miles. Russia, we must remember, not only held Siberia but also pushed its frontier, in the second half of the nineteenth century, through Turkestan and other regions of west-central Asia to the borders of India, Afghanistan, and Persia, and in 1907, by agreement with Great Britain, obtained a "sphere of influence" in northern Persia. By 1910, over a third of the area of Asia was immediately subject to Russia. And, in addition, we may note that the United States, by its victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, acquired near the Asiatic continent the Philippines, with an area of 100,000 square miles and a population of ten million.

Altogether, in the first decade of the twentieth century, almost three-fifths of the entire area of Asia (and adjacent Malaysia) was ruled by European Powers (including the United States), and a little over four-ninths of the total population of 925 million. In other words, the number of Asiatics subject to direct European influence of a governmental sort was larger than the total population of Europe itself.

Still nominally independent of European rule were two sections of Asia: the "Far Eastern" countries of China, Japan, and Siam, together comprising a little more than a quarter of the area, and about half the population, of the Continent; and the Remain-"Middle Eastern" regions of the Ottoman Empire, "Independent" little less than one-seventh the area and one-twenty-third the population of the continent. But all these theoretically independent lands were now being influenced by European material civilization as they had never been before. Japan, in particular, was already a Great Power in the European sense, more

strikingly Europeanized in government, industry, and armaments than any Asiatic country actually administered by Europeans.

There had been some European commercial and missionary penetration of Japan back in the sixteenth century.¹ Portuguese traders had "discovered" Japan in 1542, and Francis Xavier, a famous member of the recently founded Society of Modern Guiscovery" of Jesus, had inaugurated a Catholic mission there in 1549. By the end of the century Japanese converts to Christianity numbered 300,000; and Spaniards and Dutchmen were competing with Portuguese for Japanese trade. Presently, however, the major native princes and the leading exponents of native religion (Buddhism or Shinto) became thoroughly alarmed lest their own influence should be undermined, and their power destroyed, by the ambition and intrigue of Europeans. In 1587 foreign priests were ordered to leave the country on penalty of death, and in 1614 Christianity was definitively banned. In 1624 Spanish merchants, as well as missionaries, were excluded, and in 1638 Portuguese. Thousands of native Christian converts were put to death, and of Japan, commercial intercourse with the outside world was commercial intercourse with the outside world was of Japan, 1638-1853 rigidly restricted to an infinitesimal and closely supervised station to which a few Dutch ships might come. Otherwise no foreigner might enter Japan, while absolutely no native might go abroad and no ocean-going ships might be constructed. For over two centuries, from 1638 to 1853, Japan was practically cut off from Europe, and Europe from Japan.

The "reopening" of Japan to European influence was an outcome of a naval expedition, under Commodore Matthew Perry, which the United States despatched to the Far East in 1853 with special instructions to secure from the Japanese gov-

"Open-ing" of Japan, 1850's

special instructions to secure from the Japanese government a pledge of protection for American trade. The Japanese were duly impressed by the spectacle of Perry's four warships steaming into Uraga Bay near Yokohama, still more impressed by the sewing machines and other devices which he exhibited as samples of Western industrial civilization, and most impressed by the sight and sound of the big grim cannon which his ships carried as the final proof of Western superiority. So vastly impressed, indeed, was the Japanese governing prince that in 1854 he signed with Perry a

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 72, 77, 392.

treaty, by which Japan promised: (1) to succor any American seaman who might be shipwrecked on the Japanese coast, (2) to permit the fuelling and provisioning of American vessels, and (3) to allow American merchantmen to anchor in the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate. Very shortly, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Russia applied for similar privileges and obtained them. Then, in 1859, another envoy from the United States, Townsend Harris, negotiated a new treaty whereby the Japanese port of Yokohama was opened to American commerce. And, again, similar treaty rights were soon accorded to merchants of other foreign countries.

The prince who signed these commercial treaties in the name of Japan was theoretically not the sovereign of the country, but only the hereditary chief official (or "Shogun") of the Feudal Emperor (or "Mikado"). The Mikados belonged to Japan of Shogun a "divine" family which was supposed to have sprung from a sun-goddess and to have reigned in Japan continuously since the seventh century B.C.1 Being so very sacred they had long since taken to living in ceremonial seclusion in the "holy city" of Kyoto and leaving the exercise of regal authority to one or another of the feudal princes—or "daimios"—of the realm, who thus was styled the Shogun. Since the end of the sixteenth century the daimio of the Tokugawa clan had been the Shogun, and to keep himself in power he had had to wage war repeatedly with other daimios.

The Shogun's action in "opening" Japan to foreigners in the 1850's was especially resented by other daimios and by the Mikado as a sacrilegious reversal of traditional policy, and was utilized by them to undermine the Shogun's authority and to reassert the Mikado's. But even the anti-foreign sentiment of daimios and Mikado was presently altered by two events. The first was the bombardment of the Japanese town of Lesson of Kagoshima (1863) by a British squadron in retaliation Western for the murder of a British agent. The second was the bombardment of Shimonoseki (1864) by a combined British, French, Dutch, and American fleet to punish a daimio who had fired on foreign merchant vessels. The effectiveness of Western gunnery, as demonstrated on these occasions, offered convincing

 $^{^1}$ There is solid historical evidence that it had reigned since at least the fifth century A.D.

proof that Japan could not expel the foreigners or protect herself against them unless she possessed the same up-to-date type of cannon. Hence daimios who had recently been most vehement in reviling "European barbarians" now suddenly changed their tune and began to insist that Japan should freely admit the Westerners, learn from them, and excel them in their own arts. At the same time they retained their hostility to the Shogun and demanded that the powers which he had been exercising should be restored to the Mikado.

The ensuing agitation against the Shogun thus involved not only a demand for an assimilation of Western civilization but also a mounting enthusiasm for national unification under the Mikado and for the national religion of Shinto of which he was at once

the sacred representative and the chief object of wor-Japanese Revoluship. It eventuated in the Japanese Revolution of tion of 1867-1868. The last of the Shoguns was compelled 1867-1868 to abdicate and to retire into private life, and the youthful but able Mikado, Mutsuhito, was made actual as well as titular monarch of Japan. By a remarkable act of patriotism, the chief daimios surrendered to him their respective feudal rights and possessions, and the lesser nobles followed their example. Then in 1871 feudalism was formally abolished by imperial decree. The ex-daimios and certain other leaders in the revolution were rewarded with new titles of nobility borrowed from European usage and with high offices and ample salaries under the new centralized government. The peasants were freed from servile dues and made owners of the land they tilled and immediate subjects of the Empire. From his quasi-religious seclusion in the holy city of Kyoto, Mutsuhito now came forth as the enlightened "Westernizing" Emperor and established the capital of Japan at Yedo, the former seat of the shoguns, which was renamed Tokio.

Under Mutsuhito (1867–1912) Japan was rapidly Europeanized, militarily, politically, and educationally. Young Japanese were sent to Europe (and America) to observe and study. Europeans (and Americans) were welcomed to hito, Japan. Christian missions were tolerated. Foreign trade was encouraged. European counsel was eagerly sought, and European models closely followed, in modernizing the political, economic, and military institutions of the country.

The Japanese army was reorganized in the 1870's on the Prussian pattern, and a modern navy was constructed in accordance with British advice. Codes of civil and criminal law were fashioned after those of France and Germany. A public-school system of the "Western" type was established, and universities were set up at Tokio and Kyoto, with faculties of law, medicine, engineering, literature, science, agriculture, and economics. In 1880 the Emperor promulgated a constitution, vesting legis-Constitulative power in a bicameral parliament, the upper chamber being aristocratic and the lower "liberal," ment in that is, elected by the propertied classes. As in Ger-Japan many, the ministry in Japan was responsible to the Emperor rather than to the parliament; and, as in France, the local government was in the hands of prefects appointed by the central government.

Simultaneously the material civilization of Europe (and America) was making swift progress in Japan. The first railway, steeling the eighteen miles from Tokio to Yokohama, was opened in 1872. By 1914 Japan had 6,000 miles of railway, almost all of which were owned by the state. Moreover, within Industrial

fifteen years of the repeal of the old law prohibiting the construction of sea-going ships, Japan had 138 such vessels, and by 1914 her merchant marine exceeded the

Industrial Revolution in Japan

French in tonnage and was plying not only in her home waters but also to Europe, America, Australia, and India. Mining was developed, at first under the supervision of Western engineers, until in 1914 some 230,000 Japanese were annually producing coal, copper, iron, and other minerals to the total value of 65 million dollars. The cotton industry, which was non-existent in Japan prior to 1880, grew so fast that in 1914 Japanese cotton factories contained two and a half million spindles, which turned out 550 million pounds of yarn. The value of Japan's foreign commerce, which in 1874 was less than 25 million dollars, rose to 70 million in 1890, to 250 million in 1900, and to 700 million in 1914. It had multiplied twenty-eight-fold in forty years!

The foregoing figures testify that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, Japan experienced (like Europe and the United States) the Industrial Revolution and became a great and essentially modern industrial nation. And as the Industrial Revolution produced prosperous

capitalists and discontented proletarians in Europe, so also in Japan. Trade unions and serious labor problems emerged as well as business corporations and high finance. Industrial bourgeoisie combined with agricultural aristocracy to direct governmental policies, and workingmen became infected with imported principles of political democracy and even of Marxian Socialism.


In part because Japan was imitating so many other features of European development, in part because her industrialists were anxious to extend their operations and add to their profits, and in part because her population was cramped and uneasy and her army officers ambitious and ultra-patriotic, the Japanese government was not content merely to Europeanize the homeland. It must perform the imperialistic mission of Japanese Imperialism propagating its own brand of Europeanization, and incidentally of expanding its own military and political sway, in the Far East. Early in the 1890's, Japan began seriously to meddle in the affairs of China, and in the resulting Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 the Europeanized army and navy of "little" Japan made short and decisive work of the old-fashioned armaments of "big" China. By the treaty of peace (1895) Japan detached Korea from the Chinese Empire, and ac-Chino-Japanese War of quired for herself the island of Formosa (four times the 1804 size of Crete). She would likewise have acquired Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula had not Russia, with the

backing of France and Germany, intervened and stopped her. It soon became clear that Russia had designs of her own not only on Port Arthur but also on Manchuria and Korea, and at length in 1904 Japan went to war with Russia. For this, her first struggle with a European Power, Japan was well prepared. She

had a great arsenal, powder factories, iron works, and military and naval training schools. Her army had been doubled between 1895 and 1904 and its equipment vastly improved. Her navy was already superior to Russia's. She had the advantage, moreover, of being relatively near to the scene of hostilities and of commanding the united loyalty and intense patriotism of her whole population. The story of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 has been sketched elsewhere. Here it suffices to note that, by the treaty of Portsmouth terminating the war, Japan took over from Russia the

¹ See above, pp. 655-656.

lease of Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula, reacquired the southern part of the island of Sakhalin which she had ceded to



THE FAR EAST: REFERENCE MAP FOR 1900-1910

Note. After the loss of Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia added to the Manchurian railway a new line through Russian territory (via the Amur Province) from Chita to Vladivostok.

Russia back in 1875, and obtained from Russia a pledge of political disinterestedness in Korea and Manchuria.

With Russia out of the way and with the support of Great

Britain (which had been in alliance with Japan since 1902),1 Japanese officials and financiers proceeded with a "peaceful penetration" of Korea, until in 1910 its native ruler Tapanese Annexawas deposed and it was formally incorporated, under tion of the name of "Chosen," with the Japanese Empire. The territory thus annexed, about twice as large as the Korea. American state of Ohio and thrice as populous, was valuable not only as a granary for Japan but also as a market for Japanese goods and a field of investment for Japanese capitalists. In 1913 some twenty million dollars' worth of merchandise, constituting more than half of Korea's imports, were purchased from Japanese merchants. Already Japanese capitalists had founded five banks in Korea and were developing her mineral resources. The Koreans were being Europeanized by fellow Asiatics. And to the Japanese the World War of 1914 presented a wonderful opportunity to push their Europeanizing imperialism in China.2

The Chinese Empire, though "opened" to European trade and influence somewhat earlier than Japan, was much more sluggish in undergoing Europeanization. In considerable part this was attributable to the size of the Empire and to Chinese the nature of its peculiar civilization. In area and in population it was approximately equal to the entire continent of Europe. The large majority of its 375 million inhabitants dwelt along the river valleys of the Hoang (or Yellow), the Yangtze, and the Si, and were included within the eighteen provinces of China proper, which territorially constituted China about a third of the Empire as a whole. There for Proper centuries—extending far back of the Christian era the Chinese masses had lived and labored, tilling their tiny farms, eating their rice, fishing in the great rivers, or sailing their picturesque "junks," weaving fabrics of silk and cotton for the loose trousers and wide-sleeved jackets which men and women alike wore, making by hand exquisite porcelain, painting curious and delicate pictures, and venerating their ancestors and otherwise obeying the ceremonial injunctions of Confucius. Chinese, proud of their long history and high civilization, were accustomed to regard foreigners as barbarians.

China proper was the core of the Empire. But there were

² See below, pp. 887-888.

¹ On the Anglo-Japanese alliance, see below, p. 761 and note.

numerous outlying provinces. (1) Manchuria, to the north, extended over almost 400,000 square miles and included some twelve million inhabitants. It had been united with China in the seventeenth century when an ambitious Man-Manchu warrior had supplanted the native dynasty of Chinese Emperors. Since then, a Manchu dynasty had ruled the whole Empire, and it was the Manchus, by the way, who had introduced the custom of wearing the hair in a long queue. (2) Korea, to the northeast, was a semi-independent kingdom, partaking of Chinese civilization and paying tribute to the Chinese Empire. It was somewhat smaller than Great Britain and about a third as populous. (3) The Amur coastal district, north of Korea, was a relatively undeveloped dependency of the Empire. (4) Mongolia, to the northwest of China proper, was a vast territory almost seven times the size of France but with fewer people than Paris and these chiefly nomadic. "Inner Mongolia," adjoining Manchuria, was under the immediate rule of the Manchu Emperors of China, but "Outer Mongolia" was too remote and too unruly, and, although a Chinese agent was maintained at Urga, the hereditary khans were practically independent. (5) Sinkiang, in the far west of the Empire, embraced the regions of Eastern Turkestan, Kuldja, and Zungaria. It was administered partly by Chinese officials and partly by native chieftains.

(6) Tibet, south of Sinkiang (and west of China proper), was another vast and sparsely settled region. At its capital of Lhasa resided the Buddhist "pope," the Dalai Lama, whom the Tibetans regarded as their religious head and supreme civil authority. The Empire was represented by a few Chinese officials and some Chinese garrisons. (7) To the south of China proper lay the kingdoms of Burma, Siam, and Annam (including Cochin-China and Tongking), all of which at the opening of the nineteenth century were virtually independent states, though the Chinese Emperor still claimed suzerainty over them. (8) To the east of China proper, China finally, were the islands of Hainan and Formosa, and the Liu Ch'iu archipelago. The first named had long been Chinese. The last named had been tributary since the fourteenth century. Formosa had been conquered and annexed to the Empire in the seventeenth century.

mosa and the Liaotung peninsula (within striking distance of the capital city of Peking) to Japan and to renounce suzerainty over Korea. Russia at once stepped in, as we know, Increaswith the support of Germany and France, and preing Forvented Japan from taking the strategically important eign Encroachpeninsula of Liaotung. But this action signified no ments, tender regard on the part of Western Powers for the 1800's: Japanese integrity of the Chinese Empire. Only three years later (1898), Russia wrung from the Emperor a "leasehold" of
Liaotung (including Port Arthur) for herself, and with Russian it numerous economic concessions in Manchuria. In the same year, Germany, on the pretext of indemnifying herself for the murder of two Catholic missionaries of German nationality, acquired a similar ninety-nine-year lease of German Kiaochow and similar economic concessions in the Chinese province of Shantung. Also, in the same year, France demanded and obtained a like lease of Kwangchow and like economic rights in the island of Hainan and the French mainland provinces of Kwangsi and Yünnan. Great Britain, not to be left behind by her imperialist rivals of Continental Europe, made due representations at Peking, eventuating in a lease of the port of Weihaiwei, opposite Port Arthur, "for as long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the British possession of Russia," in an additional ninety-nineyear lease of the Kowloon peninsula, opposite Hongkong, and in the recognition of Britain's "privileged position" in the Yangtze valley. Italy, too, entered the picture and requested (1899) the grant of a naval station on the coast of Chêkiang; she was less energetic, however, and she alone of the European Great Powers was rebuffed.

Subsequently, in 1904–1905, as we have learned, Russia and Japan warred over their respective shares in the "dismemberment" of the Chinese Empire. Russia was forced to surrender the Liaotung peninsula to Japan and to give Japan a free hand in Korea. Shortly afterwards, however, Japan and Russia were agreeably delimiting "spheres of influence" between themselves throughout the northern area of the Empire. Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910 and acquired railway concessions in Manchuria. Russia in 1913 obtained a virtual protectorate over Outer Mongolia. In 1914 Great Britain insisted on

the "autonomy" of Tibet, which meant its dependence on herself.

In the meantime, between 1842 and 1912, and more especially from the 1890's, European influence was progressively affecting the Chinese Empire in many different ways and by various means. The "opening" of China proper to Increasing Euro-pean Influence foreign trade, foreign missionary enterprise, and foreign financial investment, as well as the transfer of in China outlying provinces to foreign rule and the lease of seaports to foreign Powers, brought into the country a steadily augmenting number of Europeans (and Japanese), with Western customs and ideas. From the "treaty ports," in which Europeans had their own settlements and government and law courts, and from the Catholic and Protestant missions, which gradually dotted the interior as well as the coast and with which were associated schools, hospitals, and orphanages, and from the official representatives of Western nations, ministers and consuls and military and naval attachés, radiated ever more widely a knowledge of European industry and finance, European politics, European "progress," and a desire to emulate the West in all these respects. The peasant masses were least touched—there was such a multitude of them! and they were so habituated to old customs! But in the cities were "Western" stirrings, and ambitious young Chinamen began to go abroad, observing and studying the West in its universities and commercial centres, and to return imbued with an intense patriotism but also with a conviction that China, like Japan, to save herself, must be "reformed" and "Westernized."

In the economic sphere some Westernization was obviously going forward. The value of Chinese foreign trade grew from 215 million dollars in 1875 to 271 million in 1890, to European 506 million in 1905, and to 608 million in 1914. The first railway, constructed in 1875–1876, had been and Intorn up by indignant Chinese officials and dumped dustry in the mud on the forlorn shores of Formosa. But before the end of the next decade, another and more successful railway was built, and by 1914 some 6,000 miles of railway were

¹ Most of the tonnage of foreign shipping was distributed in 1913 as follows: Great Britain, 38,120,000; Japan, 23,422,000; Germany, 6,320,000; France, 1,233,000; the United States, 900,000; and Norway, 740,000.

in operation within the Empire and 2,300 miles more under construction. With railways came telegraph lines, and a stimulus at once to agricultural production and to the exploitation of mines and factories. By 1914 China had forty-five textile factories equipped with one and a quarter million spindles of European make, besides some 5,000 power looms and an up-to-date shipbuilding yard at Shanghai, while thirteen million tons of coal were being mined and considerable quantities of iron and copper.

In other respects, nevertheless, the Westernization of China was seriously impeded not only by the enormous size of the country and the bitterness of the popular reaction against chronic interference and aggression of the European Great Powers and Japan, but also by the unwillingness or inability of the Chinese government itself to adopt and pursue "Backwardness" of any such revolutionary program as had enabled Chinese Japan to become politically and militarily European. Government The Chinese Empire was presided over by the Manchu dynasty, originally alien to the real Chinese and now seemingly decadent. The Emperor Kuang Hsü (1875–1908) was a small boy when he ascended the throne and, though he was hailed as "the son of Heaven" and surrounded with the utmost pomp, he remained a weakling, dependent upon the reactionary advice of court mandarins, upon the uncertain support of a corrupt group of military chieftains and civil governors, and upon the vigorous but capricious promptings of his aunt, the Empress Dowager, Tz'ŭ Hsi, who had been regent during his minority. Had it not been for this remarkable old lady, the Manchu dynasty would not have lasted as long as it did, and she was the personification of hostility to "Europe" and the "West."

Following the Chino-Japanese War and just when all the European Great Powers seemed most intent on dismembering his Empire (1898), Kuang Hsü surprised everyone by issuing suddenly and impulsively a series of reforming decrees. The imperial bureaucracy was to be reorganized and Westernized. An imperial university and a system of schools were to be established for the study of modern

NOTE. The picture opposite, "British Bridge in Canton," is from an etching by a British artist, A. Hugh Fisher (born 1880).





European science as well as ancient Chinese classics. A central cabinet of ministers of the European type was to be instituted, and corresponding changes wrought in the high command of the army. These decrees aroused a storm of opposition from officials, civil and military, who by conviction or interest were wedded to the old order and also from some moderate reformers who thought the action of the Emperor too precipitate. The

Empress Dowager Tz'ŭ Hsi put herself at the head of the opposition and coöperated with a prominent army general, Yüan Shih-kai, to effect a palace revolution in September 1898. Kuang Hsü was practically impris-

Reaction under Empress Tz'ŭ Hsi

oned, and obliged to assent to the restoration of a regency under Tz'ŭ Hsi. For the next ten years the crafty forceful Dowager Empress was the ruler of China, and the nominal Emperor a shadowy figure in the seclusion of the palace.

Tz'ŭ Hsi promptly annulled the reform decrees, put several reformers to death, and announced her intention of combating all foreign influences. Encouraged by her attitude, reactionaries throughout the Empire gave vent to their hatred of foreigners, and the more violent among them formed a body known as "Righteous Patriotic Fists," or "Boxers," who pro- Boxer ceeded to attack the property of aliens and to massacre Move-Christian missionaries and their Chinese converts. In Its Supthe spring of 1900 Boxer outrages occurred in all the pression major cities and reached a climax at Peking, where the German minister was killed and the foreign residents were closely besieged and threatened with extermination. Whereupon an international military expedition, comprising soldiers or marines of Russia, Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Germany, and Japan, hastily assembled at Tientsin, fought its way to Peking, and put the Chinese troops to rout and the imperial court to flight. In 1901 Tz'ŭ Hsi reluctantly accepted the Allied terms of peace: China was to pay to the several Powers indemnities to-talling 333 million dollars, safeguard foreigners and foreign interests within her territories, and, as a precautionary measure, permit foreign Powers to maintain armed forces for self-protection at Peking and at Tientsin.

Note. The picture opposite, "A Chinese Woman," is from an etching by a German artist, Emil Orlik (1870-1932).

The ultra-reactionary policy of Tz'ŭ Hsi thus proved worse than a failure, and henceforth the somewhat chastened Empress

promise of Tz'ŭ

Dowager tried to make amends by restraining antiforeign agitation and introducing some Europeanizing reforms. The traditional classical education of Chinese officials was modified and some attention given in the schools to natural science, European history, political economy, international law, and modern languages. A commission was sent abroad to investigate the political institutions of the West, and Chinese students were encouraged to attend uni-

versities in Europe and America. Railway construction was

expedited. Economic development was promoted.

These reforms were not radical enough to satisfy the growing party of "Westernizers" among the younger generation of Chinese intellectuals, many of whom by this time had studied abroad and all of whom were coming to believe that Chinese regeneration depended upon getting rid of the incompetent Manchu dynasty and its conservative bureaucracy. The leader of the party was

Sun Yatsen and NationalSun Yat-sen, a man of humble origin who had been trained in medicine and had become a Christian and who, though compelled to live in exile, exerted a tremendous influence on the formulation and propaga-

tion of a revolutionary program of nationalism, republicanism, and political and social democracy. In 1908 the almost simultaneous deaths of the Dowager Empress Tz'ŭ Hsi and the puppet Emperor Kuang Hsü served to quicken and intensify the revolutionary agitation of Sun Yat-sen and his radical following, for the succeeding Emperor, Hsüan T'ung, was only an infant and the new Regent was without character or ability.

In vain the conservative régime at Peking made concessions to the radicals, sanctioning provincial assemblies in 1909 and convoking a National Assembly in 1910. The followers of Sun Yat-sen refused to compromise with the existing government

Chinese Revolution of 1011

and in October 1911 rose in arms against it. Ambitious military chieftains, including the powerful Yüan Shihkai, refused or delayed to obey the orders of the court to suppress the rebellion, and very soon the revolution-

aries were in possession of several important cities and provinces. In December 1911 a provisional republican government was established at Nanking, with Sun Yat-sen as President, and in the following February the boy-Emperor Hsüan T'ung ¹ abdicated and the Manchu dynasty ceased to rule.

To consolidate the new Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-sen turned over the presidency to General Yüan Shih-kai; and to render it democratic, a constitution was adopted at Nanking in March 1912 providing for a popularly elected parliament to which the president and his ministers should be responsible. All of which was hailed by optimistic "progressives" in Europe and America as indicating

the speedy triumph of the latest and best principles of government and society, science and technology, throughout the world.

In fact, however, the Chinese Revolution of 1911-1912 was but an episode in the long and peculiarly painful process of Europeanizing the Chinese Empire, and for sometime afterwards China's internal affairs went from bad to worse. The failure and overthrow of the imperial government destroyed the prestige and ended the orderly functioning of the traditional civil and military bureaucracy; and the Republic was too novel and too weak to provide a substantial substitute. Its informed and sincere supporters were only a small fraction of the Chinese nation, intellectuals of the stamp of Sun Yat-sen, inexperienced in practical politics and inclined to be very doctrinaire. Between these, constituting a majority in the parliament and forming a political group known as the Kuomintang, and a self-seeking president with an army in back of him, an unequal conflict soon raged. Parliament enacted laws, and the President tang vs. ignored or violated them. Then, in 1913, when the Yüan Shih-kai Kuomintang inspired a revolt, Yüan Shih-kai easily and ruthlessly suppressed it and followed up his success by exiling Sun Yat-sen and destroying the parliament. In 1915, by virtue of a "referendum" which he carefully directed, Yüan proclaimed the restoration of the monarchy with himself as Emperor. Resistance was again offered by the Kuomintang and this time also by jealous generals, and only death from disease in 1916 saved Yüan Shih-kai from death by violence.

The republic was not thereby "saved," however. Its new

¹ This was his ceremonial name. After his abdication he was known as Henry Pu-yi. For a time he continued to live in the palace at Peking and to receive a pension from the Chinese Republic. Subsequently he made his escape and became a pensioner of Japan, through whose interested offices he was installed as Emperor of Manchuria (Manchukuo) in 1932. See below, p. 1079.

president and its reconvened parliament could not stay the progressive collapse of central and local government or check recurrent armed conflicts between rival war lords or prevent an increase of banditry and disorder. Nor were they in a position to resist the continuing pressure from without. They were professed exponents of a certain type of Europeanization, and they lacked the military and financial resources to oppose another type of Europeanization. In 1913–1914, as we know, Russia and Great Britain utilized the domestic troubles of the Chinese Republic to establish foreign "spheres of influence" in Mongolia and Tibet respectively; and from 1914 to 1918, as we shall presently see, Japan had a free hand to impose her own brand of Europeanization on China.¹

Siam was the third country of the Far East which underwent considerable Europeanization during the latter part of the nineteenth century without losing its identity or sovereignty. True,

Siam and Its Westernization it was pressed in upon by France from the east and by Great Britain from the west. Both of these European Powers deprived it of border provinces, and in 1896 they agreed upon a division of the whole country into

"spheres of influence" for themselves. Nevertheless, thanks to an adaptable and far-sighted King, Chulalongkorn (1868–1910), the greater part of Siam remained intact and won general respect for the orderly progress it made toward Westernization. Chulalongkorn had been reared and educated in a Buddhist monastery, as was customary with Siamese princes, but early in his reign he took the step, unprecedented for an eastern Asiatic potentate, of travelling outside his dominions. The fruits of his appreciation of what he saw and learned appeared in the reforms which he accomplished in Siam: the abolition of slavery, the simplification of court etiquette, the grant of religious toleration, the erection of schools and hospitals, the modernizing of army and navy, the remodelling of civil administration and judicial procedure in the European manner, the introduction of scientific and mechanical features of Western civilization. He established a standard coinage, postal and telegraph services, and a department of public health. He built a thousand miles of railway. He lighted his capital city of Bangkok with electric lights. He had several of his sons educated in England.

¹ See below, pp. 887-888.

Neither Chulalongkorn nor his successor Rama VI (1910–1925) was an undiscriminating or merely doctrinaire Westernizer. While appropriating many things from Europe, they were careful to conserve and foster much that was distinctively Siamese. They promoted Siamese nationalism. They respected Buddhism, which was the national religion, and with it they closely associated the new educational system. They retained, moreover, the traditionally autocratic form of government, believing that Siam would make greater progress under their own benevolent despotism than under the newfangled democracy then in vogue in Europe. In 1914 independent Siam had an area of 200,000 square miles, larger than Spain and almost as large as France, and a population of over ten million, most of whom earned a livelihood by growing rice and teakwood, though there was some notable mining and shipping. Siam, in alliance with Great Britain and France, entered the World War in 1917.

The Moslem "Near East" and "Middle East" felt the impact of Western European civilization simultaneously with the non-Moslem "Far East," although the relative poverty of the Moslem world as a whole, together with the traditional tribalism and religious fanaticism of its peoples, tended to make it less alluring and less amenable to European exploitation and hence to European imperialism. What Moslems there were in the Far East were subjected in the nineteenth century to Western rule and Western influence: those in India, to British; those in Malaysia, to Dutch; and those in the Philippines, to American. Yet all those proved less adaptable than the Japanese, the Siamese, or even the Chinese; and the Moslems of Asiatic Turkey, Arabia, Turkestan, Afghanistan, and Persia were still more "backward."

In another place we have described the delayed Europeanization of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire—the introduction of railways, the scramble of European Powers Ottoman for economic concessions and political preëminence, the Empire resulting development at the beginning of the twentieth century of a sentiment of nationalism and a demand for reform among Turks and Arabs.¹ The Arabs undergoing some Europeanization were those of Mesopotamia, Syria, and the narrow settled coasts of Arabia. Much the greater part of the

¹ See above, pp. 670-673.

Arabian peninsula was desert, peopled by nomadic war-like tribes who were left usually to their own devices. The Moslem population of Turkestan, too, was mainly nomadic, though, being better off economically and less bellicose, it was gradually absorbed into the Russian Empire, as we have elsewhere noted,¹ and brought under Russian influence.

Afghanistan, a region considerably larger than France and almost as large as the whole Japanese Empire, was so mountainous and unproductive, and its population, though numbering fewer than six million, was so adept at fighting, that it successfully resisted encroachments of Russia from the northwest and Great Britain from the southeast and preserved both its independence and its "backwardness."

Persia, the seat of a great ancient empire and civilization, had been for centuries an independent Moslem state, presided over by a "king of kings," or "shah," and characterized, Persia like most Moslem countries, by religious fanaticism, economic primitiveness, some delightful domestic art, and chronic costly warfare between ambitious chieftains and rival contenders for the kingship. Frequently, also, there were wasteful struggles with the Afghans to the east and the Arabs, Turks, and Georgians to the west, complicated and embittered by the fact that the Persians were Shiite (or "heretical") Moslems while their neighbors were Sunnite (or "orthodox").² And complicating the internal affairs of Persia far more was the rivalry which developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century between the European Great Powers of Russia and Great Britain for control of the country's resources and government. If Russia supported and influenced one faction, Great Britain supported and dominated an opposing faction. If Russia obtained a concession, Great Britain must be compensated by securing another. At least this was the situation until 1907, when the two Powers agreed to recognize each other's "sphere of influence" in Persia-Russia's in the north and Britain's in the southeast and along the Persian Gulf—and to cooperate in exploitation. Which was better for them but worse for the Persians.

In resisting foreign imperialism and effecting needed internal reform, no real leadership was provided by the sovereigns. The

¹ See above, pp. 641, 647.

² On earlier conflict between Shiite and Sunnite Moslems, see Vol. I, p. 13.

Shah Nasir (1848-1896) and his son, the Shah Muzaffar (1896-1907), travelled repeatedly in Europe, but what they chiefly derived therefrom was a lively taste for European pleasures and an inordinate extravagance in satisfying it. To get all the money they could, they imposed burden-

in Persian Govern-

some taxes, abetted the official corruption which ate like a canker throughout the government, and mortgaged themselves and their country ever more heavily to Russia and Britain. Nasir Shah was assassinated by aggrieved tax-payers, and Muzaffar Shah witnessed the insolvency of the state treasury and an alarming growth of turbulence and brigandage all over his realm.

Some Persians, however, derived from Europe an enthusiasm for "reform," for constitutionalism and liberalism and representative government as panaceas for national regeneration, and, taking advantage of the general unrest and for Restimulating the latent spirit of nationalism (which was form in Persia more traditional with the Persians than with other Moslem peoples), they built up in the first years of the twentieth century a popular Nationalist party. So widespread and threatening was their agitation that Muzaffar Shah on his deathbed in 1906 promulgated a constitution providing for parliamentary government, and his successor, Mohammed Ali Shah, swore solemnly before the duly assembled parliament that he would scrupulously respect the constitution.

But as soon as the Persian parliament attempted financial

reforms, Mohammed Ali bombarded the building in which it sat, arrested its members, and annulled the constitution. Civil war followed, and at length in 1908 the Nationalists, gaining the upper hand, deposed Mohammed Ali (who took refuge in Europe) and put in his place his twelve-year-old son, Revolu-Ahmed Shah, under a regent sworn to defend the contion of 1008 stitution. Whereupon Russian troops on the pretense of "preserving order" invaded and occupied the northern part of the country, and the Nationalists fell to quarrelling among themselves. For a time in 1911 an improvement of Persian conditions was promised by the appointment of disinterested Swedish officers to modernize the native army and of a resourceful young American, Morgan Shuster, to reform the national finances. Within a year, however, Russia obliged the Persian government to dismiss Shuster, who had declared with more truth than prudence that the selfish policies pursued by the Russians and British were largely responsible for the misgovernment and anactor archy prevalent in "weakened, war-cursed Persia." In the existing circumstances, Europeanization meant an especially oppressive and troublesome form of foreign exploitation, and as Ahmed Shah grew to manhood he showed himself unable or unwilling to resist it. He was capricious, much given to European travel and pleasure, and quite neglectful of Persia except in the one matter of getting all the money he could for himself.1

Northern Africa, like western Asia, had long been overwhelmingly Moslem. Here, since the seventh century, the indigenous Egyptians and Berbers had been largely fused with Moslem conquering Arabs and subjected to a succession of North Africa essentially oriental despotisms—Arab or Turkish characterized by common Moslem culture and by incessant strife within and depredations from without. Gradually, too, Moslem religion and Arab customs had been communicated to Negro tribesmen along the eastern coast of Africa and across the Sahara desert in the Sudan. Timbuctu had become a Moslem commercial centre in the sixteenth century, and by the second half of the nineteenth century the whole interior of the vast African continent bade fair to become Moslem like the North.

By this time, however, the partition and exploitation of Africa by European Great Powers was more startling and impressive than the conversion of primitive Negroes to the tenets European Partition of Islam. We have already explained how the more of North civilized part of Africa—the northern coast land along Africa, the Mediterranean—the part which had always been in contact, friendly or hostile, with Europe—was loosed from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and appropriated piecemeal by various European Powers: Algeria by France between 1830 and 1870; ² Tunis by France in 1881; ³ Egypt by Great Britain in 1882; ⁴ Tripoli and Cyrenaica by Italy in 1911-1012.5 Morocco alone had had no nominal connection with the Ottoman Empire, but its native Sultan in the nineteenth century had as many troubles at home and abroad as the Khedive of

¹ On subsequent developments in Persia, see below, pp. 1063-1065.

² See above, pp. 107-108, 194-195.

³ See above, pp. 518-510.

⁵ See above, pp. 673, 683-684.

Egypt, and though like the Ottoman Sultan he profited for some time from the rivalry of European Powers 1 he eventually in 1912 had to submit to a division of his country into a major French protectorate and a minor Spanish protectorate.

Prior to 1880, Europeans knew relatively little of Africa as a whole and usually styled it the "Dark Continent." Nor had there been much interest in it beyond the few stations which Portuguese and Dutch, French and British had established here and there on the coast of Guinea or at the Cape of Good Hope or on the eastern shores as

a Dark Continent

stopping-places on the way to India or for traffic in "gold dust" or, much more lucratively, in Negro slaves. The Portuguese had been most persistent and tenacious in acquiring connected territories on the east and west coasts (Mozambique and Angola, respectively), and the Dutch and British in promoting some real colonization in a limited area of South Africa. But the net result, in respect of the Europeanization of Africa, was slight, and with the abolition of the slave trade in the first half of the nineteenth century it promised to become even less.

In fact, nevertheless, the abolition of the slave trade proved to be the prelude to a swift partition of almost all Africa among European Powers and a rapidly ensuing extension of European influence from the coastal regions into the far interior. For the abolition of the slave trade was inspired by humanitarian zeal and the new industrialism, and both these phenomena continued to function. Humanitarians were not content to abolish traffic of British or other European slave dealers on the coasts of

Africa. They must interfere with the slave-dealing of Arabs and Negroes, and bring light to all benighted humanity; they must push inland and uplift potential Europeanslaves and acquaint them with Christianity and European civilization. Moreover, the new industrialism demanded rubber and other raw materials which tropical Africa could supply, and at the same time

Type of ization: Civilizing Barbarous African Tribes

raised up the hope that a Europeanized Africa would provide a profitable field for European salesmanship and investment and, through the achievements of modern science and sanitation, for European colonization.

European penetration of the "Dark Continent" was inau-¹ See above, pp. 550, 587, and below, pp. 765-768.

gurated just after the middle of the nineteenth century by a number of intrepid explorers and adventurers, of whom European Explorafour or five merit special mention. David Livingstone tion in (1813-1873), a Scottish physician, went to Africa in Africa 1840 as a Protestant missionary, but he won fame less as an evangelist than as an explorer. For thirty years he headed expeditions which traversed the wild jungles of south-Livingcentral Africa from the Transvaal to the Equator and stone from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, discovering the great lake of Nyasa, the course of the Zambesi River, and the upper reaches of the Congo, and publishing accounts which fascinated scientists and aroused a lively interest throughout Europe and America. Towards the close of his life Livingstone seemed to have been lost in the jungle, and a New York newspaper proprietor capitalized the widespread curiosity concerning Livingstone's fate by despatching a clever and adventurous Anglo-American journalist, Henry Stanley (1841-1904), to find him. Stanley "found" Livingstone in 1871, and then engaged in important explorations of his own, circumnavigating Stanley the great lakes of Tanganyika and Victoria and tracing the whole course of the Congo River. The thrillingly told tale of Stanley's trip Through the Dark Continent was published in six languages and went through countless editions in Europe and America. It was Stanley who interested King Leopold II of Belgium in the commercial possibilities of the Congo region and became the chief "promoter" of that greedy monarch's "Congo Free State." 1 Paul du Chaillu (1835–1903) was typical of a considerable number of somewhat amateurish "naturalists" who in search of strange men and animals and unfamiliar botanical Du specimens braved great hardships in Africa, won fame Chailln for themselves as travellers and publicists, and incidentally helped to open up the "Dark Continent" to European missionaries, traders, soldiers, and statesmen. Du Chaillu himself, the son of a French trader on the Guinea coast, was schooled by Catholic missionaries and employed in the 1850's and 1860's by the Academy of Natural Science of Philadelphia. His discovery of giant gorillas and human pygmies contributed to the contemporary vogue of Darwinian theories and quickened the inter-

est of Europeans, especially Frenchmen, in equatorial Africa.

¹ On Leopold II and the Congo Free State, see above, pp. 594-595.

Still another type of European adventurer in Africa was the romantic "promoter" and patriot, intent upon staking out "claims" where his particular country's trade might flourish and its flag fly. This type was represented, for example, by Karl Peters (1856–1918), a German student of British colonial activities and the organizer and chief propagandist of a German colonial society. In 1884 with a few companions he landed on the east coast of Africa, and, by plying native chieftains with grog and presenting them with an assortment of toys, he obtained from them within ten days as many as a dozen "treaties" ceding to his company about 60,000 square miles of territory. The next year he prevailed upon Bismarck to take the company and its land under the formal protection of the German government, and within the next five years, by methods similar to Peters's, German East Africa was expanded into a domain of 200,000 square miles.

An especially famous African "empire builder" was the Englishman Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902). The son of an Anglican clergyman, he was intended for the church, but being sickly in his youth he was sent off in 1870 to "rough it" in Natal (in South Africa) and soon found wealth (as well as health) in the newly discovered diamond fields at Kimberley. Then, after returning to England and studying at Oxford, he went back to South Africa and became its outstanding "promoter," financier, and statesman. He acquired an enormous fortune from gold mines, diamond mines, and commercial activities. In 1889 he organized the British South Africa Company, which obtained title, in manner resembling Karl Peters's, to the vast area known later as Rhodesia. From 1890 to 1896 he was prime minister of Cape Colony, and throughout these years he was actively advancing plans not only for incorporating the Dutch republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State with British South Africa but also for extending the sway of the British Empire the whole length of Africa northward from the Cape of Good Hope to Alexandria on the Mediterranean. At his death in 1902 he left a part of his fortune as an endowment to provide for the education of select young men from "Anglo-Saxon" countries—the British colonies, the United States, and Germany—as "Rhodes Scholars" at the intellectual centre of the British Empire, the University of Oxford.

Under pressure from such active propagandists as Rhodes and Peters and Stanley, and from a host of explorers, traders, prospectors, and missionaries, who roamed over Africa in the 1870's and 1880's, and in accordance, furthermore, with the evident wishes of industrialists and journalists and army officers and zealous patriots at home, various European governments were soon parcelling out almost the whole of the African continent among themselves. A claim to a region was asserted, a flag raised, "treaties" negotiated with native chieftains, a police force landed, Extending European Rule in Africa and a protectorate or "colony" established. When rival claims to the same region were asserted, the respective European governments involved would negotiate a special "deal," whereby one would be left in possession of the disputed area and the other receive compensation elsewhere, usually at the expense of native tribes. In the incredibly brief span of twenty-seven years from 1885, when an international congress at Berlin authorized the erection of King Leopold II's Congo Free State and laid down certain simple rules which the Powers Congress of 1885 should observe in acquiring African territory, to 1912, when Morocco passed formally and finally under Franco-Spanish "protection"—the entire continent, with the exception of two very minor countries (Abyssinia and Liberia), was partitioned by European nations.

The partition occasioned a good deal of friction in international relations, but it was eventually accomplished without direct or immediate recourse to armed conflict among the Euro-

International
Negotiations and
the Partition of
Africa

pean Powers. The aspiration of Portugal to link up Mozambique on the east coast with Angola on the west and the desire of the Dutch Boers to retain their independence alike ran counter to the ambition of Britain to extend her African empire northward from Cape Colony; the Portuguese aspiration was sacrificed

Cape Colony; the Portuguese aspiration was sacrificed by a treaty of 1891 and the Dutch desire by the Boer War of 1899–1902. Still further north, the project of a continuous stretch of British dominion from the Cape to Cairo was threatened by the extension of German East Africa inland to the frontiers of the Congo Free State, and also by the ambition of France to join Algeria and Tunis not only with her holdings

¹ On the Boer War, see above, pp. 512-513.

in Senegal and on the Congo but also with her foothold on the Somali coast of the Red Sea in a huge imperial domain that would cover northern Africa from west to east. Britain thought fit to compromise the German claim in a treaty of 1890 and thereby to concede at least a temporary severance of her projected north-and-south empire in the vicinity of Lake Tanganyika. But in respect of France, Britain deemed it safe to be less yielding.

In 1898 a French expedition headed by an army officer, a certain Captain Marchand, proceeded all the way from the mouth of the Congo (on the west coast) to the upper valley of the Nile (in eastern Africa), and here in the Egyptian Sudan, at a little village called Fashoda, the captain hoisted a French flag and asserted French claims to the surrounding country. But the British insisted that the Egyptian Sudan was a part of Egypt and that Egypt was in their own "sphere of influence," and against the French Captain Marchand at Fashoda advanced from Khartum the British General Kitchener with a larger expedition and bigger guns.¹ Under protest and with great reluctance, Marchand withdrew from Fashoda; and by treaty of 1899 France yielded to Britain the Egyptian Sudan. This treaty of 1899 proved to be the forerunner of the close entente concluded between France and Britain in 1904, whereby the latter was entrenched in Egypt and the former assured of a privileged position in Morocco.


The last phase of international negotiations concerning Africa, prior to the World War, had to do chiefly with the effort of Germany to thwart the French in Morocco and, failing in this, to secure "compensation" for Germany at the expense of French Equatorial Africa. A settlement was eventually arrived at in 1911-1912, but the accompanying exacerbation of Franco-German ill-will helped to prepare the way for the World War.

By 1914 Europe owned almost all of Africa. Of the eleven and a half million square miles of territory in the continent, almost four million were French, three and three-quarters million were British, nine hundred thousand were German and

¹ Kitchener had just won the decisive victory of Omdurman (near Khartum) over the Sudanese natives and had thus fortified the "rights" of Great Britain in the Egyptian Sudan. See above, p. 519.

² See below, p. 767.

about the same number Belgian, eight hundred thousand were Portuguese, six hundred and fifty thousand Italian, and a hun-



SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1914

dred thousand Spanish, while only the remaining four hundred thousand (barely a thirtieth part of the whole) belonged to independent native states. Included in the area reckoned as owned by Europe were, to be sure, certain countries which still retained native sovereigns,

¹ For details of the British holdings in Africa, see above, pp. 511-519; and for the French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Belgian, and German, see above, respectively, pp. 548-553, 576, 587, 594-595, 609-610.

but so long as the Khedive of Egypt had to follow the advice of a British "resident," and the Bey of Tunis or the Sultan of Morocco had to obey the instructions of French "high commissioners," such countries could hardly be termed independent.

Included within European Africa, moreover, were gigantic tracts either quite unfit for European habitation, such as French Equatorial Africa, Belgian Congo, British Nigeria, and most of the Egyptian Sudan and German East Africa, or quite unprofitable for European exploitation, such as the great Sahara Desert. Yet none could doubt that toward the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth, enormous strides were taken toward a real Europeanization of Africa. It was not merely that European Powers held political sway or that European immigrants were coming into South Africa from the British Isles and into North Africa from Italy and France. The Negro tribesmen of tropical Africa were being taught by European missionaries and school teachers, were learning European languages and ways, were more or less docilely working for European capitalists and serving under European Civilizaarmy officers. Even the Arabs of desert Africa were becoming accustomed to the profits of European trade and the penalties of European police. Optimists, with whom the first decade of the twentieth century abounded, were eloquent in voicing the expectation that within another generation or two the formerly "Dark Continent" would bask in the full sunshine of European civilization—with railways and telegraph wires radiating everywhere, with modern science bringing salubrity to the tropical jungles and fertility to the desert sands, and with the twin spirit of "progress" and "prosperity" duly communicated from white men to black and tan.

Two African countries were still independent—and correspondingly "backward." The larger of the two was Abyssinia (or Ethiopia), a landlocked Negro state wedged in the mountainous country between Somaliland and the Egyptian Sudan. Its dominant tribes had been Christian of a primitive sort since the fourth century, and in the latter part of the nineteenth century its "King of Kings," the Emperor Menelek II (1889-1913), who claimed descent from King Solomon and the Oueen of Sheba, succeeded in fighting off Italian invaders

Remaining "Independent" tries: I. Abys-

and winning from Italy, and other European Powers, unqualified recognition of Abyssinian independence.¹ Even the Emperor Menelek, however, was not averse to Europeanizing his army and permitting European capitalists to construct a railway from his capital to the coast. Abyssinia was at last in real contact with Europe.

The smaller of the two independent African states was Liberia, which had been established on the west coast in 1847 by expatriated and emancipated Negro slaves from the United States. Its civilized English-speaking inhabitants had been greatly outnumbered and given a good deal of trouble by barbarous natives in the hinterland, and latterly its area had been hemmed in and reduced by encroachments of the British from the west (in Sierra Leone) and of the French from the east and north (in Ivory Coast colony). In the first decade of the twentieth century it was a small, poor country, and the main question was whether it would be Europeanized and rendered "progressive" through its own efforts or through the forceful intervention of France or Britain or perhaps the United States. For that it would and must be brought into step with the material civilization of the Western world, few doubted.

By 1914 Africa, along with Asia, was being subjected to a process of Europeanization which bade fair to produce in the near future, out of the distinctively Western civilization of Europe, America, and Australia, a truly great and unifying world civilization. And by this time, the world as a whole was known as it had never been known before and was being traversed not only by engines on land and water but also by engines in the air. In April 1909 an indefatigable Arctic explorer, Robert

Discovery of North and South Poles

Peary, reached the North Pole and in the ice which covered the ocean depths below planted an American flag. In December 1911 a Norwegian explorer, Roald Amundsen, perilously making his way over the big, ice-encased, and mountainous continent of Antarctica, reached

the South Pole

3. INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION AND PEACE

The twentieth century, as it opened, promised not only to Europeanize the whole world but also to promote peaceful co-

On the conflict between Italy and Abyssinia, see above, p. 576.

operation among the advanced and powerful nations on whom the progress of Europeanization seemed to depend. These nations still waged wars, it was admitted, against "backward" peoples and in "uncivilized" parts of the world, but it was ob- Peace vious that among themselves there had been no vio- among Great lent conflict since 1871—almost half a century—and it was confidently predicted that once the world was 1871-1914 truly Europeanized there would remain little or no reason for international war anywhere.

The principle that the leading large nations constituted a "Concert" of Great Powers which should set an example to other and lesser Powers of substituting negotiation for violence, harmonious coöperation for dissonance and discord, had been invoked at the Congress of Vienna, back in 1815.

Although the principle had been violated by the actual Concert of Europe

participation of European Great Powers in nationalist wars about the middle of the nineteenth century, it had never been quite surrendered by European statesmen, and in the latter part of the century evidences multiplied that the principle was acquiring new vigor and worth. In 1856 all the Great Powers were represented at the Congress of Paris, which terminated the Crimean War,² and which also adopted the so-called "Declaration of Paris" for the safeguarding of neutral trade in event of war, and authorized the establishment of an international commission for the regulation and improvement of navigation on the lower Danube. In 1864, in order to reduce the pain and suffering attendant upon war, a congress at Geneva set up an international organization—the Red Cross society—which soon had official branches in all the countries of Europe. In 1882, largely through the enthusiasm and energy of Clara Barton, the United States adhered to the treaties governing the Red Cross, and subsequently both the Ottoman Empire and Japan signed them.

In 1878 the principle of the Concert of Europe was again exemplified by the Congress of Berlin,3 which prevented the Russo-Turkish War from precipitating a much vaster struggle wherein Great Britain and Austria-Hungary might easily have

¹ The Crimean War of 1854-1856, the Franco-Austrian War of 1859, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. See above, pp. 196-198, 222-223, 234-236, 243-245

² See above, pp. 197-198.

⁸ See above, pp. 264-265.

become involved with Russia. In 1885 Austria, with the consent of the other Great Powers, stopped a war between Bulgaria and Serbia. In 1897 Russia, Great Britain, France, and Italy cooperated to end an armed conflict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. In 1913 an "ambassadorial conference" of the Great Powers sat at London to supervise and expedite the pacific settlement of the Balkan Wars. The "backward" area of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan

The "backward" area of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states was not the only region where the Concert of Europe functioned with much success from 1878 to 1914. Africa was partitioned in accordance with general regulations laid down by the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin of 1884–1885, and in detail through an ensuing series of diplomatic negotiations and compromises among the Powers concerned. And, to expedite the process, the Powers mutually agreed, at a Congress at Brussels in 1890, not to permit traffic with African natives in arms or spirituous liquors. In China, moreover, the European Great Powers jointly intervened in 1900, with Japan and the United States, to suppress the Boxer insurrection; and with politeness if not perfect sincerity they unanimously endorsed the American proposal that China's territorial integrity should be maintained and her trade doors kept equally open to all foreign nations.

Nor was the Concert of Europe the only effective agency of inter-state coöperation. There appeared also a kind of Concert of America. In 1881 James Blaine, the foreign minister ("Secretary of State") of the United States, invited the sev-

tary of State") of the United States, invited the several countries of Latin America to participate with his own country in a Pan-American Conference "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America." The first such

preventing war between the nations of America." The first such conference was held at Washington in 1889, a second at Mexico City in 1901, a third at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and a fourth at Buenos Aires in 1910. The results were somewhat disappointing, and yet they sufficed to indicate an increasing desire, popular as well as official, for international conciliation and peace. In 1902 Argentina and Chile solemnly pledged each other that they would settle all their future disputes, not by war but by arbitration,

¹ See above, p. 679.

³ See above, p. 684.

⁵ See above, p. 727.

² See above, p. 669.

⁴ See above, p. 738.

and they jointly erected a huge statue of Christ at their common frontier high in the Andes.

Coöperation was spreading and taking many forms among "civilized" nations of the world. Thirty nations formed a Universal Telegraph Union (1875). Twenty-three Special agreed to make common use of the metric system of weights and measures (1875). Sixty adhered to a Agree-Universal Postal Union, created in 1878, with head-units quarters at Berne (in Switzerland). Five joined a Latin Monetary Union for the regulation of an interchangeable coinage. Nineteen ratified the Berne convention of 1883 for the standardization of patent laws. Fifteen signed the Berne convention of 1887 providing for practically uniform copyright laws.

The judicial settlement of international disputes was apparently gaining favor likewise. Great Britain and the United States developed a habit of submitting their disputes to arbitration—the Alabama claims in 1871–1872,² a national controversy over Bering Sea in 1892, a quarrel over Arbitration—the boundary between Alaska and Canada in 1903—and with such success that the possibility of war between the two major English-speaking countries seemed more and more remote and unthinkable. In 1886 Pope Leo XIII arbitrated a colonial dispute between Germany and Spain. In 1902 King Edward VII of Great Britain arbitrated a boundary dispute between Chile and Argentina. In 1909 France and Germany submitted a Moroccan dispute to international arbitration. And these are but a few instances of the many that might be cited.

It should be borne in mind that all the governmental arbitrations and conventions and all the coöperative efforts of Pan-American Conferences and the Concert of Europe betokened a widening and deepening popular interest in international solidarity. As the nineteenth century advanced and the Industrial Revolution progressed and the most diverse localities International control internationalities were knit together by railways, tional Costeamships, telegraphs, and cables, the number and importance of common concerns rapidly increased. There was a prodigious stimulation of trade and travel and migration from one country, or one continent, to another. There was a new and universal absorption in the same kinds of scientific

¹ See above, p. 528.

² See above, p. 461.

and economic problems and in similar kinds of popular education:

The international character of industrial and commercial

capitalism was emphasized by banks and corporations and undertakings which outgrew the country where they originated and became world-wide in their ramification and functioning. The international character of the problems of industrial workers was stressed not only by international congresses of Socialists but also by international federations of cooperative societies and trade unions. An international agricultural institute was founded at Rome in 1905. Similarly, in the political sphere, earnest advocates of parliamentary government organized an international Parliamentary Union (1889), and proponents of woman suffrage and feminism took to holding international congresses. Religion, too, mentary felt the same general impulse. Protestant Christians of a hundred divergent creeds and of a thousand shades of individual opinion met in world congresses, talked about unity and mutual charity, and made amicable agreements for the parcelling out of heathen lands among their several missionary Religious groups. Catholic Christians, more mindful than ever of the universal traditions of their faith and church, instituted in 1881 a series of Eucharistic Congresses, which drew large numbers of clergymen and laymen from many climes now to Paris, now to London, now to Jerusalem, now to Montreal. Even a World's Parliament of Religions was projected and actually convened. For the advancement of science and learning,

physicists, chemists, biologists, historians, and economists, and "exchange professors" and "exchange students" between the universities of different countries. There was developing around the globe a community of intellectual interests, the product of what has happily been described as "the international mind."

Pacifism was undoubtedly growing. An English "pages as

moreover, there were periodical world congresses of distinguished

Pacifism was undoubtedly growing. An English "peace society" had been founded as early as 1816 and a federation of societies of like nature had been formed in the United States in 1828. The first distinctively pacifist society on the continent of Europe was organized at Geneva in 1828 and the second at Paris in 1841. Thenceforth, especially

after 1878, associations of professed pacifists multiplied throughout the Western world until in 1914 there were some 160 of them with numerous branches and many members. International congresses of pacifists, convening intermittently and spasmodically between 1843 and 1889, became regular annual events after the latter date, and in 1891 permanent headquarters of the international peace movement were established at Berne. To the movement special resources and prestige were given by the patronage of outstanding industrialists, distinguished statesmen, and brilliant literary men. Alfred Nobel, a Swedish scientist and capitalist, devoted the major part of the princely fortune which he had amassed from the manufacture of dynamite, cordite, and other high explosives to the cause of international peace.\(^1\) Andrew Carnegie, a Scottish-American business man, drew liberally upon the wealth that he had accumulated in the iron and steel industry to endow pacifist propaganda and to build a "temple of peace" at the Hague and a Pan-American "palace" at Washington. Baron D'Estournelles de Constant, a Senator of the French Republic, employed pen and voice in behalf of international conciliation, and so did Leo Tolstoi,\(^2\) the venerable Russian novelist and social reformer. Norman Angell, a clever young British publicist, created a sensation with his book on war as "the great illusion."

To the generation of pacifists that flourished in the first decade of the twentieth century, war, at least among great civilized nations, seemed peculiarly anachronistic and therefore fated to disappear in the near future. The capitalists of every progressive country had too many foreign investments or were too involved in foreign trade to

welcome war, and they were too influential to be ignored by their several governments. The industrial workers had too much to lose from a state of war in the way of employment and wages, and, besides, many of them were so actively identified with international Socialism as to threaten a revolutionary overturn of any government which might engage in foreign war. The intellectual classes were too "enlightened" and by this time too internationally minded not to perceive the fallacies in all arguments and pretexts for war. The Christian churches were traditionally committed to support of the principle of peace.

¹ Sec above, p. 288.

Pacifists were somewhat troubled by the obvious fact that since 1860 military and naval armaments had been increasing in almost every country. To be sure, most advocates of heavy national armament, themselves influenced wittingly or unwittingly by the pacifist spirit of the age, insisted Armaments that all such armament was strictly defensive, that it constituted mere preparedness against dreadful but possible eventualities and was the surest pledge of enduring peace. Nevertheless, foremost pacifists scented danger in military and naval preparedness, and many other persons who were not professionally pacifist complained of the growing burdens of taxation which that kind of "peace insurance" entailed. A conspicuous and attractive plank in the pacifist platform, therefore, was the demand for a limitation of armaments by international agreement, coupled usually with a plea for the establishment of an international court of arbitration. Such a demand was sure to have some weight with statesmen harassed by the constant necessity of providing funds to cover the rapidly mounting expenditure on army and navy.

For the express purpose of limiting armaments by mutual agreement, the Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, with the concurrence of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, convoked an international peace conference at The Hague in Conference of "The preservation of peace," the Tsar said, 1800 "has become an object of international policy." At the conference the sovereign states of Europe and Asia and likewise the United States and Mexico were represented—twentysix nations in all. No agreement could be reached on any general limitation of armaments, but steps were taken to restrict the use of certain weapons in the event of war, to codify international law, and to establish a court of arbitration to which nations might submit their quarrels.

In 1907, with the prompting of President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States and on the formal invitation of the Tsar Nicholas II, a second international peace conference was held at The Hague, representing this time forty-four governments,

¹ See above, pp. 322-327.

Note. The picture opposite, "Ave Maria in the South Seas," suggesting interaction of European civilization and non-European primitiveness, is from the painting by Paul Gauguin (1848–1903). On Gauguin, see above, pp. 402–403.





including nineteen in America. Again the much-mooted question of general limitation of armaments was left unanswered, but certain humane amendments were made to the laws of maritime and land war, an international prize court was provided for, and conventions were adopted requiring a formal declaration of war before the opening of hostilities and restricting the employment of force for the collection of foreign debts. Finally, the holding of similar conferences at regular intervals in the future was recommended.

Here, optimistic pacifists imagined, was a real beginning of an organized international community, with its capital at The Hague, with its periodic congresses, with its statutes and codes, with its court of arbitration. If the German Empire, the United States, Switzerland, Canada, and South Africa could be organized and function successfully as federal states without internal strife, why should not external war be banished through an International Federation of the World? In fact, the international court of arbitration was duly instituted, and by it several international disputes were pacifically settled between 1901 and 1914, including one between France and Germany. A third Hague conference was actually projected for 1915; it might take a big step forward on the road

Before 1915, however, the promise of the twentieth century had taken on a somewhat different complexion. The pacifist ideal was not to be realized so easily. In truth, as we now look back upon the first years of the twentieth century, we can all see that they held an even greater promise of war than of peace and that the pacifists of the time, like most of their contemporaries, looked so intently on evidences of material and scientific progress as to neglect the more fateful evidences of impending disaster.

of international coöperation and peace.

4. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

In the midst of optimism about the bigger and better Europe, about the Europeanization of the world, and about the world's peace, there was room for some pessimism. International

Note. The picture opposite, "Prayer in a Moslem Mosque," is from a painting by Jean Louis Gérôme (1824-1924), a romantic French artist much interested in interpreting the world of Islam to the world of Christendom.

competition was even more in evidence than international conciliation; and international anarchy than international organization.

The "state system" of Europe, and of the world, was essentially anarchy of State ory absolutely independent and sovereign, and equal one to another. In theory, too, these states were supposed to respect each other's independence and sovereignty and to comport themselves in accordance with generally recognized principles and usages of international law. Moreover, each state was ostentatiously meticulous in observing the ceremonial aspects of international diplomacy and officially very vocal in claiming a share with the others in the admittedly joint task of advancing the civilization, the prosperity, and the peace of the whole world.

Yet, in fact, external politeness of one state to another usually covered a vast deal of internal rivalry. Coöperation was ordinarily determined by and directed toward the supposed self-interest or self-importance of each state involved. In last analysis, force or the threat of force was the supreme arbitrament. Nor was there any real equality among the states—in area, population, wealth, education, or anything else. All had some armaments, and hence all were called "Powers," but those that had very big armaments were distinguished as "Great Powers." Huge armies enabled Germany, Great and Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, and now Japan to rank as Great Powers, while huge navies and special resources of money- and man-power put Great Britain and latterly the United States in the same category. Among the lesser Powers were gradations of strength, actual or potential, but invariably a like ambition for promotion to a higher rank. Among the Great Powers there might be a theoretical "Concert" -and an actual one on the rare occasions when they thought their several self-interests could thereby be served without sacrifice of individual prestige—but the continuous and fast-developing feature of their mutual relationships was competition. competition, superficially at least, was for prestige— being most feared and therefore most respected by the Competition for Prestige rest of the world. And for the sake of prestige, each

Great Power must have the heaviest armaments, the most ex-

tensive imperial domain, and the largest number of satellites among the lesser Powers.

The Industrial Revolution was complicating and accentuating the competition among the Great Powers. It was prompting economic nationalism, with attendant tariff controversies and scrambles for the exploitation of "backward" regions. It was providing means as well as opportunities for an unprecedented increase and a new assertiveness of civil and military ambition.

Imperialistic competition was especially notable. Great Britain and Russia were outstanding rivals in Asia, Great Britain and France in Africa; and more recently Germany and Italy and the United States were becoming zealous competitors for places "in the sun." So far, there had been no outright ist Com-petition war between European Great Powers over the newer economic and political partition of the world, but the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Boer War of 1899-1902, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912 were more and more portentous. The weakness of the Chinese and Ottoman Empires and the inability of such lesser Powers as Portugal, the Netherlands, and Belgium to hold their extensive colonial empires if they should be attacked, were as obvious as were the conflicting ambitions of the Great Powers.

Nationalism, sentimental quite as much as economic, complicated and imperilled the relationships among European states. It had already, in the middle of the nineteenth century, inspired a series of wars for the political unification of Italy and of Germany. Since then it had overspread all eastern Europe and been intensified everywhere by the rise of popular schooling and popular press and by the multiplying propaganda of scholars and artists, publicists and patriotic societies. It not only embittered relations between France and Germany but also National-gravely menaced the integrity and the very existence of some of the imperial Powers. There was extraordinary nationalist unrest in Austria-Hungary, a Powers considerable amount in the Russian Empire, and some within

¹ For a fuller account of economic nationalism and accompanying phenomena of imperialism and militarism during the period from 1880 to 1914, see above, pp. 312-327.

the German and British empires; 1 and the rapid waning of the Ottoman Empire and the partition of most of its European provinces by lesser Balkan Powers as an outcome of aggressive nationalist warfare in 1912-1913, suggested only too clearly the fate that might presently overtake the Habsburg Empire—unless its armaments were reënforced and its prestige enhanced. Which. of course, would affect the interests and relative prestige of other Powers, and affect them in different and conflicting ways. Just as the Great Powers had long quarrelled and sometimes fought over the Ottoman Empire, so now the Habsburg Empire tempted them to fiercer quarrels and more deadly fighting. And just as the ambition of Sardinia and Prussia to unify Italians and Germans had previously involved nationalist wars in central Europe, so the liberating and unifying zeal of Serbia, Greece, and Rumania—and of leading Czechoslovaks and Poles—was likely at any time to precipitate in castern Europe a new series of wars which might conceivably engulf all Europe and the whole world.

Aggravating the situation was the marked tendency of the Great Powers of Europe to align themselves by formal alliance or informal entente in rival aggregations. Each aggre-Rival Alliances gation viewed the activities of the other with increasand the ing suspicion and fear. Each competed with the other Balance of Power in pushing its own members farther along on the path of military preparedness and in attempting to draw lesser Powers into the orbit of its influence and control. Yet neither was quite sure how solid it was, or how solid its rival, how really loyal to it were its several members, or how dependable were its satellites among the lesser Powers. The rival aggregations constituted a "balance of power" in Europe and the world, but a singularly unstable and dangerous balance.

Such a "balance of power" became alarming only in the twentieth century. From 1871 to 1890, it had hardly existed. From 1890 to 1905, though in process of formation, it promised to be a stabilizing rather than a disruptive force. Only from 1905 did it point to ultimate disaster. How this came about, we shall try to make clear by a brief survey of international relations from 1871 to 1914.

¹ On the nationalist unrest in Ircland, Egypt, and India, see above, pp. 404 501, 519, 523-524. On the difficulties which Germany was experiencing with her subject Poles, Danes, and Alsatians, see above, pp. 607, 617. Nationalism in Austria-Hungary and Russia is discussed above, pp. 636-639, 642, 645-647.

The Franco-German War of 1870–1871 had served to establish the military and diplomatic hegemony of Germany, and for the next twenty years Prince Bismarck, as Chancellor of the German Empire, was undoubtedly the most conspicuous and Gerinfluential statesman in Europe. His international many's Hegempolicy, in its broad outlines, was simple. He would only maintain the military superiority of his country. He 1871-1890 would be content with what had been won in the wars of 1866 and 1870–1871. He would especially seek no further territorial aggrandizement in Europe, which might arouse the hostility of Russia, or any outside Europe, which might provoke colonial and maritime rivalry with Great Britain. He would keep the peace and he would make sure that France kept the peace.

Bismarck was well aware of the humiliation which France had suffered from the war of 1870–1871 and of her willingness to seize the first favorable opportunity to wage a war of revenge for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and of her own international prestige. He did not fear an attack upon Germany by France single-handed, but he was acutely conscious that if she were to obtain active assistance from any of the other Great Powers a second Franco-German war might result differently from the first. Wherefore, the German Chancellor devoted his major diplomatic efforts to keeping France isolated and deprived of potential allies. And so long as Bismarck remained in office, noteworthy success attended German diplomacy.

In the main, the international situation from 1871 to 1890 was favorable to Germany, and the astute, and not too high-principled, Chancellor took full advantage of it. First of all, he adopted a most conciliatory attitude toward Austria-Hungary. He had purposely been lenient in dictating terms of Germany peace to the Emperor Francis Joseph in 1866; and and now after 1871 the internal exigencies of the Dual Monarchy, and the desire of the Habsburg family to recoup what they had lost in Italy and Germany by pursuing an expansionist policy in the Balkans, led the governing classes of Austria Hungary to seek support of Germany's strong military arm and Bismarck's dexterous diplomatic hand. Then, too, Bismarck could count upon the friendship of the newly formed

¹ See above, pp. 235-230, 245-246.

her seeming ability to dictate a peace settlement giving her a dominant position in the Balkans, provoked the liveliest apprehension in Austria-Hungary as well as in Great Britain, and at the ensuing Congress of Berlin (1878) Bismarck undertook to play the rôle of "honest broker" in apportioning the Turkish spoils.¹ By reducing the Russian share and by handing over Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Dual Monarchy, Bismarck kept the balance of power in the Balkans nicely adjusted between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but thereby while he strengthened the friendship between Germany and Austria-Hungary he aroused the enmity of Russia. The Three Emperors' League was in effect destroyed.

In order to guard Germany against untoward results of Russian ill-feeling, Bismarck in 1879 concluded a defensive alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, in accordance with the terms of which each party bound itself to support the other with all the military forces at its command if either party or both should be attacked by Russia or by another Power backed by Russia.²

Then, in order still further to offset the danger of Russian hostility, Bismarck turned his attention to Italy. Italy, as has been remarked, was already naturally well disposed toward Germany, but Bismarck was unwilling to bind the two Powers by an alliance unless Austria-Hungary were included, and relations between Austria and Italy were strained by the memory of recent wars between them, and also by conflicting ambitions as to Trent and Trieste and the mastery of the Adriatic. Nevertheless, the Italian government felt the weakness of diplomatic isolation; and in 1881 Italians were angered by French occupation of Tunis, the region of ancient Carthage, which they had

Triple begun to think of as the stepping-stone toward a new Alliance of Germany, Austria, Italy, 1882

begun to think of as the stepping-stone toward a new Italian imperialism.³ In the midst of ensuing Franco-Italian recriminations, Italy responded cordially to the overtures of Bismarck, consented to banish anti-Austrian propaganda, and in 1882 signed a treaty of alliance with both Germany and Austria-Hungary. This

¹On the Russo-Turkish War, the Russian peace settlement of San Stefano, and the ensuing Congress of Berlin, see above, pp. 261-260.

² The existence of the alliance was widely advertised at the time, but its terms were not published until x888.

³ See above, p. 549.

treaty provided that if Italy or Germany were attacked by France without provocation these two allies would go to war with France; and that if any one or any two of the three allies were attacked by two or more Great Powers, all should engage in the conflict. The Triple Alliance, first formed in 1882 for five years, was renewed in 1887 with an additional stipulation that neither Austria-Hungary nor Italy should attempt to occupy any territory in the Balkan peninsula without preliminary accord, and that such accord should be based on the principle of reciprocal compensation.1

Serbia and Rumania, disgruntled by the favoritism shown by Russia to Bulgaria in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, simultaneously became satellites of the Triple Alliance, Serbia contracting a secret engagement with Austria-Hungary in 1881, and Rumania in 1883.2 For a generation the Triple Alliance preserved the peace of central and eastern Europe. Bismarck considered it a diplomatic

Serbia and Rumania with Triple Alliance

masterpiece.

In the meantime, danger of open conflict with Russia perceptibly lessened. The assassination of the Tsar Alexander II in 1881 and the accession of the ultra-reactionary Alexander III precluded any immediate understanding between autocratic Russia and democratic France; and the Three Emperors' new Tsar, painfully aware of the isolation to which Bismarckian diplomacy had been condemning Russia, reached the conclusion that he must acquiesce in the Balkan settlement of 1878 and seek a renewal of the previous understanding with Germany and, if necessary, with Austria. Bismarck, of course, deemed the inclusion of Austria necessary; and consequently another Three Emperors' League was negotiated in 1881. By its terms, Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary mutually promised benevolent neutrality in case any of them should be involved in war with a fourth Power. This arrange-

¹ The Triple Alliance was subsequently renewed for continuous periods in 1891, in 1903, and in 1912. Its terms were not fully divulged until the World War.

² The Austro-Serbian treaty of 1881 provided that Serbia should not conclude any political treaty with another Power without previous knowledge and approval of Austria-Hungary, and that each state should preserve friendly neutrality if the other was at war; with minor changes, it remained in force until 1895. Rumania's treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary was endorsed by Germany and lasted, at least on paper, until 1916.

ment, entered into for a period of three years, was renewed in 1884 for another three-year period.

The new Three Emperors' League was temporarily reassuring to both Russia and Germany, but it was not a very substantial structure. It was weakened from the outset by secret assurance which Bismarck felt obliged to give to Austria that the Austro-German alliance of 1879 should have priority over the understanding of 1881 with Russia and be binding in case of difficulties with the latter. It was also weakened by the policy of tariff protectionism which Germany pursued in the 1880's and which, being directed in large part against the importation of Russian grain, roused the ire of influential classes in Russia. Most seriously, the League was weakened by continuing friction between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. This became acute in 1885, when Austria intervened in a war between Serbia and Bulgaria. A crisis lasted throughout the following year, and in 1887 Russia refused to renew the Three Emperors' League.

Bismarck's failure to keep Russia yoked with Austria-Hungary occurred at the very time when the agitation of General Boulanger was gathering headway in France for a war of revenge against

Germany.3 The German Chancellor, greatly alarmed, Russotook extraordinary steps to meet the situation. While German Reinsurrenewing and strengthening the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy, he made a secret three-year pact, the so-called "Reinsurance Treaty," with Treaty, 1887-1890 Russia, pledging Germany's diplomatic support of Russian pre-dominance in Bulgaria and even of Russian occupation of Constantinople, and obtaining in return a pledge of Russia's benevolent neutrality in case of a French attack upon Germany. At the same time (1887), in order to deter Russia from becoming too aggressive in the Balkans, as well as to hold France in check, he secretly encouraged a special agreement among Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Italy for the preservation of the status quo in the Mediterranean and the Near East. In 1889 he sought to bring Great Britain into direct alliance with Germany. In this he was unsuccessful, for, while the British government of the day was by no means anti-German, it was unwilling to commit Great Britain to definite participation in a Franco-German

¹ On the German tariff, see above, p. 600.

⁸ See above, pp. 556-557.

² See above, pp. 670, 681.

conflict. Then in 1890, with the forced retirement of Bismarck from office, the Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia was allowed to lapse.

The lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 was a symptom, rather than a cause, of a change which was coming about in international alignments. Previously, Bismarck had been able, by Triple Alliance and Three Emperors' League, to keep France isolated and Russia in check; and with the breakdown of the League in 1887, he had anxiously hoped to preserve the same general situation by means of the separate Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. In fact, however, the growing differences between Russia and Germany (to say nothing of those between Russia and Austria) militated against the vigor and endurance of the Reinsurance Treaty. The treaty had not stopped Russia from building strategic military railways toward the German frontier or Germany from heightening her tariff walls against Russian grain; and Bismarck himself had dealt a blow at financial cooperation between the two countries by discouraging German loans to Russia. There was no such popular backing for a Russo-German alliance as for the Austro-German alliance. By 1800 the major political parties in the German Reichstag were outspokenly anti-Russian, and most German statesmen other than Bismarck were opposed to the continuance of solemn commitments to Russia which might operate against Austrian interests and endanger the Austrian alliance and which, at the same time, might embroil Germany in quarrels between Russia and Great Britain.

The Russian government would doubtless have consented in 1800 to a temporary renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty, but it would have done so without enthusiasm. It was being pressed by the "Slavophiles" of the time "to purge holy Russia of Teutonic influence," and it was unable to obtain necessary loans from Germany for Russia's industrial development—for the building of railways, the erection of factories, the opening of mines, the stabilization of currency. But what the Berlin bourse withheld, the Paris money market supplied; and by 1800 Russia was already financially dependent upon France. In the circumstances, Russia was being naturally drawn to France, and financial need (and also anti-Teutonic Slavophile sentiment) was

¹ On Bismarck's retirement from the Chancellorship, see above, pp. 611-612.

On Russian Slavophilism, see above, pp. 253-254, 643-644.

gradually overcoming the Tsar's antipathy to the democratic politics of France, while on the other hand the prospect of escape from the international isolation in which France had been since the time of Napoleon III overcame the scruples of French republican politicians about Russian autocracy.

Hence, little by little, following the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia, Russia and France drifted into an alliance. An informal diplomatic entente was inaugurated

in 1801, and an exchange of friendly naval visits fol-Francolowed. By a military convention of 1893 Russia prom-Russian Dual Alliised to employ all her forces against Germany if France ance, 1893 should be attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, and France promised to combat Germany if Russia should be assailed by Germany, or by Austria-Hungary supported by Germany. This military convention was at first limited in duration to that of the Triple Alliance, but the limitation was removed in 1899, and in 1912 the Dual Alliance was farther supplemented by a naval convention. That such a Dual Alliance had come into existence was publicly announced by the French premier in 1895 and confirmed by the Tsar Nicholas II in 1897, but its precise terms were revealed only in 1918 when the tsardom was overthrown and the alliance at an end.

In appearance, at any rate, the previous hegemony of Germany (and isolation of France) was thus offset in the early 1800's by a "balance of power" in Europe between the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, on the one Apparent Balance of side, and the Dual Alliance of Russia and France, on Power the other. In reality, however, the new alignment was not revolutionary; it did not materially change affairs. Both alliances were expressly "defensive"; and though the conclusion of the Dual Alliance gave France a new sense of security and prestige, it actually operated to discourage any French ambition for the early recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. And, for a time, what Germany seemingly lost through the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia was substantially offset by cooperation with Great Britain.

Great Britain, while maintaining a general policy of aloofness from the international politics of the Continent, was more inclined in the 1890's toward the Triple Alliance than toward the Dual Alliance. She had contracted special obligations in 1887

with Austria-Hungary and Italy in the Mediterranean and the Near East; and in 1800, just after the retirement of Bismarck, the way was paved for an Anglo-German entente by friendly negotiations which settled outstanding colonial disputes between the two Powers in Africa and trans-Inclined ferred the North Sea island of Heligoland from Britain to Triple to Germany. In the 1890's, moreover, in a decade of fast developing imperialism, Great Britain's chief competitors were France and Russia. If it was natural for France and Russia to draw together, it seemed quite as natural for Great Britain to gravitate toward Germany. Certainly no rapprochement appeared possible between Britain and France. These Powers were traditional rivals; and the vigorous acquisition of colonies by the Third Republic after 1880 served to accentuate imperialistic rivalry between them and to raise many serious territorial questions in Africa and in Indo-China. As late as 1898 France and Britain were on the verge of war over a dispute as to their respective spheres of influence in the Egyptian Sudan.² Nor did any rapprochement appear possible between Britain and Russia. They had been rivals in the Near East since before the Anglo-Crimean War,3 and their rivalry had latterly been in-Japanese tensified and extended to Persia, Afghanistan, and the Alliance. 1002 Far East. It was against Russian aggressiveness in China that Great Britain concluded in 1902 a defensive alliance

with Japan.4

Yet as the decade of the 1800's advanced, the expected entente between Britain and Germany failed to materialize. Germany, under Hohenlohe and Bülow, made new imperialistic thrusts into China and the Ottoman Empire, which in effect Friction were more anti-British than anti-Russian. Then, in between Germany 1899, when the British undertook the conquest of the and Dutch republics in South Africa,6 the German press Britain was quite sympathetic with the Boers and critical of the British.

^{1 ()}n the Anglo-German convention of 1890, see above, pp. 614-615, 739.

² The so-called "Fashoda Incident." See above, p. 739.

⁸ See above, pp. 106, 264.

The Anglo Japanese alliance of 1902 provided that if either Power should become involved in war with two Powers over China or Korea, the other would give assistance. In 1905 the alliance was renewed for ten years with the additional stipulation that both would light if either should be attacked by a single Power in India as well as in the Far East.

^{*} See above, pp. 615-616, 668.

⁶ See above, pp. 512-513.

And, to cap the climax, Germany began, under enactments of 1898 and 1900, greatly to enlarge her navy. Already, many Britishers were uncomfortably aware that Germany was becoming Britain's most formidable competitor in manufacturing and commerce. It was now apparent to the whole British nation that their customary naval supremacy, and hence their Empire, might soon be threatened by Germany unless they quickened their own naval construction and enormously increased their public expenditure. The relations between Great Britain and Germany were moving, not toward intimate friendship, but toward openly voiced hostility.

In the circumstances, the balance of power between Triple Alliance and Dual Alliance seemed of less moment than a possible coalition of Germany with France and Russia looking toward the

Coöperation of Germany and Dual Alliance against Britain

isolation of Britain. Commercial relations between Germany and Russia were improved in the early 1890's by a reciprocal lowering of tariffs; and soon the two Powers, and France also, were coöperating in the Far East. They jointly compelled Japan to revise her peace settlement with China in 1895, and by concerted action

shortly afterwards they severally acquired territories in China.² During the Boer War there was a good deal of discussion among Continental diplomats and publicists about the need of a "Grand Alliance" of Germany, France, and Russia to give aid to the Boers and set limits to the British Empire. France, secretly consulted by Russia on the subject, declined to commit herself unless Germany should reopen the question of Alsace-Lorraine, which Germany refused to do. But, although no such Grand Alliance was forthcoming, the relations of France and Germany underwent improvement and those of Russia and Germany became really cordial.

Simultaneously, Germany's associates in the Triple Alliance dropped into the background, and the Triple Alliance itself seemed hardly existent. Austria-Hungary, fully occupied with internal nationalist troubles, willingly signed a treaty with Russia for the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans. Italy, weakened by the failure of Crispi's imperialistic enterprises, perceived the desirability of halting her vendetta with France,

¹ See above, pp. 616-617.

² See above, pp. 718, 724.

⁸ See above, pp. 574, 576.

especially since a strongly anti-clerical and therefore sympathetic French government was now in power. So, two secret agreements were concluded by France and Italy. By the first, a convention of 1900, Italy recognized the French protectorate over Tunis and French claims to Morocco, and France accorded Italy a free hand in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. By the second, an engagement of 1902, Italy and France mutually Agreepledged themselves to remain neutral if either should ment, be attacked by a third Power or if either, "as the result of a direct provocation, should find itself obliged, in defence of its honor or security, to take the initiative of a declaration of war." The text of the Franco-Italian arrangement of 1902 remained a secret until 1918; but the visit of President Loubet to King Victor Emmanuel III in 1904 2 announced to the world the termination of the open feud between the Latin sisters. The bonds between members of Triple and Dual Alliances were obviously multiplying.

With peace assured between Russia and Austria in the Balkans, and between France and Italy in the Mediterranean, Germany encouraged Russia to go to war with Japan in 1904 and cordially seconded her efforts. Then, in July 1905, when Russian troops had been decisively defeated in Manchuria, the Projected German Emperor met the Russian Tsar at Bjorkö and Russo-German persuaded him to agree to a Russo-German alliance, Alliance, directed actually (though not expressly) against Great Britain and open to French adherence. France declined to adhere to it, the advisers of the two Emperors deemed it unwise or unnecessary, and it came to nought. It was a kind of anti-climax to a decade of informal cooperation between Triple and Dual Alliances.

Already the British government, faced with increasing hostility of Germany as well as of continuing hostility of France and Russia, was ceasing to glory in Britain's "splendid isolation" and beginning to consider how she might best secure foreign friends. It still seemed as if close cooperation between Britain and Germany was more practicable and Escape desirable than close cooperation between Britain and

Britain's Anxiety to Isolation

the Dual Alliance, and accordingly the British government in 1901 sounded out Germany regarding a special understanding

¹ See above, pp. 563-567.

² See above, p. 565.

between the two countries. Germany insisted, however, that Britain should adhere formally to the Triple Alliance, and the British were unwilling to assume such definite and far-reaching obligations. So the Anglo-German negotiations broke down, and Great Britain looked elsewhere. In 1902 she concluded her alliance with Japan, and presently she turned to France.

The British foreign minister, Lord Lansdowne, proposed to the French ambassador at London a friendly settlement of colo-

nial differences and disputes between the two countries. Anglo-French The proposal was welcomed by the ambassador, and also by the French foreign minister, Théophile Del-Entente. 1004 cassé: and it eventuated, after several months' negotiations, in the conclusion in 1904 of several conventions affecting Franco-British relations in Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland, Siam, Nigeria, and the Pacific Ocean. These conventions not only gave Great Britain free rein in Egypt, and France in Morocco, but marked the end of a long period of intense imperialist rivalry and paved the way for the development between 1904 and 1914 of particularly friendly relations between the peoples and governments of France and Great Britain—the socalled Entente Cordiale.

The Anglo-French agreement of 1904 was not an alliance, any more than the similar Anglo-German agreement of 1890 had been. Now, as then, it was hoped that, by removing sources of friction, the countries concerned would be more friendly and cooperative. The Anglo-German arrangement had not achieved that end. That the Anglo-French arrangement turned out differently is attributable to circumstances of the next few years. The defeat of Russia by Japan made the French especially eager to develop the entente, and the growing naval strength of Germany had a corresponding effect on the British. Besides, as we shall presently explain, an international crisis over Morocco in 1905–1906 served to cement the *Entente Cordiale*.

One embarrassing feature of the Anglo-French Entente was evident during 1904–1905, when Russia, the ally of France, was at war with Japan, the ally of Great Britain. British sentiment was still vehemently anti-Russian, and, as we have seen, the impressionable Russian Tsar was then strongly influenced by the German Emperor. With the defeat of Russia, however, the situation changed radically. Russia reacted sharply against

German influence, which had been predominant during the preceding ten years and which was blamed (rather unjustly) for the ensuing disaster. On the other hand, Great Britain

the ensuing disaster. On the other hand, Great Britain lost her fear of Russia and began to perceive advantages in coming to terms with her. Consequently, in 1907, the British and Russian governments managed

Anglo-Russian Entente, 1907

to arrive at a mutual understanding concerning disputed spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan, and China, and to sign conventions which parallelled the Entente between Great Britain and France with a second Entente between Great Britain and Russia. Japan, also, was brought into harmonious relations with the new Entente, through a Russo-Japanese convention of 1910 and through the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911.

In Germany, meanwhile, many publicists and the government itself were viewing with alarm what was termed a German "hostile encirclement." Italy was suspected, correctly as we now know, of disloyalty to Germany and Austria. Russia had broken with Germany and was again in 1905-1914 full alliance with France. Great Britain was in ententes with France and Russia. Japan was in alliance with Britain. Austria-Hungary, alone of the Great Powers, remained a close friend of Germany.

From 1905 to 1914 German diplomacy sought in divers ways to break up the Ententes, to strengthen Austria and increase her prestige, to win the Ottoman Empire as a friend and ally, and to insist upon Germany's right to participate on the same basis as other Powers in world commerce and foreign investment. The new German effort did not break up the Ententes, but it produced periodic crises in the relations between the Entente Powers (Great Britain, France, and Russia) and the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary)—crises which grew more and more menacing to the preservation of any semblance of a Concert of Europe and more and more symptomatic of an impending war of huge dimensions. These crises had to do alternately with Morocco and with the Near East.

In the case of Morocco, a crisis was precipitated at the end of March 1905. By this time, the French foreign minister, Delcassé, had plans well advanced for the establishment of a French protectorate over the greater part of the country. He had obtained

¹ See above, pp. 662, 732.

the assent of Italy in 1900 and of Great Britain in 1904; and he had just reached an agreement with Spain whereby she Moroccan would obtain a protectorate over the part not appropri-Crisis of 1905-1906 ated by France. To be sure, the independence of Morocco had been affirmed by an international congress at Madrid in 1880. But Morocco was a backward and brigand-ridden country, bordering on the French empire in Africa and on Spanish posts on the Mediterranean; and its fate seemed to Delcassé to be a practical concern of only France and Spain. The German Chancellor, Bülow, thought otherwise, however. He was anxious to assert Germany's interest in Morocco and to utilize the occasion to check Delcassé and weaken the Entente between France and Great Britain. Bülow picked a favorable opportunityexactly three weeks after the decisive defeat of the Russians by the Japanese in the battle of Mukden—when he knew that Russia could give no support to France. On that date he had the Emperor William II disembark at Tangier and declare in a vigorous speech that he came to visit the Sultan of Morocco as an independent sovereign in whose lands all foreign Powers were to hold the same footing and enjoy the same rights.1

There followed a brief moment of awful suspense. Then Delcassé resigned, and his colleagues in the French ministry agreed to submit the whole Moroccan question to an international congress. The Congress, meeting at Algeciras in Algeciras Spain in 1906, did not reveal the cleavage between France and Great Britain which Bülow had hoped for. On the contrary, Britain consistently backed the French position, and so did Italy. The agreement finally reached at Algeciras, while paying lip service to the territorial integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of its Sultan and pledging the "open door" to merchants and investors of all the Powers, authorized France and Spain to instruct and officer a native police force and to oversee the execution of "reforms." To all intents and purposes, it was a French victory.

Civil war in Morocco and outrages against foreigners, especially Frenchmen, afforded the French government an excuse to land marines at Casablanca in 1907. Germany repeatedly

¹ William II had originally been strongly opposed to this German foray into Morocco, but eventually he yielded to Bülow's importunities and played his part to the full.

expostulated against the continued presence of French troops in Morocco; and in 1908 an attempt on the part of the German consul at Casablanca to protect from arrest a number of deserters from the French foreign legion precipitated a second crisis, which was successfully passed in 1909 by reference of the questions at stake to the Hague Tribunal. The simultaneous negotiation of a special Franco-German convention in 1909 seemed to preclude future misunderstandings. Germany put on record that her interests in Morocco were "only economic" and pledged herself, so long as "economic equality" was safeguarded, to recognize the political preponderance of France in the sultanate.

But the Franco-German agreement of 1909 was not observed. The French discriminated against German trade and investment in Morocco, and the Germans protested against the tightening of French political and military control. A new and severe crisis was precipitated in 1911 by the action of France in sending an army to Fez. the Moroccan capital, "to restore order." Germany then despatched a warship to the Crisis of Moroccan port of Agadir, ostensibly to safeguard German mining property, but with a significant hint that the warship would be withdrawn as soon as conditions were sufficiently settled to admit of French withdrawal from Fez. The gravity of the international situation was felt throughout Europe, and military preparations were hurried forward both in Germany and in France. Russia was not yet sufficiently recovered from the Japanese War to be of much assistance to France, but the British proclaimed their full support of France.

The German government did not desire war and after considerable bickering contented itself with concluding a second Franco-German convention whereby Germany promised not to oppose the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco and France agreed to maintain the German Convention of there and to cede two strips of French tion of Equatorial Africa to Germany. Although France was 1912 thus enabled in 1912 to settle the political question of Morocco satisfactorily to herself and to Spain, the Agadir crisis in 1911 served to quicken anti-German sentiment in France, and at the same time to consolidate the friendship between France and Great Britain. On the other hand, Germans felt that their

legitimate interests in Morocco had been prejudiced and their position as a World Power jeopardized by the joint machinations of the French and the British.

Even more disquieting than the Moroccan crises were the crises in the Near East, where Russia and Austria-Hungary, Russia vs.

Austria in But while in the case of Morocco, Russia, on account of her weakened military position, was able to give but little effective support to her French ally, in the case of the Near Eastern crises Germany had economic motives and powerful military means for backing Austria-Hungary.

From the opening of the twentieth century the Austro-Hungarian government favored the political and economic expansion of the Dual Monarchy in a southerly direction through Bosnia and Macedonia to Salonica on the Ægean, and many Growing influential Germans cherished the idea of "Germaniz-Influence of Cening" the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire. So tral Em-Germany and Austria-Hungary, acting in harmony, pires in Near East gradually extended their political and economic influence in southeastern Europe. In 1899 the Emperor William II ostentatiously visited the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and in 1903 a German company obtained a concession for the construction of a railway across Asia Minor, Armenia, and the fertile valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, to Bagdad and the head of the Persian Gulf. Austrian influence was paramount at the Serbian court from the Congress of Berlin (1878) to the assassination of King Alexander in 1903; and Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, a German by birth, was long estranged from Russia and dependent upon Austria-Hungary. The King of Rumania was a kinsman and ally of the German Emperor, and the wife of the future King Constantine of Greece was a sister of William II. In a word. the Teutonic Powers stood in the way of the Russian ambition of ousting the Turks from Europe and ruling at Constantinople; they began to buttress the Turk, to train his army, to exploit his country, and to seek to minimize both Russian and British influence throughout southeastern Europe.

Change in Serbian Policy

In 1903 the Balkan policy of Germany and Austria-Hungary received a cheek. A palace revolution at Belgrade put an end to the rule of the pro-Austrian dynasty in Serbia and brought to the throne a King, Peter I, who

was ardently in sympathy with the nationalist propaganda of the Serbs and openly dependent on Russia.¹

The first serious crisis in the Near Eastern Question affecting the new balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente occurred in 1908, when Austria-Hungary, taking advantage of the internal revolution in the Ottoman Empire, formally annexed the Serb-speaking provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby violating a provision of the treaty of Berlin of 1878, and arousing a storm of Eastern wrath and indignation in Serbia and Montenegro.2 Crisis of Russia immediately took steps to back the Serb states and to resist Austro-Hungarian "aggression," but Germany announced her firm intention of giving full military support to Austria-Hungary. Russia, still not fully recovered from the Japanese War and her own internal revolutionary movement,3 thercupon gave way, and Serbia was compelled to make a solemn promise that in the future she would not abet any anti-Austrian propaganda but would live on "good neighborly terms" with the Dual Monarchy. Pcace was preserved, but Russian and Serb patriots did not forget the humiliation which their respective countries had suffered at Teutonic hands Russia and Serbia drew closer together. The latter became more fiercely nationalist and expansionist. The former became intent upon army reforms and the strengthening of her ties in the Balkans.

A second crisis in the Near East was at least threatened by the war which Italy waged against the Ottoman Empire in 1011-1012.4 Russia was not directly concerned in the struggle, but it was distasteful to Germany as well Italian as to Austria-Hungary, both of which were endeavor-War of ing to bolster up Turkish power, and it was bound sooner or later to produce grave consequences, not only in the Near East but throughout Europe. In the first place it brought Italy's policy in the Near East into conflict with that of Austria-Hungary. Second, the war showed a possible community of world interests between Italy and the Powers of the Triple Entente. Third, and most significant, it opened the way to the Balkan Wars of 1012-1013, out of which emerged the gravest international crises.

¹ See above, p. 680.

² See above, pp. 634-635.

^{*} See above, pp. 655-658.

⁴ See above, pp. 673, 683-684.

In the course of the Balkan Wars, Austria-Hungary adopted a most unyielding attitude toward Serb ambitions. I On threat of war, in which she was backed by Germany, she deprived Montenegro of the important town of Scutari and compelled Serbia to evacuate various Adriatic towns which her armies Austria's had conquered from the Turks. Also, by securing the Antisanction of the Great Powers for the erection of an Serbian Policy autonomous Albania, she effectually prevented Serbia from obtaining an outlet to the sea. Then, when Serbia obtained some compensation by warring on Bulgaria, the government and general staff of Austria-Hungary reached the decision that their southern neighbor must be attacked and despoiled. The decision was not immediately acted upon only because Italy and Germany interposed objections.

In 1913 the international situation was extraordinarily perilous. Recurrent crises in Morocco and in the Near East had cost every Great Power some measure of prestige. Germany had been outplayed in the Moroccan crises by France and Great Ques-Britain. Yet France had been forced to cede African tions of Prestige territory to Germany, and Great Britain to yield predominance in the Ottoman Empire. Russia had been outplayed in the successive Near Eastern crises by Austria-Hungary and Germany. Yet Austria-Hungary had been flouted by Scrbia and held in leash by Italy, and Germany had to face the fact that instead of exercising an hegemony in Europe, as she had done in the days of Bismarck, she was now "encircled" by a ring of potentially hostile Powers.

But the more a Great Power was threatened with the loss of prestige, the less yielding and conciliatory it was likely to be. By the end of 1913 Austria-Hungary was determined not to submit to any further diplomatic rebuffs or military threats, and so was Russia. And so, too, in only lesser degree, were Germany and France.

In an atmosphere less conciliatory, the current winds were more gale-like than ever. Naval rivalry was in full swing between Great Britain and Germany, and attempts to halt it by mutual agreement had been unsuccessful ² and had now ceased altogether.

¹ See above, p. 685.

²Lord Haldane (see above, p. 478 note), on behalf of the British government, had made such an attempt through direct negotiations at Berlin early in 1912. The German government insisted that Britain should pledge neutrality in the case of war, a pledge which the British government would not give.

Imperialistic rivalry, if assuaged as between Great Britain and France and Russia, was intensified for all these Powers by recent achievements of Italy and new thrusts of Germany in the Near East. Nationalism, in an aggravated form, was everywhere rampant: it was dic-

Intensifying Inter-national Rivalry

tating to governments an emotional, rather than a reasoned, behavior; and, quite triumphant now in the Balkans, it threatened speedily to become so throughout east-central Europe.

In Serbia, the King and his prime minister, Pašič, were determined that the war which they had directed against the Ottoman Empire in 1912-1913 should lead to a political unification of all the Yugoslavs. "The first round is won," remarked Pašič; "now we must prepare for the second, against Aus-Serbia tria." No wonder that Austria-Hungary tried to against weaken Serbia and to deprive her of some of the fruits of her victory over the Turks. No wonder, too, that nationalistic Serbs redoubled their subversive propaganda, by means of secret societies and clandestine publications (and with the connivance of government officials), among kindred Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes within the Habsburg Empire-in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and Carniola. Yugoslav nationalism, like Italian or German nationalism of an earlier period, came squarely into collision with Austro-Hungarian imperialism. Would Serbia be the Piedmont or Prussia of a unified Yugoslavia? If so, final disruption awaited the Empire of the Habsburgs.

Disruption of Austria-Hungary had no terror for Russia, and Russia sympathized with Serbian ambitions. It did have a terror, however, for Germany; Austria-Hungary was Germany's one dependable ally. France had no immedi- of Great . ate stakes either in nationalist Serbia or in imperialist Austria-Hungary, but she was the ally of Russia and a Russian Balkan quarrel might embroil her in war. Great Britain's position was less certain, and so likewise was Italy's. Great Britain was in an entente with France and Russia, and was concerting military and naval plans with them, but she was not bound by a formal alliance and she was notoriously prone to "consult her own interests." Italy was in formal alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary but she simultaneously had a foot in the rival camp and what one of her leading statesmen described as a "sacred egotism." In the very uncertainty as to what Italy and Great Britain might do in a conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary over Yugoslav nationalism, there was special peril. There was a temptation to gamble.

Meanwhile, during the year 1913, the Powers vied with one another in making preparations against possible attack. Germany increased her standing army from 656,000 men to 870,000 and appropriated almost a billion marks for "extraordinary" military purposes. France lengthened the term of compulsory service from two years to three. Russia adopted a new program of army expansion. Great Britain added considerably to her already huge naval expenditure. Belgium adopted the principle of compulsory military service. And corresponding measures of military preparedness were taken in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, in all the Balkan states, and in far-away Australia and New Zealand.

No responsible statesman really desired war, and "enlight-ened" and "progressive" people still assumed that a general European war would not and could not occur. In the spring of Lull 1914 the German Emperor William II and the Russian before Tsar Nicholas II were still exchanging letters couched in the most endearing terms, and Germany and Great Britain were newly arranging with each other, secretly but quite amicably, for joint coöperation in the immediate financing and exploiting of the Bagdad railway and in any future partition of the Portuguese colonies.

Nevertheless, despite all appearances and optimistic longings to the contrary, international competition and rivalry had now reached a stage in which world peace was at the mercy of an accident. Indeed, the powder magazines throughout Europe were so well stocked, and nationalist feeling so strong and the pursuit of prestige so eager, that any untoward event was likely to produce a world-rocking explosion.

5. TOWARD WORLD WAR

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor-King Francis Joseph and heir to the Habsburg Empire, was assassinated, together with his wife, at Sarajevo, the chief town of Bosnia, by a band of fanatically nationalist Serbs. The assassination sent a thrill of horror all over Europe

and evoked a storm of indignation in Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Here was a peculiarly favorable opportunity as well as a perfectly obvious obligation, reasoned the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Leopold Berchtold, to have a final reckoning between imperial Austria and that centre of subversive Yugoslav nationalism, the independent state of Opportunity Serbia. Berchtold had harried and repeatedly thwarted Serbia during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, but he had been restrained by Germany and Italy from attacking Serbia. Now he would be restrained no longer. He would chastise Serbia so severely that she would be unable to inspire propaganda and outrages against the integrity of the Habsburg Empire.

We now know that the assassins of the Archduke, though natives of Bosnia and subjects therefore of the Habsburg Empire, were members of the Serbian secret society of the "Black Hand," that they had obtained their weapons and training Serbian in Serbia, and that they had planned and executed Comtheir crime with the active assistance of several high plicity officers in the Serbian army. Also, we now have grounds for believing that Nicholas Pašič, the prime minister of Serbia, had foreknowledge of the conspiracy and yet gave the Austrian government no adequate warning. In other words, the Serbian government had a real share of responsibility for the assassination at Sarajevo.

At the time, however, Count Berchtold lacked proof of Serbia's complicity. Indeed, his own official investigator confidentially reported to him that there was "nothing to prove or even to cause suspicion of the Serbian government's cognizance of the steps leading to the crime." Nevertheless, Berchtold was resolved to act, and he accordingly pretended to have evidence against Serbia which actually he did not possess.

Before venturing to take drastic action, Berchtold knew that he must obtain the consent of his own government and the sanction of Austria's ally, Germany. The Hungarian premier, Count Stephen Tisza, had qualms, however; he thought the policy too adventurous and besought the Emperor Francis Joseph not to assent to an armed attack upon Serbia. The aged

¹ Sec above, p. 680.

² See above, pp. 680, 683.

Emperor hesitated, and it required all of Berchtold's powers of persuasion to get him to sign the communication which the
Foreign Minister had prepared for secret despatch Austrian to the German Emperor William II. "The crime Appeal to Geragainst my nephew," the communication read, "is the direct consequence of the agitation carried on by many Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists, whose sole aim is to weaken the Triple Alliance and shatter my Empire. . . . Though it may be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian government, there can be no doubt that its policy of uniting all Yugoslavs under the Serbian flag promotes such crimes, and that a continuation of this situation endangers my dynasty and my territories. The aim of my government must henceforth be to isolate and diminish Serbia. . . . After the recent frightful event, you also will be convinced that agreement between Serbia and us is out of the question, and that the peace policy of all European monarchs is threatened so long as this centre of criminal agitation at Belgrade remains unpunished."

On July 5-6 the Austrian ambassador to Germany and a special emissary of Count Berchtold bearing the communication from the Emperor Francis Joseph conferred secretly with the Emperor William II at Potsdam. How fully the Austrians re-

German Assurances to Austria vealed Berchtold's plan we do not know. We do know that William II definitely pledged Germany's unqualified support of Austria in any action she might take against Serbia, even if such action involved war with

Russia. He was doubtless influenced by the emotion he felt over the murder of his friend, the Austrian Archduke, and he must have been impressed by the urgency of the situation and by the fear that unless Germany decisively backed Austria she would lose her one dependable ally. William II neither wished nor expected to precipitate a world war. He imagined that Austria could make quick work of Serbia and that German threats would suffice in 1914, as they had sufficed in 1909, to deter Russia from intervening. He considered, of course, the possibility of Russia's not being deterred this time, but William II was quite willing to gamble, and his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, an honest but weak man, was meekly acquiescent. So Germany presented a "blank cheque" to Austria-Hungary and underwrote Berchtold's venture.

¹ See above, p. 769.

Thus fortified, Count Berchtold had no serious difficulty in persuading all the members of the Austro-Hungarian government that drastic action should be taken forthwith against Serbia. Even the scruples of Count Tisza were overcome when he learned of Germany's promised support and was assured by Berchtold (quite hypocritically) that Austria-Hungary, in punishing Serbia, would appropriate none of her territory. Then, while the Austrian Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, was planning the military campaign against Serbia, Berchtold drafted an ultimatum which Serbia would be almost certain to reject.

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was presented to Serbia on July 23. It declared that Serbia, by failing to suppress anti-Austrian conspiracies, had violated her solemn promise of 1909 to "live on good neighborly terms" with Ultima-Austria-Hungary 1 and had therefore compelled the Serbia government of the Dual Monarchy to abandon its attitude of "benevolent and patient forbearance" and to insist on effective guaranties of good behavior by the Serbian government. Specifically, Serbia was called upon to ban anti-Austrian publications and societies, to oust any official whom the Austrian government should accuse of subversive propaganda, to discard anti-Austrian textbooks from the Serbian schools, "to accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian government for the suppression of the revolutionary movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy," and to signify unconditional acceptance of the whole ultimatum within forty-eight hours.

On July 25 the Serbian government replied to the Austrian ultimatum, promising compliance with such demands as "would not impair the country's independence and sov-Serbian ereignty" and offering to refer all disputed points to Reply to the international tribunal at The Hague or to a conference of the Great Powers. Simultaneously Serbia ordered the mobilization of her army. Whereupon the Austro-Hungarian government pronounced the reply evasive and unsatisfactory, broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia, and likewise ordered mobilization. War was clearly impending between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

But a much vaster and more terrible war was also impending.

¹ See above, p. 769.

The Russian government felt that if it stood aside from what promised to be a supreme test between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, Russian prestige would suffer irreparable harm. It had suffered enough through Russia's standing aside in Russian 1909; it must now be maintained at any cost. In the Concern present emergency, moreover, national sentiment among the Russian people, and among other Slavic peoples also, could be counted upon to back energetic action by the Russian government—and by the Russian army if necessary. Consequently, on July 18—five days before the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia—the Russian foreign minister. Serge Sazonov, had clearly warned the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg that "Russia would not be indifferent to any attempt to humiliate Serbia; Russia could not permit Austria to use menacing language or military measures against Serbia."

Besides, Russia soon received assurances of French support, for Raymond Poincaré, the President of the French Republic, paying a state visit to St. Petersburg on July 20–23 in company with

Viviani, the French premier and foreign minister, re-French marked to the Austrian ambassador there that "Serbia ances to has very warm friends in the Russian people, and Russia Russia has an ally, France," and had then instructed the French ambassador that "Sazonov must be firm, and we will support him." Neither Sazonov nor his sovereign, the Tsar Nicholas II, wished war-any more than did the German Emperor and his Chancellor. But the Russian Foreign Minister was confident that Austria-Hungary could be checked by a firm stand just as Russia had been checked in 1908-1909, and the Tsar, in an exalted mystical mood, hoped for the best. 1 As for the French government, it too had no eagerness for war, though it did have a morbid fear lest France should lose her ally and the alliance should lose its prestige; and if, peradventure, general war should come, it might have the advantage of enabling France to undo the defeat of 1870.

On July 26, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister urged that a conference of diplomatic representatives of Italy, France, Germany, and Great Britain "meet in confidence immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would

¹ On the internal situation in Russia at this time, see above, pp. 661-662, and on that in France, see above, pp. 570-571.

prevent complications" and that "all active military operations be suspended pending results of conference." The Italian and French governments responded favorably, but the German government, fearful lest such a conference, Efforts at Mediation like the one at Algeciras in 1906, would put Germany in a minority and lower the prestige of the Central Empires, replied that the basic dispute concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia alone and that the efforts of other Powers should be concentrated on "localizing" the dispute. With this evidence of Germany's firm stand, Austria-Hungary on July 28 formally declared war on Serbia, in order, as Berchtold in-Austria at formed the German ambassador at Vienna, "to cut the ground from any attempt at intervention."

Thenceforth events marched fast. Amidst frantic endeavors of diplomats to discover some means of preserving peace without losing prestige, military preparations went feverishly forward. Already, on July 26, Winston Churchill, First Lord of Develthe Admiralty in the British cabinet, had given orders opment on his own responsibility that the British fleet, then mobilized for annual manœuvres, should not disperse but should hold itself in readiness for war. Now, on July 29, when news of the Austrian declaration of war reached St. Petersburg, the Tsar was prevailed upon to sanction a general mobilization of the armed forces of Russia. That evening, at a council at Potsdam, General von Moltke,² the German Chief of Staff, argued that war was inevitable and that German mobilization should immediately be ordered.

For a few hours that same night and the next morning the prospect of a peaceful outcome seemed to brighten. William II and Bethmann-Hollweg, who had rashly given a "blank cheque" to Berchtold and blindly allowed him to use it as he would, were suddenly shocked by the realization of the enormous payment in money and men which Germany was almost certain to be called upon to make in honoring the "cheque." They had imagined that they could "localize" the Austro-Serbian conflict: the determined attitude

¹ See above, p. 766.

² Helmuth Ludwig von Moltke (1848-1916), nephew of the Marshal Helmuth Bernhard von Moltke who had commanded the Prussian armies in the wars of 1866 and 1870-1871. See above, pp. 212-213, 228, 235-236, 243-244.

of Russia now filled them with consternation. So, somewhat tardily, Bethmann-Hollweg pressed Austria to negotiate directly with Russia; and when he got no immediate response, he testily wired the German ambassador at Vienna: "As an ally we must refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration because Austria does not respect our advice. Tell Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness." And just as the Tsar was ordering Russian mobilization William II frantically wired him imploring him to avoid military measures which "would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid."

The change of front at Berlin had little effect on Count Berchtold, who refused to believe that Germany would really go back on the original promise she had made to Austria-Hungary. It did have some effect, however, on the impressionable Tsar Nicholas II, who, on receipt of the telegram from William II, promptly countermanded the order for general mobilization of the Russian army (which had not yet been published) and decreed instead a partial mobilization, "as a precautionary measure," along the Austrian (but not the German) frontier.

What thus began auspiciously, though tardily, ended speedily and direfully. The Tsar's shift of orders threw the Russian Chief of Staff and the Russian War Minister into a panic. They had a detailed plan for general mobilization but not for such a partial mobilization as the Tsar now contemplated, and they begged the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, unless he would disorganize the Russian army and do without it in his negotiations, to bring about another shift in the Tsar's mind. Sazonov saw the point and on July 30 entreated Nicholas II to renew the order for general mobilization. Nicholas hesitated: "Think of the responsibility you are advising me to take! Think of the thousands and thousands of men who will be sent to their death!" Sazonov persisted, and presently the Tsar yielded. Sazonov rushed to the telephone and informed the Chief of Staff that he was authorized to proceed with general mobilization. "Now you can smash the telephone," Sazonov added; "give your orders, General, and then disappear for the rest of the day."

Russian mobilization resulted in transforming the Austro-Serbian war into a Russo-German war. For the German Chief

of Staff now had no difficulty in convincing William II and Bethmann-Hollweg that the Russians meant business and that any delay in counter-mobilization would spell disaster for Germany. On July 31 Germany presented a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia, demanding immediate demobilization. Russia did not comply. Germany declared war.

Germany knew that war with Russia was practically certain to involve France. Accordingly, on the very day of delivering the ultimatum to Russia, Germany presented an ultimatum to France, demanding that she declare her neutrality within eighteen hours. If perchance such a declaration should be forthcoming, Germany was prepared to make the further demand that France permit German troops to occupy the fortresses of Toul and Verdun until general peace should be restored. In fact, the declaration was not made. France merely stated, on August 1, that she "would consult her interests," and at once began mobilization. On August 3, 1914, Germany declared war on France.

Thus, within a week of the declaration of hostilities by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, four Great Powers were in a state of war Germany and Austria-Hungary opposed to Russia and France. Italy and Rumania, nominal allies of the Central Powers, promptly proclaimed their neutrality, on the ground that the war was not defensive on the part of Austria-Hungary and Germany, but offensive, and that therefore they were not bound to give assistance to their allies. Thereby Italy kept her secret agreement of 1902 with France; and it was not long before Italy, and Rumania likewise, was pressing Austria-Hungary for "compensations" in accordance with provisions of the Triple Alliance.

Great Britain, on the other hand, almost immediately entered the war. The British people, on the whole, had by this time greater sympathy for France than for Germany, and Sir Edward Grey had already informed Germany that he could not bind Great Britain to observe neutrality. On August 2 he went farther and announced that Great Britain would anot tolerate German naval attacks on French coasts or shipping. There was still considerable pacifist sentiment in the British cabinet, and a minority in it were quite

critical of the Foreign Minister's manifest partiality for France. On August 4 occurred an event, however, which enabled Sir Edward Grey and the other pro-war members of the cabinet to force out the pacifists and to unite the overwhelming majority of the British parliament and British nation in enthusiastic support of Great Britain's entrance into the war on the side of her fellow members of the Entente—France and Russia.¹

German troops had been set in motion toward the French frontier, not only against the French border fortresses of Verdun, Toul, and Belfort, but toward the neutral countries of Luxemburg and Belgium, which lay between Germany and less well-defended districts of northern France. Both Germany and France had signed treaties to respect the neutrality of these "buffer states," and France had already announced her intention of adhering to her treaty engagements. But on August 2 German troops occupied Luxemburg, despite protests from the Grand-Duchess; and on the same day the German government presented a twelvehour ultimatum to Belgium demanding that German German troops be permitted to cross into France, promising, Violation of Belgian if permission were granted, that Belgium would be indemnified, and threatening, if resistance was encountered, that "the decision of arms" would determine the future relations of Belgium to Germany. The Belgian government characterized the ultimatum as a gross violation of international law, refused to grant the German request, and appealed for British help in upholding the neutrality of Belgium.

The neutrality of Belgium had always been an important point in the foreign policy of Great Britain. The British had fought against Napoleon I in part because of the annexation of Belgium by France, and they had been hostile to the ambition of Napoleon III in respect of Belgium.² They were not likely to view with pleasure Belgium's incorporation with the German Empire. On August 4, therefore, when news was received in London that German troops had actually crossed Britain at the border into Belgium, Sir Edward Grey despatched an ultimatum to Germany, requiring assurances by midnight that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality. Germany refused, on the ground of military neces-

¹ On the internal situation in Great Britain at this time, see above, pp. 485-488.
² See above, p. 207.

sity, and Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, terribly tired and disappointed, berated the British ambassador: "Just for a word 'neutrality,' a word which in war time has so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper—Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her." At midnight Great Britain declared war on Germany.

On August 7, Montenegro joined her fellow Yugoslav state of Serbia against Austria-Hungary. Then Japan became a party to the war, partially to fulfill her treaty obligations to Great Britain and partially to avenge herself on Germany, for the Japanese had not forgotten the German Emperor's slighting references to them in the past, nor the part Germany had played in preventing Japan from retaining Port Arthur in 1895 after the Chino-Japanese War. Accordingly, on August 17 Japan presented an ultimatum to Germany, demanding that she immediately withdraw all her warships from Chinese and Japanese Tapan at waters and deliver up the leased territory of Kiaochow Wàr with Germany before September 15, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." Upon the refusal of the German government to comply with the ultimatum, Japan

declared war (August 23, 1914).

Against the combination of so many foes, Germany and Austria-Hungary obtained support from the Ottoman Empire.

Many patriotic Turks had come to believe that the integrity of their empire was menaced far more by the Entente Powers than by Germany and Austria-Hungary. Against Russia they were particularly

Turkish Alliance with Germany

bitter; and on August r, the very day that Germany declared war against Russia, the Ottoman government, dominated by the zealously nationalist Enver Pasha, signed a secret treaty with

Germany, promising to aid her against Russia. For a time the Ottoman Empire pretended to be neutral, but at length on October 29, 1914, when military preparations seemed sufficiently advanced, Turkish warships bombarded Russian ports on the Black Sea.

Ottoman Empire at War with Triple Entente

Russia responded with a declaration of war, and on November 5, France and Great Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

¹ See above, p. 718.


² See above, pp. 671-673.

Thus, in the three months from July 28 to October 29, 1914, a conflict between nationalist Serbia and imperial Austria broadened into a world war in which Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire were arrayed against Russia, France, Great Britain (with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa), Japan, Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro. Six of the eight Great Powers were immediately involved, and five of the six continents.

No nation willed the war, and statesmen blundered into it rather than sought it. Nor is there any scientific way of apportioning blame for it among the various sovereigns and diplomats and chiefs of staff whom we have mentioned in the preceding pages. Some of them were cunning, some were cowardly, and some of them were merely the World some were cowardry, and some of them were interest stupid. They would have been quite unable to precipitate a world war, had they not been, equally with millions of common people, the more or less willing agents of immense forces which for a generation had been predisposing the civilized world to mortal combat. The world was parcelled out among states whose mutual combat. The world was parcelled out among states whose mutual distrusts and jealousies were quickened by rival nationalisms and rival imperialisms; and the existence among these states of a group of Great Powers, divided in the twentieth century into two huge armed camps, provided a special impetus to rival militarisms. The rapid rise of nationalism in the Balkans gave a most disquieting aspect to Austro-Russian imperial rivalry. The stimulation of national consciousness among the subject peoples of the Austrian Empire indirectly imperilled all nonnational states and directly embittered the relations between Germany and Russia. The attempts of Germany to obtain a prominent position in world trade and overseas dominion and naval power excited not only German nationalism, but the naval power excited not only German nationalism, but the nationalism of France and of Britain too, and incidentally brought into lurid light the future fate of the rich and populous basin of the historic river Rhine.

The coming of the World War took most governments and certainly the masses of mankind by surprise. The preceding age had been so "enlightened." The first decade of the twentieth century had pointed so unmistakably toward material progress, toward a world of European civilization, toward peaceful development and coöperation.

Suddenly, as in the twinkling of an eye, the "promise of the twentieth century" assumed a different significance. There might still be material progress and Europeanization of the world, but what loomed foremost now was a bigger and more destructive war than the world had ever known. The World War, as the event proved, really closed an era of "enlightenment" and inaugurated an era of "disillusionment."



CHAPTER XXIV

THE WORLD WAR

I. FROM MOBILIZATION TO TRENCH WARFARE, 1914



EARS of World War were introduced with astounding suddenness. For an instant, the popular reaction to it was one of shock, but this soon gave place to a strange sense of resignation. The masses, no more than the governments, had wished war, and yet war was now a grim reality. Apparently it had

to be, and probably it would blow away the black clouds which had recently been gathering over Europe.

At the outset, few persons could judge of the "right" or "wrong" of the war. Events had occurred with almost lightning speed in those few summer days from July 23, when Serbia was presented with an ultimatum, to early August, when Germany and Austria-Hungary were in a declared state of war with Russia, France, and Great Britain. There was no time then for governments to explain matters to the public, or for the masses to debate the question of war or peace. The die was cast before any public opinion had crystallized.

And once the die was cast, there was little opportunity or inclination to "reason why." For from declaration of war to mobilization of troops the passage in every belligerent country was immediate and inexorable. By the system of conscription and mobilization which Prussia had developed by 1866 and which other Continental nations had adopted during the generation following 1870, the strength of the peace-time army was doubled or trebled by calling back to the colors reservists who had already received military training; and the regiments thus raised to war footing were entrained for the frontier according to plans carefully worked out in advance. Within a fortnight from the ordering of mobilization, therefore, five million men or more throughout Europe were suddenly

drawn from their ordinary occupations, clothed and equipped for war, gathered into military units, transported to the frontiers, and set down in concentration areas already designated and prepared for the purpose. Mobilization with such speed and on such a scale involved a quasi-paralysis of the economic life of Europe, an upsetting of the normal affairs of practically every family in Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and France. It meant also that practically everyone in these countries was quickly and fully absorbed in the automatic operation of the mobilization machinery and thereby deprived of any chance or will to voice dissent.

Indeed, mobilization was attended in every country by an almost instantaneous merging of partisan differences in national solidarity. Opposition parties lined up behind the National several governments. All elements and all strata of society reacted similarly. The specifically "disaffected" and Collapse of groups—revolutionary or anti-militarist—behaved like the rest. In the supreme crisis, pacifism collapsed. Confronted with declarations of war and actual mobilization, almost everybody thought in national rather than in international terms. No effective resistance was forthcoming from any international society or movement—from the Christian churches, from Marxian Socialism, from scholars, business men, or financiers.

Pope Pius X, it is true, had nothing but horror for the situation, and the shock of the World War hastened his death, at Rome, in August 1914. One of his last acts was a refusal to bless Austrian arms, "I do not bless war: I bless peace." His successor, Benedict XV, persevered in maintaining a neutral position and counselling peace, but the multitude of Catholics, and of Protestants and Orthodox also---and likewise of Christians Jews and agnostics---rallied to their fellow countrymen in the passion of national solidarity. The Moslem caliph at Constantinople preached a "holy war" against the "infidel" Russians, Britishers, and Frenchmen. And many Christian priests and pastors gained temporary popularity and lasting notoriety by the vehemence with which they claimed that God was on the side of their country's army and Satan on the other side.

The Marxian Socialists were equally unable or unwilling to resist the war fever. On the eve of hostilities, Jaurès, the leading

French Socialist, was assassinated by a fanatical nationalist obsessed with fear of French disunity through Jaurès's "disloyalty." The assassin was quite mistaken. Jaurès was a French 2. Among patriot as well as a Marxian Socialist, and so were Marxian most of the other French Socialists. Jules Guesde, the Socialists veteran Socialist and a more straight-laced Marxian than Jaurès, actually joined the coalition war ministry which was formed in France in August 1014. It was similar with the large body of German Socialists. They attended peace meetings and shouted "Down with War" before war was declared. As soon as it was declared, they loyally joined their regiments, while their elected representatives in the Reichstag united almost to a man with Conservatives in voting without demur the war measures which Bethmann-Hollweg requested. Austrian Socialists aligned themselves likewise with their government, British Laborites with theirs, and the majority of Russian Socialists with theirs. In Italy, an outstanding exponent of left-wing Socialism—Benito Mussolini—joined the nationalistic Gabriele D'Annunzio 1 in urging that the country abandon its neutrality and make war on Austria-Hungary. In France the most inveterate of antimilitarist "radical" agitators, Gustave Hervé, vied with the ultra-patriotic and "reactionary" Maurice Barrès 2 in extolling French arms and damning the Germans. The "Second International," the confederation which the several national parties of Marxian Socialists had created in 1889,3 broke down utterly in 1014. Some Socialists explained their acquiescence in the war on the ground that it was an inevitable result of capitalism and a necessary preparation for world revolution and the triumph of Marxian principles. Others-probably the great majoritysimply shared the popular faith in the righteousness of their country's cause. The only Socialist group of any significance which consistently denounced the war from the beginning was the faction of the Social Democratic party of Russia headed by Lenin,4 and Lenin and his chief lieutenants were residing in Switzerland!

Nor did big business and high finance prevent or impede the war. Most industrialists and bankers, like most workingmen, were attached to a particular country, and their international

¹ See above, p. 398.

³ See above, p. 379.

^{*} See above, pp. 397-398.

⁴ See above, pp. 381-654, and below, pp. 906-907.

affiliations were of secondary significance. With the exception of munitions-makers, they stood to lose, rather than gain, by the war; and as a class they shared the popular horror of war—at least in the abstract. Yet they too were engulfed by the crisis and they accepted it like everyone else. And so did all manner of intellectuals—professors, scientists, artists, journalists.

Once caught up in the reality of war—enrolled in armies, with lives and occupations upset, with every family suffering or fearing casualties day by day—all the belligerent peoples grappled with the war as a fact of life, not as an issue or a cause. With the war on top of them, no belligerent people (except possibly in England) gave much sustained thought to origins or causes, or rights or wrongs, or even aims.

As time went on, of course, each warring government published its own account of the diplomatic negotiations National preceding the war, suppressing whatever appeared Solidarity and War unfavorable to its own cause, exaggerating whatever Propaseemed unfavorable to the cause of enemy countries. ganda and on occasion deliberately falsifying the account. Presently, too, the official apologies of the several governments were "interpreted" and supplemented by patriotic propaganda of intellectuals, journalists, and publicists; and the pious mythologies, thus built up, and protected by military censorship, became veritable creeds for entire nations, promoting and sustaining the collective morale of each. Everybody was expected to think and say the best of one's own country and its allies, and the worst of the enemy combination, and the vast majority of the warring populations did what was expected of them.

As eventually evolved, there was one "creed" for the Central Powers, and a very different one for the Entente Powers. On the one hand, the Germans were fighting a strictly decase for fensive war against "barbarous" Russia, "decadent" Central France, and "jealous" and "perfidious" Britain.

They were fighting for their existence as a nation and in behalf of the Kullur and efficiency and straightforward honesty with which they had endowed modern civilization. In Austria-Hungary, there was dissent on the part of rabidly nationalist leaders of some of the subject peoples (especially the Czechs), but the dominant Germans and Magyars and most of the

masses were stirred by loyalty to the venerable Francis Joseph and by sympathy for him, and perceived in the war a life-and-death struggle between the "Western" civilizing mission of the Habsburg Empire and the destructive barbarism of Balkan and "oriental" Slavs. The Young Turks, forward-looking and vigorous, were convinced that the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire depended upon the defeat of Russia and her allies.

On the other hand, the populations of the Entente Powers—France, Britain, and Russia—were sure that they were crusaders for world freedom and world peace against the German ambition for world dominion and against a peculiarly swashbuckling militarism. They were fighting for the right of national self-determination, and in behalf of small and weak nations—Russia for Serbia, Britain and France for Belgium. They were fighting, moreover, in defense of international law; they would make this war which had been forced upon them "a war to end war." And at least the French and British, if not the Russians, made much of the contention that they were standard-bearers of enlightened democracy against dark forces of "autocracy" represented by the Central Powers.

To the winning of the war was directed all this nationalist propaganda. To the same end was directed a radical reorganiUnity of zation of economic life within each belligerent nation.

Effort and Purpose in Each Industry, transportation, agriculture, commerce, and finance were progressively subjected to drastic regulation and control by the several governments, to such a degree as eventually to introduce de facto a war-time "state socialism" and to engage all the economic resources as well as the whole man-power of a nation in support of the war.

Thus the economic as well as strictly military effort of the warring governments fused all elements of each nation into an unprecedented unity of purpose—the limited purpose of seeing the war through. Party alignments were wiped out in each country; class divisions and religious quarrels were put aside. National solidarity was exalted as never before, and this fact made it possible alike for the masses and for the classes to endure the protracted hardships and suffering which the war entailed. From the standpoint of social history, this temporary fusion, or unity, is perhaps the outstanding fact of the World War.

At the outset, there was anxious hope, on the part alike of governments and of peoples, that the war might be brief and might end in a "knock-out blow." The wars of 1859, 1866, and 1870-1871 had each centred in a single campaign and been decided by a single battle. The Russo-Japanese Expectation of War of 1904-1905 had been over within a year, and War's the Balkan War of 1912-1913 within a few months. Speedy Decision With all the latest scientific knowledge and mechanical inventions being utilized by civilized nations to assemble their armies, equip them, and get them into action, the present war might conceivably set a record for speed and decisiveness. Otherwise, the prospect would be too dreadful to contemplate.

The common system of mobilization on the Continent made it certain that big armies would be ready to move against each other in little more than a fortnight from the declaration of war. None of the general staffs had worked out a plan for the entire war, but each of them had carefully elaborated a scheme for the opening operations with a view to taking the offensive and winning a decisive battle

fully elaborated a scheme for the opening operations fions with a view to taking the offensive and winning a decisive battle within the shortest possible time. In each case the general direction of the first military operations was largely determined by the location of the pre-arranged detraining areas, for a big army (or group of armies) could be deployed along the frontier only as railway facilities allowed. In general, the French and Russians planned to strike Germany simultaneously from two sides. While the French would attempt a general advance along the Franco-German frontier from Charleroi to Nancy and a more concentrated attack in Lorraine, the Russians would hold off the Austrians and invade East Prussia in force. On the other hand, the Germans planned to cope with their hostile neighbors in turn: to overwhelm the French with superior numbers, and then to turn against the Russians.

The German offensive against France had originally been planned by the elder Moltke ¹ along the Franco-German frontier. But with the gradual increase of the German forces, it became impossible to work out a deployment of the whole German army promptly within the limits of this frontier. In 1898, accordingly, Moltke's

successor as Chief of Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen, had

¹ See above, p. 777 note.

arranged to send forward the right wing across the neutral states of Luxemburg and Belgium, and in 1904 he extended his contemplated deployment still farther northward so that the extreme right wing would advance across the southern territory of the Dutch Netherlands. In 1907, however, Schlieffen was succeeded as Chief of Staff by the younger Moltke—Count Helmuth Ludwig von Moltke—who, wishing to avoid a violation of Dutch neutrality, called for the building of new strategic railways along the Belgian frontier. Under the chancellorship of Bethmann-Hollweg, the German government complied with this request; and in 1914, therefore, four of the seven German armies on the Western Front were concentrated where they could advance across Belgium.

Anticipating that the French would attempt an offensive at the outset, the German Staff aimed at gathering on the northern and western wing a decisive superiority of forces, even German if the British army were to come to the support of the Success in Belgium French. This aim was accomplished. Belgium, when and in summoned to let the German armies pass, coura-Battles of . Frontier geously refused, and made a stand against overwhelming odds. The gallant defense of the Liége forts allowed the Belgian army to mobilize, but the last fort at Liége fell by the time the German right-wing armies were ready to move forward. These scattered the Belgian army, crossed the country, and reached the French border according to plan; and here with a decisive superiority they met the northern wing of the French army (and a supporting "expeditionary force" from Britain). Not only here, but in the whole series of opening engagements known as the Battles of the Frontier, the French armies were defeated. The French offensive from Charleroi to Nancy was halted in its tracks, and the French advance into Lorraine was turned back. All the German armies were ordered forward in

¹ Acts of retaliation which German troops inflicted on Belgium for her resistance—such as the burning of the library of the University of Louvain—provided some substantiation for a host of "atrocity stories" which were utilized to confirm the morale of Allied peoples and to arouse anti-German sentiment in neutral countries. By the latter part of August 1914, most of Belgium was under military occupation by Germany, and a German governor was installed at Brussels. King Albert of Belgium with a remnant of his army was with the French and British.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Dawn in 1914," is from an etching by a British artist, C. R. W. Nevinson (born 1889).





pursuit, and on August 25 Moltke wired to William II that "in six weeks the whole story will be concluded."

This interpretation proved an error. The German plan had assembled a superiority of forces at the critical point and had defeated the enemy at the time and place anticipated. But the defeat was less severe than at first appeared, Invasion of France and in the next conflicts the French troops proved far steadier. At Nancy and along the Meuse the pursuing forces were defeated, while at Le Cateau and Guise the British and French checked the pursuit of the German right wing. Above all, Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, held his retiring armies under firm control; transferred troops from right to left; and continued an orderly retreat until he could redispose his forces and stand to fight along a more favorable position. As soon as his fifth army had reëstablished itself south of the Marne, he halted the retreat; and on September 6 his forces turned to deliver battle.


All the armies between Paris and Verdun were engaged in this new conflict. The Battle of the Marne, as it came to be known, comprised five or six more or less distinct battles along a 150-mile front, lasting four days. These actions were Failure at fought by thoroughly exhausted armies—by troops Marne, Sept. 1914 not yet hardened to war, who had been marching or fighting for three weeks in the hottest of midsummer weather. Along most of the battle front, the actions were indecisive; but the German advance was definitely halted, and in the western sector the British army pushed steadily forward through a gap between the German armies of Kluck and Below. By the morning of September of the British had crossed the Marne; Kluck and Below were completely separated; and to prevent disaster the German right wing retreated from the Marne to the Aisne. The armies farther east followed suit, and by September 14 the Germans everywhere were on the defensive.

The French in turn had to face the disappointment of not being able to force the defensive position of the Germans, and thus the third phase of the opening engagements in the West

Note. The picture opposite, "Edith Cavell," is from a painting by an American artist, George Bellows (1882-1925). Edith Cavell was an heroic English nurse in Belgium who was convicted by a German court-martial of sheltering Allied soldiers and was put to death in October 1915. On Bellows, see below, p. 1145.

ended in a stalemate. But though tactically indecisive, this final result of the Marne campaign marked the complete Stalemate failure of the strategy of a speedy German victory over France. The bulk of the German army was fixed, once for all, in the West; and in the circumstances there appeared little hope of employing major forces in the East against Russia. Moltke, the German commander, realized only too clearly the full meaning of the failure of his offensive. On September 9, the day his armies began their retreat, he wrote his wife: "It goes badly . . . The first hopes have been utterly belied . . . Bitter disillusionment is already upon us." Moltke himself collapsed from the blow, and a new German Chief of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, had to be appointed in the midst of the crisis.

The stalemate along the Aisne left the opposing armies pinned to the ground with their western flanks uncovered and with vital railway communications unprotected. From a common necessity both Falkenhayn and Josse set to Failure of Outflanking, and Estabwork to prolong their lines in this quarter and, if possible, to outflank each other. Falkenhayn, with lishment of Enspirited energy, ordered a new attack in the West in order to cut off Paris from the Channel ports (through trenched Western Front which British reënforcements were arriving) and from all northern France. Joffre checked the attack and turned the line northward, but try as he would during the next month he could not outflank the Germans. The net result was a new entrenched front reaching on from the Aisne north to the western tip of Belgium. In the last phase of this "race to the sea," Falkenhayn gathered all available troops and a new army corps of fresh troops raised since the beginning of hostilities and made a fierce attempt to break through to the Channel ports. British army, centring at Ypres, had to bear the brunt of the assault, which continued without let-up for three weeks. Falkenhayn's forces could make little headway, and their final repulse marked the end of the German strategic effort in France. The Battle of Ypres was in fact the longest and most hard-fought battle up to this time. It left both armies exhausted; and with the commencement of winter the Western Front stabilized in entrenched lines running from Nieuport and Yprcs (in southwestern Belgium) southward to the Aisne River, thence eastward to



Verdun, and thence southward again to Belfort and the Swiss frontier—a total distance of about six hundred miles.

The outline of this long Western Front was the result of successive fortunes of battle rather than of purpose or design. Its effect was to leave in German hands most of the industrial area of Belgium and northern France, which was to prove a serious handicap to the Allies throughout the war. The Allies, however. maintained securely their hold on the Channel ports, which assured effective lines of communication between France and England and made it easier for the Allies to blockade the German coasts. With their existing resources and materials, the Allies had little prospect of breaking down the entrenched German position across France. But, on the other hand, the existence of this "impregnable front" committed the German army and nation to the very thing the General Staff had sought to avoid: an interminable siege warfare which might drain away Germany's resources while permitting France and Britain to draw freely upon the outside world.

In the East, meanwhile, the war had reached a similar result.

Strategic Plans and Opening Operations in the East

Opening Operations in the East

The war plans of Russia, Austria, and Germany alike had ended in frustration, and the failure of the German offensive in the West was parallelled by a dead-lock along an entrenched Eastern Front.

Originally the Russian war plan had contemplated offensives against both Germany and Austria, but some years before 1914 the Russian military authorities had promised the French that, in case the main German attack was launched against France, the major part of the Russian forces would be directed at the outset against Germany. This promise was not carried out. When war actually came, the Russians yielded to the temptation to direct their chief effort against the "favorite enemy"—Austria.

Russian Success against Austria They were rewarded by a striking victory along the whole Austrian front in Galicia. But between the diversion of forces thereby entailed and an extraordinarily faulty execution of the long-planned invasion of

East Prussia, the Russian offensive against Germany ended in sensational disaster. The Russian armies which advanced into East Prussia were together numerically superior to the German army, but while the Russian generals dismally failed to cooperate, the Germans (under the central command of General Paul von

Hindenburg, with General Erich Ludendorff as his chief of staff) acted as a unit and managed to deal with the Russians piecemeal.

It thus transpired that in each of the three battles fought in East Prussia in August 1914, the Germans brought into action more battalions than the Russians. And at the culminating Battle of Tannenberg (August 26-20) one of the Russian armies was routed

Defeat by Germany, Tannen-Aug. 1014

with a loss of 125,000 prisoners, while another broke to pieces in attempting a sudden retreat and lost an equal number of men.

By this disaster the Russians lost forever the strategical opportunity to overrun East Prussia, which was of critical importance to their general war plan. Moreover, it prevented them from fully "harvesting" their victory on the Austrian front (in Galicia). And the loss of 300,000 trained officers and men, with corresponding quantities of war material, was an irreparable blow to Russian arms.

The Austrian misfortunes arose from cross-purposes at the outset of the war. Throughout the diplomatic crisis of July the government at Vienna held to the plan of a war on Serbia alone, on the premise that clear-cut diplomatic support from Germany would keep Russia from actual conflict. When Russia suddenly ordered mobilization and Germany declared war, an Austrian army was al-

Plans and Failure against Serbia and Russia

ready on its way to Serbia; and the government decided to carry through the Serbian campaign as planned. Through shocking mismanagement, this campaign ended in utter defeat, and the Austrian invaders had to retire behind their own frontiers. The troops used for the vain effort could not take their place in the line of battle in Galicia, where the Russian advance had to be met immediately afterwards. With a substantial superiority of numbers, the Russians hammered back the whole Austrian line to western Galicia, and here the exhausted and sadly weakened Austrian army made a stand behind the Dunajetz River. Desperately the Austrian commander called upon the German General Staff for the reënforcements due at this stage—six weeks after the outbreak of war. He called in vain. The Austrian defeat in Galicia had taken place almost simultaneously with the Battle of the Marne, and the Western Front held in ever firmer grip the main strength of the German army.

The German war plan in the East had provided that, while the

Austrians should advance at once and in force from Galicia, Germany would deploy at the outset six army corps in Failure East Prussia. These, pending the arrival of reënforceof Austro-Germents from the West (after France had been knocked man Coout), would repulse any Russian attack on East Prusoperation, and Ensia and then march south into Poland against the trenched rear of the Russian armies facing Austria. In 1914, Warfare in East however, the Germans were so intent upon smashing France that they deployed in East Prussia only a little more than half of the six corps planned for; and after the Battle of Tannenberg they did not immediately move south to cooperate with Austria. The resounding victory they won in East Prussia was a misfortune for Russia, but their separatist strategy left Russia free to press home her victorious advance in Galicia. When at length the German army in East Prussia was sent south to the aid of Austria, it was too late. The Austrians were badly weakened by their defeats; the Russian reserves were already on the scene; and a joint Austro-German offensive broke down. By the end of 1914 the lines in the East settled down in a more or less entrenched front extending from the borders of East Prussia through western Russian Poland and across Galicia to the Carpathian Mountains—a distance of some nine hundred miles.

In the East, as in the West, the war had reached a seeming deadlock and stalemate. On both fronts, and by both sides, the opportunity for a strategic decision and a "knock-out blow" was lost. The prospect now was a dreadful one of prolonged siege warfare.

2. GROWING MAGNITUDE OF WAR, AND GERMAN SUCCESSES IN THE EAST, 1015

By the winter of 1914–1915 the World War was assuming unprecedented character and magnitude. Millions of men, instead of thousands, were under arms, and "trench warfare" was taking the place of field operations. Each of the contending armies was ensconced in a system of trenches, running two or three deep in zigzag parallels, connected with one another by laterals, and connected also with underground "dugouts" in which soldiers rested and supplies were kept. Between the opposing trench systems was "no man's land," a waste space obstructed with mounds of dirt and tangles of barbed wire.

through which infantry must advance if they would capture the enemy's trenches.

On the Western Front, as we have pointed out, such trench systems of the Germans and of the French and British (and Belgians) now faced each other in a line six hundred miles long. On the Eastern Front, the opposing trench systems of the Russians and of the Germans and Austrians were less elaborate but more extensive, covering a distance of some nine hundred miles. There were similar trenches on the more limited Austro-Serbian front.

Trench warfare was supplemented by mechanical devices of the latest scientific perfection. Cavalry, in the circumstances, could be employed very little, but artillery was used on a scale hitherto undreamed of. Machine guns were utilized in prodigious numbers, and big cannon were installed all along the Mechantrenches to mow down the obstructions in "no man's ical Warland," to destroy the enemy's positions, and to screen the charges of infantry. Chemical inventions and appliances were increasingly made use of, so that to shell and shot were added explosive bombs and exploding mines, and considerably later in the war poisonous gases were discharged with deadly effect. Later in the war, too, the Allies built "tanks," cars encased in iron and driven by gasoline engines, which crawled over hills and gulleys on caterpillar treads and spat out smoke and bullets. Gasoline engines proved, in fact, a most important auxiliary of the new warfare. They were employed not only eventually in "tanks," but immediately in the myriads of motor lorries which supplied troops at the front with ammunition and food and conveyed prisoners and the disabled to the rear, and also in the host of airplanes which darted above the trenches, spying out the movements of the enemy, fighting off hostile planes, and dropping explosives on strategic points behind the opposing trenches.

With these new methods of warfare, and with millions of men directly involved on each side, the winning of decisive battles was seemingly almost impossible. To "carry" trenches required a vast concerted effort of artillery and infantry and an enormous expenditure of shot and shell and of warfare human life. And to provide the millions of soldiers at the front with needful supplies necessitated the persistent and

united coöperation of the whole civilian population of every belligerent nation. The financial expenditure was gigantic. Heavy taxes were levied and huge sums were borrowed.

Nevertheless, in the late winter and early spring of 1915, despite German success in East Prussia and outright conquests in Belgium, northern France, and western Russian Poland, and despite the difficulties of the new trench warfare, the Allied nations of France, Russia, and Great Britain were Allied sanguine of ultimate triumph. In population, in Confidence and wealth, and in natural resources they collectively Apparent excelled the Central Empires of Germany and Austria-Advan-Hungary. They made much of the fact that the latter tage constituted a "beleaguered fortress," against which the Russians would exert increasing pressure from the east, and the Serbs from the southeast, while the French, Belgians, and British (now being rapidly reënforced not only by volunteers from the British Isles but also by armies from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) would push hard from the west; and as portents of the inevitable capture of the "fortress" they pointed to their successes at the Marne, at Ypres, and in Galicia. They explained that their "offensive" had been slowed up by a shortage of big guns and ammunition, but Britain, the "workshop of the world," could make good this deficiency. They confidently predicted that their superior numbers and resources would prove decisive and that even without sensational "knock-out blows" they could exhaust the Central Empires and bring them to terms. British sea power was already destroying Germany's oceanic commerce, detaching her colonies, and threatening to deprive her of needful supplies, while it was strengthening the French and promising to strengthen the Russians. French military vigor and popular morale were at their best, and Russia had vast reservoirs of man-power still untapped.

Pact of London and Secret Treaty among Allies

Pact of London and Secret Treaty among Allies

Pact of London and triumph. Back in September 1914, they had solemnly promised one another, by the Pact of London, not to make peace separately but to hold together until they had achieved a common victory. Then, in March 1915, they secretly agreed among themselves that in

the future peace settlement Russia should appropriate Constantinople and all of Poland, France should regain Alsace-Lorraine and dominate the left bank of the Rhine, and Great Britain should take most of the German colonies. Serbia was encouraged to hope for the Dual Monarchy's Yugoslav provinces.

But the Germans hoped for ultimate victory too. They were superbly united and resolute, and so were the Magyars. The military endeavors of Austria-Hungary had been disappointing, but the Dual Monarchy had not been dence and shaken by any actual revolt of its subject peoples—as the Allies had hoped—and some of the most influential Polish leaders, for example, were so anxious to prevent Poland from being Russianized that their continuing loyalty to the Habsburg Empire could be depended upon. Under German leadership, the armies of Austria-Hungary, and of the Ottoman Empire also, could be made thoroughly efficient and very useful.

Germany and Austria-Hungary admittedly constituted a "beleaguered fortress," but this fact, in German eyes, had its advantages. It meant that the armies of the Central Empires could operate on interior rather than exterior lines, and that, thanks to the thick network of railways in central Europe and to the nature of the novel trench warfare, reënforcements could be transferred with relative ease and despatch from one front to another, wherever they might count the most. Besides, the whole military strategy of the Central Empires could be directed by a single authority, the German General Staff, which, by coördinating the efforts of the Austrians, Hungarians, and Turks with those of the Germans, could strike telling blows first in one direction and then in another. In this respect the situation within the "beleaguered fortress" was in marked contrast to that of the besigging hosts, who were subject to the orders of several separate and jealous general staffs Russian, French, British, and Scrbian. Unity of command was as advantageous to the Central Empires as disunity was costly to the Allies.

For the new type of entrenched warfare, moreover, the Central Empires at the beginning of 1915 had very real advantages in equipment and trained soldiery. Germany, no more than the enemy Powers, had originally accumulated stocks of munitions sufficient to outlast the opening campaigns, but with methodical foresight the war ministry at Berlin had planned the inevitable

expansion of war industry. It had made surveys of German industrial plants, determined what work each could do, and prepared specifications for a rapid change to production of war material. As a result, munitions contracted for after the declaration of war were being delivered in huge quantities to the German field armies early in 1915, just when the Allies were facing a serious shortage of munitions—when France was deprived of her major industrial centres, when Britain was only beginning to transform peace-industries into war-industries, and when Russia was literally starving for guns and munitions. "As early as the spring of 1915," Falkenhayn records, "the German High Command was relieved of any anxiety with regard to munitions supply."

At this time, also, Germany could put reserves of man-power more promptly in the field. Joffre, the French commander, had far fewer of such reserves upon which to draw; and Lord Kitchener, the British war minister, having started with only a relatively small professional army, had to take time to recruit and train wholly new units. Falkenhayn, on the other hand, by a skillful mixing of fresh young conscripts and trained personnel, put a group of new army corps into the field in November 1914; and by the close of the year, in addition to supplying losses in the existing ranks, he had ready another body of fresh troops as large as the entire British army in France.

Under these circumstances Falkenhayn sought a military decision without delay. He would attempt a smashing attack upon

German Plan in West Upset by Menacing Situation in Austria the British sector of the Western Front before Kitchener's new British army could arrive. The staff officers for the operation were chosen and their preparations were actually begun. Such an attack might well have been decisive. Beyond doubt the general condition of the Western Front at the time offered a

better opportunity than was ever to occur again for the Germans to smash through and bring Britain and France to their knees.

But the strategical failures of 1914 in the East now embarrassed the German Command. The Russian armies seemed on the point of breaking through the Carpathian Mountains and deluging the Hungarian plain. A second disastrous attempt to invade Serbia had weakened still further the Austrian army and

left it helplessly divided on two far distant fronts. Moreover, both the diplomatic and the military authorities in Germany were agreed that Italy and Rumania were preparing to enter the war on the side of the Allies and against the Central Empires. If they should enter the war, they might put finishing touches on Austria-Hungary.

To avert such a possible catastrophe, Falkenhayn compelled the Austrian foreign minister to offer Italy territorial "compensations" as a price for her continuing neutrality. Italy had been demanding "compensations" (in accordance Italian with the terms of the Triple Alliance 1) ever since the Intervention beginning of the war, but the Austrian government had been quite unheedful until pressed by Germany, and even now it had no faith that Italy could be satisfied. Public sentiment in Italy was by this time predominantly anti-Austrian and pro-Ally; and, after all, the Allies could promise Italy more territory at Austria's expense than Austria could be expected to do. Italy, while continuing to negotiate with Austria, signed at London in April 1915 a secret treaty with the Allies. Thereby she obtained from them a pledge that if she helped them in the war she might annex the southern half of the Tyrol (including Trent), Trieste, Istria, part of the Dalmatian coast, Valona (in Albania), and the Dodecanese in the Ægean, and, in addition, she might enlarge her African colonies and share in the partition of the Ottoman Empire. "This," the British statesman, Lord Balfour, later explained, "is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in war."

In Rumania were divided counsels. The Hohenzollern King Ferdinand and a number of the country's "elder statesmen" wished to be loyal to the Triple Alliance and perceived in taking sides with the Central Empires an opportunity to obtain from the Russian Empire the Rumanian-speaking province of Bessarabia. On the other hand, a majority of the "younger statesmen" were inclined to throw over the Triple Alliance entirely, to unite with the Allies, and to participate in the partition of Austria-Hungary, whence Rumania might secure provinces larger and more valuable than Bessarabia. The Allies offered the main part of Transylvania but they were precluded by Russian and Serbian objections

¹ See above, p. 757.

Revision

and the

against Russia.

1915

from offering as much as the King and his advisers deemed necessary to overcome their scruples. Consequently the Rumanian government wavered back and forth in a tantalizing fashion, biding the time when its services would command a higher price.

While Italy and Rumania were still wavering and Falkenhayn was doing his best to keep them both neutral, Hindenburg, the "hero" of the Battle of Tannenberg and of German now the military idol of the whole German nation, War Plan came forward boldly with promises of swift annihilat-Campaign ing victory over Russia. The German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and likewise Admiral von Tirpitz backed up Hindenburg; and finally, in view of

Austria's critical position, Falkenhayn acquiesced.

Wherefore Falkenhavn abandoned (most reluctantly) the prospect of victory in the West and turned East for the campaign of 1915. "With a heavy heart" he sent off to Hindenburg his reserve of fresh troops, "including the best that Germany possessed in the war." These troops were used up at once in battles fought in a midwinter blizzard---without perceptibly diminishing the pressure of the Russian army against Austria. After this fiasco, Falkenhayn took the relief offensive in his own hands. The French and British were already commencing to hammer at the Western Front, and it was impossible to transfer another whole army eastward. But by draining men from each of the divisions in the West, Falkenhayn was able to assemble twelve new divisions in time to save the Austrian front. They were there grouped with picked Austrian divisions, under a good general, August von Mackensen, and one of the best German staff officers, Hans von Seeckt, whose careful arrangements produced for the first time the grand-style artillery preparation which thereafter became so characteristic a feature of the war. The result was a triumph of Austro-German operations: the Austrian divisions did as well as the German; the Russian line was broken through at Gorlice; and in a fortnight (in May 1915) Falkenhayn's "relief-offensive" advanced ninety-five miles. The whole Russian front in Galicia began crumbling, and the general balance of the war in the East was suddenly reversed.

Rumania dropped at once all idea of intervening against the Central Powers, but even in the full tide of Austro-German success Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. This was a disappointment to Falkenhayn's hopes, although the Italy's Juncture defeat of the Russians permitted Austria to reënforce her troops on the Italian border. For Austria Allies, the crisis had passed, and the mountainous Italian frontier was easily organized for defensive warfare. For over a year, in fact, it stood secure against Italian offensives.

In Poland, meanwhile, the Austro-German advance relentlessly continued, and it presently became clear that the Russian armies were woefully short of munitions. Up to the last minute the war ministry at Petrograd sought to escape German blame by concealing and then by denying the fact. It Conquest of Poland was then too late to supply the shortage; and all that the Russian commander-in-chief, the Grand-Duke Nicholas, could do was to avoid battle and keep retreating. It was thus possible for Falkenhayn to extend his advance in the East without drawing reënforcements from the Western Front. By September 1015 all Poland, together with the greater part of Lithuania, was in military possession of the Central Empires, and a new Eastern Front was established along a straight line as far east as the Pinsk marshes.


Russian losses in the summer of 1915 were not confined to territory. Half a million soldiers were killed, a million wounded, and another million captured. The remaining Rus-Russian sian armies, at least temporarily, were demoralized by defeat and retreat. And it boded ill for the Demoralfuture that the Tsar Nicholas II, now more than ever under the spell of his hysterical wife and her strange bewitcher, the "monk" Rasputin, dismissed the Grand-Duke Nicholas and took nominal command himself of the Russian armies. The Tsar insisted that the war would go on, but he was too irresolute, too impressionable, too weak, to prevent confusion in the conduct of the war from becoming worse confounded.

Having badly battered Russia, Falkenhayn hurried West with some detachments to meet an expected French attack in Champagne. It was in the nick of time. Joffre was launching the most powerful offensive yet seen on any front. The German line was on the point of yielding, and Falkenhayn arrived just in time to

Failure of French Attack in Champagne, 1915

¹ See above, pp. 661-662.

cancel an order for retreat which would have broken the entrenched front in northern France.



This crisis passed, Falkenhayn next switched a group of divisions from Poland to the Serbian front and prepared with due care the invasion twice bungled in Austrian hands. As a by-

product of the Austro-German victory over Russia, Bulgaria now definitely allied herself with the Central Empires Bulgaria's (September 1915), accepting their offers of territorial Juncture with Cenaggrandizement and promising to cooperate with tral Emthem in the attack on Serbia. In October, therefore, pires, 1915 Scrbia was assailed simultaneously from the east by Bulgarian armies and from the north by an Austro-German army under Marshal von Mackensen. Against the double invasion Serbia could not stand, and a motley expeditionary force which the Allies managed to organize "for the relief of Serbia" and to land at Salonica (in Greek territory) 1 was too small to do aught but prevent King Constantine from bringing Greece into the war on the side of the Central Powers. Within two months, Serbia was crushed and overrun by the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians, and her royal family and the remnants of Conquest of Serbia her army were refugees. The same fate was meted out by Cento Montenegro, and Albania also was occupied. By the late winter of 1015-1016 the Central Empires were firmly entrenched in the Balkan peninsula: the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria were allies, in direct rail communication with Vienna and Berlin; Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania were conquered provinces; Greece and Rumania, though still professing neutrality, were duly awed. And all this had been accomplished while gradually increasing the number of German divisions on the Western Front.

At the outset of 1915 Germany had been viewed, and had viewed herself, as a beleaguered fortress. By the end of the year Falkenhayn had extended the fortress to include all Poland, most of the Balkan peninsula, and the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia Minor. A new ally in Bulgaria, with a strong and effective army, counterbalanced Italy's turning to the opposite side; and the conquest of the Balkans redoubled the value of Turkey as an ally.

This achievement radically altered the general pattern of the war, and laid new foundations for the Austro-German military power which was to last for two years and a half. The Russian

¹ This involved, of course, an Allied violation of Greek neutrality, but it was excused on the ground of "military necessity" (as Germany had excused her earlier violation of Belgian neutrality) and of assent by the Greek minister Venizelos (who was notoriously hostile to his sovereign).

army, except for one brief interlude, could never be a serious danger to the Central Empires. And under guidance of German officers and with aid of German munitions, the Ottoman Empire promised to be of considerable service in diverting at least British effort from the Western Front.

Already, in the winter of 1914-1915, when Russia was in dire need of munitions, the British Admiralty had counselled the Allies to force open the Turkish straits connecting the Mediterranean with the Black Sea, so that commerce between Russia and Britain might be expedited. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty at the time, 1 contended that Allied success in such an undertaking would decide the whole war. Josfre, the French commander-in-chief, afraid of weakening the Western Front and convinced that the war must ultimately be decided there, was opposed to a military diversion at the Straits; and the British had more ships than men to spare. As a compromise, it had been agreed that a naval attack should be made on the

Allied Failure at danelles

Straits, and accordingly, in February and March 1915, a powerful Franco-British fleet essayed to silence and destroy the Turkish land forts lining both sides of the Dardanelles. The attempt failed. Several battleships were sunk, and the others withdrew from what proved to be an unequal contest.

Then much wrangling ensued in Allied headquarters as to whether a military expedition should and could be sent to do what the naval expedition had failed to do. By the time another compromise was reached and an expeditionary force of Britishers, Australians, and New Zealanders, with a sprinkling of colonial French troops, was ready to disembark at the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula (bordering the Dardanelles), the Turks, under a German commander, Marshal Liman von Sanders, had had ample time to perfect their defenses and render the peninsula well-nigh impregnable. The expeditionary force fought gallantly, but it could make little headway, and its commander, Sir Ian Hamilton, was denied necessary reënforcements. It struggled intermittently for several months, and always unsuccessfully. In December 1015 it was finally withdrawn and distributed at Salonica and in Egypt.

Not only were the Turks enabled, through German advice and ¹ See above, p. 488.

supplies, to defeat the Allies at the Dardanelles but also to hold in check an attempted Russian advance through the Allied Dis-Caucasus into Armenia and at the same time to comfiture threaten the Suez Canal and to surround and capin Near ture an Anglo-Indian expeditionary force which had East, 1915 been landed in Mesopotamia. And simultaneously the Bulgarians, likewise buttressed by Germany, were holding the Balkans and keeping a large Allied force (of British, French, Italian, and Serb troops) pinned to defensive positions at Salonica. The Bulgarian and Turkish armies were thus contributing to an almost fatal diversion of Allied troops from the crucial Western Front to remote and isolated sectors in the Near East, while permitting the Germans to overcome Russia and then to concentrate on the West.

Against the brilliant German record of 1915, the Allies could offer merely a drab background of failure. On the Western Front, they had felt obliged to maintain almost constant attacks in order to prevent a greater shifting of German divisions to the Russian front. These attacks had begun before a proper reënforcement of guns and muticipal shifting of the failure in 1915.

nitions was at hand; some of the "drives" had been badly bungled, and the great French offensive in Champagne in September ended with heavy losses after having reached the threshold of success. All these efforts had perhaps saved the Russian army from annihilation, but they brought no victories and they involved terrible wastage. Above all, the French and British sapped their strength through divided counsels. Joffre wished to centre the utmost effort on the immanent problem of the Western Front. Without any clear-cut alternative program, the British gradually involved themselves in the attack on the Dardanelles, while Briand, the French premier, turned to a rival expedition at Salonica. Both Powers suffered from the dispersion of effort between East and West, and they failed in both areas.

3. RENEWED VIGOR OF ALLIED ARMIES, 1916

From his experience of trench warfare by the end of 1915 and from his knowledge that at last the Allies were amply provided with munitions, Falkenhayn drew the conclusion that Germany could no longer expect to win a "military decision" either in France or in Russia. But to stand indefinitely on the defensive

would mean the certain exhaustion of the Central Empires.

Falkenhayn's
Plan to
Exhaust
France

many was impossible. To this end, therefore, he proposed a sustained offensive against a favorable point on the Western Front, not to obtain a strategic decision but to exhaust the French army and wear down the morale of the nation at large.

The German government endorsed Falkenhayn's proposal, and without waiting for the end of winter the offensive was opened against Verdun (in February 1916). But the opening attack did not succeed as planned. The spirit of the French army stiffened to meet so direct a challenge, and the wearing-out battle dragged on in more and more hopeless effort from February to July. Both armies suffered frightful losses and both were exhausted, but Verdun remained in French hands. And at the end the test of strength lowered the morale of the German nation at large more than the French.

Moreover, the Allies by now were far stronger than in 1915. A much larger British army was provided for by the imposition of universal conscription in January 1916. Conscrip-French and British armies were far better supplied tion in Britain with guns and munitions, and even the Russian forces were now being rearmed. Besides, the Allies arranged to coördinate their military effort; and at a conference presided over by Joffre in the spring of 1916, France, Britain, Joint Allied Russia, and Italy agreed to concentrate their energies Plans each on a single vigorous offensive. These attacks on various fronts were to be delivered simultaneously in July.

The drain of Verdun was to diminish radically the French share in the joint effort, but in the East the Austrian commander, Conrad, played directly into the Allied plans. Yielding to the temptation of a decisive victory over Italy, he transferred against her a large part of his best troops and heaviest artillery from the Russian Front, and then opened a drive from the Tyrol. The Italians soon brought this to a halt, and a Russian army (under General Brusilov) then struck the sector whence the Austrian troops and guns had been withdrawn. The Austrian line collapsed quite as brusquely

as the Russian line early in 1915. The Russians reoccupied eastern Galicia and took numerous prisoners.

By shifting divisions from other fronts, Falkenhayn was able to stay the Russian advance and reëstablish new lines in Galicia. But on the heels of Brusilov's attack, the British and Franco-British French drove hard at the German front in the West in Offensive: the region of the Somme. By reason of the weakening Battle of of the French at Verdun, the Battle of the Somme was Somme a much reduced version of the operation originally contemplated. The first assaults failed to break the German position, and slow progress could only be made with heavy loss. But from the German perspective, the general situation of the war was again suddenly reversed. Verdun, then at its extreme point of danger, was relieved of serious pressure, and the German forces in the West were thrown on a desperate defensive.

Soon afterwards, at the command of General Cadorna, the Italian army opened an energetic offensive in Istria on the Isonzo front. It profited from Austrian concern offensive with Brusilov and his Russians and began with brilliant promise. Gorizia, a key point, was promptly captured; and once again Austria appeared on the verge of collapse.

These events elicited a declaration of war from Rumania against the Central Empires, and on the same day (August 27, 1916) Italy declared war on Germany. The failure of Rumania's the long German effort in the West, at Verdun, and the Juncture with obvious weakening of the Austrian army convinced Allies, the Rumanian leaders that their country's intervention would bring about the immediate débâcle of the Habsburg Empire. As a first impression, this opinion was held unquestioningly by the public at large, not only in Allied nations, but even more poignantly in Germany and Austria.

In point of fact, the Rumanians had waited just too long—partly in driving a hard bargain with the Allies.² At the crisis of

¹ Italy, in declaring war against Austria back in May 1915, had then refrained from declaring war against Germany. It should be noted that in March 1916, prior to Rumania's intervention, Great Britain had persuaded Portugal to seize German vessels in her harbors and to follow up Germany's resulting declaration of war by sending some Portuguese soldiers to the Allied trenches in France.

² The secret treaty, as finally signed in August 1916 by Rumania with the Allies, pledged her, as the price of her military support, not only Transylvania and Bukovina but also the Serbian Banat and the plain of Hungary as far as the Theiss River.

Brusilov's offensive in Galicia, in June, Rumanian intervention might well have been decisive. But by the end of August the Galician front had been patched up, and Falkenhayn, fully warned, had prepared against Rumania's action. He had been able, even in the thunderstorm of enemy offensives on every front, to gather a new army along the Transylvanian Conquest border. This army struck promptly. The Rumanian of Rumania by army was of little worth. And presently the whole Rumanian plain north of the Danube was another Central **Powers** Austro-German conquest. Instead of destroying the Habsburg Empire, the net result of Rumania's entry into the war was that all the Balkan states (except Greece) were now controlled by the Central Empires.

But within Germany, meanwhile, Rumania's declaration of war had produced an immediate crisis of despair. The Emperor

Crisis in Germany: Practical Dictatorship of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916 William II was thoroughly broken by the news, and to his intimates he declared that the war was lost and that peace must be made without delay. On the country at large the effect was much the same, for the fearfully wearing struggle at Verdun, followed by a storm of enemy offensives at every point, had strained all nerves to the breaking point. In this general mood,

Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor, together with various high military officers and the heads of the Emperor's civil and military cabinets, prevailed upon William II to dismiss Falkenhayn and to summon Hindenburg and Ludendorff to the supreme command (August 1916).

William II had resisted this step for a year and a half. Ever since 1913 there had been sharp personal enmity between him and Ludendorff; and since the beginning of the war Ludendorff had industriously built up Hindenburg's popularity and prestige in opposition to the Emperor and to Falkenhayn. Early in the war, in fact, Hindenburg—with Ludendorff as a moving spirit behind him—had become a more or less independent and rival power within the state. In the winter of 1914-1915 Tirpitz and others had even attempted to have the Emperor accord to Hindenburg full military and political direction of the war. William II understood clearly that now, in summoning Hindenburg and Ludendorff, he was in effect abdicating his "ultimate" authority in the state to a masterful and domineering rival, and

he yielded reluctantly and only because the Chancellor and his own closest advisers insisted that Hindenburg's popularity was necessary to the safety of the imperial régime. "His crown and sceptre were at stake."

The appointment of Hindenburg as commander-in-chief, with Ludendorff as quartermaster-general (and virtual dictator), amounted to a political revolution in Germany, and produced no less radical a change in the character and scope of the war. Falkenhayn's policy of "possibilities," as regards strategy and war aims, gave place by degrees to an unlimited program of conquest and an arraying of almost the whole world against the Central Empires.

Hindenburg's first act after assuming command was to inspect the Western Front, which he and Ludendorff now saw for the first time. The two were appalled by the character of the Somme offensive, still under way; and without delay they ordered the building of the "Hindenburg Line" (the "Siegfried position"), a heavily fortified line in the rear, whither the German divisions could take refuge from the untenable positions into which they had been forced. In addition, Hindenburg and Ludendorff reported certain conclusions: (1) that against such military resources as the Allied Powers were now bringing into the field, there was no possibility of Germany's winning the war by land offensives; (2) that even by holding to the defensive, the troops could not stand the strain of another continuous battle such as the Somme; and (3) that the only hope was for Towards

Germany to turn to unrestricted submarine warfare. Through the submarine Britain might be compelled within the first six months of 1917 to cease effective co-

Submarine Warfare

operation with her allies and thereby to leave them with no choice but to make peace with Germany.

In the minds of the new German Command, Britain held the key position. Allied fortunes had waxed in 1916 with increasing British success on the seas. They would wane rapidly if Britain suffered sea disaster in 1917.

4. BRITISH SUCCESSES ON THE SEAS AND OVERSEAS, 1914-1916


Great Britain's naval superiority had been utilized from 1914 to 1916 in many ways advantageous to the Allied cause. First,

it was employed to clear the high seas of enemy warships. One British squadron, it is true, was defeated by a German fleet off the coast of Chile near Coronel in November 1914: Britain's but another British squadron was promptly sent out, Naval and in the next month near the Falkland Islands it Superiority encountered and destroyed that German fleet. general, German warships which were at sea when war was declared put hurriedly into neutral ports and were duly interned, and the main battle fleet and some of the finest cruisers of Germany, which happened to be in home waters, stuck close to the German harbors where floating mines and land batteries could protect them against British attack. From time to time German cruisers made stealthy trips across the North Sea and bombarded English coast towns; occasionally they managed to clude the British naval patrol and slip safely back into their harbors; but sometimes they were caught and destroyed. From time to time, also, German "raiders" took to the high seas and preyed upon Allied merchantmen, but their careers were usually brief and always ended eventually either in capture or in internment in neutral ports. And Austrian warships hugged their home harbors on the Adriatic as closely as German warships stuck to theirs on the North Sea.

The British kept their major battle fleet "in reserve," that is, stationed in the waters north of Scotland, carefully guarded against surprise attacks by German submarines or bombers and vet ready to engage the German fleet if it should issue from its havens. In this way the British may be said to have exercised their naval power more by frightening the enemy than by actually fighting him. On one occasion—at the end of May 1916, almost two years after the beginning of hostilities—the Battle of German battle fleet did emerge into the North Sea Jutland, 1916 and oblige the British armada to fight. The British lost more lives and ships than the Germans in the battle of Jutland, as the contest was called, but they could afford to lose more, and they were victorious in that the surviving German warships returned to their home harbors and did not again venture out on the high seas.

NOTE. The portrait bust opposite is of Lord John Fisher (1841-1920), "First Sca Lord" of the British navy in 1914-1915. It is by the Anglo-American sculptor, Jacob Epstein (born 1880), concerning whom see below, p. 1149.





With German and Austrian warships driven from the high seas, Great Britain (and France) could freely transport troops and munitions to and from oversea areas. French colonial troops from Algeria, Senegal, and Indo-China were thus Transport transported in safety to France to reënforce the Allied of Troops and Mu-Western Front. To France, moreover, for the same nitions to purpose, armies were expeditiously transported early France in the war not only from Great Britain and Ireland but also from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India. Thenceforth, thanks to Great Britain's continuing naval supremacy, the number of British troops in France grew steadily until, with the imposition of conscription by the British parliament in January 1916, it equalled the number of French troops. There was opposition to conscription in Ireland, and a group of extremists of the Sinn Fein and Labor parties rose in revolt at Dublin in Easter week of 1916 and proclaimed an "Irish Republic." 1 The majority of the Irish Revolt, 1916 Irish people, however, remained quiet, and, thanks again to British sea power, troops which were despatched from England suppressed the revolt quickly—and with no little vindictiveness.

The steady stream of men and munitions which the British were able to pour into France during 1915 and 1916 explains, along with the fighting ability and good generalship of the French, why the Germans in those years could make no such headway in western Europe as they made in the east. But western Europe was not the only field of military operations where British naval supremacy counted heavily. With Germany deprived of the means of aiding her was colonies, these were invaded and conquered onies by Allied forces. The British navy was, indeed, the chief factor in expanding the European war into a real World War.

¹ See above, pp. 408-50r. Only about 2,000 Irishmen actively engaged in the insurrection of 1916. About a hundred British soldiers were killed in putting down the "revolt." Afterwards, fifteen "rebels" (including James Connolly, a prominent figure in labor circles, and Padraic Pearse, poet and "president of the republic") were executed, and many others, including "suspects," were imprisoned.

Note. The picture opposite is a memorial to Canadian soldiers who served in the World War, by the Croatian sculptor, Ivan Meštrović (born 1883). On Meštrović, see below, p. 1150.

Early in August 1914 the German colony of Togoland in Africa was invaded by French colonial troops from the east, and by British from the west; it surrendered at the end of the month. Then, expeditionary forces of Britain, France, and Belgium penetrated into the larger and more important German colony of Kamerun, gradually overcoming the resistance of its weak garrison and compelling its surrender at the beginning of 1915. Against German Southwest Africa, General Louis Botha inaugurated a campaign with a South African army in September 1914, but violent anti-British sentiment among a portion of the Dutch-speaking Boers produced within the Union of South Africa a serious revolt led by Colonel Moritz and participated in by the famous General De Wet. Halting the campaign against German Southwest Africa, therefore, General Botha, with the coöperation of General Smuts, another able Boer who was loyal to the British Empire, proceeded to crush the revolt in the Union. As soon as this was accomplished, early in 1915, Generals Botha and Smuts renewed the attack on German Southwest Africa and completed its conquest in July of that year.

The conquest of German East Africa proved more disticult. Although British warships bombarded and captured the port of Dar-es-Salaam in August 1914, the German governor of the colony, General von Lettow-Vorbeck, was so resourceful in commanding the loyalty of the natives and in conducting military operations that he not only kept the British on the defensive throughout 1915 but also carried the war into British East Africa. In 1916 General Smuts, with an army of British and Boer South Africans, reënforced by native troops and a detachment from India and a small Belgian expedition from the Congo, managed to conquer the greater part of German East Africa, but the surrender of Lettow-Vorbeck was not effected until November 1918.

In the southern Pacific, a contingent of New Zealanders, aided by French and Australian warships, captured German Samoa in August 1914, and shortly afterwards Australian expeditions seized New Guinea, Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and the Bismarck archipelago. In the northern

¹ See above, pp. 513-514.

Pacific, and in the Far East generally, Japan as the ally of Great Britain was enabled to make short work of German concessions and colonies. Japanese warships at once seized the Ladrones and Caroline Islands and convoyed to China a military expedition which laid siege to Kiaochow and captured it in October 1914.

In the Near East, Great Britain employed her naval superiority to penalize the Ottoman Empire for siding with Germany. At the very beginning of Turkish hostilities, in October 1914, Britain formally freed both Cyprus and Egypt from British nominal vassalage to the Ottoman Empire. Cyprus was transformed into an outright British colony, and Egypt into a full-fledged British protectorate. Then, while an Anglo-Egyptian army warded off Turkish attacks from across the isthmus of Sinai against the Suez Canal, an Anglo-Indian army was landed at the head of the Persian Gulf and undertook the conquest of Mesopotamia.

In 1915 the Turco-British phase of the World War was disappointing to Great Britain (and the other Allies). The Anglo-Egyptian army was on the defensive and barely able to hold the Suez Canal. Half of the Anglo-Indian army, after advancing 180 miles up the Tigris, was surrounded by superior Turkish forces at Kut-al-Amara and compelled to surrender in April 1915. And, as we have previously pointed out, the prolonged efforts of the British at the Dardanelles, first by sea and next by land, ended in December 1915 in sorry failure.

In 1916, however, the tide turned and Great Britain gained several advantages in the Ottoman Empire. First, the peninsula of Sinai (between Egypt and Palestine) was conquered by the Anglo-Egyptian army reënforced by Successes in 1916 Australians and New Zealanders who had been transported from Gallipoli. Second, the town of Kut-al-Amara on the Tigris was retaken by the Anglo-Indian army, now strengthened by fresh troops from India and ably led by General Maude; in March Bagdad was captured, and by the end of the year the greater part of Mesopotamia was in British hands. Last, but not least, a young Britisher, known as Colonel Lawrence,²

¹ On the previous status of Cyprus and Egypt, see above, pp. 265, 518-519.

^{*} Thomas Lawrence (1888-1935) acquired first-hand knowledge of the Arabs and

ingratiated himself with the Arab sherif of Mecca, Hussein, and with his fighting son, Feisal, and persuaded them to head a general Arab revolt against the Turks. Hussein proclaimed the independence of Hejaz in June 1916; and presently Feisal, with Lawrence as the liaison officer between him and the British, was making raids against the Turks and spreading nationalist propaganda among the Arabs northward to the very gates of Damascus.

Back of these growing threats against the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, as back of the overthrow of Germany's colonial empire in Africa and the Pacific, was British naval supremacy. And less showy but more fundamentally important were the commercial effects of Great Britain's naval superiority. German merchantmen, as well as German warships, were driven from the seas; and the British navy enforced, with Destrucgrowing stringency, a virtual "blockade" of German tion of German seaports and interfered more and more with neutral Commerce trade with Germany. Germany, of course, continued to import and export goods across the Netherlands or the Scandinavian countries, but vessels to or from these countries were subjected to search by the British and commodities clearly German in origin or destination were usually confiscated. Germany (and Austria-Hungary) was thus deprived of profitable foreign markets for manufactures and likewise of a copious supply of needful raw materials, and most of Germany's resulting economic loss was Britain's gain.

Britain's general industry was stimulated, rather than retarded, by the World War. The demand for its products was increased by the slowing down of non-military pro-Stimuladuction in Allied countries, by enemy occupation of the tion of British chief industrial centres of France, and especially by Industry the disappearance of German competition. With the stimulation of industry and commerce went a relatively great accumulation of "war profits," so that Britain, retaining her position not only as workshop but also as banker of the world, was enabled, as time went on, to lend her allies more money, their language, and an intense admiration for them, from extended travels which he made for scholarly purposes in Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Sinai in 1911–1914. He was sent to Egypt as an "expert" by the British War Minister, Lord Kitchener, shortly after the Turks entered the war. He proved himself not only "more Arab than the Arabs" but also a master of guerrilla warfare.

as well as to furnish them with more munitions, than Germany could do on the other side.

Even Britain would have cracked under the strain of financing and supplying all her far-flung naval and military forces-and acting as special banker and munitions-maker for her numerous allies and many of their military operations—had she not been in a position to avail herself of the trade with neutrals which she denied to Germany. With the United States, particularly, Great Britain traded freely and permitted her allies to trade, just as she practically forbade American trade with Germany. This meant that, thanks to British supremacy on the high seas, the mills, factories, and foundries of industrialized America were at the service of the Allies rather than of the Central Empires and that many manufacturers and bankers in neutral America were themselves amassing "war profits" from the sale of munitions and the loan of money to Great Britain, France, Italy, etc. Furthermore, it meant that the United States and similar neutral countries were more open to British and Allied propaganda than to that of Germany, and that consequently the majority of their influential citizens were disposed to sympathize with the Allies rather than with the Central Empires.

Still another commercial advantage of great importance Great Britain had over Germany, and that was in respect of foodstuffs. At the beginning of the war, Germany with Austria-Hungary was almost if not quite self-sufficing in grain, meat, and most other agricultural staples, while Britain was dependent for the majority of her foodstuffs on foreign imports. As the war went on, Britain's mastery of the seas assured to herself and her allies a sufficient importation tion of of foodstuffs from the United States, Canada, Ar-Germany gentina, and Australia, but it worked increasing hardship for the Central Empires, and especially for Germany. Germany had to put more and more farm-hands in her armies or in her munition plants, with consequent loss of agricultural self-sufficiency; and the British "blockade" steadily lessened the chance of Germany's supplying the deficiency from abroad. Every belligerent, in order to conserve its food supply, took to "rationing" its civilian population, but rationing gradually became more drastic in Germany than elsewhere. By the end of 1916 hunger threatened to undermine German morale.

In the submarine—or "U-boat," as they called it—the Germans had one weapon which, if duly developed and freely used, might nullify the advantages accruing to the Allies Possible from British supremacy on the seas. It might be em-Rôle of German ployed to destroy enemy warships, to interfere with Submathe transportation of men and munitions from England to the Continent, and perhaps to starve out Great Britain. Some enemy warships and transports were actually destroyed by German submarines in the early stages of the war, and in June 1916 the battleship on which Lord Kitchener, the British War Minister, was travelling to Russia for a conference with the Tsar, was sunk by a mine which had been planted by a German submarine. On the whole, however, the British took special precautions against submarine attacks on their battleships, so that their superiority in this respect was amply maintained.

Nevertheless, the Germans kept on building submarines and becoming more expert in handling them, until, as the British "blockade" tightened on Germany, they thought Contemseriously of retaliating with a submarine "blockade" plated Submaof Great Britain. The British could not hope to saferine guard all the merchant vessels along their coasts and Blockade of Britain bound for their ports, in any such meticulous way as they safeguarded their battleships. Such merchant vessels would therefore be relatively easy marks for German submarines, and the destruction of a considerable number would frighten off others and leave Great Britain with a shortage of raw materials for her factories, of munitions for her armies, and of food for her population. A large-scale submarine campaign against British shipping was the one chance—and a good chance which Germany had of putting Great Britain out of the war.

So the Germans reasoned. Unfortunately, a large-scale submarine campaign was fraught with danger for Germany as well as for Britain. The ultimate success of such a campaign would depend upon the destruction of many merchant vessels bound to or from England, some of which might be flying neutral flags and most of which would probably be carrying neutral passengers. Neutral nations would

pt to protest emphatically against the torpedoing of their s and even more emphatically against the killing of their ens, and, if Germany were to persevere in the campaign, or that neutral nation would be almost certain to abandon neutrality and enlarge the already big circle of her active nies. The United States, of all the neutrals, most at stake. American citizens were always elling to England, frequently on British ships; united States of American munitions and foodstuffs were g sold in Britain; and the United States was the only at Power, the only highly industrialized nation, which was yet identified with one or the other of the belligerent coalis. Might not an unrestricted submarine campaign on the

. May 1915 a German submarine torpedoed and sank, off coast of Ireland, one of the largest of British merchant els, the Lusitania, which was carrying from the United es to Britain a cargo of arms and some 1,200 Sinking engers, including a hundred American citizens. United States government had previously pro-

of Germany cause the United States to join the opposing

:52

ad against British interference with American property on high seas. Now, backed by strongly pro-Allied sympathy ome, it protested with greater vehemence against German ruction of American lives on the high seas. For a year

omatic notes were exchanged between Germany the United States, interrupted now and then by submarine attacks and by acute crises, until in 1916 Germany acceded to American demands promised that thereafter, unless she gave due

German Assurances to United States, 1916

ce to the contrary, no merchant vessel would be sunk without ing and without proper provision for the personal safety of engers.

thus transpired that the United States called a halt on nany's using to the full the one weapon which might directly seriously cripple Great Britain. In the meantime Great in clinched her hold on the seas and on lands oversea; by pressing her "blockade" of Germany's home ports, she isified the threat of starving out the German people and fying their military successes on the Continent.

5. THE CRISIS OF THE WAR, 1917-1918

Despite the brilliant successes of the Central Empires against Russia and Serbia in 1915 and against Rumania in 1916, despite the drain of man-power which Germany had latterly exacted from her enemies on the Western Front, hopes of the Allies ran high in the winter of 1916-1917. The course of events Allied seemed to take a new turn, as auspicious for the Hopes, 1916-1917 Allies as it was critical for Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany was truly suffering from the British "blockade." and her armies could apparently make no headway against France; they had been repulsed at Verdun, and farther west they had been obliged to retire to the "Hindenburg Line." In Austria-Hungary, the death of the venerable Emperor-King Francis Joseph in November 1916 gave impetus to disruptive agitation among subject peoples—Czechs, Slovaks, Yugoslavs, and Rumanians—and his conciliatory and peace-loving grand-nephew who succeeded him under the title of Charles I soon initiated secret negotiations with the Allies looking toward the Dual Monarchy's withdrawal from the war.

The Emperor Charles indicated his willingness to let France regain Alsace-Lorraine, Russia take Constantinople, Serbia gain an outlet to the sea and a portion of Albania, and Italy annex Trent. The negotiations, begun in January 1917, broke down in May because of stubborn opposition from both Italy and Germany. Charles sadly confessed that his realm could not fight another year without internal revolution.

The main reason why Germany opposed the Austrian peace proposals was the prospect now presented her of winning the war by resort to unrestricted submarine warfare. German Hindenburg and Ludendorff advised it. The German Resort to Unre-Admiralty pronounced it feasible and predicted that stricted it would starve out England in six months. Submarine War-Chancellor and the Reichstag approved, and public fare opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of it. Both the military and the diplomatic authorities recognized that in reply the United States would probably go to war, but they thought that American intervention could not thwart the prompt succeis of the U-boat campaign. The possibility of an American army

being sent to Europe was also taken into account, but it was reckoned—quite accurately—that no large force could be organized and transported until long after the six-months' period counted upon for the submarines to achieve their aim.

Plans and preparations for the new German effort were matured by January 1917, at the very time when the Habsburg Emperor was making his peace overtures to the Allies. On the last day of the month Germany notified the United States and other neutral Powers that she was withdrawing the pledges previously given and that thenceforth all sea traffic within specified areas adjoining the British Isles, France, and Italy would, "without further notice, be prevented by all weapons." In other words, German submarines would sink at sight all merchantmen, regardless of the flag they might fly and America's the passengers they might carry, whether of belligerent Juncture or of neutral nations. The United States, under the Allies. leadership of its President, Woodrow Wilson, at once broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and, after debating a project for "armed neutrality," at length on April 6 declared war on Germany.

The American declaration of war was not unexpected in Germany. It was but a logical outcome of the position which Wilson had taken about unrestricted submarine warfare a year previously.1 It was naturally hailed with popular applause in the Allied countries. It justified their cause anew and temporarily reassured them. Yet, just as the Germans anticipated, America could be of hardly more practical help to the Allies immediately after the declaration of war than she had been previously. Months must elapse before she could raise and train and equip a sizeable army, and in the meantime German submarines might succeed in cutting off from England and France such supplies as the United States had hitherto sent them and in so crippling England in particular as to oblige her to accept German peace terms. Whether American intervention was of significance or not would depend in last analysis upon the success or failure of the German U-boats in 1917.

Almost simultaneously with the intervention of the United States, Russia underwent an internal revolution which also, at the moment, was popularly acclaimed in Alliest countries, though

¹ Sec above, p. 819.

actually it was of very dubious value to the Allied cause. Ever since the terrifying military reverses of 1915, affairs Russian in Russia had been going from bad to worse. The tem-Revolution of porary come-back which General Brusilov staged in March eastern Galicia in the summer of 1916 was more than offset by the increasing incompetence of the Tsarist régime. The Tsar himself was thoroughly incompetent in the rôle as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in the field, and the Tsarina, left in full charge of the government at Petrograd, blindly followed the dictates of the perverse Rasputin in filling offices and determining policies, and stubbornly refused to heed the gathering storm of criticism and opposition. The Russian autocracy learned no lesson from military failure and accepted no advice from any really qualified person. Throughout 1916 it adhered, ever more closely, to its traditions of secrecy, suspicion, repression, and intrigue. One fawning courtier succeeded another in Rasputin's favor and consequently in high office.

In vain the Constitutional Democrats and Octobrists 1 in the Duma jointly urged the appointment of a responsible ministry and the establishment of constitutional government. The Duma was dissolved for its pains, and what members were not jailed were sent home. In vain a convention of the local zemstvos endorsed the Duma's recommendations; it too was dissolved. In vain Russian patriots of various social classes and divergent political complexion—conservative country gentlemen and radical trade unionists, aristocratic army officers and bourgeois business men and professional men—demanded reforms, if only to ensure Russian victory in the war. The Tsarina was deaf to In December 1916 a group of reactionary but patriotic noblemen, headed by a relative of the Tsar, hatched a plot against Rasputin as the evil genius of the régime and made doubly sure of getting rid of him by poisoning him and then stabbing him. Not even this assassination brought the Tsarina to reason, for the dead Rasputin exercised upon her disordered mind, and through her upon the Tsar's mind, an even greater influence than had the living Rasputin.

During the winter of 1916–1917 popular disaffection overspread Russia. Patriots complained that the government was hampering the prosecution of the war and hinted that it was conducting

¹ On these Russian parties, see above, pp. 658-661.

treasonable negotiations with the enemy. The subject nationalities grew restless. The middle classes grumbled. There were riots of peasants in the country and strikes of workingmen in the cities. Besides, the winter was especially severe, and, while the courtiers feasted, many of the populace went hungry.

Revolution was precipitated by decrees of the autocratic government, on March 11, 1917, that Petrograd strikers should return to work and that the recently reassembled Duma should again go home. The strikers refused to obey and won over to their side the soldiers whom the government relied upon to suppress them; they then formed a revolutionary "soviet |or council| of soldiers and workingmen." The Duma likewise refused to obey, and its president despatched a telegram to the Tsar, imploring him to name a new and liberal ministry. On March 15, Abdication of a deputation from the Duma waited on the Tsar at Tsar Pskov and convinced him that he must abdicate. Nicho-Abdicate he forthwith did in favor of his brother, the Grand-Duke Michael. But already it was too late for any member of the imperial Romanov family to command the revolution-

By agreement between the Duma and the Petrograd Soviet, a provisional government had been established on March 14, 1017, under the chairmanship of Prince George Lyov, a liberal landlord, head of the Union of Zemstvos, and member of the Constitutional Democratic party. With Prince Lvov were associated eight other "Cadets" (including the eminent historian Paul Milyukóv as minister of foreign affairs), three Octobrists, and one Revolutionary Socialist (Alexander Kerensky) as spokesman

for the Petrograd workingmen. This provisional government at once proclaimed freedom of speech, of association, of the press, and of religion. It liberated Provithousands of political prisoners and removed the ban on political exiles. It restored full autonomy to Finland and promised to extend it to Poland. It announced

aries, and Michael declined to assume the crown.

cratic ment in Russia

that a National Constituent Assembly would shortly be elected by universal manhood suffrage to determine the permanent form of Russia's future government. Simultaneously it labored to stimulate the patriotism of the masses and to infuse new energy into Russia's conduct of the war.

There was rejoicing in the countries allied with Russia and in

the United States. Russia, it was popularly believed, would fight harder and more effectively now that she was overthrowing autocracy and becoming democratic. The struggle against the Central Empires would henceforth be, as President Wilson rhetorically declared, "a war to make the world safe for democracy."

In March, when the Russian Revolution occurred, the British administered a stinging defeat to the Turks in Mesopotamia and captured the important city of Bagdad. In April, Allied Ofwhen the United States entered the war, General fensives Robert Nivelle, who had succeeded General Joffre as commander-in-chief of the French armies in the previous November, opened a fierce offensive against the German trenches on the Western Front along the Aisne River. And simultaneously, elaborate preparations were made for an offensive in the Balkans on the part of the Allied army at Salonica, now commanded by General Sarrail and comprising 600,000 men from Great Britain, France, Italy, and Serbia, with two brigades from Russia. To ensure that the pro-German King of Greece would not embarrass this offensive, an Anglo-French naval expedition was despatched to Athens; in June, it obliged Constantine to abdicate and quit the country and installed the pro-Ally Venizelos as Greek premier under the purely nominal rule of Constantine's youthful second son, Alexander I (1917-1920). In the meantime, the United States persuaded Panama and Cuba to declare war on Germany (April 1917). Siam followed suit in July, and Liberia and China in August. The whole world seemed to be arraying itself on the side of the Allies.

With American intervention and the Russian Revolution to the fore, and with the German army on the defensive, awaiting the outcome of the submarine campaign, it was not surprising "Defeatism" in that a wave of popular pacifism—or "defeatism" swept over Germany. Early in 1916 the German Social Democrats had split into two factions, the majority, under Friedrich Ebert and Philip Scheidemann, continuing to support the government in the prosecution of the war, and the minority, under Hugo Haase and Eduard Bernstein, refusing to approve of further military expenditure. Now, early in 1917, the majority

¹ A third and smaller group of German Socialists, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were even more radical. Known as "Spartacans," they vehe-

joined the minority in counselling peace and urging democratic reform within Germany, and to the pacifist agitation of the Socialists was added that of the Catholic Centre party. Against this pacifist agitation Hindenburg and Ludendorff were adamant. They countered it by promising German victory in the submarine warfare and eventually on the Western Front; and in July they forced the Emperor William II to dismiss the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, whom they accused of being too conciliatory to the Socialists and Centrists, and to appoint in his place a conservative bureaucrat, George Michaelis, who would be a mere agent of the army chiefs. But even with the backing of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, Michaelis could not prevent the Centrists and Socialists from putting through the Reichstag in July 1917 a resolution requesting the government to make peace on the basis of "no annexations, no indemnities."

Nor was the internal situation in the Habsburg Empire reassuring. Already, mutinies were occurring in Czech, Croatian, and Polish regiments of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and presently some of their soldiers deserted to the Allies, Disaffection of the "provisional governments" of the several subject disaffected nationalities were set up at Paris or Peoples London. In July 1917, on the Greek island of Corfu, in Austria representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs (Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs) signed with Nicholas Pašič, the premier of Serbia, a formal "declaration" of their joint purpose to create at the close of the war a unified democratic state with King Peter of Serbia as their common sovereign.

In the circumstances, seemingly auspicious for a general peace settlement, Pope Benedict XV on August 1, 1917, called upon the warring countries to end "the fratricidal conflict" and to negotiate "a just and durable" peace. He proposed the substitution in international affairs of the "moral Peace force of right" for the "material force of arms," the Proposals, restoration of all conquered territories, the mutual cancellation of claims to indemnity, a guaranty of the freedom of the seas, provision for the future adjustment of international disputes by arbitration, a decrease in armaments, and a conciliatory settlement, involving plebiscites if necessary, of rival

mently denounced the war and advocated the forceful establishment of "a dictatorship of the proletariat." Their leaders were jailed by the German government.

claims to such territories as Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and Trentino. By August 1917, however, neither group of belligerents was willing to listen to papal admonitions. The war was at a crisis.

German hope of victory had recently risen again with the progress of the U-boat campaign and with the firm and reassuring attitude of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. And the Allies were more than ever reluctant to negotiate with Germany, now dominated by a High Command which was committed to territorial annexations. President Wilson replied to the Pope, in behalf of "the Allied and Associated Powers," that peace could not be made with such a régime as Germany's. The war must continue.

Back in April, the French offensive on the Aisne had broken down, with terrible losses, and the luckless General Nivelle was supplanted as commander-in-chief of the French armics by General Failure of Allies were barely holding their own on the Western Allies were barely holding their own on the Western Front. Nor was the elaborately prepared offensive in the Balkans, under General Sarrail, any more successful. The Bulgarians, with some reënforcements from Germany and Austria, not only successfully resisted the advance of the Allied army during the spring and summer of 1917, but actually pressed it back toward Salonica. And neither on the Italian front nor on the Russian was there any compensatory gain for the Allies.

While the Central Empires were holding their military conquests on the Continent, Germany was prosecuting her subHeightenmarine campaign with vigor and considerable success.
Ing of Submarine sank nearly four million tons of Allied shipping. If this amount could be doubled during the second half of 1917, Germany, it was recognized, would be enabled to starve out England and also to prevent the transportation of American troops to France. And the necessary slowness of the United States in getting troops ready for transportation across the ocean was a source of satisfaction to Germany as it was of alarm to France and Great Britain.

The United States did everything in her power, after declaring war on Germany, to aid the Allies. She increased her taxes and floated huge "liberty loans," from the proceeds of which she made liberal financial grants to the Allies. She speeded up her production of munitions and other war supplies. She Delay in conscripted four million young men, trained and American equipped them, and prepared them for active service in France or on the high seas. She joined her naval forces to those of Great Britain, and constructed hundreds of new transports for conveying soldiers and supplies to Europe. But the doing of all these things took time. It was estimated that at least a year must elapse before the full weight of America's participation in the World War could be felt. In the meantime the German submarine warfare threatened to nullify it completely.

In the circumstances, pacifism, or "defeatism," passed from the Central Empires to some of the Allied countries. In France, several bankers and politicians, including the ex-premier Joseph Caillaux, worked to bring about an early peace with Germany on the basis of mutual concessions, and, parallelling "Defeation conferences and intrigues, pacifist agitation ism" in spread among the French populace and produced serious mutinies in the French army. A mutiny of some ten divisions was largely responsible for the break-down of General Nivelle's offensive in the spring of 1917. In Italy, a similar "defeatist" movement gathered even greater headway during the summer of 1917 and threatened to undermine the

In Russia, "defeatism" grew rapidly and most alarmingly. For three years Russia had suffered heavier losses than any other country. The masses of her people were sick and tired "Defeatnot only of the oppressive and blundering autocracy, ism" in which they blamed for their disasters, but also of the whole war. As the event proved, the high expectation popularly entertained in France, Britain, and America of the help which the Russian Revolution of March 1917 would be to them was quite unjustified. Most Russians soldiers were much more concerned with getting something for themselves from the provisional government at home than with waging a foreign war; and the provisional government, though anxious to continue the war, was unable to agree upon a generally acceptable program of internal reforms or to resist the importunities of the rapidly spreading "soviets of soldiers, workers, and peasants." In May

morale of the Italian army.

¹ See above, pp. 570-571.

the conservative head of the provisional government, Prince Lvov, resigned, and was succeeded by Alexander Kerensky as premier and minister of war with several colleagues chosen from among the "Menshevik" Socialists.

This change in the personnel of the Russian government did not silence the destructive criticism or halt the subversive activity of the most radical group of Socialists, the "Bolsheviks" or "Communists." These, organized and inflamed and astutely

Communist and German Propaganda in Russia

led by Lenin, who had returned from exile in Switzerland under safe conduct from the German government, and by Leon Trotsky, who had returned similarly from America, preached the doctrine that the Revolution should make no compromise with capital-

ism and the bourgeoisie, that a dictatorship of the proletariat must be established by the Bolsheviks alone, and that the cessation of foreign war was an absolutely necessary condition for accomplishing any real domestic reforms—for socializing Russian land and labor. Lenin and Trotsky gradually acquired great influence over the Petrograd Soviet and over other soviets. A large part of the industrial proletariat was soon converted to enthusiastic support of the Bolshevik program, and a multitude of peasants in the armies at the front, if a bit hazy about the economic philosophy of the Communists, were ready to acclaim any group which promised to take them out of the trenches and let them go home. Such readiness on the part of Russian soldiers was quickened, moreover, by propaganda which German agents industriously spread along the Eastern Front.

In vain Kerensky begged the Allies to consent to a general peace "without annexations or indemnities." In vain helabored to combat both Bolshevik and German propaganda, and to restore the discipline of the faltering and weakening Russian armies.

Breakdown of Russian Army and Kerensky's Government In vain he launched a desperate offensive, in July 1917, against the Austrians and Germans. Russian troops mutinied. The Austrians recovered all of Galicia. The Germans captured Riga and penetrated into Estonia. In vain, Kerensky turned to the "Right" and schemed for the establishment of a military dictatorship; he and the army chiefs could not agree upon the dictator,

and none of them was sufficiently daring to strike. In vain he

¹ On the various groups of "Socialists" in Russia, see above, pp. 654, 658.

turned to the "Left" and promised speedy and radical reforms within Russia. Kerensky was a weak and wordy man, but a much stronger man would have had difficulty in counteracting Bolshevik agitation and in making the Russian Communist Revmasses fight when they would not fight. In November olution of 1917 a second revolution occurred in Russia. Keren-Nov. 1917 sky's "provisional government" was overthrown, and Lenin at the head of the Communists took charge of affairs.1

One of the first acts of the Communist régime was to agree to a truce with the Central Empires; and in March 1918, after protracted wrangling and practically at the point of the victor's bayonet, a peace treaty was signed at Brest-Litovsk by Russia on one side, and by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire on the other. The peace which the German High Command of Ludendorss and Hindenburg thus dictated was harsh in the extreme. It practically involved a


Russia's Withdrawal from War: Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. March 1018

German partition of the Russian Empire. Poland, Lithuania. and the Latvian province of Courland were ceded outright to Germany (and Austria). Bessarabia was entrusted to the Central Empire for transference to Rumania, Armenian districts south of the Caucasus were surrendered to the Ottoman Empire. Finland, Estonia, the Latvian province of Livonia, and the huge area. of the Ukraine ("Little Russia") were detached from Russia and recognized as independent states (under German protection and domination).

Rumania, completely isolated by the collapse and defection of Russia, felt obliged to sue for peace and to agree to a treaty which the Central Empires imposed upon her at Ruma-Bucharest in the same month of March 1918. Thereby Rumania yielded Dobruja to Bulgaria and certain drawal mountain passes on the Hungarian frontier to the from War Dual Monarchy; and in return for her promise of close cooperation with Germany and Austria, she was promised Bessarabia.

With the surrender of Russia and Rumania, German might was unquestionably paramount throughout central and eastern Europe. The areas appropriated from Russia were administered as dependencies of Germany (and Austria), which was thus re-

¹ On the Russian Revolution of November 1917 and its domestic consequences, see below, pp. 006-030.



GERMAN PARTITION OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Note. Area marked (a), formerly a part of Russian Poland, ceded to the Ukraine. Area marked (b) is Bessarabia.

Germany's of crushing resistance of Italians, French, and British in the West. In the circumstances, "defeatism" ceased to disturb the German government. The German people as a whole seemed to forget the slogan of "no annexations"

and no indemnities" and to rally behind Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff with renewed enthusiasm for "victory and conquest first, peace afterwards."

In October 1917 Austro-Hungarian armies, taking advantage of the prostration of Russia and the development of "defeatism" among the enemy, undertook to put Italy out of the war. They overwhelmed a demoralized Italian army at Caporetto and compelled the rapid retirement of all the Italian Defeat of Italy at forces from Austrian soil back into Italy as far as the Caporetto Piave River, only a few miles from Venice. They captured nearly two hundred thousand prisoners and two thousand pieces of artillery. Only Austrian inability to bring up arms and supplies necessary for pursuit and the prompt cooperation of France and Great Britain permitted the Italians to reform their lines and to cling to the Piave. Italy was manifestly staggered, but not quite felled.

Throughout the winter of 1917–1918, while German diplomats were negotiating peace with Russia and Rumania, General Ludendorff was making gigantic preparations for a supreme German military effort against the Allied armies in France.

All available troops were concentrated on the Western Front. All available machine-guns and ammunition were brought hither. The biggest cannon (the so-called Front

"Big Berthas") were put in place to shell Paris at a distance of sixty miles. All was made ready for a series of assaults surpassing any that the world had ever known.

In March 1918 the Germans smote the British trenches in the valley of the Somme, near St. Quentin, and ploughed a path through to Amiens. In April, they hit the British west of Lille and advanced some fifteen miles. In May, they assailed the French along the Aisne and fought their way southward across the intervening hills to the Marne River, reaching Château-Thierry, only about forty miles from Paris. These furious "drives" and sledge-hammer blows netted Germany considerable territory and much booty of prisoners and guns and served to restore the Western Front approximately as it had been in 1914 on the eve of the battle of the Marne. Nevertheless, they were supremely expensive, for they were attended by awful devastation and by a frightful loss of life not only of Frenchmen and Britishers but of Germans also. Germany was sapping her man-

power and exhausting her munitions, without quite subduing the Allies.

In June 1918 the Austrians made a desperate attempt to supplement the German "drives" in France by assailing the Supreme Austrian Effort against But the Italians rallied and dislodged them with heavy losses. This failure of the Austrians on the Piave marked the turn of the tide. Military successes of the Central Empires ceased, and the final triumph of the Allies began.

6. THE TRIUMPH OF THE ALLIES, 1918

Despite the collapse of Russia, the submission of Rumania, and the forced retirement of the Italians to the Piave and of the French to the Marne, the Central Empires were not winning the World War. Allied resistance was stiffening in Italy, in France, and on the high seas. The governments of the Allied Great Powers were displaying a greater vigor than ever before and a greater willingness to coöperate, and their peoples were evincing anew a firm and united determination to achieve "peace through victory." What was most decisive, the German submarine warfare was proving ineffectual. All these factors contributed ultimately to the defeat of the Mid-European Confederacy and to the triumph of the Allies.

Previously there had been much bungling on the part of cabinet ministers in Allied countries and notorious lack of cooperation on the part of Allied generals. As early as December 1916 the British government had been reformed and put into the competent hands of David Lloyd George. Then, Strengthening of in November 1917, after the disaster at Caporetto, Allied the Italian ministry was reorganized, with Vittorio Governments Orlando, a resolute patriot, as premier and practical Simultaneously, the French government passed into dictator. the active hands of George Clemenceau, the veteran politician of the "Radical" Left and a very determined person. And in Woodrow Wilson the United States had a president distinguished

¹ See above, pp. 477-488.

² See above, pp. 544-545, 549, 554, 556, 567-568, 570.

Note. The portrait-bust of Clemenceau, opposite, is by Auguste Rodin (1840-1917). On Rodin, see above, pp. 412-413.





I at her ord gue je ne les racerais jemus

equally for his vigor in pressing the war and for his eloquence in sustaining popular morale.

In November 1917 a Supreme Allied War Council was created to coördinate the military efforts of France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States; and in March 1918, in the Coördi~ midst of the furious German drives on the Western nation of Front, the Allied Great Powers at last agreed to entrust Allied Armies to one man the central direction of all their military operations in France. For this responsible post, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, a short, grizzled, deep-eyed Frenchman of sixtyfive, the foremost military genius of the time, was selected. To Foch were subordinated the French armies under Marshal Pétain and the British under Sir Douglas Haig. 1 It was thus in the fourth year of the war that the Allies finally achieved a real coördination of command.

There can be little doubt that popular morale in Allied countries was heightened, as that in the Central Empires was gradually lowered, by the idealistic utterances of Woodrow Wilson. In one of his most famous speeches, in January 1918, he appealed to world sentiment to back the Allied war aims, which, he declared, consisted of "fourteen points": (1) open covenants of wilson's peace, openly arrived at, and in the future no secret diplomacy; (2) absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except when the seas are closed by general international agreement; (3) removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers to international trade; (4) reduction of national armaments; (5) impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, with the interests of the subject populations receiving equal weight with the government seeking title; (6) evacuation of Russian territory, with full opportunity for Russia to determine her own future development; (7) evacuation and restoration of Belgium; (8) evacuation and

¹ Pétain had succeeded Nivelle as French commander-in-chief in May 1916, and at the end of 1915 Sir Douglas Haig (subsequently Earl Haig) had become commander of the British armies in succession to Sir John French (Earl of Ypres). We may note further that Diaz (subsequently Duke of Vittorio) had succeeded Cadorna as chief of staff of the Italian armies after the rout at Caporetto in November 1917, and that Pershing had been appointed to command the American army in April 1917.

Note. The picture opposite is from a war drawing by Jean Louis Forain (1852-1931). On Forain, see above, p. 405.

restoration of French territory, and righting of the wrong done in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine; (9) readjustment of Italian frontiers along clear recognizable lines of nationality; (10) autonomous development for the peoples of Austria-Hungary; (11) evacuation and restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania, with an outlet to the sea for Serbia and with interrelations of the several Balkan states according to historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; (12) secure sovereignty for the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire, with autonomy for other portions and with freedom of shipping through the Straits; (13) establishment of an independent Poland, including all territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, and having access to the sea; (14) formation of a general association of nations under specific covenants for the purpose

Restoration of Allied Morale of affording mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. These "fourteen points," though vague in general and ambiguous in detail, elicited the hearty and stimulated the hopes of multitudes, not only in

approval and stimulated the hopes of multitudes, not only in America, Britain, France, and Italy, but also among the "subject nationalities" of the Austrian and Ottoman Empires.¹

The publication during the winter of 1917-1918, by the Communist government of Russia, of the existing secret treaties to which the Tsar's government had been party, indicated that the Allies, in the event of victory, were committed to territorial changes which might not square with an "idealistic" peace settlement. The disclosures of the Communists, however, were buried, at least temporarily, under an avalanche of reassurances

Minimizing the Secret Treaties from President Wilson and Allied spokesmen. The President implied, without saying so categorically, that the "secret treaties" had been superseded by his "fourteen points"; his vision of a new world

order, wherein the principle of national self-determination would be fully recognized and peace and good-will would reign between nations, undoubtedly strengthened the determination of the Allied peoples to win the war, and simultaneously it undermined

¹ The "Fourteen Points" were by no means wholly original with Wilson. Analogous "idealistic" peace aims had been put forth in 1917 by an international congress of Socialists at Stockholm, by the British Labor party, by French and British statesmen, and, as we have previously indicated, by the majority of the German Reichstag, by the Austrian Emperor, and by the Pope.

morale in the Central Empires. In Austria-Hungary, Czechs and Poles, Yugoslavs and Rumanians expressed sympathy with the Allies ever more openly and turned toward mining Morale of them ever more eagerly for "deliverance." Even in the German Empire, a growing number of people read into Wilson's words a promise that if only they would democratize their country it would be let off easily in the peace settlement.

Most significant, the submarine campaign was not bringing Germany the speedy victory which Hindenburg and Ludendorff had predicted. By virtue of the vigilance and precautions of the British and American navies and the convoy and patrol systems which they jointly developed, the destruction of Allied shipping by German submarines marine Menace gradually declined. The tonnage destroyed in the first half of 1917 was four million; in the second half of 1917, two and a quarter million; and in the first half of 1918, less than two million. Meanwhile, shipbuilding was being pushed so rapidly that in 1018 newly launched merchant vessels far exceeded in tonnage old ones destroyed. England, therefore, was not starved out by Germany, nor were the oceanic communications and transports of the Allies seriously interfered with. On the other hand, Great Britain, with the active coöperation of the United States, drastically tightened the "blockade" of German ports and starved Germany to a degree never Tightenfelt or anticipated before her submarine effort. And ing of Blockade meanwhile the United States was contributing men against and money to the Allies, and was persuading still Germany other nations to make common cause with them. Brazil declared war on Germany in October 1917; Guatemala, in April 1918; Nicaragua, in May; and Haiti and Honduras in July. Most of By the summer of 1918 the four states of the Mid-World with Allies European Confederacy were confronted with a hostile coalition of twenty-five independent nations 1 and five "dominions," 2 representing every continent and most of the islands

In June 1918 military successes of the Central Empires on the

of the world.

¹ Four of these Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in 1917 but did not participate actively in the War.

² Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India.


Continent of Europe ceased. Austria-Hungary was exhausted by her desperate "drive" against the Italians on the Piave. Germany was halted by the British on the Somme and by the French at the Marne, and no reserves of man-power were left her to withstand the hundreds of thousands of American soldiers who were beginning to reënforce the Allied armies in France.

In July, when the Germans attempted to cross the Marne River, between Château-Thierry and Épernay, Marshal Foch called fresh American troops to the assistance of his French and British veterans and gave battle. The resulting "second battle of the Marne" was a deadly two weeks' combat and an Allied triumph. Not only was the German advance definitively stopped, but the French captured Château-Battle of Thierry and drove the enemy back northward across Marne, July 1918 the Aisne River. To the Germans the second battle of the Marne, in 1918, was far more disastrous than the first battle of the Marne in 1914. In 1914 the Germans, with superior artillery and greater stores of ammunition, could entrench themselves on the heights of the Aisne and successfully resist the counter-attacks of the French. In 1918, however, they had no such advantage. They were unable to repair the damage done, and they were helplessly inferior to the Allies in numbers and in equipment.

The Allies, flushed with victory and guided by the masterhand of Marshal Foch, did not fail to follow up their success at the Marne. Relentlessly they hammered at the German German trenches everywhere in France. While Franco-Expulsion from British armies recaptured St. Quentin, Cambrai, and France Lille, Franco-American armies drove the Germans and Belgium from St. Mihiel, south of Verdun, and cleared the ground northward in the Argonne along the Meuse River. By the end of October 1918 the Germans were crowded almost completely out of France and compelled to evacuate a large part of Belgium.

Allied military success was not confined to the Western Front. Already in October 1917 the British army which had previously advanced from Egypt and defeated the Turks in the Sinai peninsula, penetrated victoriously into Palestine under the command of General Edmund Allenby and in coöperation with the Arab

forces of Feisal and Captain Lawrence. Turkish resistance, organized and conducted by the German General von Falkenhayn,



THE ALLIED ADVANCE, JULY-NOVEMBER 1918

I July 18-August 7 II August 8-October 10 III October 11-November 1
IV November 2-November 11

was stubborn but ineffectual. Jaffa fell to the British in November, and Jerusalem in December. In 1918 Falkenhayn was supplanted as commander-in-chief of the Turks by Liman von Sanders, but the latter could not turn the tide. The British and Arabs overran all Palestine, secured the country east of the Jordan, and syria advanced into Syria. At the beginning of October 1918 they captured Damascus, and by the end of the month they were in

was signed on November 11, 1918, between Germany and the Allies, but by this time revolutionary agitation and naval and military mutinies within Germany had brought about the downfall of the imperial government of William II and Prince Maximilian and the succession of a republican and socialist government. It was consequently this latter government which signed the armistice of November 11.

In accordance with the armistice, the Allies occupied the left bank of the Rhine, the French establishing themselves in Alsace-Lorraine and at Mainz, the Americans at Coblenz, and the British and Belgians at Cologne. To the Allies, furthermore, Germany surrendered all her battleships and submarines and great numbers of guns, locomotives, motor lorries, and railway cars. The Mid-European Confederacy was broken and disarmed. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire lay prostrate at the feet of the triumphant Allies.

The armistice of November 11, 1918, brought an immediate sense of relief and exhilaration to the whole world. The horrible blood-letting of four years and more, with all its attendant havoc, suffering, and misery, was at last halted. Permanent peace might now be made, and the delayed millennium of optimistic progressives finally achieved.

Formal peace was made, but it ushered in no millennium. What the World War and the ensuing peace settlement actually did was to disillusion a vast number of Europeans and to stimulate pessimism rather than optimism. As we now look back on the first two decades of the twentieth century, we perceive that the World War—its antecedents, its course, its immediate consequences—marked the end of one historic era and the beginning of another. It was a different Europe, and a different world, which came out of the struggle from the one which went into it. A different Europe, and a different world, politically, economically, and intellectually. To

world, politically, economically, and intellectually. To be sure, the development of technology and science and strictly material aspects of civilization went on continuously, and so did the merging of European civilization in world civilization. Yet very many of the faiths and simplicities which had characterized the Age of Enlightenment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and of the first decade of the twentieth now seemed, to large sections of mankind, too credulous—the simple faith in

individualism, in political democracy, in personal liberty; the simple faith in the purely pacific role of nationalism; even the simple faith in capitalism and in "progress."

It could hardly be otherwise. Continuity of thought and habit and of steady advance along rutted roads of achievement could not be maintained in the midst of events as cataclysmic and universal as those of the World War. The World War was waged by thirty nations, including every one of the so-called Great Powers. Sixty-five million men bore arms in it. Eight and a half million men were killed. Twentynine million men were wounded, captured, or "missing." Every family in eastern and central Europe, every family in Italy, France, and the huge British Empire, and many families in America suffered loss of near relatives or close friends. The direct financial cost of the World War has been estimated at over two hundred billion dollars; its indirect cost, at over a hundred and fifty billion dollars more; and these figures do not include the additional billions in interest payments, veterans' care and pensions, and similar expenses with which the world has been saddled since the war. Never before had there been a struggle so gigantic, so deadly and costly.

Out of the emotions stirred by the World War and out of the continuing conflict over its liquidation within nations and between nations emerged, as we shall presently point tween nations emerged, as we shall presently point toward out in some detail, an embittered and disillusioned Disillusioned Europe, an hysterical or cynical world. The age of "enlightenment" was passing, and a new age, dark and dubious, was come.



CHAPTER XXV

AFTERMATH OF THE WORLD WAR

I. THE REVOLUTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE



HE military disaster which befell the Mid-European Confederacy in the autumn of 1918 was the signal for immediate political revolutions within Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire. The revolutions, though precipitated in several instances by socialists or other

"radicals," proved to be uniformly brief, comparatively bloodless, and more conducive to democratic nationalism than to any basic social change.

In Germany, Prince Maximilian, the Chancellor on whom the Emperor William II imposed the unpleasant task of opening peace negotiations with the Allies, sought to allay domestic unrest and criticism by promising in October a number of constitutional reforms. Henceforth, the imperial ministry would be responsible not to the Emperor but to the popularly elected Reichstag, which should control the making of war and peace. Individual freedom of speech, press, and assembly would be solemnly guarantied. The Prussian government would be democratized.

The more the Chancellor promised in the way of reform, however, the louder grew the demands for a revolution which should overturn the whole monarchical régime, and to such demands the counsel of the American President, Woodrow Wilson, gave point and cogency. Before the end of the month the Social Democratic leaders, Philip Scheidemann and Friedrich Ebert, were joining the Independent Socialist chieftain, Hugo Haase, in declarations that William II must abdicate. On October 28 a serious naval mutiny occurred at Kiel, and on the next day the Emperor hastily left Berlin and betook himself to military headquarters at Spa, imagining that his high army officers would safeguard alike his person and his throne.

Within a week, almost every industrial city in the German Empire witnessed Socialist rioting and the formation of revolutionary "workers' councils." On November 7 rioting at Munich so alarmed the royal Bavarian government that King Louis III and other members of the Wittelsbach family fled, and on the following day Bavaria was proclaimed a "democratic and socialist republic," with Kurt Eisner, a left-wing Socialist, as "president." In vain Chancellor Maximilian begged William II to save the Hohenzollern dynasty by abdicating in favor of his infant grandson. The Emperor, relying on the army, was deaf to the Chancellor, and by the time the high military officers (including Hindenburg) reluctantly informed him that even the army was seething with sedition and could not be relied upon, there was no longer a friendly Chancellor to advise him. In the night of November 9-10 William II hurriedly packed his bags and with a few personal attendants ingloriously took flight across the frontier into the Netherlands. There, set-William II, Nov. tling down to the life of a country gentleman in the château of Doorn, he finally had the leisure and the resolution to pen a formal abdication on November 28, 1918.

resolution to pen a formal abdication on November 28, 1918. It is a curious commentary upon the mutability of human fortunes that the history of the German Empire of the Hohenzollerns was almost exclusively the history of two reigns—that of William the First (1871–1888), under whom the Empire had been reared in might, and that of William the Last (1888–1918), under whom it fell with a fearful crash.

Already, on November 9, 1918, Prince Maximilian of Baden had felt obliged to turn over the Chancellorship to Friedrich Ebert, and presently, under the latter's guidance, a provisional government was established comprising three Social Democrats and three Independent Socialists, and called, in imitation of the contemporary revolutionary administration in Russia, the "Council of People's

Commissars." But though Ebert and his fellow Socialists in Germany were willing to borrow nomenclature from the Russian Bolsheviks, they had no serious thought of adopting their policies. Only a relatively small group of German Socialists the so-called "Spartacans," led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg "were in full sympathy with the Russian Com-

¹ On the divisions among the German Socialists, see above, pp. 824-825.

munists and eager to emulate them in a violent exercise of proletarian dictatorship and a forceful accomplishment of quick social levelling. The major groups, on the other hand—those that shared in the provisional government—were democratic patriots first, and Marxian Socialists afterwards. They were too anxious for national regeneration to countenance civil war, and too devoted to democracy to favor any dictatorship, even of themselves. They were sure that in a civilized country like Germany the Socialist goal could be most surely, if somewhat slowly, reached under the legal orderly operation of political democracy. So the Socialist provisional government proceeded to repress Spartacan and Communist agitation and to prepare for the democratic election of a Constituent Assembly.

The "moderation" of the official Socialists was supported by the Catholic Centre party, led by Mathias Erzberger, and German also by the Progressives and left-wing National Liberals, newly fused into the Democratic party under **Parties** and the the leadership of Hjalmar Schacht, an able banker. Revolu-It thus transpired that the three political organizations -Progressive, Centrist, and Social Democratic-which had repeatedly united in opposition to illiberal policies of the Hohenzollern Empire, 1 now joined anew to supplant the Empire with a liberal democratic republic. Against this republican bloc were arrayed a Royalist "Right" and a Communist "Left." The "Right" comprised the former Conservative and Free Conservative ative parties, now reorganized as the Nationalist party and intent upon the restoration of monarchy, and the more moderate group of right-wing National Liberals who, under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann, a wealthy industrialist, assumed the title of "German People's party" and, while preferring monarchy, expressed a willingness to collaborate with republicans. The "Left" was composed of Liebknecht's Spartacans, who refused to participate with the "bourgeoisie" in the election of a Constituent Assembly and preached popular insurrection.

In January 1919, on the eve of the elections, the Spartacans staged a revolutionary demonstration at Berlin, but their leaders, Liebknecht and Luxemburg, were more adept at talking than at acting and the attempted insurrection was sternly suppressed by Gustav Noske, the Socialist Commissar of Defense in the

¹ See above, pp. 602-607, 618.

provisional government. Both Liebknecht and Luxemburg were arrested, and both on the way to prison were killed. In the following month the assassination of Kurt Suppression of Eisner, the radical socialist "president" of Bavaria, by reactionary conspirators gave rise to fresh disorders, which, however, were firmly dealt with by the central government of Ebert and Noske.

Meanwhile the Constituent Assembly was elected by secret ballot of all Germans over twenty years of age, men and women alike; and on February 6 it met at Weimar. Its membership of 421, including 36 women, was distributed among the several political parties as follows: Nationalists, 42; People's party, 21; Democrats, 75; Centrists, 88; Socialists, 185; and minor groups, 10. Thus, the thirty million Germans who exercised the suffrage out of a possible total of thirty-five million had chosen only 63 professed monarchists as against 348 members of the republican coalition of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats. This coalition, therefore, dominated the Weimar Assembly, and directed its constructive work- its ratification of the peace treaty with the Allies in June 1919 and its adoption of a constitution at the end of July for the future government of the German Federal Republic. Ebert was elected first constitutional president of the republic, and Scheidemann was appointed its first chancellor.

By August 1919 it seemed as if the German revolution was successfully accomplished. The Hohenzollern Empire was ended and a democratic Republic inaugurated with comparatively little bloodshed and with the backing of a large mathematical property of the popular electorate. There were many differences of aim and policy among the groups composing the victorious coalition. There was discontent and murmuring among workingmen who regarded Liebknecht and Eisner as martyrs and extolled Russian Communism. There was increasing agitation on the part of the monarchical and nationalist Right to discredit and subvert the Republic. But for the time being, at any rate, democratic republicanism was allowed to function in Germany.

In the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the revolution of

²On the provisions of the Weimar Constitution of 1919 and on the history of the German Republic under it, see below, pp. 889-890, 971-987.

Revolution in Austria-Hungary


By this time it was too late for conciliation or compromise. The leading statesmen of the subject nationalities were resolved on achieving a complete separation from the Habsburg Empire, and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian armies removed the one means which the Emperor-King might have employed to enforce obedience.

On October 18, a group of Czech patriots and scholars, including Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Beneš, formally proclaimed at Paris the deposition of Charles of Habsburg as King of Bohemia and the sovereign independence of the "Czechoslova-The kian Republic." Ten days later, a self-constituted Czech "national council" took over the government at Czechoslovakian Prague, and the next day a similar "national council" Republic in the Slovak provinces of Hungary voted for a union of the Slovaks with the Czechs in a unified "Czechoslovakia." A national assembly was speedily convened at Prague. In November it ratified what had been done and chose Masaryk as president of the united Republic, with Beneš as foreign minister, and eventually in February 1920, after protracted debates, it adopted a definitive democratic constitution for the new state.

The southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary revolted simultaneously with the Czechs and Slovaks in the north. On October 29, 1918, the Croatian Diet unanimously proclaimed the deposition of Charles of Habsburg and the separation of the "kingdom of Croatia and Dalmatia" from Hungary. Authority was then transferred to a revolutionary Yugoslav Congress, to which

Yugoslav Union vina and likewise from the Slovene province of Carniola; and on November 23, in accordance with the earlier Declaration of Corfu, the Congress voted to incorporate all the Yugoslav territories of Austria-Hungary with the independent state of Serbia in a unified "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." Of the new kingdom-really a Greater Serbia—King Peter of Serbia assumed the kingship in

¹ See above, p. 825.



December, with his son Alexander as regent and with a ministry headed by the veteran Serbian politician, Nicholas Pašič, and including Ante Trumbič, the foremost Croatian advocate of the union, as foreign minister.

Against the Yugoslav union, Austria-Hungary was powerless.

Only King Nicholas of Montenegro attempted to oppose it. But his little country was quickly occupied by Serbian troops, and at the end of November 1918 the Montenegrin parliament deposed him and ac-

cepted the new régime.

The Poles of Austrian Galicia likewise utilized the occasion to join the Poles of Prussia and Russia in establishing a free and united national state. In this they were unexpectedly aided by

Resurted the military reverses of all their "oppressors," not rection of only Austria and Germany but also Russia. In the Poland early stages of the World War, Polish patriots had been divided on the question of tactics. One group, represented by the celebrated musician, Ignace Paderewski, hoped ardently for an Allied victory, imagining that the defeat of Austria and Germany would force them to surrender their respective Polish provinces and that victorious France and Britain would persuade their Russian ally to grant autonomy if not complete independ-Rival Ef- ence to reunited Poland. Another and larger group, taking their cue from an able soldier and "radical," forts of Paderew-Joseph Pilsudski, were not so sanguine of Allied ski and victory or of Russian altruism or Franco-British benevolence. Mindful that Austria had treated her Polish subjects better than Russia had treated hers, they thought that their immediate task was to assist the Central Powers in conquering Russian Poland and uniting it with Austrian Poland. Consequently, while Paderewski was issuing pro-Allied propaganda and currying favor with French and British statesmen, General Pilsudski had organized a Polish legion and fought on the side of the Central Powers against Russia.

Fortunately for the Polish nation, the conflicting efforts of Pilsudski and Paderewski were both crowned with success. Pilsudski had the satisfaction of witnessing the Russian military débâcle of 1915–1916 and of securing from the Austrian and German Emperors a joint pledge, on November 5, 1916, that they would create an "independent" kingdom of Poland, "a

national state with an hereditary monarch and a constitutional government," in "intimate relations" with their own realms. Whereupon, a "regency" was set up at "Re-Warsaw, and elections were held for a state council, or upper chamber, of the promised Polish parliament.

By the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in March 1918, Russia formally

By the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in March 1918, Russia formally renounced all claim to Poland.

By this time, however, Pilsudski was becoming disillusioned about the magnanimity of the Central Powers. For it was quite clear that in their hour of triumph over Russia they had no intention of bestowing real independence on Russian Poland or of joining their Polish provinces to it. So Pilsudski turned against the Germans and was duly imprisoned by them, while Paderewski had the satisfaction of knowing that at last his own pro-Allied efforts would command the united support of the whole Polish people. During 1918 Austrian Galicia, as well as Prussian Posen, was rife with Polish sedition, and Polish volunteers joined the Allied armies in increasing numbers. With the triumph of the Allies and the pledges of Woodrow Wilson, Poland's final deliverance was at hand.

The deliverance came in the midst of the revolution throughout central Europe. When the Dual Monarchy collapsed, Galicia naturally gravitated toward "independent" Poland; and when Germany surrendered, the Poles of Posen, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia moved in the same direction. released from his German jail, arrived in Warsaw on November 10, 1018, and four days later took over from the Austro-German Regency the provisional government of the country. in January 1919, as an outcome of negotiations be-Erection tween the provisional government at Warsaw and the of Polish Polish National Committee at Paris, the government Republic, 1918-1919 was reorganized under the presidency of Pilsudski

with Paderewski as premier and minister of foreign affairs, while a Constituent Assembly was elected by universal suffrage.

The revolutionary emergence of a united and independent Poland thus synchronized with the attainment of political unity and freedom by Czechoslovakia and by Yugoslavia, Rumanian and also with Rumania's forceful appropriation, not only of Bessarabia from Russia, but of Transylvania from Hungary and of Bukovina from Austria. The national

unification of the Rumanian-speaking peoples was an important phase of the general revolutionary movement and of the attendant disintegration of the Habsburg Empire.

Simultaneously the two cores of the Dual Monarchy—Magyar Hungary and German Austria—were revolutionized. In Hungary, Count Michael Károlyi, who, despite aristocratic ancestry and great wealth, was a chronic critic of the existing illiberal and monarchist régime, put himself at the head of a "provisional government" on October 24–25, 1918. On November 2 he announced that the Emperor-King Charles, "to avoid further Károlyi's bloodshed," had voluntarily freed the Magyars from Hunteir oath of fealty to him, and two weeks later Republic, Károlyi proclaimed Hungary an independent republic, with himself as governor, pledged to democratize the country and to redress the grievances of its subject nationalities. Károlyi's government soon encountered extraordinary difficulties. The subject nationalities would not recognize it, and it was unable to prevent the secession of the Croats and Serbs or to resist the occupation of Transylvania by a Rumanian army. Moreover, its promises of radical democratic reform alienated the conservative landlords and its delay in fulfilling such promises angered the Social Democrats.

In March 1919, when it became clear that the Allies meant to back the aggrandizement of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia at Hungary's expense, Károlyi resigned the government into the hands of a left-wing Socialist and Jewish journalist,

Béla Kun's Communist Dictatorship, 1919 Béla Kun by name, who had recently returned from Russia where, as a prisoner of war, he had acquired a fanatical enthusiasm for Communism. Béla Kun at once proclaimed a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Hungary and feverishly proceeded to rain Com-

munist decrees upon the Magyars and at the same time to employ force against the revolting nationalities. He organized a "red army" and despatched it in turn against the Slovaks and against the Rumanians. Against the former, he obtained a temporary success inasmuch as Czechoslovakia did not yet have a substantial army of her own. But against the Rumanian army, the ragged and ill-equipped forces of Communist Hungary could not stand. As the Rumanians advanced on Budapest and domestic plots thickened against him, Béla Kun in terror fled on August 1, 1919,

into Austria, where he found refuge in a mad-house. Budapest was occupied by Rumanian troops throughout the autumn of 1919, while control of the internal affairs of Hungary passed to a group of aristocrats, including the Archduke Joseph, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, and Count Stephen Bethlen. Following the withdrawal of the Rumanian army, a general election was held in Hungary in January 1920, with results overwhelmingly favorable to the reactionaries. Admiral Horthy was immediately made "Regent," and in April 1921 Count Bethlen began what proved to be a ten-year term as premier and practical dictator.

Meanwhile, Vienna was the scene of a revolution. Here, on October 30, 1918, in the midst of military collapse and governmental paralysis, and at the very time when the disintegration of the Empire was proceeding apace and tion of reducing "Austria" to its original German provinces, 1918 at mobs of workingmen and students inaugurated a series of demonstrations which rapidly grew in size and in determination to have done with the Habsburgs. The Emperor Charles knew that he was powerless to stem the tide. He was ruined by the World War which he himself had not made and by circumstances over which he had little control. Young, well-intentioned, and amiable, his respectable personal qualities were no proof against the vast elemental forces which took his ancestral realm from him and left him the unenviable fame of being the last of the Habsburg Emperors. On November 11, 1918, Charles issued his final imperial decree. "Since my accession," he said, "I have incessantly tried to rescue my peoples from this tremendous war. I have not delayed the reëstablishment of constitutional rights or the opening of a way to real national betterment. Filled with an unalterable love for my people, I will not, with my Abdicaperson, be a hindrance to their free development. I tion of acknowledge the decision taken by German Austria Emperor Charles to form a separate state. The people have by their deputies taken charge of the government. I relinquish all participation in the administration of the state." 1

¹ Charles I thus abdicated as Austrian Emperor on November 11. Two days later he formally abdicated as King of Hungary. In March 1919 he took up his abode in Switzerland. Subsequently, when professed royalists had obtained the upper hand in Hungary, he made two unsuccessful attempts to regain the Hungarian crown—in March and in October 1921. After the second attempt, the Allies practically

The "provisional government" of the "national German state of Austria" was already constituted by mutual agreement among the leaders of the Social Democratic, Christian Socialist, and Nationalist parties, and on November 12 it proclaimed Austria a republic. In the following February a Constituent Assembly was elected by universal suffrage, and with a large coöperating majority of Social Democrats and Christian Socialists it eventually adopted a democratic constitution strikingly similar to that which the corresponding coalition of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats prepared at Weimar for Germany. In December 1920 Michael Hainisch was elected first constitutional president of the Austrian Republic.

The World War had begun in July 1914 with the attack of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, then rated as a Great Power, upon the little Slav state of Serbia. Five years later, thanks to military fortunes and revolutionary upheavals, Serbia was free and amply revenged. Within the former confines of the Dual Monarchy were now the three independent states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and German Austria, while large portions of its erstwhile territories were being appropriated by Serbia, Rumania, Poland, and Italy.

Moreover, all those Powers which had taken their stand with the Dual Monarchy in the World War were now undergoing revolution. Germany, as we have already indicated, was supplanting the Hohenzollern Empire with a democratic republic and relinquishing some of its territory and population to resurrected Poland. And political revolutions were being simultaneously effected in Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire.

In Bulgaria, the dynasty and the form of monarchy remained, thanks largely to the circumstances that King Ferdinand was Revolucian canny enough to abdicate the crown and leave the tion in the country in October 1918 and that his youthful son and successor, Boris III, entrusted practically dictatorial power to a forceful and popular statesman, Alexander Stambulinsky. Stambulinsky, a peasant by birth and the leader of the Agrarian party in Bulgaria, had spent three years in jail for opposing King Ferdinand's juncture with the Central Empires in the World War. He could not be held responsible,

exiled him to Madeira, where he died in April 1922, leaving his claims to his young son, the Archduke Otto. See genealogical table at p. 133, above.

therefore, for the resulting misfortunes, and his vigorous insistence upon meting out punishment to officials who **Boris III** had advised King Ferdinand and upon effecting inand Stambulinsky ternal reforms which would be beneficial to the peasantry tended during the critical post-war period to allay the outraged patriotic sentiment and to brighten the economic prospects of the Bulgarian masses.

In the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Mohammed V had died in July 1918, and in the ensuing October, when Allied armies and Arab forces were overrunning Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, his successor, Mohammed VI, accepted the resignation of Enver

Pasha and the other "Young Turk" ministers whose alliance with Germany had brought the Turkish power to the brink of ruin. Against the pusillanimous conduct of the Sultan during the winter of 1918-1919,

Revolution in Ottoman

as well as against the seeming determination of the Allies to partition the Empire utterly, patriotic Turks found a capable and resourceful leader in Mustafa Kemal, who belonged to the left wing of the Young Turk movement but who had been notably critical of Enver Pasha's policies in the World War. 1 While the Sultan Mohammed VI maintained only the form of an imperial Ottoman government at Constantinople, Mustafa Kemal began in the late spring of 1010 to establish a separate and strongly nationalist Turkish government in Anatolia. Gradually, through military prowess as well as organizing genius, Mustafa Mustafa Kemal managed to secure the unity and independence Kemal of the Turkish provinces of the Empire, until by 1923

Turkish Republic

he was able to appropriate Constantinople, depose Mohammed VI, and finally transform the Ottoman Empire into the national republic of "Turkey," with its capital and centre at Angora (in Asia Minor) rather than at Constantinople, and with himself as its first president.

Even before the formal conclusion of the World War by specific treaties, the old historic Empires of Ottomans and Habsburgs had been revolutionized out of existence, the Hohenzollern Empire of Germany had been replaced by a German Republic, and Bulgaria had acquired a new sovereign and a new ministry.

¹ On earlier activity of Mustafa Kemal, see above, p. 671; and on his new Turkish régime, see below, pp. 1053-1057.

2. THE PEACE OF PARIS

The revolutions in central Europe and the prompt establishment of democratic republics in Germany, Austria, and Hungary aroused popular hope in the defeated and disarmed countries that the victorious Allies in dictating the peace settlement would be exceptionally considerate. The President of the United States had clearly stated that chastisement by the Allies would be directed not against peoples but against autocratic governments, and it was on the basis of his idealistic "fourteen points" that Germany had agreed on November 11, 1918, to lay down her arms and make peace.

The hope of the defeated peoples simply did not square with realities in the victorious countries. Allied statesmen had paid lip service to the "fourteen points," which at best were vague Commit- and susceptible of various interpretations, but they were much more definitely committed to the series of ments of Allied "secret treaties" which they had negotiated with one Statesanother during the war and which promised to this or that country, as the price for its services on the Allied side, specific aggrandizement, national or imperial, at the expense of Germany or her confederates. And even if Allied statesmen themselves had been minded to interpret the "fourteen points" in a conciliatory sense and to revise the secret treaties accordingly, they could hardly have commanded the support of their respective nations, now fired with an intense patriotism and with a fierce hatred of the "enemy."

For four years and more, the popular psychology in Allied countries, especially in France, Great Britain, and Italy, had been keyed up to fever pitch, we must remember, by hysterical

war Psychology of Allied Peoples war propaganda and by personal experience of the horrors of death and destruction. Against the final day of reckoning with their hated foe, French peasants had prepared detailed claims for damages in the invaded and devastated regions, and British shippers for losses on the high seas. The vast majority of people in every Allied country held Germany guilty of the war and responsible for its havoc. They were mindful, too, of the imperialist peace which Germany, as recently as March 1918, had dictated to Russia and Rumania, and they believed that if her armies on the Western Front had

been as successful in the summer of 1918 as Ludendorff had hoped, she would have shown no mercy to them. Now that their own armies were triumphant, why should they show mercy to Germany? To show mercy would merely encourage Germany to undertake another war of conquest.

Nor were the mass of Allied peoples much impressed by what appeared to them to be the twelfth-hour conversion of Germany to pacifism and democracy. They imagined it was mere cringing hypocrisy in order to extract from the Allies more favorable terms; and many persons expressed keen regret that the Allied armies had been precluded by the armistice from occupying Berlin and then and there imposing a peace of vengeance. Indeed, no effective public opinion restrained the Allied statesmen from dealing with the German Republic in the same way as they would have dealt with William II. The German people might revolt and become republican if they liked; that was their own business and not the Allies'. The business of the Allies was to refashion the map of the world and to determine the peace settlement in their own interests.

Horror of the recent past and anxiety lest it might recur were the prevailing popular emotions which conditioned the preparations for making peace. Clemenceau of France and Orlando of Italy, backed by their nations, demanded the dire punishment of the Central Empires. In Great Britain a general election of December 1918 registered a thumping majority for Lloyd George's slogan of "Hang the Kaiser and Make Germany Pay." In the United States, two ex-Presidents of the Republican party, Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft, issued a joint pronouncement against any "parleying" by Wilson which might concede to Germany "a peace around a council-table instead of a sentence from a court," and the Republican party carried the Congressional elections of November 1918.

It had been decided to exclude the enemy states from the peace congress until the Allies should have agreed among themselves upon the terms of peace. It had also been decided Allied that the negotiations should be conducted at Paris, Peace the very centre of Allied hostility to Germany. And at Paris just as January 18 had been the date in 1871 when a Hohenzollern King of Prussia, in the midst of a successful war against France, and surrounded by his triumphant generals and

statesmen, had stood in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace at Opening Session at Versailles and been proclaimed German Emperor, so now, precisely forty-eight years later, at the close of an overwhelmingly victorious war against Germany, statesmen and generals of the Allies assembled in the same hall to undo the work of Bismarck and the Hohenzollerns. On January 18, 1919, the peace congress held its inaugural session. It was a brilliant assemblage of the foremost men of the Allied

countries—except Russia. The Russian Empire of the Romanov Tsars, which had played a stellar rôle in bringing on the World War, had collapsed and disappeared from Not Represented the stage before the war was over, and the succeeding Russia of the revolutionary Communists was now as much a pariah among the Allies as Germany or any other enemy state. The remaining "allied and associated" Powers—and there were thirty-two of them 1—were eminently represented, however. There was Clemenceau, the old "tiger" of French politics, premier of his country and honorary president tions Represented of the congress. There was Marshal Foch, the organizer and winner of military victory. There was President Wilson, who in coming to Europe for the congress had established a wholly new precedent for American executives. There was Lloyd George, who from being the most resolute social reformer in Great Britain had become the most conspicuous pa-Celebtriot in all the dominions of King George V. There rities Present was Orlando, the Italian premier; Marquis Saionii. twice prime minister of Japan; Venizelos, the chief statesman of Greece: Arthur Balfour, British foreign secretary, who had attended the Congress of Berlin in 1878; Generals Botha and Smuts. erstwhile Boer warriors against Great Britain, now stalwart champions of the British Union of South Africa; the prime ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Newfoundland: princes from India and Arabia; the president-elect of Brazil; the premiers of Belgium, Portugal, and Rumania, and likewise of the new states of Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

¹ The thirty-two did not include Russia or Montenegro (which was now incorporated with Serbia), but they did include, in addition to the other twenty-four Powers which had broken with Germany, the three newly established states of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hejaz and the five British "Dominions" of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India.

² The new name for enlarged Serbia.

Attending these and other celebrities were a host of more obscure "experts"—geographers, historians, economists, lawyers, and secretaries—a host as necessary to the making of peace as privates had been to the waging of war. And waiting upon them, and seeking to influence them, were numerous "agents" from a great variety of national, racial, and religious groups—Irishmen, Koreans, Jews, Negroes, Moslems, Abyssinians, etc.

The Peace Congress, after its formal inauguration on January 18, 1919, met rarely, and then in manner ceremonious and perfunctory. The real work of the Congress was done by special committees of diplomats and "experts" selected as needs arose, and it was done in privacy, only such reports being passed on to the whole congress as met the approval of the spokesmen of the Allied Great Powers. For several months the principal decisions were made by the "Big Four"—Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, and Wilson.

It was no easy task to reconcile differences of opinion and policy among the thirty-two delegations and to preserve a united front on the part of all the "allied and associated" governments. Woodrow Wilson, who had set his heart upon fashioning a permanent League of Nations, felt himself obliged to make repeated concessions to his fellow negotiators in order to enlist their support for his pet project. The tragedy of the American President's position at Paris was that for the assurance of the Compro-mising the "Four-"fourteenth point" of his peace program he had to surrender or compromise many of the other thirteen For example, Point One (open covenants Points" openly arrived at) quickly evaporated in the atmosphere of the Congress. Also, Point Two (freedom of the seas), of which the President talked much before he went to Europe, was sacrificed to British susceptibilities. It was likewise a concession to British demands that Point Five was so interpreted as to admit of the transfer of the bulk of the German colonies, under a so-called "mandatory" system, to the British Empire. Wilson, with the backing of Lloyd George, did resist the French demand for the whole left bank of the Rhine, but only by promising that the United States would join Britain in future defense of France—a promise which in spirit if not in letter was contrary to his earlier declarations against group alliances within the League of Nations. Wilson also held out against the Italian demand for the Adriatic port of Fiume, which was in addition to the territories pledged to Italy by the secret treaties, and so stubborn was he that the Italian delegates temporarily withdrew from the congress. Eventually, however, Italy got Fiume.


It was particularly difficult to satisfy the territorial demands of the lesser Powers-Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Greece-without doing injustice to the Adjusting Territorial principle of nationality. Nationalities were too inter-Claims mingled in central and southeastern Europe to permit any hard-and-fast segregation of them within national frontiers. If, for example, all Poles were included in Poland, a considerable number of Germans would be included too; or, if all Czechs and Slovaks were incorporated in Czechoslovakia, a fairly large number of Germans and Magyars would likewise be incorporated. In general, wherever the Allied diplomats had to choose between being unjust to enemy states and being unjust to pro-Ally states, they naturally made the former choice. But in many instances, bitter boundary disputes raged between pro-Ally states themselves. Only the weariness of the several peoples concerned and the dictatorial attitude of the representatives of the Allied Great Powers enabled the peace congress to settle disputes and conclude its labors, and even then there were clashes between Poles and Lithuanians, between Rumanians and Magyars, between Yugoslavs and Italians, and between Greeks and Turks.

After four months of unremitting labor on the part of the Allied diplomats at Paris, the draft of the proposed peace treaty with Germany, containing about 80,000 words, was agreed to by Agreeing on Draft Treaty the German plenipotentiaries, headed by Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the foreign minister of the republican government at Berlin, were admitted to the Congress and presented with the

¹This plenary session on May 6 was secret, and the treaty draft was endorsed without its details being fully known. Only a 10,000-word digest was submitted to the session. Several Powers—Portugal, France, China, and Italy—agreed to it "with reservations."

Note. The cartoon opposite, from a contemporaneous issue of *Punch*, is by Sir Bernard Partridge (born 1861). The "Big Four" here caricatured consist of the "Allied" Lloyd George, André Tardieu (substituting for Clemenceau), and Orlando, and the "Associated" Woodrow Wilson.





draft. The Germans protested that it was intolerably severe and obviously contradictory of the "fourteen points," on the basis of which they had consented to the armistice and to disarmament. They pleaded for its radical amendment. To German entreaties, the Allies were deaf; and after huge demonstrations of protest throughout Germany, after threats of compulsion on the part of the Allies, after the resignation ance of the Scheidemann ministry at Berlin, after several days of awful suspense, the German Constituent Assembly at Weimar on June 23, 1919, the last day of grace, voted to accept unconditionally the Allied terms of peace.

On Tune 28, in the Hall of Mirrors in the stately old palace of Louis XIV, the treaty of Versailles was therefore signed by representatives of Germany and of thirty-one nations leagued against her.1 The scene was that in which in 1871 the German Hohenzollern Empire had been proclaimed, and the date was that on which in 1914 the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary had been assassinated. The World War was thus formally ended on the fifth anniversary of the immediate occasion of its beginning, and with deepest humiliation to the Germany of the Hohenzollerns.

Treaty of Versailles between Germany and the Allies, Tune 28.

Though President Wilson and many of the premiers and "experts" returned home soon after the signing of the peace treaty with Germany, many diplomats remained in Paris for

another year, drafting peace treaties with the other enemy states and working out numerous details of the general peace settlement. Peace was formally concluded with Austria in September 1919; with Hungary in June 1920; and with the Ottoman Empire in August 1920. All these treaties, including the one of June 1919 with Germany, were negotiated at Paris and

Treaties between Other Central **Powers** and the Allies, 1919-1920

signed at various places in the vicinity of Paris. Together, there-

¹ One of the thirty-two delegations on the Allied side—China—refused to sign the treaty of Versailles, because of concessions to Japan. General Smuts, in attaching his signature on behalf of South Africa, protested against what he conceived to be the illiberality of the victors to the vanquished.

NOTE. The picture opposite is of the signing of the treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, from the official painting by the British artist, Sir William Orpen (1878-1931). On Orpen, see below, p. 1145.

fore, they constituted what we may call the Peace of Paris (1010-1020).

Into each of the four major treaties of the Peace of Paris was written a "covenant," providing for the establishment and functioning of a League of Nations and of a Permanent Court of International Justice; and supplementing the treaties League was a special "convention," designed to effect an international organization of labor. Of the Labor Covenant and Labor Conven-Convention and of the Covenant of the League of tion Nations, we shall treat in some detail in a later chapter. Here we merely note that, while they were part and parcel of the Peace of Paris, they were incidental and secondary, in the minds of most of the negotiators, to the territorial and financial provisions of the several treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Turkey. What these provisions were, we shall now outline.

The treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, and ratified by the Weimar Assembly on July 7, profoundly altered the position of Germany. Territorially, Germany coded Provi-Alsace-Lorraine to France, the towns of Eupen and sions of Treaty of Malmédy to Belgium, the city of Memel to Lithu-Verania,2 and the province of Posen and a strip through sailles: Territorial West Prussia (the so-called "corridor") to Poland.3 Furthermore, she consented to the holding of plebiscites, under international auspices, to determine whether Upper Silesia and the southern part of East Prussia should be annexed to Poland. and Schleswig to Denmark.4 Besides, she surrendered outright the important Baltic port of Danzig, which became an internationalized "free city," and for a period of fifteen years the valuable coal region of the Saar, which passed under the administration of the League of Nations and the economic control of France. In the case of the Saar, a plebiscite would determine at

¹ See below, pp. 1009-1021.

² The treaty merely provided for the cession of Memel to the Allies. Memel was "appropriated" by Lithuania in 1923. See below, pp. 1023-1024.

³The "corridor," which cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany, had belonged to Poland until 1772. See the maps, below, pp. 872-873.

⁴ As the outcome of these plebiscites, in 1919, the northern third of Schleswig joined Denmark and all East Prussia remained with Germany. In Upper Silesia, the plebiscite was delayed and interfered with by nationalistic fighting and disorder; when it was held, in 1921, it was generally favorable to Germany, though certain districts gave Polish majorities; and in 1922 the League of Nations arbitrarily partitioned Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland.

the end of fifteen years whether it would remain permanently under international government or revert to Germany or be annexed by France.¹

In addition to territorial cessions in Europe, Germany parted with all her overseas imperial domain. Her lease of Kiaochow and privileged position in the Chinese province of Shantung, as well as her Pacific islands north of the equator, were transferred to Japan; her portion of Samoa, to New Zealand; her other Pacific possessions south of the equator, to Australia; German Southwest Africa, to the British Union of South Africa; German East Africa, to Great Britain, except a small section in the northwest, which went to Belgium; and Kamerun and Togoland were divided between Great Britain and France. In most cases the Powers receiving German colonies did so not as absolute sovereigns but as "mandatories" of the League of Nations, to which they promised to give periodic accounts of their stewardship.

Germany recognized, moreover, the sovereign independence of Belgium, and likewise of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and German Austria. She specifically denounced the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, which she had signed in March 1918 with Russia and Rumania respectively, and gave the Allies carte blanche to settle as they would the affairs of eastern Europe.

Militarily, Germany promised to reduce her army to 100,000 men, including officers; to abolish conscription within her territories; to raze all fortifications between her western frontier and a line drawn fifty kilometers cast of the Rhine; to stop all importation, exportation, and nearly all production of war material; to reduce her navy to six battleships, six light cruisers, and twelve torpedo boats, without submarines; and to abandon military and naval aviation. She agreed, furthermore, to demolish fortifications at Heligoland, to open the Kiel Canal to all nations, to refrain from building forts on the Baltic, and to surrender her transoceanic cables. She expressly consented to the trial, by an international tribunal, of the Emperor William II for "supreme offense against international morality" and of other German officials for "violations of the laws and customs of war." ²

¹ The plebiscite, held in 1935, was favorable to Germany. See below, p. 1002.


² In accordance with this provision, Great Britain, France, and Italy, in 1920, requested the Netherlands to hand over William II for trial. Queen Wilhelmina's

Germany was forced to acknowledge responsibility for the World War, and accordingly to promise that she would make financial reparation "for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property." She was to make an initial payment of five billion dollars and such subsequent payments, up to "the utmost of her ability," as a special Reparations Commission of the Allies should direct. In the meantime she was to pay shipping damage on a ton-for-ton basis by cession of most of her existing merchant marine and by new construction; to devote her economic resources to the rebuilding of devastated areas in France; to supply France, Belgium, and Italy with coal; to return works of art taken from Belgium and France, and to deliver to Belgium manuscripts and books of equivalent value to those destroyed at Louvain.

The total amount of war indemnity—or reparations—which Germany must pay was left indefinite. It was to be the most that she could pay, and many of the Allied statesmen, despite the misgivings of some economists, imagined that throughout the coming years she could be made to pay a vast deal. Whatever the amount, the treaty of Versailles provided that until it was paid and the treaty fully executed Allied armies should continue to occupy the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads on the right bank at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz, with Germany footing the bills. The one concession in this drastic arrangement was that if Germany should be duly fulfilling her obligations to the Reparations Commission, Cologne would be evacuated at the end of five years, Coblenz at the end of ten, and Mainz at the end of fifteen.

Harsh indeed were the terms which the Peace of Paris imposed on Germany. Her domain in Europe was restricted; her overseas empire was destroyed; she was disarmed and impoverished and mortgaged; for a long time, it seemed, she would be completely at the mercy of her conquerors. And hardly less harsh was the punishment which the Peace of Paris meted out to Germany's confederates in the World War.

advisers declined on the ground that no existing international court possessed legal jurisdiction and that the Dutch people "could not betray the faith of anyone who has confided himself to their free institutions." Upon the promise of the Dutch government to take necessary precautions to prevent the ex-Emperor from endangering the world's peace, the Allies dropped the project of trying William II, or any other war-time official of Germany.



Austria, by the treaty signed at St. Germain, near Paris, on September 10, 1919, and ratified by the Constituent Assembly at Vienna on October 17 was required to recognize the Treaty sovereign independence of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, of St. Germain Poland, and Yugoslavia, and to cede to them, and to with Italy and Rumania, the bulk of the realm which Austria. previously, in union with herself, had composed the 1919 Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Austria was left, thereby, a small independent German state, with an area and a population smaller than Portugal's. Part even of the German-speaking Tyrol was detached from her and added to Italy, and Austria had to promise that she would not unite in the future with Germany. She was deprived of seaports; her army was restricted to 30,000 men; and she was obligated, like Germany, to pay such indemnity as the Reparations Commission should determine.

From Bulgaria were taken, by the treaty signed at Neuilly, near Paris, on November 27, 1919, most of the land she had Treaty of acquired in the Balkan War of 1912–1913 and all her Neuilly conquests in the World War. Dobruja went to with Bulgaria, Rumania; the greater part of Macedonia, to Yugoslavia; and the Thracian coast, to Greece. Bulgaria promised to pay an indemnity of almost half a billion dollars and to reduce her army to 33,000 men.

Hungary, by the treaty of the Trianon signed on June 4, 1920, was stripped of non-Magyar subjects as completely as Austria

had been shorn of non-Germans. The Slovak provinces went to Czechoslovakia. Transylvania and a strip of land to the west of it were ceded to Rumania. Croatia was yielded to Yugoslavia. The Banat was divided between Yugoslavia and Rumania. Hungary thus shrank from an imperial and maritime domain of 125,000 square miles, with twenty-two million inhabitants, into a national and landlocked Magyar state of 36,000 square miles with a population of eight million and with an army limited to 35,000 men.

Determination of the fate of the Ottoman Empire was delayed by the persistence of acute differences among the Allies—especially between France and Great Britain, and between Italy and Greece—about the distribution of the spoils, and also by the existence of rival Turkish governments, that of the Sultan at Constantinople and that of Mustafa Kemal at Angora. At

length, on August 10, 1920, an agreement was reached among the Allies, and on the same day they signed at Sèvres, Treaty of near Paris, a treaty of peace with the Sultan's govern-Sèvres with ment. Thereby, the Arab state of Hejaz, embracing Ottoman the strip of territory east of the Red Sea, would be Empire, independent; Armenia would be a free Christian republic under international guaranties: Palestine, Mesopotamia. the trans-Jordan area, and Syria would be detached from the Empire and the first three made "mandatories" of Great Britain, and the fourth, of France; Cilicia would be a "sphere of influence" for France, and southern Anatolia, including the port of Adalia, a "sphere of influence" for Italy; Smyrna and adjacent territory on the coast of Asia Minor, together with Thrace, Adrianople, the peninsula of Gallipoli, and the remaining Ægean islands would be surrendered to Greece. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would be demilitarized and internationalized, and the once mighty Ottoman Empire would be contracted into a petty Turkish state retaining only the city of Constantinople and the interior of Asia Minor and subjected to crushing debts and to organized foreign control of its taxes, loans, and economic concessions.

The government of the Sultan Mohammed VI at Constantinople agreed to the treaty of Sèvres, but the Turkish National Assembly at Angora, under the forceful leadership of Mustafa Kemal, refused to ratify it. Taking advantage of the demobilization of the Allied armies and of the war weariness of the Allied peoples, Mustafa Kemal, with his Turkish forces, obliterated the Armenian republic and obliged Italian troops to quit southern Anatolia

Successful Turkish Opposition to Treaty of Sèvres

and the French to desist from occupying Cilicia. The governments of France and Italy, thus discomfited by the Turkish military revival and already critical of the advantages conferred by the treaty of Sèvres on Great Britain and Greece, proceeded in the spring of 1921 to treat directly with Mustafa Kemal, promising him, at the price of certain economic concessions, to renounce their respective claims to Cilicia and southern Anatolia and to work for a revision of the treaty of Sèvres. At the same time, at Moscow, the Communist government of Russia signed a treaty with the Turkish Nationalists, condemning the treaty of Sèvres, disavowing Russian ambitions in the Ottoman Empire, re-ceding Kars and Ardahan to Turkey, and proclaiming "the solidarity which unites Turkey and Russia in the struggle against imperialism."

In the meantime the British government, which had most to lose by the revival of Turkish power, was abetting the proposals of Venizelos and of the recently restored King Constantine that Greece should undertake the suppression of the militant Turkish

Nationalists and the enforcement of the treaty of Græco-Sèvres.1 Accordingly, in July 1921 a large Greek Turkish army, under Constantine, advanced from Smyrna War of 1921-1922 against Mustafa Kemal. At first the Greeks gained some ground, but presently they were turned back and eventually overwhelmed and driven from Smyrna. They received no real aid from the British, who distrusted King Constantine and who had had enough fighting for the present, while, on the other hand, the Turks were supplied with arms and munitions by the French and the Italians. In triumph, therefore, the troops of Mustafa Kemal possessed themselves of the whole of Asia Minor, and in November 1922 they occupied Constantinople and deposed Mohammed VI. It was the end of the Ottoman Empire, but not of Turkey.

The victories of Mustafa Kemal and his Turkish Nationalists scrapped the treaty of Sèvres and called for a new peace settlement in the Near East. After another series of difficult and delicate negotiations, peace was finally concluded between Turkey


Final
Treaty of
Lausanne
between
Turkey
and the
Allies,
1923

and the Allies at Lausanne, in Switzerland, on July 24, 1923. By the terms of the treaty of Lausanne, Turkey definitely resigned all claims to Hejaz, Palestine, Trans-Jordania, Mesopotamia, and Syria, but she retained the whole of Anatolia and likewise Cilicia, Adalia, Smyrna, Constantinople, Gallipoli, Adrianople, and eastern Thrace—a total area of about

300,000 square miles, with a population of about thirteen million.

¹ Both Venizelos and Constantine favored war with Mustafa Kemal, but no love was lost between the two Greeks or between the republican and royalist factions which they respectively headed. Following the death of King Alexander I of Greece in 1920, Venizelos and his republicans were defeated in a general election by the royalists; Venizelos accordingly withdrew from the government, and Constantine was restored (November 1920). In September 1922, following the disastrous rout of his armies in Asia Minor, King Constantine again abdicated, this time in favor of his son, George II, and removed himself finally from Greece.

She consented to the freedom of the Straits and their demilitarization, but she escaped most of the onerous foreign control of



SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, 1923 Compare with maps above, pp. 266, 267, and 687.

her internal affairs which the treaty of Sèvres had imposed upon her.¹

¹ Greece lost most heavily by the treaty of Lausanne. She was compelled not only to surrender Smyrna, Gallipoli, and eastern Thrace to Turkey, but also to

The Peace of Paris of 1919-1920 included not only the Turkish treaty of Sèvres (as subsequently revised by the treaty of Lausanne), the Hungarian treaty of the Trianon, the Special Bulgarian treaty of Neuilly, the Austrian treaty of Arrange-St. Germain, and the German treaty of Versailles, ments in General but numerous supplementary conventions and agree-Peace ments among the Allies and between the Allies and Settlement certain nations which had been neutral during the World War. Thus, late in 1919, a plebiscite was authorized to determine the boundary between Poland and Czechoslovakia, and at the same time the Arctic archipelago of Spitzbergen, hitherto a "no man's land," was entrusted to Norway.

Delimitation of the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia proved peculiarly troublesome. So long as the Orlando cabinet was in power at Rome, Italy insistently demanded not Italy and only Trieste and Istria and the Adriatic islands and Yugoslavia that part of Dalmatia pledged her by the secret treaties of wartime, but the important port of Fiume also. But the Yugoslavs seemed equally insistent upon appropriating Fiume, and in this they were stubbornly backed, as we have said, by President Woodrow Wilson and hardly less so by the French. With the advent of a more conciliatory Italian cabinet, under Francesco Nitti, in July 1919, the outlook for a mutually acceptable compromise grew brighter, only to be overcast, however, in September, by the forcible seizure of Fiume by a free-lance Italian expedition under Gabriele D'Annunzio. the ultra-patriotic litterateur, 1 now turned soldier-adventurer. D'Annunzio posed as a twentieth-century Garibaldi, and even surpassed his illustrious prototype in rhetorical exuberance. He won a plebiscite in Fiume and raided the town of Zara in Dalmatia. Eventually, a compromise was reached between the governments of Yugoslavia and Italy Fiume and by the treaty of Rapallo (November 1920): Fiume became a free neutralized city; a strip of Dalmatian of Rapallo and Rome coast extending southward from Istria as far as Fiume, and also the town of Zara, passed to Italy, and the remainder of resign to Italy the Greek-speaking Ægean islands known as the Dodecanese. By a remarkable special arrangement between Greece and Turkey, the Christian Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor were transplanted to Greece and the Moslem Turkish residents of Greece were removed to Turkey.

¹ See above, p. 398.

Dalmatia to Yugoslavia.¹ Still later, in accordance with the supplementary treaty of Rome (January 1924), the main part of Fiume was definitively annexed by Italy, and its chief suburb by Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile a series of important treaties was concluded by the Allied Great Powers with national states which had recently been created or much enlarged—Poland, Czechoslo-Treaties vakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, etc. These treaties with contained provisions relating to boundaries, to the Newly Estabassumption of the public debts of annexed regions, and lished or Unified to commercial affairs. In most instances, moreover, they contained provisions guarantying certain rights and privileges to national, racial, or religious minorities within the several states. In the case of Poland, and in that "Minorof Rumania, "minority rights" were primarily intended for the benefit of Jews, while in the case of Yugoslavia and in that of Czechoslovakia they were in behalf of Germans and Magyars.²

In the Peace of Paris and its manifold negotiations and treatics, Russia had no direct part. Indeed, at the very time when the Allies were making peace with Germany, they were encouraging military revolts against the Communist government in Russia.³ Nevertheless, the Peace of Paris

Russian Communists gradually got the upper hand in their own country, and the series of separate treaties which they concluded in 1920–1921 with the non-Russian states that

¹ At this very time, President Wilson's policies were being repudiated by a majority of the American electorate. The United States consequently refused to ratify the treaty of Versailles or the Covenant of the League of Nations or the special alliance with France and Great Britain, and proceeded to make a separate peace with Germany and Austria (1922). On the general defection of America from the Peace of Paris, see below, pp. 1018–1021.

² The chief proponents of the treaty rights of minorities were Jews, who were fearful of losing their identity or being discriminated against in the fiercely nationalistic countries of central Europe; and they gained the interested support of the British and American governments. The British government had already committed itself, in 1917, to Zionist demands for a "Jewish home land" in Palestine. See below, pp. 882–883. National minorities, other than Jewish, were to share in the new treaty rights, partly because the Jews did not wish to be singled out by name and partly because the Allies felt somewhat apologetic about incorporating large numbers of Germans or Magyars with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. For form's sake, the Allies imposed a "minorities treaty" on Austria, though Austria was left without national minorities.

³ See below, pp. oir-oi4.

had emerged out of the old Russian Empire belonged, logically and chronologically, if not formally, to the general peace settlement of the World War.

From the moment of its advent to power in November 1917 the Communist dictatorship of Russia had proclaimed its firm intention of abandoning the imperial policies of previous Russian governments and respecting the doctrine of national self-determination, and to this intention it adhered after Germany had been compelled by the Allies to renounce the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and after the peoples in the former western provinces of the Russian Empire had set up provisional but Independweak governments of their own. Consequently, ence of Finland. Russia negotiated treaties in 1920 with Finland, with Estonia, Estonia, with Latvia (comprising the Letts of Livonia Latvia, and Courland), and with Lithuania, recognizing the sovereign independence of each and delimiting the frontiers.

Poland, egged on by the Allies, declined for a time to negotiate with the Russian dictatorship and actually made war against it. But when hostilities reached a deadlock, peace negotiations were opened in earnest; and on March 18, 1921, was signed Russo-Polish the treaty of Riga. Russia recognized the independ-War and ence of Poland and consented to the drawing of the Treaty of Russo-Polish frontier from the Duna River to the Rumanian border, along a line about twenty-five miles east of that tentatively fixed by the Allies; and each of the countries pledged itself not to participate in military activities against the other and not to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of the other. There still remained a serious dispute between Poland and Lithuania over the city of Vilna, which the former had taken by force in October 1920. Otherwise, however, the territorial settlement appeared satisfactory both to Russia and to the new national states which had seceded from her. At a congress of their representatives in Warsaw in March 1922, Russia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland agreed to confirm the existing treaties with one another and in future to submit all disputes to arbitration.


The revolutions of 1918-1920 in central Europe and the international peace treaties of 1919-1923 were two phases of the aftermath of the World War. A third, the emergence of a more emphatically nationalistic state-system, with accompanying


shift in the relative positions of the Great Powers, we shall next discuss.

3. NEW NATIONAL STATES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

Nationalism was greatly forwarded by the World War and its aftermath. The doctrine of national self-determination, the doctrine that people who speak a common language General and cherish common historic traditions should live Acceptance of under a polity of their own making, was invoked Doctrine during the World War by Tsarist Russia against the of National Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, by Germany against Self-Russia, by the Allies against the Mid-European Determination Confederacy, and, most oracularly and influentially of all, by President Wilson of the United States. Aroused national sentiment proved a most efficacious stimulant of popular morale in waging the war, alike for Germans, Frenchmen, Britishers, Italians, and Americans; and an increasingly ardent hope of achieving national independence spurred on the various subject peoples in the empires of central and eastern Europe.

Back in 1815 the Congress of Vienna, in its territorial settlement of Europe, had almost wholly ignored the principle of nationality. The principle was then too novel and too Growth of closely identified with the vanguished France of the Nationalism since Revolution and of Napoleon. By 1919, however, the Congress of Vienna principle could not be ignored. It had become enshrined not only in nineteenth-century France, but also in the historic "unifications" of Italy and Germany; and during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth it had been gaining devotees of an ever greater fanaticism and in an ever widening area, in eastern as well as western and central Europe. The World War began as a despairing effort of the imperial domain of Austria-Hungary to The stay the disruptive process which the principle of na-War a Nationality, as represented by Serbia, was fostering. And the World War, however much economic imperialism was associated with some of its participants, was basically and strikingly a nationalistic war. It was an extension, on a colossal scale, of the series of nationalistic wars of the third quarter of the nincteenth century. It was an herculean effort to complete or restore the national unifications of France, Ger-





many, and Italy, and to follow them up with national unifications of Rumanians, Greeks, and the several Slavic and Baltic peoples.

Basing the European State-System on Nationality

In this respect the World War was eminently successful. The Congress of Paris of 1919-1920 recognized the principle of nationality and wrote it into the public law of Europe. At last, the political map of the continent was radically revised and re-drawn. Big imperial domains and fragmentary nations were wiped out, and in their place appeared a set of strictly national states, an emphatically nationalistic—and novel—state-system.

Four great imperial domains were dismembered—the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian

Destruction of **Empires** in Europe

Empire, the German Empire. Moreover, certain small states or provinces whose inhabitants comprised but a part of a given nationality lost their historic identity for example, Montenegro, Croatia, Bohemia, Transyl-

vania, Galicia, Livonia, Courland, Schleswig. From the welding together of disjointed members of the same linguistic nationality and from the partition of multi-national empires, six national states were newly created—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania.

Construction of National States

Latvia, Estonia, and Finland; six existing national states were enlarged and consolidated-Serbia (Yugoslavia). Rumania, Greece, Italy, France (by recovering Alsace-Lorraine), and Denmark (by obtaining northern Schleswig); and five states which had previously been imperial were now transformed into strictly national states-Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Russia. Altogether, where there had been twenty-one sovereign states in 1914 (including four extensive empires), there were twenty-seven in 1920, and almost all of the twenty-seven were national.

The Communists in Russia were as ready to recognize the principle of nationality as was the peace congress at Paris. Not

Communist Russia and the Principle of Nationality

only did they consent, as we have seen, to the break-up of the historic Russian Empire and the secession of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, but they acquiesced in the incorporation of Bessarabia with Rumania and they reorganized what remained of the Empire on a federal basis. Much the greater

part of it—the part peopled by Great Russians—became the "Russian Soviet Socialist Republic," with its capital at Moscow.

But federated with this Great Russian state, and accorded some degree of cultural nationalism and local autonomy, were certain lesser "Soviet Socialist Republics" for formerly subject nationalities: (1) the White Russian, established in January 1919, with its capital at Minsk; (2) the Ukrainian (or Little Russian, or "Ruthenian"), set up in December 1919, with its capital at Kharkov; and (3) the Transcaucasian, itself representing a federation of the three petty national states of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.¹

To re-cast the political map of eastern and central Europe on a severely national basis was extraordinarily difficult. To bring together all Poles, for example, in a single Polish state, involved the inclusion of a considerable number of Germans and Ruthenians, as well as Jews. For wherever there was a majority of one nationality, there was likely to be a minority of another nationality. In general, as we know, the new boundaries were drawn by the peacemakers at Paris in such a way as to reward the nations which had favored the Allies in the World War and to penalize those which had opposed them. Thus it befell that whereas the Italians gained all of "Italia irredenta," Nation "Irrenew "irredentas" were created for Hungary, Bulgaria, dentas" and Germany. Sizeable Magyar minorities passed in Europe under the sway of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia; Bulgarian minorities, under the rule of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece; and German minorities, under the dominion of Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. And, contrary to the principle of nationality, German Austria was prohibited from uniting with Germany. Besides, the arbitrariness with which frontiers were delimited between some of the Allied national states themselves—for example, between Italy and Yugoslavia, and between Poland and Lithuania—tended to accentuate, rather than to allay, nationalistic ambition and rivalry. And to the same end operated the compulsion which the Allies exerted on newly founded or enlarged national states, such as Poland and Rumania, to get them to accord special rights and privileges to national minorities within their respective territories.

Nationalism could not be so aroused in belligerent countries during the World War or so applied to the post-war territorial settlement in eastern and central Europe, without affecting the

¹ See below, pp. 914-917.

whole world. In Switzerland, there was more friction among the three constituent nationalities—German, French, Nationand Italian. In Belgium, the Flemish- or Netherlandish-speaking population grew embittered against alism in Switzertheir French-speaking countrymen, some going so far as to demand political autonomy or even independence; and after the war, the Belgian government felt obliged to make several significant concessions to the Flemish national Ιn Belgium movement, such as emphasizing the equality of the Flemish language with French and transforming the University of Ghent into a purely Flemish institution. In Spain, simultaneously, there was a marked recrudescence of autonomous agitation In Spain among Catalans and Basques. Even in France, there was notable agitation of a similar sort by small but noisy groups of Bretons, Provençals, and Corsicans, while the majority of the "redeemed" Alsatians appeared to combine with their joy at being freed from Germany a stubbornness about retaining their own cultural peculiarities. In Iceland, nationalism reached such a threatening stage that In Iceland Denmark agreed in 1918 to recognize her ancient colony as an independent sovereign state; henceforth the only bond between Iceland and Denmark was that both had the same king.

In Ireland, too, separatist nationalism produced a veritable revolution. At the beginning of the World War the Irish masses In Ireland (outside Ulster) had seemed content to follow John Redmond and his parliamentary Nationalist party and to await patiently the putting into force of the pending Home Rule Act.¹ Gradually, however, they grew critical and restless. The British government, while professing the utmost concern about the right of national self-determination for Belgians and other Continental peoples, persevered in being strangely indifferent to any such right for Ireland. The Home Rule Bill, already passed, was not applied, while, on the other hand, the British government not only inflicted the direst punishment on the handful of Irishmen who participated in the Easter rebellion of 1916 at Dublin² but also proposed to enforce military conscription on all Irishmen. In the circumstances, the relatively mild home-rule nationalism of John Redmond lost popular support in Ireland,

¹ See above, pp. 501-502.

² See above, p. 813.

and the more uncompromising nationalism of the Sinn Fein party gained ground.

The Sinn Feiners were not at all content with mere home rule; they would have a fully self-governing Ireland. Nor would they await any concessions from the British and Its Leaders Parliament at Westminster; they would act independently. They possessed, moreover, several enthusiastic and resourceful leaders, including Arthur Griffith, the real founder of this new type of Irish nationalism, and, quite as notably, Eamon De Valera and Michael Collins. De Valera, born in New York in 1882 of a Spanish father and an Irish mother, had been educated at Dublin and had developed into a very doctrinaire and fanatical advocate of national independence for Ireland; he participated in the armed insurrection of 1016, and escaping from a British prison in 1919 he toured the United States and collected vitally necessary funds for the Sinn Fein organization. Collins, born of a peasant family near Cork in 1890, resigned a position in the British civil service at London to join the "Irish Volunteers" and engage in the 1916 rebellion; clever and supple, he managed to get out of jail in 1917 and thereafter to elude arrest, and, endowed with a magnetic personality and real organizing ability, he soon became the guiding spirit of the Sinn Fein movement. No wonder that the Irish masses (outside Ulster) deserted Redmond and the "elder statesmen" and rallied to the standard raised by these high-spirited younger nationalists.

In the general elections to the British Parliament in December 1918, three-fourths of all the Irish constituencies—which formerly had elected Nationalists of the Redmond party—returned Sinn Fein candidates. As many of these as were not in jail, acting on the principles enunciated by Griffith, promptly met at "Irish Dublin (instead of taking seats in the British Parliament at Westminster), and proclaimed themselves the legal Parliament (or Dail) of the "Irish Republic," 1918 Valera as president and Griffith as vice-president.

A desperate struggle ensued between the nationalist "Irish Republic," on one hand, and the British government and Ulster Unionists, on the other. There were frequent skirmishes between Republican riflemen and British troops, many assassinations and other personal outrages on both sides, and much destruction

¹ On Griffith and the origins of Sinn Fein, see above, pp. 498-499.

of property. For three years matters went steadily from bad to worse

In 1920 David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, with Unionist support, attempted to solve the problem by putting

Home Rule Act of 1920, and Government of Northern Ireland through the British Parliament a new Home Rule Act, providing for two separate and partially autonomous governments in Ireland, one for the six counties in Ulster and the other for the twenty-six counties in the rest of the country. The Unionists in Ulster accepted the Act as a satisfactory compromise and accordingly instituted at Belfast a local government

of their own, the government of "Northern Ireland." But the Act was bitterly denounced by the Republicans of the south, as sanctioning the division of Ireland and as conferring little power on the proposed Irish Parliament at Dublin. So the Irish revolution proceeded.

Finally, when no other solution seemed possible, Lloyd George invited the "Irish Republic" to send delegates to London to negotiate terms of peace with Great Britain. The outcome was the treaty of London, signed in December 1921, which provided for the establishment of an "Irish Free State" as a Treaty of London, self-governing Dominion within the British Empire, 1921, and the Irish similar in status to Canada; Ulster could join the Free State if it so determined by plebiscite, or it might Free State continue under the separate government provided by the Home Rule Act of 1920. The treaty was speedily ratified by the British Parliament, but in Ireland it encountered strenuous opposition, not only from the "Government of Northern Ireland," but also from De Valera and other extremists in the Republican government, who protested against what they termed the compromising attitude of Collins and Griffith and insisted that Irishmen should not remain in the British Empire or take an oath of allegiance to the British King. In January 1922 the Dail by a close margin ratified the treaty of London, accepted the resignation of De Valera, and transformed itself into the "provisional government of the Irish Free State," with Griffith as president and Collins as prime minister.

The Irish Free State began its career in most difficult circumstances. Ulster voted to stay out of the Free State. De Valera and his Republican followers took up arms against the Free

State and for a year terrorized southern Ireland. Griffith, the founder of Sinn Fein and intellectual leader of the Free State, soon died; and Collins, the able premier and minister of defense, was assassinated. Nevertheless, the "provisional government," guided by Collins's successor, William Cosgrave, slowly but surely gained strength and stability. The British military forces duly evacuated Ireland. A working agreement was reached between the Free State and the Government of Northern Ireland. A democratic constitution was adopted by the Dail and ratified by the British Parliament, and in December 1922 the Irish Free State was permanently established. The greater part of Ireland, under the inspiration of Sinn Fein nationalism, had definitely severed its historic political union with Great Britain and had joined Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa as a self-governing Dominion of the British Empire.

The triumph of nationalism in Ireland synchronized with special manifestations of nationalism in other parts of the British Empire. Each of the self-governing Dominions— Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa— alism in Other experienced special pride in its military exploits during the World War, faith in its increasing importance in the future, and determination to have its voice heard

in the counsels of the world, not indirectly through London, but directly from its own national capital. Each of these Dominions signed the peace treaties of Paris as a sovereign Power, and each was admitted to separate membership in the League of Nations. Three of them—South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand—acquired individual "mandates" for certain German colonies.

The nationalism implicit in these developments was affirmed as a principle in the so-called "Balfour Report," which was adopted by an Imperial Conference of the statesmen of Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions in 1926: "They [Great Britain and the several Dominions] are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs,

though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." It remained to have this principle enacted into imperial law, and

this was accomplished in December 1931, with the passage of the "Statute of Westminster" by the British Parliament.

The Statute recognized the legal equality of the Dominions with the mother-country and their practical independence of one another. It provided that no law of the British Parliament might be applied to any Dominion without the latter's express consent, that no law of a Dominion parliament might be "disallowed" by the British government, and that no alteration in the laws concerning the royal succession or titles might be made without the assent of all the Dominion parliaments as well as the British. Implicitly, at least, each Dominion was to be free to direct its foreign affairs as it would. Thereby, an "British important part of the British Empire-Canada, Aus-Commontralia, New Zealand, South Africa, and likewise the wealth of Nations" Irish Free State—was legally transformed into a merely sentimental alliance of independent nations, now officially styled the "British Commonwealth of Nations."

Outside the self-governing Dominions, the British Empire was troubled, in the post-war years, by rising nationalism. Reserving the details of such trouble for later consideration, we may here remark its widespread outcroppings in 1919-1920 in India and in the Near East. In India, coöperation between Rising Hindus and Moslems was quickened by common war Nationalism in experiences and by common opposition to the repres-India sive policy which the British government pursued,2 with the result that the nationalist movement became more comprehensive and more radical. Already, in 1917-1918, the British Secretary of State for India, Montagu, and the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, had agreed on a program of "reform" calculated to conciliate the more moderate Indian Nationalists, and in 1919, in conformity with the Montagu-Chelmsford program, the British Parliament passed a new "Government of India Act." Certain matters, such as those relating to the Reform army, the police, and the administration of justice, of 1919 in India were still "reserved" to British officials, but certain other matters, such as those relating to education, agriculture.

¹ See below, pp. 1058-1060, 1062-1063, 1065-1069.

² This reached a climax in the "massacre of Amritsar," in the spring of 1919, when several hundred natives who had assembled to protest against the government were attacked and killed by British troops under the command of General Dyer.

and public health, were "transferred" to the supervision of provincial councils, a majority of whose members would henceforth be elected by the natives. This Act of 1919, though advertised by the British government as "a great step forward," was far from satisfying the Indian Nationalists, whose demands for full "home rule" were now championed by a remarkable Hindu mystic, Mohandas Gandhi. Of Gandhi, we shall say more in another place.¹

In the Near East, Great Britain added greatly to her imperial domain but had to cope at the same time with strenuous nationalist opposition from native peoples. The British had utilized Turkish belligerency in the World War to proclaim, in December 1914, the complete separation of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, the deposition of the pro-Turkish Khedive Abbas II, the succession of his more tractable uncle, Hussein Kiamil, with the new title of "Sultan," and the establishment of a formal British protectorate over Egypt.² Patriotic Egyptians did not take kindly to the British protectorate; and, Nationespecially after Hussein's death in 1917 and the accesalism in sion of his brother, Fuad, the native Nationalist party increased its popular following and its demands for national independence. The leader of this party, Saad Zaghlul, a lawyer and statesman of peasant stock, was insistent on having Egypt represented at the Paris Peace Congress as a sovereign Power; and his arrest and deportation to Malta by the British authorities precipitated a popular insurrection which was put down in 1919 only by the energetic campaigning of General Allenby at the head of a British army of 60,000 men. Lord Milner was then sent out from London to "conciliate" the Egyptians, and in accordance with his recommendations a treaty was signed in 1921 between Great Britain and the Sultan Fuad, whereby Egypt would become formally independent—the Sultan assuming Egyptian "Indethe title of King-though Egyptian "independence" would actually be restricted by continuing British ence," "alliance" and "supervision." The treaty was rejected by the Nationalist followers of Zaghlul, and, after more rioting and more military suppression, it was put into force by a unilateral proclamation of the British government in February 1922. A constitution for the new kingdom was devised in 1923,

¹ See below, pp. 1066-1068.

² See above, p. 815.

and in 1924 Zaghlul, finally released by the British, became prime minister of Egypt under King Fuad. Egypt proceeded to act as if she were independent; Great Britain, as if Egypt were a British dependency.¹

The Arabs, too, inclined toward nationalism and made a good deal of trouble for British imperialism. They had been more than willing to coöperate with British armies in putting an Arab Naend to Ottoman rule in Hejaz, Palestine, Syria, Trans-Jordania, and Mesopotamia, but they were not at all tionalism satisfied with the post-war settlement. Hejaz was recognized, to be sure, as an independent Arab state under a native King, Hussein, and one of this King's sons—Feisal—was dignified with the title of King of Iraq (Mesopotamia), while upon another, Abdullah, was conferred the chieftainship of Trans-Jordania. The British, nevertheless, in the pursuit of imperialist aims, not only prevented the formation of a single comprehensive national state for the Arabs but coöperated with the French in dominating the several Arab regions. France was given a "mandate" for Syria, while Great Britain herself took "mandates" for Mesopotamia (Iraq), Trans-Jordania, and Palestine, and showed signs of regarding the "independence" of Hejaz in the same light as the "independence" of Egypt. The result was an inflaming of Arab nationalism and acute friction between European officials

In Palestine, Arab nationalism came into conflict not only with British imperialism but also with Jewish nationalism. In November 1917, while the World War was in a critical stage and just

and native rulers in the several Arab states.3

Jewish
Nationalism and
the
Balfour
Declaration

before the army of General Allenby had captured Jerusalem,⁴ the British government had responded to the representations of Jewish Zionists by issuing, through its foreign minister, Arthur Balfour, a famous "declaration": "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home

for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other

¹ See below, pp. 1062-1063.

² See above, pp. 815-816, 837-838.

³ See below, pp. 1058-1062.


⁴ See above, pp. 836-837.

country." After the war, under the "mandate" which Great Britain received, the governorship of Palestine was entrusted to Sir Herbert Samuel, a British Jew, and Jewish immigration was actively encouraged. This was resented, for both political and economic reasons, by the Arabs who constituted the large majority of the country's population; and a series of disturbances ensued.

The immediate aftermath of the World War was thus characterized by a great surge of nationalism and by the reorganization of the traditional state-system of Europe in approximate conformity with the principle of nationality. It was also characterized by a noteworthy shift in the "balance of power" The Great among the traditionally imperial nations of the world. Powers after the Certain Great Powers of the nineteenth century ceased, World at least temporarily, to be Great Powers, while others rose to a new eminence. Austria-Hungary as a single Great Power disappeared altogether, and none of the states which took its place could be ranked as a Great Power. Russia, though still embracing a vast expanse of territory and a huge aggregate of population, was so exhausted by the war, so intent Eclipse of Austria. upon internal socialistic experimentation, and so iso-Russia. lated from ordinary international relationships, that she hardly counted, for the time being, as a Great Germany Power. Germany was in a similar position: her armaments were rigidly restricted, her navy surrendered, her colonies gone, her homeland narrowed, and her natural resources heavily mortgaged to foreign creditors. On the other hand, Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan now occupied a place in world affairs more commanding than ever before.

Great Britain's imperial predominance seemed amply assured. She had humbled Germany, her latest rival, as completely as in earlier centuries she had overcome the Spaniards, the Dutch, and the French. To her already far-flung dominion were now added, in one form or another, some of the most valuable provinces of the old Ottoman Empire--- Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Egypt—and also

¹ According to the census of 1922, Palestine had a population of about threequarters of a million, of whom approximately 85,000 were Jews and 650,000 were Arabs. The latter were mainly Moslem in religion, although there were almost as many Christian Arabs in Palestine as there were Jews. Christian and Moslem Arabs tended to make common cause against what they thought of as Jewish "intrusion." On subsequent developments in Palestine, see below, pp. 1059-1060.



the bulk of the German colonial empire: East Africa (renamed "Tanganyika"), Southwest Africa, parts of Kamerun and Togoland, and Pacific islands south of the equator. She could now construct a Cape-to-Cairo railway exclusively on British soil, and by supplementing the Suez Canal (which she already owned) with the Bagdad railway (whose financial control she acquired in 1023) she could safeguard the trade of the vast expanse of land and water from Cairo and Constantinople to Rangoon and Singapore. The richest regions of Asia and of Africa were hers. To be sure, these gains were shared in some instances with South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, and were partially though intangibly offset by the rising nationalism of all the self-governing Dominions (including the recently established Irish Free State) and likewise of native peoples in India and the Near East. Yet the British Commonwealth of Nations promised to add to, rather than subtract from, the mother-country's power and prestige; and throughout the world, British manufactures, British trade, and British naval might enjoyed an enhanced reputation.

France emerged from the World War as the foremost military state on the Continent of Europe. She was exalted, as Germany was abased. Against a German "war of revenge" she was insured by possession of Strasbourg and Metz and by an occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. Moreover, she exercised a paramount influence alike in the military and in the economic affairs of Poland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; most of the lesser Powers of Europe were her satellites. And outside Europe, France maintained her position as a colonial and imperial Power second only to Great Britain. To the French empire were added "mandates" for Syria and portions of Kamerun and Togoland, and a greatly strengthened protectorate over Morocco. Simultaneously, to the industrial resources of France were added the rich iron mines of Lorraine and the coal fields of the Saar, so that she was likely to become, in the near future, a really industrialized nation of the first magnitude.

Italy not only completed her national unification but assumed a leading imperial rôle in the Adriatic and eastern Mediterranean. She extended her frontier in Trentino so that a considerable number of Austrian Germans were included within it, and she advanced her sway in Istria and Dalmatia at Yugoslav expense. She dominated Albania, tightened her hold

on the Dodecanese, helped to thwart Greek aspirations in Asia Minor and Thrace, and somewhat enlarged her African colonies of Libya and Somaliland. She was not fully satisfied with the



THE NEAR EAST AFTER THE WORLD WAR

Italian: Libya; Dodecanese (1); Eritrea (6); Somaliland (9).

British: Egypt; Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; Kenya; Palestine and Trans-Jordania (3);

Iraq (4); Aden (5); Somaliland (8).

French: Syria (2); Somaliland (7).

colonial settlement; and Italy, as well as France, was firmly resolved not only to keep her late foes disarmed but also to maintain for herself the heaviest possible armaments.

Even more startling than the change in the balance of power in Europe resulting from the relative decline of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary and rise of Great Britain, France, and Italy was the change in the world balance produced by the heightening power and prestige of the United States and Japan. The international prestige of the United States was immensely enhanced by her ultimately decisive intervention in the World Of United War, and her position as a Great Power was greatly strengthened by war-time developments—not only by her demonstrated ability to put millions of men under arms but also by her industrial, financial, imperial, and naval gains. The war stimulated American industry and profited American business men and financiers to such an extent that at its close New York was supplanting London as the financial capital of the world and the United States was Great Britain's close rival as the world's chief workshop. During the World War, moreover, the United States was steadily building up her naval power and intensifying her imperialism in the Caribbean. Presently she was insisting on possession of a navy equal to Britain's, and already she was adding to her economic and political influence in Latin America, interfering in Mexico, purchasing the Danish West Indies, and establishing virtual protectorates over Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua.¹ At the Paris Peace Congress she secured from the European Powers a formal recognition of her special privileges, under the "Monroe Doctrine," throughout the American continents.

Japan, simultaneously, magnified her influence and power in the Far East. This she was enabled to do by the continuing discord and strife within China ³ and by the absorption of the European Powers (and the United States) in other aspects of the World War. On the Chinese government of Yüan Shih-kai she made in January 1915 "twenty-one demands," calculated to transform China into a Japanese protectorate, and though she receded from some of them, under pressure from the United States and other Powers, she compelled Yüan to accord her, by treaties of May 1915, special economic and political rights in southern Manchuria and in eastern Inner

¹ See above, pp. 600-700.

² See Vol. I, pp. 780-781, and below, p. 1014.

⁸ See above, pp. 728-730, and below, pp. 1074-1080.

Mongolia. These treaties were not ratified by the Chinese parliament and were repudiated by the several Chinese governments which succeeded Yüan's after his death in June 1916. Nevertheless Japan acted as if they were binding, and China was in no position to restrain her. Indeed, Japan utilized the exigencies of rival Chinese governments to mortgage the country ever more heavily in favor of herself. She loaned almost two hundred million dollars to China between 1914 and 1918, and for every advance of money she gained some valuable concession. Moreover, by an agreement of November 1917 with the United States, the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement, Japan, while promising to maintain the "open door" in China, obtained formal American recognition of her own "special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous." Then, by the peace treaties at the end of the World War, Japan was empowered, despite vehement protests from China, to take over from Germany the lease of the port of Kiaochow and the economic concessions in the Shantung peninsula; and, in addition, she was given a "mandate" for the former German colonies in the Pacific north of the equator. The World War cost Japan much less than it cost any other Great Power, and yet Japanese gains from it were especially important.

4. TEMPORARY VOGUE OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICANISM

The immediate aftermath of the World War seemed to confirm Woodrow Wilson's contention that the war had been waged by the United States and the Allies "to make the world safe for democracy." For, with the exception of Russia, where the Tsarist régime was supplanted by a Communist dictatorship,¹ all the Great Powers and most of the lesser ones adopted or elaborated democratic forms of government. And with the extension of democracy was associated a new vogue of republicanism.

In 1914, six of the Great Powers were monarchical. In 1919, only three remained such, and these three—Great Britain, Italy, and Japan—had reconsecrated their political institutions by military victory. The three most famous European dynasties—the Habsburg, the Romanov, and the Hohenzollern—had ceased to reign. Lesser princely

¹ See above, pp. 821-824, 827-829, and below, pp. 906-930.

families had been expelled, moreover, from the several German Republics had replaced monarchies in Germany, in Austria, and in Russia. All the newly created states of central Europe were republics-Poland and Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia and Finland. Not only were the American continents almost wholly republican, but Europe was now predominantly so, and even in Asia the vast and populous country of China was at least nominally republican, while from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire was rising a Turkish Republic. Divine-right absolute monarchy was at last extinct, except in a veiled form in Japan; and monarchy of the constitutional liberal type was obviously on the decline.

Individual kings were forced out of Greece and Bulgaria, but in both these countries the institution of monarchy troublously survived. The King of Montenegro was formally deposed in order that the country might be merged with Yugoslavia. Albania, having deposed her German prince,1 was proclaimed a republic. Simultaneously there were ineffectual anti-royalist demonstrations in the Netherlands, in Sweden, and in Spain. In Portugal, a royalist uprising against the republican government was easily put down. Only in Hungary did a newly established republic soon revert to formal monarchy, and here it was monarchy without a king.

The era of the World War and the Peace of Paris witnessed, not only a general advance of republicanism and a corresponding

retrogression of monarchy, but also an almost universal adherence to the principles and practices of political of Polit-Thoroughly democratic constitutions democracy. were evolved by popularly elected assemblies in the

ical Democracy

revolutionized Central Empires and in the newly founded or newly unified states of central and eastern Europe—in Germany (1919), Austria (1920), Czechoslovakia (1920), Poland (1921), Yugoslavia (1921), Turkey (1921), Estonia (1921), Latvia (1922), Lithuania (1922), Rumania (1923), etc.

The German constitution, adopted by the Weimar Assembly in 1010, retained the federal organization of the German Empire while lessening the powers of the several states and broadening those of the central government. For the exercise of the latter, it entrusted legislative authority jointly to the Reichstag, rep-

¹ See above, p. 685, note.

resenting the people, and to a Reichsrat, representing the states, and executive authority to a president, elected by Demothe people for seven years, and to a chancellor and cratic Constituhis associate ministers, responsible to the Reichstag. tion in The suffrage was accorded to all German citizens, Germany, IQIQ male and female, over twenty years of age; a detailed bill of rights was included; and provision was made for the initiative, referendum, and recall, and for proportional and professional representation. Similar and contemporaneous changes in the state constitutions of Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, and all the others guarantied the democratic character of the whole German Republic.

The Austrian constitution of 1920 established a federal republic of eight states,1 with a legislature similar to Germanv's. and an executive like the French—a titular president Demoelected by the legislature (for four years instead of cratic Constituseven, however) and a directing ministry responsible tion in to the legislature. The Czechoslovakian constitution Austria, 1920 of 1920 and the Polish constitution of 1921 were alike modelled on the democratic constitution of the French Republic. Each provided for a bicameral parliament—a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies-which should choose the Czechopresident, enact the laws, and control the ministry. slovakia Both constitutions, however—and the Austrian likeand Poland wise-were more democratic than the French, in that they enfranchised all adult citizens, women as well as men.

Yugoslavia and Rumania retained the institution of monarchy, but adopted constitutions, the one in 1921 and the other in 1923, Yugowhich resembled rather closely the democratic conslavia and stitution of the Italian kingdom. Both guarantied individual liberties, parliamentary government, and ministerial responsibility; and both, despite provincial opposition, affirmed the unitary, rather than the federal, character of the state, and provided for local administration under prefects appointed by the central government. Both conferred the suffrage on all male citizens over twenty years of age.

¹ Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and Vienna.

Simultaneously, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania adopted constitutions at once republican and democratic. Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland, though remaining nominally monarchical, likewise removed all property qualifications for the exercise of the suffrage and enfranchised women.

Baltic and Scandinavian Nations

In Great Britain, the earlier electoral reforms of 1832, 1867, and 1884-1885 1 were consolidated and supplemented by an important democratic Act of 1918, containing the following provisions. All men could vote who were over twenty Compleyears of age and had maintained a residence or place tion of Demoof business for six months, and all women who were cratic over twenty-nine years of age and had owned or Reform in Britain tenanted premises for six months or were married to men who owned or tenanted premises, and also all war veterans who were over eighteen years of age. Voting in a general election would take place on one and the same day. No person could vote in more than two constituencies. Proportional representation was applied to university constituencies. liamentary seats were redistributed so that each would represent approximately 70,000 of the population. Subsequently, in 1928, the British Parliament took an additional step toward the democratic goal and granted the suffrage to women as freely as to men.

Meanwhile, the constitution of Northern Ireland, embodied in an act of the British Parliament of 1920, conformed in democratic tenor with the British reform of 1918, Constituwhile the constitution of the Irish Free State, as tions in adopted in 1923, went farther. It not only en-Ireland franchised all citizens over twenty years of age but elaborated a system of proportional representation.

In France, a long-debated electoral reform bill, which had been repeatedly passed by the Chamber and rejected by the Senate, was finally enacted in 1919. It substituted Demoanew the scrutin de liste for the scrutin d'arrondissement 2 cratic Reand incorporated with it a scheme of proportional representation. In Italy, a similar reform was adopted in 1919, introducing proportional representation and the scrutin In neither Italy nor France, however, was woman suffrage introduced.

¹ See above, pp. 77-78, 273-276.

² See above, pp. 540-541, note.

In Belgium, an electoral reform of 1919 abolished the existing In Belsel system of plural voting 1 and substituted for it the gium and system of one-man-one-vote, and a further reform of 1921 partially enfranchised women. In the Dutch Netherlands, really democratic government was introduced in 1917 by the extension of the suffrage to all men and women and the establishment of proportional representation.²

In general it may be said of all the newer constitutions and electoral reforms of the years from 1917 to 1923 that special emphasis was put on representative, democratic government, on ministerial responsibility, and on guaranties of individual liberty. In most of the changes, the enfranchisement of women stood out conspicuously; it seemed an appropriate recognition of the significant rôle which women had played in the World

War and were playing in industrialized society, as well Woman as a logical application of the principle of political Suffrage democracy. Full suffrage was accorded to women, on the same basis as to men, in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia. Poland, the Baltic and Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Great Britain, and the Irish Free State. In the United States, moreover, a constitutional amendment providing for universal woman suffrage was approved by the Congress, ratified by the federated states, and formally proclaimed in 1920. Japan, too, felt the surge of the Demodemocratic movement in Europe and America; she cratic Redid not enfranchise women, but in 1925 she put an end form in Japan to property qualifications and extended the parliamentary suffrage equally to all adult male citizens.


All this radical democratizing of political institutions was hailed as a world-wide fruition of that priceless seed which had been planted in France and the United States in the eighteenth century, which had germinated and sprouted in western and central Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, which in the first decade of the twentieth, on the eve of the World War, had pushed its shoots upward through the un-

¹ See above, pp. 593-594.

² On the previous electoral system in the Netherlands, see above, pp. 626-627.

Note. The picture opposite, suggestive of "post-war leisure," is from a painting by a French "modernist," Théophile Robert (born 1879).





promising soil of the Russian, Ottoman, and Chinese Empires, and which now, in the aftermath of the World War, seemed

unmistakably to assure to the whole world a common type of political aspiration and achievement. The world, it was boasted, was henceforth truly safe for democracy, and political democracy would amply justify itself in its rapid amelioration of internal social conditions and international relations. There

Seeming
Final
Fruition
of Democratic
Movement

was still, during the immediate aftermath of the World War, a remarkable note of optimism in European thought and word.

Yet the seemingly all-but-universal triumph of democracy came at the very moment when international relations were embittered in unprecedented degree by the World War and the Peace of Paris, when the gravest and most extraordinary problems of economic reconstruction were confronting statesmen and peoples, and when nationalism, rather than democracy, was commanding the deepest affections of the masses of mankind. In the circumstances, the triumph of democracy, at least of the traditionally liberal type, was more apparent than real. It proved but a passing phase of the immediate aftermath of the war. Already, in fact, it was menaced by Emergence

It proved but a passing phase of the immediate aftermath of the war. Already, in fact, it was menaced by the rise of Communist dictatorship in Russia and by vigorous widespread agitation for like dictatorship

Menaced by Emerging Dictatorship

elsewhere. Presently, it would be menaced and largely undone by the forceful establishment of a startling array of other dictatorships.

To understand such an outcome, we must bear in mind that the post-war years were characterized not only by democratic experimentation and a very fierce nationalism, but also by a most distressing economic instability. The nature of this instability and some of its significant aspects, we shall now discuss, leaving to another chapter the treatment of the several dictatorships which eventuated.

5. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The economic situation in Europe during the post-war years was extremely difficult. The war had been terribly expensive

Note. The picture opposite, "From an Office Window," is from a post-war etching by a British "modernist," C. R. W. Nevinson (born 1889).

and destructive, and its conclusion was attended by grievous handicaps to economic and social reconstruction. The Post-War governments of the several belligerent nations found Economic themselves saddled with huge war debts, and, in Difficuladdition, with extraordinary obligations for the rehabilitation of wounded men and devastated areas. Then, too, the demobilization of the gigantic armies, the release of millions of men from trench and camp and their return to rural field or urban factory glutted the labor market at the very time when the special demand of the preceding years for munitions and food-stuffs sharply declined. Furthermore, the scrapping of numerous war industries involved a stoppage of the abnormal profits and wages which had been accruing therefrom to capitalists and workingmen respectively; and the prospect of reaping comparable returns from the resumption of ordinary industrial and commercial enterprise was dimmed alike by a renewal and intensification of international Economic competition and by a sharp diminution of the pur-Nationalism chasing power of the general public. Besides, the intense nationalism which was developed by the war and the peace settlement militated against normal economic recovery, for this nationalism, being economic as well as political, led not only to an increase in the number of states in Europe but also to the adoption by each of high protective tariffs which seriously checked international trade and hence domestic production.

Immensely aggravating the situation was the expectation of the victorious European nations that reparation payments could and would be made by Germany (and the other van-Reparations and quished countries) sufficient in amount to cover their Interown expenditures on reconstruction of devastated Allied Debts areas and rehabilitation of soldiers and also to enable them to discharge the debts which they owed to one another and most largely to the United States.1 Germany and her confederates were compelled by the peace treaties, as we know, to promise large reparation payments, and through subsequent negotiations the European Allies agreed to a schedule of debt payments to the

¹ These so-called "inter-allied debts" included large loans which Great Britain made to her Continental Allies during the first three years of the World War and still larger loans which the United States made to Great Britain, France, and Italy (and other Allies) during the last year of the war and just after the armistice. The American loans totalled over eleven billion dollars.

United States. But it was one thing to promise and quite another thing to keep the promises.

Relatively little in the way of reparations was actually forthcoming from Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria. These states were so reduced in area and resources, so weighed down by their own war debts, and so hemmed in by tariff barriers which their neighbors erected against them, that, if they were to escape internal bankruptcy, they would have to receive, rather than give, financial assistance abroad. Bulgaria was a very poor country anyway, and Austria and Hungary were no longer the hubs of an extensive and fairly prosperous im- Insolperial domain. Hungary was now a petty agricultural vency of Austria country without ports or markets, while Austria and Hunlacked means of sustaining her overgrown urban population at Vienna. Very soon the finances of both Austria and Hungary were wrecked by inflation, and as early as 1921 the League of Nations felt obliged to arrange for a foreign loan to Austria. In 1923 similar arrangements were made in respect of Hungary.1

In the case of Germany, from which the creditor nations naturally expected most, the payment of reparations involved manifold difficulties. The German people were not minded to pay reparations at all. They felt that the promise

of Making Germany

to pay had been extorted from them under duress and they resented its coupling with the allegation that they alone were "guilty" of the war. They and their government would pay only what they were compelled to pay. And in compelling Germany to pay, the Reparations Commission which represented the several creditor nations had its hands full. If Germany were pressed too hard, she might go Communist and, in conjunction with Russia, disintegrate the whole capitalistic fabric of modern Europe. If, on the other hand, she was not pressed hard enough, she would be enabled to recover her military and economic power and utilize it in the not distant future to undo the treaty of Versailles.

The stand which the Allies—and the Reparations Commission -took immediately after the war was that Germany must be made to pay the most that she could pay, and yet nobody knew

¹ International supervision of Hungary's reconstruction was exercised, under League auspices, from 1924 to 1926, by Jeremiah Smith, an American banker.

just how much that might be; the estimates of economists were much more modest than those of statesmen, especially of French statesmen. No precise amount had been fixed by the peace treaty, and the resulting uncertainty was troublesome and exasperating. It sharpened the rivalry among the Allies for preferential treatment of their respective claims, and at the same time it retarded Germany's economic recovery and lessened her ability to pay. In 1920, after much haggling, the Allies agreed, at an international conference at Spa, upon a percentage division of whatever reparation payments Germany could be compelled to make.1 Then, in 1921, after more haggling, the Fixing Reparations Commission fixed the total German German Reparaindemnity at thirty-two billion dollars—an amount tions at 32 much less than what Clemenceau and Lloyd George Billion. had talked about in 1918 but still larger by three **IQ2I** than the figure which had been proposed by economic experts at the peace congress.

But even with the removal of uncertainty as to what was expected of Germany and with a definite apportionment among the Allies of what was to be paid, there remained no little doubt as to whether Germany really could pay the staggering sum of thirty-two billion dollars and no little perplexity as to how she would pay it if she could. It was argued at first that she would pay a considerable part of it in kind, that is, by giving her creditors coal, locomotives, textile machinery, and Obstacles other products of her mines and factories; and in fact to Paying in Kind she did make some such payments in kind. The more she thus paid, however, the louder grew the complaints in Allied countries that they were being deprived of markets for their own goods; and presently the Allied governments called a halt on payments in kind from Germany.

Money payments were supposed to constitute the major part of the indemnity, but they could be made by Germany only if she enjoyed a favorable balance of trade, that is, if her exports obstacles exceeded her imports. But this condition was very to Paying in Cash provided a valuable market for German manufactures, was now in chaos and virtually closed to economic penetra-

¹ According to the agreement at Spa, France would have 52 per cent, Great Britain 22, Italy 10, Belgium 8, and the others 8.

tion from the outside world. Germany no longer possessed overseas colonies or "spheres of influence" where her goods might receive preferential treatment. Moreover, neighboring Poland was entering into economic competition with Germany, levying high tariffs against German imports and diverting her own exports from customary German routes to a newly established route across the Polish "corridor." For a brief time, such handicaps to German enterprise were partially offset by a currency inflation, which artificially stimulated Germany's production and enabled her to undersell her chief competitors—Britain, France, and the United States—even in their home markets. But these countries soon erected additional tariff walls against the flood of "cheap" German goods, while within Germany inflation reached such a stage that the currency became practically worthless. By the autumn of 1923 the German mark, whose pre-war value was about twenty-five cents in American money, was quoted at two and a half trillion to the dollar in Berlin and at four trillion in Cologne; milk sold for 250 billion marks a quart, and was scarce at that price.

Already, in the latter part of 1922, Germany had declared her inability to meet her financial obligations to the Allies and had requested a two-year moratorium. The British government, anxious to expedite the resumption of normal commercial relationships, gave favorable car to the request, but the

French government, then presided over by Raymond Poincaré, who imagined that Germany could pay if and she would, resolved to apply force. Wherefore, in January 1923, despite British criticism, a French army (with detachments from Belgium and Italy) crossed the Rhine and took possession of the rich mining

Default French Occupation of Ruhr.

region of the Ruhr, the very nerve-centre of Germany's industrial life. The event proved sorry for all concerned. The Germans, outraged by the hostile incursion and yet unable to oppose it by force of arms, were firmly welded together in patriotic fervor and in stubborn determination to pursue a policy of passive resistance to French demands, even if such a policy meant the economic ruin of their own country. The French, on the other hand, were scandalized by the general strike which almost completely paralyzed industry in the Ruhr and throughout Germany and which clearly demonstrated a national purpose on the part

of Germany to prevent the collection of reparations, and they were still more scandalized by the eventual discovery that their expedition into the Ruhr cost them more money than they got out of it. By the autumn of 1923, it was obvious, even to the French, that Germany's economic life was in dissolution and that the reparation arrangements would have to be revised.

In 1924, therefore, as a result of international negotiations and of deliberations by a commission of economic experts headed by an American banker, Charles Dawes, new arrangements were agreed to by the Allies on one side and by Germany Dawes on the other. There was no change in the total amount Plan for Reparaof the German indemnity, which was left at thirty-two tions. billion dollars, but it was made payable over a long 1924 period of time in annual installments (beginning at 250 million dollars and then gradually increasing) and in accordance with special regulations to be administered by a neutral "agentgeneral for reparation payments." 1 Simultaneously Germany cancelled her inflated currency and, at great cost to a large part of her population, restored the pre-war mark and instituted new taxes, while France withdrew her armed forces from the Ruhr and awaited the flow of money from Germany.

For a time the "Dawes Plan" gave promise of working well. German industry quickened, and reparation payments were made promptly. But the plan was admittedly only a temporary expedient, and there were serious flaws in it. Germans were impatient with the close regulation of their domestic affairs by foreigners, a regulation which threatened to be interminable, and they insisted that the total amount of the indemnity was beyond all reason and must be pared down. With this latter contention there was considerable sympathy in most Allied countries, especially in Great Britain and the United States, but all the European Allies and particularly France were naturally anxious to couple with any reduction of the debt which Ger-American Opposimany owed them a corresponding reduction of the tion to debts which they owed to the United States. In the Debt United States, however, the government and the weight of public opinion not only opposed any cancellation of the

¹ An American, Parker Gilbert, served as "Agent-General for Reparation Payments," with almost dictatorial powers over Germany's economic life, from 1924 to 1929.

inter-allied debts but also supported a policy of tariff protectionism which further handicapped the debtor nations.

In 1929 a second commission of economic experts, under the chairmanship of another American financier, Owen Young, met at Paris and recommended a radical revision of the "Dawes Plan" of reparation payments. The total amount of such payments would be reduced by three-fourthsfrom thirty-two billion dollars to eight billion—and the payments would be made by Germany during a term of fifty-eight years without direct foreign supervision. These recommendations, together with a provision for complete and immediate Allied evacuation

Young Plan, 1929: Reducing German Reparations to 8 Billion

of the Rhineland, were embodied in an international agreement signed at The Hague early in 1930.

By this time, however, a world-wide economic depression of the most serious kind had set in, and German national sentiment was solidly inimical to further payment of reparations. In 1931, the creditors of Germany felt obliged to grant her a temporary moratorium, and in 1932, through an international conference at Lausanne, they finally expressed their willingness to fix the remaining German indemnity at the modest figure of 700 million dollars if the United States would agree to a corresponding slashing of the inter-allied debts. The United States would not agree, but in the almost universal industrial paralysis of the time the Allies actually ceased paying anything to the United States or receiving anything from Germany. Practically, though not legally, both reparations and inter-allied debts were thus wiped off the slate of international accounting, but only after they had grievously impaired the economic and political stability of the chief nations

Reducing German Reparations to 700 Million, 1932

Collapse of Reparations and Inter-

of the world during the thirteen years following the Peace of Paris.

Complicating the situation during those thirteen years was the continuing heavy expenditure of most governments not only on industrial and agricultural reconstruction but also on armaments. Instability and uncertainty in national finance combined with fierce and distrustful nationalism to foster governmental fear and popular alarm in respect of foreign nations and hence to sustain and even intensify the international rivalry in armaments. Naval rivalry was accentuated between the United States and Japan, between the United States and Great Britain, and likewise between France and Italy. Moreover, Expenditure on big armies were maintained by France and Italy, Armaand relatively big ones were built up by the newly ments created or unified states of central and eastern Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, etc. Even in Germany, where, in accordance with the treaty of Versailles, the regular army was greatly restricted, a rapidly growing number of men received military training in national militia or in semi-private organizations. All this cost money-more and more money. And the cost, in turn, contributed still more to economic instability within nations as well as to ill-feeling among nations. It was all a vicious circle.

Certain social consequences of the general economic developments of the post-war decade should be remarked. The traditional titled aristocracy, as a class, suffered serious European losses and set-backs. Throughout eastern Europe, Social they were shorn of much of their landed wealth and Classes in Postpolitical influence. In Russia they were dispossessed War Era: altogether of their property and either put to death Landed Aristocor driven into more or less penurious exile. In Gerracy many and Austria they were stripped of special privileges and largely supplanted in public office by commoners. In Rumania, Poland, and other states of east-central Europe, they bowed to the threat of popular revolution and acquiesced in a series of land-reforms which transferred large portions of their ancestral estates into peasant proprietorships.

The peasantry, speaking generally, profited—at any rate temporarily. The war increased the demand for farm products, and the economic instability succeeding the war proved less disturbing to agriculture than to manufacturing. In particular, the depreciated currency of most European countries enabled peasants to pay off mortgages on their holdings at the very time when in several countries new land legislation was enabling them to add to their holdings. For some years after the war it seemed as though the greater part of continental Europe was undergoing a social transformation in the direction of peasant proprietorship of land and as though the

newly emancipated farmers, by means of cooperative enterprise, would make significant contributions to the stability and conservatism of European society and perhaps in the long run to the orderly economic reconstruction of the world. It was frequently remarked that national recovery and reconstruction proceeded faster in France, with her relatively large class of peasant proprietors, than in an overwhelmingly industrialized country such as England. Yet there were many gradations in European "peasantry." Some peasants were mere agricultural laborers without land of their own and utterly dependent on a highly disorganized and uncertain labor market. Others had holdings too small to be of profit to themselves under the most auspicious circumstances. Those who were the best off were handicapped by increasing burdens of taxation, direct or indirect, and by decreasing stability in finance, trade, and industry. At most, peasant profits were relative rather than absolute.

Among the middle classes—or bourgeoisie—a distinction must be made. A group of financiers and investors, together with captains of certain key industries—collectively the haute bourgeoisie-amassed handsome personal fortunes, in part from war-time "profiteering" and in part from post-war speculation. On the other hand, the lower middle class—professional men and salaried employes and many shopkeepers-suffered greatly from the general economic instability and especially, just after the war, from depreciated currency and resulting inflation. In Germany, inflation reached such an extreme in 1923 as to render valueless the bonds which had been issued during the war and which were held principally by the middle class. In France, inflation was not quite so drastic in effect, but it sufficed by 1926 to reduce by four-fifths the principal and income of domestic stocks and bonds. And Russia's repudiation of all her foreign indebtedness added to the difficulties. Altogether, throughout the greater part of continental Europe, the lower middle class saw its savings wiped out and its pensions and insurance reduced to zero. It was but natural that the economic instability of this class should promote its political instability and tend to make the class as a whole impatient with democratic government and receptive to dictatorship.

Post-war developments were beneficial to some of the indus-

trial proletariat and injurious to others. In Russia the entire class was peculiarly favored by the Communist revo-Industrial lution: the revolution was essentially theirs, and its Prolemajor efforts were directed in their behalf. In Gertariat many, at least for a time, the artificial stimulation of industrial enterprise by reparation payment and inflation assured full employment to urban workers, while Socialist participation in the country's republican government guarantied the maintenance of favorable labor-legislation. In France and Belgium, too, the rebuilding of devastated areas provided gainful employment for workingmen. On the other hand, the unsettled conditions in commerce and manufacturing reacted unfavorably upon workingmen almost everywhere. Feverish activity quickly alternated with depression and unemployment, and increase of wages hardly kept pace with increase in the cost of living. In Austria, the peace treaties deprived industrialized Vienna of usual markets, with terrible economic consequences to proletariat as well as to bourgeoisie. In Italy, proletarian distress was evidenced immediately after the war by an epidemic of strikes and a contagion of Communist agitation. In Great Britain, an army of unemployed men, aggregating two million in 1921, was being supported by government doles and public taxation.

Economic instability, with its fateful effects on the traditional social classes of Europe, made for political instability. The democratic governments which had been strengthened or newly established in 1919–1920, when relief from the bloodletting of the World War brought on a brief reign of emotional optimism, encountered a rising tide of criticism and popular disfavor as the stern realities of economic reconstruction gave rise to a new emotion of pessimism and despairing revolt.

In the circumstances, Marxian Socialism appeared to numerous Europeans to promise the most practical way of escape. It had been growing and spreading its influence before the war. It spread of had taken possession of Russia during the war. It now had larger followings than ever before in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and Great Britain. It might soon, some hoped and others feared, replace everywhere merely democratic governments with socialist governments. Yet, Marxian Socialism after the World War was no longer the single well-

knit international movement which it had been before the war. The war had rent it asunder.

One large fraction of Socialists was now thoroughly committed to "reformist" tactics-emphasis on political democracy and the evolutionary character of social change, willingness to col-

laborate with bourgeois reformers, and recognition of the special claims of national patriotism. The other large fraction was now quite devoted to "directaction" (or syndicalist) tactics—revolutionary seizure of power by industrial workers, forceful socialization of industry through a "proletarian dictatorship," uncompromising opposition to the bourgeoisie, and

Division among Marxian Socialists: "Reformism" vs. "Direct Action"

minimizing of political (though not necessarily cultural) nationalism. The former comprised the "regular" majority parties of Social Democrats in most countries of central and western Europe. These had much to do with guiding the democratic revolutions of 1919-1920 and with operating the resultant governments, and for mutual cooperation in forwarding their program of radical but hardly revolutionary social reform they reconstituted the international organization—the "Second International"—which the war had disrupted.2 The "direct-action" Socialists, on the other hand, comprised the successfully revolutionary (Bolshevik or Communist) party in Russia and imitative minority parties which sprang up in other countries Social and took the title of Communist to distinguish themselves from the "Social Democrats." In 1919 they corats vs. formed at Moscow a world organization of their own, in open rivalry with the "Second International," and known therefore as the "Third (or Communist) International."

Between "Communists" and "Social Democrats" the cleavage steadily widened. They would not and could not coöperate, and their rival efforts to capture the urban proletariat throughout central and western Europe were attended by mutual recriminations. Communists accused Social Democrats of condoning the exploitation of the masses. Social Democrats accused Communists of sabotaging efforts at general amelioration. There was undoubtedly a marked drift after 1920, wherever economic in-

¹ On differences between right-wing "Reformists" and left-wing "Syndicalists" before the World War, see above, pp. 380-382.

³ Sce above, p. 786.

stability was most pronounced, from Social Democracy to Communism, from acquiescence in the ordinary functioning of democratic government to demands for violent erection of dictatorship.

Nevertheless, it was not Marxian Socialism, not even its Communist wing, which eventually profited, outside Russia, from the drift toward dictatorship. Rather, it was nationalism, which

Rise of Nationalist Dictatorships gathered together under its banners critics of democracy, foes of Marxism, and victims of economic insecurity and instability. How actually the advance of political democracy was halted and turned back by pment of nationalist dictatorships in central Europe,

the development of nationalist dictatorships in central Europe, as well as of Communist dictatorship in Russia, we shall discuss in some detail in the following chapter.



CHAPTER XXVI

DEMOCRACIES AND DICTATORSHIPS



UROPE, at the close of the World War, seemed to be committed to political democracy. A decade afterwards, the greater part of Europe, and of the world at large, was reacting sharply against democracy.

Democratic government, to be sure, still subsisted in a fringe of countries on the

Atlantic seaboard—Great Britain and France, Scandinavia. Belgium, and the Netherlands. It was reasserting itself in Spain, and it was still flourishing in Switzerland and overseas in the United States and in the British Dominions. But most of central Europe, as well as eastern Europe, and much of the world outside Europe had already repudiated democracy of the conventional nineteenth-century variety in favor of some novel kind of dictatorship. In Russia and the lands attached to her, the dictatorship was Communist. In Italy, Germany, and the lesser countries of central Europe, and likewise in Turkey, Persia, and Japan, the dictatorship was Fascist or Nationalist. However much these dictatorships might differ among themselves in name and avowed object, they were uniformly antagonistic to the individualism and "liberalism" traditionally associated with political democracy. From Berlin and Rome eastward through Moscow and Angora to Tokio, political power in the 1930's was in the hands of disciplined minority parties, scornful of parliamentary democracy, intolerant of popular dissent, and ruthless in enforcing the will of their respective "leaders."

In some quarters, the rapid rise and spread of dictatorship was interpreted as a temporary result of unprecedented economic crisis and social unrest following the World War, a result which would gradually pass with the inevitable return to "normalcy." In other quarters it was interpreted as a "realistic" demand for the accomplishment of reforms which "romantic" democracy had proved itself utterly unable to achieve, and therefore as

ushering in a new and perduring kind of political action. Without undertaking any defense of either interpretation, let us sketch the story of how the several major dictatorships of Europe came into existence and how they have functioned, together with an account of political developments in countries which have remained democratic.

The first of the dictatorships in point of time, the one which has lasted the longest, gone farthest in socialist experimentation, and had the greatest external influence, is the Russian "dictatorship of the proletariat." To it we devote the first section of the present chapter.

I. COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP IN RUSSIA

From March to November 1917, Russia was presided over, as we have elsewhere explained, by a revolutionary "provisional government," desirous of establishing political democracy as well as of prosecuting the World War, but quite unable to agree upon any effective program of internal social reform. Indeed, by November 1917 this provisional government was so divided in its counsels, so uncertain as to what it should or could do, and so devoid of any large popular support that it was at the mercy of a mere handful of resolute persons well organized and fearlessly led. Which explains why it was then actually overthrown by the Bolshevik faction of Marxian Socialists.²

Marxian Socialists comprised an almost infinitesimal part of the vast Russian population, and of that part the Bolshevik faction was hardly a half.³ Yet what the Bolsheviks lacked in numbers they compensated for in leadership, in concentration, in definiteness of purpose, and in tactical resourcefulness.

The outstanding leader of the Bolsheviks was Vladimir Ulyanov (1870–1924), popularly known by his pen-name of N.

Lenin Lenin. He belonged to a middle-class family, his father having been a schoolmaster and his mother the daughter of a physician; and, after studying law at the University of Kazan, he was admitted to the bar. While he was at the university, however, he had become an ardent disciple

¹ See above, pp. 821–824.

² See above, pp. 827–829.

³ On the two factions of Marxian Socialists in Russia before 1917—the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks—and on the rival "Social Revolutionaries," see above, p. 654.

of Karl Marx—a discipleship in which he was confirmed by the execution of his older brother for complicity in a plot against the Tsar Alexander III (1891). In 1894, the year of the accession of the Tsar Nicholas II, young Ulyanov-or Lenin-undertook Marxian propaganda in St. Petersburg, for which he was imprisoned and then exiled for three years to Siberia. This exile he utilized to write a book on Russian capitalism, which subsequently attracted considerable attention in Socialist circles. From 1900 to 1917 Lenin made his headquarters in Switzerland, with the exception of the two years (1905-1907) when revolutionary disturbances in Russia invited and enabled him to return home. Wherever he was, he directed a tireless agitation in behalf of Marxian Socialism and (after 1903) of its Bolshevik wing, editing a newspaper (the *Iskra*, or "Spark"), inditing programs and pamphlets, producing learned tomes, and ever cementing the organization and increasing the activity of his group. Lenin was undersized, with a wide forehead and piercing eyes. He had great driving force, and, with an iron will and a fanaticism about the ends he sought, he combined a keen sense of political expediency. It was this organizing and compelling genius who returned finally to Russia in April 1917 and who, by converting the St. Petersburg "soviet of workers and soldiers" to his views, managed to precipitate the revolution of November 1917 and to inaugurate a dictatorship of his own.

Lenin had several capable lieutenants, of whom three merit special mention. Levi Bronstein (or Leon Trotsky as he called himself) was a flaming person, both oratorical and Trotsky clever, who came of a middle-class Jewish family and was educated at the University of Odessa. Arrested as a revolutionary and exiled to Siberia, he had escaped to western Europe in 1902, making the acquaintance of Lenin and collaborating on Iskra, though then sympathizing more with the program of the Menshevik Socialists than with that of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky returned to Russia in 1905 and took an active part in the St. Petersburg soviet of that period. Then, after a second arrest and exile to Siberia, he escaped again and led a roving existence in Vienna, Constantinople, Zürich, and Paris. From Paris he was expelled for pacifist agitation in 1916, and from New York, where he briefly found refuge, he sailed in March 1917 for Russia, arriving at St. Petersburg shortly after Lenin. Here, during the ensuing summer, he definitely cast his lot with the Bolsheviks and played a rôle hardly second to Lenin's in preparing the way for the November revolution.

Joseph Stalin, the son of a Georgian peasant shoemaker in the Caucasus, was no such theorist or intellectual as the middleStalin class Trotsky or Lenin, but he was a remarkably sturdy and persistent propagandist of the latter's doctrines. Dismissed from an Orthodox seminary in 1896, when he was seventeen years of age, for "unreliability and lack of religious vocation," he joined the extremist Socialist group, and thenceforth until 1917 he waged implacable warfare with the Tsarist régime, suffering frequent arrests, imprisonments, and Siberian exiles, but never seeking escape abroad and always fomenting Bolshevik agitation within Russia. That Russian laborers were minded to give ear to Lenin and Trotsky on their return home in 1917 was owing in no slight degree to the work which Stalin had done during their absence.

For this work, Stalin must share the credit, or debit, with Michael Kalinin, a peasant of the Tver province (in west-central Russia), who, like so many of his class, was brought up, poor and uneducated, to divide his time between labor on his village-farm and labor in an urban factory and who acquired from association with factory operatives an enthusiasm for Socialism which in turn he communicated to fellow peasants in the village. Kalinin, like Stalin, was frequently arrested and banished, but the more he suffered the more resolute he grew in revolutionary propaganda. He was expounding Bolshevik doctrines to workers, soldiers, and peasants at St. Petersburg when the revolution of March 1917 occurred, and he was prominent among the same constituency in the ensuing November revolution.

Lenin's party of professed Bolsheviks was small when he seized power in November 1917, but his program was calculated Bolshevik to enlist widespread popular support. He proclaimed that his dictatorship was a "dictatorship of the proletariat," including workers, peasants, and soldiers; and upon each of these numerous classes he proposed to confer immediate benefits. In behalf of the industrial workers, he decreed the confiscation of private factories and their transformation into government institutions, with shop committees of

workers in control of production, purchase, and sale. In behalf of the peasants, he decreed the expropriation of landlords and the nationalization of the land, with peasant-communities in charge of its partition and use. In behalf of the war-weary soldiers, he took Russia out of the World War and concluded with the Central Powers the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918). He also issued, in November 1917, a "Declaration of the Rights of Peoples," recognizing the principle of cultural nationalism and promising to accord to subject peoples in Russia the right of national self-determination, and simultaneously he named Stalin as Commissar of Nationalities.

This revolutionary program obtained the enthusiastic allegiance of numerous soviets which had been set up all over Russia during 1917, and it was through a federation of these soviets that Lenin and his dictatorial Council of Commissars extended Bolshevik influence and sway beyond St. Petersburg and Moscow to the country at large. At first there was a good deal of opposition, not merely from habitual supporters of the Tsardombureaucrats, army officers, nobles, and Orthodox clergymen but also from many Constitutional Democrats ("Cadets") among the bourgeoisie and from the radical parties of Social Revolutionaries and Menshevik Socialists. Indeed, the anti-Bolshevik Social Revolutionaries obtained a majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly which had been authorized by the provisional government of 1917 (prior to Lenin's seizure of power),2 and which met at Moscow in January 1918. The Bolshevik central government, however, denounced the demotion of Democratically elected Assembly as an agency of "reaction," cratic and Bolshevik soldiers promptly broke it up, while Assembly, Bolshevik soviets throughout the country, representing at the time only a minority of the population, albeit a de-

The Bolsheviks were resolved to achieve a thorough social revolution, and against "reaction" of any sort they struck hard. "Direct action" was employed against recalcitrant nobles and capitalists and against army officers and bureaucrats of the old régime; such as could not flee were put to death. Energetic measures were taken, in accordance with a decree of January 1918,

termined minority, terrorized the majority.

¹ See above, p. 829, and the map on p. 830.

² See above, p. 823.

to disestablish the Orthodox Church in Russia and to silence all Christian clergymen. In July 1918 the Tsar Nicholas II, his wife, and children, who had been held under guard at Execution Ekaterinburg (near the Urals), were slaughtered by of Tsar, 1918 order of the local soviet. And against all dissident political groups, even that of the Menshevik Socialists, Bolshevik soviets and soldiers and revolutionary tribunals con-Bolshevik ducted a veritable reign of terror. A considerable part Terrorism of the opposition was won over, or at any rate was frightened into passivity, but thousands were killed and other thousands escaped death only by flight abroad.

The terrorism was undoubtedly aggravated by the bitter hostility with which most of the outside world viewed the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia. For several years after the revolution of November 1917, it was no less generally Foreign feared in foreign countries than confidently hoped by Concern Russian Bolsheviks that economic disorders arising from the World War and the Peace of Paris would lead sooner or later to social revolution and the triumph of Marxian Socialism in central Europe and even in France, England, and the United States; and such instinctive fear in foreign countries was confirmed by the tales told by anti-Bolshevik émigrés of the chaos and crime prevailing in Russia, and likewise by the pleas and plots for world revolution which were known to emanate from Moscow. In the circumstances, foreign governments naturally sought to intervene in Russia and overthrow its Communist government.

During and immediately after the negotiations which eventuated in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918), the Germans interfered most actively in Russia. Their purpose was to strengthen their own military position and to prevent the spread of Communism in central Europe. They extracted from the Bolshevik government a formal promise not to countenance subversive propaganda in the Central Powers. They encouraged leaders of the "liberated" border countries of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukrainia to set up anti-Bolshevik governments quite free of Russia and dependent on Germany. They gave financial and military aid to various Russian generals who opposed the Bolshevik dictatorship. Not until the final military collapse of the

Central Powers in November 1918 were the Russian Bolsheviks relieved of the menace of German intervention.

But already the Allies were intervening. Statesmen and leading citizens of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States were infuriated by the actions of the Bolshevik dictatorship in withdrawing from the war, in making a separate peace, in repudiating Russia's foreign debts, and in preaching a world-wide social revolution. tion, 1918-Allied intervention in Russia began in March 1918 as a war measure against Germany. Refusing to acknowledge the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Allies not only declined to recognize the Bolshevik government, which agreed to it, but also decreed and enforced a rigorous economic blockade against Russia. Moreover, they encouraged an army of Czechoslovaks (which had deserted from Austria earlier in the war and joined the Russians) to disregard the peace of Brest-Litovsk, to establish a military base on the Volga River, and to defy the Bolsheviks. Simultaneously, they landed "expeditionary forces" of their own at Murmansk, the single ice-free port of Russia on the Arctic Ocean, and at Vladivostok, in eastern Siberia. Presently, they seized Odessa and other Russian ports on the Black Sea.

Under protection of the Czechoslovaks and the Allied expeditions, various Russian generals of the old régime collected against the "red" armies of the Bolsheviks several "white" armies of the opposition and precipitated civil war within Russia. Thus Allied intervention, beginning as a war measure against Germany, speedily assumed the character of a domestic and foreign crusade of the forces of capitalism (and perhaps democracy) against the forces of socialism (and revolutionary dictatorship). For a time, toward the close of 1918 and throughout 1919, it seemed as if Lenin's government would be unable to overcome foreign intervention and domestic revolt. Allied troops, reënforced by Russian malcontents, captured Archangel in the north, occupied the Crimean peninsula in the south, and overran the greater part of Siberia from the east. "White" forces, supplied with arms by the Allies, advanced still farther into Russia. From the west, General Yudenich led an army of anti-Bolshevik Russians and Estonians against St. Petersburg. From the south, General

Denikin ¹ set out in the direction of Moscow. At Omsk, in western Siberia, members of the dissolved Constituent Assembly, with a motley following of Social Revolutionaries, Cadets, and some ultra-conservatives, set up an anti-Bolshevik government which claimed to be the legal successor to Kerensky's "provisional government" of 1917 and which was maintained by an army of Czechoslovaks and "white" Russians under the command of Admiral Kolchak.

Gradually, however, the Bolsheviks got the upper hand. They were favored by the personal ambition and rivalry of the opposing generals and by the chronic dissensions between Bolshevik such of their followers as advocated the establishment Resistance of a democratic republic and such as wanted a restoration of the Tsardom. There was no like uncertainty among the Bolsheviks as to what they expected to do, and with singleness of purpose they combined a fanaticism, a ruthlessness, and withal an adroitness of popular appeal and an adeptness at military organization which were of inestimable advantage to them. Leon Trotsky, as Lenin's Commissar of War, proved himself the man of the hour. He enflamed the masses of Russian peasants and workers with hatred of the "whites" as agents of "reaction," intent upon blocking social reform and political progress in Russia, and though the "red" soldiers whom he rallied to the defense of the Bolshevik dictatorship were often ragged, unkempt, and poorly armed, they were much more numerous by the end of 1919, and far more enthusiastic, than their foes.

The Bolsheviks were also favored by the fact that foreign governments, no matter how much they might detest Lenin's Socialist régime, were in no position at the close of the World War to conduct extensive military operations against the bulk of the Foreign inhabitants of the huge country of Russia. Germany Impocrations impotent. France, which had most at stake in the way of financial investments, was too warweary and too occupied with penalizing Germany to undertake

¹ General Anton Denikin, perhaps the ablest of the anti-Bolshevik leaders, had coöperated with General Kornilov (the aspirant to a military dictatorship under Kerensky, see above, p. 828) and with General Alexeiev (the chief-of-staff of the Russian armies under Nicholas II) in the recruitment of a "White" army in southern Russia at the beginning of the Bolshevik dictatorship. After the death of Kornilov and Alexeiev in 1918, Denikin succeeded to the leadership of their forces.

forceful debt collection in Russia. Great Britain was restrained by a multiplicity of other imperial concerns and by the attitude of the rapidly growing Labor party at home. Japan was more interested in obtaining privileges in nearby China than in overthrowing a government in faraway European Russia. United States, after repudiating the Peace of Paris and withdrawing from European counsels, was not minded to participate in distant military adventures.

The result was the withdrawal of Allied expeditionary forces, from northern Russia in the autumn of 1919, and from Siberia in the spring of 1920. Then, with the loss of active Allied support, the anti-Bolshevik rebellions in Russia collapsed or were suppressed. General Yudenich was driven out of the Baltic area, and the Estonians, who had supported him, were compelled to sign a treaty of peace with Bolshevik Russia in February 1920. Admiral Kolchak, deserted by the Czechoslovaks (who returned home via Vladivostok), had to surrender Omsk in November 1919, and in the following February he was captured and shot at Irkutsk. As for General Denikin, his early successes were followed by reverses, so that early in 1920 he lost his military base at Rostov and fled to Constantinople.

What the Allies thus failed to do directly, they still hoped to achieve indirectly. Particularly did the French seek to incite peoples on the Russian border to fight the Bolsheviks. In 1920 they encouraged the desire of Poland for territorial expansion eastward and egged her on to attack Russia. At the same time they enabled a Russian émigré, Baron Wrangel by name, to raise another "white" army and

Polish Effort and Failure,

renew General Denikin's attempt to invade southern Russia. They also prevailed upon nationalistic Ukrainians to take the field in alliance with Wrangel and the Poles.

At first the Franco-Polish effort promised success, but in July 1920 the "red" armies of Bolshevik Russia defeated the Poles and drove them back to the very gates of Warsaw. Here the Poles rallied and defeated the Russians, but they were no longer sanguine of ultimate victory. So Poland agreed to an armistice, and later, in March 1921 at Riga, concluded a peace treaty with Russia. Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1920, "red" armies over-

¹ See below, pp. 1018-1021.

whelmed the "white" forces in the Crimea and obliged the remnant and General Wrangel himself to follow General Denikin into exile at Constantinople, while other "red" armies, in conjunction with Bolshevik Ukrainians, put an end to armed opposition at Kiev and to the "independence" of Ukrainia.

By 1921 the authority of the Bolshevik government was not seriously disputed in Russia. Domestic opposition was Bolshevik suppressed and foreign intervention stopped. In Masterv 1022, moreover, Germany formally recognized the of Russia. 1021 Bolshevik dictatorship, and presently the Allies followed suit: Great Britain, France, and Italy in 1924; the United States ultimately in 1934.

But if foreign countries failed to destroy Marxian Socialism in Russia, the Russian Bolsheviks failed equally to revolutionize the world at large. They continued to preach and to expect proletarian uprisings, in one country after another, against capitalism and in favor of communism, and they went on fostering and guiding the international federation (the "Third International"), which they had formed at Moscow in 1919, of

Bolshevik the several Communist parties in Europe and over-Failure seas.¹ Nevertheless, outside the confines of the former outside Russia Russian Empire, only Hungary experienced an actual Bolshevik dictatorship, and then very briefly.² Communist minorities were vocal and active elsewhere, but the most threatening ones were circumvented and silenced, as we shall presently see in the case of Italy, by a "fascist" dictatorship.

The principle of nationality was respected and even extolled by the Russian Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik government sanctioned the right of national self-determination, and Territorial accordingly agreed, as we have already pointed out,3 Losses of Russia to a shrinkage of Russia's territorial dominion. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were recognized by a series of peace treaties in 1921-1922, as completely independent nations with non-Bolshevik governments of their own

⁸ See above, pp. 860-870.

¹ The Third (or Communist) International—sometimes cited by the abbreviation of "Kominturn"-had its headquarters at Moscow and affiliated parties of left-wing Socialists in Russia, Germany, France, Spain, the United States, Japan, and many other countries. On the "First" and "Second" Internationals of the Marxian Socialists, see above, pp. 378-379.

² On the Bolshevik dictatorship of Béla Kun in Hungary, see above, pp. 850-851.

choosing. Bessarabia was suffered, with only formal protests from Russia, to unite with Rumania. "Spheres of influence" and special privileges which the Tsar's government had obtained in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and China, were renounced. To cap the climax, the permanent constitution of Bolshevik Russia was based on a "Treaty of Union" concluded in July 1923 by representatives of the major nationali-

ties in what remained of the former Russian Empire.

Constitution of Communist Russia: Treaty of Union, 1023

By this treaty, the "Russian Empire" was supplanted by a "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," comprising (at first) four: (1) the Russian (that is, Great Russian) Soviet Socialist Republic, with its capital at Moscow; (2) the White Russian, with

its capital at Minsk; (3) the Ukrainian (or Little Russian), with its capital at Kiev; and (4) the Transcaucasian, itself a confederation of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, with its capital at Tiflis. Subsequently,

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

three other Soviet Socialist Republics were organized within the "Union": (5) the Turkoman, in 1924, covering southwestern Turkestan; (6) the Uzbek, also in 1924, embracing the former khanates of Khiva and Bokhara in southeastern Turkestan; and (7) Tajikistan, erected in 1929 on the borders of Afghanistan and China. Among these seven republics, great disparity of size and importance obtained: the Russian included 92 per cent of the area and 68 per cent of the population of the entire Union; the

Ukrainian, with 20 per cent of the population, had only 2 per cent of the area; and none of the others had more than 2 per cent of the area or 4 per cent of the population. Each nevertheless was recognized as a national

Federation of National-

state and encouraged to develop its distinctive language and national culture. Not only were the "Russifying" policies of the former Tsarist régime thus reversed in Europe, Turkestan, and the Caucasus, but cultural nationalism was actively fostered among minorities hitherto inarticulate. By 1926 the Great Russian state—the major member of the Soviet Union—was according various degrees of cultural autonomy to some twenty-five peoples within its extensive frontiers, for example to primitive Yakut and Mongol tribesmen in Siberia, to Tartars in eastern European Russia and in the Crimea, and to a German colony on the Volga. The Treaty of Union of 1923 also prescribed the form of gov-



THE SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE, 1935

ernment which should obtain both in the federal state and in its constituent parts. Nominally, the form of government was democratic. Everyone who had reached the age of Governeighteen and who either earned a livelihood by "productive work useful to society" or was enlisted in the country's armed forces was permitted to vote for members of the

local soviet. Local soviets chose deputies to regional soviets, and these were represented in the Congresses of Soviets for the several federated states and also in the All-Union Congress of Soviets for the entire federation. The All-Union Congress, which in theory was the supreme governing body of Communist Russia, comprised about two thousand delegates thus indirectly chosen by the majority of the people. The Congress All-Union Congress, however, was too large and unwieldly to exercise real power. Its actual functions were to assemble once in two years, to listen to reports, to ratify acts of government, and to elect a Central Executive Committee to which the cabinet—the Council of People's Commissars—was nominally responsible.

The government of the several states was modelled after that of the Union, with local and regional soviets, with central Congress, Executive Committee, and Council. Each state might enact laws concerning matters of local justice, health, and education, but the Union might annul any state legislation at variance with its own.

In practice, the democratic features of Communist government, whether of the Union or of its federated states, were obscured and largely nullified. Certain categories of citizens were expressly disfranchised: ex-officials of the Tsarist gov-Undemoernment or of any counter-revolutionary government; cratic Features monks, nuns, and clergymen of any religious denomof Soviet ination; all persons who hired labor for profit, who Government lived on an unearned income, or who engaged in private trade; and well-to-do peasants, or "kulaks." 2 Moreover, for those who were enfranchised, the indirect and highly complex system of voting was so arranged as to discriminate against the peasant majority of the country and in favor of the working-class minority in the cities. And as final assurance that the "democracy" of Soviet Russia would be quite subordinate to its Bolshevik "dictatorship" was the all-important political rôle of the Communist party.

No political party other than the Communist might exist or

² In 1931, the number of the expressly disfranchised was estimated at eight

million.

¹ In 1931, over 84 million were registered as voters out of an estimated total population of 160 million. About 61 million actually went to the polls.

function in Russia, and no person might belong to the Communist party unless he avowed an unquestioning faith in the principles of Marx and Lenin, promised strict obedience to the party discipline, and proved his sincerity and zeal durnist Party ing a probationary period. Manual workers and revolutionary soldiers were eligible for membership on six months' probation and two recommendations from members of two years' standing; "poor" peasants and private handicraftsmen were eligible on a year's probation and three recommendations from members of three years' standing; and professional men, on two years' probation and five recommendations from members of five years' standing. All members had to be continuously "active" and "above reproach"; and a remarkable puritanism, as well as fanaticism, tended to characterize the party. Numerically the party was small. At first it was almost infinitesimal, and though it grew as success attended Lenin's policies, it embraced as late as 1935 only two and three-quarter million persons, a slight fraction of the whole Russian population. Of its membership, over two-thirds were urban workingmen. Peasants (still the vast majority of the nation) constituted less than a fifth of the Communist party, and professional men less than a seventh.

The organization of the Communist party resembled that of the Union. Party "cells," in factories, offices, and villages, were represented in regional committees, which sent deputies to an All-Union Party Congress, which in turn elected a Central Committee, with its supreme "political bureau" of nine members. This "political bureau" proposed the major policies of Communist Russia, and after securing their endorsement by the Party Congress it utilized the party machinery to ensure their adoption and enforcement by the government. Except in theory, slight distinction prevailed between the party and the government. All the People's Commissars and three-fourths of the Congress of Soviets were members of the Communist party and hence bound to carry into effect the party's decisions.

The Communist party was the only organized group which could put up candidates for government office. It alone had the means of enforcing its will and of silencing opposition. It controlled the "red army." It directed a drastic censorship of the press and of public meetings. It dominated an extraordinary tribunal for the summary trial and execution of its opponents.

The Cheka, as this revolutionary tribunal was originally styled, was formally abolished in 1922. But the next year it was revived, under the initials OGPU, as a "third section of the police," with a staff of 45,000 agents. Under either title, it might arbitrarily seize, imprison, exile, or sentence to death any persons suspected of "counter-revolutionary" (that is, anti-Communist) tendencies in politics or economics. "Shooting," said one of the party leaders, "is the highest measure of social defense." And year after year, not only during the period of uncertainty from 1918 to 1921 but also afterwards when the Communist régime seemed to be firmly established in Russia, thousands were imprisoned without any hearing and other thousands were shot without any public trial. Tsarist methods of repression were improved upon by the Communists. Persons too tepid in their devotion to the new dictatorship as well as persons too heated in their opposition to it were mercilessly put to death.

Within the Communist party and therefore within the Soviet government was a supreme dictator—the man who, through his personal influence and with the aid of revolutionary The tribunal, red army, censorship, and party discipline, Party and could actually rule as few despots in history have been able to rule. He had to have the wholehearted support of a compact group, such as the core of the Communist party provided, but, once assured of this, he was in a position to make his will prevail, in a truly revolutionary manner, throughout the length and breadth of the huge Russian domain.

First the dictator was Lenin, who held the two posts of President of the Council of Commissars in the government and President of the Political Bureau in the party. By Lenin, 1922, however, Lenin was suffering grievously from then overwork; he was partially paralyzed and beginning to lose the power of speech. Whereupon ensued a bitter rivalry for the succession between Trotsky, the Commissar of War in the government, and Stalin, the secretary of the Central Committee of the party. Gradually the latter gained the support of the party, which meant the favor of the government, so that when Lenin died, in 1924, Stalin became the acknowledged dictator. Trotsky was immediately dismissed from the Commissariat of War; in 1927 he was expelled from the Communist

party; in 1928 he was banished to Turkestan; and in 1929, in danger of his life, he fled abroad and found refuge at Constantinople. Stalin did not directly preside over the government. He was content to remain as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party and chief member of its Political Bureau, and from these party-posts to exercise his virtual dictatorship over the government. He retained his friend and fellow peasant, Kalinin, as titular President of the Soviet Union. In Lenin's place as President of the Council of Commissars (or Prime Minister), Stalin put another of his personal friends, Alexis Rykov, and kept him there until a difference of opinion developed between them in 1930. Rykov was then deposed and succeeded by Molotov, an intimate of Stalin's and his colleague on the Political Bureau of the Communist party.

The central purpose of the Communist dictatorship, whether of Lenin or of Stalin, was to realize in Russia the material and economic millennium promised to the "toiling masses" Goal of by Karl Marx. Capitalism would be destroyed. The Communist Dicprofit-making motive would be removed. Russian tatorship society, instead of comprising a minority of wealthy idlers and a majority of poverty-stricken workers, would consist of a single class, all of whose members would enjoy the fruits of their labor. Simultaneously, under social ownership and control, the latest and best machinery would be introduced into Russian factories and onto Russian farms, increasing their yield, raising the general standard of living, and endowing all the masses with ever multiplying material comforts.

The first few years of the Communist dictatorship seemed to indicate not only that no such social millennium would eventuate but that the Russian people at large were actually in a worse economic plight than they had been under the reign of capitalism and the Tsar. A part of the difficulty was obviously attributable to the fact that the Communists began their experiments at the very time when most of Europe, and Russia in particular, was reeling from the effects of the World War. Russia had suffered more from the war than any other country, and her agriculture, trade, and industry were already in serious confusion before Lenin executed his coup d'état. Then, too, we should remember that from 1918 to 1920 Lenin and his lieutenants had to devote major energy to

fighting off foreign foes and putting down domestic revolts, and that this protracted twofold struggle aggravated the economic distress within Russia. But aside from the handicaps resulting directly from the war and its aftermath, the Russian Communists were confronted with almost insurmountable obstacles in the conditions and habits of Russian life. The masses of the population were illiterate, ignorant, and quite inexperienced in the technics required to give effect to the elaborate socializing program of the Communists.

The Communist dictatorship decreed at the outset the confiscation of private property, the repudiation of debts (domestic and foreign), and the nationalization of land, large-scale industry, mines, banks and insurance companies, water transport, and the few railways formerly operated by private companies. It was one thing, however, to expropriate and expel noble landlords and bourgeois capitalists, and quite another thing to procure the competent proletarian bureaucracy and the needful public funds for maintaining and developing socialized industry, agriculture, and trade. The peasants were glad to get rid of landlords, but they were more anxious to appropriate Land and the confiscated lands for themselves than for the the Peasstate. Actually the decree for nationalization of the land remained largely a paper measure. Only a very small portion of the land came under the direct control of the government; most of the land was parcelled out among the peasants as if it were their private property. And the peasant-farmers gave little evidence of abandoning the profit motive of capitalism or of acting at the mere behest of governmental authorities at Moscow.

Large industrial plants were socialized. But the workers in charge of them were more prone to engage in political discussion than in hard labor, and they were neglectful of Industry repairs to machinery. The government attempted and the workers to remedy the evil by employing technical experts, even those who were known to be critical of Communism. For some time, nevertheless, the government was unable to maintain industrial production at pre-war levels. Trade with the outside world was cut off. Trade within the country was paralyzed. No adequate funds were available, either from internal

¹In 1914 there had been sixteen million farms in Russia. In 1929 there were over twenty-five million.

taxes or from foreign loans, to replace worn-out machinery in the factories or rolling stock on the railways. With the breakdown of the railways, the diminishing production of farms and mills, and the rapidly swelling number of migratory persons, practically homeless and penniless, a scourge of famine visited Russia in 1921-1922. The grain harvest 1021-1022 of 1921 was only two-fifths of the harvest of 1913. and what there was of it could not be expeditiously distributed. The resulting conditions were frightful alike in city and countryside. Forty million persons suffered from malnutrition and five million starved to death. Millions more might have perished but for the arrival of relief expeditions, with food and money, from the United States, the Papacy, and several European nations. The famine in Communist Russia was the worst of modern times.

In 1921, on the eve of the great famine and just when civil war and internal disturbances were ceasing, Lenin and his Communist colleagues proclaimed a "new economic policy," essen-

NEP: Temporary Compromise between Socialism and Capitalism

tially a compromise between socialism and capitalism. On one hand, socialization would be pressed in respect of big industry and public utilities. On the other hand, foreign as well as Russian engineers would be encouraged by liberal financial rewards to oversee and develop industrial production, private business would be tolerated on a small scale, and the

peasants would be permitted to rent land, hire labor, and sell grain to private traders, whose position, in turn, would be considerably ameliorated.

The New Economic Policy (or NEP, as it was styled) did not prevent the famine, but it undoubtedly contributed to the steady economic rehabilitation which characterized Russia

Gradual Economic Improvement

after the famine. The production of pig iron increased from a paltry 115,000 tons in 1920 to 4 million tons in 1928, and in the same period the production of coal increased from 10 million tons to 42 million and that of petroleum from 25 million barrels to 88 million. By 1028.

Russia's foreign trade, which had been negligible in 1920, was valued at 867 million dollars, about two-thirds of its value in 1913.1

¹ Russia's most valuable export in 1913 had been grain; she exported none in 1928. The country's total grain production in 1928 was 10 per cent less than what it had been in 1013.

Simultaneously, there was notable improvement in the lot of a considerable number of peasants, though "socialized agriculture" made comparatively little headway. By 1928 some million peasants were organized in "collectivist coöperatives," and another million worked on "state farms." Yet state and collective farms together furnished less than 2 per cent of the country's grain production. That profits were accruing to Russian farmers was evidenced by the growing class of "kulaks," or "rich peasants." 1

The NEP, in the minds of the Communist leaders, was only a temporary makeshift. They had no intention of establishing a peasant proprietorship in Russia or of favoring agriculture at the expense of industry. They had a predilection for mass production of goods and a fondness, almost a veneration, for the latest mechanical devices. Their fundamental ambition was to transform Russia from an economically "backward" and predominantly agricultural country into a "progressive" and predominantly industrial country. This they would do by means of a "planned econ-

Socialistic "Planned

omy," a systematic collectivist development of basic industries and an equally systematic collectivist industrialization of agriculture.

Accordingly, and in the light of their experience with the NEP, Stalin and his lieutenants worked out a "Five-Year Plan" and put it into effect from 1928 to 1933. The production of coal was increased from 42 million tons to 77 million; pig iron, from 4 million tons to 7 million; petroleum, from 88 million barrels to 150 million.2 Besides, new blast furnaces, automobile and tractor plants, and machineshops were erected, and the supply of electric power was almost tripled. In agriculture, efforts were made to extend the area of "state farms" and "collective farms" and to speed up their mechanization, so that they would produce a proportionately larger share of foodstuffs and thus discourage private farming.

¹ It was over the kulaks that Trotsky and Stalin quarrelled after the death of Lenin. Trotsky demanded an immediate "drive" against the kulaks and an intensive socialization of the land. Stalin, fearful of precipitating a class war among the peasants, contended that the kulaks should be tolerated for a time.

² In 1028 the Soviet Union stood sixth among the nations of the world in coal production, sixth in pig-iron production, and third in petroleum production. In 1933 it had advanced to fourth in coal production (after the United States, Great Britain, and Germany), third in pig-iron production (after the United States and France), and second in petroleum production (after the United States).

The execution of the Five-Year Plan, while achieving most of what was expected of it, especially in respect of industrialization, disclosed some defects and shortcomings. Incompetence of workmen and ineptness of managers and government officials led to much industrial waste. Relatively little was done to improve the transportation system, or to increase the production of light industries and ordinary consumers' goods. Furthermore, the agricultural objects of the Five-Year Plan were not fully realized. Much progress was made, it is true, in socializing and mechanizing agriculture. More than 200,000 "collective farms" were organized and over 800 million dollars were invested in farm machinery. On the other hand, much of the machinery was inexpertly used, many of the collective farms were inefficiently managed, and in some sections, particularly in Ukrainia and northern Caucasus, sabotage was practiced by kulaks and other independent peasants. The share of the country's grain production which "socialized" farming furnished was raised much above the 2 per cent of 1928, but it fell considerably short of the 40 per cent contemplated by the Five-Year Plan.

In 1933 a Second Five-Year Plan was launched. It proposed

In 1933 a Second Five-Year Plan was launched. It proposed to triple the 1932 output of coal, iron, petroleum, electric power, second and tractors, to push forward the socialization of agriculture, and at the same time to put new emphasis on the improvement of internal transportation and communication and on the manufacture of goods for popular consumption in the urban centres ¹ and especially in the rural districts. To raise the standard of living and thereby to quicken both consumption and production was the central aim of the Second Plan.

The progressive gains in socializing and mechanizing Russia under the "New Economic Policy" and the "Five-Year Plans" were immensely aided and fortified by attendant educational and propagandist activities of the Communist dictatorship. Lenin and Stalin and their chief associates in the Communist party understood perfectly well that unless the mass of workers and peasants were inspired with an enthusiastic, even fanatical, attachment to the new order, mere decrees of the Soviet government would be

¹ These were growing rapidly and being "modernized." Moscow's population increased from 2,000,000 in 1917 to 3,660,000 in 1933.

without lasting effect. A socialistically trained citizenship was as necessary as economic planning.

From the outset, the Communist dictatorship had banned any education or propaganda in Russia which might have purposes and ideals at variance with its own. Dissident political groups, not only the "Constitutional Democrats" among the bourgeoisie, but also the "Social Revolutionaries" and ing "Menshevik Socialists" among peasants and workers, were dissolved, and the dissemination of their ideas was prohibited and rigorously penalized. Within the Communist party there might be some freedom of discussion before a decision was taken, but none thereafter. Newspapers multiplied in Russia under the Soviet régime, but only orthodox Communist opinions might be expressed in them. Radios and cinemas spread rapidly, but they too might not be agencies of "reaction." The universitics and learned societies of Tsarist times were retained and enlarged, but they were purged of scholars unsympathetic with Communism and newly staffed with persons willing to interpret their subjects according to Marxian principles. Museums and art galleries and theatres were kept open and added to, and the common people were encouraged to attend them; so as not to cripple them, they were permitted to retain many of their former officials and actors but these were scrupulously watched for any overt hostility to the new order. Individuals who had been wealthy or of high professional standing or had had some connection with the Tsar's government were naturally suspect and were constantly spied upon by the Cheka or OGPU; they had to be very circumspect.

The Communist dictatorship was particularly determined to counteract religious influence. The Communist leaders, being Marxian in philosophy and therefore dogmatically materialist, were not merely indifferent but actively antagonistic to all supernatural religion. To them, historic Christianity Repressing Christianity, was superstitious and worse: it was an instrument of reaction, an opiate of the people, a means of obscuring the realities of this world in a dream of another world. The masses could not safely be suffered to divide their allegiance between the materialism sponsored by Communists and the spiritualism preached by clergymen. Furthermore, the Com-

munist leaders were specially fearful of the reactionary influence of the Orthodox Church. It had been intimately associated with Russian history, with the life of the Russian people, and with the government of the Tsars. It could hardly be expected to countenance such a break with history or such a revolution in social life as the Communists demanded, and unless it was deprived of its wealth and prestige and of its traditional educational control it might undermine and ultimately destroy the Soviet government.

As early as January 1918 the Communist dictatorship decreed the separation of church and state in Russia, the confiscation of all church property, and the suppression of all church schools. Clergymen were disfranchised, and during the ensuing years, as the dictatorship strengthened its hold on the country, the Orthodox Church and all the other Christian bodies—and Judaism and Islam likewise—were reduced to the status of barely tolerated private cults. Many clergymen were exiled or put to death. Many church edifices were transformed into national museums or into recreational centres for workingmen. Public teaching of religion and public solicitation of funds for religion Decree of were alike forbidden. In 1929 the regulations of the 1929 con-Soviet government in respect of religion were revised cerning and codified in a comprehensive decree, according to which "groups of believers" were empowered to contract with the government for the use of church buildings for exclusive Religion purposes of worship, but they were estopped from any other collective or individual religious activity, and clergymen were severely restricted in training and movement.

The government, while curbing Christian propaganda, and to a lesser extent the Jewish and Moslem religions, gave free rein and active encouragement to atheistic propaganda. A militant "Society of the Godless" arose and throve, establishing permanent exhibitions of anti-religious paintings and cartoons, holding frequent demonstrations against religious observances, and conducting a systematic campaign of vituperation against priests and of jeering at religious rites and beliefs. To the younger generation of the Russian masses, the so-called "anti-religious front" of the Communist party and the Society of the Godless mainly addressed themselves, and with much success. The older generation were less affected; many of

them persevered in their habitual Christian worship. But with the younger generation cut off from Christian religious instruction and simultaneously exposed to the unrestrained counterpropaganda of atheism, the Communist dictatorship had reason for being optimistic about the outcome. It would be miraculous if in the long run historic religion could impede the fulfillment of the Soviet program, and the only miracles in which the Communists put much stock were those of modern technology.

Communism was a kind of religion itself. It was not purely an economic program or a set of political principles. It had a

dogmatic philosophy. It promised a millennium—one, Commuto be sure, that was material and secular, but one that nism as Religion was as emotionally attractive as it was problematical. And it inspired its devotees with a faith and an ardor transcending ordinary human experience. Not since the Jacobinism of the French Revolution had there been such an all-compelling nonsupernatural religion as was this Russian Communism of the twentieth century. Like the French Jacobins, the Russian Communists evinced the faith within them by a wealth of symbolism and a fever of missionary zeal. They paraded red flags, sang proletarian anthems, addressed one another as comrade, and raised Marx and Lenin to the stature of divinities. The great city of St. Petersburg, which had been patriotically rechristened during the World War as Petrograd, was now renamed Leningrad. In the central "Red Square" of the capital city of Moscow was enshrined in 1024 the embalmed body of Lenin as a perpetual object of public worship. In thousands of workmen's tenements and in thousands of peasants' cottages, lithographs of Lenin and Marx were hung, like icons, in the midst of customary candles. The religion of Communism was formal, but it was also very serious and sincere, and, as we have said, very intolerant.

If Communism was a substitute for other religion, its "church" was the Communist party. The party was indeed the organized and eager preacher of the new dispensation throughout Russia. For its importance lay not only in its control of the Soviet government and its direction of public policies but also in its missionary labors among the masses, getting them to accept and to coöperate loyally in the achievement of Communist aims. To this end, the party strove especially to convert the youth of the land. It organized

as a feeder and auxiliary to itself a "Communist League of Youth" (the so-called "Komsomol") for boys and girls between the ages of fourteen and twenty-three and secured a membership in it of four and a half million. For children between the ages of ten and sixteen the party created an association of "Communist Pioneers," and it enrolled still younger children (those from eight to ten) in still another association (the "Octiabrist").


For the conversion of the rising generation to Communism, as

well as for the assurance of needful literacy to the whole nation,

the Communist party and the Soviet government introduced far-reaching educational reforms. Elementary schools were rapidly multiplied in town and country, always Masses under strict governmental control and always with teachers and textbooks of Communist sympathies. In 1931 the central government decreed that every child within the Soviet Union must attend a primary Communist school for at least four years, and in 1933 a supplementary decree lengthened the period of compulsory attendance to seven years. For the maintenance and extension of such schools, ever heavier charges were made on the budgets of localities as well as on that of the state. By 1935 Soviet Russia was expending a great deal more on public education than the Tsarist régime had spent. One result was already manifest in 1935; the Russian masses were becoming literate. But a second result was almost equally obvious; conversion of Russian masses to Communism was proceeding apace. Another agency of Communist propaganda, as well as of national defense, was the Red Army. This had originally been recruited by Trotsky and had been greatly enlarged The Red by him during the trying days of 1918-1920. After the overthrow of the "white armies" and the failure Army of foreign intervention, the Red Army had been largely demobilized, and Trotsky's scheme for a well-organized professional army, with a territorial militia, was not immediately realized because of shortage of funds. Under Trotsky's successor, however, a decree of 1925 provided for a permanent

Red Army on the theoretical basis of compulsory military training for all able-bodied men between the ages of nineteen and

Note. The picture of Maxim Gorky, opposite, is by a French artist, Théophile Alexandre Steinlen (1859–1923). Gorky was one of the Russian intellectuals who espoused the cause of Communism. Concerning him, see above, p. 391.





forty. Practically, a selection was made from those liable to serve in the army, both in order to save expense and in order to assure a preponderance of confirmed Communists. By 1935 the Red Army of Soviet Russia was larger than the army of prewar Germany. About half of the rank-and-file and three-fourths of the officers were full-fledged members of the Communist party or of its affiliated "Communist League of Youth." And the Soviet government's expenditure on army and police surpassed its expenditure on education.

There can be no doubt that under the Communist dictatorship much was done to better the economic condition of the Russian masses, to make them literate, and to elevate their standard of living. There can also be no doubt that the Russian

living. There can also be no doubt that the Russian standard of living was still relatively low and that any advance of literacy or improvement of economic condition was attended by most drastic restrictions on the freedom of individual intelligence, initiative, and per-

Experimental
Nature of
Russian
Communism

sonality. The Communists promised that these qualities would come to the fore and be amply respected when economic and social equality was fully attained, but there was no little uncertainty outside Communist circles as to whether such equality would ever be attained. Disparities of station and of opportunity continued to exist in Soviet Russia between leaders and followers, between party comrades and ordinary citizens, between urban proletariat and rural peasantry, between "rich" peasants and extremely poor peasants, between the cunning and the stupid, the thrifty and the shiftless. Perhaps Russian Communism would eventually prove its worth and be widely copied throughout the world. Perhaps it would but serve to entrench another oligarchy in political and economic power. Time alone could register a verdict.

Meanwhile, the Communist dictatorship of the Soviet Union clearly evinced its determination to strengthen Russia's position as a national state and Great Power. National interpretation

ests were asserted and defended. National armaments were maintained and strengthened. The Union entered into treaties of friendship and trade with most

Policy of Soviet Union

"bourgeois" countries and in 1934 joined the League of Nations.

Note. The picture opposite, "A Russian Peasant," is from the painting by a Russian artist, Abram E. Arkhipov (1862–1933).

The Soviet Union looked askance at Japanese expansion in the Far East just as the old Russian Empire had done, and in manner reminiscent of the Tsar's it safeguarded itself against possible German aggression by entering into an alliance with France. Russia under the Communists, as under the Tsars, was a huge country, firmly resolved to rank accordingly in the counsels of Europe and of the world. Its dictatorship was patriotic as well as socialistic.

2. FASCIST DICTATORSHIP IN ITALY

At the close of the World War, Italy seemed to be committed, in common with all other nations of central and western Europe, to the perfecting of democratic and parliamentary institutions.

Liberal and Democratic Italy at Close of World War

Vittorio Orlando, the prime minister who presided over the country during the latter part of the war and participated in the peace negotiations at Paris, was a convinced liberal as well as patriot, and the adverse vote in the Italian parliament which brought about his resignation in July 1919 was occasioned by popular disappointment over his failure to obtain Allied sanction for the

annexation of Fiume rather than by any marked disapproval of his domestic political policy. He was succeeded by Francesco Nitti, another liberal, under whose auspices the already democratic franchise was supplemented in September 1919 by a scheme of proportional representation.2

In fact, however, Italy was sorely beset with post-war diffi-culties, more so than any of the other Allies (except Russia). Economic conditions were especially bad. The country was relatively poor, its industry and trade were disorgan-Economic ized, its agriculture was stagnant, and in the cities Difficulunemployment was rife. Public indebtedness had been vastly increased by the war, and post-war budgets showed ever bigger deficits. Still worse, currency inflation set in, producing a sharp rise of prices and a chaotic upset of values.

Such conditions promoted popular unrest and invited a resurgence of the radical and revolutionary movements which had troubled Italy during the first decade of the twentieth century but which had temporarily ebbed during the war. Chief among these was Marxian Socialism, with its left wing of Revolutionary

¹ See above, pp. 832, 856-857.

² See above, p. 801.

Syndicalism. It was newly inspirited and rendered more extreme by the apparent success of Lenin and his "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Russia; and the plight of urban workingmen in Italy, particularly in the north, afforded to its apostles a favorable seed-ground for their propaganda. Italian Socialists, in the general election of November 1919, secured 156 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (out of a total of 574), and, while they demonstrated in the Chamber against the existing government, they took "direct action" outside parliament against the existing economic and social order. They conducted one strike after another. They committed sabotage. In some instances they forcefully appropriated industrial plants and attempted to operate them.

Another movement, less revolutionary in purpose but hardly less troublesome to the government, gathered headway at the same time. This was the rise of a Catholic political party, the so-called Popular party, ably led by a militant Sicilian priest, Luigi Sturzo, and supported by Catholic intellectuals who were anxious to counteract the traditional hostility of the Liberal régime to the church and by Catholic peasants and laborers who were sympathetic with the party's program of democratic social reform, especially with its project of distributing large landed estates among peasant proprietors. In the general election of November 1919, the Popular party secured 101 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Against the Socialists on one side and the Popularists on the other, both with fairly well-defined purposes, the middle-class Liberal majority in the Italian parliament could present no united front and pursue no coherent policy. Some Impotent were becoming more and more nationalist; others were Liberal Ministries becoming more and more kindly disposed toward moderate socialism; and the factionalism which had characterized Liberal groups in Italy before the war reappeared in an acute form just at the time when unity and firmness were most needed. Nitti was too tolerant of Socialist propaganda and violence to please the property-holding Liberals and too yielding Nitti on the question of Fiume to satisfy the nationalists among them. In June 1920 the veteran politician Giolitti prevailed upon the Liberal majority to put Nitti out of office and to allow himself to form his fourth ministry.¹ Giolitti was an old man, however, and either unable or unwilling to press for any real social reform or to employ armed force against lawlessness and disorder. Internal troubles reached a zenith in the winter of 1920–1921. While Communists kidnapped capitalists, set up "revolutionary tribunals," and armed themselves as "red guards," while strikes paralyzed the metal industries, the railways, and even agriculture, the government remained irresolute and supine.

In April 1921 Giolitti dissolved parliament and appealed to the country. The ensuing elections only emphasized the radical differences of purpose and method among Italians. The Socialist representation in the Chamber was cut from 156 to 122, but alongside the Socialists appeared a new and definitely Communist party with 16 representatives. The Popularists increased their representation to 107, but a new nationalist group, the Fascist, obtained 35 seats. Liberals of all shades were now a minority in the Chamber, and still a quarrelsome minority. In June 1921 Giolitti resigned and was succeeded by Bonomi, a well-intentioned but colorless politician, with a coalition of Liberals and Popularists. Bonomi, in turn, was succeeded in February 1922 by another Liberal, Luigi Facta, Bonomi and Facta honest but mediocre and aged. Between assaults of Communists from one quarter and assaults of Fascists from another, and in the midst of deep-seated dislike between Liberals and Popularists, the governments of Bonomi and Facta were reduced to impotence. Some revolution was clearly impending in Italy. Would it be Communist or Fascist?

The Fascists had abler leadership and larger popular following than the Communists. The latter were becoming too extreme even for the majority of Socialists, and they had no leaders of outstanding ability or determination. The former, on the other hand, appeared to a rapidly growing number of Italians as the one firm bulwark against national disintegration and social chaos, and in Mussolini they possessed a leader both resourceful and resolute.

Benito Mussolini (born in 1883) had been identified during most of his life with left-wing Marxian Socialism. His father, a blacksmith, had been a vehement revolutionary and anti-Catholic

¹ On Giolitti and his earlier ministries, see above, pp. 574-575, 579, 580.

before him, and he himself had joined the Socialist party in his late teens while he was studying in a normal school. For a time he lived in Switzerland, taking courses at the universities of Lausanne and Geneva, engaging in Socialist journalism, and organizing Socialist trade unions. Expelled from one canton after another and eventually from the Swiss Confederation, he was patriotic enough to return to Italy for required military training, but his subsequent participation in Socialist agitation cost him an imprisonment in 1908. Shortly afterwards, he betook himself to Trent (then in Austria), where he edited a newspaper in behalf both of revolutionary Socialism and of Italian irredentism, until the Austrian government suppressed the paper and expelled the editor. Returning to Italy once more, Mussolini espoused revolutionary syndicalism in a newspaper which he founded at Forli, denouncing parliamentary government, calling for "direct action," and lauding Sorel's advocacy of violence and Nietzsche's plea for the "superman." 1 For opposing the Tripolitan War of 1911-1912, he was arrested and imprisoned for five months. This made him a hero in Socialist circles all over Italy, and at the end of 1912 he became editor of Avanti, the official organ of the Italian Socialist party.

Mussolini's break with the Socialist party began over the question of participation in the World War. The majority of the party leaders were quite hostile to participation, while Mussolini was ardently favorable. He argued that Italy was a "proletarian nation," committed by the doctrine of class-conflict His Break to war against the "capitalist nation" of Austria-Hungary, and that the surest way of converting the

Marxian

Italian masses to Socialism was to identify the Socialist party with a national cause. Forced out of the editorship of the Avanti, he established at Milan a "National Socialist" journal of his own, the Popolo d'Italia, through whose pages he conducted a strenuous campaign first for Italy's participation in the war and then for working-class cooperation in winning the war. In 1915 he joined the army and served in the trenches as private and corporal until scriously wounded in 1917. Then, back on his newspaper, he zealously combated pacifism and defeatism, and commenced to inveigh against the "menace" of Russian Bolshevism.

Gradually the personal following of Mussolini swelled.

¹ On Sorel, see above, p. 382, and on Nietzsche, see above, pp. 366-368.

first it embraced only a small minority of Socialist workingmen, but, with the termination of the war and the demobilization of the Italian army, it gained the adherence of a large number of ex-soldiers and youthful intellectuals, and then, when the existing government seemed unable to cope with economic unrest and Communist violence or to satisfy popular demands for the annexation of Fiume, it enlisted the support of numerous property-holders and patriots. Just as the older generation of extreme nationalists applauded D'Annunzio's forceful seizure of Fiume, so the younger generation of World War veterans—and a large fraction of the bourgeoisie—gave willing ear to Mussolini's plea for transforming Italy from a "liberal" to a "fascist" state.

The words "Fascist" and "Fascism" were derived from the "fascio" (or "club") which Mussolini organized among his followers at Milan in March 1919 for the general purpose of propagating his brand of national socialism and for the His specific purpose of fighting Marxian Communists and Expand-Socialists. During the next two years, a network of similar "clubs" (or "fasci") was spread over the industrial towns of Italy, and the members, under the ing Organization of "Fascists" inspiring and somewhat histrionic leadership of Mussolini, indulged in constant counter-violence against the strikes and other activities of the "reds." In April 1921 some 35 Fascists (together with 10 Nationalist disciples of D'Annunzio) were elected to the Chamber of Deputies, and in November of the same year the Fascist political party was definitively constituted with a graded hierarchy (headed, of course, by Mussolini), with a rigid discipline, and with a wealth of symbolism and ceremonial. As Garibaldi's volunteers had worn red shirts, so Mussolini's distinguished themselves with black shirts, and as the word Fascist suggested not only the "fasci" (or "clubs") of modern Italy but also the "fasces" which officials of the ancient Roman Republic had borne, so Fascism was symbolized by a bundle of rods enclosing a battle axe, and Fascists saluted their chief—Il Duce ("The Leader")—with the outstretched hand of the old Roman salute. Even a party anthem was adopted, the stirring student song of Giovinezza ("Youth") which had been popular during the World War.

¹ See above, pp. 868-869.

With mounting enthusiasm (and violence) and with perfecting organization and resolution, the Fascist movement gathered momentum rapidly during 1921-1922. Simultaneously, the opposing groups in Italy weakened. Facta, the prime minister, was elderly and irresolute. Giolitti, the ing Oppo-sition to most famous of the Liberal leaders, was in his eighties **Fascism** and widely distrusted. The Socialist party lacked competent leadership and at its congress in 1922 it split on the question of cooperation with the Communists. The Communists were a sect, rather than a national party, and they too lacked resourceful leadership. The Popular (or Catholic) party, despite the frantic endeavors of its gifted chief, Sturzo, was also disintegrating: its left wing was too revolutionary to collaborate successfully with the Liberal government of the day; its right wing was drawn toward Fascism; and the Pope was becoming sceptical of the official participation of Catholics in Italian politics and distrustful of Sturzo.

thousand of them paraded the streets in military formation, and Mussolini, in a grandiloquent speech, declared that "what we have in view is the introduction into the Liberal State, which has fulfilled its functions, . . . of all the forces of the new generation which has emerged from the war and the victory." "Either the government will be given to us or we shall march on Rome." On October 27 Facta resigned from the premiership, and the Fascist "army" at Naples moved on Rome. The regular army stood aside, and King Victor Emmanuel III, without a government and with Fascist fighting men pouring into the capital, sent for Mussolini and asked him to form a ministry.

In October 1922 the Fascists held a congress at Naples. Forty

Thus, at the end of October 1022, Mussolini became prime minister of Italy. From the terrified parliament he at once obtained a grant of dictatorial powers for a year, Mussolini, and then proceeded, on the one hand, to extend and Prime Consolidate the Fascist organization throughout the Country, and, on the other, to conduct and reform the public administration. With his harsh voice and short crisp sentences, with his flashing black eyes and magnificent scowl, with his Napoleonic bearing, he mightily impressed the nation, as well as king and parliament; and his great energy and exacting at-

tention to details soon produced effects. Order was restored throughout the country. Strikes were suppressed and Socialist agitators punished. Economies were introduced into government. Administration was rendered less wasteful. Public works were undertaken and unemployment relieved.

In November 1923, Mussolini persuaded parliament, despite opposition from Socialist and Popularist members and from some Liberals, to enact an essentially revolutionary electoral law. Thereby, in the future, the political party securing a Fascist plurality of votes in the general election would be Electoral Triumph entitled to two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while the remaining third would be distributed among the other parties on a proportional basis. The first election under the new arrangement was held in April 1924. The Fascists, better organized than their rivals and freer to exercise compulsion, obtained four and a half million votes out of a total of seven and a half million and therefore appropriated two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber, leaving the combined Socialists, Popularists, and Liberals in a helpless minority.

The kidnapping and murder of the Socialist leader, Giacomo Matteotti, by Fascists just after the assembling of the new Chamber temporarily filled many Italians with mingled fear and indignation, and for a time in 1924 the anti-Fascist minority in the Chamber threatened to form a compact group and make some trouble for the Fascist government. Mussolini, however, disclaimed any responsibility for the crime against Matteotti, and by strict censorship of the press and forceful police measures he managed to weather the storm. A reign of terror Disap-pearance ensued. Political opponents were imprisoned or intimidated, and critics were silenced. Sturzo escaped of Organ-ized Opinto exile, together with some Socialist leaders and a number of Liberals. Others, especially those most nationalistically inclined, espoused Fascism, and still others merely retired into private life and set a seal on their lips. By the end of 1924 Italy was definitely resigned to a dictatorship of Mussolini and the Fascists.

By a series of enactments from 1925 to 1928 the Fascist majority in parliament empowered the government to dismiss "disloyal" officials, to dissolve all political parties except the Fascist, to abolish Freemasonry and all other secret societies, to set

up a tribunal of summary justice for the trial of political offenders, to confiscate the property of "seditious" persons, Establishment of to suppress seditious newspapers, and to centralize the administration. Mussolini, as prime minister, was authorized to initiate all legislation, and offenses against his person were made direfully punishable. The local prefects, whose powers were strengthened, were to be directly responsible to him, and he would appoint governors (or podestàs) of cities and villages. To cap the climax, the popular election of members of parliament was transformed, by a law of 1928, into a mere plebiscite; henceforth, the electorate would simply vote yes or no on a list of candidates approved by the Fascist party. Political democracy, as previously practiced in Italy, was at an end, and all kinds of individual liberty were sharply abridged.

Formally, the central Italian government continued to be "constitutional." The King was still the nominal sovereign. The Parliament, composed of Senate and Chamber of Deputies, was still the legal law-making body; and to it was still responsible the ministry (or cabinet). Actually, however, the whole government was dominated by the party organization of the Fascists, just as the contemporary Soviet government of Russia was controlled by a single Communist Party party. And in Italy, as in Russia, the dictatorial party comprised a relatively small minority of the population.

In 1932—ten years after the "March on Rome"—the Fascist party numbered about a million and a quarter. No person was admitted to it unless he had demonstrated his loyalty to its principles and undergone training in its auxiliaries: the "Balilla," for boys from 8 to 14; the "Avanguardia," for adolescents from 14 to 18; and the "Fascist Youth," for young men from 18 to 21. In 1933, out of 600,000 applicants for membership in the party, 200,000 were accepted. The members of the party were distributed among some 10,000 local "fasci" Its Grand Council (or "clubs"), which were federated by provinces, and ultimately directed by the Party's Grand Council. This

¹ In 1932 the membership of these three auxiliaries amounted to about a million and a quarter. In addition, there were two auxiliaries for girls: the Piccole Italiane, numbering 660,000 between the ages of 8 and 13; and the Giovani Italiane, numbering 80,000 between the ages of 13 and 18.

Council, as reconstituted in 1928, included the state ministers, the leaders of the "March on Rome," the general secretary and certain other officials of the party, and representatives of Fascist corporations, about twenty persons in all.

The chairman of the Grand Council of the Fascist party was prime minister of the country. The Council not only ruled the party and shaped its policies, but also nominated candidates for parliament, and inasmuch as no other party existed after 1928 to make nominations or to conduct organized campaigns against Fascist nominees, all the members of parliament were practically certain to be members of the Fascist party, quite obedient to the dictates of the Grand Council. To make doubly sure of the supremacy of the party's council over the state parliament, it was further provided in 1928 that the Council must be consulted on all matters affecting the constitution, the royal succession, the powers of the prime minister, the relations between church and state, and the ratification of treaties involving territorial changes. And to enforce its will throughout the country, the Grand Council had at its disposal a special body of Fascist militia and a special tribunal of Fascist magistrates. In 1928 Fascist symbols, such as the fasces, the salute, and the anthem, were officially accepted as national symbols.

The machinery of the Fascist party and that of the Italian state were thus closely interlocked, and the supreme manipulator of both was Mussolini, "Il Duce." He was chairman The Dictator of of the Grand Council and through its discipline, its Party and Govmilitia, and its tribunal he was master of parliament and the country at large. He was also prime minister ernment: Mussolini of the state, initiating legislation, appointing officials, advising the king, and directing the whole national administration. By 1929, he was not only prime minister but minister of the interior, of foreign affairs, of colonies, of war, marine, and air. In his own person he was a cabinet-majority. No statesman since Napoleon (except Lenin and his successor in Russia) had exercised such wide and varied powers, in manner so dictatorial. The phrase L'état c'est moi was much more applicable to a modern Fascist (or Communist) dictator than to a Louis XIV.

Mussolini and his fellow Fascists in Italy sought to gain the support of the working classes by undertaking social reform and

substituting a "corporate state" for the previous "liberal state." Individualism would be frowned upon, and the differences between capital and labor minimized. With these ends in view, an enactment of 1926 abolished non-Fascist trade unions, prohibited strikes and lockouts, and Corporate at the same time legalized thirteen "syndicates" State (six of employers, six of employes, and one of professional men), under whose joint auspices special tribunals should be established for the settlement of labor disputes. In 1927 a "charter of labor" was promulgated: while guarantying private property and encouraging private initiative, it forbade employers to work their men more than eight hours a day or six days a week or to discharge them on the score of illness or military service; it obliged employers to contribute to the insurance of their men against illness, accidents, old age, and unemployment; and it empowered the labor corporations to train apprentices and maintain employment bureaus. In 1928 the electoral law entrusted the thirteen syndicates with political functions; each would nominate parliamentary candidates to be passed upon and approved by the Grand Council of the Fascist party before a general election. In 1930 the thirteen syndicates were reformed and coördinated as "corporations" under a general Fascist Confederation of Industry, headed by a state Minister of Corporations. In 1934 a National Council was created of deputies from the various corporations in order immediately to advise parliament on economic and social legislation and eventually to supplant parliament as the law-making body of the realm. Functional or professional representation, rather than individual or territorial representation, was the political goal of the corporate state of the Fascists.

Mussolini and his fellow Fascists sought also to secure the support of the Catholic masses by reversing the anti-clerical

policies which liberal governments had pursued since the time of Cavour and reaching a friendly agreement with the papacy on the "Roman question." To Mussolini's overtures, Pope Pius XI responded sympathetically; he was no advocate of Fascism but he perceived an advantage to the church in ending

Religious Conciliation and the Lateran Treaty, 1929

the conflict which since 1870 had forced Italians to choose between loyalty to their national state and obedience to their religious head.¹ Consequently, after delicate and protracted negotiations between Mussolini and the Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Gasparri, the treaty of the Lateran was concluded in 1929. Italy agreed to the temporal sovereignty of the Pope within a small but independent Papal State, embracing the Vatican and St. Peter's with about a hundred acres of adjacent land (the so-called Vatican City) and also with the estate of Castel Gandolfo outside Rome. In return the Pope recognized the Kingdom of Italy, surrendered his claims to the greater part of Rome, and promised to "remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between nations and to international congresses convoked for the settlement of such disputes unless the contending parties make a joint appeal to his mission of peace."

Simultaneously with the signing of the Lateran Treaty, a financial agreement and a concordat were concluded between the papacy and the Italian government. The financial agreement provided for the payment to the Pope of a sum of about 100 million dollars in lieu of the annual appropriations which Italy had been making as indemnity for the seizure of Rome in 1870 but which the papacy had hitherto refused to accept. The Concordat concordat, on the other hand, provided for the future relations of church and state in Italy. The Pope would Church appoint all bishops in Italy, but before doing so he would communicate each nomination to the Italian government "in order to be sure that the latter has no objection from a political standpoint." The state would continue to pay the salaries of bishops and priests, and bishops, before taking office, must swear loyalty to the state, the king, and the government. Religious instruction would be given in the state schools by persons approved by the church. The church might freely engage in popular propaganda of a religious nature but not in political activity, and no ecclesiastic might belong to any political party.

This sensational termination of the long feud between the

This sensational termination of the long feud between the Italian state and the Catholic Church was acclaimed alike by devout Catholics, who perceived a gain for religion in the new freedom of papacy and church, and by enthusiastic Fascists, who perceived a strengthening of their cause in the removal of ecclesiastical opposition. Some friction continued, nevertheless,

¹On the conflict between Papacy and Italian government, see above, pp. 247, 423, 572-574.

and in 1931 the dissolution of Catholic clubs and societies by the Fascist dictatorship evoked such vigorous protests from the Pope that the clubs were permitted to reopen under their respective bishops.

The Fascist régime, in addition to enlisting Catholic support through the settlement of the quarrel between church and state, and seeking industrial and working-class support through the arrangements for a corporate state, devoted much attention to popular education as a means of gaining mass sup-Popular Education port. The number of schools was increased, and the laws providing for compulsory attendance were more rigorously enforced. In 1921, just before Mussolini took office, some three million children were attending elementary schools in Italy; in 1935, there were four and a half million. In 1921 the percentage of illiteracy in the country as a whole was over a fourth; in 1935 it was less than a fifth, and in northern Italy it was fast reaching zero. The great stress in the schools was on training for citizenship, and citizenship was now deemed synonymous with Fascism. The teachers were Fascist in sympathy; and Fascist in principle and aim were the curricula and textbooks. For many children, moreover, Fascist training in the schools was supplemented by similar training in the party's auxiliary organizations of youth. For all young men, furthermore, it was supplemented by intensive training in the army, for the army, of course, was Fascist in its command and in its conduct. The Fascist party might be relatively small, but the younger generation of the whole Italian nation was being educated in Fascism.

Nationalism was continually emphasized and extolled by Mussolini and his fellow Fascists. Italians were ceaselessly reminded of their past greatness and future destiny as a nation.

For patriotic reasons as well as to provide work for men otherwise unemployed, and in many instances to develop the country's economic resources, the government fos-

develop the country's economic resources, the government fostered a great variety of public works. Pride in the past was stimulated by repairing ancient monuments, unearthing and reconstructing the old Roman forum, and erecting memorials to Julius Cæsar and Augustus. Faith in the future was aroused and confirmed by a host of "modern improvements." The railways were refurbished and trains were made to run on time. Palatial steamships were built for transoceanic service, and the Italian merchant marine, which in 1913 had been hardly a fourth as large as Germany's or a half of France's, reached in 1935 a tonnage almost equal to either the French or the German. Tourist traffic from abroad was energetically encouraged. New cable lines were laid. The radio industry was fostered. Airplanes were manufactured and increasingly utilized for passenger and mail service throughout the country. Agricultural works were also undertaken, involving extensive reforestation and the reclamation of swamp lands. And industrially, Italy's lack of coal and iron was partially compensated for by a remarkable development of hydro-electric power, which by 1935 represented a horse-power of almost five million, more than twice the developed water power of any other country in the world.¹

As far as might be, economic self-sufficiency (or, in other words, economic nationalism) was a Fascist policy and goal. In keeping with it were the hydro-electric developments, the agricultural works, and the national merchant marine. In keeping with it, likewise, were the new national syndicates and corporations and the heightening of previous protective tariffs.

Militarism was another conspicuous feature of Fascist Italy. Not only was the army kept on the basis of universal compulsory service, but it was better equipped and rendered more efficient, and it was paraded much more frequently in public view and was lauded by Mussolini more often and more ostentatiously. The Italian navy was increased, and the air service of both army and navy was perfected. In 1934 some military training was definitely prescribed for all Italian boys from the age of eight.

Imperialism was still another aspect of Fascist thought and ambition. The Italian population was growing faster than that of most other European countries. Already it was surpassing the French, and to Mussolini and other patriots it required a commensurate colonial expansion. Hence Mussolini, who as a Socialist had decried the seizure of African territory in 1911, now as a Fascist loudly championed a

¹ The nearest competitors with Italy in this respect were France and Switzerland, each with a developed water power of two and a third million. In respect of total *potential* water power, Italy was a close third to Norway and the Soviet Union, and was followed in order by France, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and Germany.

greater imperial domain for Italy in Africa and the Near East. He obtained from France and Great Britain an extension of Libya into the sands of the Sahara desert. He insisted upon retaining the Greek Dodecanese in the Ægean and secured a virtual protectorate over Albania. In 1935 he undertook anew the conquest of Abyssinia (Ethiopia).

For all the enterprises of the Fascist government in Italy—military, naval, and imperial, economic, educational, and ecclesiastical, indemnifying the Pope and at the same time financing a multitude of public works and sustaining financial strain the enormous burden of indebtedness contracted during the World War—government expenditure was immensely increased. Yet, despite general post-war depression and special economic difficulties in Italy, the increase of expenditure was made without serious popular murmuring. Italian finances continued to be more or less perilous, but the Fascist government was more rigorous and probably more honest than its predecessors in spending money, and it had the assistance of some able financiers.

To all appearances, at any rate, the Fascist dictatorship was becoming solidly entrenched and popular in Italy. In the general election of 1929—essentially a plebiscite on the Fascist list of candidates for parliament—eight and a half Support million electors voted "yes" and 140,000 voted "no." In the general election of 1934, ten million voted "yes" and only 15,000 voted "no." In both elections, about 90 per cent of the electorate went to the polls.

3. DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE

While a Communist dictatorship was being established in Russia, and a Fascist dictatorship in Italy, most of the countries of western Europe clung to the principle of the "liberal state" and to the practices of political democracy. In the Western countries, to be sure, the difficulties of operating democratic government were more obvious than formerly. Parliaments and their responsible ministers had now to cope with intricate postwar problems of economic reconstruction and to cope with them in the midst of growing strife among parties and extraordinary agitation of extremists. Yet in these countries, despite the rising

¹ See below, pp. 1080-1082.

vogue of Communism or Fascism elsewhere, the essential features of modern individualism and modern political democracy persisted.

Personal liberty and parliamentary government were traditions of long standing and great weight in Britain, and hardly less so in France, Belgium, and Switzerland; and Strength they had long been the goal of political aspiration in of Democratic the Netherlands and Scandinavia. Moreover, the Tradition economic conditions within Britain, France, and Belin West gium after the war, though serious enough, were certainly better than in Russia or Italy, while those in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Scandinavia (which had been neutral during the World War) were much better. Furthermore, the peoples of Britain, France, and Belgium were more loyally attached to an existing régime which had "won the war" and dictated a peace satisfying to national prestige than were either the Russians who had suffered crushing defeat or the Italians who were keenly disappointed with the peace.

In Great Britain, the outstanding problems of the post-war years were economic. The stoppage of special war industries and the difficulty of resuming normal peace-time 1. Great production in the face of increasing foreign competi-Britain tion and diminishing foreign markets jeopardized Britain's century-old position as "the banker and workshop of the world." Her production of coal and iron, of cotton and certain other basic industries, was still impressive, but it showed a decline from pre-war standards both in absolute amount and in relation to the production of other industrial Economic nations, most notably the United States and France. Difficulties The British output of coal fell from 287 million tons in 1913 to 243 million in 1925, and of iron from 121/3 million tons in 1913 to 10 million in 1925; while the number of active cotton spindles decreased from 58 1/2 million in 1913 to 56 million in 1925. This occurred, morcover, when the output of coal was increasing in the United States from 520 million tons to almost 600 million, and in like proportion in Germany and France; when the output of iron was expanding in France from 6 million tons to 14 million; when the number of cotton spindles was enlarging in the United States and France and more so in Japan and Russia.

In the circumstances, there was a shortage of jobs in mines and factories for the masses of British industrial workers, just at the time when the demobilization of the war armies vastly increased the number of persons seeking such jobs. The result was an unprecedented amount of unemployment, which promised to become chronic and acutely troublesome. The number of registered adult workers who could not obtain employment was over two million in 1921 (out of a total of about twelve million); and around that figure it subsequently hovered, dropping to one million in 1927 and soaring to three million in 1933.

This standing army of unemployed persons and the still larger host of their dependent families had to be provided for in some way. But the national debt had been so enormously increased by the war that the interest charges alone amounted to 360 million pounds sterling in 1921–1922 as over against 22 million ten years previously. To meet those charges and at the same time to defray current expenses of army, navy, and civil administration and extraordinary expenses of unemployment relief meant national taxation so heavy as to threaten the capitalistic system on which Britain's industrial supremacy had been built.

The British government which first had to face these economic problems was that coalition of Liberals and Conservatives, headed by Lloyd George, which had been formed in Lloyd 1916 and which had received a thumping vote of confidence from the country at large in the "khaki Ministry, election" of December 1918. It negotiated the 1916-1922 peace treaties of 1919-1920, and effected the peaceful demobilization of the conscript war armies. It opposed the republican movement in Ireland, but finally, though reluctantly, agreed to the treaty of 1921 establishing the Irish Free State. It extended the insurance of workingmen against illness and unemployment and greatly increased the governmental subsidies (or "doles," as they were called) to the unemployed. It also man-

¹On the pre-war career of Lloyd George, see above, pp. 477-488; on the formation of his Coalition ministry in 1916 and his war-activities, see above, p. 832; and on the parliamentary election of 1918, see above, p. 855. The election of 1918, we may here note, returned 484 supporters (mainly Conservative) of the Coalition, as against 57 Laborites, 26 dissenting Liberals (under Asquith), and 73 Sinn Feiners. The last named did not take their seats in the British House of Commons but proceeded, instead, to constitute an Irish parliament (or Dail) at Dublin, concerning which see above, pp. 876-879.

aged, by introducing many economies and by imposing very heavy income taxes, to balance the budget. And in 1921, with the purpose of arresting the industrial decline, it departed from the long-established policy of thoroughgoing free trade and imposed tariff duties on the importation of certain foreign manufactures which were underselling British key industries in the home market.

In 1922 Lloyd George's premiership came to an end. A section of the Liberal party disliked him for his deposition of Asquith back in 1916 and denounced him as a mercurial self-sceker. The Labor party, which was expanding rapidly under the leadership of Ramsay MacDonald, found fault with Lloyd George for his subservience to the Conservatives and his seeming abandonment of social reform. And the Conservatives, who constituted the majority in Parliament, were disgruntled by his settlement of the Irish question and by his inability to bring about an industrial recovery. Following a repudiation of the coalition government by a Conservative caucus in October 1922, Lloyd George

Conservative
Ministry
of Bonar
Law and
Baldwin,
1922-1924

resigned, and King George V entrusted the premiership to Bonar Law, the nominal leader of the Conservative party. The ensuing general election returned a clear Conservative majority, though the Laborites secured a larger representation than they had ever had before and in excess of that of the combined

Liberal groups, Asquith's and Lloyd George's.² It was obvious that liberalism of the pre-war kind was being ground between the upper and nether millstones of conservatism and labor.

The Conservative victory proved abortive. Bonar Law, on

¹ Ramsay MacDonald (born 1866), the son of a Scottish workingman and largely self-taught, had been conspicuous in the Labor party from its origin, serving as secretary until 1912 and then as leader until 1914, and contributing much to its journalism and propaganda. He professed a kind of right-wing Socialism, and for his pacifism during the World War he suffered political ostracism and temporary imprisonment. His marriage in 1896 to the niece of Lord Kelvin, the famous scientist (see above, p. 332), had brought him considerable wealth and strengthened his desire to ally intellectuals and "respectable" middle-class reformers, as well as trade unionists, with the Labor party. Such a desire he largely realized after the war, and this, along with popular reaction against the horrors of war and the sorry economic conditions of the time, helps to explain why the Labor party expanded rapidly after 1918.

² By the election of November 1922, the 615 seats in the House of Commons were distributed as follows: Conservatives, 347; Laborites, 142; Asquith Liberals, 60; Lloyd George Liberals, 58; and Independents, 8.

account of illness, soon retired from the premiership in favor of Stanley Baldwin, a business man who had occupied several important financial offices since 1917. Baldwin's announcement that tariff protectionism was the remedy for the country's economic ills evoked dissension among Conservatives as well as strenuous opposition alike from Laborites and from Liberals. On the tariff issue, Parliament was dissolved and new Macelections held in December 1923. This time the Conservatives were reduced to a minority, while both Ministry, the Laborites and the Liberals (now temporarily 1924 reunited) gained ground. Early in 1924 the new parliamentary majority voted Baldwin out of office and permitted Ramsay MacDonald to form a Labor government.

But the Labor government was shortlived, too. It could last only as long as the Liberals were willing to support it, and the "moderation" which the Liberals insisted upon was likely to alienate the extremist element among the Laborites. Before coming into office, MacDonald had advocated a capital levy and other drastic socialist measures for dealing with the domestic situation. Once in office, however, he dropped all such proposals and contented himself with obtaining from Parliament the repeal of some of the war-time tariff duties and an authorization for the construction of workers' dwellings. Presently, while a section of his own party grumbled at his "moderation," the Liberals took alarm at his "extravagance" and the mounting cost of unemployment relief; and when he finally decided to recognize the Communist dictatorship in Russia, the Liberals repudiated him. In vain he appealed to the British electorate in October 1924. Though the popular vote for Labor candidates went up by a million, the Conservative party, on a platform of uncompromising resistance to the "Red Peril," secured an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons.2 MacDonald's Labor ministry was succeeded by a Conservative ministry under Stanley Baldwin.

The second Baldwin ministry lasted almost five years, from November 1924 to May 1929. It sponsored several important

¹ The election of December 1923 returned 257 Conservatives, 192 Laborites, 158 Liberals, and 8 Independents.

² The election of October 1924 returned 412 Conservatives, 152 Laborites, 42 Liberals, and o Independents.

measures. One was the definitive adoption of tariff protectionism. Another was the enfranchisement of women on Second the same basis as men. Still another was the lower-Baldwin ing of the age limit for receipt of old age pensions. Ministry, 1024-1020 A fourth was the establishment of state control over radio broadcasting. A "general strike" of British workingmen in May 1926, the climax of protracted and bitter labor troubles in the coal mines, created grave apprehension and led to the enactment of a Trades Dispute bill, outlawing general strikes and imposing restrictions on trade-union activity. On the other hand, Parliament refused to sanction a revision of the Book of Common Prayer which the Assembly of the Anglican Church had endorsed in an effort to conciliate the "Anglo-Catholic" group within the church.1

At the regular general election in 1929, the Conservatives met defeat. The Labor party obtained a plurality of seats in the House of Commons, and, though still dependent for an absolute majority upon the remnant of Liberals headed by Second Lloyd George, there was no question about its assum-Mac-Donald ing the conduct of government.2 Accordingly, Baldwin Ministry. resigned and Ramsay MacDonald formed his second Labor cabinet, including for the first time in English history a woman member-Margaret Bondfield as Minister of Labor. At the outset of his second ministry MacDonald appeared to be less "compromising" than he had been during his first ministry, but fundamentally he was more intent upon a pacific foreign policy than upon domestic social reform and temperamentally he was more susceptible to the appeals of persons of birth and substance than to the urgings of lower-class extremists in his own party. As economic conditions grew rapidly worse in Britain, reflecting in an acute form the world-wide depression which

¹ The Anglican Church, as the English state church, was subject to parliamentary control (which could be exercised, in part at least, by persons who were not Anglicans). Parliament in 1919 had set up an Assembly of the Anglican Church with the purpose of conferring upon it some legislative autonomy. Now the "Anglo-Catholic" element in the Church of England was aggrieved not only by the failure of the revised prayer book but also by Parliament's reassertion of its right to dictate to the church.

² The election of May 1929 returned 289 Laborites, 260 Conservatives, 58 Liberals, and 8 Independents. Lloyd George's willingness to support a Labor ministry was opposed by another Liberal leader, Sir John Simon, with the result that a new cleavage developed among the dwindling Liberals.

set in seriously in 1930, MacDonald abandoned any idea which he may previously have had of resorting to radical socialistic expedients. In 1931, against the counsel of the majority of his cabinet, he endorsed the proposals of his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, to reduce governmental expenses and to effect drastic economies in unemployment relief. This split the Labor party. A minorployment relief. This split the Labor party. A minorployment relief is the MacDonald and Snowden and took the title of "National Laborites." The majority repudiated the prime minister and chose Arthur Henderson as leader of the radical "Laborites."

Whereupon MacDonald invited the Conservatives and the Liberals to unite with him in backing a "national" government. The Conservatives responded with alacrity, and so did a fraction of the Liberals under Sir John Simon, with the result that the new ministry, as formed in August 1931 under MacDonald's titular headship, comprised two or three other "National Laborites," two or three "National Liberals." Coalition Ministry and a majority of Conservatives (including Baldwin and Austen Chamberlain). In the ensuing elections, the Coalition—especially the Conservative part of it—won a resounding victory. The Conservatives almost doubled their representation in the House of Commons, and altogether the Coalition appropriated eight-ninths of all the seats in the House. To be sure, the opposing Labor party, under Henderson, polled a popular vote of six and a half million and elected four times as many members as did the National Labor party of MacDonald; but the parliamentary representation of the Laborites as a whole was sharply cut, and against 68 National Liberals who supported the Coalition, only Lloyd George and three other Liberals remained in opposition.

Thus, the British government was essentially conservative and nationalist during the crisis of economic depression from 1931 to 1935, as it had been in the crisis of peace-making and post-war readjustment from 1918 to 1922. In name, it was

¹ The election of October 1931 returned 554 members of the Coalition and 61 of the Opposition. The Coalition comprised 471 Conservatives, 68 National Liberals, 13 National Laborites, and 2 Independents. The Opposition consisted of 52 Laborites, 4 Lloyd George Liberals, and 5 Independents. In 1933 about half of the National Liberals (including Sir Herbert Samuel) deserted the Coalition and joined the Opposition.

a coalition government. In fact, it was a government of the Conservative party; and just as formerly the Conservatives had taken Lloyd George, a radical Liberal, in tow, so now they had captured MacDonald, the Labor leader. And now, headed nominally by MacDonald 1 and actually by Baldwin, the government pursued policies at once conservative and patriotic. Tariff protectionism was elaborated by an act of 1932, and certain features of Tariff the old Corn Laws were revived.2 British imperialism Protecwas given a new slant by the Statute of Westmintionism ster (1931), in accordance with which the self-governing Dominions were recognized as "nations" and grouped together as a "Commonwealth." 3 National appropriations for army and navy were maintained at a relatively high level (averaging 115 million pounds sterling annually during the decade from 1925 to 1935 as compared with 64 million in 1910). At the same time, national expenditure for unemployment-relief remained large: and only by withholding debt payments to the United States and abandoning the gold standard did the government effect anv appreciable lightening of its grievous financial load. The budget for 1934-1935 was less by 90 million pounds sterling than the budget for 1924-1925, but it was still almost five times greater than the largest pre-war budget.4

During most of the post-war period, and in its most critical years, the Conservative party was dominant in Great Britain. The Liberals, who had been in power for almost ten years immediately preceding the World War, were now rent by internal dissension and deprived of any large popular following. Principal opposition to the Con-

¹Until 1935, when Baldwin replaced MacDonald as Prime Minister. MacDonald remained a purely honorary member of the cabinet. The general election of November 1935 assured Baldwin's continuance in power. His supporters now comprised 387 Conservatives, 35 National Liberals, and 8 National Laborites. In opposition were 158 Laborites, 21 Liberals, 1 Communist, and 5 Independents. The government's majority was thus 245.

²On the Corn Laws, see Vol. I, pp. 462, 759, and the present volume, above, pp. 83-84.

³ See above, pp. 879-880.

⁴ The budget of 1910 (see above, p. 457) was 168 million pounds sterling; that of 1935 was 706 million. Expenditure for army and navy had increased from 64 million to 114 million; for interest on the national debt, from 22 million to 236 million; and for all other governmental services (including public education, pensions, health, and relief), from 64 million to 356 million Some allowance should be made, of course, for differences in purchasing power between 1910 and 1935.

servative party had definitely passed from the Liberals to the Laborites, and, though the latter suffered a set-back through the secession of Ramsay MacDonald and his fellow "National Laborites" in 1931, there was evidence aplenty that the set-back was only temporary and that a new political (and social) alignment was becoming ever more sharply position defined between the extremes of Conservatism and Labor. This did not signify, however, that Britain was necessarily headed toward revolution or dictatorship, toward Communism or Fascism

It is true that there was an unusual amount of criticism of parliamentary government and party politics in post-war Britain. At one extreme, some workingmen and some intellectuals espoused Communism of the Russian variety and openly advocated the overthrow of the historic British Constitution and the establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletar-Fascist iat." At the other extreme, Sir Oswald Mosley (born Minor-1806). a volatile aristocrat and boastful war veteran, ities in who had been in turn a Conservative and a Radical Laborite and was always something of a poseur, underwent a sudden conversion to Fascism of the Italian (and German) kind and began to inveigh against Parliament and the Jews and to organize a band of "black-shirts." Nevertheless, the confessed Communists in Britain, though noisy, were not nu-

merous, and Sir Oswald's Fascists were an object of popular

derision.

The vast majority of Britishers continued to support the parliamentary party of the Conservatives or that of the Laborites, and both parties were seemingly as desirous as the dwindling Liberal party to retain the characteristic political in- Large stitutions of modern England. The Conservatives Demowould conserve, not only the monarchy, the state Majority church, and the House of Lords, private property in Britain and industrial capitalism, but also the responsibility of the ministry to the popularly elected House of Commons and the individual liberties and the social-reform legislation which had become traditional with parliamentary government. The Laborites would seek to achieve radical social changes and farreaching modifications of the capitalistic system, but they would achieve their goal within the framework, and under the auspices,

of the existing British Constitution with its curious compound of monarchical tradition and practical democracy.

Two democratic governments were maintained in Ireland from 1922 onwards. One was the government of Northern Ireland, which functioned at Belfast under the premiership 2. Democof Sir James Craig (Viscount Craigavon), with a parliaracy in mentary majority of Unionists and in subordination British Commonto the British government at Westminster. 1 The other wealth: In was the government of the Irish Free State, which ex-Northern Ireland ercised at Dublin practically sovereign sway over the greater part of Ireland in accordance with the written constitution which it adopted (with the sanction of Great Britain) in 1022.2 This government was directed for ten years, from 1022 to 1932, by William Cosgrave with the backing of In Irish moderate Sinn Feiners. Internal order was restored, Free State religious and other individual liberties were respected, the Irish (Gaelic) language was given an equal legal status with English, and much was done to promote Irish agriculture, industry, and public works. Following the electoral success of extreme Sinn Feiners in 1932, Eamon De Valera was chosen "president of the executive council," and under his guidance a more intensely nationalist policy was pursued.3 Debt payments to Great Britain were stopped. The oath of allegiance to the King was abolished. Appeals to British courts were forbidden. The British government protested against these actions as violations of the treaty between Britain and the Irish Free State and sought to penalize the latter by levying special tariffs against its products. De Valera and his parliament at Dublin retaliated with counter-tariffs.

¹ Northern Ireland, though accorded a local parliament of its own in 1921 (see above, p. 878), continued to be represented in the British Parliament. In the elections to its own local parliament in 1933, the Unionists (that is, the Conservatives) secured 37 seats, and the Opposition 15 (consisting of 11 Nationalists, 2 Republicans, and 2 Laborites). It is interesting to note that the title of "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland," which had been the official designation of the British monarchy since the Union of 1801, was changed, after the creation of the Irish Free State, to "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland."

² Sce above, pp. 878-879.

³ The Irish Free State elections of 1932 returned a De Valera Coalition of 72 extreme Sinn Feiners (with the party-name of "Fianna Fail") and 7 Laborites, and an Opposition of 74 (consisting of 57 followers of Cosgrave in the "Cumann Na nGaedhal," 4 Agrarians, and 13 Independents). Later elections, in 1933, were still more favorable to De Valera.

The government of the Irish Free State, whether under Cos grave or under De Valera, remained parliamentary and democratic, as did the government of Northern Ireland under Craig Some extremists in labor circles agitated in both parts of Irelanc in favor of Communism, but they were too few and too unpopular to make serious trouble. On the other hand, in the Free State General Owen O'Duffy headed in 1933 a Fascist body of "blue shirts," numbering perhaps 40,000, but De Valera was hostile to it and took steps to suppress it.

Not only the Irish Free State but all the other and older selfgoverning Dominions of the British Empire stuck to political democracy and displayed little inclination toward Communism or Fascism.1 In Canada, the government was directed from 1917 to 1921 by a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals, then almost continuously for nine years by a Liberal ministry headed by Mackenzie King, then for five years by a Conservative ministry under Richard Bennett, and from 1935 by another Liberal ministry under King. In Australia, the government was in the hands of a patriotic coalition during the war and throughout the post-war period, except for two years (1929-1931) when the Labor party was in power. Zealand, the ministry of William Massey, which had originally been formed in 1912, lasted until his death in 1025, and the same moderate and conservative elements which had supported him won the succeeding elections and thus retained control of the government. In South Africa General Smuts, with the joint backing of moderate Boer nationalists and British unionists, was prime minister from the death of General Botha in 1919 until 1924, when he was succeeded by General Hertzog, who had the support of extreme Boer nationalists and also of labor. Hertzog was a democrat as well as a nationalist, and under his leadership the franchise was extended to all men and all women or white extraction, while immigration was restricted to persons coming from "Nordic" nations. In the elections of 1933, Smuts joined forces with Hertzog, and the coalition triumphed.

The number of self-governing democratic "nations" in the British Empire (or "Commonwealth," as it was officially styled

 $^{^1\,\}mathrm{On}$ the previous history of these self-governing Dominions, see above, pp. 505-516.

after 1931) was increased by one in 1923, when the British Rhodesia and New-foundland Southern Rhodesia and conferred self-government upon this large and growing African state. Subsequently, in 1933, the autonomous government of Newfoundland, finding itself unable to cope with financial difficulties, requested the British Parliament to sanction, as an emergency measure, the reconversion of Newfoundland into a crown colony. This was done, and thus in turn the number of self-governing colonies was reduced by one.


In all the English-speaking countries (including the United States), there was more concern with radical movements after the war than previously, more talk about socialism and even communism, and at the same time more manifest nationalism. But in all of them, democratic traditions were still cherished and democratic usages observed.

It was likewise in France. Here, the democratic and parliamentary institutions of the Third Republic continued to function in much the same way as they had functioned before the war. True, extremes of "Left" and "Right" were more vocal with subversive propaganda and more active with hostile demonstrations. On the one hand, a Communist party arose and flourished, denouncing the "bourgeois" Republic and all its works and demanding a "dictatorship of the proletariat." On the other hand, the royalist and ultrapatriotic Action Française, intensifying its campaign against the existing régime, gained the allegiance of many bourgeois youths, especially at Paris, and contributed to the growth of a Fascist movement. Yet the agitation of one extreme tended to counteract the other's, and between the two extremes stood the vast majority of Frenchmen. A large number of them still adhered to parties of the pre-war Left-Socialist, Independent Socialist, or Socialist Radical-but these were thoroughly committed to democratic republicanism and hardly inclined therefore to co-

¹ See above, p. 567, note.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Leading the Life in the West End of London," is from a post-war painting by the Anglo-Irish artist, Sir William Orpen (1878–1931). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum, New York. On Orpen, see below, p. 1145.





operate with the Communists. The groups of the pre-war Centre and Right were somewhat strengthened by the war, but most of their popular following was now resigned to the Republic and hence not likely to accept any Royalist or Fascist program. Very few professed Royalists (or Fascists) were actually elected to the French Parliament, and the Communist members were outnumbered by the less extreme Socialists. Moreover, the successive post-war elections maintained such a balance between the republican Left and the republican Centre and Right that neither could enjoy any monopoly of power; the collaboration of both was repeatedly necessitated.

From 1919 to 1924 the French government was controlled by the "National Bloc," in which the conservative and very patriotic groups of the Centre and Right were particularly influential, though Socialist Radicals of the Left continued Bloc, to man the strategic departments of education and the interior. Clemenceau, prime minister during the latter part of the war and during the peace negotiations, retired from office in 1920, following his defeat for the presidency of the Republic in succession to Poincaré. Millerand, once a Socialist and now a conservative and nationalist, became prime minister and shortly afterwards was elevated to the presidency.

The successive Bloc ministries labored with remarkable success to reconstruct the war-devastated areas of northern France and to restore economic prosperity. Some 22,000 factories were rebuilt and equipped with the most up-to-date machinery. The output of mines and foundries was greatly increased and hydro-electric power was highly developed. Indeed, French machine-industries—both textile and metal— Industrial Advance advanced, rather suddenly, into a class with those of Germany and Britain. This industrial advance, coupled with the maintenance of normal agricultural production and the persistence of peasant proprietorship, helps to explain why there was no such pressing problem of unemployment in France as in

¹ Poincaré had been succeeded as President in 1920 by Paul Deschanel, but later in the year Deschanel resigned and was succeeded by Millerand. On Clemenceau, see above, pp. 544-545, 567-570, 832, 856. On Poincaré, see above, pp. 570-571, 776. On Millerand, see above, pp. 560, 563 note.

Note. The picture opposite, a street scene in Paris near the Eissel Tower, is from a painting by a "modernist" French artist, Maurice Utrillo (born 1883).

Great Britain, and why there was no such social disturbance or political revolution as in central or eastern Europe. To be sure, the public debt of France was prodigiously swelled by the war and by post-war reconstruction, and the Bloc ministries, counting upon reparation payments from Germany, failed to balance the budget. When Germany balked at paying reparations, Poincaré, who was premier from 1922 to 1924, took the extreme step of despatching French troops into the Ruhr.¹

The "National Bloc" was also less anti-clerical than the prewar Radical governments of France had been. It did not repeal the earlier "laic laws," or modify the separation of church and state as enacted in 1905–1907. Nevertheless, with the conciliatory Briand as foreign minister, it resumed friendly diplomatic relations with the papacy and left the relations of church and state in the recovered provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to be regulated by the concordat of 1801 rather than by the "laic laws." Throughout France, moreover, it eased the enforcement of the Associations Act of 1901 and tolerated the revival of Catholic religious communities.

In the elections of 1924 the Socialist Radicals deserted the "National Bloc" and re-created with the Socialists a "Cartel of the Left," which, profiting from popular disappointment at the failure to make Germany pay, won a majority of seats in Parliament. Whereupon Millerand, who had openly opposed the Cartel in the elections, was forced out of the presidency of the Republic, and under his less assertive successor, Gaston Doumergue, a Radical ministry was installed with Edouard Herriot as premier.

Herriot's Radical ministry lasted barely a year. It withdrew French armed forces from the Ruhr and otherwise evinced a willingness to compromise with Germany. At the same time it undertook a fiercely anti-clerical campaign, breaking off diplomatic relations with the papacy and threatening to denounce the concordat in Alsace-Lorraine and to stiffen and enforce the "laic laws" throughout France. The result was an outraging of moderates, and their counter-campaign against

¹On German reparations and French occupation of the Ruhr, see above, pp. 894-899.

²On the "laic laws" and French anti-clericalism in general, see above, pp. 542-543, 553-556, 563-567.

the Cartel was seconded by many patriots who thought Herriot too conciliatory toward Germany and not conciliatory enough toward Alsace-Lorraine. But what chiefly brought about Herriot's downfall was the sorry state of public finance, and the dif-ferences within the Cartel over the means of remedying it. Inflation and a capital levy, advocated by Socialists and extreme Radicals, were repugnant to moderate Radicals, while the former were most reluctant to seek a balancing of the budget through drastic economies and ordinary taxation, which the latter favored. In 1925, with financial affairs reaching a critical stage and the government seemingly powerless to handle them, Herriot resigned. For a year longer his Radical supporters composed ministries which succeeded one another in kaleidoscopic fashion, until at length in 1926, following an Poincaré alarming decline of the franc and a riotous demonstration at Paris, Herriot and his Radicals on the Left Coalition, definitely broke with the Socialists and joined the 1926-1932 groups of the Centre and Right in constituting a ministry of "national union" under Poincaré's premiership.

Poincaré's "national" ministry rehabilitated French finances and balanced the budget. It stabilized the currency, with the franc at about a fifth of its pre-war value. It increased taxes and introduced many economies. It gave France a businesslike administration, completed the reconstruction of the country, and fostered production alike of fields and of factories. Simultaneously, it appeased the Catholics by restoring diplomatic relations with the papacy and by reversing the anti-clerical policies of the Herriot ministry. In 1928, for the benefit of workingmen, it sponsored the enactment of a comprehensive social-insurance law. Furthermore, it had in the person of its foreign minister, Aristide Briand, an outstanding champion of world peace as well as of French security. In 1928 the period of compulsory military service was reduced from eighteen months to twelve.

The general election of 1928 was a decisive victory for Poincaré and his ministry of National Union, but he was already in bad health and the next year he felt obliged to retire from public life. His immediate successors, however, relied upon the same backing and pursued similar policies, until 1932, when new elections again

¹ Poincaré died in 1934. Briand predeceased him in 1932.

brought forward a "Left Cartel" and enabled Herriot to form another Radical cabinet.

The Cartel, this time, was peculiarly precarious. The Socialists at the Left were more disposed to fraternize with the Communists at the extreme Left, and the Radicals could not quite make up their minds whether they should go with the Socialists or break with them and join the Centre. Besides, a most unedifying scandal came to light concerning a financial promoter and adventurer by the name of Stavinsky and involving a number of republican politicians, especially in the Radical camp. Herriot's ministry, which had been formed in June 1932, was forced to resign in December, and during the next fourteen Riots at months five other Radical ministries rose and fell. In Paris. February 1934 popular resentment against the Rad-1934 icals was utilized by extremists, both Royalist and Communist, to precipitate at Paris a series of street riots, in which several persons were killed. Whereupon, to allay the resent-Doumerment and prevent civil strife the Radicals united with gue and National the groups of Centre and Right to reconstitute the Union "national union." Gaston Doumergue, whose term as President of the Republic had expired the previous year, 1 headed the new coalition ministry.

Doumergue conducted affairs much as previously, in similar circumstances, Poincaré had conducted them. He was not quite so forceful perhaps, and he did not have quite as much personal prestige. And, failing to get Radical support for a constitutional law which would enable the ministry to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and hold new elections, he resigned in 1935. However, the "national union" continued, affairs improved, and the Radicals, to the discomfiture of the Socialists and even more to that of the Communists and the Royalists, remained in alliance with the republican Centre and Right. In this they were but reflecting the majority will in France, for the mass of the French people, however much they might disagree about economic and religious policies, were still sincerely attached to principles symbolized by the words "liberty, equality, and fraternity" and by the forms of republicanism and democracy.

¹ Doumergue's successor in the presidency was Paul Doumer, who was assassinated in 1932. Albert Lebrun was then elected President. Both Doumer and Lebrun, like Doumergue, were "Moderates" rather than "Radicals."

Democratic institutions were also maintained and respected throughout the post-war period by the peoples of Belgium, the Dutch Netherlands, and Switzerland. In each of these 4. Democcountries there were grave economic and financial racy in problems and in Belgium a special cultural problem Western arising from differences between Flemings and Walloons;1 but all such problems were dealt with in orderly democratic fashion and with considerable success. In all three countries, there was a weakening of the middle-class Liberal parties and a corresponding access of strength for the more democratic parties of Socialists and Catholics. Communist groups arose and obtained some representation in the several parliaments, but their popular following was relatively small and unimportant.

In Belgium, the ministries from 1919 to 1935 represented usually a coalition of Catholics and Liberals, though on occasion the coalition was made up of Catholics and Socialists. The orderly functioning of democratic government in Belgium was aided, no doubt, by several factors: the long experience with parliamentary elections and procedure and with coöperation among the major parties; the patriotism of the masses and the personal popularity of King Albert,² both of which had been enhanced by the World War and its outcome; the astuteness and integrity of the leading statesmen; and, above all, the country's industrial recovery and its ability to carry the financial burdens necessitated by the war and by post-war reconstruction.

In the Netherlands, where the monarchical constitution had been thoroughly democratized in 1917,³ the ministries under the new régime of universal suffrage and compulsory voting represented a coöperating majority of Calvinists and Catholics against a minority of Socialists and Liberals. It is not without interest that from 1918 to 1925, for the first time in the nation's history, the prime minister, Ruys de Beerenbrouck, was a Catholic. The Netherlands, though not a belligerent in the World War, had been put to extraordinary expense in caring for refugees from Belgium, and after the war the Dutch were further handicapped by a decline in foreign trade,

¹ Sec above, pp. 591, 876.

² King Albert was accidentally killed in 1934, and the crown passed to his son, Leopold III.

On the previous history of the Netherlands, see above, pp. 625-627, 892.

especially with Germany and Britain, on which much of their prosperity depended. Yet the government, with apparent popular sympathy and support, adhered to a conservative program.

In Switzerland, a middle course was steered between extremes of radicalism and conservatism. A Radical and Socialist proposal to make a capital levy was rejected by popular referendum in 1922, and in 1934 a Conservative proposal to authorize the government to suppress Communist and Fascist agitation was similarly rejected.

In the Scandinavian kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and likewise in the neighboring republic of Finland, political democracy was firmly established and popu-Scandilarly supported. In the kingdoms, Socialists or Lanavia and Finland borites comprised nearly half of the membership of the several parliaments and frequently presided over the responsible ministries, but the large majority of Scandinavian Socialists were democratic social reformers, willing to cooperate with liberals and even with agrarians, and not disposed to champion a social revolution or a political dictatorship. Under Socialist premiers, Denmark banned strikes and lockouts in 1933 and Sweden enacted an unemployment-insurance law in 1934. Finland, under a democratic government of conservative leanings, outlawed Communist propaganda in 1930, suppressed a Fascist revolutionary movement in 1932, and in 1933 forbade the preaching of direct action and the maintenance of armed forces by any political group. Alike in Finland, Sweden, and Norway, the liquor question was conspicuous during the post-war years. Prohibition, enacted in Finland and Norway in 1919, was repealed in the latter country in 1927 and in the former in 1932, and was rejected by popular referendum in Sweden in 1933. Governmental dispensing of liquor, which had been the rule in Sweden since 1914, was ultimately adopted by Norway and Finland.

Political democracy was less substantial and more uncertain in the southwestern peninsula of Europe—in Spain and Portugal.² At the close of the World War, Spain was still nominally a constitutional monarchy like Sweden or Belgium, with a parliament

¹ On the previous political history of the Scandinavian nations, see above, pp. 620-624.

² On pre-war developments in Spain and Portugal, see above, pp. 580-590.

elected by universal manhood suffrage and with a governing ministry appointed by the king but responsible to the 5. Postparliament. Actually, however, the Spanish govern-Spain ment was still much the same as it had been before the war, a government manipulated in part by the king and in part by professional politicians and ambitious army officers, a government to which the masses were largely indifferent and yet against which the irreconcilable factions of "revolution" and "reaction" conducted ceaseless campaigns of criticism and vituperation. This "compromising" royal government had momentarily profited in popular esteem from the economic advantages which accrued to Spain as a neutral in the World War, but with the cessation of the war Spain was deprived of exceptional markets for her products, the financial returns to her farming class diminished, unemployment increased among her laboring Opposiclass, and fault-finding with the existing political and tion to Monarchy social order became more pronounced. Republicans and Socialists intensified their subversive propaganda and multiplied their ranks. A Communist party was organized. An epidemic of strikes paralyzed industry and threatened revolution.

The government lacked capable leaders, and at the very time when it should have been formulating and executing a farreaching program of remedial legislation, it was itself paralyzed by petty factional quarrels and resulting ministerial instability. And aggravating the situation were the protracted and apparently disastrous efforts of the royal government to put down native uprisings in the northern part of Morocco which had been allotted to Spain before the World War. 1 For years the fighting in Morocco had taken a heavy toll of Spanish soldiery and Spanish treasure, without achieving its objective, and in Tulv 1921 it reached a sorry climax in an utter rout and almost complete extinction of a Spanish army. This ultimate disaster outraged patriotic sentiment in Spain and turned it against King Alphonso XIII, to whose personal interference with the military command in Morocco the disaster was chiefly attributed. For the next year and a half Spain was on the verge of revolution.

In a desperate attempt to save his throne and silence his critics, Alphonso XIII connived at the establishment of a dictatorship, in September 1923, by General Primo de Rivera.

¹ See above, pp. 766-767.

Rivera (1870-1930), a nobleman and army officer who had served with distinction in the Spanish-American War and in Dictator-Morocco and latterly as military governor of Barceship of Primo de lona, now executed a coup d'état with his armed forces Rivera, and put himself at the head of the government. He sus-1923-1930 pended the constitution, exercised a rigid censorship of the press. and for seven years (from 1923 to 1930) maintained a kind of Fascist dictatorship with the motto, "country, monarchy, religion." He infused new energy into the Moroccan enterprise, and in cooperation with French arms he finally brought it to a successful issue in 1926. Within Spain, Rivera aimed at a "corporate state," directed by a single Nationalist party and characterized by an essentially Fascist reorganization of politics and society. To this end, he set up in 1928 a state department of national economy and prescribed the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes, and in the same year he convoked an advisory assembly to draft a new national constitution.

Primo de Rivera was an honest man and not without personal ability. But he had no such popular following in Spain as Mussolini had in Italy, and he was not forceful (or unscrupulous) enough to overcome opposition. He failed to build up a strong supporting party or to allay popular discontent, which continued to express itself in strikes, riots, and occasional mutinies, and he was handicapped by interference and intrigues of the King. Eventually, disillusioned and broken in health, Rivera resigned and retired to private life in January 1930 as suddenly and unexpectedly as he had seized power.² He was succeeded in the dictatorship by another army officer, General Berenguer, a nominee of King Alphonso and a very weak man. The very next month Berenguer yielded to public clamor and agreed to restore the democratic constitution which had been suspended in 1923.

In the ensuing local elections of April 1931 the Republicans won an overwhelming victory, and their leader, Niceto Zamora, threatened a general insurrection unless the King should immediately abdicate. On the fourteenth of the month, Alphonso XIII took ship at Cartagena and fled abroad. He did not formally abdicate, but merely

¹ The Moroccan War cost Spain some 800 million dollars and an average of over 13,000 lives a year during the decade 1916–1926.

² He died in March 1930.

"suspended the exercise of the royal power." At once, Zamora proclaimed Spain a republic and put himself at the Flight of head of the "provisional government" of this Second Alphonso Spanish Republic. And the general parliamentary election in June 1931—the first in eight years—returned a majority favorable to a republican form of government and to radical social and religious changes.

This parliament transformed itself into a "national constituent assembly," and proceeded to draft a constitution and determine the initial policies of the Republic. The new republican constitution, as adopted in December 1931, contained guaranties of personal liberty, prescriptions for the separa-Constitution of church and state and the nationalizing of church property, and provisions for democratic government. Laws would be made by a unicameral Republic parliament to be elected every four years by direct and secret suffrage of both men and women, with special arrangements for proportional representation and popular referenda, and administration would be conducted by a ministry responsible to the parliament but appointed by a president, who would be independently elected for six years and empowered to dissolve the parliament and order new elections. Zamora was elected first president of the Spanish Republic, and Manuel Azaña became its first constitutional premier with a coalition ministry of Radical Republicans and Socialists. Simultaneously the parliament adopted a new national flag, a tricolor of red, yellow, and purple, and declared ex-King Alphonso guilty of high treason, outlawing him and confiscating his private property.

In 1932 the republican parliament, in response to demands of the Catalan regionalists, enacted a home-rule law for Catalonia, delegating certain legislative and administrative powers to a local parliament and a local president of its Rule for own choice and putting the Catalan language on an equal footing with Castilian. Similar measures of local autonomy the Spanish parliament proposed to grant to the Basques and to the province of Galicia. In the same year, moreover, the

¹ On the First Spanish Republic, see above, p. 583.

²Of the 440 deputies, only about a quarter could be classed as Conservatives (including very few openly professed Royalists). The revolutionary majority comprised 113 Socialists, 54 Socialist Radicals, 86 Radical Republicans, 25 Moderate Republicans, 41 Catalan Regionalists, and 4 Communists.

central parliament authorized the expropriation of all lands owned by the nobility.

The most startling legislation of the republican parliament, however, had to do with the Catholic Church. The Socialists were vehemently anti-clerical, and the Radical Republicans hardly less so, and other Republicans were fearful lest the church, if left untouched, would use its wealth and prestige in support of counter-revolutionary agitation. So the parliamentary majority backed a series of drastic measures against Clerical the church. In 1932 the Jesuits were banned and expelled and their schools and other property confiscated for "social welfare," and every Catholic clergyman in Spain, whether regular or secular, was deprived of governmental salary or subsidy. A law in 1933 transferred the whole property of the Catholic Church in Spain, valued at half a billion dollars, to the state, and another law of the same year required all Catholic congregations to pay taxes and to report regularly to the government and forbade them to engage in industry, commerce, or education. The Pope protested against these measures as "infringements on the liberty of the church," and Catholic ecclesiastics and laymen in Spain began to organize an electoral resistance.

Local elections in the early autumn of 1933 showed a strong popular reaction against the radical, particularly the anti-clerical, policies of the government. Azaña resigned the premiership, and, Reaction following the failure of the Moderate Republican in Spanish leader, Alejandro Lerroux, to command a majority of the deputies, President Zamora dissolved the parliament and ordered the election of a new one. In this general election, in November 1933, the first under universal suffrage, the masses of the population participated—of twelve and a half million electors, at least 80 per cent voted. It confirmed the conservative trend evident in the preceding local elections. The coalition of Radical Republicans and Socialists was decisively defeated, the representation of the latter being cut in half and the Radical coalition as a whole being outnumbered three to one. The new majority comprised groups of Moderate Republicans, among whom the balance of power was held by the Catholic Popular Action party, organized and led by the wealthy José Gil Robles. With the defeat of the Radicals and Socialists, and with the

support of Gil Robles, Lerroux was enabled to form a fairly stable ministry of Moderate Republicans and to hold in abeyance the execution of the land laws and some of the anti-clerical measures previously enacted. In vain the revolutionary minority protested against the turn of events and incited to violence. Terrorism by Communists and an attempted general strike were overcome by the government in December 1933, and in the following October a more serious insurrection, in which Socialists and Catalan Regionalists and even the Radical ex-premier, Azaña, participated, and which involved considerable loss of life and destruction of property, was crushed by government troops. By 1935 the Spanish Republic was definitely in Moderate hands and quite rid, at least temporarily, of the threat of revolution from the Left, though there was still much uncertainty about a possible reaction to the Right.

As for Portugal, its nominally democratic republic, which had been fashioned back in 1910, continued after the World War, as before, to be the plaything of a swift succession of professional politicians and army officers until, in 1926, one of the latter, General Antonio Carmona, inaugurated a practical dictatorship of more enduring and constructive character. General Carmona appropriated the office of president by military coup d'état in 1926. In 1928 he secured election to the office for a regular term of four years, and this term, by decree in 1932, he lengthened to six years. Then, in accordance with a new constitution which was drafted by the dictator and approved by general plebiscite in mona's "Demo-1933, he was confirmed as president for an additional term of seven years. The new constitution repre-Dictatorsented a compromise with Fascist principles. While entrusting chief authority to the president, elected by direct ballot of "heads of families," and to a ministry, wholly responsible to him, it vested certain legislative powers in a single-chamber parliament, half of whose members would be chosen by administrative and colonial "corporations" and half by democratic suffrage. Under General Carmona's "democratic" dictatorship, public administration was reformed, national finances were improved, and revolutionary agitation was sternly suppressed. Strikes and lockouts were prohibited, and provision was made for the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes.


DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE

All the national states occupying the broad belt of central Europe from the North Sea to the Black Sea, and from the Baltic to the Ægean, issued from the World War as democracies, and most of them as republics.1 Within them, however, the operation of thoroughly democratic government soon proved extraordinarily difficult. Most of the states of central Europe were newly created or newly unified states, to Democracy in confronted with the task either of getting people to Central " govern themselves who had never done so before or of welding together hitherto disparate populations. They were handicapped, too, by social and economic conditions of the utmost gravity pulosses and costs of the war, by staggering public and private indebtedness, by urgent requirements of reparation or reconstruction, by ruinous inflation, and simultaneously by pressing popular demands for agrarian and other social reform. Moreover, to surmount their handicaps and perform their tasks, the new democracies had to rely upon barliaments whose members were generally inexperienced in the practical conduct of public affairs and split up among a large humber of mutually antagonistic political parties or groups representing many varieties of opinion and conviction from the extreme of feudalism to that of communism. Small wonder that enthusiasm for constitutional democratic government in central Europe waned fairly quickly and was succeeded by enthusiasm for some kind of strong-man rule.

The only state of central Europe which persistently adhered to democratic practices was Czechoslovakia. It had in some degree, to be sure, the same difficulties as its neighbors, and certain difficulties peculiar to itself. It contained a large minority of Germans, who did not take at all kindly to the predominance of Slavs whom they had long deemed inferior to themselves economically and intellectually, while among the Slav majority were wide differences of outlook and interest, not only between peasants and 1 See above, pp. 888-801.

NOTE. The portrait bust, opposite, is of President Masaryk of the Czechoslovakian Republic, by the Yugoslav sculptor, Ivan Meštrović (born 1883). On Meštrović, ee below, p. 1150.





artisans, between Catholics and Socialists, but also between the Czechs of Bohemia and the Slovaks who had recently been "freed" from Hungary. Nevertheless, the great personal prestige of Thomas Masaryk, who in a very real sense had been the "father of his country" and who was its devotedly democratic president continuously throughout the post-war period, combined with the political sense and parliamentary adroitness of other leading statesmen, including the able foreign minister, Edward Beneš, to preserve democratic government in Czechoslovakia. Conciliation and compromise gradually prevailed over factional quarrels and subversive agitation. Socialists coöperated with bourgeois parties in assuring a fair degree of stability to the parliamentary majority and the responsible ministries. A concordat with the papacy in 1928 regulated the relations of church and state in manner acceptable to both and strengthened the government with the clerical parties. Even the German element in the country was sufficiently reconciled to the new order to participate in constructive legislation.

Rumania adhered formally to her democratic constitution of 1923,1 and managed under parliamentary auspices to unify, politically and administratively, the newly acquired Rumania provinces of Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia, and also to effect an important land reform throughout the kingdom, involving the expropriation of 13,000 landlords and the partition of their combined estates of fourteen and a half million acres among a million peasants. Nevertheless, the agencies of democratic government-elections, parliament, and ministries—continued to be manipulated by cliques of professional politicians, some of whom were notoriously corrupt and all of whom were inclined to be arbitrary if not dictatorial. On the death of the war-king, Ferdinand I, in 1927, his infant grandson, Prince Michael, succeeded to the throne under a regency, but by a coup d'état in 1930 Michael's father, who had been legally debarred from the succession on account of his infatuation with a woman of unsavory reputation, deposed the

¹ See above, p. 890.

NOTE. The picture opposite is from a sculptured memorial by Ivan Meštrović of King Peter I, the first sovereign of united Yugoslavia and father of King Alexander. See the genealogical table facing p. 674; and specifically on King Peter, see above, pp. 680-681, 683, 768-769, 846-848.

child-king and crowned himself as Charles (Carol) II. Charles II had the support of army officers and of politicians of the so-called Liberal party, and though the Liberals in the ensuing general election polled only half of the popular vote, they possessed themselves of four-fifths of the seats in parliament. For a time the government was threatened by a revolutionary "Iron Guard," a Fascist and anti-Semitic organization, whose violent propaganda secured a considerable following and led in 1933 to the assassination of the Liberal prime minister as part of a plot to overthrow the formally democratic régime. The King defied the Rumanian Fascists, however, and under another Liberal premier the Iron Guard was disbanded.

Yugoslavia was particularly troubled by deep-seated differences in religion, culture, and political ambition between the Serbs and the Croats. The former were Orthodox Yugo-slavia and "backward"; the latter were Catholic and "progressive." Furthermore, though both were devoted to the "greater Yugoslavia" which the World War had brought into existence, the former regarded it as a mere expansion of Serbia and insisted therefore upon manning the whole centralized administration of the realm, while the latter strove for a federal state with "home rule" for Croatia. Frequent fights between Serb and Croatian deputies in the Chamber at Belgrade reached a climax in June 1928 with the killing of Stefan Radič, the Croatian leader, and several of his lieutenants. Whereupon, early in 1929, King Alexander, with the support of the army, dissolved the parliament, suspended the constitution, and proclaimed himself dictator. He personally appointed the ministers and all local officials. He exercised a rigorous press censorship and directed a ruthless suppression of dissent. In 1931 the royal dictatorship was formally ended by the promulgation of a new constitution. Practically, however, the dictatorship continued, for the new constitution was issued by the King and enabled him to control both the military and the civil service, to name half the Senate, and indirectly to dominate the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. As was expected, "government candidates" carried the ensuing general election, and for the next three years the ministry was solidly Serbian with no Croatian representation. In 1934 King Alexander, on a trip to France. was assassinated at Marseille. His son, a boy of eleven years,

succeeded as Peter II with a regency which promised to pursue a more conciliatory policy.

Poland, the largest and most populous of the new states of central Europe, achieved a remarkable amount of consolidation and reconstruction, administrative, financial, and educational, but she did so at the expense of liberal parliamen-Poland tary democracy. From the outset, the Polish electorate, and consequently the Polish parliament, was split into an extraordinarily large number of political parties and factions, the chronic rivalries and intrigues of whose leaders made the successful operation of constitutional government almost impossible. In vain the membership of the Chamber of Deputies was drastically reduced in 1922. At length in 1926 Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, the outstanding Polish hero of the World War, executed a military coup d'état, overturning the cabinet of the day, assuming the premiership of a "nationalist" ministry, and becoming virtual dictator.1 Pilsudski refused to be called a dictator and showed notable reluctance to appear as one. He declined to accept the presidency of the republic, and in 1930 he relinquished the premiership. Nevertheless, with the army in back of him, he tolerated in the presidency and in the ministry only such persons as would do his will, and shortly before his death in 1935 he compelled a reluctant parliamentary majority to accept a new constitution under which the powers of the president were greatly enhanced and those of parliament correspondingly curtailed.

In Lithuania, similar political turbulence prevailed, until a similar coup d'état, likewise in the year 1926, put General Anton Smetona, an ardent nationalist, into the presidency.

Then, in 1928, the adoption of a new constitution provided Smetona with legal means of prolonging indefinitely his presidential dictatorship.

In the other Baltic states, Latvia and Estonia, the radically democratic constitutions which had been adopted just after the World War were eventually discredited by the free scope which they gave to conflicting and paralyzing agitation of Communist and Fascist extremists. Fi-

¹ On Pilsudski, see above, pp. 848–849. A friend of Pilsudski's, Professor Ignatz Moscicki, was elected president of the Republic in 1926 and redected for another seven-year term in 1933.

nally, in 1934, they were suspended by arbitrary decrees of the respective prime ministers, who proceeded to act as dictators. New constitutions were quickly drafted, exalting the presidency over the parliament, and were ratified by popular plebiscite, while Communist propaganda was outlawed in both countries.

Hungary, of all the states of central Europe, was least affected by the wave of liberal democracy which had followed in the wake of the World War. The Magyars, long accustomed to government by the land-owning families of the old aristocracy, looked all the more readily to them for guidance after the partition and humiliation of the country by foreigners and the failure of Béla Kun's Communist efforts. From 1920 onwards, Hungary was nominally a "constitutional monarchy," but really an aristocratic and semi-Fascist state, much as it had been before the World War and with no partition of the large landed estates. Its head or "Regent," Admiral Horthy, and its successive prime ministers (Count Bethlen from 1921 to 1931, and Julius Goemboes from 1932) directed public affairs in quite arbitrary fashion, and were sustained in parliament and in the country at large by a well-organized patriotic party—the National Unity party. Not only was revolutionary radicalism suppressed, but agitation of "legitimists" in behalf of a Habsburg restoration was discouraged.

In Bulgaria, under King Boris III, the post-war years were marked by intense party strife and frequent crimes of political violence. In 1923 the able Agrarian premier, Stambulinsky,² was deposed by a coup d'état and murdered, and during the next three years a nominally "democratic" but essentially reactionary ministry conducted a campaign of terrorism against "radicals" whether of town or of countryside. A more truly democratic government was installed in 1926, but before long it felt obliged to manipulate elections and to stamp out a growing Communist party; and in May 1934 it in turn was forcefully overthrown by a group of army officers intent upon transforming Bulgaria into a Fascist state. For a year these Fascists ruled, only to be supplanted in 1935 by still another coup d'état, engineered this time by the King.

In Albania, the attempt of an Orthodox bishop who had been educated in the United States, Fan Noli by name, to create an

¹ See above, pp. 850-851.

² See above, pp. 852-853.

enduring democratic republic was brought to naught by a young Moslem army officer, Ahmed Zogu, who, becoming president in 1925, had himself proclaimed King as Zog I in 1928. King Zog retained the form of constitutional government, but his was the controlling will in the new Albanian kingdom. As Albania relapsed from republic to monarchy, so Greece

wavered between monarchy and republic. The Greek parliament compelled King George II to quit the country in Greece December 1923, and in March 1925 it voted the dethronement of the dynasty and the establishment of a republic, which was promptly endorsed by popular plebiscite. The change, however, was only one of name; and under the republic, as under the monarchy, Greek politics continued turbulent and at times bloody. Venizelos, the country's veteran statesman,¹ contrived to return to office in 1928, but his enemies, of whom he had many, combined against him, and in 1933 the premiership passed to Tsaldaris, an acknowledged Royalist. In 1935 Venizelos inspired a revolt, which was put down with considerable bloodshed, and Venizelos fled to Italy. Whereupon General Kondylis executed a military and royalist coup d'état, and, after the formality of a plebiscite, recalled King George II to the Greek throne.

From what we have already said in the present section, it must be apparent that throughout east-central Europe the postwar political trend was toward dictatorship, while General Trend retaining some parliamentary forms. This was true of the larger states: the republic of Poland and the Dictator-kingdoms of Rumania and Yugoslavia. It was true, ship too, of the small republics on the Baltic: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It was true, also, of the small states on the Danube and in the Balkan peninsula: the nominal kingdom of Hungary, the actual kingdom of Bulgaria, Greece which was royalist and then republican and then royalist again, and Albania which was republican and then royalist. Only Czechoslovakia adhered rather strictly to its democratic republican constitution. But Czechoslovakia was hemmed in, and its lot perhaps eventually determined, by Germany and Austria, whose post-war political development strikingly symbolized the general European drift between 1920 and 1935 from democracy to dictatorship.

The German Republic, which had been proclaimed at the

¹ See above, pp. 674-675, 805 note, 824, 856, 866.

time of the collapse of the Hohenzollern Empire in November 1918 and provided with a democratic constitution by the Weimar Assembly in 1919, was gravely handicapped by several circumstances. Added to the huge The German Republic, 1918-1933 internal indebtedness incurred by Germany during the war was the post-war requirement of making vast yet indefinite reparation payments to the Allies. The story of what this circumstance actually involved—wild currency inflation, cancellation of internal indebtedness and default in reparation payments, international control over German finances, drastic taxation at home and big borrowings abroad, and eventual repudiation of all foreign obligations—we have elsewhere related.² Here we may remark that these financial necessities and expedients were attended by serious dislocation of German society and resulting popular disaffection Its Economic Economic and Social with the republican government. At one extreme, Difficulties landlords and many industrial capitalists, fearful of a socialist levelling, grew ever more hostile to the new government. At the other extreme, radical workers looked ever more fondly to Communism of the Russian variety as the means of escape from economic insecurity. And between the extremes were numerous shopkeepers and other members of the lower middle class, together with the younger generation of students, who, unable to earn a usual livelihood and threatened with

degradation into the proletariat, stood ready to follow almost any revolutionary advocate of "national regeneration."

Bad as were the economic and financial circumstances of postwar Germany, it is very doubtful whether they were essentially worse than those of post-war Britain or even post-war France. Britain's burden of taxation was considerably heavier, her industrial recovery much slower, and the number of her unemployed much larger. France's war debt was staggering, and unlike Germany (or Britain), she had to rebuild an extensive wardevastated area. Nevertheless, in grappling with their economic problems, both the British and the French possessed governments which were of long standing, which had been newly consecrated in popular esteem by the seemingly victorious war they had waged and the peace they had imposed, and which therefore were not readily subject to subversion.

¹ See above, pp. 842-845, 889-890.

² See above, pp. 894-899.

The Germans, on the other hand, were undertaking a novel experiment in self-government; and a people who had thought of the Hohenzollern Empire as a Great Power, occupying a proud preëminent position in arms and diplo-Nationalmacy, in science and industry, in world prestige, were ist Diffinaturally prone to abuse the Republic which had begun its career by accepting the treaty of Versailles with all its horrible humiliations for Germany. How, indeed, could such a mighty Germany as that of the Empire have fallen so low as the Germany of the Republic? Gradually it came to be believed in ever widening circles within Germany that the explanation lay not in the undemocratic features of the old Empire and certainly not in any real defeat of the German army (which had fought so long, so gloriously, and on the whole so successfully against the world). Rather, the explanation lay in the "stabs in the back" which traitorous Socialists and internationally minded Catholics and Jews, masquerading as democrats and republicans, had inflicted on Germany and her "invincible" army through the "peace resolution" of the Reichstag in 19171 and finally through the revolution of 1018. In other words. the psychological nationalist circumstances of post-war Germany were even more unfavorable to the permanence of the democratic Republic than were the economic and financial-circumstances.

Nor could the Republican government obtain from the Allies such timely modification of the treaty of Versailles or of the reparation arrangements as might have served to disarm its critics and strengthen its hold upon the Foreign German masses. The concessions which it did obtain—the paring down of reparations and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Ruhr and the Rhineland—were made too haltingly and with too poor grace.

Despite all these unfavorable circumstances, the German Republic managed to survive under its democratic constitution for fourteen years—from 1919 to 1933. At first, while popular reaction against the war was still potent, the republican parties of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats commanded a large majority of the German electorate and hence of the Reichstag, and through close coöper-

ation these parties constituted the ministries and directed the

¹ See above, pp. 824-825.

policies of the state.¹ As domestic and foreign difficulties multiplied, there were frequent changes of ministry, but every ministry comprised Centrists and Democrats and every one was supported, if not directly participated in, by Socialists. From 1923, moreover, when French occupation of the Ruhr called forth a united German resistance, the People's party (formerly the National Liberal party) was induced by its leader, Gustav Stresemann, a prominent industrialist and perhaps the most statesmanlike of all post-war Germans, to abandon its opposition to the republican form of government and to collaborate with Democrats, Centrists, and even Socialists. Stresemann himself headed a coalition ministry in 1923, and though he soon resigned the chancellorship he retained the post of foreign minister under successive Chancellors until his death in 1929.

From 1923 to 1929, indeed, the German Republic seemed to be gathering strength and securing stability. There was increasing collaboration of the industrial People's party and the commercial Democratic party with trade-union Social-Seeming Strength ists and Catholic Centrists. There was some improvement, through the "Dawes plan" and the "Young plan," in the arrangements about reparation payments. There was a marked revival of business. There was balm to national pride in certain successes which attended Stresemann's diplomacy: he was treated as an equal and a friend by the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand; he obtained the withdrawal of French troops from the Ruhr and speeded up their evacuation of the Rhineland; he negotiated the "Locarno Pact" 2 to lessen the danger of another war between France and Germany; and he gained the admission of Germany to the League of Nations and to a place, as a Great Power, on its Council. At the general elections of 1924, the republican coalition polled eighteen million votes out of a total of twenty-nine million. At the general elections of 1928, it polled almost twenty-three million out of a total of thirty-one million.

On these parties of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats, and also on the People's party, see above, pp. 843-845. Socialists held the office of prime minister (or Chancellor) from 1919 to 1920 and again from 1928 to 1930; and Centrists held it 1920-1922, 1923-1925, 1926-1928, and 1930-1932. Chancellors were of the People's party from 1922 to 1923 and from 1925 to 1926, and of the reactionary Nationalist party from 1932 to 1933.

2 See below, pp. 1033-1035.

The Republic seemed to be more solid than it really was. The governing coalition as a whole might win elections and might collaborate in maintaining the democratic constitution, in distributing offices, and in sustaining Stesemann's conduct of foreign relations, but its elements were too diverse to enable it to adopt and pursue any consistent policy in respect of internal reforms, which were popularly demanded, or in respect of the opposition which beset it from the Nationalist-Right and the Communist Left. The People's party, the Democratic party, and a large fraction of the Centre party represented bourgeois business interests, which could hardly be reconciled with demands of working-class Socialists. The industrialists of the People's party, moreover, had a traditional antipathy to the other groups in the republican coalition, especially to Socialists and Centrists, and a fundamental sympathy with the nationalism of the extreme Right. On the other hand, the Socialists were eager not to appear as the tail to a bourgeois kite, partly because of the Marxian principles which they professed and partly for tactical reasons. As a party they were devoted to the democratic Republic, for the maintenance of which they were quite willing to cooperate with any Dilemma group that shared their political devotion. Yet, in Socialists their anxiety to reassure the mass of German workingmen that there was no need of Communism of the Russian variety, with its repudiation of political democracy and of "law and order" and its championship of social revolution and proletarian dictatorship, the Socialists as a party espoused various radical reforms which made it extremely difficult for them to cooperate with other democratic republicans. It was an embarrassing dilemma for the Socialists: whenever they cooperated closely with the bourgeois parties, the popular vote of the Communist party increased; and whenever this occurred the Socialists drew

Communism of the Russian variety had been preached in Germany during the republican revolution of 1918–1919, but its apostles were then few and ineffectual, and the riots which they precipitated were fairly easily put down. Presently a leader

extreme Right.

apart from the coalition and thereby not only weakened the sincerely democratic elements in it but also alarmed the more conservative members and impelled them farther toward the

emerged in the person of Ernst Thälmann, a mechanic of Hamburg; and a definitely Communist party was organized with local "cells" and regional "soviets" and in inti-Rise of Commumate relationship with Moscow. At the general elecnist Oppotion of 1920, the party polled about 600,000 votes as compared with eleven million polled by Socialists. Then, following four years of general economic distress and of particular propaganda directed against the democratic Republic and the Socialist party as "tools of capitalism and reaction," the Communists obtained in the regular election of 1924 a popular vote of almost three and three-quarters million-more than half the popular vote of the Socialists. In the election of 1928 the Communist vote fell off a bit, but in 1930 it increased again to four and a half million and in 1932 to nearly six million, these increases being almost entirely at the expense of the Socialist vote. Thälmann had no such organizing or managing ability as Lenin or Stalin; and his lieutenants were second-rate, lacking in personal initiative and repeating the phrases rather than emulating the deeds of the Russian Communist leaders. Yet the growing membership of the Communist party in Germany and its intransigent attitude toward the existing order served to stimulate and intensify extremist counter-propaganda from the Nationalist Right at the very time when Socialist as well as bourgeois support of the democratic Republic was being lessened.

Subversive propaganda from the extreme Left was troublesome enough to the German Republic, but more disturbing and evenNationalist Opposition
was the landed Prussian aristocracy, long identified with the monarchy and with high office in its army and civil service, and now scandalized by the débâcle of German arms and the overthrow of the Hohenzollern Empire and filled with rage at the threat of social as well as political democracy. Politically, these aristocrats had provided the leaders for the Conservative and Free Conservative parties which had flourished before the war, and they continued to furnish the leaders for the Nationalist party which emerged from the fusion of the Conservative groups immediately after the war.

¹ See above, pp. 884-885.

At first the popular following of the Nationalist party was not impressively large. In the election of the Weimar Assembly in 1919, the party polled only three million votes out of a total of thirty million, and for some time afterwards it seemed to be powerless, despite constant vehemence and occasional violence,1 to arrest the democratic movement and restore the old order. In vain it increased its popular vote to four million in the general election of 1920. In vain its deputies in the Reichstag talked and voted against the Republican coalition. In vain one of the Nationalist leaders, Wolfgang Kapp by name, with the assistance of General von Lüttwitz, executed a coup d'état at Berlin in 1920 and put the Republican government to flight; a strike of Socialist workingmen promptly turned the tables, so that Kapp and Lüttwitz ran away and the Republican officials returned. In vain an odd team of nationalistic fanatics, the renowned elderly General Ludendorff and a hitherto inconspicuous young man by the name of Hitler, attempted another coup at Munich in 1923; they were arrested and Hitler was jailed.

If Nationalists were as yet unable to overthrow the Republic, they at least could rejoice by 1924 that their cause was gaining ground. For the prevalent financial disorder and economic insecurity of the preceding four years, which was availing

curity of the preceding four years, which was swelling the ranks of the revolutionary Communist party, was operating also, along with widespread popular hatred of foreign tutelage and growing impatience at the

Gains of Nationalist Reaction

of foreign tutelage and growing impatience at the seeming ineffectualness of the Republican government, to attract to the reactionary Right not only the German aristocracy and its usual satellites but also considerable numbers of the industrial bourgeoisie, of the lower middle class, and of the patriotic youth. In the regular election of 1924 the conservative Nationalists polled over five and a half million votes, while a newer and even more resolute nationalist party—the National Socialist—polled an additional two million. The startling gains thus recorded for the extreme Right, and also the similar gains simultaneously registered by Communists of the extreme Left, were made at the expense of the parties supporting the democratic Republic. The latter still retained a majority of the German electorate, but the

¹ Erzberger, the Catholic Centrist leader, was assassinated by fanatical Nationalists in 1921, and Walter Rathenau, a leader of the Democratic party and an outstanding Jewish capitalist, suffered a like fate in 1922.

majority was becoming precarious and its foes at the Right outnumbered two to one its opponents at the Left.

Early in 1925 the Nationalists, by clever manœuvring, obtained an even more ominous success. The death of Friedrich Ebert, the Socialist who had been president of the Republic since 1919, necessitated the popular election of a successor; and against the candidate of the Republican coalition, Wilhelm Marx (a leader of the Centre party), the Nationalists put forward Field-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, Prussian squire and national hero of the battle of Tannenberg. 1 Thanks to Hindenburg's personal fame and thanks to the fact that Thälmann, the Com-Hindenmunist leader, entered the campaign as a third candiburg, President date, the Nationalists secured a plurality (though not of Repuba majority) of the votes cast and thus elected Hindenlic, 1025 burg to the presidency.2 Hindenburg was an old and doubtless overrated man, but he had a venerable appearance and great prestige. It was well known where his basic loyalties were—to Empire, to army, to landed nobility, to the Protestant statechurch of Prussia; and it was the hope of reactionary Nationalists, as it was the fear of democratic Republicans, that he would employ his new key-position to forward attempts at restoring the Hohenzollern Empire.

Hindenburg did nothing of the sort, however. Instead, throughout the seven years of his full presidential term, from

Hindenburg's Coöperation with Republican Coalition 1925 to 1932, he coöperated with the Republican majority in the Reichstag and with the Republican chancellors and ministries, whether of the People's party or of Centrist and Socialist. It was a source of disappointment to the Nationalists, as it was of satisfaction to the Republicans; and it contributed,

along with the lessening of economic difficulties, to a temporary decline of Nationalist opposition to the Republic. In the general election of 1928 the popular vote of the conservative Nationalists fell to the four million which it had been in 1920, while the National Socialists polled less than half the number of votes they had polled in 1924.

This election of 1928 proved to be, nevertheless, the last sub-

¹ See above, pp. 794-795, 802, 810-811, 839.

² Hindenburg received 14,660,000 votes; Marx, 13,750,000; and Thälmann, 1,930,000.

stantial victory of democratic republicanism in Germany. Business "prosperity," which had been artificially stimulated for several years by foreign loans and which had been accompanied by industrial over-production and financial speculation, came to an abrupt halt in 1929, and the ensuing economic depression added to the difficulties of the Republican government and multiplied the number and virulence of its detractors. There Economic was disappearance or diminution of profits for middle-Crisis of 1929 and class persons as well as for landlords and peasants. For Its Politworkingmen there was decline of wages and rise of unical Consequences employment. Desperately but unavailingly the government sought financial relief. Foreign loans could no longer be negotiated, and yet the Allies were exasperatingly dilatory about lightening the load of reparation payments which Germany was expected to carry. Economies in internal administration only swelled the ranks of the unemployed. Heavier taxation only impeded the recovery of business. And the death of Stresemann in the fateful year of 1929 cost the government not only a remarkably capable foreign minister but also the statesman who had linked the naturally conservative People's party with the cause of the Republic. In the circumstances, the moderate democratic majority in Germany was rapidly whittled away by the extremes of revolutionary Communism and militant Nationalism. Only the Catholic Centrist party remained fairly constant, and it had always been a minority party. The Socialist party was weakened by secessions to the Communist; and the Democratic and People's parties, by secessions to the Nationalists. Communist danger created alarm, but the Nationalist danger, as

It was not that the conservative Nationalist party was making any headway; it was scarcely holding its traditional followers. It was rather that a much more popular and militant Rise of nationalist party-that of the National Socialists, or National Socialist "Nazis" as they were commonly styled—was being ("Nazi") built up by a plebeian (and magnetic) person. This per-**Party** son was Adolf Hitler, the very one who had been jailed in 1923 for an attempted coup d'état against the Republic. He was Adolf not widely known at that time, and there was little in Hitler his previous career to indicate that he would ever emerge from obscure mediocrity. He had been born in Austria in

the event proved, was far more real.

1889 of a family of the lower middle class and had grown up with only ordinary schooling and with only frustrated ambitions. As a youth he had failed to gain admission to the Austrian Academy of Painting and had eked out a meagre livelihood by working long hours in an architect's office at Vienna and, from 1912, as a freelance illustrator at Munich, solacing himself meanwhile with enthusiastic appreciation of Wagner's operas, Nietzsche's philosophy of the superman, and the anti-Semitic writings of Adolf Stöcker and Stewart Chamberlain. Influenced by these sources, he had already become an ardent German nationalist, adoring "Aryan" Germany, despising the polyglot Austrian Empire, and detesting Jews and Marxians and liberals and pacifists, when the World War broke out. Though still an Austrian citizen, he enlisted in the German army, and in it he served gallantly from first to last, being frequently in the thick of battle and repeatedly wounded or gassed. He was awarded an iron cross for his valor, but he was never promoted beyond the rank of corporal; and his cup of bitterness was filled to overflowing when the victory of the Allies was followed by the republican revolution within Germany. "My brow burned with shame," he wrote, "and my hatred against the men who had brought about this crime grew and grew; I decided to become a politician."

youthful army acquaintances in forming a political organization—the National Socialist party. There were only seven of them, and Hitler was the seventh. It was not very promising. Yet Hitler managed presently to assume the leadership of the little band and to make some converts. In 1920 the group adopted an "unalterable program." The program was certainly His Program radical. It denounced the entire Peace of Paris and demanded the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany, the restoration of the German colonies, and the full rearming of Germany. It assailed Jews within Germany as "aliens," denied them German citizenship, and threatened them with exile. It proposed to prohibit foreign immigration, to ban all "unpatriotic" newspapers or associations, and to "nationalize"

In 1919, therefore, Hitler had joined with a handful of his

¹ See above, on Wagner, p. 173; on Nietzsche, pp. 367-368; and on Stücker, p. 608. Chamberlain, a Teutonized Britisher, was the son-in-law of Richard Wagner and the author of a ponderous tome, *Foundations of the Nincteenth Century*, in support of the thesis that virtue and civilization are the product of the "Aryan race" and are endangered by the "Semitic race."

popular education. It called for the adoption of economic reforms in harmony with the principle of national, rather than Marxian, socialism. It condemned the "corrupting parliamentary system" and championed the substitution of professional representation directed by "a strong central authority."

Almost simultaneously with the adoption of this program, Hitler made the significant discovery that he had oratorical ability, that by "letting himself go" in frenzied exposition of woes and wrongs of Germany and in fierce denunciation of Jews and foreigners he could attract and hold large audiences. To a person who had been thwarted all his life, it was gratifying to know that he had at least one talent which he could put to effective use. So, with zest, Hitler took to spellbinding; and in a country where political oratory was relatively rare and customarily restrained, and where of course the general economic and psychological conditions were especially propitious, Hitler's spellbinding drew circus-crowds.

The attempted coup of Hitler and his Nazis in 1923 was premature. As yet he was a local rather than a national figure, and his convinced disciples were comparatively few and not well organized. The ensuing year, however, was helpful to him and to his cause. The notoriety which he gained from his Propaarrest, trial, and imprisonment served to arouse widespread interest in him and in National Socialism, at the very time when French occupation of the Ruhr was producing financial chaos and an outraged state of mind all over Germany. Furthermore, Hitler utilized the enforced leisure of a year in jail to write a sensational account of his life and ideas, a kind of Nazi bible, which soon became a "best seller," and also to devise a better-disciplined organization and more strenuous methods of propaganda for his following. regular election of 1924 the Hitler party of National Socialists polled almost two million votes and returned thirty-two deputies to the Reichstag.

Though the number of Nazi voters waned during the next four years, as economic conditions improved, Hitler and his equally fanatical lieutenants continued to perfect the party organization and to stage ever bigger demonstrations against the Republic. In general, the organization of the National Socialist party in Germany was similar to that of the Communists in

Russia or of the Fascists in Italy. Under the dictatorial party headquarters (at Munich) were local "cells" of regular duespaying members, affiliated societies for university students, for youths between the ages of fourteen and eighteen (the Hitler Jugend), and for children, and also, most important of all, what amounted to a private army consisting of a special police force (the so-called S.S.) and a brigade of "storm troops" (the so-called S.A.). The storm troops, including veterans of the World War as well as many more youthful adventurers, were clad in the party uniform—a brown shirt with the "Aryan" emblem of the swastika in black on a red arm-band—and were expected to protect party meetings and to break up the meetings of other parties. The special police were a smaller and more select body, wearing the distinctive uniform of a black shirt with a skull as a badge, and acting as personal guards for the party leaders and as executioners of their behests. The Nazis were prepared to supplement Hitler's oratory with acts of violence.

The real opportunity for Hitler and the National Socialist

party was provided by the serious economic depression which began in 1929. By this time the organization and methods of the party were highly efficient, and the very violence Flood which it preached (and practiced) in behalf of "national regeneration" attracted to it a multitude. Tide of National Socialism Emotional youths flocked to it in crowds. The lower middle class rallied almost solidly to it. Landed aristocrats of the conservative Nationalist party, though still prone to regard Hitler as a vulgar upstart, were quite willing to climb on his band-wagon, which they fondly thought they themselves could subsequently steer. Even industrial and commercial magnates, men who had hitherto supported the People's or the Democratic party but who were now doubtful about the ability of the Republican government to arrest the growth of Communism, commenced to contribute money and votes to the Nazis.

Early in 1930, in a desperate attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the Republic, Heinrich Brüning, a Centrist and one of the ablest men in the Reichstag, was entrusted with the chancellorship. Brüning was sincere and courageous, and he succeeded in bringing about a drastic revision of the reparation arrangements and the final withdrawal of foreign troops from the Rhineland. Nevertheless,

neither his achievements nor his abilities availed in the internal situation. Ever more vehemently the Communists assailed him and the "bourgeois" Republic, while ever more fiercely, from the opposite extreme, the Nazis denounced him and the "traitorous" Republic. Nor could he take energetic measures against the extremes. He was himself a liberally minded person, conscientiously opposed to meeting violence with violence: Socialists on whom he had to rely were tender of the Communists; his more moderate supporters were tender of Nationalists; and both extremes were making dangerous inroads into the electoral strength of democratic republicanism. In vain Brüning appealed to the country in a special election of September 1930. Of the government coalition, only his own Centre party made gains, and they were slight; the popular vote of the People's and Democratic parties fell off by a million and a quarter and that of the Socialist party by half a million. On the other hand, though the conservative Nationalist party lost two million votes, the Communists gained over a million and the Nazis almost six million.

The upshot of the election of 1930 was that the republican coalition no longer had a dependable majority in the Reichstag. The Socialists held a balance of power, and without competent leadership they wavered between supporting Brüning and joining the Communist opposition; if they adopted the latter course, parliamentary government would be impossible. In fact, the Socialists, while not accepting office in Brüning's ministry, usually supported him, and whenever they threatened to desert him he had recourse to the article in the constitution which empowered the President to govern by decree. It thus transpired that for two years, from 1930 to 1932, the government of the German Republic was perilously carried on by Brüning with the apparently loyal coöperation of President von Hindenburg.

So convincing was Hindenburg's loyalty and so strong was his hold on the country at large that not only Brüning but the whole Republican coalition labored manfully in the spring of 1932 to ensure his reëlection to the presidency of the Republic for another term of seven years. Against him, Hitler was the candidate of the Nadency, tional Socialists, and Thälmann, of the Communists.

It was a bitterly contested election, but the results seemed

reassuring. Thälmann polled 3,700,000 votes, and, though Hitler attained to an impressive total of 13,400,000, Hindenburg reached a still more impressive total of almost 20,000,000 and was elected.

Hindenburg's reëlection to the presidency was hailed alike by Centrists, Socialists, and Democrats as a victory for the Republic. It turned out to be nothing of the kind, for Hindenburg proceeded to disappoint his republican supporters in 1932, just as back in 1925 he had disappointed his monarchical supporters. only now more quickly and more utterly. There is little doubt that at heart the Marshal had always been thoroughly reactionary and quite unsympathetic with the republican régime which he headed. He had cooperated with the liberal and democratic forces so long as he thought he had to coöperate with them, but with the rise of Communism and the still more spectacular rise of National Socialism and with the supreme vote of popular confidence in himself, he felt free to heed the more congenial advice of aristocrats and conservatives like himself. These, as we know, were chiefly identified with the Nationalist party, and they sedulously instilled in the old man-now a very old man—a fear that Brüning was much too radical and the hope that a Nationalist government might utilize the numerous Nazis in order to get rid of radicals and to restore things Hindenas they had been in the "good old days." At any burg's Dismissal rate, a month after his reëlection, Hindenburg took of Brüning sudden fright at republican proposals for breaking up the large landed estates in his native East Prussia and peremptorily dismissed Brüning from the chancellorship. Brüning was the last truly republican Chancellor of Germany.

In Brüning's place Hindenburg appointed Franz von Papen, an aristocrat who had once been a member of the Centre party but who had quarrelled with its democratic leaders and had left it to ally himself with the Nationalists; and with Papen was

Reactionary Ministries of Papen and Schleicher, 1932-1933

now associated a ministry of ultra-conservatives. including General Kurt von Schleicher. The new government, though enjoying the confidence of President von Hindenburg and clothed by him with practically dictatorial powers, was gravely handicapped. It was confronted at the outset with a hostile majority in the Reichstag and with a threatening situation in the

key state of Prussia, where Socialists held the premiership and commanded the police. Furthermore, it had to rely upon the backing of Hitler and the National Socialists as well as upon that of the conservative Nationalists, and between the two groups were notable differences of size and divergencies of aim. Nationalists, who constituted the government, wanted to use the Nazis for their own conservative ends, but the Nazis, whose following was far more numerous, would tolerate the new government only as a means of enabling themselves to get into power. For a time, Nationalists and Nazis could remain independent and yet work together, but eventually one group would have to swallow or fight the other.

In the meantime Papen and Schleicher, with the help of Nazi fury and violence, sought to remove the handicaps which beset the reactionary government. On July 20, 1932, they executed a military coup against the Socialist premier and police officials in Prussia. The latter refrained from calling a general strike, such as had defeated Kapp's monarchical coup ten Collapse years earlier, and meekly surrendered their posts, of Socialalleging in justification of their pusillanimous behavior

ist Resist-

that resistance would have aided the Communists. This collapse of the Socialists overjoyed and emboldened Papen and his Nationalists, and the Nazis likewise. Then, eleven days after the coup, a general election was held in an effort to secure an amenable Reichstag. This effort was not so successful. The National Socialists, it is true, more than doubled their representation, but the conservative Nationalists actually lost some seats, while both the democratic Centrists and the bitterly antinationalist Communists made gains. Papen was still without a majority in the Reichstag, and in carrying on the administration he was more than ever dependent on the friendship of Hindenburg and the favor of Hitler.

In November 1932 Papen had Hindenburg dissolve the Reichstag again, and once more he appealed to the verdict of a general election. This time the conservative Nationalists made some gains, but they were more than offset by gains of the Communists.1 Disappointed, Papen

¹ This election of November 1932, the last free election under the Republic, recorded eleven and three-quarters million votes for the National Socialists, at one extreme, and six million votes for the Communists at the other. Between

resigned; and Hindenburg, still averse from turning over the government to the plebeian Hitler, appointed General von Schleicher as Chancellor. For two months longer Schleicher carried on without a Reichstag majority, in the face of open opposition from Hitler, and in the midst of secret intrigues on the part of Papen and influential landlords and business men who were now convinced that the conservative cause could best be served through outright collaboration with the National Socialists.

This conviction was finally implanted in Hindenburg, and in January 1933 the senile president dismissed Schleicher and appointed Hitler to the chancellorship, with Papen as Vice-Chancellor. "And now, gentlemen," declared Marshal von Hindenburg, "forward with God!"

It was really "Forward with Hitler." For Hitler was at last in power, and to the discomfiture of his democratic republican opponents he was in power in accordance with the letter of the constitution. His government, to be sure, was not yet a unit; it represented a coalition of National Socialists with conservative Nationalists. But the latter were a convenient link with Hindenburg and "respectability," and in view of their relatively small popular following they were less likely to oppose the Nazi phalanx than to be absorbed by it. The important thing was that National Socialist members of the government in Power, 1033 commanded the public police as well as the private "storm troops," and thereby Hitler was enabled to suppress opposition and overawe the country. In March 1933 new elections were held, this time in the midst of Nazi terrorism and with results quite favorable to a Nazi dictatorship. The popular vote of the National Socialists went up to seventeen and a quarter million while that of the conservative Nationalists remained at three million. Of the other parties, only the Centrist held its own; the Socialist and the Communist both lost ground, and the Democratic and People's parties almost completely disappeared.

these extremes, the Catholic Centrists and the conservative Nationalists polled just about the same number as they had polled at the beginning of the Republic in 1919—five and a half million and three million respectively; the Socialist vote declined, though it still totalled seven and a quarter million; the vote of the People's party was cut to 660,000 and that of the Democratic party to a paltry 340,000.

¹ Both the Socialists and the Centrists and also organized labor protested otherwise, but their protests were platonic. Schleicher at first was minded to defy the President, but he hesitated and presently acquiesced. Communist demonstrations against Hitler were suppressed by Nazi storm troops.

In the new Reichstag, Hitler's government had an absolute majority of 33 and a much larger practical majority by reason of the arrest and jailing of the 81 Communist deputies and dire threats against others.

On March 12, 1933, President von Hindenburg decreed that the Republican flag of black, red, and gold should be hauled down and replaced by two flags: the black, white, and End of red of the old Empire, and the swastika of the new German Republic nationalism. And on April 1 the Reichstag voted, 441 to 04, to delegate its powers, for a term of four years, to the Hitler government. Thus, on the 118th anniversary of Bismarck's birth and in the month of Hitler's 44th anniversary, Beginning of Third the democratic German Republic formally passed Empire away and was succeeded by what was styled the "Third German Empire" and what was essentially a dictatorship of the National Socialist party.

The change was not merely one of name. It was a real break with Germany's past, not only with the liberal and democratic traditions of the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848 and the Weimar Assembly of 1919, but also with the conservative traditions which had characterized the Hohenzollern Empire from 1871 to 1918. Conservatives who helped Hitler to bring about the change hoped no doubt that it would be but a prelude to the restoration of the former Empire, but in this they were disappointed. Hitler's main backing was popular and radical rather than aristocratic and reactionary, and by means of it he was enabled not only to overthrow the democratic Republic but to hold conservatives in check and forestall any restoration of constitutional monarchy. The Third Empire was something new: a personal (and nationalist) dictatorship; less evolutionary than revolutionary.

The revolution which inaugurated the Third Empire was attended by intense popular enthusiasm, skillfully worked up and exploited by propagandists of the new régime. Press, Popular radio, and cinema were alike utilized to stir patriotic Enthuemotions and to direct them into National Socialist channels. For the same purpose were staged a rapid succession of imposing public demonstrations: brown-shirted storm troopers

¹The "First" had been the Holy Roman Empire, from 962 to 1806, and the "Second," the Hohenzollern Empire, from 1871 to 1918.

parading and saluting, young people singing and cheering, multitudes listening to inflammatory speeches and waving swastika flags. Such methods were usual with the Nazis, and they were developed to the full and employed with overwhelming effect under the guidance of one of Hitler's chief lieutenants, Joseph Goebbels, who had a genius for showmanship and was now given an official post as "Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment." Like a whirlwind the hysteria swept the country. On all sides the new order was hailed as "restoring the self-respect of the nation," and any doubt about it on the part of individuals or groups had to be dissembled.

The hysteria of the Nazi revolution was heightened and extended by spectacular "drives" of Hitler and his aides against certain groups-notably Jews and Marxists-who were made scapegoats for Germany's misfortunes during and since Antithe World War. On April 1, 1933, the very day on Jewish "Drive" which the dictatorship was formally established, the government sponsored a nation-wide boycott against Tewish shopkeepers and professional men, and shortly afterwards it decreed that only "Aryans" (that is, German citizens who were not Jews and whose parents and grandparents were not Jews) might occupy civil or military posts or serve as judges, policemen, school teachers, or university professors. There followed a wholesale dismissal of Tews (and Christians with Tewish blood) from state institutions and public offices, an active discrimination against them in the learned professions and in business, and spasmodic assaults upon them individually and collectively. Thousands of German Jews fled abroad, and the much larger number who could not or would not flee suffered grievously in mind and estate. Such rabid anti-Semitism evoked indignation in foreign countries, but in Germany it was excused and gloried in as making for national unity and patriotic regeneration.

On May Day 1933, while the anti-Jewish "drive" was still in

¹ Goebbels was born in the Rhineland in 1897 of peasant and artisan stock. Undersized and afflicted from infancy with a club foot, he was rejected for army service in the World War. Endowed with a good mind and aided by scholarships, he attended several universities, eventually obtaining the Ph.D. degree from Heidelberg in 1921. He joined the National Socialist party in 1924, becoming the editor of its Berlin newspaper in 1926 and a member of the Reichstag in 1928. In 1929, as director of the party's propaganda, he found a most congenial field for his talents: his vituperative fanaticism, his fondness for the spectacular, his great organizing abilities.

full vigor, Hitler's government climaxed its parallel campaign against Marxists by staging at Berlin a monster Anticounter-demonstration of "German labor." Hundreds Marxian "Drive" of thousands of Nazi workingmen paraded and saluted, sang and cheered, while Nazi storm troops cowed Communist and Socialist workingmen into silence. So utterly cowed, indeed, were the latter that the government proceeded promptly and without trouble to ban all Marxian propaganda in the country, to abolish all Socialist as well as Communist trade unions and confiscate their funds, and to substitute a single labor organization, the "German Labor Front," directed and controlled by the National Socialist party. The ease with which the German working class was detached from Marxism and made a prop of the Third Empire was one of the most astonishing phenomena of the Nazi revolution, though it should be remembered that most of the leading Communists and Socialists were already in iail or exile.

Taking advantage of the rising popular enthusiasm for the "new Germany" and of the swift and spectacular suppression of Jews and Marxists, Hitler and his Nazi lieutenants moved next to rid themselves of possible political opposition. In May 1933 the parliament of the key state of Prussia was obliged to confer on the local premier dictatorial powers similar "Drive" to those which the Reichstag had already conferred against Possible political ship in Prussia Hitler at once appointed his close Opposition and associate, Hermann Göring. Simultane-

ously the other German states were subjected to "governors" named by Hitler and responsible to him. Moreover, the private "army," or police force, of the conservative Nationalist party—the so-called Stahlhelm—was "coördinated" with the Nazi storm troops; and in June the leaders of this conservative party, and likewise of the People's party, perceiving at last that they were but tails to the Nazi dog (and powerless to wag the dog), were induced to break up their respective political organiza-

¹ Göring, who shared with Goebbels the special confidence of Hitler, was born in Bayaria in 1893, the son of a Prussian army officer and colonial administrator. He himself had a brilliant record as an aviator during the World War, and his disappointment with the outcome of the war made him a temporary drug-addict and a permanent convert to National Socialism. Göring was wealthy and resourceful, and with energy and ruthlessness he combined a fondness for art and show.

tions and to accept "guest membership" in the National Socialist In June 1933, furthermore, the government decreed the destruction of the Socialist and Democratic parparty. Dissoluties, and early in July, through a concordat which tion of Papen in Hitler's behalf negotiated with the Vatican, Rival **Parties** Pope Pius XI agreed to the dissolution of the Catholic Centre party in return for a pledge that the Catholic Church would continue to enjoy full religious freedom in Germany. On July 4, therefore, the Centre party—the last of the democratic political organizations in the country—passed out of existence, and ten days later Hitler decreed that in the Third Empire there should be but a single political party, and that the National Socialist party.

Thus, within six months of Hitler's advent to the chancellorship, he was the practical dictator of Germany. Hindenburg still remained titular "President of the Republic," but the Hitler's Republic was dead and Hindenburg was dying. The Practical living state was now the highly centralized Third Dictatorship Empire, and the real power in it was Hitler's. To Hitler, at once Chancellor of the Empire and leader of the sole remaining political party in Germany, had been subjected the central Reichstag, the several state governments, the entire civil and military bureaucracy, the press, the radio, the schools, and all individual liberties. A clean sweep was made of all elements who had opposed the Nazis during recent years. Not only Jews and Marxists suffered, but a much larger number of other German citizens. Open dissenters who were not hounded into exile were herded in "concentration camps." The masses seemed acquiescent and even enthusiastic.

By the autumn of 1933 Hitler was ready to seek a national endorsement of the Nazi revolution which he had effected, and in order to obtain the greatest possible endorsement he cleverly His Apavailed himself of an international issue which would appeal for appeal to German patriots. At an international conference then pending at Geneva on the limitation of armaments and sponsored by the League of Nations, Hitler's representatives had proclaimed the right of Germany, under the Versailles treaty, to rearm herself fully unless the other Powers should straightway reduce their armaments to a

¹ See below, pp. 1041-1043.

level with hers. In October, when the conference failed to reach any agreement about mutual disarmament or to sanction any rearmament of Germany, Hitler not only withdrew his delegates from the conference but announced Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations. If foreign nations would not On recognize Germany as an equal, he said, Germany Military Should go her own way without them. This was the issue which he presented to the German electorate. He called for popular ratification of his action in breaking with the League of Nations and simultaneously he called for the election of a new and thoroughly "loyal" Reichstag.

The plebiscite and the election of the new Reichstag were held in November 1933. In the former, forty and a half million Germans voted "yes" and two million voted "no." An Over-In the latter, thirty-nine and a half million cast their whelming Popular ballots for the list of candidates nominated by the Endorse-National Socialist party-- the only party which could ment nominate candidates while three and a half million ballots were "blank" or "spoiled." Despite the fact that the opposition was minimized by the electoral system and methods, there could be no doubt in Germany or abroad that Hitler and his Third Empire had received an overwhelming popular endorsement. Over nine-tenths of the German electorate were with the nationalist dictator and against the League of Nations.

With a Reichstag unanimously devoted to him, Hitler proceeded to buttress the new régime with two important constitutional laws. The first, adopted in December 1933, provided that the National Socialist party "is inseparably united with the state," that "it is a corporation of National public law," and that "its regulations are determined Socialist Party by the Leader" (that is, by Hitler personally). The second, ratified by the Reichstag in January 1934 on the anniversary of Hitler's accession to the chancellorship, formally abolished the state parliaments and transformed the several states (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, etc.) into mere ad-Centralministrative districts of the Empire, and at the same izing German time empowered the central government (that is, Hitler Governand his ministers) to alter the imperial constitution at will. In accordance with this latter authorization, the upper

house of the German parliament—the Reichsrat ¹—was abolished in February 1934.

The Third Empire, then, emerged as a National Socialist dictatorship. It was highly centralized and emphatically national. What neither the Hohenzollern Empire nor the Weimar Republic had ventured to undertake—the destruction of local autonomy and the complete submerging of Prussia and the other historic German states—was now finally achieved.

As there was only one government in the Third Empire, so there was only one party, the National Socialist. This was splendidly organized, with headquarters at Munich in a famous "brown house" (reconstructed and enlarged in the The spring of 1934), with an intricate hierarchy of depart-National ments, vocational, educational, and recreational, with Socialist Party a Political Bureau, with a Labor Front, with a Youth Movement, with an extraordinarily adept Propaganda Agency, with disciplinary courts of its own, and with armed forces of its own—the picked party police (the S.S.) and the more numerous storm troops (the S.A.). The enrolled membership of the party was relatively small; it was kept down by a system of careful selection and probation, and comprised, in the autumn of 1933, fewer than two million. Nevertheless, it was an enthusiastic and militant membership, in close and manifold touch with the masses all over Germany, and disciplined and directed from above.

The dictator of the Third Empire, of course, was Adolf Hitler. This he was in virtue of his leadership of the National Socialist party, of his official position as Chancellor, and of his The Dicown personal ability. There had been a tendency to tator of Party and deny or decry his personal ability before his advent Governto public office and to regard him either as an igment: Hitler noramus incompetent to rule or as a demagogue whose vogue would be fleeting. After his advent, however, it became apparent, even to his bitterest foes and detractors, that he possessed remarkable qualifications for dictatorship: not only oratory and histrionics, but insight into popular psychology, quickness in making decisions and energy in carrying them into effect, adroitness in managing men and inspiring their confidence, and untiring application to the details of administration. And

¹ See above, p. 800.

along with such personal qualities, Hitler now had the constitutional means of exercising a dictatorship. He was the Chancellor of the Empire, and as such he dominated both the central government and the several state governments, decreed laws for the whole country (with or without the concurrence of his hand-picked Reichstag), and might change or abrogate the constitution. He was also the "leader" of the one legal political party in the state, and as such he was the arbiter of a compact and very effective organization for safeguarding and perpetuating his dictatorship. So long as the National Socialist party was united and obedient to Hitler, he with his governmental control of all means of publicity was inviolate.

There was some danger of conflict within the party. It had a "left" wing and a "right" wing, disposed respectively to stress or to belittle the "socialism" in the party's name and platform, and some of its leading men had rival personal ambitions. To Hitler the danger seemed acute in the spring of 1934, when the especially ambitious commander of the storm troops, Ernst Röhm by name, growing critical of the government's economic "conservatism" and indignant at its talk of reducing and reforming his command, was suspected of conspiring with the ex-Chancellor, General Kurt von Schleicher, to overthrow Hitler. At any rate, Hitler, in conjunction with Goebbels, Göring, and the secret police, took drastic action at the end of June 1934 to nip any such conspiracy in the bud and to terrorize the National Socialist party into unity and the country at large into obedience. Röhm with several of his aides was murdered at Munich in Hitler's presence. General von Schleicher was dragged from his home at Berlin and slain. Simultaneously, some of Papen's associates were slaughtered, and so too were certain Catholic and labor leaders. Altogether, in the "purge of 1934," several hundred persons were murdered. "Reasons of state" and of "morality" were all that Hitler would advance, and the unquestioning acceptance of his explanation clearly demonstrated the strength of the dictatorship he exercised over the party and over the country.

About a month after the "purge," President and Marshal Paul von Hindenburg died on his estate in East Prussia. Then, following grandiose funeral rites on the battlefield of Tannenberg, at which Hitler was chief mourner and orator, Hitler decreed that,

subject to ratification by popular vote, Hitler should be President as well as Chancellor under the new official title of Death of Imperial Leader (Reichsführer). Another plebiscite Hindenburg, 1934 was accordingly held in August 1934. It was not quite so overwhelming as the previous one, but still it was impressive.

Four and a quarter million Germans voted "no," but Hitler as thirty-eight and a quarter million voted "yes." At Reichslast, by popular will as well as by his own, Adolf Hitler führer was sole Leader of Germany, real successor of the Hohenzollerns and of Hindenburg and with far more authority than any of them.

Reënforcing the dictatorship was incessant preaching of the philosophy—one might say the religion—of National Socialism.

This philosophy was essentially Fascist but more ex-**Principles** treme (in certain ways) and more devotional. of Nation-Italian Fascism, it taught that people exist for the al Socialstate, not the state for its people, and that the state must be national and imperial, military and expansive. Like Italian Fascism, too, its ideal was the "totalitarian state," a state which should embrace an entire nationality and should regulate all the activities of its members, political, economic, and

"Totalitarian" and "Authoritarian" State

cism, its program called for an "authoritarian state," in which a single select political party would rule and from which personal dissent and class conflict would be banished, and for a "corporate state," which, while retaining private property and class distinctions, would subordinate them to national welfare and would make occupational groups, rather than individuals, the units of economic and political life. Thus, like Italian Fascism, German National Socialism was the implacable foe of liberalism, democracy, Marxian socialism, and also of pacifism and internationalism and of what were deemed the traditional Christian virtues of humility, meekness, and charity. Beyond Italian Fascism went German National Socialism in respect of its distinctive doctrine of racial superiority—that the Germans, being "pure Aryans," are inherently supe-

cultural. Likewise, after the manner of Italian Fas-

rior in moral virtue and military prowess not only to all "Aryan" their "Slavic" and "Latin" neighbors but also to the State alien and contaminating "Semitic" Tews in their midst. Fiercer and more evangelical, too, was the ardor with which National Socialism inflamed its votaries. Mussolini had

a sense of humor, but not Hitler. Fascism was ceremonial and even theatrical, but the rites of National Socialism were performed with deadly seriousness.

The inculcation of Nazi doctrine was masterfully directed by Joseph Goebbels, "imperial minister of propaganda and public enlightenment," and by Alfred Rosenberg, "supervisor of the party's educational and spiritual work." The latter was the theorist, expounding the "gospel" and detecting "heretics" among writers, artists, university professors, and intellectuals generally. The former was the executive, responsible for the staging of public demonstrations and also for the even more important work of "coördination." This word "coördination" was much used in the Third Empire. It meant the bringing of all cultural agencies into harmony with National Socialism and their utilization for its promotion. All newspapers and other publications throughout Germany were thus "coördinated." So were the radios and the cinemas and the theatres. So was the entire school system—the teachers and the textbooks in all educational institutions from kindergarten to university.

The perfect practice of Nazi precepts was impaired or threatened in two noteworthy respects. One was the inability or unwillingness of Hitler's government to realize the economic ideal of the "corporate state." Aside from the merging of Difficulty Marxian (and other) trade unions in the Nazi Labor of Effect-Front, the federating of business men in some dozen ing Social groups, and a special provision for the compulsory settlement of labor disputes, no significant economic or social changes were attempted. Great landlords kept their estates, and great capitalists retained their industries or mines, their corporations or banks. Indeed, Hitler leaned heavily upon the well-to-do upper classes in Germany, for example employing one of them, a great banker, as his minister of finance,—which doubtless ex-

¹ So designated by Hitler in January 1934. Rosenberg, born in 1893 at Reval (then in Russia and now in Estonia) and educated as an engineer in Russia, migrated to Germany after the war and joined the National Socialist party in 1919. A prolific writer of brochures and books, and from 1921 the editor of the principal Nazi newspaper, he made amends for his Jewish name and his Russian background by becoming the most rabid anti-Semitic and anti-Russian leader of the party. A hig book of his, published in 1930, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, is the most ambitious exposition of the philosophy of the Nazi movement.

plains why they were content with him and why his "socialism" was much less in evidence than his "nationalism." Germany remained a distinctly capitalist country, and, despite a rapid shrinkage of foreign trade and an intensification of economic depression, its public finances were managed so that funds were forthcoming for extensive public works, and unemployment was lessened thereby, at least temporarily. Public works and patriotic orations were Hitler's contribution to social reform.

The other drawback was in "coördinating" the Christian churches. Prior to Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship, the bishops of the Catholic Church in Germany had forbidden the faithful to join or support his party on the ground Difficulty that its incitements to hatred, war, and racial intolerof Coördiance were basically anti-Christian.1 Then, following nating the Churches Hitler's firm establishment in office and his apparently conciliatory negotiation of a concordat with the Vatican, promising religious freedom to the church, the bishops acquiesced in the dissolution of the Centre party and withdrew their formal condemnation of National Socialism. The concordat, however, brought about a restless truce rather than real peace between the Catholic Church and the Third Empire. Hitler and his associates, regarding the concordat as a first step in "coordinating" the church, proceeded to interfere with Catholic societies and publications of all kinds, to compel them to serve Nazi ends or else to suppress them. Such interference was interpreted in Catholic circles as wilful violation of the concordat, and some of the bishops continued to inveigh openly against the "tyranny" and "paganism" of the Nazi régime. Nevertheless, neither the Catholic Church nor Hitler's government was anxious to engage in another Kulturkampf.² The government hesitated to lay violent hands upon critical bishops lest the Catholic laity rally to their defense. On the other hand, the bishops were apprehensive about losing the support of many Catholic laymen if an out-and-out conflict was joined with the nationalist government. The uncertainty on both sides made for caution but not for harmonious "coordination."

¹ Hitler in childhood has been baptized and reared a Catholic, but in manhood he was hardly a practicing one. He sometimes styled himself a Catholic; but National Socialism, rather than Christianity, was his real religion.

² On the Kulturkampf of Bismarck's time, see above, pp. 603-605.


German Protestantism had been always allied with secular government and usually quite subscrvient to it. But there were several different Protestant churches in Germany, not only the Lutheran and the Calvinist, but the separate state churches of Prussia, Saxony, etc., and in each were different shades of individual opinion. The problem here, then, for Hitler and his colleagues was twofold: first, to combine all the Protestant churches into one, as the Catholic Church was one; and second, to coordinate the unified church with the Empire. They did succeed in effecting a corporate union—in name—under an "Imperial Bishop" warmly sympathetic with National Socialism, but they failed to "coordinate" the whole union or even to hold it together. A radical faction in it—the so-called German Christians -- shocked the more orthodox by urging the limitation of church membership to "Aryans," the substitution of "German German scriptures for the Hebrew and Greek Bible, Chrisand the reinterpretation of Christ as an exemplar of militancy. As the Imperial Bishop sought to conciliate the German Christians, orthodox congregations protested and defied him; and when he attempted to discipline the latter, they repudiated his authority, and the German Christians grew more belligerent. Before long it was apparent that many Protestants as well as Catholics, though willing to cooperate politically with National Socialism, would resist dictation in the field of religion.

On the other hand, as contrasting loyalties became manifest between devout Christians and devout Nazis, extremists among the latter pressed for a national repudiation of Christianity altogether and a revival of the pre-Christian "Pagans" tribal and pagan religion of the ancient Germans, with at least symbolical worship of Thor and Woden and veneration of the warrior-heroes of Valhalla. Prominent among such extremists was Alfred Rosenberg, "the philosopher" of National Socialism.

Accompanying the Nazis' forceful campaign to establish uniformity of thought and action in Germany was a remarkable emigration of intellectuals—scholars, scientists, publicists, professors—who would not or could not be "coördinated." Some of these were Jews, but many were non-Jews. Though the government tried to arrest the emigration, thousands managed to get away to foreign parts,

spreading dislike and hatred of the Nazi régime and incidentally depleting Germany of independent men of genius and reputation.

Germany's international position, on the eve of Hitler's advent to power, had been perceptibly improving. Russia was




GERMANY (HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE) IN 1771

NOTE. The states forming the Empire (including Savoy) are comprised within the heavy black line. Habsburg lands are shown in vertical lines; Prussian (Hohenzollern), in diagonal lines.

on friendly terms with her. Italy was disposed to favor her as over against France. Popular sentiment in Britain and the United States was becoming more sympathetic. Even in France a rapprochement with Germany was seriously advocated.

Hitler's advent changed all this. For a decade he had been an impassioned and much publicized champion of Germany's tearing up the treaty of Versailles, rearming herself, and recapturing all "German" lands of which she had been deprived; and now that he was in power, with the whole German nation




GERMANY (CONFEDERATION), 1815-1866

NOTE. The black line is the boundary of the Confederation. Austrian (Habsburg) lands are shown in vertical lines; Prussian (Hohenzollern) lands, in diagonal lines.

apparently committed to his leadership, it was but natural that distrust and apprehension should possess foreign governments and peoples. To be sure, he now sought to Appreallay the fears of his neighbors (and possible criticism at home) by modifying the tone and in part the content of his public utterances on international policy. Early in his chancel-

lorship, while reaffirming in no uncertain terms that Germany must be accorded equality with other Great Powers, particularly in respect of armaments, he disclaimed all thought of war as a



GERMANY (HOHENZOLLERN EMPIRE), 1871-1913

Note. This is after Bismarck's partition of the German Confederation and his enlargement of Prussia. The numerals refer to provinces of Prussia: (1) East Prussia; (2) West Prussia; (3) Pomerania; (4) Brandenburg; (5) Posen; (6) Silesia; (7) Saxony; (8) Hanover; (9) Schleswig-Holstein; (10) Westphalia; (11) Hesse-Nassau; (12) Rhineland.


means of achieving a revision of the treaty of Versailles and expressly declared that "the Empire is ready to become a party

Hitler's Pacific Protestations

to every solemn non-aggression pact, for Germany is not thinking of aggression but of security." Neighboring nations were not wholly reassured, however, and France, Britain, and other Great Powers persisted in their refusals either to sanction the rearmament of Germany or to reduce their own agreements. It was an this issue as a rearrange of the reduced their own agreements.

their refusals either to sanction the rearmament of Germany or to reduce their own armaments. It was on this issue, as we know, that Hitler had Germany withdraw in the autumn of 1933 from the Disarmament Conference and from the League

of Nations. Yet in his ensuing call for a plebiscite in Germany on the issue, he stated emphatically that "the German government and the German people are united in the will to pursue a



GERMANY (THIRD EMPIRE) IN 1935

Note. This shows the single centralized state with which Hitler superseded the Federal Republic of 1919-1933. Its territorial extent, except for Austria, is remarkably similar to that of the First Empire in 1771.

policy of peace, reconciliation, and understanding, as the foundation for all decisions and all negotiations."

In accordance with Hitler's pacific protestations, his government concluded with Poland in January 1934 a non-aggression

pact, guarantying for ten years the existing boundaries between Germany and her eastern neighbor and thus relieving the tension which had marked their mutual relations since the Peace of Paris. By conciliating the

Hitler's Pact with Poland, 1934

Polish government, Hitler felt freer to push forward his immediate plans for annexing Austria, recovering the Saar, and rearming Germany.

To bring about the incorporation (or "coördination") of

Austria with the Third Empire, Hitler encouraged Nazi agitation within that country, which, he hoped, would overthrow its failure to independent and anti-Nazi government and substitute a government thoroughly sympathetic with his own. Such agitation grew and spread in Austria, culminating in July 1934 in the murder of the Austrian premier, Engelbert Dollfuss, by Nazi assassins and an attempted Nazi revolution throughout Austria. The revolution failed, however, partly because fewer Austrians rose to Hitler's support than had been expected, and partly because the Italian government of Mussolini threatened war if the Nazis should possess themselves of Austria; and Italy's stand was seconded by Czechoslovakia, France, and Britain. For a moment the peace of Europe hung by a thread, but Hitler's government soon backed down, disavowing any complicity in the disturbances within Austria and any intention of seeking to obtain Austria by force.

Though the treaty of Versailles had prohibited the union of Germany and Austria, it had pledged the restoration to Germany of the Saar if the latter's population at the end of a of Saar, fifteen-year period should vote accordingly. In this case, therefore, the Allies had no such legal grounds for opposing Hitler's ambition as they had in the case of Austria, and they duly arranged through the League of Nations for the holding of the promised plebiscite in the Saar in January 1935. The outcome was convincing proof of the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda and of the strength of German patriotic sentiment in the Saar. Ninety per cent of the votes were cast in favor of reunion with Germany, and on March 1, 1935, the district was formally turned over to the Third Empire.

Elated and emboldened by its success in the Saar, Nazi Germany strove the harder to "Nazify" other separated districts, preparatory to their reannexation by the Empire. In the free city of Danzig, Nazi sympathizers gained control of the democratic parliament. In Memel, they created grave difficulties for the Lithuanian government. In Schleswig they were troublesome to the Danish government, and in Eupen and Malmédy, to the Belgian. In Czechoslovakia they constituted a compact political party, which, though professing loyalty to the country's democratic

constitution, caused alarm among patriotic Czechs by polling more votes in the general election of 1935 than any other party.

Meanwhile, Hitler was realizing his plan for the rearming of Germany. He had served notice on the other Powers at the time of the Disarmament Conference of 1933 that Germany would not consider herself bound by the provisions of the treaty of Versailles which limited her armaments, unless the others respected the promise made by them in the same treaty that German disarmament would be followed by general disarmament. Then, while nothing was accomplished in the way of general disarmament, Hitler actually proceeded with German

rearmament, though his government officially denied Rearming Germany it. At length, in March 1935, when the British gov-

ernment advised an increase of British armaments in view of "preparations in other countries, notably Germany," Hitler publicly and dramatically repudiated the treaty limitations on German armaments and proclaimed the reëstablishment of universal military service in the Empire. The protests from other countries, in the circumstances, were perfunctory and quite unavailing. The German government fixed the size of its standing army at 550,000 men, the tonnage of its navy at 35 per cent of the tonnage of the British navy, and its aircraft strength at a par with the British and French. At the same time Hitler pledged Germany to respect the Locarno Pact, affecting her western frontier, and to conclude a similar non-aggression pact involving all her eastern neighbors except Lithuania.

Hitler's ambitious and assertive foreign policy elicited loud popular applause in Germany, but abroad it aroused resentment and fear. With the possible exception of Poland, the nations of Europe were less favorably disposed toward the Third German Empire than they had been toward the German Republic. France and Great Britain were antagonized by Hitler's high-handed dictatorship within Germany, as well as by his outspoken attacks on the treaty of Versailles and his arbitrary rearming of the Empire. Soviet Russia, alarmed by his invectives against Communism and his tolerance of Nazi propaganda in behalf of German expansion eastward into Lithuania and the Ukraine, formed a defensive alliance with France. Fascist Italy, alienated by his efforts to annex Austria and to extend the German Empire to the Italian borders, entered into a special entente with France. Lithuania and Czechoslovakia were directly menaced by the National Socialist régime in Germany, and indirectly Denmark, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. Yet that régime undoubtedly commanded popular support in Germany, and there was little prospect, unless some extraordinary military or financial disaster should supervene, that it would be as shortlived as the democratic German Republic had been. The Third Empire, under nationalist dictatorship, seemed to be firmly established.

It remains to say a few words about political developments in post-war Austria. This state, which the peace treaties had stripped of extensive dependencies, reduced to nar-The rowly German confines, and terribly impoverished, Austrian Republic, preserved its republican and democratic constitution 1919-1934 for fifteen years—from 1919 to 1934. At the outset the Social Democrats were the largest party, with the Christian Socialists a close second, and the Nationalists a poor third; and government was carried on by a coalition of Socialists and Catholics. Subsequently, however, the parliamentary representation of the Social Democrats fell below that of the Christian Socialists, and government was then conducted by a coalition of Catholics and Nationalists. Over such a coalition a distinguished priest and statesman, Ignatius Seipel, presided as Chancellor of the Republic from 1922 to 1924 and again from 1926 to 1929.

The majority of both Christian Socialists and Social Democrats were loyal to the Republic, but it was difficult for them to cooperate. The former were Catholic and chiefly rural and agrarian; the latter were Marxian and almost wholly urban and wage-earning. The former were jealous of provincial autonomy; the latter were eager to subordinate the countryside to the capital city of Vienna. To complicate matters, the Social Democrats had a left wing which, under the stress of sorry economic conditions at Vienna, grew more numerous and more inimical to collaboration with any "bourgeois" government, while a right wing of the Christian Socialists was so antagonistic to Marxian

¹ On the democratic constitution of the Austrian Republic, and on the parties of Christian Socialists and Social Democrats, see above, pp. 851-852, 800.

² Social Democrats controlled the municipal government of Vienna, which sponsored expensive public works, including noteworthy construction of model tenements. In July 1927 they organized against the national government a monster demonstration at Vienna, which was terminated by state police and militia.

Socialists that it stood ready to make common cause against them with extreme Nationalists.

There were two types of Nationalist in Austria. The first, corresponding to the Conservative in Germany, was aristocratic, aiming at a repudiation, so far as possible, of individualism and democracy, a restoration of the Habsburg dynasty, and an alliance or federation with Germany. The foremost representative of this type was a young and wealthy nobleman, Prince Ernst von Starhemberg, who fell under the spell of Mussolini and organized a kind of Christian Fascist movement in Austria to forward aristocratic and patriotic ends; he disliked the Socialists, but he also disliked Hitler. The second type was more plebeian; it was embodied in a National Socialist (Nazi) party, which, imported from Germany, availed itself of the desperate economic conditions prevalent from 1929 to win converts, especially from the restless youth and the impoverished middle class, to the entire program of Hitler, including the submergence of Austria in a militant German Empire.

By 1930 the political situation in Austria resembled that in Germany, with bitter conflicts between extremes of Marxian Socialists and National Socialists, and with both extremes striving to weaken the Christian Socialist party, the main middle-of-theroad support of the existing government. The difference was that the Christian Socialist party in Austria was relatively larger and stronger than the corresponding Centre party in Germany, that it had several very resolute leaders, and that Starhemberg and his Fascist conservatives were more inclined to coöperate with it than with the National Socialists. Scipel had taken Starhemberg into his ministry as commander of the militia, and when Scipel finally retired on account of ill health a similar Christian Socialist leader, Engelbert Dollfuss, replaced him and continued his policies.

Dollfuss was of peasant stock, young in years and diminutive

in stature, but courageous and resourceful. Beginning as minister of agriculture in 1930, he became Chancellor in 1932. For a time he sought collaboration of the Social Democrats with his Christian Socialists, but it was difficult to obtain, and, as the menace of National Socialism rapidly increased in Austria after its triumph in Germany, he

rapidly increased in Austria after its triumph in Germany, ne sacrificed an uncertain alliance with Social Democrats for a

surer one with Starhemberg and his Fascist conservatives. Thereby Dollfuss angered the Socialists but he drove a wedge between Fascists and Nazis, and he offset Hitler's hostility by the friendship of Mussolini. A price he had to pay to retain power and preserve Austria's independence; he had to subvert the democratic republic and establish a Fascist dictatorship.

This was accomplished by a series of ministerial decrees which Dollfuss issued in 1933–1934 and by a new constitution which he drafted and which went into effect in April 1934 with the approval of the Austrian parliament (whose Social Democratic

"Christian Corporate"
Dictatorship in
Austria,
1934

members had been forcefully excluded). The constitution described the new Austria as "a Christian Corporate State," and provided for a number of "advisory councils," appointed by the government or representative of various corporations: a Council of State, a Cultural Council, an Economic Council, and Provincial

Councils for the several provinces. Together, these Councils would elect the President, whose term of office was lengthened to six years and whose powers were enlarged, and likewise the Parliament (or "Federal Chamber"), which might not initiate legislation but might veto legislative proposals of the government (unless sanctioned by popular referendum) and by two-thirds vote override governmental decrees. The "government" was obviously dictatorial, and the "government" was the Chancellor and his ministers and the commander of the militia. Which at the time meant Dollfuss and Starhemberg.

To the new order in Austria both Social Democrats and National Socialists were violently opposed, and against both the Suppression of government directed repressive measures. In February 1934, on the eve of the adoption of the new constitution, the proclamation of a general strike by Socialist leaders was answered by an attack of government troops on Socialist strongholds in Vienna, resulting in four days' street fighting, the outlawing of the Social Democratic party, and the merging of all trade unions in a national union under governmental guidance and control.

Then, in July 1934, National Socialists attempted a coup against the government. Dollfuss was assassinated at Vienna and widespread rioting occurred in the provinces. The Christian Socialist dictatorship survived, however, thanks to foreign sup-

port from Mussolini, who by a prompt show of force convinced Hitler that he must discountenance the coup, and thanks also to the loyalty of Starhemberg, who with his militia suppressed the Nazi insurrection in Austria and punished its ringleaders. Kurt Schuschnigg, an adherent of the Christian Socialist party and member

Murder of Dollfuss of Nazi Coup

of Dollfuss's cabinet, succeeded to the chancellorship, with Starhemberg as Vice-Chancellor, and the Austrian Fascist dictatorship continued on its difficult course.

In Austria, desire for national union with Germany and sympathy with Hitler's National Socialism were by no means destroyed, though for the time being they were deprived of propagandist nourishment and rendered quiescent. In any event, the vogue which political democracy and individual liberty had enjoyed in 1919 was clearly gone by 1935 in Austria, as in most of the other countries of central and eastern Europe.



CHAPTER XXVII

INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND DISORDER



OICING the aspirations of large sections of mankind, Woodrow Wilson had proclaimed a twofold purpose of American intervention in the World War—"to make the world safe for democracy" and "to end war"; and at the close of the World War the almost universal vogue of political democracy (which we

have described in preceding chapters) was accompanied by wide-spread demand for a new international order. Just as arbitrary government and forceful imperialism should give way to democracy and national self-determination, so relations between democratic national states should no longer be anarchical and competitive, but systematic and coöperative. The old disorder of rival alliances, menacing armaments, and recurring crises, should be transformed into a world league of free, and therefore peaceloving, nations. By means of such a league, a system of organized peace would be established. Future war would be prevented, general disarmament brought about, and joint action assured for the advancement of human welfare and world civilization.

To the generation which had experienced the terrifying night-mare of the World War, the vision of a dawning day of international peace and concord was peculiarly compelling. It attracted multitudes of common men in 1919–1920, as well as Woodrow Wilson, and it elicited a response from all the statesmen who in those years were negotiating the Peace of Paris. As we shall presently show in some detail, decisive steps were taken by the Paris Peace Congress to fashion a League of Nations and to introduce a new order in international relations; and throughout the post-war era that League has continued to exist and to function.

Nevertheless, just as disillusionment about political democracy grew and one nation after another reacted against it during the post-war era, so in the same period difficulties about operating the League of Nations, and achieving the new international order

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of peace, disarmament, and coöperation, became ever more manifest, with attendant disillusionment in this sphere too. The two major difficulties, which we shall discuss more fully in the last two sections of the present chapter, may here be indicated briefly. The first arose from apparently irreconcilable differences between those nations which profited from the peace treaties of 1919-1920, accepted them as definitive, and regarded the League as an instrument for preserving the status quo, and those nations which were aggrieved by the treaties and wanted the League to modify them. These differences engendered rivalries within the League, and distrust of it by both "satisfied" and "dissatisfied" nations, the latter because it seemed impotent to effect treaty revision, and the former because it might not be strong enough to resist treaty revision. Hence, both groups engaged in a frantic "quest for security" outside as well as inside the League, a quest which was never quite successful except in reviving, in the midst of the new international order, all the features of the old international disorder—rival alliances, competitive armaments, a precarious balance of power.

If the first difficulty may be summarized in the phrase, "the quest for security," the second may be expressed as "the worldwide pursuit of national interests." Though all peoples wanted peace, and most peoples adhered to the League of Nations, no people truly preferred the common good to what it deemed its own national interests and no people would actually let others determine what its national interests were. As nationalism, in the post-war period, assumed ever more rampant and more intolerant forms, not only in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany and under the other dictatorships of central and eastern Europe, but also in Japan and Turkey and all over the world, national interests, real or fancied, were constantly exaggerated and were pressed by peoples and pursued by statesmen with a vigor and a truculence hardly compatible with the new international order which Woodrow Wilson had championed at Paris in 1919. In the circumstances, it was as surprising as it was solacing that the League of Nations endured at all.

I. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Prior to the World War, the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 had been hailed as foreshadowing a new order in inter-

national affairs, and propaganda in behalf of a permanent league of nations had been conducted by numerous individuals and organizations in Europe and America.1 To such propaganda, the World War gave impetus. It was eloquently War-Time argued that the catastrophe could have been prevented Agitation if a league had been in existence in 1914. It was argued, for a League likewise, that if half the nations of the world could pool their resources of men and money and cooperate as allies in a protracted war, then it should be as possible as it was desirable for all of them to form an enduring alliance in the common cause of peace. In all the belligerent countries, popular demands multiplied for a peace which should be enduring and one therefore which should be guarantied by a permanent league of nations.2 To these demands, statesmen paid respectful attention, and the President of the United States appended to his famous peace program as its fourteenth and last point: "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity."

In Woodrow Wilson's program this point might be last but it was not least. It would be, he reiterated, "the most essential part of the peace settlement." He insisted upon its unqualified acceptance by the Allies and by Germany as a condition of the armistice and peace terms. And in the actual peace negotiations at Paris the one thing for which Wilson labored assiduously was a "covenant" for a league of nations.

Concerning just what the league should be there were wide differences of opinion, ranging from the hope of Lansing, the American Secretary of State, that it should be no more than an improved Hague Court for international arbitration, to the desire of Clemenceau, the French premier, that it should be a Covenant military alliance for the enforcement of peace. The of League plan eventually agreed to was a compromise, based Nations, upon draft proposals of Sir Cecil Hurst, acting for the British government, and David Hunter Miller, representing the American President, and worked out by a special

¹ See above, pp. 746-749.

² Books on the subject were written in almost every country, for example in Germany by Matthias Erzberger. Especially active in popular propaganda were the British Labor party and the American League to Enforce Peace.

commission of the Paris Peace Congress. The "Covenant" in which it was ultimately embodied was a kind of international constitution, incorporated with the major treaties signed in 1919-1920 by the Allies and the enemy-states.

The Covenant, in establishing the League of Nations, provided for an international body of two houses: (1) an Assembly, consisting of delegates from the several members of Structure the League (each member having one vote and not of League more than three delegates), and meeting at Geneva in neutral Switzerland; and (2) a Council, a smaller body, holding more frequent sessions and composed of representatives of permanently designated Great Powers and of a few lesser Powers selected from time to time by the Assembly.2 In addition, it provided for a Secretariat, responsible to the Assembly and Council, and served by a staff of officials with headquarters at Geneva. In close association with the League, furthermore, provision was made for the creation of a permanent Court of International Justice and for the functioning of an International Labor Office.

The League was thus furnished with legislative, executive, and judicial organs of its own, theoretically separate from the government of any of its component member states. Yet, under the Covenant, the League was not a super-state.

Nature of League It was rather an instrument of the sovereign states maintaining it. It represented states, not peoples. The delegates in its Assembly and in its Council were not popularly elected, but were appointed by their respective governments. Moreover, a unanimous vote, rather than a mere majority, was normally requisite for League legislation, and in last analysis the execution of its decisions was in the hands of the several state governments. Essentially the League was a continuous committee or conference of diplomatic agents.

The purposes of the League, as stated or implied in the Covenant, were four: to prevent war, to organize peace, to discharge certain special duties imposed by the peace treaties of 1919–1920,

¹ On these treaties, see above, pp. 859-865.

² At first, the permanent seats on the Council were assigned to Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States, and the temporary seats to Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece. Subsequently Germany and Russia were given permanent seats, and the number of temporary seats was raised from four to six (1922), to nine (1926), and to ten (1933).

and to promote international coöperation in that undefined but vast field where the interests of nations are common or subject to amicable adjustment. Of these purposes, the main one, at least the one uppermost in the minds of the framers of the Covenant, was the first—to prevent war. Toward its realization, several important articles of the Covenant were directed.

Article 10 obligated members of the League "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of one another.

Prevent Article 11 empowered the League to "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard that may be deemed wise and enectual to saleguard the peace of nations" and authorized any member to bring to the attention of either Council or Assembly "any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace." Article 12 required the members to submit disputes either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council and "in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council." Article 13 bound the members to "carry out in good faith" any arbitral award and not to resort to war against "any member of the League that complies therewith." Article 15 prescribed that any dispute which could not be settled by arbitration must be submitted to the Council and prohibited any resort to war in contravention of a unanimous decision of the Council (exclusive of the parties to the dispute). Article 16 ordained, in summary, that a member which should resort to war in disregard of these provisions of the Covenant, should "ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all members of the League." Finally, in respect of any dispute between a member and a non-member. Article 17 declared that if the nonmember "refuses to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute and shall resort to war against a member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the state taking such action."

War was not altogether forbidden by the Covenant. Armed rebellion and civil war were plainly excluded from the Altogether Prohibited League's jurisdiction by a stipulation in Article 15 that the Council may make no decision and take no action against a party to a dispute arising out of "a matter

which by international law is solely within the jurisdiction of that party." Even international war might legally be waged if the parties to it had previously submitted their dispute to mediation and the Council had failed to reach an unanimous decision. And to prevent "illegal" war, the League, having no military or naval force of its own, could rely only upon the "moral obligations" which its members assumed under the Covenant.

The Covenant did specify "sanctions" to be taken by the League against recalcitrant members (and non-members). any state resorted to war in disregard of the Covenant, Article 16—"on sanctions"—required the other members of the League "immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations," to prohibit "all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state," and to prevent "all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any state, whether a member of the League or not." In such a case, furthermore, it would become the duty of the Council to recommend "what effective military, naval, or air force" the members of the League should severally use to uphold the Covenant. The Council was also instructed, by Article 10, to "advise upon the means" to be employed in any case of "aggression" or of "threat or danger" of aggression.

In such fashion the League of Nations would attempt to prevent international war. But the League was not to confine itself to a merely negative rôle of prohibiting war and recommending "sanctions" against nations which engaged in it. The League was expected to do more—to act positively and constructively to uproot underlying causes of war and to organize and consolidate the new world-order of peace organize and coöperation. The central agencies of the League—Secretariat, Council, and Assembly—were designed for this long-range purpose as well as for the immediate purpose of preventing war, and so was the permanent Court of International Justice, which, authorized by the Covenant, was duly founded in 1921. This Court was similar in certain respects to the Hague Tribunal which had been established by the Peace Conference of 1899; ¹

¹ See above, pp. 748-740.

it had its seat at the Hague (rather than at Geneva), and it was a judicial rather than a diplomatic or political body. Court of But whereas the Hague Tribunal was not a permanent Internaorganic institution but only a panel of judges from tional Tustice which arbitrators might be selected for a particular dispute, the Court of International Justice was a continuously functioning bench of fifteen judges, appointed for a term of nine vears by joint action of the League's Council and Assembly, paid regular salaries, and empowered not only "to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it" but also to "give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly." 1 The world was thereby supplied with a convenient and very dignified and respectable means of substituting judicial procedure for the arbitrament of arms.

In the belief that secret treaties and alliances had contributed to bringing on the World War, the framers of the Covenant sought to outlaw them. Provision was accordingly Publicamade that every treaty or other international engagetion of **Treaties** ment of any member of the League should be published and that none would be binding unless registered with the Secretariat.2 Besides, a pledge was exacted from every member of the League that it would abrogate all existing "obligations or understandings" inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant and would not enter into any new ones,3 though a special proviso was inserted—at American request—that "nothing in the Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." 4

The Covenant recognized, moreover, the peril, in a changing world, of too rigid insistence on a status quo consecrated by treaties of the past. It expressly enabled the Assembly "from time to time" to "advise the reconsideration, by members of the League, of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." ⁵

¹ Article 14 of the Covenant.

² Article 18.

⁸ Article 20. ⁴ Article 21.

⁵ Article 19.

Furthermore, the Covenant aimed at doing away with big competitive armaments, which were generally regarded as a major cause of past war and as a major obstacle to future peace. It therefore obliged the members of the League to "recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety" and also that "the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections," and it instructed the Council to formulate definite plans alike for the limitation of armaments and for the prevention of "the evil effects" attendant upon

In addition to preventing war and organizing peace, the League of Nations was to perform certain tasks bequeathed to it by the peace treatics of 1919–1920. It was to supervise the plebiscites in Schleswig, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia.² It was to administer the Free City of Danzig. It was to govern the Saar for fifteen years and then

hold a plebiscite there to determine whether the district should revert to Germany or pass to France or remain under the League.³ It was to oversee the enforcement of the special treaty provisions concerning "minority rights." ⁴ Besides, the League Minority

concerning "minority rights." ⁴ Besides, the League of Nations was to possess at least a nominal suzerainty over the former German colonies and Ottoman territories which were now "mandated" to other Powers, and the League Council was to receive annual reports

Rights and Mandated Territories

from the Mandatories and to seek the advice of a permanent commission of the League "on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates." ⁵

Finally, the League was charged with promoting coöperation in matters of general humanitarian interest and concern. To this end, all previously established international bureaus and commissions were placed under the League's Promote direction, and to it was entrusted the making and coversight of international agreements to secure fair Coöperation and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children." "just treatment of native inhabitants" of colonies

their private manufacture.1

¹ Article 8.

² See above, p. 860.

³ See above, pp. 861, 1002.

⁴ See above, p. 869.

Article 22 of the Covenant.

⁶ Article 24.

belonging to members of the League, "freedom of communication and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League," and regulation of "the traffic in women and children," "the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs," and "the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest." 1 To the same end, the League was "to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease" and "to encourage and promote the establishment and coöperation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations" for "the mitigation of suffering throughout the world." 2

In intimate association with the League, and serving as its instrument in the labor field was a special international organization, separately provided for by a "Labor Convention" Labor adopted at Paris in 1919 and, like the Covenant of the Conven-League of Nations, incorporated in the several peace The Labor Convention recognized "relations between capital and labor" to be "matters of international concern," and for their regulation created an International Labor Conference and an International Labor Office. The former, composed of four delegates from each country, two representing the government and one each the employers and the workingmen, would meet annually and make labor agreements subject to ratification by the countries concerned. The International Labor Office, functioning permanently at the seat of the League of Nations, would collect and distribute information on labor conditions, prepare the agenda for the Labor Conference, and supervise the execution of interstate labor agreements.

The Labor Convention affirmed that "the well-being, physical, moral, and intellectual, of industrial wage-earners is of supreme international importance," and specified nine principles which should govern labor legislation in all countries. The nine principles were: (1) labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce; (2) right of free association (trade unionism); (3) a living wage; (4) the eight-hour day; (5) a weekly day of rest, preferably Sunday; (6) abolition of child labor; (7) equal pay for equal work as between men and women;

² Article 25.

⁽⁸⁾ equitable treatment of all workers, including foreigners; and

⁽⁹⁾ a system of inspection for the enforcement of labor laws.

¹ Article 23.

4 Article 26.

From what we have now said of the functions of the League (and its allied Labor Organization), it must be obvious that they were far-reaching and important, and that under the Covenant the League was expected to be the cornerstone of a new worldorder of pacific cooperation and general security. It must also be obvious that, if the League was to fulfill this expectation, its membership should embrace most if not all of the sov-Covenant ereign states of the world. The Covenant, in fact, Provisions about invited all the Allies and almost all neutral nations 1 League to accede to it "immediately" and "without reserva-Membertion," and thus to become initial members of the League. Further, it provided for the subsequent admission of any "fully self-governing state, dominion, or colony" by twothirds vote of the Assembly, and, membership being voluntary. for the withdrawal of any member on two-years' notice.2 Incidentally, every member was to assume a proportionate share of the not inconsiderable expenses of the League.3 And amendments to the Covenant might be made if ratified by all the members represented on the Council and by a majority of those represented in the Assembly.4

In January 1020, pursuant to the call of President Wilson of the United States, the League of Nations was formally inaugurated at Paris with an initial meeting of the Council, and the first Assembly convened at Geneva in the following November. By this time all the Allies in the World War save one and nearly all the invited neutrals had ratified the Covenant and joined the League—a total of forty-two members. Thereafter the organs of the League

¹ Mexico and Costa Rica were not invited because President Wilson did not like their governments; Russia was not invited because no one in the Paris Peace Congress liked her Communist government or thought it would survive; and the new Baltic states were not immediately invited, except Poland.

² Article r of the Covenant.

³ Article 6.

⁵ The "Allied and Associated" Powers which promptly joined the League numbered twenty-nine: Great Britain and her five "Dominions" of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Portugal, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, China, Siam, Liberia, Brazil, Cuba, Panama, Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Thirteen neutral Powers similarly adhered: Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Persia, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Salvador. Argentina virtually withdrew from the League shortly after her original adherence, but returned to active membership in 1933.

functioned regularly, and its membership grew. At the end of 1920, Costa Rica, Finland, Luxemburg, and Albania were admitted and also the former enemy-states of Austria and Bulgaria.

Its Growing Membership

In 1921 followed the new Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; in 1922, Hungary; in 1923, the Irish Free State and Ethiopia; in 1924, Santo Domingo; in 1926, Germany; in 1931, Mexico; in 1932, Turkey and Iraq; in 1934, Afghanistan, Ecuador, and, finally, the Russian Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. By 1935 the number of countries which had adhered to the League of Nations reached the impressive total of sixty-two—twenty-eight in Europe, twenty-one in America, eight in Asia, three in Africa, and two in Australasia.

There were some significant secessions from the League:

Costa Rica in 1924, Brazil in 1926, Japan and Germany in 1933, and Paraguay in 1934. And the United States steadfastly refused to ratify the Covenant and join the League.

The abstention of the United States was a serious handicap to the League. It meant the withholding of the moral support and active coöperation of a Great Power which had

Abstention of United States and active coöperation of a Great Power which had taken a decisive part in the World War and whose President had been chiefly responsible for creating the League of Nations, a Great Power which had always

boasted of its love of peace but which now insisted that the best way of assuring peace was to avoid "entangling alliances" and stay out of the League. How the United States came to adopt an attitude of such grave import to post-war international relations calls for special explanation.

The United States had entered the World War in April 1017 in a burst of indignation against Germany's ruthless submarine warfare and with the idealistic purpose of securing a lasting peace on the basis of justice and right. Some Americans, primarily and bitterly anti-German, were content that the United States should contribute its resources of men and money to the crushing of Germany and should then resume its traditional policy of aloofness from European politics. Other Americans, predominantly humanitarian, were anxious that the United States should utilize its commanding position not only to win the war but to assure a peace settlement which for the future would guaranty

popular and national rights and make the world indeed "safe for democracy."

Most Americans, no matter what their motive was for favoring war with Germany, were tragically ignorant of the vast complexity of the struggle. While fighting went on, they were proud of the diplomatic leadership which the Allies seemingly accorded to the President of the United States, and few of them raised serious or sustained protest against President Wilson's statement of war aims or his championship of a league of nations. But with the defeat of Germany and the emergence of manifold differences among the Allies, public opinion in the United States underwent a transformation. It was perceived that other countries were pursuing selfish ends and consulting their respective national interests rather than the common good, and it was argued that America should do likewise. As idealism gave way to disillusionment, the masses were prepared to desert President Wilson and to follow leaders who would serve narrowly American interests by recalling the United States from European adventures to a policy of traditional (and somewhat self-righteous) isolation. Tending further to loosen the hold of President Wilson on the

American public was the resumption of acute political partisanship in the United States on the eve of the peace negotiations. Wilson as the leader of the Democratic party was the target of the rival Republican party, which carried the Congressional elections of November 1918 and obtained a majority in the Senate (whose consent was necessary for the ratification of treaties). Then the President, hoping no doubt that the peace settlement would redound to the political advantage of himself and his party, widened the breach with the Senate majority by taking Democrats but no prominent Republican with him to the Peace Congress at Paris. In the circumstances the Republican party sought especially to discredit him and his work. At first he was assailed because he seemed too conciliatory toward Germany. Later, when the terms of the peace settlement were disclosed, he was accused of fatally compromising his own principles, of agreeing to a peace of vengeance rather than of justice, of sacrificing American interests, and of ensnaring the United States in European quarrels. Many Republicans who had previously advocated some kind

of a league of nations took to criticizing and denouncing the particular League of Nations which Wilson agreed to at Paris.

When President Wilson returned to America in July 1919 and sought the necessary ratification of the League Covenant and the Treaty of Versailles, he encountered widespread popular opposition and especially stubborn hostility from the Senate majority. Among his critics and adversaries were those who particularly objected to the League of Nations as tending to impair American sovereignty and vitiate certain constitutional powers of the American Congress, or as tending, in disregard of the admonitions of George Washington, to entangle the United States still more in the meshes of Old World diplomacy. There

Opposition to Peace Treaty were others who particularly objected to the Treaty of Versailles: idealists who contrasted it with the "Fourteen Points"; patriots who denounced its concessions to Japan and Great Britain; German Americans who

resented the dismemberment and degradation of the Fatherland; Italian Americans who thought it unfair to Italy; Irish Americans who thought it too fair to Great Britain and the British Empire and not fair at all to Ireland. All these insisted that the United States should not underwrite a "vicious" and "unjust" peace.

For almost two years a deadlock ensued between President Wilson and the Senate majority, the latter stubbornly refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and the League Cov-Conflict enant except with "reservations" which the President between President quite as stubbornly declined to accept. In September and Senate 1919 Wilson undertook a tour of the country in order to reënlist popular support for himself and his cause, but he was soon stricken with a paralysis from which he never fully regovered. Henceforth a broken and almost helpless man, he faced death and, what undoubtedly seemed worse to him, the defection of his own country from that League of Nations upon which he had set his mind and heart. The longer the deadlock continued, the higher mounted the wave of Senatorial hostility to the President's peace program. In November 1010 and again in March 1920 the Senate adopted by majority vote some fourteen drastic reservations of the Treaty of Versailles and the League Covenant, but the minority, faithful to the President's injunctions, blocked the ratification of Treaty and Covenant with these reservations.

The dispute was settled and the deadlock broken by the verdict of the American people in the presidential election of November 1920. At that time the candidate of the Democratic party, a supporter of the policies of President of Senate Wilson, was overwhelmingly defeated, and Warren American Harding, a Republican Senator, was elected to the Isolation Presidency. The new President, addressing the Congress shortly after his inauguration, in March 1921, declared that "in the existing League of Nations, world governing with its super-powers, this Republic will have no part." American participation in the League of Nations was doomed.

The United States, in 1922, concluded separate peace treaties of its own with Germany, Austria, and Hungary, and then withdrew all American troops from Europe. The American government persistently refused to join the League of Nations or to cooperate fully with it. Eventually, some partial and halting Later coöperation was achieved through the presence of Minor American American "observers" at Geneva, through American

representation on certain League commissions, through

Coöperation with League

American participation in special conferences (such as those on disarmament) called by the League, and, in 1934, through America's acceptance of membership in the League's Labor Organization. On the other hand, the United States Senate could not be induced to approve of America's adherence to the permanent Court of International Justice, although it was urged by President Harding and his Republican successors and although, to bring it about, numerous important concessions were agreed to by the member nations. In 1935 the Senate, this time with a large Democratic majority, blocked a renewed attempt by the Democratic President, Franklin Roosevelt, to carry the United States into the World Court.

The abstention and critical attitude of the United States undoubtedly injured the League of Nations. But there were other and hardly less grave gaps in the League's membership. For fourteen years after the establishment of the League, the extensive and populous Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was not a member, partly because the Communist dictatorship in Russia re-

Other Weaknesses in League Member-

garded the League as an international agency for preserving capitalism and hence either feared or despised it, and partly

because most Powers in the League were hostile to the Russian dictatorship and skeptical of its willingness or ability to cooperate with them. For six years, moreover, Germany was excluded from membership; and during this period, and afterwards also, Germans and pro-German sympathizers were made to feel that the League was not so much a really coöperative peace league of all nations as a league of the victors in the World War in order to perpetuate the spirit and preserve the fruits of their victory. After the withdrawal of Germany and Japan, only four Great Powers remained in the League—Britain, France, Italy, and Russia.

Nevertheless, despite weaknesses in its membership and growing doubt about its ability to perform the primary task for which it had been organized—the prevention of inter-Achievenational war,—the League demonstrated with increasments of League ing clearness that in other respects it was effectual and indeed indispensable. The League Secretariat steadily enlarged its personnel and its activities, gathering and publishing great quantities of useful data about world conditions, political, economic, social, and cultural. League commissions and conferences constantly multiplied, exploring an ever wider range of special problems and drafting reports and recommendations. The League supervised the repatriation of over 400,000 prisoners of war, belonging to twenty-six different nationalities. It also aided in caring for several hundred thousand Greek and Armenian war refugees expelled from Turkey, and in directing the inter-change of populations between Greece and Turkey.¹ It contributed to the financial rehabilitation of Austria and Hungary. It conducted the post-war plebiscites with notable impartiality and administered Danzig and the Saar with noteworthy success. Through its agencies, it did much to check the spread of typhus and the international traffic in opium. Through its commission on intellectual cooperation, it brought together scientists and scholars from all parts of the world and facilitated the exchange of scientific, artistic, and literary information and the movement of students and teachers from one country to another. Through its associated Labor Office and Labor Conferences, it prompted a good deal of international collaboration in collecting facts and dealing with problems of industrial labor. Through

¹ See above, p. 868 note.

the Court of International Justice which it created, a considerable number of controversial matters were successfully adjudicated; and through special committees which it sponsored, a start was made toward a codification of international law.

In other words, what had originally been deemed the incidental province of the League of Nations became the field of its most significant and very real achievements. Even nations which were highly critical of its political activity (or General lack of political activity) and which either remained outside the League or withdrew from it, were obliged to Peace to recognize the great value of the services it rendered to international well-being in non-political matters. It provided convenient and continuous means of international negotiation. It accustomed statesmen of many different countries to meeting together in frequent conference and thinking in international as well as national terms. It definitely made for a new world-order. This or that nation might temporarily resent or repudiate it as an organization, but its actual accomplishments in the general field of international cooperation were so impressive and incontrovertible that no nation could ignore it or wish its destruc-

In the adjustment of disputes between nations and in the prevention of war, the League was not so uniformly successful. It undoubtedly helped in these respects with its convenient agencies, with its painstaking investigations and reports, and with its less tangible but still important contributions to the formation of pacific public opinion. And particularly in Its Rôle in disputes between lesser Powers, it actually mediated Internawith distinct success. For example, a dispute between tional Disputes Finland and Sweden in 1920 over the ownership of the Aland Islands in the Baltic was referred to the League, and the Council, after investigation by a special commission, awarded the islands to Finland. Again, a dispute between Poland Between and Germany over the boundary line which should be Lesser **Powers** drawn in Upper Silesia following the confused plebiscite there, was referred to the League in 1921, and the Council adjusted it by a compromise somewhat partial to Poland. Then, too, in 1024 the Council determined the status of the German Baltic port of Memel by confirming Lithuania's forceful appropriation of it and requiring it to be governed in accordance with a plan drawn up by a special neutral commission. In 1925 a Greek attack upon Bulgaria in retaliation for frontier incidents was stopped by remonstrances of the League Council and the threat of an economic boycott against Greece. Similarly, hostilities between Colombia and Peru resulting from the seizure in 1932 of a town in the former's border province of Leticia by armed forces of the latter, was averted by a League commission, which took charge of Leticia in June 1933 and brought about a year later an amicable agreement between the two countries whereby Peru tendered apologies and Colombia regained the province.

League mediation was less successful in disputes to which Great Powers were party. True, the good offices of the League were utilized to settle in 1926 a protracted dispute over the ownership of the rich oil fields of Mosul between Great Britain as mandatory for Iraq on the one side and the weaker state of Turkey on the other, but this case was not a conclusive test of the League's strength. For, inasmuch as the settlement was favorable to Great Britain (and Iraq), the Great Power gladly accepted it, and the lesser Power was induced, by minor British concessions, to acquiesce.

In a dispute of 1923 between Poland (backed by France) and Lithuania over the city of Vilna, attempted League mediation was pushed aside and Poland's armed seizure of Vilna was upheld by an independent accord between France and the other Great Powers of Britain and Italy. In another dispute of the same year between Italy and Greece, arising from the murder, presumably by Greek bandits, of several Italian members Flouting of League of an Albanian boundary commission, Italy without recourse to the League demanded of Greece an official apology and heavy indemnities and, to enforce quick compliance with her demands, bombarded and occupied the Greek island of Corfu. In vain Greece appealed to the League of Nations. Italy flouted the League, maintaining that its intervention would be an infringement of her own national dignity and sovereign rights, and only consenting to evacuate Corfu through the friendly mediation of her "equals"—Britain and France and on terms necessitating Greek acceptance of her major demands.

The League could not prevent Japan from forcibly appro-

priating Manchuria and conducting military operations against China. China besought the League to interfere, but the By Japan only tangible results were a paper report from a League commission and the withdrawal of Japan from the League. 1 Nor could the League stop a war which broke out in 1928 between two of its South American members, Bolivia and Paraguay, over the long-disputed intermediate territory known as the Gran Chaco. When Paraguay was called to account by the League in 1934, she simply followed Japan's example and withdrew from the League. Not League "sanctions" but exhaustion of the belligerents and independent mediation of their neighbors stopped the Chaco War in 1935.2

In 1935, too, the League failed to prevent Italy from undertaking the conquest of Ethiopia. After Italian troops had actually invaded the African state (a fellow member of the League), the League Assembly authorized the application of economic "sanctions" against the aggressor,

but it was dubious whether this hitherto untried weapon of the League would prove effective in the circumstances. It was more probable that Ethiopia would be sacrificed to an accord between Great Britain and France, on one hand, and Italy, on the other.³

Meanwhile, the sorry succession of League failures to bring about any limitation of armaments, concerning which we shall say more in the next section, not only occasioned Germany's secession in 1933 and her repudiation of the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles on her own arm- Arma-

aments, but spread and intensified distrust of the League as a guarantor of national security and international peace. The League of Nations, highly serviceable as it was in noncontroversial matters, was apparently ineffectual in disputes vitally affecting the political ambition and prestige of a strong and self-willed nation. Which only confirmed the conviction of those Powers which wanted a revision of the peace settlement of 1919. 1920 that they could not obtain it through the League, and likewise the conviction of those Powers which wanted to preserve the status quo that the League could not really ensure it. The League of Nations sufficed neither for ambition nor for security.

¹ See below, pp. 1078 - 1079.

² See below, pp. 1088-1080.

³ See below, pp. 1080-1082.


2. THE QUEST FOR SECURITY

Complicating and endangering the new international order envisaged by Wilson and other champions of the League of Nations were basic differences among the Powers about the "security" which they all anxiously sought during the post-war period. The nations did not want another big war. They had experienced,

Different National Interpretations of "Security"

in the late World War, quite enough miseries and horrors. They wanted to be sure that there was not another war like that. But how to forestall it? How to secure themselves? Unfortunately, what was "security" for one nation might be a threat against the "security" of another. A victor nation, such as France, would interpret "security" and seek its attainment in a fundamentally different way from a vanquished nation, such as Germany.

Germany from 1871 to 1914 had been indisputably a Great Power—the foremost military Power in the world-and her might had then secured her against foreign aggression Security and dismemberment. Now, by the Treaty of Versailles, for she was terribly weakened and humiliated. Forced to admit a war-guilt which she did not feel, she was treated as an outcast from the society of nations, deprived of valuable territories in Europe and colonial possessions overseas, estopped from annexing German Austria, heavily mortgaged to her enemies, and virtually disarmed. Obviously she was at the mercy of powerful and vindictive neighbors, just as she had been back in the seventeenth century and in the first decade of the nineteenth. Her "security" was lost, and she could hardly expect. to regain it through a League of Nations dominated by her conquerors and pledged to uphold the new status quo. Yet potentially Germany was still a Great Power, with population a third larger than France or Italy or Britain, and with natural resources and industrial development equal to Britain's and superior to those of Italy or France. She had certainly the incentive, and probably the means, to reassert herself and recover needful "security." It would involve, of course, the repudiation bit by bit—the quicker the better—of the Treaty of Versailles: the rearming of Germany, her escape from reparations and consequent foreign tutelage, her appropriation of Austria, and in time her reacquisition of colonies and of European lands of which she



had been despoiled—the Saar, Memel, Danzig, the Polish Corridor, Schleswig, Eupen and Malmédy, perhaps Alsace-Lorraine. Eventually she would again be "secure"—so big and strong that no other Power, or even a combination of Powers, would venture to attack her.

Similar to Germany's post-war attitude toward "security," in kind if not in degree, was the attitude of other nations which had been vanquished in the World War, particularly Hungary and Bulgaria. Hungary bitterly resented the Treaty of the Security Trianon, which had dismembered and impoverished for Other her in order to enlarge and enrich what she considered quished the self-seeking states of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria was outraged by the Treaty of Neuilly, which had made her abjectly inferior to her neighbors and rivals in the Balkans- Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece. Both Bulgaria and Hungary, like Germany, sought "security" in drastic revision of the peace settlement, and in such a quest they were heartened by the success with which Turkey, their confederate in the World War, had defied the enemy combination and broken the bonds fastened upon her by the Treaty of Sèvres. German Austria was a bit more resigned than the other vanquished Powers to the loss of territories and prestige, though the grave financial situation in which she found herself after the war impelled her toward a union with Germany for the attainment of economic as well as military "security," and in this respect at any rate she was favorable to treaty revision. In Austria, too, was a fairly large party which, failing union with Germany, would seek a substitute "security" through restoration of the Habsburg dynasty and ensuing imperial federation with Hungary.

Quite as eager for "security" were the victors of the World War. France, in particular, was intensely solicitous about it. Thrice within the last century she had suffered agonizing German invasion, and twice it had eventuated in Security for France loss of territory, continuing military occupation, and payment of indemnity. From 1871, the date of the second of these calamities, down to 1914, she had lived in constant fear and foreboding, subjected to repeated humiliations, and only barely able, by the utmost effort and sacrifice, to maintain herself

¹ See above, pp. 865-867.

^{*}In 1814-1815, again in 1870-1871, and again in 1014.

as a Great Power. Now, at last, the third German invasion, after a most deadly and devastating struggle, had been repulsed, the "lost provinces" of Alsace-Lorraine regained, and measures taken to keep Germany in order. The measures were perhaps severe, but France was sure that they were not too severe to serve their purpose and that any softening of them, any "revision" of the peace treaties, would be fraught with consequences fatal to the "security" of herself and of all Europe. Germany was still, potentially, a Great Power, greater than France in population and resources; she must be prevented from developing her superiority and employing it for fresh aggression. France had won the war, and to preserve the fruits of victory she must insist upon a scrupulous observance of the peace settlement, especially the Treaty of Versailles.

Similar sentiments prevailed in the newly created or expanded states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

These owed their national unity if not their very inde-

Security for Newly Unified Nations These owed their national unity if not their very independence to the peace settlement of 1919–1920, and they were thoroughly hostile to any modification of the existing status quo, which, by benefiting Germany,

the existing status quo, which, by benefiting Germany, Hungary, or Bulgaria, might endanger their own "security." They were natural allies of France. It was likewise with Belgium, which had been a major battlefield for the World War and was anxious not to be the victim of another such conflict.

Great Britain also sought "security," but in a way which diverged from the French on one hand and the German on the Security other. By reason of her insular situation, she could for Great afford to be less panicky about the menace of large-Britain scale military invasion than either France or Germany; her homeland had not been ravaged in the World War, and there was little likelihood that it would be in another war if she retained her naval superiority. This naval superiority was essential not only to her own defense but also to the safety of her far-flung overseas empire and of her vast foreign trade. And supplementing her naval concern and almost equally traditional with it was Britain's anxiety to prevent any Power on the Continent of Europe from exercising an absolute or continuous hegemony which might directly interfere with her commerce or indirectly menace her colonial and maritime supremacy. Britain had fought in the World War to prevent Germany from acquiring such an hegemony, and now that Germany was stripped of colonies and

ships and duly humbled, Britain had no desire that France should take the place of Germany. Consequently, "security" meant to Britain the retention of her own naval superiority and the restoration of a nice balance of power between Germany and France. Germany must be held to the "reasonable" provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, that is, to those compatible with British interests, and France must not be supported in "unreasonable" demands. Convinced that land armaments (though not sea armaments) fostered a sense of insecurity, Britain was unsympathetic with the French view that security must exist before there can be any general limitation of armies.

The attitude of the United States was similar to Britain's, except that it was more extreme. The United States was geographically more distant from Europe and traditionally more aloof. Whereas Great Britain would couple for United naval strength of her own with active participation in the League of Nations and direct efforts to reconcile France and Germany, the United States would let all Europe "stew in its juice" and would rely for American "security" on a policy of "splendid isolation," economic and political—fortified by a gigantic navy. Like Britain, the United States could not comprehend why other nations, after the World War, did not disarm.

Russia, though a Great Power and one which before the war had played an important rôle in international affairs, was even more isolated, for several years after the war, than the Security for Russia United States. At least until Lenin's death and Trotsky's downfall,1 Russia's dictatorship was inimical to the whole "capitalistic" world and bent upon achieving security for itself by strengthening Communism at home and promoting unrest abroad. In this latter respect, it tended to be more hostile to the victors in the World War, notably Britain, France, and Japan, than to vanquished Germany, and for a time there was prospect of an entente between the German Republic and the Russian dictatorship. Subsequently, under Stalin, Communist Russia reacted against Nazi Germany, as against imperialist Japan, and, in quest of special guaranties of security, resumed her stellar rôle in international affairs, joining the League of Nations and allying herself with France.

Italy, throughout the post-war period, occupied an inter¹ See above, pp. 010-020.

mediate position, in the matter of security, between France and Germany. She had no common frontier and no basic Security quarrel with Germany; she was not directly menaced for Italy by Germany. Yet if she did not uphold the Treaty of Versailles, Germany might annex Austria and thus be enabled to reclaim that part of the Tyrol which Italy had taken from Austria. On the other hand, Italy was not pleased with the treatment she had received from her Allies in the peace settlement of 1919-1920; they had tried to restrict her expansion east of the Adriatic because of their solicitude for Yugoslavia and Greece: she had been deprived of promised colonies in Asia Minor by the revival of Turkish power, and France and Britain had been quite miserly in granting "compensation" to her in Africa. Italy was especially jealous of France—the Great Power which was her nearest neighbor, which maintained the largest army in Europe and a big naval force in the Mediterranean, which clung to Corsica and Tunis and championed Yugoslavia, yet whose population was being rapidly surpassed by Italy's. In the difficult circumstances, Italy followed notably Machiavellian methods: being reckless in speech and cautious in action; stimulating patriotic fervor and military preparedness at home, while professing peace and advocating cooperation abroad; playing off one group of Powers against another; adhering to the League of Nations but not taking it too seriously.

The quest for such different and conflicting kinds of "security" as those demanded by France, Germany, Britain, the United States, Russia, and Italy—and Japan also—made for

Resulting International Friction States, Russia, and Italy—and Japan also—made for international friction rather than for international amity and concord. It involved more threats of warlike disorder than promises of pacific order. It largely

negated the primary purpose of the League of Nations. And the tragedy about it was that every Great Power, and all the lesser Powers, sincerely desired peace—each one, however, on its own terms.

French
Diplomatic
Hegemony and
Quest of
Security

France utilized the prestige which she gained from the World War and the military superiority which she retained after 1918, just as Germany had done after 1871, to exercise a kind of premiership in international affairs and to advance plans for her own

¹ See above, pp. 864-867.

"security." Not all of these plans could be realized, however, in the face of determined opposition from other Great Powers, and consequently the history of French diplomacy during the post-war period is the story of a perpetual search for new devices whereby France could be secured against a recurrence of war and any aggression by Germany.

At first, while the Paris Peace Congress was in progress, the French government and Marshal Foch pleaded earnestly that the future security of their country, and therefore the peace of Europe, depended upon the severance of the whole left bank of the Rhine from Germany. Then, when President Wilson pressed for a League of Nations, the French negotiators pleaded that the League be furnished with "teeth," that it be provided with a strong international army to enforce strict observance of the treaties of peace. Neither President Wilson nor Lloyd George (on behalf of the British government) would assent to the League's being made a hard-and-fast military alliance or to the extension of French frontiers to the Rhine, and eventually France agreed, though reluctantly, to an alternative plan for her special security. This was to be a defensive triple alliance by the terms of which the United States and Great Britain would jointly Failure of

of which the United States and Great Britain wou guaranty the territorial integrity of France and would come to her military assistance if she should be attacked by Germany. The treaties of alliance were duly signed at Paris, and on the strength of them France abandoned her claims to German lands (except Alsace-Lorraine and the coal fields of the Saar) and accepted an innocuous League of Nations. But the persistent re-

Projected French Alliance with Britain and America, 1919-1920

fusal of the United States to heed President Wilson's advice and to endorse the Franco-American treaty rendered the alliance inoperative for Great Britain as well as for the United States, and left France to seek security by other means.

One obvious means was to tie in defensive alliance with France the lesser states of Europe which had a common interest with her in supporting the peace settlement and opposing treaty revision, and this means she exploited to the full. She contracted a formal military alliance with Belgium in September 1920; with Poland in 1921; and with Czechoslovakia in 1924.

French Alliance with Belgium, Poland, and Little Entente, 1920-1927

The last-named country had already formed, in 1920-1921, a so-

called "Little Entente" with Rumania and Yugoslavia for the purpose of safeguarding the territories which they had severally appropriated from Hungary, and this arrangement helped France to enlarge her own circle of alliances by drawing into it Rumania in 1926 and Yugoslavia in 1927.

There were drawbacks about these French alliances. They were expensive, because they had to be buttressed by large and fairly frequent loans. They were none too reliable, because the parties to them, other than France, were minor Powers, widely scattered, whose fighting abilities, if not patently slight, were unproved. Besides, the alliances involved France in all the controversies of eastern, as well as western, Europe, and they especially aroused the jealousy and distrust of Italy. Indeed, Italy, in furtherance of her own ambitions in eastern and central Europe and as a counterpoise to the French system of alliances, cultivated particularly friendly relations with Hungary, Austria, and Bulgaria, and encouraged them to hope for treaty revision.

Not content with the alliances with the Little Entente, Poland, and Belgium, France sought additional means of security in a strengthening of the Covenant of the League of Na-French tions. From her point of view, there were two fatal Efforts to Strengthweaknesses in the Covenant: (1) it did not define en League "aggression"; and (2) it did not specify with sufficient exactitude the action to be taken against an "aggressor." Therefore, to remedy these weaknesses, she sponsored the drafting by an international commission, in 1923, of a "treaty of mutual assistance," which, as revised in 1924 under the title Geneva of "Geneva Protocol," was submitted to the members Protocol. **IQ24** of the League for ratification. The Protocol aimed at "clarifying" the Covenant and closing its loopholes. Every international dispute must be settled by arbitration or by conciliation. A state which refused to accept the award, or which in any way prejudiced the peaceful solution of a dispute, was ipso facto the "aggressor." And against such an aggressor, each signatory of the Protocol would undertake to act "in the degree

¹ In 1930, shortly after the conclusion of the formal alliance between France and Yugoslavia, an entente between Italy and Bulgaria was evidenced by the marriage of a daughter of King Victor Emmanuel III to King Boris III. See the genealogical tables facing pp. 132 and 674.

which its geographical situation, and its particular situation as regards armaments, allows."

Practically, what France wanted from the Protocol was a more effectual underwriting of the peace settlement by the whole League, and particularly by Great Britain as its most puissant member. Britain was very chary of the Protocol, however. In general, she disliked the idea of obligating herself either to obey or to enforce each and every decision of an international body in which France and the Continental satellites of France would probably have a preponderant voice. And, backed by public opinion at home and in her self-governing Dominions, she advanced two specific objections to the Protocol. First, it might easily involve her in war with the United States, which, being outside the League and spurning its agencies of arbitration and conciliation, would have to be deemed an "aggressor" in any serious dispute with a League member. Second, it would almost certainly require her to serve as a police officer all over the world, including regions, such as eastern Europe, where she herself was not directly interested. The first objection France could have overcome by consenting to exempt American cases from the scope of the Protocol, but the second was insurmountable. So Great Britain withheld ratification, and the Protocol of Geneva collapsed.

In 1925 Franco-German relations underwent some improvement, thanks to the temporarily successful operation of the Dawes Plan for reparation payments, and thanks also to the Attempt mutually conciliatory attitude of the foreign ministers at Franco-German of the two countries, Aristide Briand in France and Rap-Gustav Stresemann in Germany. Both of these statesprochemen had come to believe that they could promote the security of their respective nations by direct negotiations and agreements, and as this belief was consonant with British interests and desires, Britain's foreign minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain, encouraged the negotiations and persuaded the Italian

The outcome was a group of treaties, drafted in October 1925 in idyllic surroundings at the Swiss health resort of Locarno on Lake Maggiore, and collectively styled the Pact of Locarno. Germany would enter the League of Nations and receive a permanent

government to do likewise.

¹ See above, p. 898.

place, as a Great Power, on its Council. Simultaneously, Germany would definitely desist from seeking treaty re-Pact of vision by force of arms and would settle by arbitration Locarno. or conciliation every dispute which might arise be-1925 tween her and France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, or Poland. Germany would reserve the right to seek a peaceful modification of her eastern frontiers but she would expressly recognize the permanence of her new western borders. Wherefore, as the most significant feature of the Pact, Germany and France and Belgium would forever respect their mutual frontiers and refrain from war with each other except in self-defense or in accordance with the stipulations of the League Covenant; and Great Britain and Italy would guaranty this feature of the Pact by giving armed assistance to any of the three Powers if it should be faced with a violation of the Pact by any other of the three. The Pact of Locarno, though assailed by extremists in both

Germany and France, was generally hailed at the time as an epochal event: as marking a final reconciliation between victors and vanquished and constituting a big step forward toward world peace. In the afterglow of optimism thus engendered, the American Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, acting on a Kellogg-Briand suggestion of Briand (who in turn derived the sugges-Pact for tion from an American scholar 1), proposed to all the Outlawry nations of the world that they pledge themselves by a solemn pact "to outlaw war," that is, "to renounce of War. 1028 the use of war as an instrument of national policy." Briand was not completely satisfied with the form which Kellogg gave to his suggestion. The American Secretary was insistent, however, that the pact should embody only a principle and that its enforcement should rest solely upon the "good faith" of the several signatories. Regretfully, and perhaps a little cynically, Briand finally acquiesced in this interpretation; and with a great flourish was signed at Paris in August 1928 the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. Being but a pious declaration, it was speedily adhered to by almost every nation. What it really amounted to was indicated by the ironic fact that its ratification by the United States Senate was accompanied by the enactment of a bill materially increasing the strength of the American navy.

Not the Kellogg-Briand Pact and not even the Locarno Pact ac-

¹ Professor James T. Shotwell.

tually solved the problem of security. On the Locarno Pact, France and Germany put very different interpretations. France imagined it meant German acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles. Germany expected that it would be followed by a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Both were mistaken. Germany pressed the harder for annulment or amendment of those clauses in the treaty charging her with war-guilt, imposing heavy financial burdens on

Impasse between France Germany Treaty Revision

her, limiting her armaments, and contracting her historic eastern borders. Against such pressure, France was adamant. would make no further concessions; and now that she was assured of British and Italian assistance in preserving the territorial arrangements of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the West. she felt all the freer to oppose any alteration of those affecting the East. Consequently, France renewed and strengthened her military alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia; and in the spring of 1931, in concert with Italy, she estopped Germany from forming a close tariff-union (Zollverein) with Austria. This last action brought out in bold relief the widely divergent goals of German and French foreign policy and the illusory nature of the "security" which the Pact of Locarno had aimed at achieving. Henceforth the spirit if not the letter of Locarno was dead, and apparently the only remaining way of seeking security was through some delicate balancing of national armaments.

There had been no general disarmament after the World War. France, it is true, cut her standing army in half by reducing the term of service from three years to eighteen months; Italy called fewer men to the colors; and, in accordance with the peace treaties, the armies of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria were drastically curtailed. Yet the principle of universal military service was in

Security through Arma~ ments and Its **Dangers**

effect not only in most countries which had adopted it prior to 1914 but also in all the newly created or unified states: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, the Baltic and Balkan states; and in all of these it was utilized for the maintenance of very sizable armies. Russia gradually built up a larger, and probably more efficient, army than she had had before the war. Moreover, while the British navy was smaller than it had previously been, it was still a superior fighting force; and the navies of the United States and Japan were considerably stronger than

they had been. Altogether there was a vast deal of continuing military or naval "preparedness." It was costly. It consumed a large part of the financial resources of the several governments and gravely embarrassed their post-war efforts at economic reconstruction. It was dangerous. It kept up and even exaggerated the rivalry, the sudden alarums, and the chronic sense of danger, which had attended the "armed truce" of Europe from 1871 to 1914 and which had eventuated, as everybody knew, in the miseries and calamities of the World War.

Statesmen understood the perils of continuing international competition in armaments, and the delegates to the Paris Peace

Pledges of Paris Peace Congress to Limit

Congress of 1919-1920 had given three pledges of a determination to put a stop to it. First, they severely restricted the armaments of Germany and her European allies in the World War. Second, they declared Armaments
in the peace treaties that they imposed these restrictions on the vanquished nations "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments

of all nations." Third, they recognized in the Covenant of the League of Nations that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety" and provided that the League Council "shall formulate plans."

Yet, despite these solemn pledges and despite the obvious perils of not carrying them into effect, no general limitation of armaments was achieved during the post-war period. Difficulty of Keeping Each nation wanted some other nation to take the initiative in the matter, and no nation would take it. the Pledges Every state was convinced that the armaments of other states, but not its own, were inconsistent with "national safety." The United States and Great Britain continually found fault with France and Poland for not reducing their armies and applying the sums of money thus saved to the discharge of their foreign debts. But France and Poland both retorted that they would gladly reduce their armies if they could definitely count on assistance from the United States and Great Britain in protecting them against possible German aggression and that in the meantime the English-speaking Powers should evidence their sincerity in the cause of general disarmament by reducing their navies.

The basic difficulty, indeed, was one of security. Lacking the certainty of joint action to assure peace, each Power felt obliged to do its utmost to obtain security through its individual efforts. Special alliances and pacts and a league Problem of nations might help, but what would they amount Security to without the backing of physical force? And who would supply the force except the several nations vitally concerned? National armaments might be dangerous in the future, just as they had been before the World War, but to get rid of them would be still more dangerous. If France and Poland, for example, should reduce theirs to a level with Germany's, what would prevent Germany from tearing up the Treaty of Versailles and renewing the World War? But if France and Poland, for reasons of their own security, would not reduce their armaments, why should Germany be expected to keep hers reduced at the sacrifice of her security? Or, to cite another example, if the United States should not maintain a navy at least equal to any other Power's, how in another world war could she follow an independent course, avoid entangling alliances, preserve her neutrality, and safeguard her trade, her coasts, and her island possessions? But if the United States required a big navy for her security, how much the more was the security of such island states and imperial Powers as Great Britain and Japan dependent upon big navies!

With every nation in quest of security through armaments, it proved quite impossible to bring about any general disarmament. All that was practically possible was to try to keep down the armaments of those nations which had been vanquished in the World War, and among other Powers to arrange such balancing of existing armaments as would temporarily serve to uphold the status quo and to prevent the actual increase of national armies and navies from becoming madly competitive.

International negotiations for a balancing of navies met with somewhat greater success than those for the balancing of armies, in part because the number of naval Powers was Attempted smaller than the number of military Powers, and in Limitation part because the immediate purposes of the former were more reconcilable than those of the latter. The most important naval Powers at the close of the World War were Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. Great Britain, which

had possessed by far the largest navy before the war, was now in imminent danger of being exceeded in naval strength by the United States. She might offset it by renewing her defensive alliance with Japan,1 or she might directly enter into a naval race with the United States. But either of these courses would be almost certain to antagonize the United States and to produce the same ugly situation in Anglo-American relations as had recently existed in Anglo-German relations, and in view of the troubled political and economic conditions of post-war Europe Great Britain had neither the inclination nor the available funds to oppose the United States. It was clearly to the advantage of Britain to reach a naval accord with the United States and to have Japan included in it. Nor was the United States at all reluctant to become party to such an accord—provided she was granted equality as a naval Power with Great Britain and superiority to Japan. A mutual limitation of naval armaments would evince America's abiding devotion to peace and conciliation at the very time when America's abstention from the League of Nations and the World Court was causing unfavorable comment in Europe. It would have the additional and very practical advantage of bringing the Anglo-Japanese alliance to an end and of thus increasing America's security against possible Japanese aggression in the Pacific and the Far East; and incidentally it would save both Powers much money. As for Japan, the impending lapse of her alliance with Great Britain and the embarrassing state of her finances left her with no choice but to accede for the time being to a project which at least would preserve her existing rank among naval Powers and assure her an hegemony in Far Eastern waters.

Accordingly, an international conference on the limitation of naval armaments was held at Washington in 1921-1922 and washing- attended by representatives of all the naval Powers,

washington Conference, 1921-1922 attended by representatives of all the naval Powers, not only the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, but France and Italy.² The outcome was an agreement to retain for ten years approximately the existing ratio among battleship tonnages of the several Powers: Great

¹ On the Anglo-Japanese alliance, see above, pp. 761, 764. It had been last renewed in 1911 for ten years and hence would automatically expire in 1921 unless again renewed.

² The Washington Conference, being called to consider general international questions in the Pacific and the Far East as well as the specific question of naval

Britain 5, the United States 5, Japan 3, France 1.67, Italy 1.67. The agreement also included a formal condemnation of the use of submarines against merchant and passenger vessels and a pious reaffirmation of the declaration of the Hague Conference of 1907 against the use of poison gases in warfare. In vain the United States sought to include a limitation of light cruisers; Great Britain successfully opposed it. In vain Great Britain sought to include a prohibition on any use of submarines in war; France refused to agree to it. The Washington Conference did halt—for ten years—the highly provocative and expensive competitive building of so-called "capital ships"—battleships and battle cruisers. But its failure to agree upon a similar check for other naval craft—light cruisers, submarines, and destrovers meant that in this respect naval rivalry continued among the Great Powers, and their sense of security, instead of growing, actually lessened. Britain complained about the large fleet of submarines which France proceeded to build, and the United States, about Britain's mounting number of cruisers.

Intent upon establishing an all-round naval parity with Great Britain, the United States urged the holding of another international conference to negotiate a supplementary agreement about light cruisers and all small craft. Great Britain and Japan politely acquiesced in the holding of such a conference Geneva at Geneva in 1927, but it failed because the United ConferStates and Britain could not agree about cruisers. Subsequently, in 1928, Britain reached an independent naval agreement with France, whereby the latter accepted the former's superiority in light cruisers in return for Britain's toleration of unrestricted submarine building by France.

The failure of the Geneva Conference only strengthened the resolution of the United States to achieve parity with Great Britain in all respects and at any cost; and inasmuch as the United States was in a better financial position to persevere in a naval race, Great Britain eventually consented to reopen negotiations looking toward a full naval agreement based on complete parity between the English-speaking Powers. In 1930, therefore, still another international conference was held at London.

armaments, included representatives also of China, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium. On the resulting agreements which dealt with matters other than naval limitation, see below, p. 1078.

The London Conference was hardly more successful than the earlier ones in effecting a general limitation of naval armaments. Assent was given, it is true, to a prolongation of the Washington agreement to 1937; and the United States Conferand Great Britain managed to supplement it with an ence, 1930 arrangement between themselves whereby Britain would be allowed a superiority in light cruisers and America a corresponding superiority in large cruisers. In this arrangement Japan acquiesced, though very reluctantly and only on condition that she be accorded parity with the others in the matter of submarines and some increase of her ratio for cruisers. But neither France nor Italy would adhere to it. France was not satisfied with the proposal to increase her ratio to half of Great Britain's and America's, unless both these Powers should specifically guaranty her security in the Mediterranean—which they were not minded to do; and Italy's insistence on a like increase in her ratio, so as to assure her a continuing parity with France, ran counter to Britain's insistence on having a navy stronger than any two navies of Continental Europe. Consequently the London agreement bound only three of the five naval Powers, and its binding of the three was weakened by a provision (the "escalator clause") that any of them was free to exceed the specified tonnage totals if it should deem its "national security" to be "materially affected" by new naval construction of another Power.

The London agreement, and the Washington agreement too, proved short-lived. In 1934 Japan served notice that she would Failure of not consent to a renewal of either agreement unless she Was accorded full naval parity with the United States and Great Britain, and on the refusal of these Powers to meet her demands, she formally announced her intention of resuming complete freedom of action in 1937. Already France and Italy were utilizing their abstention from the London agreement to effect such an increase of their fleets as threatened the two-Power standard of Britain; and Britain's anxiety to maintain this standard rendered her eager to get rid of handicapping agreements. By 1935 an unrestricted and fearful race in naval armaments was in plain prospect between the United States and Japan, between France and Italy, between Great Britain and Continental Europe, and between Great Britain and America.

And Germany and Russia were reëmerging as ambitious naval Powers. Altogether there was more naval "preparedness" in 1935, and far more naval expenditure, than ever before in the world's history. Naval agreements, promising though they had been, had failed to provide security.

Attempts to negotiate a general limitation of land armaments were even less successful. In 1925 the League of Nations created a special commission to study the problem and Attempted draft recommendations preparatory to the calling of a Limitation of Armies: "disarmament conference." The Commission soon League discovered that both technically and politically the Commisproblem was well nigh insoluble. Technically, the sion, 1925 chief difficulty was in distinguishing between what was strictly and immediately military and therefore to be limited and what was only incidentally military and hardly susceptible of limitation. An actual standing army and its actual arms and equipment could be recognized and perhaps dealt with, but what about a potential army and its potential resources? What about army reserves, militias, and police forces? What about ordinary mail and passenger airplanes which could easily be converted into military planes? What about a nation's wealth and man-power and industrial production, employed in peaceful pursuits today but employable for military purposes tomorrow? If answers could be found to these and similar technical questions, a supreme political question would remain. How to reconcile the military needs of a nation intent upon preserving the status quo with the military demands of a nation zealous to change it?

For five years the Commission toiled at the problem, and eventually, like the proverbial mountain, it brought forth a mouse. It took the form of a "draft treaty," providing for a limitation, "in principle," of the number Treaty," of men in active service in land, naval, and air forces, of governmental expenditure on army material, and of military (but not commercial) aircraft; a condemnation of the use of poisonous gases and "all bacteriological methods of warfare"; a reaffirmation of the sanctity of treaties; and a permanent commission to collect information and report periodically on the progress of "disarmament." As if to prove that the "draft treaty" should not be taken too seriously, it contained a special "escape clause," proposed by the United States and providing

that if a "change of circumstances constitutes, in the opinion of any high contracting party, a menace to its national security, such high contracting party may suspend temporarily, in so far as concerns itself, any provision or provisions of the present convention other than those expressly designed to apply in the event of war."

In the hope that by some miracle a large diplomatic congress might succeed where a small expert commission had failed, the long-promised international Conference on Disarma-Geneva ment was convoked at Geneva in February 1932. It Conferwas attended by official representatives of all the mem-1932-1934 bers of the League of Nations and, in addition, by delegates of the United States and the Russian Soviet Union. Its task was not only to debate and if possible to agree upon the "draft treaty" as submitted by the Commission, but also to supply its most glaring omission—the exact specification of the future size of each nation's army and of the future expenditure of each nation on war material. The task was humanly impossible in existing circumstances, and no miracle occurred. From the beginning the viewpoints of France and Germany were diametrically opposite. France would be insecure if she reduced her army to a level with Germany's, and Germany would be insecure if France didn't. Utterly unable to find a way out of this impasse, and yet reluctant to admit failure, the Conference floundered about for months and years in a bog of irrelevant discussion. In vain President Herbert Hoover of the United States sensationally proposed in the summer of 1932 a universal cut of one-third in military and naval forces. Great Britain as well as France rejected it, politely but firmly. In vain the British premier, Ramsay MacDonald, earnestly proposed in the following year a "standard army" of 200,000 men for each of the Great Powers and for Poland, and a progressive approach to parity by Germany. This was unsatisfactory to Germany, now dominated by Hitler, and in October 1933 she impatiently quit the Conference and proclaimed her purpose of rearming without regard for the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles.

For several months longer the Geneva Disarmament Conference continued, but with Germany gone, its discussions grew ever more futile. Finally, in the summer of 1934, Great Britain,

¹ See above, pp. 860-861.

the Power most interested in limiting armies (if not navies), acknowledged that the failure of the Conference was definitive and that therefore she would proceed to enlarge her own armaments, particularly her air forces.

The Conference then faded away, and in 1935 Germany independently reëstablished the kind of army which she had had before the World War.

The collapse of protracted efforts at Geneva in behalf of a general limitation of armaments thus nicely synchronized with the break-down of the Washington and London naval agreements. Obviously, security was not obtainable through an international balancing of national armaments. This method was a failure, and indeed worse than a failure. For, instead of leading to even a slight reduction of armed forces, it led to Germany's getting rid of the reduction previously imposed upon her and to an increase of armaments, both military and naval, of all Great Powers and of almost all lesser Powers.

Every nation was left to seek security by the supposedly discredited pre-war methods of arming itself to the teeth and negotiating special alliances and ententes to overawe and hold in check the military might of possible foes. It meant a return to international anarchy, and to a balance of power peculiarly shifting and precarious.

Every nation still sought peace, though on its own terms, in its own way, and in the midst of multiplying omens of ultimate war.

Japan, as we shall presently explain more fully,¹ utilized her strong army and navy and the breakdown of international cooperation to pursue with impunity an aggressively imperialist policy in the Far East. The League of Military Nations adopted pious resolutions about the matter, Imperialism and the United States and the Russian Soviet Union were alike disgruntled and alarmed. But nothing was done, or apparently could be done, to halt Japan. Great Britain's own interests were not sufficiently jeopardized to stir her to action. France was too intent upon preserving the status quo in Europe to bother about its upsetting in Asia. Germany was naturally sympathetic with any Power which could flout the peace settlement of 1919–1920, and Italy perceived in the highhanded force-

¹ See below, pp. 1078-1080.

fulness of Japan a precedent for the realization of her own ambitions in Africa. So Japan did what she pleased in the Far East, and when it suited her she withdrew from the League of Nations and ended the naval agreements with the United States and Great Britain.

Germany was enabled likewise to do independently what she had been forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations to do-to rearm herself fully. France wanted the other Great Powers to join in firm resistmany's Rearming ance, but this they would not do. Japan and the United States were alike "disinterested," and Great Britain and Italy were much more interested in restoring a balance of power between France and Germany than in confirming French hegemony. Out of politeness to France and a sense of propriety, the Disarmament Conference and the League Council expressed "regret"; and France, fearful of acting alone, had to content herself with agreeing to a Four-Power Pact with Britain, Italy, and Germany (1933). This Pact obligated its signatories to consult together and pursue "a policy of effective coöperation"; to "examine" proposals "relating to methods and procedure calculated to give due effect to these articles"; to "reëxamine" questions left unsolved by the Disarmament Conference; and "to consult together as regards all economic questions which have a common interest for Europe." It was all quite vague and innocuous. Germany went on rearming herself at will.

Germany's ambition to annex Austria was not so easily fulfilled. Here, Italy was so vitally concerned that, fol-Italy's lowing the assassination of Dollfuss and the attempted Stand against Nazi coup at Vienna in the summer of 1934,1 she dis-German played a genuine eagerness to back any Power or any Annexation of combination of Powers seeking to guaranty the terri-Austria torial status quo in central Europe. She adopted a new attitude of benevolence toward Yugoslavia and began to look with favor upon the Little Entente (of Yugoslavia, Italy's Czechoslovakia, and Rumania). She interposed no Rapprocheobjection to the developing rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria or to the formation in ment with Yugoslavia 1934 of a Balkan league (the so-called "Balkan Bloc") similar in purpose to the Little Entente and consisting ¹ See above, p. 1002.

of Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, and Turkey.¹ Simultaneously she impressed upon her satellites, Hungary and Bulgaria, that they should seek treaty revision only in the distant future and through the proper and pacific agencies of the League of Nations.

A strain was put upon the new Italian policy by the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia at Marseille in October 1934. Many Yugoslav patriots blamed Italy and Hungary for the outrage, inasmuch as for several years previously both countries had been abetting subversive movements within Yugoslavia and harboring terroristic exiles, and retaliatory measures were now demanded. The strain was soon eased, however. Italy overlooked the spasm of hostile demonstrations in Yugoslavia, repressed counter-demonstrations, and maintained a conciliatory and reassuring attitude. She also viewed with equanimity the vehement complaint which Yugoslavia lodged with the League of Nations against Hungary, and collaborated with the League Council in preparing a report which, though largely absolving Hungary, was acceptable to Yugoslavia.

The new Italian policy was quite in line with French desires, and was climaxed therefore by a formal and truly significant entente, concluded at Rome early in 1935, between France and Italy. Not only did the two Latin Powers mutually pledge themselves to support the independence of Austria, but by settling colonial disputes of long standing they paved the way for continuing effectual cooperation in other respects. France yielded to Italy special privileges in Tunis and certain territories and rights elsewhere in northern Africa 3 and secretly assured her a free hand in Ethiopia. In return, Italy promised to join France in opposing unilateral treaty revision in Europe.

The Franco-Italian entente was supplemented in 1935, so far as France was concerned, by a Franco-Russian alliance. This we have already described.⁴

On the other hand, Poland, fearful of Russia as well as of

¹ Also in 1934, a similar Baltic entente was formed by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

² Sec above, p. 968.

³ France ceded a district of 44,500 square miles bordering on Libya and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a strip of French Somaliland on the Gulf of Aden, and a share in the ownership and management of the railway connecting the Gulf with Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital.

⁴ See above, pp. 929–930.


Germany and dubious about relying exclusively on French guaranties, welcomed Hitler's surprising overtures for a direct understanding. The outcome was a treaty of 1934 whereby Poland and Germany mutually guarantied their existing common frontier for ten years. It meant a novel collaboration of Poland with Germany and a corresponding weakening of her alliance with France.

More serious than Poland's ambiguous position, however, was Great Britain's. While professing sympathy with the Franco-Italian entente, Britain independently negotiated an Britain's agreement with Germany in 1935, recognizing the Ambigulatter's right to possess a navy 35 per cent the size of the British navy. Thereby Britain undoubtedly hoped ous Position to forestall another race in naval armaments between herself and Germany and probably to counterbalance the combined naval strength of France and Italy. But a more immediate and less fórtunate result of the Anglo-German naval accord was that it greatly alarmed France, both because the contemplated German navy would be larger than her own and because Britain had separately sanctioned and confirmed a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Whence arose a severe strain in Franco-British relations, impeding coöperation between the two countries and diminishing the sense of security in each.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Franco-Italian entente and the Anglo-German naval accord, Italy gave clear evidence of aggressive intentions against the independent African Italy's state of Ethiopia. .Ethiopia appealed to the League of Military Imperial-Nations, but League action was difficult in the cirism cumstances. Great Britain, anxious to check an expansion of Italy's colonial empire which might prove menacing to the "security" of Egypt and the Suez Canal, pressed the League to take a stand in support of Ethiopia. France, anxious to maintain her entente with Italy and at the same time not to weaken the League or break with Britain, held off for a time and sought a compromise (outside the League) between Britain and Italy. Eventually, when the latter went really to war with Ethiopia, France joined Britain in approving economic "sanctions" by the League against Italy. But if France—and Britain—stood

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Football," an example of post-war art trends, is from a painting by André L'Hote (born 1885).





for the principle of "collective security," Italy as well as Germany and Japan was now against it.

In 1935—fifteen years after the Paris peace settlement—Europe was still seeking security and still not finding it. Indeed, evidences were multiplying that the post-war quest for security had already led Europe, and the whole world, back into the pre-war maze of national and imperial rivalries, competitive armaments, diplomatic alliances and ententes, and recurring international crises. It was now merely a more intricate and more uncertain maze.

3. THE WORLDWIDE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

It must be apparent from what we have said in the preceding sections, that efforts without precedent were made during the fifteen years from 1919 to 1934 to establish a new world-order of national security and international peace. Never before had there been such an invention and elaboration of peace machinery—League of Nations, World Court, International Labor Office, mutual security pacts, international conventions, and commissions and conferences galore. Nevertheless, it must be equally apparent that all this peace machinery did not actually prevent war or create a sense of security, and that at the end of the fifteen years the new world-order was still not a reality but only a dissolving dream.

Peace machinery existed, but its successful operation required an effective will not only of idealistic statesmen and intellectuals but of the masses in the several countries. In other Peace words, it required a public opinion within every nation Machinery and favorable to the subordination of national interest and Public policy to international adjustment. This, however, Opinion was significantly lacking. On the contrary, the bulk of public opinion in every country, instead of keeping pace with the development of peace machinery and becoming more Public internationalist, grew ever more nationalist, more Opinion Preponddevoted to the concept of national honor, the defense erantly of national rights, and the unrestrained pursuit of na-Nationaltional interests. The result was that post-war governments, peculiarly responsive to public opinion, were unable or

Note. The picture opposite, "Jazz," another example of post-war art trends, is from a sculpture by Voros.

unwilling to make full use of the peace machinery newly available. What use they did make of it was in non-controversial matters or for national objects which they thought to be more readily attainable thereby.

Let us emphasize that all governments and peoples professed a love of peace and that all of them sincerely sought security, that is, protection against attack. All of them, moreover, were willing and even eager to employ any peace machinery which

Supporting would contribute to their security. But they must judge whether it would or not, and the peace which they solemnly professed to love must be a peace compatible with the maintenance and furtherance of their respective national policies. Wherever in any country an issue arose between internationalism and nationalism, it was always the latter which prevailed.

Elsewhere we have explained how nationalism was quickened by the World War and the Peace of Paris. 1 Here we must remark its intensification and spread during the post-war period. Indeed, it was now more ubiquitous than either democracy or dictatorship, and more universally compelling than pacifism Post-War or humanitarianism, socialism or communism, natural cation of science or supernatural religion. It affected men's Nationalminds and hearts as the Industrial Revolution affected ism their bodies, only faster and more completely. If the Industrial Revolution promised to draw peoples together in a common and essentially new material civilization, nationalism actually wrought a psychological and spiritual separation of peoples resembling primitive tribalism.

Everywhere, nationalism was intensified. It was now extolled as a philosophy of life for all men, as a veritable religion. And its foremost missionaries and pulpit orators no longer represented it as the "liberal" nationalism which had been conspicuous in Europe back in the mid-nineteenth century,² but rather as a much more exclusive and intolerant kind—an "integral" or "totalitarian" nationalism. Like the liberal variety, it

"Totalitarian would base the state system of Europe, and the world, on the principle of nationality and the practice of national self-determination. But unlike the liberal va-

riety, it would exalt the national state above humanity and

¹ See above, pp. 871-883.

² See above, pp. 66-68.

above the individual. Each nationality, and consequently each national state, would be an end in itself, a consummation of all virtue and an object of supreme adoration. It would emphasize its peculiar culture, its own past greatness, its own future "mission," and, in extreme instances, its own "racial" purity and superiority. It would pursue exclusively national interests, and it would pursue them militantly. At home, it would suppress individual dissent and dominate every group activity, economic, social, religious, and educational. Abroad, it would stand ready to avenge its honor and extend its power. For, according to a famous exponent of the new nationalism, "a nation declines when it loses military might." ¹

Everywhere, moreover, this creed of "totalitarian" nationalism was spread among the masses with astounding rapidity and success. The technic of mass propaganda was much more highly developed after the war than before, and spread the masses of mankind were much more responsive Propato it. Compulsory public schooling was finally enabling almost everyone to read and write, at least a little, and thus to give eye or ear (if not critical reflection) to the cheap newspapers, the cinemas, radios, and amplifiers, which modern technology was simultaneously perfecting and multiplying. With these helps, it was comparatively easy for agitators and demagogues to sway entire nations; and in view of the intense emotions aroused by the World War and of the widespread economic instability and political unrest which ensued, it was especially easy for apostles of violent nationalism to obtain numerous and fanatical disciples.

"Totalitarian" nationalism was not academic. It was very practical. It produced important results. It created and was embodied in the Fascism of Mussolini, the National Its Socialism of Hitler, and kindred movements which issued in nationalist dictatorships all over central and east-central Europe. And every such dictatorship was firmly entrenched in power, and its particular brand of

¹ Charles Maurras, the leader of the Action Française. Similar expressions abound in the speeches and writings of contemporary nationalist statesmen, such as Mussolini and Hitler. For example, Mussolini wrote of his Fascist nationalism in 1923 that it "involves force . . . the assembling of the greatest force possible, the inexorable use of force whenever necessary,—and by force is meant physical armed force."

nationalism deeply impressed on the masses, by the absolute control which it assumed and exercised over press and radio, church and theatre, school and army. No one but an ardent nationalist might publicly express an opinion in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy or, for that matter, in Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, or Greece.

Under the democracies of western Europe and of the British Commonwealth and the United States, there was no legal bar to non-nationalist or even anti-nationalist propaganda, ism in the and no official endorsement of "totalitarian" prin-West ciples. On the other hand, there was no bar to "to-talitarian" propaganda, and during the post-war years this was freely carried on by such private organizations as the Action Française in France, the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, and Sir Oswald Mosley's "Blackshirts" in England.¹ None of these organizations achieved any direct or immediate success comparable with that of the Fascists in Italy or the Nazis in Germany. Yet they were symptomatic of the ubiquitous character of the latest nationalism and serviceable in stirring the patriotic emotions of many persons who did not accept its full program. Regardless of whether the "totalitarian" creed made headway, or not, in democratic countries, there can be no doubt that the majority of their citizens were increasingly disposed to support certain of its practical implications—emphasis upon patriotic instruction in the schools, suspicious if not intolerant attitude toward racial and religious minorities, erection of special barriers against foreign imports and foreign immigrants, absorption in national interests and national policies, and, for the furtherance of the latter, reliance on augmenting national armaments. Just as a dictatorship could compel its people to be more nationalistic than they would otherwise have been, so, under democratic institutions, quickening nationalist sentiment among a people operated to render their government more nationalistic.

In the United States, for example, it was the weight of public opinion, as expressed in democratic elections, which reversed the international policies of Woodrow Wilson and obliged succeeding administrations to hold aloof from the League of Nations and the World Court,² to refuse any cancellation of the interallied debts,³ to consent to the rear-

¹ See above, p. 951. ² See above, p. 1021. ³ See above, pp. 898-899.

ing of a very high wall of tariff protection against foreign trade and the imposition of drastic restrictions on foreign immigration, and to spend more money on naval armaments than any other nation in the world. In France and Great Britain, In France likewise, the democratic governments of the post-war and era were quite responsive to public opinion, and public opinion was preponderantly nationalist rather than internationalist—more intent upon making the League of Nations an agency of traditional national policy than a stepping-stone to a new world-order, more anxious about immediate national prosperity than about distant general welfare, and more concerned with practical questions of national security than with idealistic yearnings for universal peace.

The Communist dictatorship of Russia officially decried the forceful nationalism—and imperialism—of other dictatorships and also of "bourgeois" democracies. Actually, how-Nationever, its peculiar economic policies made for a national alism in exclusiveness—an extreme kind of economic nationalism-which was supplemented, moreover, by the cultural nationalism that Lenin endorsed and Stalin forwarded.1 as the Communist dictatorship consolidated its position at home and taught the Russian masses to applaud its achievements, it evinced an ever greater solicitude for "national" interests. Desire for national security and prestige, rather than devotion to the spread of Marxian principles, was what induced the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to join the League of Nations, to enter into an alliance with France, and to undertake military preparedness rivalling that of Germany or Japan.

There were different degrees of patriotic fervor in different countries. In Russia its temperature was not as high as in the democratic countries, and in these not as high as in Rising countries under nationalist dictatorships. Everywhere, Nationalist Fervor however, it was rising, and in Fascist Italy and Nazi through-Germany it approached the boiling point. For here a out Europe thoroughly totalitarian nationalism was at once the basis and the object of all political and social activity; the preaching of it had enabled a Mussolini and a Hitler to become dictators, and once they were dictators they permitted the preaching of nothing else. Of course, such dictators were apt to be less

¹ See above, pp. 909, 914-915.

reckless in deed than in speech, less bellicose abroad than at home. They felt the responsibility and feared the consequences of carrying their nationalism to its logical conclusion and precipitating international war. Yet, having gotten into power by inflaming their respective nations, they had to employ the same method to keep themselves in power, with the result that they ran increasing risk of becoming the servants, instead of remaining the masters, of the popular passions which they evoked.

Popular nationalism was sharpest and most rampant in countries which passed under dictatorships, and the number of such countries notably increased from 1922 onwards. But in countries which remained democratic, preponderant public opinion was only a degree less nationalist. If dictators pursued exclusively national policies as a matter of principle, democratic leaders pursued them out of deference to electoral majorities. The outcome was much the same all over Europe and in the United States: the pursuit by every nation of policies which either its dictatorial faction or its democratic majority thought conducive to its particular interests—commercial and military, territorial and imperial. If the pursuit of any such national interest could obviously be forwarded by an international pact or conference or by some device of the League of Nations or World Court, the government concerned was ready, with popular support at home, to act accordingly, and thus to appear as a champion of international cooperation and peace, while actually serving its own ends. But if its ends could not easily be served thereby, if its pursuit of national interests seemed to be impeded, then, with noisier and more heartfelt support at home, it would sacrifice internationalism to nationalism and go its own way.

Nor was this supreme pursuit of national interests confined to Europe and the United States. It was world-wide. Indeed, Rising fully as significant as the intensification of nationalism Nationalist Ferror in Europe during the post-war era, was the simultaneous appearance of the same phenomenon outside Europe: in parts of Africa and all over Asia, both in the Near East and in the Far East, and throughout the American continents. In all these extensive areas, "Europeanization" went on apace, but in its latest phase it involved not merely

¹ On the "Europeanization" of the world during the preceding era, from 1870 to 1914, see above, pp. 695-742.

the introduction of material aspects of European civilization but also a general acceptance of its latest cultural and spiritual fashion—the fashion of nationalism, of "totalitarian" nationalism, of nationalist dictatorship, of strenuous pursuit of narrowly national interests.

The Moslem Near East became belligerently nationalist. It had started in this direction before the World War,¹ but the war and its immediate aftermath were decisive in clarifying In the goal and hastening its attainment.² The traditional Moslem religious unity of the "Moslem world" and the agelong political comprehensiveness of the Ottoman Empire went down in ruins together, and in their stead emerged, clearly and strongly, the separate nationalisms of Turk, Arab, and Egyptian, and of Persian and Afghan also.

In a previous chapter we have related how, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War, a forceful and very patriotic Turkish army officer, Mustafa Kemal, established the national republic of Turkey, with its and Dictatorship capital at Angora and with himself as its president, and how, by fighting and diplomacy, he wrung from Mustafa Greece and the Allied Great Powers a revision of the peace settlement (in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923) assuring to his state possession of all ethnically Turkish lands—the whole of Anatolia and Asia Minor and the European district of Constantinople.3 Turkey, as thus constituted, was only a portion of the former Ottoman Empire, but it was an important portion and it was a strictly national state. The vast mass of its thirteen and a half million inhabitants were Turks.

Nominally the new Turkey was republican and democratic. A "fundamental law" of 1921 proclaimed the doctrine of popular sovereignty and vested supreme authority in a National Assembly; and an elaborated constitution of 1925 provided for the election of the Assembly by universal suffrage of the Turkish people every four years and for the choice by the Assembly every fourth year of a President of the Republic. Actually, however, the new Turkey was conducted by Mustafa Kemal as

¹ See above, pp. 670-673.

² See above, pp. 815-816, 881-883.

³ See above, pp. 864-867. To emphasize the nationalist character of the new Turkey, the Greek name of "Constantinople" was supplanted by the Turkish, "Istanbul."

a nationalist dictatorship. This he was enabled to do by reason of the personal fame which attended his military successes and which earned him the popular title of "Ghazi" ("The Victorious"), and by reason likewise of his continuing leadership of the army and the single well-organized political party in the country, the People's party. As chief of the People's party, he controlled the Assembly, dictated its policies, and made sure of his election to the presidency. As President of the Republic, he appointed the central ministers and the local officials. As commander of the army, he enforced obedience to his Assembly, his agents, and himself.

Under Mustafa Kemal's dictatorship, Turkey was rapidly nationalized. Not only was the old imperial Ottoman tradition destroyed by the overthrow of the Sultanate and the expulsion of Mohammed VI in 1922, but, what was even more fundamental, Turkish institutions were pried loose from their historic religious and Moslem setting and endowed with a purely secular and national character. Mohammed VI and his Ottoman predecessors had been not merely Sultans of an Empire but Caliphs of all orthodox Moslems, and their authority resided as much in the Caliphate as in the Sultanate. With the deposition of Mohammed VI in 1922, his cousin, Abdul Medjid II, was suffered to succeed him as Caliph though not as Sultan. This proved but a makeshift, for Mustafa Kemal soon took steps to destroy the religious as well as the political influence of the imperial family and to undermine the hold of Islam on the country. In 1924 Abdul Medjid II was expelled from Turkish soil and the Caliphate was formally abolished; ¹ and in the same year, governmental appropriations for religion were suppressed and religious schools were transformed into state schools. Then in 1926 the old legal system, which had been based on prescriptions of the Koran and decisions of Moslem judges, was superseded by a modern national system comprising three codes: a civil code, modelled on that of Switzerland; a criminal code, patterned after Italy's; and a commercial code, copied from Germany's. Polygamy was prohibited, and marriage, to be binding, must be

¹ See above, pp. 664–665, 865–866. Mohammed VI died in exile in 1926, and Abdul Medjid II predeceased him. Orthodox Moslems held a conference at Alexandria in 1926 to choose another Caliph, but they were unable to find a qualified candidate. The Caliphate thus lapsed altogether.

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performed by civil rather than religious officials. The Gregorian calendar was substituted for the Moslem, and the Roman alphabet for the Arabic. The metric system of weights and measures was adopted. The fez and turban were outlawed in favor of hats and caps; women were forbidden to wear veils; and the Turkish people were told to take surnames. By government decree, the Moslem holy day was changed from Friday to Sunday. In 1928, by a constitutional amendment, the Turkish Republic was expressly declared to be entirely independent of Islam.

Of course, most Turks continued to be Moslems, but their religion was henceforth a private and not a public concern; and in external appearance and behavior, at any rate, they were patriots first and foremost and adherents only incidentally of a world-religion. And the dictatorship which wrought this astounding change was fully determined not to grant to Christianity or other supernatural religion any favor which it denied to Islam. What it appropriated from Europe in the way of legal codes, alphabet, calendar, dress, and social usage, was for secular and national, not for religious, purposes. Christian missions in Turkey were regulated and restricted by Mustafa Kemal's government much more rigorously than they had been by any Ottoman Sultan.

Many Moslem clergymen and monks were aggrieved by Mustafa Kemal's religious policy, and in 1924–1925 the fanatically Moslem Kurds rose in revolt. At the same time, leaders of the Union and Progress party,² which had guided Turkish affairs during and just before the World War, reëmerged from obscurity and began to form a "Republican Progressive" party in opposition to the new régime. Kemal hit back promptly and with vigor. He put down the Kurdish revolt. He abolished religious orders and closed monasteries. Against political adversaries he conducted a veritable reign of terror, exiling some and executing others.

Simultaneously, in order to arouse the patriotism of the Turkish masses and make it a prop for his own party and policies, he inaugurated an extensive program of education and propaganda. He equipped every sizable town with a public school for children and with a reading and radio centre for adults. Into all the

¹ Kemal took for himself the name of "Ataturk" ("Chief Turk").

² See above, p. 671.

radio centres was poured a stream of nationalistic speeches and news bulletins from Angora, and into all the schools were put uniform nationalistic textbooks prepared under Kemal's personal auspices and expounded by teachers of his own selection. Everybody was pressed to become literate, adults as well as children, and to learn to read the Turkish language, not in the Arabic characters which were traditional with good Moslems, but in Roman characters which were supposed to comport better with the new nationalism.¹ And, subject to rigid government censorship, newspapers and pamphlets were widely circulated throughout the provinces.

One result of these educational endeavors was to reduce Turkish illiteracy, which had long been notoriously high. From 95 per cent in 1920, it was brought down in the next fifteen years to 65 per cent. Another and still more significant result was to enlarge the scope and increase the effectiveness of governmental propaganda. The Turks were learning to read, as well as being accustomed to hear, that they were a pure and superior "race," descended from the highly civilized ancient Hittites, that throughout the ages they had had a "mission," that now, under the mighty and benign guidance of the "Ghazi," they were again fulfilling their destiny, and that in the future they would be a truly great people if only they would be intensely loyal to their race and nation and to the People's party. Such was the burden of the textbooks in the schools, and such doubtless was the lesson which the rising generation of Turks committed to memory.

The nationalist dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal gave much attention to Turkey's economic betterment. A twelve-year public works plan was launched in 1929, providing for railway extension, harbor construction, and a large number of irrigation and reclamation projects. In 1933 a five-year industrial plan was adopted, calling for the development of hydro-electric power, the exploitation of coal, copper, and oil deposits, and the erection of state factories in Anatolia. All these undertakings were to be national, with minimum financial borrowing from foreign coun-

¹ Moslems, including Turkish Moslems, had always regarded the Arabic language of Mohammed and the Koran as sacred, and it was indeed revolutionary for Kemal to insist upon a translation of the Koran into Turkish—and into a Turkish written in Roman characters.

tries and without any onerous concessions to them. Technical assistance might be obtained from Sweden or Switzerland, but not from any of the Great Powers.

Turkey under Mustafa Kemal was proudly independent and self-reliant. She would pursue her own interests and tolerate no external interference. By force of her own arms she had torn up the Treaty of Sèvres and imposed on unwilling foreigners the Treaty of Lausanne. Thereby she had rid herself of political and economic tutelage to other Powers, and in particular had secured the abolition of the so-called "capitulations" which in Ottoman days had deprived the government of jurisdiction over foreign residents in Turkey. For the retention of these gains she would rely above all on her own efforts and her own army. Mustafa Kemal was a military man, and as such, and as an ardent nationalist too, he kept the Turkish army strong and ready for any emergency.

In foreign affairs, once he had secured Turkey's independence and "national" frontiers, Kemal was generally pacific and conciliatory. It was the best way, he believed, of serving national interests, of upholding the status quo established by the Treaty of Lausanne and assuring an uninterrupted development of nationalist reform within Turkey. With the Russian Soviet Union he concluded a treaty of mutual guaranty and neutrality in 1925, renewing and amplifying it in 1929 and again in 1933. He cultivated especially friendly relations with Greece and arranged an entente with the Greek government in 1930. He brought Turkey into the League of Nations in 1932, and in 1934 he made Turkey a party to the Balkan Pact with Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. He was especially resolved to ward off possible Bulgarian attacks and to regain for Turkey the right to fortify the approaches to Constantinople.

Altogether, the position of Turkey during the post-war period was stronger and more dignified than that of the Ottoman Empire prior to the war. She was now a strictly national state, and her people were being stamped, as never before, with an earnest secular patriotism. And her nationalist dictatorship seemed to be firmly founded and effectually conducted, at least for the lifetime of Mustafa Kemal. Kemal was unanimously reëlected to the presidency of the Turkish Republic in 1927, 1931, and 1935.

¹ On the "capitulations," see above, p. 665.

Nationalism was also rife during the post-war period among the Arabs, though these, unlike the Turks, possessed no comprehensive state and no leader whom they would all follow. Arabs comprised the large majority of the population in all the former Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire which were not included in the new Turkey, but the peace settlement of 1919–1920 partitioned them, as we have already pointed out,¹ among various sovereignties: the nominally independent kingdom of Hejaz; the British mandates of Palestine and Mesopotamia; and the French mandate of Syria. This partition and especially its attendant subjection of the major parts to imperialistic European Powers served to accentuate and give direction to Arab nationalism. In every part of the Arab lands, agitation was ceaselessly vocal and sometimes violent; it would create as much trouble as possible for British or French rule and likewise for any native prince who might not resist foreign domination. In other words, Arab patriots were less immediately concerned with building a unified national state than with opposing alien imperialism in the several existing states.

Shortly after assuming her mandates, Great Britain thought

Shortly after assuming her mandates, Great Britain thought to conciliate the Arabs by entrusting the civil administration of Mesopotamia to Prince Feisal, a son of King Hussein of Hejaz, with the title of King of Iraq, and of the trans-Jordan part of Palestine to another son, Abdullah by name. The appetite of Iraq and Arab nationalists was only whetted thereby. Especially in Iraq, the agitation for self-government and complete independence, adroitly guided by King Feisal, gathered strength and momentum. Bit by bit the British High Commissioner gave way, making one concession after another. At length, after protracted negotiations, Great Britain concluded a treaty at Bagdad in 1930, recognizing the independence of Iraq, promising to sponsor its admission to the League of Nations, and agreeing, when this was brought about, to renounce all mandatory rights over the country and within five years to withdraw all troops. In accordance with the treaty of Bagdad, Iraq was admitted to the League in 1932 and the last of the British garrison was evacuated in 1935. Britain retained a defensive alliance with the country and some economic

¹ See above, pp. 882-883.

² See above, pp. 816, 836-838, 882.

³ See above, p. 882.

privileges in it. In the meantime, in 1933, King Feisal died and was succeeded by his son Ghazi, but Iraq was already a practically independent Arab state, with an industrious population of almost three million, with rich natural resources, with a fairly strong army, with a form of parliamentary government, and with a resolute national spirit.

Trans-Jordania was not so successful in achieving independence. Its population of 300,000, though solidly Arab, was largely nomadic and much more backward than the comparatively settled population of Iraq, and Abdullah was less Jordania forceful than his brother Feisal and more dependent on British financial and military assistance. Hence, while Great Britain agreed in 1928 to a measure of self-government for the region, confirming Abdullah as Emir and authorizing him to create a Council and an elective Assembly for the enactment of local laws and the supervision of local administration, actual British control continued. British armed forces might be sent into the country at any time, and acts of the Emir or of the Assembly might be disallowed by a resident agent of the British High Commissioner of Palestine.

For Palestine proper—that is, for the portion of the British mandate west of the Jordan-a "constitution" was promulgated by the British High Commissioner in 1922. He would head the civil and military administration, and in the making of local laws he would be assisted by a Legislative Council, comprising himself and twenty-two other membersten appointive and twelve elective (including at least two Jews and two Christians)-although over any act of the Council he might exercise an absolute veto. The Palestinian Arabs, being markedly nationalist, denounced the document as a caricature of self-government and refused to participate in Council elections, with the result that the constitution remained a dead letter and the High Commissioner continued to govern quite despotically, with only such informal advice as he could get from individual natives but with the substantial backing of British funds and British troops.

What especially complicated the situation in Palestine was the promise which the British government had made, in the Balfour Declaration of 1917,¹ to respect the "national aspirations" of

¹ See above, pp. 882-883.

Jews as well as Arabs. The Jews, though only a small minority of the population when Britain took over the mandate, cherished the belief that Palestine should and would be governed primarily for their benefit; and this the Arab majority bitterly resented. Nor was Arab resentment lessened by the influx of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, which increased the Jewish element in the total population of about a million from 75,000 in 1920 to 250,000 in 1935. These Jewish immigrants, with superior technical skill and with financial subsidies from Zionist organizations in the West, undoubtedly contributed to an economic and industrial renaissance in Palestine, but in doing so they displaced many Arabs in gainful occupations and thus added to the grievances and the nationalistic agitation of the latter.

The British administration did its best to soften the conflict between Arabs and Jews. It tried to respect equally the cultural traditions of both groups, religious, linguistic, and educational. While assuming a paternal attitude toward Jewish undertakings and encouraging their colonizing projects, it sought to reassure the Arabs by withholding special political privileges from the Jews and discouraging their indiscriminate immigration. Above all, it endeavored to dispense even-handed justice and to enlist the coöperation of both groups in matters of common interest and advantage—in modernizing Jerusalem, in promoting public health, in improving transportation, in increasing the yield of farm and factory. Yet the nationalism of neither Arab nor Jew was thereby mitigated. There was frequent incitement to acts of violence, and repeatedly there were bloody riots at Jerusalem and in the countryside. An Arab outbreak against the Jews in 1929, for example, took a toll of 133 killed and 339 wounded, and another in 1933 took a further toll of 27 killed and 243 wounded. In last analysis, it was only through force or the threat of force that the British withstood Arab nationalism in Palestine and conserved their mandate.

It was likewise with the French in Syria. Here the Arab population was large and relatively progressive, and its leaders were as eager for national independence as were those of Iraq. In order to lighten their task, the French, soon after assuming the mandate, cut off from Syria the region around Beirut, which was predominantly Christian and

more kindly disposed to a French protectorate, and constituted it the autonomous "Republic of the Lebanon," with a native President and an elective Assembly. The rest of the mandate the main part of it—was then consolidated into the "State of Syria," with its capital at Damascus and under the direct rule of the French High Commissioner. Despite the fact that most of the occupants of this post were tactful administrators as well as able soldiers and that they did a good deal to develop the country, there was constant protest from Arab nationalists and on occasion serious rioting at Damascus. The most serious rioting occurred in 1925, when a new and exceptionally untactful Commissioner appeared in the person of General Sarrail, and it was rendered more serious by a simultaneous revolt of the Druses, a peculiar Moslem sect of warlike mountaineers. Sarrail's failure to suppress the Druse revolt and his attempt to stop the rioting at Damascus by subjecting the city to a deadly forty-eight-hour bombardment created the gravest kind of unrest all over Syria and provoked a general insurrection. Hastily Sarrail was recalled to France, and a new High Commissioner sent out with military reënforcements. Order was restored in the greater part of Syria in 1926, and in the following year Druse resistance was over-

Whereupon, constructive measures of a conciliatory nature were taken by the French. In 1927 the Druse territory was accorded a separate autonomy, and in 1928 the French High Commissioner authorized the popular election of a National Assembly to draft a constitution for Syria. The Constituent Assembly, as thus elected, was dominated by Arab nationalists, who insisted that Syria must be completely independent and must include the Lebanon, to which the High Commissioner replied that France would not relinquish her rights and duties as mandatory. The impasse was ended by the Commissioner's dissolving the Assembly and in 1930 decreeing a constitution. Henceforth Syria would be a Republic in subordinate alliance with France, with a parliament of its own and with a native Moslem president. The first general election under this constitution was held in 1932 and returned a Nationalist majority which proved so intransigent that in 1934 the French High Commissioner suspended the constitution and assumed a temporary dictatorship. Already, in 1932, largely for financial reasons, the

Commissioner had suspended the constitution of the Lebanon Republic. The whole French mandate of Syria was thus recommitted to military rule.

In the Arab state of Hejaz (lying along the coast of the Red Sea and embracing the Moslem "holy cities" of Mecca and Medina), King Hussein aroused patriotic opposition by his subservience to Great Britain and Moslem opposition by his pretensions to the Caliphate in succession to the Ottoman Sultans. Both kinds of opposition were championed and exploited by the ambitious and able Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, sultan of Nejd (a primitive principality in the Arabian desert) and leader of the austere Moslem zealots known as Wahabis. After extending his sway over the nomadic tribes of the desert, Abdul Aziz invaded Hejaz in force in 1925. Hussein abdicated, his son Ali was defeated and expelled, and Mecca was captured. Early in 1926 Abdul Aziz took the title of "King of Hejaz and Nejd," and then proceeded to subjugate almost all the semi-independent chieftains of the Arabian peninsula. In 1932 he changed the name of his enlarged realm from "Hejaz and Nejd" to "Saudi Arabia." Abdul Aziz ibn Saud had organiz-

to "Saudi Arabia." Abdul Aziz ibn Saud had organizing genius and patriotic zeal as well as personal ambition and military ability. He gave Arabia an unprecedented respite from tribal feuds and raids and a novel political unity. He pursued nationalist policies and annulled foreign concessions. He promoted motor transportation throughout the country. He established a state bank. Though remaining essentially a military dictator, he created a consultative popular Council. In the interest of Arab solidarity, he made friendly overtures to the sons of the King Hussein whom he had overthrown, and concluded treaties of alliance and arbitration with King Feisal of Iraq and Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordania.

In Egypt, the Nationalist leader, Zaghlul,² died in 1927, but the principles for which he had stood continued to inspire the Egyptian majority of his countrymen and incidentally to cmbarrass both the British High Commissioner and the native sovereign, King Fuad. Fuad had to steer a difficult middle course between British imperialism on the one hand and Egyptian nationalism on the other. Without formally accepting the arrangement which Britain had forced upon him

¹ See above, p. 882.

² Sec above, pp. 881-882.

in 1922, he practically acceded to it, listening to the "advice" and submitting to the "supervision" of the British Commissioner, and not pressing for independent conduct of foreign relations or membership in the League of Nations. At the same time he made the most he could of Britain's recognition of Egyptian "independence" and directed internal affairs in harmony with national sentiment. In 1930 he promulgated a new constitution, restricting the parliamentary franchise and strengthening the royal prerogative. What most immediately concerned the Egyptian parliament, and King Fuad also, was the development of a compulsory system of national education. In 1930 almost 90 per cent of the adult population of Egypt were illiterate, but already half a million children were attending elementary schools, and annual government expenditure on education had been increasing from two and a half million dollars in 1917 to fifteen million in 1930. In another generation, it was planned, the new popular education would make Egypt fully literate.

Persia, during the post-war years, underwent a revolution akin to Turkey's. The Persian counterpart to Mustafa Kemal was Reza Pahlavi, who, born in 1878 of a poor family near the Caspian Sea, had been a soldier since youth, serving under Russian officers before the World War and rising to chief command Persia in northern Persia with the withdrawal of the Rus- and Dicsians during the war. In 1921 Reza suddenly appeared of Reza at Teheran, the Persian capital, at the head of a disciplined fighting force, and with its loyal backing he set up a Nationalist government with himself as Minister of War. This post he utilized to reorganize the whole Persian army and bring it under his personal control, just at the time when Russia and Great Britain were ceasing their chronic interference in Persian affairs. the former because of domestic Communist revolution, and the latter because of greater and more immediate concern with imperial problems elsewhere. The result was that Reza could act freely without the risk of foreign intervention and that he could take advantage of the patriotic fervor which overspread the country with the removal of the long-standing threat of its partition by foreign Powers. Likewise, he was in a position to dominate, and if necessary to defy, the youthful and capricious weakling, Ahmed, who was nominal Shah of Persia.

¹ See above, pp. 732-734.

Friction soon developed between Ahmed Shah and Reza Pahlavi. In 1923 the latter assumed the premiership, and, availing himself of the former's absence on a pleasure jaunt in Europe, called together the Persian Parliament, or Mejliss, and induced it to grant him wide powers independent of the Shah. Then in 1925 he caused the Mejliss to depose the still absent Shah Ahmed and to convoke a special National Assembly. This Assembly, late in 1925, elected Reza Pahlavi as Shah of Persia, with right of succession to his heirs. He was now titular as well as actual head of the state, and its military dictator.

Reza Shah pursued thoroughly nationalist policies. He was a warm admirer, and almost slavish imitator, of Mustafa Kemal. Following the example of the Turkish dictator, he annulled foreign economic concessions, abrogated the "capitulations," and banned all alien checks on national sovereignty. Moreover, he bodily introduced into Persia most of the novel laws and decrees which Kemal was issuing in Turkey, especially the laws directed against the influence and privileged status of the Moslem religion and the decrees looking toward a "modern" secularized nation, with European dress, calendar, weights and measures, legal codes, and social usages. Like Mustafa Kemal, too, Reza Shah sought to intensify the national patriotism of the Persian people by teaching them, in army and public school and by aid of all the technical devices of propaganda, to cherish their distinctive Aryan language, their glorious history, and their still more glorious "mission." In line with this purpose, he solemnly announced in 1934 that the nation would no longer be officially designated by the corrupt and unnational name of "Persia," but by the ancient and racial name of "Iran." The Persians, he explained, were the true "Iranians," the pure and aboriginal "Aryans." Also, like Mustafa Kemal, Reza Shah evolved schemes for the economic betterment of his country. He promoted motor transportation, patronized irrigation and reclamation projects, and planned the construction of a railway from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf.

National dictatorship was confronted with greater obstacles in Iran (Persia) than in Turkey. The country was more rugged and less productive. Its people were more primitive and more fanatically Moslem, and they were less disposed to subordinate their customary tribal life and their traditional religious habits to the exigencies of new secular nationalism. There were spasmodic revolts of tribesmen and steady resistance on the part of leading Moslem clergymen. Yet Reza Shah persevered, confident that the reformed army would sustain him in the near future, and that in the more distant future time itself was on his side.

Afghanistan was even more rugged and primitive than Persia, but here, too, nationalism was espoused by the rulers and forced upon the ruled. King Amanullah (1919-1929) obtained from both Russia and Great Britain treaty guaranties in 1921 that they would respect the country's political independence and territorial integrity. He reorganized the native army, introduced motor transport, inaugurated a system of public schools, and began railway construction. By his successor, Mohammed Nadir (1929–1933), a constitution was promulgated in 1932, providing for the drafting of laws by a royal ministry and their ratification by an elective Council, for the establishment of compulsory elementary education and compulsory military service, for the support of the Moslem religion by the state, and for the adoption of a new national flaga tricolor of black, red, and white, with a white crescent on the centre stripe. Mohammed Nadir was assassinated in 1933, but his young son, Mohammed Zahir, succeeded to the throne with the promise of serving national interests and with the support of an army of 70,000 men. Afghanistan was admitted to the League of Nations in 1934, as Persia (Iran) had been admitted back in 1020.

The huge Empire of India seethed with nationalist agitation throughout the post-war period. The governmental reform which the British Parliament enacted in 1919, "transferring" certain powers to provincial councils and "realism in serving" others to the British Viceroy and his agents, India only stimulated and spread the agitation. In 1920 control of the native "All-India Congress" passed from "moderates" to "extremists," and these elected to its presidency Lajpat Rai (1865–1928), a Hindu lawyer and fanatical patriot, who had been deported in 1907 for advocating Dominion status for India, and who, after spending the war years in America, had returned home and become editor of an influential Nationalist newspaper at Lahore. Through his journalism and through his following

¹ See above, pp. 880-881.

² See above, pp. 523-524.

in the Congress, Lajpat Rai spread his conviction, especially among Hindu intellectuals and among the masses in the Punjab, that India must have the same national status as that enjoyed by Canada or South Africa. But of even greater effectiveness in consolidating Hindu nationalism throughout India was another native lawyer, Mohandas Gandhi (born 1869).

Gandhi came from a traditionally pro-British and devoutly Hindu family. After studying at the University of London, he had begun the practice of law at Bombay in 1892, but, Gandhi called to South Africa the next year on professional business, he had remained there for twenty-one years, concerning himself with the sorry plight of lower-class Hindu immigrants and carrying on a tireless struggle in their behalf. On his return to India in 1914 he applied the methods which he had developed in South Africa to the home-rule movement and began to preach resistance to the British by "soul force" and "non-coöperation." From 1919 his counsels grew more urgent and more widely influential. In 1920, with a rapidly multiplying number of disciples, he proclaimed a general campaign of "civil disobedience," that is, of "non-violent non-coöperation." As long as British rule continued in India, natives should refrain from supporting or participating in it. They should accept no public office. They should withdraw their children from government schools. They should not appear in law courts. They should not buy foreign commodities. They should boycott British machinery and should restore the domestic spinning-wheel. Gandhi was earnest and ascetic, very religious and quite opposed to the use of force, and he soon acquired an immense personal influence over the Hindu masses, who acclaimed him with the honorary title of "Mahatma" or "Great Soul." In 1921 Lajpat Rai joined Gandhi, and the All-India Congress voted to follow unquestioningly the dictates of the latter and of any successor he might designate. Gandhi sought, at first with some success, to make his movement truly All-Indian, to include in it not only the higher-caste Hindus but the lowest caste, the so-called "untouchables," and also the Moslems. He urged a cessation of the agelong strife between Hindus and Moslems and a minimizing of caste distinctions among the former. Many Moslems were becoming nationalist, and for a time they made common cause with Gandhi.

Gandhi's movement failed to achieve its prime object, however. He could not overcome Hindu intolerance of Moslems or Moslem contempt and distrust of Hindus. He could not restrain hotheads from committing acts of violence which indirectly embarrassed him and directly profited the British. In 1922 the British officials felt solid enough to arrest and jail him for sedition, and though they released him early in 1924 when he went on a hunger-strike, they no longer feared him. The Moslems were deserting him, and he himself was becoming ever more mystical and impractical. Nevertheless, if Gandhi failed to unite all India in a common nationalism, he at least performed a signal and lasting work by giving point and inspiration to the nationalism of the Hindu majority.

The British régime continued to function in India under a succession of able Viceroys,1 and with the aid of loyal native princes and competent provincial governors, trained British civil servants and well-drilled military forces. Important labor laws were enacted by the Legislative Council in 1922-1924: a factory act restricting the employment of children, a mines act, and a workmen's compensation act. Agricultural production was greatly increased by the completion in 1032 of extensive and expensive irrigation works in Sind, the Punjab, Madras, and Bengal. Simultaneously, the output of mines and factories (especially cotton factories) forged steadily ahead. Though the number of schools was added to, the government continued to spend much larger sums on army and police than on education, and in 1931 only 8 per cent of the 350 million natives could read or write. In 1931 splendid new government buildings were opened with pomp at Delhi, the capital of Britain's Indian Empire.

Meanwhile, Hindu Nationalists were pressing hard for self-government. In 1928, when the British cabinet in London sent out a special commission, headed by Sir John Simon, to study the political situation in India and to recommend what if any change should be made in the Act of roro, the Nationalists held a convention and drafted a set of "minimum demands," according to which India as a whole

¹ Viscount Chelmsford, 1916-1921; Marquess of Reading, 1921-1926; Baron Irwin, 1926-1931; Earl of Willingdon, 1931-1936; and Marquess of Linlithgow, from 1936.


should enjoy Dominion status within the British Empire and under a written constitution of her own. Such a constitution, the Nationalists proposed, should guaranty individual rights and provide for a federal system of government, with a central parliament at Delhi and with provincial parliaments in the several states, all to be elected by universal suffrage (both male and female) without any favor to minorities. This last proposal antagonized the mass of Indian Moslems and cemented their alliance with other opponents of Hindu "radicalism": Indian princes, who were fearful of democracy and anxious to preserve the status quo; "moderate" Hindus who stood to profit from the existing régime; and Britishers who desired, whether for selfish or for altruistic motives, to retain as much political and economic control of India as possible. Gandhi labored tirelessly to counteract these divisive developments and to promote harmony and concord within India, but he was only partially successful.


In 1930 the British government invited a varied group of Indians, including Princes, Moslems, Hindus, Moderates, and Nationalists, to a "round-table conference" at London with representatives of the British political parties, Laborite, Conservative, and Liberal, in order to consider the recommendations of the Simon Commission and to thresh out the whole subject of Indian government. Gandhi and his Nationalist followers refused to participate, and those who did accept the invitation could reach no general agreement. Nor was any agreement reached in a second round-table conference, in 1931, when Gandhi did attend, nor in a third, in 1932–1933. There was no easy way of reconciling Moslems and Hindus, high castes and low, autocratic princes and democratic doctrinaires; and between Hindu Nationalists and British Imperialists the gulf was wide.

Nevertheless, the British government was anxious to effect some compromise, and in 1933 it endorsed the project for an Indian

Indian Constitution submitted by the Marquess of Linlithgow, a Conservative statesman and the official reporter for the round-table conferences. According to the proposed Constitution, all India directly under British rule, excepting Burma, would be divided into eleven states ¹ and

¹ The eleven would be: Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Madras, Bombay, the Central Provinces (centring in Nagpur), the United Provinces (centring in Luck-





these would be federated with the states under native princes to form the United States of India. Each state would have a large measure of local autonomy, exercising it through a native prince or an elective native legislature, as the case might be; and for general legislation there would be a federal parliament, comprising appointed representatives of the princely states and elected representatives of the others, with a ministry responsible to it. Elections, both federal and state, would be restricted by qualifications of religion, property, and literacy to about 10 per cent of the men and about half of I per cent of the women in India. And at the head of the whole Indian government would be a British Governor-General (subject only to the cabinet at London) who would direct foreign relations and military affairs quite independently of the Indian parliament and who might similarly employ "emergency powers" in crises involving religion, minorities, currency, and justice to Europeans.

This Constitution had taken several years to draft, and obviously several years more must elapse before it could be adopted and given a fair trial. In 1935, after strenuous opposition to it on the part of extreme British Imperialists, it was enacted by the British Parliament, and the Marquess of Linlithgow was appointed Viceroy of India and charged with the difficult tasks of obtaining the necessary ratification of it by the various native princes, of overcoming the hostility and securing the coöperation of the Hindu Nationalists, and in the meantime of applying the Constitution bit by bit. His five-year term of office would thus be a transitional and dubious stage in Indian government. Eventually the compromise Constitution might succeed or it might fail. Much would depend upon Lord Linlithgow's tact and persuasiveness and much more would depend upon the progress of nationalism within India.

Siam was one of the countries in the Far East which had maintained its independence (if not its full territory) and which emerged from the World War stronger and more self-reliant. It had been fortunate in its rulers, ism in Far East King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910) and his son Rama VI (1910–1925), who, as we have previously explained, had

now), Sind, the Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier Province. Burma was to be excluded from the Indian Federation and provided with a separate government.

¹ See above, pp. 730-731.

done much to Europeanize the country, while preserving its traditional political and religious institutions and fostering the national patriotism of its people. For its participation Siam in the World War, Siam gained additional pledges of its independence and territorial integrity, and during the years following the war it got rid of "capitulations" and other restraints on its jurisdiction over resident foreigners. Rama VI died in 1925 and was succeeded by his brother, Prajadhipok, who, being afflicted with a physical infirmity which required medical attention in Europe and America, absented himself for fairly long periods from his kingdom and was unable therefore to deal effectively with the growing unrest among his people, some of it inspired by youthful admirers of Russian Communism, and more of it by democratic agitators and ambitious army officers. In Tune 1932 a revolt occurred at Bangkok. It was led by a young man, Luan Pradit, sympathetic with Communism, who put himself at the head of the government and compelled the King to promulgate a constitution, transforming the absolute monarchy into a limited monarchy, making the royal ministry responsible to a parliament elected by universal suffrage, and promising radical social and economic changes. For constitutional government there was widespread popular demand, but not for social revolution. Taking account of this fact and prompted by reactionaries, the King in the following April dismissed Pradit from office, expelled him from the country, and prohibited Communist propaganda. But if Pradit's economic doctrines were unpopular, the King's arbitrary action was unpopular too. The outcome was that in June 1933—just a year after the original revolt—the commander of the Siamese army, Phya Bahol, executed a coup d'état and in the name of democracy and progress established practically a military dictatorship. The King acquiesced, and an attempted insurrection of Luan Pradit was put down. Bahol as dictator respected the form of constitutional government, but he dominated the parliament, and he so employed his power as to precipitate a conflict over the royal prerogative between the parliament and the King and in 1935 he forced the latter's abdication. King Prajadhipok was succeeded by a cousin, a child whom the new dictatorial régime at Bangkok could easily manage.

Japan had become, before the World War, a Europeanized

Power not only, but a Great Power. She already ranked with the leading nations of Europe and America in industrial and commercial development and in military strength and prestige,1 and her position was enhanced by the war and its aftermath.2 The defeat of Germany, the revolution within Russia, the depression in Britain, the absorption of France in problems of domestic reconstruction and security, all contributed to freeing Japan from checks upon the extension of her trade and sway in the Pacific and on the Asiatic mainland. And the industriousness and intense patriotism of the whole Japanese nation amply seconded the determination of its business men and statesmen to take full advantage of the opportunities thus offered. More and more concessions were obtained in the Far East, especially from China, providing additional markets for Japanese industry and additional fields for Japanese investment, and stimulating the expansion of Japanese manufacturing plants and merchant marine. Industrialization forged steadily ahead in Tapan, and with it the desire and the ability of the nation to maintain larger armaments on land and sea and to use them ever more ambitiously for imperial purposes.

The masses in Japan were devoted to the semi-divine dynasty which had reigned from time immemorial and whose contemporary representatives, the Emperor Yoshihito (1912-1926) and the Emperor Hirohito (1926-), were men of intelligence and tact. Equally devoted to the monarchy, and to the modern social and political order identified with the monarchy, were the leading politicians and statesmen, usually nobles or wealthy commoners, well trained and highly patriotic, who constituted the ministries, dominated the parliament, and directed national legislation and administration. These leaders, immediately after the war, were divided into two major political parties: the Seivukai, conservative and aristocratic, supported Politics. 1920-1930 chiefly by great nobles, farmers, and soldiers; and the Minseito, mainly middle-class and liberal, with an urban following.3 The Seiyukai was more vocally nationalist, and during and just after the World War it controlled the government.

³ Minseito was the name applied to this party in 1927; it had been known as the Kenseikai from 1915, and previously, from 1910, as the Kokuminto. The rival party, the Seiyukai, had been definitely organized and designated as such in 1900.

Then, following a terrible earthquake which in 1923 wrecked the cities of Tokio and Yokohama and united the urban electorate in demands for speedy and businesslike reconstruction, the Menseito got the upper hand. It carried the general election of 1924, and, under one of its most eminent leaders, Viscount Kato, a wealthy industrialist who was premier until his death in 1926, it not only pushed forward the reconstruction of the devastated centres but also pursued a conciliatory foreign policy and enacted in 1925 an internal democratic reform, establishing universal manhood suffrage. After Kato's death, the Seiyukai contrived to man a ministry from 1927 to 1929, but a sweeping victory of the Menseito in the general election of 1930, the first under universal suffrage, seemed to promise to this party a long period of predominance and to Japan a continuing evolution towards national democracy and international peace.

The promise was soon belied, however. The Menseito was not truly a popular party. It had gained its electoral victory by usual methods of political corruption, and the attitude of its leaders toward difficult national problems which were then becoming acute aroused the active hostility of large sections of the population. For example, the Finance Minister and party chairman, Junnosuke Inouye, seeking to overcome the economic depression which beset Japan in common with all other industrial nations, urged a drastic curtailment of governmental expenditure and a general policy of financial deflation (instead of inflation), which, though endorsed by some bankers and industrialists, was strenuously opposed by governmental officials, both civil and military, by agricultural interests, and by organized labor. Again, the Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, in his desire to promote peace and lighten the burden of armaments, consented to the London naval agreement of 1930 and sought an amicable adjust-ment of Japan's differences with China, which outraged Japanese nationalists, particularly officers in army and navy. In the circumstances, nationalist propaganda against the government made rapid headway. While a cabal of army Military and Fascist officers took it upon themselves to open hostilities Disturbagainst the Chinese in Manchuria, thereby nullifying ances the peace efforts of Shidehara, Fascist organizations sprang up in Japan, applauding the strong action of the military, demanding the overthrow of parliamentary government, and insisting

that the only cure for domestic economic ills was through a forceful extension of the Japanese Empire. Faced with a rising tide of popular conversion to militarist and Fascist propaganda, and unable to prevent attendant acts of terrorism, the Menseito ministry resigned in December 1931.

For a time a Seiyukai ministry attempted to carry on under the premiership of the party's chairman, Tsuyoshi Inukai. It dissolved the parliament and so manipulated the ensuing general election as to ensure the return of a large majority of its own supporters. Very soon, however, Inukai discovered that the military and Fascist groups were much more influential in the country than was his parliamentary party, that they were intent upon making him do their will, and that extremists among them were as ready to commit acts of violence against independent members of the Seiyukai as against those of the Menseito. In vain he tried to govern as a constitutional premier and to subject the military to the civilian authorities. There was a steady increase of insubordination and terrorism in the winter and spring of 1932, beginning in January with the assassination of Inouye, the leader and ex-minister of the Menseito, and culminating in the killing of the Seiyukai premier himself in May.

The murder of Inukai clearly evidenced the collapse of orderly constitutional government in Japan and precipitated in May 1932 what was practically a military coup d'état. A Nationalnew ministry, extra-parliamentary and thoroughly Régime nationalist, was set up, headed by Viscount Saito, in Japan, elderly ranking officer of the Japanese navy and for 1932 several years strong-arm governor of Korea, and comprising a compact set of dictatorially minded officials. Counter-demonstrations were promptly repressed, a rigid censorship enforced, and steps taken to emphasize nationalism at home, in press, schools, and religion, and to promote imperialism abroad. The conquest of Manchuria was vigorously pushed, the resistance of China smashed, and, when the League of Nations ventured to protest, Saito's government announced the withdrawal of Japan from the League. Presently, too, announcement was made of Japan's purpose to terminate the existing naval agreements with the United States and Great Britain. Japan would seek security in her own national and imperial ways. In July 1934 Viscount Saito retired by reason of age and physical infirmity and was

succeeded by an even more nationalistic naval officer, Admiral Keisuki Okada. By 1935 the Japanese dictatorship, in the pursuit of national interests and with enthusiastic national backing, was consolidating its influence and increasing its military and naval power in Japan proper, in Korea and Formosa, and in the mandated islands of the northern Pacific. It was also exercising a scarcely veiled protectorate over the whole extensive territory of Manchuria and expanding the Japanese "sphere of influence" ever farther southward over China.

Japan's swiftly growing power in the Far East was at the expense of China, whose affairs, after the death in 1916 of the nominal president and actual dictator, Yüan Shih-kai, went from bad to worse. A form of republican government continued, but for at least a decade it was utterly at the mercy of greedy and unscrupulous provincial governors, who, with the aid of mercenary troops, wrung all the money they could from the people within their jurisdiction and intrigued and fought with one another for supreme control. One such "war-lord" might get the upper hand for a moment and install a "president" who would do his bidding, but he would soon fall prey to other "war-lords" and his puppet president would be replaced by another. In the circumstances, the civil government of the Chinese Republic was bound to be not only kaleidoscopic but corrupt, and quite unable to command the united loyalty of the nation or to preserve its territorial integrity and independence. Whole provinces and even larger areas were practically detached from any central authority. Then, too, as early as 1917, the central government at Peking was defied by a rival "nationalist" government which Sun Yat-sen 2 established at Canton (in southern China). And while Russian agents were spreading Communist propaganda widely in southern China, Japanese agents were seeking and obtaining favors from the government in northern China.

At first the nationalist efforts of Sun Yat-sen seemed as ineffectual as the more conservative régime at Peking.

Sun
Yat-sen
He had in back of him a party of intellectuals, the so-called Kuomintang, who helped him to organize the government at Canton in 1917 and formally conferred

¹ See above, pp. 728-730, 887-888.

² On Sun Yat-sen, see above, pp. 728-730.

upon him in 1921 the title of "President of the Chinese Republic." But he was preacher and visionary rather than organizer or leader, and for several years the Kuomintang lacked competent generals and was torn by internal dissensions. The best that Sun Yat-sen could do was to retain a precarious foothold in the city of Canton and the adjacent province of Kwantung and to welcome overtures from the government at Peking for a conference looking to the reëstablishment of national unity. It was while he was participating in such a conference that he died at Peking in 1925.

With the death of Sun Yat-sen, he was extolled all over China as a great national hero and his ideas became the inspiration and guide for a revival and rapid extension of the Kuomintang. China, the party now declared unitedly and enthusiastically, must possess a democratic government, a higher standard of living for the masses, and an intensity of national feeling that would preserve her historic territory and distinctive culture and tolerate no foreign interference or tutelage; and, pending the achievement of these ultimate goals, China must submit to a nationalist and socialist dictatorship. Such was the program, and for its execution emerged an extraordinary leader, Chiang Kai-shek.

Born at Ningpo in 1886, Chiang had joined the Kuomintang in his youth and been entrusted in 1020 with the organization and conduct of a military training school at Canton. In 1925 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang forces; and during the next year, with real military genius of his own and with no less helpful popular propaganda on the part of Communist advisers from Russia, he overcame opposition in southern China and made an amazing advance northward to the Yangtsze River. In 1927 he occupied Nanking in force, and there installed the Nationalist government. In vain the remaining war-lords of the North put themselves under the direction of the governor of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin, and attempted to stem the Nationalist tide. Their armies melted away; the remnant was overwhelmed; and Chang Tso-lin, retreating into Manchuria, was killed by a bomb. In June 1928 Chiang Kai-shek entered Peking in triumph.

Peking was renamed Peiping ("Northern Peace") and the capital of the Chinese Republic was definitely transferred thence

to Nanking. In October 1928, on the seventeenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Revolution,1 Chiang Kai-shek was inaugurated as President of the Republic. He thus combined in his own person the headship of the civil government, the Nationalchairmanship of the Kuomintang, and the command ist Dictaof the army. He was a dictator, and a strenuously torship in China nationalist one. He reaffirmed his devotion to the program of Sun Yat-sen, save for its Socialist and Communist tendencies, which he now expressly repudiated. He chose his chief advisers and lieutenants from the Kuomintang. He married the sister-in-law of Sun Yat-sen. In 1931 he convoked at Nanking a National Convention, which drafted a "provisional constitution" and elected a civilian as titular head of the government. though it confirmed the existing dictatorship by making the Kuomintang the only legal party in the state and by empowering Chiang Kai-shek to appoint the ministers and to direct military affairs.

The Nationalist dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek assured to China a greater degree of internal order than the country had known since imperial days, and it encouraged and promoted an essentially revolutionary spirit among the masses. It particularly fostered popular patriotic education, multiplying elementary schools and supplying them with nationalistic textbooks in the simplified vernacular writing which had recently been devised by James Yen, a social worker and a graduate of Yale University. By 1930 millions of farmers and day laborers were learning to read and write, although 60 per cent of the vast Chinese population were still illiterate. Above all, the government was intensifying the nationalism of those who could read. investors and traders and foreign missionaries were regarded with increasing suspicion and put under closer surveillance. Boycotting of foreign goods for political reasons was invoked more frequently and obeyed more generally. Loyalty to the contemporary nation was being exalted, on an ever widening front, above loyalty to traditional province or religion.

Yet the task confronting the Nationalist dictatorship in China was herculean. The country was so big and its population so numerous. Banditry was so usual, corruption so habitual, and the opportunities for ambitious and grasping officials so great

¹ See above, p. 728.

and alluring. The government of Chiang Kai-shek did better than its immediate predecessors in grappling with internal difficulties, but it possessed neither the financial resources nor the military strength to overcome all of these and at the same time to withstand, unaided and successfully, the forceful aggression of disciplined

Weakness and Continuing Disintegration of

foreign Powers. It could hardly maintain its authority in China proper. It could not recover Tibet from the virtual protectorate of Great Britain or narrow the "sphere of influence" which France continued to exploit north of Indo-China. It could not prevent the Moslems in the extensive western territory of Sinkiang from revolting in 1928 and setting up a practically independent government. It could not control the tribesmen in Mongolia and keep those in outer Mongolia from falling under the domination of Soviet Russia. And to cap the climax, it had to suffer Japanese conquest of Manchuria. How this occurred, we shall now indicate.

For centuries Manchuria had been a dependency of the Chinese Empire, and the last reigning dynasty of imperial China—the Manchu-had had its origin in Manchuria. The Manchuprovince was twice as large as Japan, and ever since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 ¹ the richness of its natural resources for both agriculture and industry had been increasingly recognized and exploited. Railways had been built by Japanese companies and by Russian companies. The indigenous population, somewhat different ethnically from the Chinese though sharing their culture, had grown and been added to by a large farmer-immigration from China and by a smaller number of Japanese business men and railway employes, so that the total population of Manchuria rose from sixteen million in 1905 to thirty-four million in 1935. Politically, the province had been administered by a Chinese governor, who, in the troubled period following the Chinese Revolution of 1911, had usually been a typical war-lord, repeatedly defying the central government at Peking and on occasion selling concessions to Japanese or Russians. In 1915, during the World War and while Russia was heavily engaged elsewhere, Japan had insistently demanded of the Chinese government formal recognition and confirmation of her privileged economic and political status

¹ See above, pp. 655-656, 718-720.

in Manchuria, and after the war Japan was in an excellent position to enforce her demands.¹

To be sure, the European Great Powers and the United States had some interests of their own at stake and they sought by diplomatic means to curb Japanese ambitions. Thus, Interat the Washington Conference of 1920-1921 on the national limitation of naval armaments, Japan was prevailed Guaranties upon to accede to several international agreements affecting China and the Pacific. The most important of these were two Nine-Power treaties, signed by Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal. China, and Japan, asserting the independence and territorial integrity of China, permitting the Chinese to alter their tariffs and pledging them to equal treatment of all foreigners on Chinese railways, and prohibiting special arrangements "designed to create spheres of influence . . . in Chinese territories." 2

Japan might join other Powers, including China, in treaties of mutual guaranty and likewise in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Japanese Āmbioutlawry of war. Yet she would interpret such intertions in national engagements in the light of her own national Manchuinterests, the pursuit of which led her to cast wistful eyes on Manchuria. Manchuria, detached from China and subjected to Japan, would freely supply the Island Empire with needful raw materials, with desirable markets for manufactured goods and capital investments, with fields for favorable settlement of surplus population, and with an eventual happy access of national wealth, power, and prestige. And just as the Chinese became more nationalist and therefore less disposed to make peaceful concessions to Japan, so Japan's intensifying nationalism impelled her to obtain concessions by force.

Hostilities were opened in Manchuria by Japanese troops in September 1931, not on the authority of the civil government at Tokio but on that of military commanders, who insisted that

¹ See above, pp. 887-888.

² In addition to these two Nine-Power treaties, there were two Four-Power treaties, signed by Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan, promising mutual respect of one another's possessions in the Pacific and mutual consultation if war should threaten. There was also a treaty between Japan and China, providing for the eventual transfer of Kiaochow from the former to the latter. On Kiaochow, see above, pp. 724, 781, 815, 860.

forceful action was necessary to protect Japanese property (notably railway property) in the province, to repress banditry, and to restore order. Presently the Japanese government acquiesced in what it could not, and doubtless would not, prevent; and the dictatorship

Japanese-Chinese "War," 1931-1933

which issued from the coup d'état at Tokio in May 1932 committed itself completely to the Manchurian adventure and heavily reënforced the troops in charge of it. Japanese armies soon overran the whole province of Manchuria, dispersing the forces of the Chinese governor and putting him to flight. China appealed to the League of Nations, and a League commission, after six months' investigation, recommended that Japan be censured and Manchuria be accorded an autonomous government under Chinese sovereignty. Japan ignored the recommendations, withdrew from the League, and proceeded with her own plans for Manchuria. The League expressed regret and China protested, but China was powerless to stay the Japanese and no other Power was minded to go to war with them in China's behalf.

Already, in February 1932, the Japanese military authorities had installed at Mukden a native but sympathetic "provisional government" and inspired it to proclaim Manchuria an independent state with the name of Manchukuo. Then in March the ex-Emperor of China, Henry Pu-yi, who had been a pensioner of Japan since boyhood,1 was put in nominal charge of the new state; and with his government Japan concluded in September 1932 a treaty, formally recognizing the independence of Manchukuo. In vain patriotic Chinese attempted a boycott and resorted to violence against the Japanese. A Japanese expeditionary force was landed at Shanghai, and Japanese troops occupied the Inner Mongolian province of Jehol (south of Manchuria). At length in May 1933 the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek consented to a truce with Japan, leaving Jehol to Manchuria and providing for a demilitarized zone between it and China.

Within Manchukuo, Japanese arms reëstablished order and dictated a political arrangement finally embodied in a constitution of March 1934. Thereby Henry Pu-yi was enthroned as the Emperor Kang Teh, with an advisory native Council and an executive

"Empire of Manchukuo," a Japanese Protectorate


¹ See above, pp. 728-729.

native ministry, but with Japanese officers in command of the army and with Japanese advisers for foreign affairs, for financial and economic matters, and indeed for the whole central and local administration. Manchukuo was independent in name. In fact it was a Japanese dependency.

From China and Manchukuo in the Far East, the primitively Christian state of Ethiopia (or Abyssinia) in eastern Africa is remote in mileage and very different in nature and Ethiopia history.1 Yet during the post-war period it evinced an analogous nationalism and was threatened by analogous foreign aggression. The country had been politically unified and Italian designs against its independence had been thwarted by the Emperor Menelek II (1889–1913), an intelligent and energetic prince who proudly claimed descent from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. For a time, under Menelek's weak grandson and successor, the Emperor Lej Yasu, disruptive forces seemed to prevail, but when this youthful sovereign showed an inclination to desert the Christianity of his ancestors and of the bulk of his people and to embrace Islam, a strong religio-patriotic spirit was aroused, resulting in 1916 in his excommunication and dethronement and the succession of a daughter of Menelck, the Empress Zauditu (1916–1930), with a cousin of hers as Regent. This man (born in 1891) was vigorous and firmly resolved to maintain the integrity and foster the economic and national development of the country. Construction of a Frenchowned railway from the capital town of Addis Ababa to the sea multiplied contacts with the outside world and stimulated exports and imports. With improving financial conditions, larger sums were expended on schools and army. In 1923 the slave trade was formally forbidden, and Ethiopia was admitted to the League of Nations. In 1930, on the death of the Empress Zauditu, the Regent became Emperor in name as well as in fact and amid the plaudits of his subjects assumed the title of Haile Selassie. The next year he founded a national bank and promulgated a constitution providing for a bicameral parliament and a responsible ministry.

But though Ethiopia was strengthened within, she was faced with increasing danger from without. For Italy, under the Fascist régime of Mussolini, was now intent upon resuming her

¹ On Abyssinia before the World War, see above, pp. 741-742.



imperial projects in East Africa, which had been halted at Adowa back in 1896, and finally uniting and crowning her separate coastal colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland Ambitions with a protectorate over the healthier and more valu-Ethiopia able interior lands of Ethiopia. In the pursuit of national policy, therefore, Italy negotiated with Great Britain in 1925 a special agreement whereby the latter, in return for a free hand in obtaining water-rights in northern Ethiopia for the benefit of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, assured to the former a free hand in seeking concessions in eastern Ethiopia, especially for the construction of an Italian railway connecting Eritrea with Somaliland. Ethiopia promptly protested to the League of Nations against this foreign partitioning of spheres of influence within her territory and against the affront to her sovereignty which it implied, but the League contented itself with recording "explanations" from Italy and Britain which really did not explain. Whereupon, Italy sought to obtain a predominance in Ethiopia by ingratiating herself with the native government and consenting in 1928 to a treaty between the two countries pledging "perpetual friendship" and arbitration of all disputes. But Ethiopia stubbornly refused the requests of her "friend" for special concessions and favors, and gradually Italy reached the conclusion that if she were to realize her ambition she would have to employ force or the threat of force. Justification for its use she found in tribal disorders and "incidents" along the Eritrean border; and a possible remaining check on its use she sought to remove by coming to terms with France in January 1034.2

Whereupon, Italy proclaimed her purpose of appropriating Ethiopia and despatched a large army to adjacent Eritrea. Against the threatening aggression, Ethiopia again appealed to the League of Nations; and presently her appeal was supported by Great Britain, who perceived in Italy's African activity a menace to her own imperial interests (and to the cause of "collective security") which she had not perceived (or at any rate acted upon) in the case of Japan's aggression in Manchuria. In vain France tried to effect a compromise acceptable to Italy and Great Britain (if not wholly so to Ethiopia). Italy went relentlessly ahead with military

¹ See above, p. 576.

² See above, p. 1045.

preparations; and in October 1935 Italian troops invaded Ethiopia in force, captured Adowa, and pushed into the interior. Italy and Ethiopia were actually, if not "legally," at war.

By this time, France, fearful of having to stand alone against a possible German attack if she should alienate the British and throw over the League of Nations, had been persuaded to join Great Britain in backing action by the League. And most of the other League members (except Austria, Hungary, and Albania) fell in line behind Britain and France. Consequently, in October the League formally accused Italy of "aggression," and in November applied economic "sanctions" against her. At the end of 1935 it was doubtful how effective such sanctions would be but quite clear that Italy, in the pursuit of national (and imperial) interests, was bent on conquering Ethiopia.

Post-war political developments among the Latin nations on the American continents ¹ reflected prevalent currents in Europe.

Post-War Latin America
There was similar dissatisfaction with traditional government, similar popular unrest, similar intensification of nationalism, a similar trend toward dictatorship, and in one significant instance a similar resort to war in the pursuit of national interests.

In Mexico, the revolutionary movement, which had begun in 1910,² took on a much more radical complexion as its original leaders were supplanted in turn by Alvaro Obregón (1880–1928) and Plutarco Elias Calles (born 1877). Both these men were

Mexico and Its Revolutionary Nationalist Dictatorship natives of the northern state of Sonora, the former a planter and the latter a school-teacher. Both had become "intellectual radicals" in their youth and voluble advocates of land reform in behalf of the native Indian population. Both had recruited Indian troops and risen to the rank of general in the revolutionary

armies which put Madero into the presidency in 1911 and Carranza in 1914. Obregón was at first the more influential of the two. As acknowledged leader of the radical wing of Carranza's followers and as commander-in-chief of the army, he forced into the Constitution of 1917, against Carranza's wishes, some of its most revolutionary provisions, notably those promising the parti-

¹ For an outline of the pre-war history of these nations, see above, pp. 700-710; and for a map of Latin America, see above, pp. 702-703.

² See above, pp. 704-706.

tion of large landed estates and vesting in the government the ownership of all mineral and petroleum resources. In 1920 an open break occurred between Carranza and Obregón: the former, seeking reëlection in violation of the Constitution, ordered the latter's arrest; and the latter, commanding superior forces, headed a revolt against the former. Carranza was deposed and murdered, and Obregón was elevated to the presidency, with Calles as his Minister of the Interior. Then, on the expiration of his term of office in 1924, he secured the election of Calles as President, with himself as Minister of War. Obregón planned to resume the presidency again in 1928, but after his election and before his inauguration he was assassinated. It was left for Calles to continue and develop the dictatorship, and this he did through the National Revolutionary party which he organized and led and which dominated the army and the parliament.

Both Obregón and Calles built up their popular following by championing an intense Mexican nationalism and directing it against every "alien" influence. They particularly catered to the native Indian element, numerically large but long neglected. They sponsored a considerable amount of land reform and labor legislation. They prompted a campaign of popular and patriotic education, establishing public schools in rural villages as well as in urban centres, and supplying them with radical nationalist teachers and textbooks. They extolled native (and primitive) Indian art and encouraged Indian Mexicans to cherish it and Spanish Mexicans to imitate it. They talked about the Indian "race" in terms almost as glowing as those which Hitler applied to the Aryan "race."

They were especially jealous of foreign influence or tutelage. They induced the parliament to impose severe limitations on foreign economic enterprise in Mexico, agricultural, industrial, mining, and commercial. Though they welcomed the recognition which the United States accorded to their revolutionary dictatorship in 1923 and utilized it to strengthen their own position, they were careful not to make any exceptional concessions to the United States, and until 1931 they held aloof from the League of Nations. Moreover, it was to oppose "alien" influences, as well as to weaken the chief traditional prop of "reaction" within Mexico, that Obregón and Calles and their supporters waged war against the Catholic Church.

Controversy between church and state in Mexico was no novelty, but it was greatly embittered by the drastic ecclesiastical restrictions which were written into the Constitution of 1917, and it reached an acute stage during the presidency of Calles. In 1926 Calles had his subservient parliament enact a series of laws, applying and supplementing the constitutional provisions: the church might own no property, maintain no monastic establishment, conduct no school, and carry on no "subversive" propaganda; the government might permit the use of church buildings for strictly religious purposes, but ecclesiastics would be subject to special regulation and close surveillance; no foreign priest might function or reside in Mexico; native priests must register with the government and assure it of their "good behavior"; and laymen as well as clergymen were forbidden to agitate or petition for any alteration of these repressive measures. Even further went some of the local state governments, which, at the dictation of fanatical allies of Calles, practically stopped Catholic worship in extensive areas of the country by prescribing that there should not be more than one priest for every 100,000 laymen, and in some cases by closing the churches altogether or forbidding any service in them in Latin or by an unmarried clergyman. Against all this legislation, and specifically against the requirement of registration, the Mexican clergy, with papal approval, went on "strike"; and for three years bishops and priests conducted no religious services in Mexico. At length in 1929, to quiet the agitation of Catholic laymen and to allay popular unrest, and also to appease foreign sentiment, the government consented to a truce with the Catholic hierarchy, whereby assurances were given that the anti-clerical laws, without being repealed, would be leniently enforced, and religious services were therefore resumed. In 1931, however, a new tide of governmental activity set in against the church and indeed against all religion. In vain the clergy and the Pope protested. The papal delegate—a native Mexican—was expelled as a "pernicious foreigner." Many church edifices were expropriated by the state. And in 1934 the National Revolutionary party, the government party, definitely pledged itself to make socialist education compulsory in all schools and universities and "to tear away youth from the hands of the Catholic and other clergy and analyze religion for them in the light of reason and science."

The Mexican government was essentially a dictatorship, analogous to that of Russia or Germany. Only one political party was allowed to exist and engage in propaganda—the National Revolutionary party—and this, through its control of the army and the civil administration, held every seat in the Mexican parliament, every ministerial post, and the presidency of the republic. The masses were largely indifferent to politics, and dissent or opposition among the classes was ruthlessly suppressed. There were, of course, some differences of opinion and some personal rivalries within the National Revolutionary party. Though solidly nationalist, it represented various degrees of devotion to socialism and to anti-clericalism, and gradually the preëminence of Calles in it was undermined by one of his ambitious lieutenants and protégés, General Lazaro Cardenas. Cardenas, born in 1805 of a family part Spanish and part Indian, had risen under Calles's auspices to be secretary of the National Revolutionary party and Minister of War, and these strategic positions secured his election to the presidency in 1934 for a six-year term. He was younger and more vigorous than Calles, less concerned with the somewhat stale issue of anti-clericalism, and more eager to forward economic policies of a socialistic character. He threw himself with energy into the prosecution of a "six-year plan" for the "Mexicanizing" of industry, the development of public works, the construction of model dwellings for urban workingmen, and the distribution of communal lands among agricultural villages. By 1035 Cardenas had such a hold on the National Revolutionary party, and therefore on the army and the government, that he could push Calles into the background and succeed him as virtual dictator of Mexico.

If in Mexico nationalism was stressed by the protracted revolutionary movement and given an anti-religious and eventually socialistic slant, it was emphasized in two major countries of South America—Argentina and Brazil—by a sudden break in the orderly functioning of government which had long prevailed and a forceful seizure of power by conservative groups.

In Argentina, the Radical government of Hipolito Irigoyen, who had been President from 1916 to 1922 and again from 1928, was overthrown in September 1930 by a coup d'état of General José Uriburu, who assumed a temporary dictatorship and utilized it to assure the election a year later of another Con-

servative officer, General Agustin Justo, as constitutional President of the Republic. In Brazil, a similar revolt in October 1930, led by Vetulio Vargas and supported Brazil by army officers and by popular sentiment against the existing hegemony of the state of São Paulo in national politics, drove the President and President-elect into exile and installed Vargas as dictator. Vargas suppressed a counter-revolt in São Paulo in 1932 and then decreed the election of a National Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage (including women). The new constitution which issued from the Assembly in 1934, while retaining the federal character of the Brazilian state, enlarged the powers of the central government; and while prescribing that four-fifths of the Chamber of Deputies should be democratically elected by universal suffrage, it recognized the principle of the "corporate state" by providing that the remaining fifth of the Chamber should be chosen by professional and trade associations. The Constitution also granted nationalist demands by imposing drastic limitations on foreign immigration and foreign investment. Likewise it favored the Catholic Church by permitting religious instruction in the schools, guarantying the freedom of religious congregations, and authorizing the substitution of religious for civil marriage. In 1934 the National Assembly formally elected Vargas as constitutional President of Brazil.

The upheavals of 1930 in Brazil and Argentina were attributable in considerable part to the economic depression and financial instability then current throughout the world, and this factor was certainly important in the epidemic of revolutions which affected other less politically stable countries of Latin America from 1930. In 1931 Chile entered a revolutionary cycle: demonstrations of students and professional men at Santiago and Valparaiso compelled the president to flee; his Liberal successor was forced out by Radical Socialists; these in turn were ousted by a military dictator; and this paved the way in 1932 for the election to the presidency of a veteran politician, Arturo Alessandri, who had been president from 1920 to 1925 as a Radical, but who now assumed the chief magistracy with the aid of Conservatives and Moderates.

Peru witnessed in 1930 the expulsion of a president who had governed for twelve years and the seizure of dictatorial power

by a radical army officer, who, however, was assassinated three years later. In 1931 a military coup in Ecuador unseated a constitutional president and gave rise to a Ecuador. Uruguay quick succession of political experiments. In Uruguay, the president executed a coup d'état of his own in 1933, suspending the constitution and obtaining the adoption of a new one, and thereby his reëlection. In Cuba, following four years Cuba and of political turmoil, the conservative and dictatorial Central America President Machado was finally overthrown in 1933, and there ensued still greater turmoil as rival factions struggled to succeed him in power. In Central America, Guatemala, Honduras, and Salvador were troubled by revolutionary outbreaks.

In fact, only a few countries of Latin America preserved political stability during the post-war era. Colombia continued constitutional, though the strong Conservative party colombia vehemently denounced the "corruption" of the Liberal government which took office in 1930, refused to coöperate with it, and boycotted the general election of 1934. Venezuela remained quiescently subject to the dictatorship which General Gomez had established back in 1908. Costa Rica maintained its exceptional tradition as an orderly parliamentary state, and Panama escaped serious revolutionary disturbance.

For several years after the World War, the countries of Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua were occupied and governed, directly or indirectly, by armed forces of the United Latin Na-States.² Gradually, however, the United States recontionalism vs. Amersidered and revised its imperialist policy, partly beican Imperialism cause of nationalist pressure from the natives, partly because of waxing hostility to the United States all over Latin America with attendant discrimination against traders and investors from the United States, and partly because Santo of a growing concern of the American people with Domingo, domestic and narrowly national problems. In 1924 ragua, American armed forces were withdrawn from Santo Domingo, and in 1033 they finally quitted Nicaragua. In 1030 the native Haitian parliament was permitted to assemble for

It is also noteworthy, in this connection, that in 1934 the

See above, pp. 707.

2 See above, pp. 690-700, 887.

the first time in seventeen years and to elect a native president,

and in 1934 American troops evacuated the country.

United States Congress, taking account of vigorous nationalist sentiment in the Philippine Islands, enacted a law, which was speedily ratified by the Philippine legislature, providing for the transformation of the dependency into an autonomous Commonwealth, with power to devise its own constitution (subject to approval by the President of the United States), to elect a native Chief Executive and a native Congress, and to make and execute its own laws, and providing further for a gradual withdrawal of American troops and, if the experiment in self-government should prove successful at the end of ten years, for the formal recognition by the United States at that time of the complete independence of the Philippines. The Philippine Commonwealth was duly inaugurated in 1935.

In the Philippines, then, and in the "backward" countries of the Caribbean and Central America, nationalism was coming to the fore and commanding the paramount allegiance of the people. The same phenomenon was all the more in evidence in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, in Japan and China, in India and Egypt, in Persia and Turkey: indeed, in all the would-be "progressive" nations of America and Asia and Africa, as of Europe also. In the circumstances, the pursuit of national interests was world-wide and ever more intolerant of restraints. Pursuit of National Once a policy or an action appeared to serve national interest, the statesman who was loudest in urging it and most forceful in forwarding it was almost certain to be stalwartly backed, if not relentlessly pushed on, by the large majority of his fellow nationals. If such policy or action involved a violation of international engagements and a resort to arms, as it occasionally did, other nations might express regret, but hardly the nation immediately concerned. Its government and its people alike believed that in an emergency the strict observance of treaty obligations and the preservation of international peace had to be subordinated to the safeguarding of vital national interests. And it was for each nation to decide, of course, what its vital interests were.

Such was the basic explanation of Japan's war against China and of Italy's war against Ethiopia. Such, too, was the real explanation of the long and deadly war which the two South American states of Bolivia and Paraguay waged against each other almost continuously from 1928 to 1935. To both, the acquisition of the swamp-land of the Gran Chaco was Chaco a national interest so vital that they could not afford War, a Symptom to negotiate any compromise between themselves or acquiesce in any arbitration by outsiders; they simply had to fight it out. One attempt after another was made to restore peace between the belligerents—by neighboring Powers jointly and singly, by the League of Nations, by Pan-American Conferences at Washington in 1928 and at Montevideo in 1934all in vain. Only utter exhaustion of Bolivia and Paraguay stayed the fighting and brought about a truce in 1935. The Chaco War was a conflict between third-rate Powers, but like so many other events of the post-war period, it was symptomatic of the difficulties besetting a pacific world-order.



CHAPTER XXVIII

COSMOS AND CHAOS

I. THE DISILLUSIONMENT



OYALTY to principles and ideals which had characterized the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ¹ was rapidly waning in the second quarter of the twentieth century and giving way to a novel "Disillusionment." Pessimism was supplanting optimism.

Individualism, which the "Enlightenment" had done so much to extol and for two centuries to advance, was now eclipsed both by material developments and by changing habits of mind. As industrialization proceeded and big machines multiplied and were magnified, the individual was swallowed up in society. He was no longer a separate entity, no longer an autonomous unit. He was merely a cog in mechanized Individualism industry or agriculture. He merely performed a function, usually an extremely minor one, in mass production. More and more it was with crowds of fellows that he worked, lived. and travelled about; and, what was especially destructive of individualism, he was intellectually a ready-made product of mass education, of mass journalism, of mass sport and recreation. He was peculiarly susceptible to social pressure and also to propaganda. And propaganda in the new age was naturally directed toward enlisting as many individuals as possible in some sort of mass movement, preferably socialistic or nationalistic or both.

The World War provided eloquent evidence of the passing of individualism. Far more than any previous war, it was a mass war, a war in which millions were engaged not on their own initiative but as veritable automatons, a war in which victory was won not by the genius of any individual general or the heroism

¹ On the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 506-555; and on its continuation in the nineteenth century, see above, pp. 691-695.

of any individual troops but rather by superior production and coördination of military machines, cannon fodder, and popular propaganda. This large-scale mechanizing and socializing of war was a spectacular demonstration of the progress of industrial civilization, but it was quite disillusioning to persons who had imagined that technology would but supplement and confirm the individualism of the Enlightenment. And post-war political and social developments served to deepen the Disillusionment.

Political democracy of the individualistic sort, with its universal equal suffrage, its representative parliaments, and its ministerial responsibility, ebbed more quickly than it Ebbing of arose. Fifteen years after the World War it survived Democracy in relatively few countries, and in these it was meeting with unprecedented criticism and opposition. All over central and eastern Europe and throughout the progressively "Europeanized" world-in Japan and China, in Persia and Turkey, in most of Latin America—dictatorship was the political order of the day. It might be Communist, as in the Russian Union of Soviet Republics, or it might be nominally Corporate, as in Italy or Germany; it was clearly not Democratic in the conventional meaning of the word. It was more akin to the Cæsarism of the ancient Roman Empire or to the "benevolent despotism" which had immediately preceded the advent of modern democracy 1 or to the episodic military dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte, although it was much more intensive and efficient than any of these, and, unlike the earlier "benevolent despotism," it was almost never associated with titled aristocracy and only exceptionally with royalty.

As a rule, it was established and directed by men of plebeian origin adept at swaying the multitude emotionally and at organizing and guiding a fanatically devoted band of supporters. Such a band, by espousing a popular cause and employing violence, would acquire a privileged position in the state and then use it to monopolize all the latest machinery for the manufacture of public opinion and thus ensure a continuing pseudo-democratic acquiescence of the masses, civilian and military, in the actions of the dictatorship. A "spirit of democracy" might still be invoked, but its practical embodiment in a disciplined minority-

¹On "benevolent" or "enlightened" despotism of the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 346-356, 388.

party rather than in the majority of free individuals marked it off sharply from the form of democracy which had been developed in the nineteenth century and almost universally adopted at the close of the World War. That reaction should ensue so suddenly and so widely—that the suffrage should be put on a class and occupational basis and popular voting limited to occasional plebiscites, that parliaments should be made into rubber-stamps or done away with altogether, that broadened governmental powers should be assumed and arbitrarily exercised by one party and one man—was astonishing and disillusioning. Individualistic democracy had apparently been but an unsuccessful experiment in the political history of mankind. At any rate, a reaction against it, involving a revival and intensification of Cæsarism, was now in full swing.

In full swing, too, was reaction against those individual liberties which had been struggled for and largely attained during the previous age. Economic liberalism, already weakened by the rise of tariff protectionism and governmental regulation of capital and labor,1 hardly survived the World War Contracand its aftermath. Not only did the war necessitate a tion of temporary conscription of industry and agriculture by every belligerent nation, but it left a legacy of financial disorder and social unrest highly favorable to continuing experimentation with extreme forms of economic nationalism. Some of these forms were more extreme than others. Undoubtedly Communism, as practiced in the Russian Union of Soviet Republics and preached everywhere, represented the most perfect break with the tradition of economic liberty, but Fascism and National Socialism and all the other dictatorial and "corporate" programs of the post-war period were fundamentally at variance with the passive-policeman idea of the liberal state, and even in remaining democratic countries government assumed economic functions and pursued economic policies which would have shocked earlier generations of "liberals." The truth of the matter was that the masses of mankind were thoroughly disillusioned about the possibility of bettering their lot through unaided individual effort. In their quest for equality, they were willing to sacrifice liberty.

The denial of economic liberty was attended, in the growing ¹ See above, pp. 312-318.

number of Communist and Fascist countries, by drastic abridgment of personal liberty. Individual freedom of speech, publication, and association was far more restricted in Communist Russia than it had been in Tsarist Russia; in the Germany of Hitler than in the Germany of Bismarck; in the Italy of Mussolini than in the Italy of Cavour; in the Mexico of Calles than in the Mexico of Porfirio Diaz. There was increasing resort to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, closer police surveillance of citizens, more restrictive regulation of immigration and emigration, mounting intolerance of internal dissent, a new and fiercer wave of anti-Semitism, and a new and ever more strenuous attempt to direct individual behavior and to control individual conscience. To the Age of Enlightenment, in which it had been fondly believed that liberty would continue slowly but surely to broaden out from generation to generation, was succeeding an age in which liberty was actually and obviously undergoing contraction. It was truly an Age of Disillusionment.

The latest age likewise belied the confidence of the preceding age in steady progress toward a world-order of pacific and cooperating nations. The nationalism which overspread the world proved to be a divisive rather than a unifying force, and the concurrent industrial and technological advance was made to serve primarily nationalistic

sionment

ends. Despite the formation of a League of Nations and despite the frequent repetition of peaceful protestations, there was little or no concrete evidence that the nations of the world were beating their swords into ploughshares or effecting any "moral disarmament" or lessening the causes and occasions of armed conflict. Between nations satisfied with the Peace of Paris and those dissatisfied, and between nations bent on imperialism and those determined to resist it, there could be only a temporary truce; and in the midst of prevalent anxiety about national security and pursuit of national interests, the truce must at best be precarious. Indeed, the question uppermost in the minds of statesmen and publicists fifteen years after the conclusion of the World War was not whether there would be another world war but how soon it would come; not if it would be destructive, but whether greater destruction could be wrought by chemistry and aviation than by artillery.

It had formerly been widely held that if only the masses of

mankind could be put in school and taught to read and write, they would become custodians as well as products of "enlightenment," that they would be equipped to appreciate and secure the benefits of peace, liberty, and democracy. It had accordingly been a central aim of the Era of the Enlightenment, and one of its outstanding achievements, to promote popular and secular education. So far as the promotion of public education was concerned, there was no reaction after the war. In fact, it was now pressed more vigorously and more universally than ever before. Under dictatorships, as in democracies, earnest and largely successful efforts were made to give everybody a schooling and to expose everybody to the supplementary instruction of newspapers, cinemas, and radios. Yet the results of all this educational endeavor were not quite in keeping with "enlightened" hopes. While the least literate nation in Europe Propa-gandist Education submitted to a Communist dictatorship, the most literate stampeded to the Nazi dictatorship of Hitler. Apparently, literacy of itself did not predispose anybody to anything. It merely enlarged the opportunities for propaganda. And, in the dawning new age, expanding education became frankly and boastfully propagandist-in Russia, in Germany, in Italy, in Japan, in Turkey, in Mexico, almost everywhere. It could be so easily managed and manipulated by "ministers of propaganda." It could be so readily utilized to stir emotion, to implant discipline, to propagate "official" doctrines.

What has here been said is but an epitome and interpretation of the national and international events recorded in the two preceding chapters. The waning of individualistic democracy and parliamentary government, the contraction of personal liberty, the triumph of nationalism over internationalism, the failure of education to make people intelligent or critical and its extensive use to fortify dictatorship, all these were marks of a new age. But there were other marks, which we shall mention here and discuss at somewhat greater length in the following sections of the present chapter.

An idea of "progress" was still in evidence, confirmed by
"Progress" very real progress in producing material goods and
creating an economy of abundance, and strengthened
by propaganda to the effect that Communism or Fascism would be a perfect panacea for present ills and a sure guide to

future happiness. But if material progress helped to solve old problems concerning the production of wealth, it gave rise to new and extraordinarily difficult ones affecting the Contindistribution of wealth; and the new dictatorships uing were more successful in regimenting thought than in getting rid of poverty. For everywhere poverty was still paradoxically associated with progress.

Natural science continued to be cultivated and applied with ever greater ardor and ever more astonishing results. Yet in the midst of universal reliance on the practical experimentation and achievement of scientists, the Changing Science scientists themselves, especially the physicists, were becoming curiously disillusioned about natural principles and "laws" which had been regarded as axiomatic throughout the Era of the Enlightenment and fundamental to its philosophy. Mechanical certitudes were newly accompanied and qualified by scientific doubt.

People were still religious. People still had at least a rudimentary philosophy of life. People still liked literature and music and the pictorial and plastic arts. But in all Chaos in these respects there were acutely chaotic differences. Art and Religion of conviction and taste. In general it may be said that, while the claims of historic supernatural world-religion and the forms of classical and traditional art continued to be championed. there was a marked reaction against them. In some places the reaction appeared in the guise of fanatical atheism, with attendant inculcation of materialist philosophy and encouragement of "proletarian" art. In other places the reaction involved an invocation of the "primitive" and the "tribal"—a conscious appreciation of antique and "barbarous" art, and an emotional exalting of the customs and ceremonies of a nation's aboriginal ancestors. The world, whose material civilization was being rapidly unified by a common industrialization, was simultaneously being rent asunder psychologically and culturally by a new tribalism. The cosmos which the Age of Enlightenment had envisaged was being reduced to chaos in the Age of Disillusionment.

2. PROGRESS AND POVERTY

Progress in industrialization proceeded with accelerating pace all over the world. The Industrial Revolution, which since its origin in England had been occurring in one country after another during the eighty years from 1830 to 1910,1 reached a new stage of achievement in the next twenty years. Not only was the output of previously mechanized industries greatly augmented by incessant technological improvements, Industrial but new machine industries sprang up with almost Progress lightning rapidity and expanded with astounding suddenness. Not only was industrialization intensified in "capitalistic" countries such as Great Britain, the United States, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, but it was sedulously fostered by the Communist régime in Soviet Russia and lavishly patronized by dictatorships in such "backward" countries as Turkey, Persia, China, and Mexico. Not only was all Europe being swiftly mechanized, the east and south as well as the west and Throughnorth, but the newest material features of what had out the World been deemed distinctively "western civilization" were becoming common characteristics of what now appeared as "world civilization." There was no longer, in these respects, any real contrast between "West" and "East," or between Europe and the world. The entire world was a unit, as never before, in admiration for the latest technology and in exploitation of the most up-to-date machinery. It was a unit, likewise, in utilization of similar means of working and living and travelling and in adoption of similar social and intellectual attitudes.

Production of coal and iron—the twin bases of modern industrialization—was approximately doubled throughout the world between 1910 and 1930. The decline which appeared in Great Britain 2 was more than offset by the gain in the United States, where the production of coal increased from 415 million tons to 550 million, and of pig iron from 27 ½ million tons to 32 million. The coal production of both Germany and France went up by a third, and the lowering of Germany's iron output was counterbalanced by a doubling of the French output. By 1930, moreover, Russia was mining more coal than France and more iron than Great Britain. Besides, production of coal was increasing in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Australia, and South Africa, and of iron and steel

¹ On the Industrial Revolution from its beginnings to 1870, see above, pp. 3-60; and on its progress from 1870 to 1910, see above, pp. 284-307.

² See above, p. 944.

in Czechoslovakia, Spain, Sweden, India, Japan, and China. The world output of pig iron, which had risen from about 12 million tons in 1870 to about 40 million in 1910, reached almost 80 million tons in 1930.

It was similar with the textile industries. While the worldproduction of cotton gained only slightly, that of wool increased by over a fifth, that of natural silk almost doubled, Textiles and that of artificial silk (or rayon) multiplied a hundredfold—mounting from 6 million pounds in 1910 to 600 million in 1933. This rayon development was one of the outstanding accomplishments of post-war industrialization. It had hardly begun before 1910,1 and it assumed large proportions only after 1920. From the start, too, it was a thoroughly mechanized industry: the raw material was made by machinery, and its whole manufacture of thread and cloth was by machinery. Furthermore, it became suddenly important all over the world in almost every European country and in the United States and Argentina, Japan and Australia. In these respects the new rayon industry but emphasized the post-war trend of the older textile industries toward ever more automatic mechanizing and toward ever broader diffusion. In the cotton industry, for example, electric power was generally substituted for steam power, spinning and weaving machines were "modernized," and chief production was no longer restricted to Lancashire (in England) or to northeastern districts of the United States but was shared with southern United States, eastern Europe, Egypt, India, China, and Japan.

Along with the textile industries advanced other well-established industries, alike in quantitative output and in world diffusion. Such was true of the leather industry, pottery and porcelain, paper and printing, typewriters, Other Industries cutlery, firearms, furniture, tinware, tools, canning and refrigeration, electrical goods. There was an especially marked advance of the electrical industries. Electric power was substituted more and more for steam power. Hydro-electric power plants were multiplied.² Electric lighting was immensely bettered through the use of the tungsten filament lamp which had been invented just before the World War by an American scientist, William Coolidge.

¹ On its beginning, see above, p. 287.

² See above, pp. 290, 942, 955.

Undoubtedly the most striking and significant industrial developments had to do with means of communication and transportation. The existing network of railways was much Railways extended in Asia and Africa and South America, and rail locomotives, driven by steam or electricity, conveyed prodigious numbers of persons and prodigious quantities of goods not only in Europe and the United States but in every country of the world. In the year 1930 the Japanese railways carried over one and a quarter billion passengers, almost as many as the British or German railways; Russian railways carried more passengers than those of the United States; the railways of Argentina transported more than those of Poland; and the hundred million passengers carried by Italian railways were exceeded almost fourfold by the passenger traffic of Australian railways and fully sixfold by that of Indian railways. In the same year Russian railways hauled 280 million tons of freight, almost as much as the British or German railways and a third of the total hauled by American railways, while the Japanese railways were surpassed in freight handling by the Indian, and the Australian were almost equalled by the South African.

The existing network of steamship lines was similarly expanded, and the total tonnage of the world's merchant shipping rose from 42 million in 1910 to 49 million in 1914, to 57 million in 1920, and to almost 70 million in 1930. Great Britain retained a larger merchant fleet than any other nation, but the ratio of its tonnage to the world-total decreased from 44 per cent to 29. The tonnage of the United States and also of Italy and the Netherlands doubled between 1910 and 1930 and that of Japan tripled, while the merchant shipping of both France and Norway increased by a half. Only the merchant marine of Germany underwent an absolute decline, and by 1930 most of the shipping losses which she had suffered from the World War were repaired. The vast majority of the total world tonnage, moreover, was now powered by steam, and ships were being built larger and equipped with constantly improved machinery.

¹ The relative rank of the major shipping nations in 1930, with their approximate tonnages, was as follows: Great Britain, 20,500,000; United States, 14,000,000; Japan, 4,300,000; Germany, 4,200,000; Norway, 3,700,000; France, 3,500,000; Italy, 3,300,000; Netherlands, 3,000,000.

The girdling of the earth with telegraph and telephone wires proceeded apace. By 1930 the mileage of telegraph wires amounted to 2,800,000 in North America, 2,200,000 Telegraph in Europe, 900,000 in Asia, 400,000 in South America, and 225,000 in Africa, 175,000 in Oceania, and 100,000 under the seas. The mileage of telephone wires was even more startling: it totalled 150 million for the world—93 million in North America, 45 million in Europe, 5 million in Asia (of which 3½ million were in Japan), 3½ million in Oceania, 2½ million in South America, and 1 million in Africa. In 1934 a telegram was sent around the world, from New York back again to New York, in 3 minutes and 46 seconds. In the same year a man could talk with himself, by telephone and radio, around the globe.

To telephone and telegraph, steamship and railway, which had already had revolutionary significance for communication and transportation in the nineteenth century, were now added new twentieth-century devices of automobile, motor truck, airplane, motion picture, and radio. Originating just prior to 1910, all of these were found quite practical and were greatly improved during the post-war period, when their production assumed colossal proportions as their operation wrought gigantic changes.

Production of motor cars and trucks developed principally and very rapidly in the United States.¹ Here the annual manufacture of passenger cars rose from 181,000 in 1910 to 2 million in 1920 and on to 43/4 million in 1929, while Transport that of trucks mounted from 6,000 in 1910 to 830,000 in 1020. Outside the United States, however, a considerable and gradually increasing number of cars were produced in Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, and also in Canada and Japan; and regardless of where they might be manufactured, their use was ever extending and expanding. The number of motor vehicles registered outside the United States in 1920 was only a million and a quarter, hardly 15 per cent of the worldtotal; in 1935 it was eleven million, representing 50 per cent of the world-total.

Aviation, just beginning in 1910,² was enormously stimulated and developed by the World War, and was utilized immediately

¹ On the beginning of automobiles, see above, p. 298.

² See above, pp. 298-300.

afterwards for commercial carrying of mails, passengers, and express. Regular airplane service was soon inaugurated between Paris and London and between other chief Aviation cities in Europe and also in America, and presently it was established from London to Alexandria in Egypt and on to Bagdad and India, from Paris across northern and western Africa to Brazil, and from New York southward to Mexico and Central and South America. In 1920 regular commercial airlines covered 2,200 miles in Europe and 3,200 in the world at large; in 1934 some 50,000 miles were covered in Europe, 30,000 in the United States, and at least 120,000 in other continents and overseas. For most of these routes, airplanes were employed, but particularly in and from Germany some airships or Zeppelins continued in use. In 1929 a Zeppelin circumnavigated the globe, from Friedrickshafen (in Germany) via Tokio and Los Angeles and New York back to Friedrickshafen, in twenty days. Already, in 1927, an American aviator, Charles Lindbergh, won international fame by flying an airplane alone and without a stop from New York to Paris; and in 1934 two Frenchmen, Paul Codos and Maurice Rossi, made a non-stop flight from Paris to New York. Gasoline motors for both airplanes and airships, as well as for automobiles and tractors, were being constantly improved, and airplanes were being increasingly utilized, not only for commercial purposes, but also as auxiliaries to army and navy and for purposes of recreation, exploration, and science. In 1934 an Italian army flier established a new altitude record by ascending in an airplane almost nine miles above the earth, and in the same year two British army officers made the first west-to-east airplane crossing of the Pacific Ocean, from Brisbanc, Australia, to Oakland, California, in fifteen days. By airplane an American naval officer, Admiral Richard Byrd, explored the Arctic Ocean and visited the North Pole in 1926, and then in 1929 explored the Antarctic Continent and flew over the South Pole.

The fuelling of gasoline engines for the rapidly growing number of automobiles, motor trucks, and airplanes gave a great impetus to the petroleum industry—to the production of the crude oil and to its refining and distribution. Between 1910 and 1933 the world output of petroleum increased over fourfold, from 325 million barrels to 1,370 million.

¹ On the beginning of the petroleum industry, see above, p. 300.

The industry was most highly developed in the United States, where the supply of the raw material was most plentiful and the demand for it greatest, but by 1933 it was quickening in other countries. In this year, while the United States furnished 60 per cent of the world output, Russia furnished 11 per cent, Venezuela 9, Rumania and Persia 4 each, Mexico and the Dutch East Indies 3 each, and Colombia 2 per cent, the remaining 4 per cent being produced by Peru, Argentina, India, Poland, Japan, and Egypt.

Another industry, which had been comparatively an infant in 1910 but which was brought to speedy maturity by the needs of the new motor transportation, was the rubber industry.1 This, like the petroleum industry, consumed multiplying quantities of raw material, rising from 75,000 tons in 1910 to 850,000 tons in 1933; and, like the petroleum industry, its manufacture (though not its supply of raw material) was largely concentrated in the United States. In 1933 the United States consumed about 65 per cent of the world's production of crude rubber; Great Britain, 10 per cent; France and Germany, 6 per cent each; Canada, 4; Japan, 3; and Russia and Italy, 2 per cent each. The value of rubber goods manufactured in the United States was estimated at one and a quarter billion dollars. Almost all the crude rubber now came, not from "wild" trees, but from cultivated "plantations," principally in the Dutch East Indies, the Malay peninsula, and Ceylon, and secondarily in India, Borneo, French Indo-China, Siam, and Africa.

Elaboration of motor highways attended the development of motor transport, and was attended in turn by an ever greater and more widespread utilization of "concrete." ² Concrete roads soon parallelled railways or provided a "concrete for them, and, in addition, concrete (reenforced by iron or steel) was increasingly employed for public buildings, industrial plants, garages and hangars, dwellings, sidewalks, piers, harbor walls, bridges, telegraph poles, and even shipbuilding.

Motion pictures were still another universal phenomenon of the post-war period. Though originally invented prior to 1910,³ they were perfected and popularized during the World War and

¹ On the beginning of the rubber industry, see above, p. 300.

² See above, pp. 300-301.

³ See above, p. 296.

more especially after 1920. In 1928 "sound" pictures (or "talking movies") were first made, and very soon afterwards they were being heard, as well as seen, all over Motion **Pictures** the world. By 1930 there were 60,000 motion-picture theatres—27,400 in Europe, 20,500 in the United States, 4,000 in Latin America, 4,000 in the Far East, 3,000 in the overseas British Dominions, 1,000 in Africa, and 100 in the Near East. In the United States alone the weekly attendance at the cinema averaged 130 million. In the production of motion pictures, the United States led, with 140 studios, two-thirds of which were located at Hollywood (near Los Angeles); and Germany, France, and Japan followed in this order. The large majority of films displayed in the British Dominions, Latin America, and most countries of Europe, were American-made, although most foreign governments were beginning to censor and limit American imports and to favor domestic production.

Accompanying the rise of motion pictures and excelling them in revolutionary effect was the development of radio. Wireless telegraphy had been in some use since the opening of Radio the twentieth century, 1 but it was not until 1920 that the first permanent radio broadcasting station was put into operation-by an American concern, the Westinghouse Company—and private homes began to be equipped with radioreceiving sets. Thenceforth, however, progress in the production and use of radios was sensationally rapid. Within fifteen years every nation in the world had at least one broadcasting station: in Europe there were 375 stations, in North America 850, in South America 225, in Asia 135, in Oceania 100, and in Africa 25; China had 75 stations, Turkey 2, and Vatican City 1. As for radio-receiving sets, the United States led the world with 18½ million, followed by Great Britain with 6 million, Germany with 5½ million, Japan with 2 million, and France with 1½ million. But everywhere there were enough to enable the vast majority of mankind, whether in town or country, to receive practically simultaneous news of what was happening in Rome or Manchester, Berlin or Moscow, Tokio or Mexico City, Calcutta or Melbourne, Cape Town or Minneapolis, Jerusalem or Mecca. Everywhere, thanks to the radio, the opportunities and incentives for propaganda were well nigh perfect.

¹ See above, p. 202.

From hearing at a great distance, it was only a step to seeing; and this step was initiated in the 1920's by experiments with television carried on more or less independently by several European and American physicists, notably Charles Jenkins (born 1867), a native of Ohio, and John Baird (born 1888), a native of Scotland. In 1925 these inventors exhibited apparatus capable of developing electrical currents from images and reconstructing luminous images from the currents. In 1928 Baird announced the successful transmission of images and scenes across the Atlantic and in color.

Industrial advance of the post-war period was accompanied by an increase in the world output not only of manufactured goods and such raw materials as coal and iron, petroleum and rubber, but also of foodstuffs. For the industrializing and mechanizing of agriculture continued, and produced an ever Agricullarger yield of meat and grain, vegetables and fruits. In respect of grain, for example, the wheat crop of the Progress world steadily enlarged from 3,250 million bushels in 1920 (which was about what it had been in 1910 and 1900) to 4,550 million bushels in 1930, at the very time when scarcely smaller gains were being made in the world-production of rye, barley, oats, corn, and rice. Apparently the latest phase of the Industrial Revolution was providing humankind with an ampler supply of food and clothing as well as with more expeditious means of communication and a greater range of creature comforts.

And yet . . . And yet . . . Dogging the heels of industrial progress was unprecedented poverty! In the midst of a boasted "economy of abundance," when there was much more for everybody to eat and wear and enjoy than ever before in the world's history, when industrialization was spreading and intensifying everywhere, raising productive capacity to new heights and promoting millionaires to the grade of billionaires, a most disillusioning economic depression set in. It was by no means the first depression in modern times, but it was more general, more severe, and more continuous than any previous one. Beginning in 1929, every country was affected in measure as it had been industrialized. Stocks and bonds depreciated in value. Factories and mills and

On the Industrial Revolution in agriculture, see above, pp. 34-40, 301.

shops shut down. Industrial workers lost their jobs and their wages and had to be cared for by private charity or public doles.

By 1932 the number of unemployed and destitute workers in western and central Europe, the United ployment States, and Japan (the most highly industrialized portions of the earth) was estimated at 30 million, including 6 million in Germany, 3 million in Great Britain, 11/4 million in Italy, I million in Czechoslovakia, I million in Japan, and over 12 million in the United States. Here was mass unemployment. with mass poverty, of unexampled proportions. And with hosts of men (and their families) thus deprived of purchasing power, the demand for the products of machine industry, and hence for raw materials and foodstuffs, markedly declined, with further deleterious effects upon industry and commerce and likewise upon agriculture. To the millions of persons who had no income at all were added many more millions whose income was terribly reduced. The world was experiencing as much progress in poverty as in technology.

Some responsibility for the depression resided no doubt in the extraordinary extension of credit during the World War and in the ensuing inflation and over-speculation of the post-war years, and there was a tendency in many quarters to regard it as an inevitable but transitory phase in the latest of those "business cycles" which had periodically characterized modern industry.

Crisis in Technology and Capitalism

A greater and more fundamental responsibility, however, would seem to lie in the fact that by 1929 both industrial technology and industrial capitalism were entering a new and very critical stage of development.

The Industrial Revolution had originated, we may recall, through the application of private capital to the invention and exploitation of machines, and by essentially the same means it had been carried forward during a century and more down to the World War and the post-war years and been extended outward from one country to another, from one continent to another, throughout the world. Persons of wealth owned the machines and employed them for the amassing of more wealth. They speeded them up. They multiplied them. They improved and elaborated them. Early industrial machines were vastly more productive than previous hand-tools, and later machines were progressively more productive. Not only were they more and

more productive. They were rendered more and more automatic. They needed fewer and fewer human hands to operate them. Indeed, increase in technical efficiency of production was an important and abiding feature of the whole process of modern industrialization. It was made possible by science and technology. It was patronized and promoted by the spirit of capitalistic profit-making.

Increase in technical efficiency and hence in production could go on for some time to the growing advantage of capitalists and without serious disadvantage to most workingmen, because, as the methods of manufacture improved, the markets expanded rapidly enough to absorb the new goods. When some new invention made it possible for an employer to produce an equal or even a greater quantity of goods with only half the number of employes, the surplus of workers would be dismissed, but few of them would be likely to remain permanently unemployed. For sooner or later the fortunate capitalist would use his augmented profits to start a new enterprise in which more workers could find jobs, and consequently what is called technological unemployment could largely cure itself.

Recently, however, and especially since the World War, the improvements in industrial (and agricultural) machinery have been extending all over the world and increasing more rapidly than the increase of new markets, with the result that vast quantities of goods have been produced which cannot be profitably disposed of. These goods, however much they may be desired, cannot be sold because the only persons who might buy them would be those employed in producing them. And as the proportion of workers grows less, the proportion of potential buyers grows less, for the workers are the buyers—and, without employment and the money it brings, they simply cannot buy the goods that are produced in such abundance. But this is not all. For when the masses, by reason of widespread unemployment, are unable to make purchases, the manufacturers are unable to make sales, so that not only the proletariat but the retailing and trading middle classes and finally capitalism itself are faced with the threat of ruin.

In other words, the latest stage in the industrialization of the world under capitalistic auspices was demonstrating a most disconcerting fact, that as the production of goods grows more efficient the distribution and consumption of goods grow less efficient. This is the basic explanation of the paradoxical contemporary spectacle of Poverty in the midst of Plenty. It is as absurd as it is tragic, and as difficult to overcome as it is widespread and deep-seated.

Practically, what was done in most industrial nations to cope with the new and critical situation was for government to intervene—to provide subsistence for the enlarging armies Governof the industrially unemployed either by giving them ment Inoutright doles or by paying them wages for public tervention works, and to meet the resulting increased expense by imposing heavier taxes upon the wealthy minority or by borrowing huge sums of money from them. Such procedures could hardly be more than temporary or transitional makeshifts. For no intelligent or conscientious person could look forward with any satisfaction to an enduring situation in which a dwindling group of men would own all property and control all industrial and agricultural machinery and from their immense profits maintain the masses of mankind in a life of more or less chronic idleness.

even if idleness were shorn of some of its worst features Its Limby a most benevolent patronage of popular education itations and of organized sport and recreation. And there were more immediate difficulties. Industry, even the most technically perfected industry, might not stand the continuing strain of governmental taxes and borrowings sufficient to provide for crowds of industrially unemployed persons ever increasing in number and demanding an ever increasing share of goods. Wealthy persons would naturally grow more and more fearful and resentful of progressive governmental inroads and restrictions on their wealth; they would pay taxes and subscribe to public loans with more and more reluctance; and they would try to halt rather than to forward any far-reaching reform affecting the distribution of wealth. On the other hand, poor and idle persons would naturally become more discontented, more restless, and more responsive to demagogic agitation; and with swelling numbers they might successfully back violent revolution in preference to orderly reform.

¹This and the preceding two paragraphs are adapted from a challenging paper by Professor W. P. Montague on "Democracy at the Cross Roads" which was read at the International Congress of Philosophy at Prague in 1934.

Government intervention was particularly conspicuous in countries subject to dictatorship, such as Russia, where the Communist régime attempted to abolish private capital altogether, and Italy and Germany, where Fascist dictatorships tried to regulate private enterprise and make it serve "national" ends. Undoubtedly the increasing vogue of dictatorial and bureaucratic government, especially after 1929, all over central as well as eastern Europe, and in many other parts of the world likewise, was greatly enhanced by the contemporary economic crisis and by popular disillusionment about the ability of democratic government to remedy it. But there can be some doubt about the ability of dictatorships to do away with the evils inherent in the latest stage of industrial capitalism without rendering the cure worse than the disease. For if self-interest and desire for private profit are to be given up as the prime incentives to economic activity, then force and a more or less militaristic compulsion must take their place. And if the rights and liberties of private property are to be abolished in favor of bureaucratic ownership or bureaucratic regulation by the state, then those other rights and liberties which constitute the essence of human personality, and without which the individual would be degraded to the status of a bee in a hive or a cog in a machine, must be abolished also.

To date, Fascist dictatorships have accomplished much more in destroying personal freedom than in getting rid of poverty or lessening its causes. The Communist dictatorship, at an even greater cost of personal freedom, has succeeded in increasing industrial production and at the same time in raising the standard of living for the masses (while lowering that of the classes), but in Russia the level of general living is still pretty low, industrialization is still in its infancy, and probably, as the Revolution runs its course and the masses acquire a taste for greater comforts, the Communist bureaucracy will be faced with much the same fundamental difficulty as that confronting any capitalistic group—how to retain its power and harmonize progress and poverty.

No sure and practical solution of the basic problem of progress and poverty is now in sight. Yet everyone recognizes that some such solution must be found. It is a challenge to the present and succeeding generations.

3. MECHANICAL CERTAINTIES AND SCIENTIFIC DOUBT

The latest age witnessed, as we have noted in the foregoing section, the world-wide triumph of machines of precision, speed, and mass production. It was the machine age *par excellence*. This was certain. There could be no doubt about it.

Nor could there be any doubt that the progressive industrializing and mechanizing of the world was intimately associated with the accumulating achievements of technology, of engineering and applied science, and, fundamentally, of tance of Science experimental science. Without intensive and manifold pursuit of the natural science which had developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the twentieth century could not have been the supreme machine age which it was. Just as the industrialization of the era from 1870 to 1910 was surpassed by the industrialization of the period after 1910, so the scientific experimentation and accomplishment of the former era 1 reached a climax in the latter period. It was the advance of science as well as of mechanical industry which rendered the World War of 1914-1918 different in kind from any earlier war and far more disturbing in degree; and the World War in turn served further to stimulate scientific research as well as industrial production. The post-war years were years of amazing discoveries and applications in the field of natural science.

Science was now a universal cult. It had more high-priests and more acolytes, and a much larger mass-following, than ever before. It was fostered assiduously by almost every government in the world, whether by the "bourgeois" Support of Science democracies of the West or by the "proletarian" dictatorship of Russia, whether by the nationalist régimes of Germany and Italy or by those of Japan and Turkey. It was patronized by every big corporation, by every university and technical school, by almost every individual of wealth. temples were laboratories, and scientific laboratories multiplied and expanded as "research institutes" in connection with all manner of public and private enterprise. The cult was handsomely supported by government funds and by endowments of semi-private "foundations." No one begrudged financial outlays for "science." For everyone was now sufficiently "science-

¹ See above, pp. 327-353.

conscious" to be respectful toward scientists and to marvel at their doings, and the cult of science was obviously a cult of "good works." Men might be dubious about theories, but they had to accept facts. They might not grasp the full bearing of "pure" physics or chemistry or biology, any more than of pure theology, but they were quite devoted to the practical applications of science which conferred upon them such certainties as motor transport, photography, and physical health and comfort.

Physics and chemistry had been the twin sciences most esteemed and forwarded throughout the whole Era of the Enlightenment-from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, through the nineteenth, and up into the twentieth. And now their practical applications were particularly striking. It was applied physics which was providing man with constantly improving automobiles, airplanes, radios, electric power and lighting, and all sorts of machinery. It was applied chemistry which was furnishing him with Physics growing knowledge of useful properties of natural and substances and enabling him to multiply the production of field and factory, to make synthetic goods and artificial ice, to preserve foodstuffs, to "take" pictures and produce motion pictures. There was, of course, no sharp cleavage between physics and chemistry. A practical application of the one always involved some practical application of the other, and progress in the one was accompanied ever more clearly by progress in the other. The physicist and the chemist were now close allies of each other, and the two were joint directors and dispensers of the marvellous realities of contemporary technology.

Biology had not had as long a vogue as physics or chemistry. It was, so to speak, an afterthought of the Era of the Enlightenment. But with its rapid rise and revolutionary progress in the second half of the nineteenth century, it had come to occupy a central position in scientific thought during the period from 1870 to 1910—and afterwards also. As it continued to be studied and applied, it ceased to be a rival of physics and chemistry and became rather their ally and intimate associate. Indeed, the most marked feature of the twentieth-century science of biology was its utilization of the methods and

¹ On biological science during this period, see above, pp. 342-349.

findings of physical and chemical science; so much so that in the latest age biology could almost be said to have been resolved into biophysics and biochemistry.

Biology, like physics and chemistry, proved increasingly useful. Especially in physiology, medicine, and surgery, its utility

was as certain as it was sensational. Painstaking microscopic investigation of animal bodies disclosed elab-Medical Science orate mechanisms, the existence of which had hardly been suspected previously, and led to experimental work on them of prime significance to the physical health of human For example, novel study was made of the hitherto beings. mysterious ductless glands, or secretory organs, in Study of Glands animals and humans. In 1901 a Japanese biologist, Takamine by name, isolated adrenalin in the suprarenal glands, determined its chemical nature, and found it useful in regulating heart action. In 1910 similar work was begun on the sexual glands, and shortly afterwards on the pituitary gland. The latter, it was discovered, influenced physical growth; if it was over-active, it would produce a giant, and if under-active, a dwarf-conditions which might be partially corrected by an artificial halting or speeding up of the pituitary gland. In 1919 the active principle of the thyroid gland, needful for both bodily and mental development, was detected and named "thyroxin" by an American biochemist, Edward Calvin Kendall, at the Mayo laboratories in Minnesota, and its exact chemical constitution was determined in 1926 by a British biochemist, Charles Harington, at the University of London. In 1922 a young Canadian scientist and professor at the University of Toronto, Frederick Banting, obtained from the pancreatic gland of sheep an extract, called insulin, for the alleviation of human diabetes.

Likewise it was demonstrated, just before the World War, by a British biochemist at the University of Cambridge, Sir Frederick Hopkins, that physical health requires in the diet certain "accessory factors," to which the name of vitamins was subsequently

vitamins given. Thanks to continuing post-war researches of Hopkins, of several German biochemists, and perhaps chiefly of Henry Sherman, a professor at Columbia University in New York, several different kinds of vitamins were discovered and their respective functions described. Vitamins A and D, for example, were found mainly in animal fats, such as butter

and cod-liver oil, and in green plants: A would protect the animal generally from infection and specifically from a type of eye disease; D would ensure the proper calcification of bones in the growing animal. Vitamin B, found in the outer layer of various grains and in yeast, would be a safeguard against the disease of beri-beri. Vitamin C, present in fresh green plant tissues and in certain fruits, especially the lemon, would prevent scurvy. And there were other vitamins whose character and use were discovered.

On the Darwinian theory of evolution, which had made such a stir in the second half of the nineteenth century,1 twentiethcentury biologists, botanists, and zoölogists amassed much factual data of considerable importance. The Evolution more evidence they accumulated, the more it confirmed the basic assumption of Darwin, that the process of life on the earth had been evolutionary. At the same time, however, it made clear that the process was not as simple as Darwin had surmised and certainly not as simple as Huxley or Haeckel had maintained. As the distinguished biologist William Bateson² said in 1922, summarizing contemporary scientific evidence for evolution: "In dim outline evolution is evident enough. From the facts it is a conclusion which inevitably follows. But that particular and essential bit of the theory of evolution which is concerned with the origin and nature of species remains utterly mysterious." In other words, the particular explanations which Darwin offered of the origin of species—natural selection, sexual selection, and inheritance of acquired characteristics—did not really explain. The inheritance of acquired characteristics, though still debatable, was extremely doubtful, and a new difficulty had recently arisen from the seeming dependence of variation on elements being lost and not gained.

Mendel's basic principles of heredity ³ were confirmed and their application extended. Many deficiencies and abnormalities, such as color-blindness and eye cataract, were shown to follow Mendelian rules in their descent. One of the lian most brilliant contributors to exact knowledge of heredity was an American, Thomas Morgan (born 1866), for many years professor at Columbia University and latterly direc-

¹ See above, pp. 343-348, 363-365.

² See above, p. 340.

³ See above, pp. 348-349.

tor of the biological laboratory at the California Institute of Technology. Morgan's painstaking investigation of the cell structure of the fruit-fly revealed that within T. H. Morgan each cell nucleus is a number of thread-like bodies which have been called "chromosomes," and that there is an actual numerical correspondence between the number of groups of hereditary qualities and the number of pairs of chromosomes. Additional study by Morgan and by others disclosed that there were different numbers of paired chromosomes (or "genes") in different plants and animals: four in the fruit-fly, seven in the garden pea, eight in wheat, probably twenty-four in man. It was further demonstrated that with twenty "genes" there would be, by permutations and combinations, over a million possible kinds of germ cells, and that with the juncture of two such sets (male and female) there would be a prodigiously greater number of possible combinations. Biology thus offered a scientific explanation as to why no two individuals in a mixed race are identical. Biology of race was becoming biology of the individual.

Not only did biology become increasingly practical in combination with chemistry and physics, but earnest efforts were made to psychology similarly practical by treating it as an exact physical and chemical science. Following in the footsteps of Wundt, the "father of physiological psychology," a Russian scientist and physician, Ivan Pavlov (born 1849), had begun in the 1890's to make detailed psychological observations of animals and humans, not in terms of supposed internal consciousness, but in those of external physical stimuli and reactions. The outcome was a physiological psychology of "conditioned reflexes," which, as subsequently developed by an American professor at Johns Hopkins University, John Watson (born 1878), became widely known after the World War as "behaviorism." According to the

Behaviorist, no one from outside can detect a being's consciousness, sensation, perception, or will, and consequently these concepts must be regarded by the scientific psychologist as unreal and non-existent. It suffices for him to suppose that "we talk and then we think---if indeed we think at all," and to concentrate on the study of stimulus and response. For as man is a machine by the definitions of

¹ See above, p. 352.

mechanics, so psychology, by behaviorist definitions and axioms, must be the physical response of the animal-machine to physical stimulus.

Whatever may be the doubts about the "whole truth" of behaviorism, there can be no doubt that it was of practical value, especially in the observational and experimental study of child psychology. It also contributed, along with other types of psychological research, to the contemporary vogue of "intelligence tests" and "aptitude tests." Such tests were numerously devised and extensively applied, and altest though there was a tendency to claim too much for them, some of them were doubtless useful in indicating, at least roughly, what a child was mentally equipped to undertake.

Another novel and practical interpretation of psychology was made by Sigmund Freud (born 1856), an Austrian Jew, who, after studying medicine at Vienna and Paris, became a clinical neurologist and the foremost practitioner of "psycho-analysis." Freud invested psychology with a strict determinism, explaining everything, from our most trivial mistakes to our most cherished beliefs, as due to the operation of powerful instinctive forces, which mature with the body and which, if checked or distorted, may be the cause of mental ill-health. He particularly stressed (1) the existence of the "unconscious" and its dynamic influence on consciousness. (2) the existence of intrapsychical conflicts between various sets of forces, the chief of which is "repression," (3) the existence and paramount importance of infantile sexuality, and (4) the use of psycho-analysis, that is, of resuscitating buried memories through a process of "free association," as the remedy for mental disorder and perversion.

Freudian psychology had an immense vogue in the twentieth century. In 1908 the first international congress of psychoanalysts was held, and in 1910 a permanent international association was formed. Before long, Freudian principles and Freudian methods were being applied not only to living individuals but to historic personages and also to nations and to society at large. Many differences of emphasis arose among the disciples of Freud, and in the post-war years there was a marked reaction against his excessive dogmatism and in

On the beginnings of psychological "testing," see above, p. 353.

favor of a considerably modified "psychiatry." Yet the latest and great vogue of psychiatry, and also of social and educational psychology, owed much, both in point of view and in method, to the pioneer work of Sigmund Freud.

Just as, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, leading psychologists insisted that they were natural and experimental "scientists," so an increasing number of students of history, anthropology, economics, politics, and sociology made similar These contended, more strenuously than ever before, claims. that their several subjects were "social sciences," sus-Social ceptible of the same objective treatment and mechan-Sciences ical interpretation as physics or chemistry or biology involving the same minute observation of phenomena, the same marshalling of facts, the same eventual deduction of "laws." It seemed as if the Positivist ideal of Auguste Comte 1 was about to be realized. As the natural scientists collaborated in a multitude of laboratories and research institutes, the social scientists took to coöperating in libraries, research councils, and field work. Vast masses of factual data were collected and published about man's present and past occupations and activities, about his social life, about his economic life, about his political life, about his cultural life. Never before had there been such an outpouring of doctoral dissertations, such a profusion of "scientific" monographs, such an elaboration of cooperative research and publication. Never before had governments and private corporations availed themselves so much or so consistently of the findings and advice of social scientists. There appeared to be a positive and certain utility in social science, and at any rate, thanks to multiplying research, there was available to the world a vast

So much for the certainties of scientific and mechanical achievement in the twentieth century. But alongside the certainties, which represented a culmination of the scientific progress of the whole Era of the Enlightenment, emerged now some strange Revoluand troublesome doubts about scientific beliefs closely associated with the progress of that Era. These doubts portended the coming, in the domain of natural science, of a new era—the Era of Disillusionment. They did for long-flourishing scientific ideas what the World

quantity of social information.

¹ On Comte and Positivism, see above, pp. 368-374.

War did for pacifism, and the rise of dictatorship for democracy. Applied science might go on from its latest triumphs to still greater triumphs, but the philosophy and metaphysics of science could not confidently continue along the simply material and mechanical lines which it had been following since the seventeenth century. For now there were doubts—very serious doubts—about Newtonian physics itself, about the very nature of matter and motion, about "natural laws," even about the conception of "cause and effect." Physicists under—Physics went a veritable revolution in thought, and the revolution in physics was bound to affect chemists and biologists, and in time psychologists and social scientists. It was quite upsetting and disillusioning.

Three developments in twentieth-century physics inaugurated the revolution: the propounding of the quantum theory; the demonstration of the principle of relativity; and the study of atomic structure and activity. The quantum theory was advanced by a German physicist, Max Planck, in 1901 to account for a curious phenomenon in "black-body" and the Quantum radiation which could not be accounted for by gen-Theory erally accepted "laws" of physics. According to current physical theory, radiation from a "black body" (that is, a body which absorbs most of the radiant energy that it receives) should be concentrated at the violet end of the spectrum; instead, it was found on actual experimentation to be piled up at the opposite, or red, end of the spectrum. Whereupon Planck suggested a new theory that would square with the experimental results. He supposed that all radiation comes from a vibrating body, much as sound comes from a violin string when plucked. The old "laws" of physics had assumed that each vibration would gradually cease and the vibrator gradually return to a state of rest until it was set in motion again. Planck's new idea was that the vibrator, instead of steadily and gradually emitting energy as it slowed down, gave out energy by jerks and in little units (or "quanta"); it could put out one unit, or several, but not a fraction of a unit. In 1912 Planck extended his quantum theory to all kinds of energy and added the assumption that only

¹ On the materialistic and mechanistic metaphysics of modern times, see Vol. I, pp. 506-512, and the present volume, above, pp. 355-358.

² On Newton, see Vol. I, pp. 400-502.

emission proceeds discontinuously, by jumps and in quanta, while absorption is continuous. Using this revolutionary hypothesis, he was able to present a detailed explanation of the actual distribution of "black-body" radiation among the different colors of the spectrum. In 1918 Planck was awarded the Nobel prize for physics.

What was thus begun by Max Planck was carried farther by an even more famous physicist, Albert Einstein (born 1879), a German of Jewish family, who had been educated at the Swiss University of Zürich, and after teaching there and at Prague for some time had become director of the physics institute at Berlin. Einstein refined the quantum theory and applied it with eminent success to the phenomena of the liberation of electrons from metals under the influence of light. And since then the theory has been further applied to a wide variety of problems connected with the structure of atoms and the behavior of their electrons.

Simultaneously with the development and application of the quantum theory, the principle of "relativity" was adopted and worked out mathematically by Albert Einstein. It was intended to supply certain recognized deficiencies tivity in the physics of Sir Isaac Newton, but its eventual effect was less to supplement than to revolutionize Newtonian assumptions.

Physicists had long been aware of a basic difficulty about the Newtonian conception of motion as something absolute: always and everywhere the same. They knew that it could not be the same unless it were related to the same thing. This difficulty Newton had met partly by ignoring it and partly by assuming vaguely that something in outer space might be entirely at rest. Nineteenth-century physicists had attempted to surmount the difficulty by supposing that there is an intangible something filling all space, a something which they called "ether." The ether hypothesis was convenient; it not only provided for a medium through which light-waves could undulate, analogous

¹At Berlin, Einstein remained until 1931, when the anti-Semitic campaign of the Nazis made him glad to accept a proferred asylum at Oxford University. In 1933 he settled in the United States at Princeton. He was awarded the Nobel prize for physics in 1921.

Note. The picture opposite, an example of "abstract" "modernist" sculpture, is by Amadeo Modigliani (1884–1920), concerning whom see below, p. 1150.





to the water through which sea-waves undulated, but it also offered an explanation of absolute motion and thus supported the Newtonian assumptions. If there was an all-pervading ether, the sun and planets and stars were all moving in it, and so their motion could be considered as absolute by reference to it, just as a bird's motion can be referred to the air through which it wings its way.

Unfortunately for the peace of mind of physicists, the ether hypothesis was exploded by a delicate practical experiment which two American scientists performed in 1887 and which was repeated many times afterwards—always with the same disconcerting results. No effect of "ether" upon motion was discoverable, and hence the predicating of absolute motion on the existence of "ether" was no longer tenable. Motion, after all, must be relative and not absolute.

But this conclusion about the relative character of motion carried with it other and equally disturbing conclusions. Length could not be absolute; it must vary with differing points of observation and velocities of motion. Moreover, there could be no absolute time, for time is relative to motion; persons and instruments alike will figure time differently if they are moving with different velocities. Nor could there be absolutely simultaneous occurrences, for occurrences are relative to time, and time is relative to motion. In fine, no physical measurement in the ordinary and traditional way could be made by anyone, which would not be different to an observer not sharing his motion. If referred merely to the motion of the earth, physical measurements might still have, of course, an immediate workaday utility in a geocentric way (like astronomy before the time of Copernicus), but they would be of no value in understanding the universe objectively and scientifically. It was obviously important to find a way of re-formulating Newtonian physics in relative terms.

To this task, Einstein applied his extraordinary mathematical

¹ The so-called Michelson-Morley experiment. Albert Michelson, born in Germany and educated at the United States Naval Academy, was professor of physics at the Case School in Cleveland in the 1880's and at the University of Chicago from 1892 to his death in 1931. He was awarded the Nobel prize for physics in 1907.

NOTE.. The portrait of Albert Einstein, opposite, is from an etching by a German artist, Emil Orlik (1870-1932).

genius. In 1905 he showed by his Special Theory of Relativity how statements of physical facts could be made that were identical for all observers moving with any velocity relative to one another, provided only that their motions were uniform. Then in 1915 he achieved his General Theory of Relativity by which he could state physical facts so that they would be the same for all observers, regardless of how they were moving. Just how Einstein constructed and formulated his special and general theories can be grasped only by a highly skilled mathematician. It is possible, nevertheless, to convey to others some inkling of both the principle and the significance of Einsteinian relativity.

Einstein starts with the demonstrable fact that the speed of light is constant; that no matter how an observer is moving, light seems to come to him and to go from him at the rate of 186,000 miles a second. Then Einstein proceeds to add to the traditional three dimensions of space-length, breadth, and thickness—a fourth dimension of time and to fuse them in a new concept which he describes as "space-time." Then, to express the separation of events, he utilizes in space-time a quantity called "interval," which can be established geometrically for any particular observer and which will be exactly the same for all observers however they may be moving. This "interval" is thus an absolute quantity and the basis of Einstein's mathematical computation and formulation of relativity. The new formulation, for most practical purposes, gives results almost identical with the old one of Newton's, but in some respects there are important differences. According to the new conception, gravitation is not a force propagated mysteriously through space, but rather a distortion of space-time resulting from the presence of bodies with large masses.

Latterly Einstein has been laboring to bring the phenomena of light and of electromagnetism into the calculations of relativity. Partial success he has already obtained—sufficient, at any rate, to make it highly probable that light and electromagnetism are distortions, or "wrinkles," of space-time in much the same way that gravitation is. And, interestingly enough, the most recent study of atomic structure and activity points to a similar conclusion: that the atom is merely the universe in miniature, merely a minute set of wave disturbances. If it is so, then the ultimate constituents of all matter and all energy are but crinkly distortions of Einstein's space-time.

Which brings us to the third of the revolutionary developments in twentieth-century physics—the new atomic conceptions. Elsewhere we have sketched the evolution of atomic theories during the nineteenth century, from Dalton's Atomic chemical theory at the beginning of the century to Concepthe "electron" theory of Lorentz and Joseph Thomson at the end of the century 1 and have remarked the close relationship of the latter to simultaneous advance of knowledge concerning electricity. During the first decade of the twentieth century, intensive study of radio-activity and of the spectra of light and of X-rays 2 yielded a mass of additional data, but this was not coordinated with the electron theory until 1911, when Sir Ernest Rutherford (born 1871), a native of New Zealand and a professor in the University of Manchester (England), proposed a new theory about atoms. He ford suggested that each atom be considered as a nucleus (or proton) charged with positive electricity, around which revolve in space negatively charged particles (or electrons). Rutherford's atom thus resembled a tiny solar system, with the nucleus for the sun and the electrons for the revolving planets: and it was highly successful in explaining many hitherto perplexing phenomena. Only two years later, however, the theory was amended in important respects by Niels Bohr (born 1885), a Dane who had worked at Manchester with Rutherford. Bohr was one of those who perceived the advantage of combining the quantum theory with Rutherford's atomic theory. He assumed that in an atom in its normal state the electron revolves around the nucleus without radiating any energy. This was a departure from the "law" of physics which held that there should be a gradual and steady radiation of energy, but it did agree with the quantum theory according to which energy could be given off only in little "lumps," or quanta. Bohr likewise assumed, contrary to previous teaching, that, while an electron could revolve only in certain orbits, it could "jump" from one of these to another. The Bohr picture of the atom was a great success, for it included the accepted facts of the quantum theory, and with its model of an atom in which electrons "jumped" it gave a reason why energy should appear only in discrete portions.

¹ See above, pp. 335-336.

² See above, p. 334.

As study of the atom was carried farther by Bohr, Rutherford, and other physicists, it became increasingly clear that matter and radiation are not so distinct as was once thought. In the opinion of a famous German physicist, Schrödinger, radiation consists of waves travelling with the speed of light, the waves being variously designated, according to their several lengths, "Waves as X-rays, light-waves, radio-waves, etc.; while matter consists of waves travelling with a speed less than light and going round and round in orbits rather than forward in straight lines. In other words, the whole universe is nothing but waves of energy, some of which are free and some of which are bottled up in structures that we call atoms.

An especially interesting application of the new atomic conceptions was to "cosmic rays." Early in the twentieth century

a new type of radiation was discovered and described

Cosmic Rays by an Austrian physicist, V. F. Hess, and by other Ravs scientists. It possessed an extraordinarily short wavelength, enabling it to penetrate several yards of lead (whereas a quarter of an inch of lead would stop X-rays completely). By observation from balloons, it was proved to come from outer space, and its presence at night indicated that it did not come from the sun; and so it was termed "cosmic radiation." Through subsequent research, particularly of an American physicist, Robert Millikan (born 1868), cosmic rays have been found to be very plentiful and very powerful, and their wave-lengths have been determined with considerable accuracy. It has been shown, moreover, that one of the commonest wave-lengths of the cosmic ray is just such as would be produced if a single electron and a single proton rushed together and annihilated each other in a single flash of radiation. On the basis of this curious coincidence of the new atomic theory with the new knowledge of cosmic rays, it has recently been contended that somewhere on the outer fringes of the universe the coalescence of electrons and protons is producing radiation by destroying "matter."

But perhaps the most amazing deduction from recent study of the atom is the "principle of indeterminacy," as enunciated by a distinguished German physicist, Heisenberg, in 1927. Observing that the behavior of single electrons in an atom follows no set pattern or "law" and is therefore not predictable, Heisenberg affirms that at least

in the realm of the ultra-microscopic, the long-posited axiom of causality must be rejected. Such phenomena as electrons cannot be dealt with individually on the principle of causality or determinism, but only *en masse* by the principle of probability, just as an insurance company deals with human beings.

The new discoveries about atomic structure, about relativity, and about quanta, have already begun to have revolutionary effects upon scientific and philosophic thought. The mechanical and material interpretation of the universe (and of everything in it) as built up during the Era of the Enlightenment has become old-fashioned in the present age. There are processes in nature which do not seem to operate mechanically or according to mechanical laws. In radio-activity the break-down of the radium atoms follows the principle of probability rather than any "law" of scientific or causal certainty. In the same way the discovery that if one knows where an electron is in its orbit around a proton, one cannot tell how fast it is going, or that if one knows how fast it is going one cannot tell where it is, tends further to weaken mechanistic doctrines. Besides, matter itself is now indistinguishable from energy, and substance from behavior. Indeed, the classical conception of "substance," as something extended in space and persistent in time, has been rendered quite meaningless, since neither space nor time is either absolute or real. A "substance" has become a mere series of events, connected in some unknown and perhaps unknowable way, and occurring in space-time.

And just as the new atomic and quantum theories have forced a radical revolution of ideas about the ultimate character of "matter," so the theory of relativity has led to strange new hypotheses as to the ultimate nature of the universe. According to Einstein's physics, space is curved, and the farther one moves out in it, the nearer one approaches the place where one started! The universe is not infinite, but finite!

We are too near to the contemporary revolution in physical science to hazard even a guess as to just what effects it will eventually have. We are too much disconcerted by contemporary the overturn of seemingly well-established laws and principles, too much taken aback by the destructive from in physicists of our own day have been physics delivering against that mechanistic and deterministic world which

the scientific labors of three centuries had been building. "A few years ago," writes a famous scientist, "the exact accuracy of Newton's law of gravitation and the permanence of the chemical elements were thought to be quite certain; and in fact, the probability in favor of those principles was so great that we all should have been willing to bet our last shillings at long odds on their truth. Yet Einstein and Rutherford have proved that we were wrong, and our money would have gone to that rash gambler who had the apparent (nay real) folly to take our bets."

We should bear in mind that ever since the time of Galileo and Newton the science of physics has provided the basic models and the most persistent thought-patterns for all other Relationsciences and would-be sciences: not only the "natural ship of Other sciences" of chemistry and biology, but the social Sciences to Physics sciences and psychology and philosophy. As one after another of these subjects became "scientific," it tended more and more to accept the assumptions and to reënforce the teachings of physics; and chief among such assumptions had been the material and mechanistic nature of the universe. Now, however, quite a different lesson is derivable from physics; and in view of the long and solidly established premiership of physical science, it would be strange indeed if its new assumptions should not have in the future far-reaching influence upon all kinds of scientific thought and research. Just as physical "laws" had produced an intellectual revolution in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,2 so physical "indeterminacy" might bring about another in the twentieth century.

Already there were omens of such a revolution, not only in physics but in other intellectual disciplines. There were omens, for example, in philosophy. At the close of the nineteenth century the dominant philosophy was materialistic, based on Newtonian physics and fortified by "Darwinism": its extreme expressions were those of Herbert Spencer and Ernst Haeckel. But from the beginning of the twentieth century dissident types of philosophy were growing in favor. One was "neo-scholasticism," representing a serious effort to reconcile modern science with traditional Chris-

¹ Sir William Cecil Dampier, of Trinity College, Cambridge University, in his *History of Science* (1931), p. 460.

² See Vol. I, pp. 496-576.

³ See above, pp. 346-347, 363-365.

tian ideas, and ably championed by Cardinal Mercier of Belgium and by other distinguished scholars, especially at the University of Louvain and the Catholic Institute of Paris. Another, of very different complexion, represented an attempt to use biology as a road of escape from the mechanical view of things which physics apparently imposed. It had been foreshadowed, in a pessimistic way, by Nietzsche,1 but it was developed, and given an optimistic slant, by a French Jewish philosopher, Henri Bergson (born 1859). In his Creative Evolution, published in 1907, Bergson tried to sweep away both physics and logic. To him, the "élan vital"—or "vital urge" was all important, and instinct and intuition were far more significant than reason; there might be final causes, but they did not matter, for immediate causes were moulded anew as creative evolution proceeded. Bergsonian philosophy, we may note, was not without influence on the contemporary Syndicalism of Sorel² and on the ensuing Fascism of Mussolini.

A third philosophic tendency of the new age was a marked revival of the "idealism" which stemmed from Kant and Hegel.³ During the nineteenth century, this alternative to "materialism," though espoused by a succession of academic philosophers, had been repellent to almost all men of scientific and "practical" bent. Then, early in the twentieth century, it attracted anew an impressive group of apostles throughout Europe, particularly the Italian Benedetto Croce (born 1866). Croce began croce in 1902 the systematic exposition of his "philosophy of the spirit," divided into æsthetic, logic, ethic, and history; and by the 1920's he was exercising an increasingly profound influence on thought. To him, "spirit" is manifest in the whole content of actual human experience, that is, in history; and the business of history is not merely to amass factual data but to give it meaning and significance in terms of purpose and "spirit."

Simultaneously, a novel psychology was emerging and winning converts. It arose in Germany and was developed, under the name of Gestalt (meaning "shape" or "form"), esgestalt pecially by Max Wertheimer from 1912 onwards. It Psychology chology and particularly its tendency to reduce individual behavior to a sequence

¹ See above, pp. 366-368.

⁸ See Vol. I, pp. 510, 739-740.

² See above, p. 382.

of conditioned reflexes and thereby to deprive it of any meaning or significance. According to the Gestalt concept, meaningful behavior remains meaningful in theory, and hence psychology, instead of ignoring everything except physical reactions to physical stimuli, must take into account the entire nature (or "shape") of a perception. Thus, the seeing of a square does not consist in seeing four equal straight lines enclosing four right angles, but is the perception of the square as a whole. In the same way a melody is the totality of a series of tones and not just a succession of separate tones. The whole should be regarded as greater than the sum of its parts.

For the "social sciences" of economics, politics, sociology, and history, the implications of the "new physics" are staggering.

For two centuries scholars in these fields have consultations sciously essayed methods and goals similar to physicists, and have usually made similar assumptions concerning a mechanical, material universe operated by discoverable "natural laws." In all probability, most of such scholars will be carried along for a time by the momentum of their past traditions, for the "lag" between the social and the natural sciences has always been considerable. It took time for economists, sociologists, and historians to become "scientific," and it may take time for them to reorient themselves to radically changed views of "science."

Social scientists have certainly accumulated and digested a vast deal of information during the last century. Yet today there are doubts—multiplying doubts—about the ability of social scientists to achieve any such scientific objectivity as they have sought or to substantiate from the greatest possible mass of data any such ultimate "laws" as they have posited. In 1916 Croce pointed out, in dramatic fashion, that "scientific history" was nearing its end; that its devotees, who imagined themselves to be concerned only with objective "facts," were constantly revealing their own subjectivity by their selection and organization of facts; and that, in any event, historical "truth" was not absolute but only relative.

Of sociology, similar disillusioning criticism was voiced. It was shown how one sociological "system" after another had been put forth as "scientific"—Comte's 1 and Herbert Spencer's and

¹ See above, pp. 368-370.

latterly Pareto's 1—only to be regarded by succeeding generations as a "dated" commentary on the thought of a particular person or group at a particular time. In the case of politics and of economics, actual occurrences of the post-war era have been even more disheartening than academic discussion has been destructive. Just as "political science" could not predict, but only describe, the rise of dictatorships, so "scientific economics" could neither prevent nor cure the depression which overspread the world in 1930.

When social scientists undertook the publication of a monumental encyclopedia in 1930, they abandoned as hopeless any systematic treatment of the "science" of economics. The editors contented themselves with a general description of the inner turmoil of the "science" and with ten special articles on as many different schools and methods. In a prefatory article, the editor-in-chief, long an exponent of the scientific character of economics, confessed frankly that the whole subject had always been a "battle-ground for rationalizations of group and class interests" and that no end of the conflict was in sight.

The newer scientific doubt, especially as it affects the social sciences, has recently been epitomized by a thoughtful American scholar, Dr. Charles Austin Beard. "Deprived of the certainty which it was once believed science would ultimately deliver, and of the very hope that it can in the nature of things disclose certainty, human beings must now concede their own fallibility and accept the world as a place of trial and error, where only those who dare to assume ethical and æsthetic responsibility, and to exercise intuitive judgment, while seeking the widest possible command of realistic knowledge, can hope to divine the future and mould in some measure the shape of things to come." ²

4. RELIGION IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Religious currents continued to flow during the quartercentury from 1910 to 1935 in much the same channels as they had been following during the previous forty years from 1870 to 1910. Wherefore, what we have said in some detail elsewhere concerning religion in the "age of realism" 3 is generally ap-

¹ Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) published his *General Sociology* in 1916. It was an imposing pile of fact and conjecture, partially "positivist" and partially critical.

² C. A. Beard, The Open Door (1934), p. 20.

⁸ See above, pp. 413-420.

plicable to the present "age of disillusionment" and need not be rehearsed here. Basic questionings of supernatural religion have continued. So has the activity of the Christian churches—Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox—and also of Judaism, Islam, and other "world-religions." So, too, has missionary enterprise. There has been a notable lessening of conflict, at least in its

crude forms, between "science" and "theology." It has become "sciincreasingly clear to thoughtful persons that religion is not necessarily inimical to experimental or applied science" and "Theence, that first-rate scientists can be sincerely religious, and that whatever conflict there was in the previous age arose not from pure research but from philosophizing about research. In other words, it was a particular philosophy or metaphysics of science which made the trouble—the philosophy of materialistic and mechanistic determinism. Such a philosophy had undoubtedly been gaining ground in the nineteenth century, and, as we have already explained, it was diametrically at variance with vitalistic spiritual assumptions fundamental to every supernatural religion and theology. In the latest age, however, most physicists and many other scientists have come themselves to doubt the validity of that philosophy. For, as we have indicated in the preceding section of the present chapter, the new wave-mechanics seem to suggest that there is a principle of indeterminacy at the base of the ultimate units or electrons, which makes an exact measurement of both position and velocity forever impossible; and if this surprising development be confirmed, the strongest scientific argument for philosophic determinism will break down. In measure as it breaks down, a natural reaction sets in toward vitalism—toward the idea that a spirit or soul, temporarily or permanently connected with the body, controls or even suspends physical laws to some appointed end. Such an idea would be as favorable to supernatural religion as mechanism was unfavorable.

Yet all this is still problematical. If the general scientific atmosphere of the present age is not so definitely hostile to the claims of religion as that of the previous age, it is scarcely more directly confirmatory. The new discoveries do no more than to introduce an element of indeterminacy into physical theories and to emphasize the principle of "probability." To be sure, some distinguished contemporary physicists have concluded that

¹ See above, pp. 416-418.

the new discoveries involve a mystical, spiritual conception of the universe, and their conclusions have been seized upon by some religious teachers as proof of the "scientific rediscovery of God." Nevertheless, such conclusions in favor of supernatural religion, just like earlier ones against it, are philosophic rather than scientific in the strict sense. Divine factors have not yet been investigated, much less proved to exist, by laboratory research, and it is possible that results of further research may serve eventually to weaken the present theory of indeterminacy and to support a new one of determinism. It should be borne in mind that, whatever spiritual interpretation an individual scientist (or anyone else) may be disposed to put upon physical phenomena, the scientist as scientist is not concerned with spiritual interpretations but only with observable phenomena of "matter," whatever "matter" may be. It should equally be borne in mind that science, from its very definition, looks at reality from one and only one point of view, and that so long as men regard reality from other points of view, men will be religious.

Furthermore, while new theories about "matter" and physical science have recently tended, at least in thoughtful minds, to assuage and obscure an important earlier source of acute conflict between "science" and "theology," there are other tendencies in the present age which represent a steady development and spread of previous critical attitudes toward particular supernatural religions. The "higher criticism" of Bible and church history has gone on, and, reënforced by continuing "Higher research in the fields of anthropology and comparative religion, has crystallized and disseminated the notion Criti-cism" that Christianity, for example, is only one of innumerable mystery religions which in the history of mankind have risen, run their course by "borrowing" from each other, and then declined and disappeared. Likewise has continued, in ever intensifying degree, a popular absorption in "this-worldly," as opposed to "otherworldly," concerns. This is attributable in part, no doubt, to the fact that the creed of materialism which the intellectual élite postulated a half-century ago has now permeated the masses (just when the élite is beginning to entertain misgivings about mechanistic determinism). But doubtlessly in greater part it is attributable to amazing parallel progress in applied science and

to be irreligious in effect. It concentrates the attention of common people, as well as of privileged classes, on material things which are immediately "practical," which afford them unusual means of diversion and recreation, and which give promise of ensuring them a rapid access of economic and physical well-being. It thus contributes to a growing indifference to the practice of traditional religion, a gradual breaking away from conventional moral standards, and a corresponding readiness to act in the spirit, if not to subscribe to the letter, of "neo-paganism." It also renders the masses more receptive to "secularization"—to the modern process of transferring the supervision and direction of human society in all its aspects, educational and cultural as well as political and economic, from religious to secular authority, from clergymen to laymen, from church to state.

Confirming the secular trend of modern times and immensely magnifying it in the present age has been the vogue of the "totalitarian" state, whether Communist or Nationalist. It involves purposeful inculcation of "statolatry"—veritable worship of the state—and drastic restrictions on other kinds of wor-"Statolatry"—ship. Both Marxian Communism and Totalitarian Nationalism have religious features: they are philosophized about in an almost theological manner; they are endowed with symbols and rites; they stir popular emotions; they point individuals and society to a "good life." But fundamentally both are rivals and adversaries of traditional supernatural world-religions. Marxian Communism repudiates tradition and the supernatural. Totalitarian Nationalism tends to subordinate the universal to the local and to confine the traditional to the tribal.

There had always been in Christendom, especially in Catholic Christendom, conflicts over the respective jurisdictions of state and church, and at least since the French Revolution a good deal of "anti-clericalism." On one historic occasion, that of the French Revolution itself, there had been a fierce but brief and unsuccessful effort to uproot Christianity altogether. Yet through-

Note. The picture opposite, "The Crucifixion," is from the modern painting by George Bellows (1882–1925). On Bellows, see below, p. 1145.





out the nineteenth century—as generally throughout earlier centuries—the large majority of Europeans (and Americans) adhered to one or another of the Christian churches, and their governments uniformly professed respect for the Christian religion. To be sure, there was, during the latter part of the century, a marked growth of scepticism and indifferentism; and many statesmen, like many scholars and other persons, not only ceased to belong to any church but actively supported and forwarded secularizing policies. Still, nevertheless, the trend was toward securing full toleration within presumably Christian nations for dissenters and toward depriving Christian churches of special privileges.

Not until the twentieth century, not until after the World War, not until the rise of "totalitarian" dictatorships, did the trend change. Then, rather suddenly, conflict between church and state was transformed into conflict between religion and atheism, anti-clericalism was merged in anti-religion, and whole nations were rendered intolerant of even private practice of traditional faiths. Nor was the changed trend and Anti-Religion peculiar to Western Christendom. It has appeared, we may recall, in both Catholic and Protestant Germany and also in Catholic Mexico and Spain. But it is now most striking in Orthodox Russia and, outside Christendom, in Moslem Turkey and Moslem Persia. In some degree, indeed, it is world-wide. In China there is a novel "drive" to revolutionize historic Confucianism. Just as strenuous efforts have been put forth in Germany to supplant the "imported" world-religion of Christianity with an "indigenous" tribal religion of primitive Aryanism, so in Japan the government has sedulously fostered a preference for native Shintoism as over against any "foreign" religion such as Buddhism or Christianity. In the circumstances, every one of the historic world-religions is extraordinarily troubled, and its missionary endeavors seriously handicapped.

Yet, despite difficulties, old and new, with which it is confronted in the present age, despite universal progress of secularization and relative decline of ecclesiastical influence on society and on the shaping of public policies, organized supernatural reli-

Note. The portrait opposite is of a famous Hindu writer, Rabindranath Tagore, from an etching by a British artist, Muirhead Bone (born 1876). On Tagore, see below, p. 1142.

continuing habits, if not in human nature; and apparently it satisfies vital human needs and aspirations in a machine age as formerly in an age of hand-tools. At any rate, it still commands the allegiance of a vast number of men and women all over the world, alike among the classes and the masses, alike among intellectuals and the ignorant; and what decline it may have suffered is relative rather than absolute.

Of the major Christian bodies, the Catholic Church continues to be the largest and the most intransigent. On the whole, it seems to have gained rather than lost strength during Catholic the past quarter-century. The World War caused it Christiimmediate political embarrassments, and the Popc of anity the time, Benedict XV (1914-1922), had to employ all his many diplomatic talents to preserve his neutrality between the belligerents, while his earnest peace pleas fell on deaf ears.1 Benedict In several ways, however, the war years proved ad-XV, 1914-1922 vantageous to the Church. They witnessed a notcworthy revival of Catholic activity and influence in France and Italy, and an access of Catholic church membership in Great Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, and even Scandinavia; and the political map of Europe which resulted from the war enhanced the international prestige of the Church. Catholics were numerically preponderant in the newly created nations of Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, and the Irish Free State, and they were now numerous in the enlarged states of Yugoslavia and Rumania. They also constituted an important minority in Latvia. And for several years after the war Catholic political parties dominated or held a balance of power in the governments not only of Belgium, Austria, and Spain but also of Germany. the Netherlands, and Hungary, and of the recently "freed" na-This improved international position of the Catholic Church was made the most of by the exceptionally able successor of Benedict XV-Pope Pius XI.

Pius XI was a distinguished scholar and adaptable statesman,

¹ On the peace efforts of Benedict XV, see above, pp. 825-826. An outstanding monument of his pontificate was the completion (1917) of the codification of canon law which had been begun under his predecessor, Pius X. It was the first since Gratian's in the twelfth century.

as well as a vigorous administrator and staunch upholder of the Catholic faith and tradition. It was a tribute both to his tact and to his power that he could successfully negotiate with Mussolini the Lateran treaty of 1929,1 settling the "Roman question" and reëstablishing, after the lapse of fifty-nine years, an independent temporal sovereignty for the papacy. True, the seat of this sovereignty—"Vatican City" was an extremely small part of Rome, but it sufficed to symbolize to the world that the Pope was no longer a "prisoner" of Italy or subject to Italian law, but that, instead, he was a supra-national figure, guarantied as such by a solemn international treaty. Over his state of Vatican City, Pius XI henceforth ruled as a temporal prince, issuing coins and postage stamps of his own, modernizing the Vatican library and museum, building a railway station and installing radio-broadcasting apparatus, and creating (in 1933) a special commission for local government.

With most nations in Christendom, Pius XI maintained or newly established particularly friendly relations, and with a considerable number of them he concluded significant concordats—with Latvia in 1922, with Poland in 1925, with Lithuania in 1927, with Czechoslovakia in 1928, with Italy, Portugal, and Rumania in 1929, with Germany in 1933, with Yugoslavia in 1935. It was an epidemic of concordats, the like of which had not been known since the time of Pius VII early in the nineteenth century, and the new concordats of Pius XI were generally more favorable to the Church than the carlier ones had been. They assured to the Pope the free appointment of bishops within the countries concerned and to the Church the right of imparting religious instruction, and if in some instances they restricted political activity of the clergy they uniformly promised to respect Catholic social action. In addition to the nations with which formal concordats were negotiated, a large number of others maintained regular embassies or legations at the Vatican—some forty in all--including France, Spain, Great Britain, the Irish Free State, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Liberia, and most of the Latin American states; and with these, special agreements were made. Under Pius XI many strains between church and

¹ See above, pp. 939-940.

state, including grave ones in Italy, France, Portugal, and Brazil, were notably eased.

On the other hand, there were some serious set-backs for Catholicism. The Catholic minority in the Russian Soviet Union (largely concentrated in Ukrainia and White Russia) Set-Backs suffered from the anti-religious policies and actions of the Communist dictatorship; and repeated protests of Pius XI went unheeded. Nor could the Pope stem the anti-clerical and anti-Christian tide in Mexico; the papal delegate was unceremoniously expelled from Mexico City and the National Revolutionary dictatorship of the country resolutely refused to make any concessions.2 In Spain, moreover, the establishment of the Republic precipitated an acute conflict between state and church and led to a series of drastic anti-Catholic enactments, though here diplomatic relations were not broken off with the papacy and a Catholic reaction was soon manifest.3 Then, too, not all the new concordats were scrupulously observed by governments which agreed to them, and especially in the case of Germany the Nazi régime so interpreted and applied the concordat of 1933 as to threaten an outright break with the Church.4

Under Pius XI, the number of Catholic bishops has been considerably increased throughout the world and the missionary activities of the Church extended farther in Asia and Africa. To meet native nationalist objections to "European" missionary enterprise, the Pope has striven, with no little success, to create native hierarchies in China, Japan, and India, for example, and to entrust to them the conduct of the missions within their respective countries. Large numbers of European (and American) priests, monks, and nuns still labor in far-away fields, but to a much greater degree than formerly their labors are now supplemented by those of native clergymen.

Several important encyclical letters have been addressed by Pius XI to the Catholic world, discussing current questions and indicating the attitude which Christians should take toward them. Extreme "totalitarian" nationalism has been condemned. Limitation of armaments and

On the easing of these strains, see above, pp. 940-941 for Italy, pp. 956-957 for France, p. 965 for Portugal, and p. 1086 for Brazil.

² See above, pp. 1083-1085.

³ See above, pp. 964-965.

⁴ See above, p. 996.

judicial settlement of international disputes have been urged. The principles and program of Catholic social reform as outlined by Leo XIII in 1891 have been reaffirmed and developed. Unnatural means of birth-control have been denounced. The traditional "rights" of the Church, especially in the education of youth, have been insistently reasserted. And, while repeatedly applauding science and scholarship, Pius XI has unceasingly emphasized the supernatural and dogmatic teachings of Catholic Christianity.

Of the major Christian bodies, it is the Orthodox Church which has been hardest hit by recent developments. The Orthodox Church had never had any such independence Orthodox of secular government as the Catholic Church has Christihad, and, with the recent overthrow of governments on which for centuries it relied, it has suffered a notable decline and shrinkage. The final disruption of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal have served to narrow the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople and to deprive him of any privileged position and of much of his former prestige. Far more serious, and affecting indeed the large majority of the Orthodox In Turkev communion, has been the revolution in Russia, with Russia its destruction of the Tsardom, which had always supported the Church, and its establishment of the Communist dictatorship, which has zealously combated Christianity and actively championed materialistic atheism.2 Orthodox Christianity continues to exist and be practiced in the Soviet Union, but it is barely tolerated by the state and the vast majority of young people in Russia are being brought up in ignorance of it and usually in militant opposition to it.

Elsewhere Orthodox Christianity continues to function just about as it did before the World War. It is represented by national churches in Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. It has bishops in Albania, in Palestine, Elsewhere and Syria, and also in Hungary and Poland. It has a growing number of adherents in the United States and Canada. It still maintains a mission in Japan, though most of its missionary activity in Asia has been halted by the drying-up of its Russian source. In 1923, we may note, the Gregorian calendar (of Catholic

¹ See above, pp. 426-427.

² See above, pp. 925-927.

and Protestant Christianity) was adopted by the Orthodox Church.

Protestant Christianity has developed since the World War along lines which had been marked out with some clearness between 1870 and 1910.1 There are now as many Protesprofessed Protestants throughout the world as ever before, and perhaps more. But Protestantism is less tant Christianity than ever a single coherent movement. On the one hand, "high-church" Anglicanism—latterly styled Anglo-Catholicism—has been coming to the fore and likewise a similar "high-church" trend in Lutheranism, while ritualistic observances have been growing in most Protestant churches and in some a "fundamentalism" has continued to be preached. On the other hand, the "broad-church" or "modernist" trend has become ever more pronounced in almost every Protestant body, not only among Unitarians and Congregationalists, but among Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians. With multitudes of professed Protestants, little remains of historic Protestantism, that is, of Protestant faith and practice of the sixteenth century: there is a veritable repugnance to anything savoring of dogma, a sharp reaction against "puritanism," and an absorption in "good works" and the "good life."

In the circumstances, Protestant sectarianism has lost much of its earlier distinctiveness and bitterness, and increasingly successful attempts have been made to federate, if not Coöperto unify, various Protestant denominations in particuation lar countries. In the United States, for example, a "Federal Council of the Churches of Christ" was formed just after the war by representatives of the country's chief Protestant Churches—Baptist, Congregational, Disciples, Dutch Reformed, Episcopalian, Quaker, Lutheran, Methodist, Moravian, and Presbyterian: it promotes cooperation in matters of evangelism. social service, race relations, and international justice and goodwill. In Canada, several different denominations were actually merged in a "United Church of Canada." In England a unification of the Methodist Church was effected, and in Scotland of the Presbyterian Church. Under general Protestant auspices, furthermore, a "world alliance for promoting international friend-ship through the churches" was instituted at Constance in

¹ See above, pp. 430-438.

Switzerland. In 1922 was created an international council for coördinating Protestant missionary endeavors throughout the world. In 1925 an "ecumenical Christian conference on life and work" at Stockholm was attended by delegates of thirty-one non-Catholic bodies; it naturally refrained from discussing ecclesiastical organization and creed, but it issued a joint report on social and international morality.

Protestant missionary enterprise has remained impressive in Asia and Africa, though in China, at any rate, Protestant missions have been more adversely affected than Catholic missions by the rise of nationalism. And though there have been too few Protestants in Russia or Mexico to feel the heavy hand of irreligious or anti-religious dictatorships where Orthodox or Catholic Christians have most felt it, the Protestant majority in the German Empire have suffered from similar coercion. It is a tribute to the continuing vitality of Protestant Christianity that large numbers of both Lutheran and Calvinist clergymen have made a determined stand against being "coördinated" with the Nazi régime.¹

Judaism has continued to comprise "orthodox" and "reformed" groups, the latter growing at the expense of the former.² It has continued, too, to be partly religious and partly national, to foster Zionism and to be plagued by anti-Semitism. It has latterly suffered from a systematic "racial" persecution of the most violent sort in Germany,³ and from a less violent but more subtle "materialistic" subversion within Russia.

Islam has begun, only since the World War, to encounter head-on the forces of opposition and criticism with which Christianity has long been confronted. But the encounter is as upsetting as it has been sudden. The Moslem Caliphate is now at an end.⁴ The process of secularization is already far advanced in Turkey and Persia, and is steadily advancing in Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, and India. Despite the fact that millions of human beings still profess allegiance to Allah and to Mohammed as his prophet, there is as yet no evidence of any profound or widespread revival of Islam. And it is somewhat similar with the great traditional world-religions of the Far East—with Hinduism and with Buddhism.

¹ See above, p. 997.

² See above, pp. 441-445.

³ See above, p. 988.

⁴ See above, pp. 1054-1055.

The basic religious question today is not one of "science" versus "theology." It is whether in the long run an exclusively "this-worldly" faith such as Marxian Communism or Totalitarian Nationalism can and will provide the masses of mankind with a satisfying substitute for "other-worldly" faith which from time immemorial humanity has cherished.

5. ART IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Art in the Age of Disillusionment has been symptomatically revolutionary and chaotic. Rebellion against conventions of the nineteenth century has characterized major monuments Rebellion of recent twentieth-century literature, painting, sculpture, and music. But while all the different kinds of against Convencontemporary art evince a reaction, in greater or less degree, against traditions of the immediate past, every one of them displays an extraordinary variety of inspiration and goal. There is no single dominant fashion in present-day art-forms, such as "classicism" was in early modern times, or "romanticism" in the nineteenth century, or "realism" at the beginning of the twentieth. All these moods and modes still persist and are simultaneously exemplified by works of art in the latest age, but side by side with them appear strange new tendencies. There is a novel "primitiveness," an enthusiasm for the simplicity of the antique, even of the bar-barous. There is also a sophisticated "modernism," Primitivism, Moderna cultivation of the abstract rather than the concrete. ism, etc. accompanied by much experimentation with geometrical design. There is, too, a related "functionalism," an earnest effort to render art peculiarly expressive of the massiveness and speed of the machine age and in many instances of the age's proletarian and Marxian trend. There is, moreover, an extremely iconoclastic "futurism," a wild and wilful flight from the past and even from the present, sometimes as a release for highly charged emotions of totalitarian nationalism, and sometimes as a mere stunt. At the opposite extreme, there is a reviving religious element in contemporary art, representing not so much a revival of the romantic medievalism of the nineteenth century as a novel reinterpretation of supernatural and traditional religion in terms of the newest art forms (primitive or modernist or realist).

In literature, the sociological and psychological interests of

the preceding "age of realism" have remained very important, the psychological gradually outweighing the sociological and assuming more and more a Freudian complexion. In English literature, for example, such sociological "realists" as Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells have continued to treat entertainingly and provocatively of a wide range of social problems, but Shaw has latterly interspersed his pleas for socialism and his plays on nationalism with strangely subjective confessions of helplessness and impotence, while Wells, after resigning himself to the World War in his Shaw and Wells Mr. Britling Sees It Through (1916) and becoming almost theological in his God the Invisible King (1917) and Men like Gods (1923), has rushed on to outline universal history in pessimistic vein, and in optimistic vein to psycho-analyze himself.

After all, both Shaw and Wells survive from an earlier age, and though their remarkable adaptability has assured them a continuing popularity and significance, they are probably less representative of the new age than certain other (and mainly younger) masters of English prose or poetry whom we may mention. Thus, John Galsworthy (1867-1933) inaugurated in 1906 the long series of his Forsyte novels, nicely articulating the psychological with the sociological in detailed studies of the decay of an upper middle-class family, and presently he was writing plays such as The Skin Game (1920) and Loyalties (1922), in which he employed terse and strictly natural dialogue for the discussion of disturbing ethical problems of the time. James Joyce (born 1882), an Irishman who by preference resided abroad, chiefly at Paris. combined æstheticism with a revolutionary frankness about sex in his Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916) and in his still more sensational Ulysses (1922). D. H. Lawrence Joyce and (1885-1930), who began his literary career in 1911 Lawrence with novels of crude force and originality, soon passed completely under the influence of Freudian psychology, and after the World War he was quite obsessed with sex problems and the minutiæ of psycho-analysis. Simultaneously a brilliant American dramatist, Eugene O'Neill (born 1888), was winning fame by producing fantastically pathological plays, such as Emperor Jones (1921), depicting bar-

¹ See above, pp. 388-380.

barous primitive egomania, or such as Desire under the Elms (1924) and Strange Interlude (1927), contrasting in Freudian style the respectability of one's outward appearance with the viciousness and depravity of one's inmost thoughts.

Similar disillusioning philosophy underlay the work of the most accomplished and most influential French novelist of the Era of Disillusionment, Marcel Proust (1871-1922). Proust Proust came of a gifted Parisian family, his father being a professor of medicine and his mother of Jewish extraction. As a young man he was enthusiastic and active. contributing to Socialist publications, translating Ruskin into French, expounding the "creative evolution" of Bergson (to whom Proust was related by marriage), and all the time playing a conspicuous part in polite society. About 1902, however. failing health induced him to withdraw from active life; and his new-found leisure he employed in penning an elaborate psychological exposé of the society he had known. He planned it as a series of fifteen novels under the general title of A la Recherche du Temps Perdu: the first volume was actually published in 1913; another in 1918; the third and fourth in 1921; and three others after his death. Proust's method is analytical. superficially resembling Henry James's, but more properly comparable with Freud's. His characters are erotic and abnormal, having little in common with the generality of mankind; they are always in process of development and change, and they are frightfully futile. Proust won some recognition in France during his life, but only after the World War and after his death has his fame spread widely and his influence become profound.

In Proust's footsteps, and in those of James Joyce and D. H. Lawrence, have followed a herd of novelists all over the world, psycho-analyzing themselves and every weakling whom they knew or could imagine, dwelling on the most salacious details of sexual abnormality or perversion, assailing "convention" and extolling "frankness," and, in the name of "the new realism" or "the new art," presenting, often in captivating literary form, a most disillusioning if not disgusting picture of man's stupidities and savageries. And to like end have doubtlessly contributed a multitude of frank and soul-searching stories of the World War, one of the best of which (though not the most brutal) is All Quiet on the Western Front by a German veteran, Erich Remarque

(born 1898), whose disillusionment about the war has since been enhanced by the collapse of democracy in Germany and his own forced exile to Switzerland.

Much less pathological and revolutionary, but still "realist" and chiefly psychological in emphasis—and with special attention to form—is another current in contemporary literature. In English, it is exemplified to some extent by the continuing vogue of Joseph Conrad (1857-1924). Conrad, a Pole by birth, had spent his youth and early manhood as a sailor, first on French and then on British merchant vessels, and had subsequently settled down to the slow and painful composition of tales of the sea and of adventure in the language which he had acquired along with English citizenship. The best of these tales, such as The Nigger of the Narcissus, Lord Jim, and Nostromo, were published a decade before the World War, but their popularity came mainly afterwards. They were seemingly in the "romantic" tradition of Cooper, which suggests perhaps why they were not so highly esteemed in the Age of Realism. Yet they were artistically constructed, studded with frequently beautiful and always precise descriptions, and informed throughout with keen and realistic insight into human nature and character—qualities which appeal to post-war taste.

Comparable with Conrad is John Masefield (born 1875), who, a native of Liverpool, lived his early years in many countries and occupations, serving before the mast at sea, and for a time earning his way as best he could in America.

Masefield published his first verse, Salt-Water Ballads, in 1902, and his first novel, Jim Davis, in 1911. In 1916 he produced a stirring volume on the Gallipoli campaign, and after the World War, several plays. In 1930 he was appointed poet laureate of Great Britain. Masefield's most characteristic expression is in narrative poetry and drama, spirited and sternly "realist."

Delicately psychological delincation of character is wrought by several recent writers, including, for example, the American novelist, Willa Cather (born 1876). The background of almost all her stories is some "frontier" area in America: the Middle West, as in O Pioneers (1913) and Lost Lady (1923); the Southwest, as in Death Comes for the Archbishop

¹ See above, p. 806.

(1927); or old Quebec, as in *Shadows on the Rock* (1931). But whatever be the scene, their chief concern is the analysis of character in a style restrained and even cold and in studied accordance with the classic ideal of balance and form.

In French literature, Romain Rolland merits mention here. Rolland (born 1866) began his career as a professor of art and its history—at the French School at Rome, and sub-Rolland sequently at the Normal School in Paris and at the Sorbonne. While he was still teaching art, he brought out, between 1904 and 1912, his literary masterpiece, Jean Christophe, a diffuse ten-volume account of the soul-adventures of an imaginary German musician. Rolland was in Switzerland when the World War started, and as a protest against the conflict he wrote Au-dessus de la Mêléc, which was a literary sensation of the day but which cost him his French citizenship and consigned him to permanent exile. After the war he published an impassioned defense of the Indian leader, Gandhi; and in 1922 he issued the first of a new series of psychological romances bearing the general title of The Enchanted Soul.

In German literature, the foremost post-war novelist was Thomas Mann (born 1875). He came of a patrician merchant family of Lübeck, and in his native city he laid the scene of a remarkable character- and period-novel, Buddenbrooks, the Ruin of a Family, which he published in 1903 and which established his reputation. In this and in his later work, he displays a fondness for lingering among trivial details with considerable irony and great cumulative effect, and also a wistful regret at the apparently inevitable swamping of aristocracy in a modern sea of plebeian mediocrity. Mann received the Nobel prize for literature in 1929; and after the advent of the Nazi dictatorship, he was practically exiled from Germany.

Quite a different literary trend of the last twenty-five years represents a continuing and ever increasing interest in mysticism and symbolism. To the previous vogue of Maeterlinck ¹ has been added not only the steadily growing vogue of nationalistic "mystics"—Celtic and Teutonic, and likewise Indian—but also a new vogue of individualistic masters of delicate fantasy and subtle irony such as Walter de la Mare (born 1873) and Lord Dunsany (born 1878).

¹ See above, p. 395.

Quite different, too, is a notable recent resurgence of distinctively Catholic literature, represented by such varied authors as Claudel, Chesterton, Papini, and Undset. Paul Claudel (born 1868), long in the consular and diplomatic service of France—in the Far East and in South America and the United States, as well as in Europe—is the outstanding French poet of recent times. Trained in the school of the symbolists and particularly indebted to Rimbaud, he has broken away from them in essential respects and produced lyrics and mystery plays of surpassing beauty of form and deeply religious meaning. Gilbert Chesterton (born 1874), an English journalist who entered the Catholic Church in 1922, has been a voluble and paradoxical literary champion of traditional religion against such "materialists" as Shaw and Wells. Essays have poured from his pen, and so have ballads, biographies, literary studies, and detective stories. Never was Christian civilization defended in manner so unconventional—or so witty. For in all his swashbuckling denunciation of modern society and capitalism and materialism, Chesterton has always displayed a high good humor and sometimes a matchless eloquence.2 Incidentally, his Lepanto (1911) is one of the finest ballads in the English language.

Papini (born 1881) acquired reputation in Italy before the World War as a brilliant literary critic of radical and iconoclastic proclivities. The war disillusioned him, however, and, following his conversion to Catholicism in 1920, he passed from criticism to mysticism, producing a romantic and devotional Life of Christ and eulogistic biographies of St. Augustine and Dante. Sigrid Undset (born 1882), the daughter of a Norwegian archæologist, won local fame by a novel, Jenny, in 1912, and then international fame by two series of "realistic" novels of medieval Norway. These were no romantic idealizations, but very "frank" and almost photographic expositions of life and society in the middle ages, and they were presented in an ultra-modern style. While she was

¹ See above, p. 393. A forerunner of Claudel was the English Catholic poet, Francis Thompson (1859–1907), whose verse, extraordinarily rich both in thought and in diction, has attracted more and more attention since his death.

² With Chesterton is usually associated his friend and fellow-journalist, Hilaire Belloc (born 1870), a Frenchman who was naturalized an Englishman in 1902, and whose writings are as voluminous and frequently as brilliant as Chesterton's.

writing them, she became a Catholic, and recently she has been producing another series of novels, critical of contemporary life and thought. In 1928 Undset received the Nobel prize for literature.

In addition to reviving Catholic letters, there has latterly been an expanding "mystical" influence of Oriental literature. There have been innumerable translations from Japanese and Chinese authors, and, beginning just before the World War, there has been an almost devotional attitude in Europe (and America) toward the poetry and prose of the principal contemporary Hindu writer, Rabindranath Tagore (born 1861).1

One other, and most revolutionary, development in recent literature must be mentioned—a strenuous and radical revolt against everything traditional, whether of content or of form, whether classicist or romantic or "realist." It has been defined as "futurism" by one of its loudest and most zealous apostles, F. T. Marinetti (born 1881), an Italian in Literature who was intimately associated with Mussolini in the early days of Fascism. In a pioneering manifesto of 1909, Marinetti denounced "the cult of the past" as the bane of all art, and went on to describe the goal of "futurist" literature in these words: "We futurists uphold the ideal of a great and strong scientific literature, which, free from all and every classicism and pedantic purism, will magnify the most recent discoveries, the new intoxication of speed, and the celestial life of aviators. Our poetry is poetry essentially and totally rebelling against all used forms. The tracks of verse must be torn up and the bridges of things already said must be blasted and the locomotives of our inspiration must be started toward the coming, toward the boundless fields of the New and the Future! Better a splendid disaster than a monotonous race daily re-run! We have put up too long with the station masters of poetry, the conductors of scanning, and the punctual time-tables of prosody." Subsequently he declared that "futurist" drama should be "a tangible, muscular, athletic, mechanical synthesis without any psychology whatsoever." Marinetti-himself was an unbalanced egotist and hardly a literary genius, but he expressed ideas about literature

¹ See the portrait of Tagore, facing p. 1129, above.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Figure," is from a painting by Matisse.





which have found increasing favor in the latest age. And the result, whether it is called "futurist" or not, is the appearance in almost every country of strange new types of prose and verse—of verse that is prose, and of prose that only the author knows what if anything it means.

Of the art of painting, Paris has remained the focal point, and here the "post-impressionism" inaugurated by such artists as Cézanne, Van Gogh, and Gauguin has been developed and given new (and revolutionary) direction, especially by two contemporary masters-Matisse and Picasso. Henri Matisse (born 1869), in full revolt against both classicism and impressionism, began where Cézanne and Gauguin left off. He varied and exaggerated the former's use of distortion, and he intensified the latter's bright coloring. Gradually he worked out an essentially new technic, rendering form quite unconventional, though remarkably supple and subjective, and treating light, not as the impressionists had done, by means of the juxtaposition of minute touches of color, but by employing pure tones on a large scale and thus producing the effect of modelling and the illusion of space. And as he reacted against the traditions of "civilized" painting, he became infatuated with the art of "barbarous" peoples—Polynesians, African Negroes, and Mexican Indians—with its abbreviations and accentuations of form, its bizarre coloring, and its "rhythm." Latterly Matisse has reduced the size of his canvasses, painting still life and landscapes as well as small feminine figures and brilliantly illuminated interiors.1

Pablo Picasso (born 1881), a Catalan Spaniard and son of an artist and professor at the Academy of Barcelona, settled in Paris in his youth and speedily became a leading post-impressionist and "naturalist." Choosing his subjects from the circus and the morbid side of life in a big city, he drew them with forceful directness and colored them with striking originality and restraint. Then, just before the World War, he took to painting still-life pictures of grouped fruit-bowls, bottles, or musical instruments, in manner more and more abstract and angular. This was a new manner, to which the name of "cubism"

NOTE. The picture opposite is a self-portrait by Picasso.

¹ For an example of Matisse's art, see the picture facing p. 1142.

has been given: it was an attempt to cover the surface of a canvas with form and at the same time to reduce all form to simple geometric design. Ficasso produced some attractive as well as astonishing "cubist" pictures, which enjoyed a considerable vogue and were widely imitated. After the war, however, Picasso himself tired of "cubism" and reverted to his "naturalist" style, applying it with brilliancy not only to painting but also to sculpture. Next to Cézanne's, Picasso's is probably the greatest influence in ultra-modern art.¹

Cubism has gone on without Picasso, and in its wake have issued from Paris a swift succession of other pictorial isms: "futurism," denouncing the static quality of all past painting and striving to portray motion; "lyricism," seeking a close analogy in expression between painting "Cubism," etc. and music; "sur-realism," rejecting reasoned technic and depending upon inspiration to depict dreams and states of mind; "popularism," based on the supposition that common people without any technical training produce the most naïve and sincere pictures and therefore the best.² None of these isms or of the many others which might be mentioned—has amounted to much in itself. Yet altogether they are symptomatic of the turmoil and confusion into which painting has fallen in the Age of Disillusionment, and at least suggestive of certain general tendencies among the large majority of contemporary painters the world over. "Naturalness" is eagerly sought after. Content matters less than form, and form must be unconventional, must convey some sense of thickness as well as of length and breadth. must express not merely concrete images but abstract conceptions. Prized by "modernists," moreover, is what the uninitiated might describe as amateurish.

Of course, ultra-modern painting is not just "art for art's sake." It is put to special uses, nationalistic, socialistic, religious. Of these, the nationalistic probably predominate, for ultra-modern forms seem peculiarly appropriate to the glorification of the primitive ancestors of one's nation or to the symbolizing of its abstract mass and might. Striking pictures of the kind,

¹ An illustration of "cubist" painting by one of Picasso's disciples may be found facing p. 1046, above.

² For examples of such "popularism," see the painting by Henri Rousseau, facing 2. 696, above, and that by Maurice Utrillo, facing p. 955.

and some good ones, have been produced in Communist Russia and in Nazi Germany, and also by the native Mexican artist Diego Rivera, who, on one huge mural after another, has portrayed the primitive Indian life and labor of his country.

Of course, too, there are many contemporary painters who cling to past traditions, classical, romantic, or impressionist. But most of them betray, in greater or less degree, the influence of newer schools and movements. For example, the tradition of British portrait painting has been maintained and handed on from Sargent 1 to such "moderns" as Sir William Orpen (1878-1932), an Irishman by birth, and Augustus John (born 1878), a Welshman. Orpen's early work was marked and Tohn by the use of quiet harmonies of grey and brown, in the manner of Whistler, but, beginning with his famous portrait of Percy Wyndham (1907), the influence of the French postimpressionists was evident in his use of bright colors and his treatment of light. Orpen was the official British artist of the World War, and he painted the Paris Peace Congress of 1919.2 Augustus John, in war scenes and post-war portraits, went farther than Orpen in adopting "naturalist" technic and employing distortion for personal emphasis and decorative effect.

Another illustration of the same tendency is furnished by an American artist, George Bellows (1882–1925). His painting represented a compromise between "realism" and "post-impressionism." He was a good draughtsman and a master of color. With dignity of composition he combined an intense vitality. Bellows pictured numerous sporting scenes quite realistically. Besides, he produced several religious works; and his *Crucifixion*, for example, was what El Greco might have done if he had lived in the Age of Disillusionment.³

The latest age has given impetus not only to new methods and fashions of painting but also to similar developments in all the pictorial arts. Many "modern" artists have devoted themselves to engraving and etching and have produced works of unconventional but real distinction

¹ See above, p. 404.

² See the reproduction of it facing p. 859, above, and, for another example of

Orpen's art, the picture facing p. 954.

³ Compare Bellows's *Crucifizion*, facing p. 1128, above, with the painting by El Greco in Vol. I, facing p. 143. For another example of Bellows's art, see the picture in the present volume facing p. 791.

in these fields. There has likewise been a noteworthy revival of lithography. Moreover, the art of posters, beginning in a significant way with Gauguin, has since been stimulated by the propagandist activity of governments (especially during the World War) and by advertising exigencies of capitalistic industry. Then, too, the art of caricature, being particularly prized by a disillusioned public, has commanded the services of some of the best and most original draughtsmen of the latest age. For example, Forain, the most skillful of French cartoonists, found new inspiration for his talents in popular disillusionment about the World War and the League of Nations. And so, in only lesser degree, did the famous English caricaturist, Sir Bernard Partridge (born 1861).

Architecture, as the most monumental and enduring of the arts, has always been more conservative than the others. It has been so in the latest age. Severely classic models have been followed, for example, in the post-war Commerce Building and Supreme Court Building in Washington, and in the War Cenotaph (by Sir Edwin Lutyens) in London. Romantic Gothic has provided models for recent ecclesiastical edifices, notably the great Anglican cathedral at Liverpool (by Sir Gilbert Scott), and in New York the Riverside Baptist church, the Catholic church of St. Vincent Ferrer, and the Episcopal church of St. Thomas (the last two designed by Bertram Goodhue). Byzantine models have also been employed, as for the Russian memorial at Leipzig (1913) and for the projected vast shrine of the Immaculate Conception at Washington.

Yet architecture responds more and more to current demands for new models in stricter keeping with contemporary developments, and the result is an accelerating "modernism" in all sorts of construction. Progressive industrialization of the past quarter-century has led to a general adoption of the building technic of industrialism—steel skeleton construction, and the wide use of reënforced concrete. It has also called for new types of office building, loft building, factory, garage, hangar. Moreover, growing urbanization of the population of every country has necessitated city-planning on a large scale and a revaluation of the aims of domestic as well as public architecture. Further-

¹ See above, p. 405; the drawing opposite p. 833; and the tailpieces on pp. 841, 904. ² See the cartoon by Partridge facing p. 858.

more, the expanding cult of applied science has prompted architects to seek some "scientific," or "functional," expression of the new materials, to adapt the appearance of a building to its actual use. Steel and concrete both suggest the employment of strong vertical and horizontal (but particularly vertical) lines, wide spans, and slim supports; and, in addition, reënforced concrete lends itself to curving forms. And architects have shared in the widespread feeling engendered by the World War that the old order was passing away, and a new and quite different one was emerging. In view of all these circumstances, it is not surprising that in the post-war years naturally conservative architecture has become steadily more "modernist."

Among preachers and practitioners of revolutionary architecture, two merit special mention. One is an American, Frank Lloyd Wright, born in Wisconsin in 1869, and from 1895 a zealous advocate of "functionalism." Before the war he designed a number of "functional" structures, which were then deemed freakish, and, to secure disciples, he wrote several books and founded a training school. Then, after the war, he won international recognition by building at Tokio the great Imperial Hotel, an excellent example of the artistic beauty attainable by purely "modernist" methods. The second notable architect is a younger man, a German, Erich Mendelsohn, born in 1887 in East Prussia. Mendelsohn's outstanding monuments are the Mosse-haus at Berlin (1923), with its stunning interplay of horizontal and vertical lines, and the Potsdam Observatory, or "Finstein Tower" (1927), a poetical conception, moulded rather than erected, and conveying a curious sense of movement.

Extreme "modernist" architecture has especially flourished in Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia. Here it appears in newer public buildings and factories, in apartment houses, and in war memorials. It is impressively exemplified in the Socialist housing developments in Vienna, in the Town Hall of Stockholm, and in the Finnish railway station at Helsingfors. The last named, in grandeur, in logic of design, and in decorative richness, is now the finest railway station in Europe.

The new architecture is in evidence in almost every country.

¹ See above, p. 1004 note.

It has been employed for new church edifices, not only in Germany, but in Spain and France and elsewhere. It is strikingly utilized in the great French air-port at Orly. It has been widely adapted to the fashioning of "cubicle" family-houses, all of them starkly simple and some of them very ugly. For some structures of marked beauty and dignity, it has been assimilated with traditional forms, for example with the Gothic, as in the Nebraska state capitol (designed by Goodhue). And almost everywhere it has served to put a premium on simplicity, on the renouncing of superfluous architectural detail, and to invite a renewed dependence upon harmonious embellishment with sculpture, painting, and mosaics. This dependence has been beautifully achieved in several French war memorials, in which sculpture and architecture reach a new unity of effect, fresh and unconventional, and in the interiors of certain "modernist" churches, in which mural decoration of paint and mosaic is integrated with architectural material and design.

"Modernism" has inspired a new fashion in household furmodernist out superfluous ornament and relieved only by careful
attention to effects of color and lighting. At its worst
it is monotonous and dreary. At its best it is dignified and
sophisticated.

Sculpture has become more and more significant, as more and more of it has latterly been required to adorn multiplying mesculpture morials of the World War and in general to supplement and complement the new "modernist" architecture. Sculpture, like painting, has reacted sharply against traditions of the immediate past and exhibited novel and even revolutionary trends. Just as recent painters have rebelled against the "post-impressionism" of the preceding Age of Realism (and also against both florid romanticism and rigid classicism), so recent sculptors have turned their back on the "romantic realism" of Rodin, that giant of the previous generation, and indeed against all traditional "schools." And the trends of sculpture in the latest age have been analogous to those of painting.

A leading sculptor of the age, and the chief exponent of "primitivism," is the Frenchman Aristide Maillol (born 1861). Beginning as a painter, he was induced by Gauguin to aban-

¹ See above, pp. 412-413.

don impressionism, and for several years he worked on tapestry design, made majolica vases, experimented with glazes, and modelled wall fountains. Then, about 1910, becoming fascinated with archaic Greek statuary of the early fifth century B.C., he took to sculpture and thereafter produced a large number of monumental statues and terra-cotta statuettes, all characterized by a natural and naïve "primitiveness." Perhaps Maillol's most distinguished statue is the reclining goddess Fame which he completed in 1925 for a monument to Cézanne.

Something of the same trend has been observable in the work of a younger American sculptor, Paul Manship (born 1885). Devoted mainly to classical subjects—though he has done a striking portrait-bust of John D. Rockefeller—his figures show archaic traits skillfully coupled with intensely modern feeling. Among his major achievements are his Dancing Girl and Fauns and his Infant Hercules (for a fountain at the American Academy in Rome).

Indeed, much of the newer sculpture is consciously archaic in inspiration and in effect. It is imitative not alone of primitive Greek art but also, in many recent instances, of even more primitive art of ancient Etruscans or modern Negroes, Redmen, and South Sca Islanders. It represents a phase of disillusionment about traditional civilization and in measure a return to paganism and barbarism.

On the other hand, much of the newer sculpture, like much of the newer painting, tends away from the primitive and the concrete and toward an ever greater sophistication and abstraction. This aspect of modern sculpture may be illustrated by reference to Jacob Epstein and Amadeo Modigliani. The former, born in New York in 1880, the son of Polish Jewish parents, studied at Paris and settled in London in 1905. The large sphinx which he carved in 1909 for the monument to Oscar Wilde ¹ in the Père Lachaise cemetery (at Paris) established his fame, and thereafter he extended his experimentation with abstract sculpture with surer mastery and growing popular appreciation. Eventually, however, his radicalism lessened; and the fine series of bronze portraits (including that of Lord Fisher ²) which he executed during and after the World War were more traditional in form though still quite "modern" in feeling.

¹ See above, pp. 304-305.

² See above, facing p. 812.

Modigliani (1887–1920), a precocious Italian, commenced his modigliani artistic career as a "post-impressionist" painter but soon passed from "cubist" painting to a kind of Grancusi "cubist" sculpture, utilizing such simple geometrical figures as the cube and the sphere as patterns for "abstract" portrait busts. Modigliani and Epstein are only two of a considerable number of gifted artists who have spread the vogue of abstract sculpture. Probably the ablest and certainly the best known of its contemporary exponents is the Rumanian Constantin Brancusi (born 1876).

The outstanding sculptor of the latest age is a Croatian, Ivan Meštrović, who was born in 1883 and was apprenticed in Meštrović childhood by his father, a peasant, to a marble-cutter at Spalato. Here he learned the trade so well and displayed such creative genius that his employer sent him to the art school at Vienna, and by 1906 his work attracted the favorable attention of Rodin. Meštrović has been thoroughly "modernist," but instead of following any one of the several modernist trends, he has managed to fuse them in a remarkable originality of his own. He is "primitive," "archaic," and at the same time "abstract," and yet not at all contemptuous of tradition. He can be gross and also ultra-refined. And while he is a patriotic Yugoslav, executing magnificent monuments in honor of the political unification of his country, he is a devout Catholic, carving "medieval" Madonnas and an extraordinarily "modern" St. Francis (1925).²

In some ways comparable with Meštrović is the Englishman Eric Gill (born 1882), who studied architecture and then sculpture, and, reaching the conclusion that art and religion are inseparable, became a Catholic in 1913. Since then, while accepting and developing "modernist" art forms—primitivism, abstraction, and all the rest—he has employed them primarily for religious ends. Some of his work has been in stone, but he has excelled in wood-carving. Notable among his creations have been the Stations of the Cross in Westminster Cathedral and the war memorial for the University of Leeds.³

In music there has been reaction, akin to that in sculpture

¹ For an example of Modigliani's sculpture, see above, facing p. 1116.

² For examples of his sculpture, see above, facing pp. 813, 966, 967.

For examples of Eric Gill's art, see the tailpieces on pp. 1007, 1153.

and painting, against tradition and convention, though more gradual and less complete. A good deal of "national" Music music continues to be written and enjoyed, and in every country concert programs still abound in selections from great "universal" masters of the past—Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner, Brahms, etc.

"New" music began to make itself heard in the Age of Realism, prior to 1910, and two composers associated with its origins we have elsewhere discussed, Richard Strauss and Claude Debussy. Debussy died in 1918, but during the post-war years Strauss has remained extraordinarily productive and influential. New operas and pantomimes he has produced—

Woman without a Shadow (1919) and Whipped Cream (1924)—with a mastery of peculiar technic and gorgeous stage setting. And scores of younger musicians, consciously or unconsciously, have imitated his tricks and patterned their style after his.

Certain younger composers have gone much farther with "new" music and have sought, with greater or less success, to render it thoroughly revolutionary and very "modern." For example, the Russian Alexander Scriabin (1871–1915), after writing romantic music in the manner of Beethoven or Chopin, evolved a new and "mystical" system of harmony, consonant, he claimed, with a natural color scheme and also with the moral truths of theosophy, to which he became a convert. This system he tried out in his last five sonatas and in the famous *Poem of Fire* which he composed shortly before his death.

Another and even more daring innovator was the Austrian Arnold Schönberg (born 1874). Largely self-taught, he at first followed in the footsteps of Wagner and Strauss and then in Debussy's, but he soon outdistanced them Schönberg and declared war on the whole classic conception of tonality. Modern musicians, he insisted, should rid themselves of all traditional schools and rely chiefly on "natural inspiration"; and this precept he has practiced, with curious effects and no little genius, in his Chamber Symphony (1906), Book of the Hanging Gardens (1908), and subsequent compositions.

But the greatest and most original of contemporary musicians

¹ See above, pp. 406, 407-408.

² Through Madame Blavatsky. On her and on Theosophy, see above, p. 450.

stravin-sky pupil of Rimsky-Korsakov, he caused an international sensation with his Firebird (1910), a ballet motivated by a Russian folk-tale but treated in quite novel musical diction. The qualities here displayed—freedom from rhythm as well as harmony, brilliant coloring, impetuous violence, and strangely penetrating charm—Stravinsky has developed and accentuated in numerous later ballets, including Sacre du Printemps (1913) and Les Noces (1923), and likewise in the amazing oratorio-opera of Œdipus Rex (1928). Stravinsky, more than anyone else, has blazed new trails along which the latest generation of "modernist" musicians are proceeding in Russia, Austria, France, Spain, England, and the United States. The general direction is toward "abstract" and "primitive" music—toward a new cosmos and perhaps a new chaos.


To the reader of this book, it may appear that the latest developments in art, as in science, economics, and politics, are destructively revolutionary, that they signify a general revolt against traditional European civilization, especially against its "enlightened progress" from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, and portend a universal relapse into barbarism. There are, indeed, many thoughtful (and pessimistic) persons who regard the present age not only as one of disillusionment about the past but as one of despair for the future. Such is the burden of a big tome on *The Decline of the West* by a contemporary German philosopher, Oswald Spengler. He, at any rate, is sure that we are in the downward curve of another historical cycle comparable with that which involved the ruin of the ancient Roman Empire and its pagan civilization. As then, so now, the cosmos turns to chaos and civilization reverts to barbarism.

The world has undoubtedly been changing in our twentieth century—becoming more unified and contracted in some respects, more fragmentary and complex in others. But no past century has been without change—or without deprecation of change. A Spengler can hardly say worse of the present age than the Jewish prophet Jeremias said of the sixth century B.C., or the Christian apologist Salvian said of the fifth century A.D. The

¹ See above, p. 407.

lamentations of Jeremias were followed by the rise of Greek civilization; the lucubrations of Salvian, by the emergence of European civilization. It may well be that Spengler is but the darkness preceding the dawn of a still more glorious day in human civilization.

Nor should the student of history be unmindful of a central historical (and physical) fact, that change is always relative, that it always appears much greater at close range than from a distance. The French Revolution, for example, appeared to its contemporaries to be a complete break with the past and a veritable cataclysm; to us it seems less important for what it changed than for what it left intact or merely adapted. In all probability, the present age of world war, dictatorship, and chaotic art and science will seem to later generations progressively less revolutionary than it appears to us. And even to us it has significance only in relationship to, and as a continuation of, the whole story of mankind and particularly of that part of it which has constituted the subject-matter of this book.



APPENDIX 1

STATES OF THE WORLD IN 1930

RANKED ACCORDING TO AREA AND POPULATION

[Note. Small Caps indicate states whose language and traditional culture are European. Area is given in square miles. Population in each instance is according to the available official census or estimate nearest to 1930.]

	Area	Population
ı.	Russia 8,144,228	1. China 440,700,000
	China3,853,560	2. India351,399,880
3.	CANADA3,684,463	3. Russia 165,700,000
4.	United States (con-	4. United States (con-
	tinental)3,560,176	tinental)122,834,324
	Brazil 3,285,319	5. Japan91,792,639
	Australia2,974,581	6. Germany65,300,000
	India1,805,252	7. GREAT BRITAIN46,189,206
	ARGENTINA1,153,418	8. France41,928,851
	MEXICO	9. ITALY41,806,000
	Persia	10. BRAZIL41,079,000
	PERU532,047	11. Manchukuo 34,074,980
	BOLIVIA 506,467	12. POLAND32,132,936
	SOUTH AFRICA471,917	13. SPAIN28,719,177
	Manchukuo460,383	14. RUMANIA 18,025,237
15.	COLOMBIA443,985	15. MEXICO16,404,030
	VENEZUELA393,874	16. CZECHOSLOVAKIA14,726,158
	Egypt	17. Egypt14,226,898
18.	Abyssinia (Ethiopia) 350,000	18. YUGOSLAVIA13,930,918
	Turkey	19. Turkey
	CHILE	20. ARGENTINA11,846,655
21.	Japan	21. Siam
22.	France	23. Abyssinia (Ethiopia). 10,000,000
	Siam200,148	24. Persia
25	SPAIN190,050	25. HUNGARY8,688,349
26.	GERMANY181,714	26. COLOMBIA8,223,000
	SWEDEN	27. BELGIUM
	NEWFOUNDLAND162,734	28. SOUTH AFRICA8,072,800
	POLAND149,957	29. NETHERLANDS 8,061,571
30.	FINLAND149,641	30. AUSTRIA
žІ.	Norway149,254	31. Portugal6,698,345
	Iraq143,240	32. Australia 6,683,754

	Area	Population
33.	ITALY119,744	33. Greece6,480,000
	ECUADOR118,500	34. Afghanistan6,330,500
	RUMANIA113,886	35. PERU
36.	Saudi Arabia (Hejaz)112,500	36. SWEDEN6,141,671
	NEW ZEALAND 104,015	37. BULGARIA6,067,000
	YUGOSLAVIA96,018	38. Nepal 5,639,092
39.	GREAT BRITAIN94,284	39. CHILE4,287,445
	URUGUAY72,153	40. SWITZERLAND 4,066,400
	Paraguay	41. CUBA3,768,192
	CZECHOSLOVAKIA 54,207	42. FINLAND3,667,067
	Nepal 54,000	43. DENMARK 3,574,851
	GREECE 50,257	44. Iraq3,300,000
	NICARAGUA 49,200	45. VENEZUELA3,216,000
	GUATEMALA48,290	46. Bolivia
	Honduras	47. IRISH FREE STATE2,972,802
	LIBERIA	48. Norway2,817,124
	Сива	49. HAITI2,550,000
	BULGARIA 39,814	50. GUATEMALA2,454,000
	ICELAND39,709	51. LITHUANIA2,340,038
	Hungary35,911	52. URUGUAY 1,941,398
	PORTUGAL	53. Latvia 1,900,045
	PANAMA	54. ECUADOR,800,000
	AUSTRIA32,369	55. LIBERIA1,750,000
	IRISH FREE STATE26,592	56. NEW ZEALAND1,594,099
	LATVIA25,402	57. SALVADOR1,459,578
•	COSTA RICA23,000	58. SANTO DOMINGO1,200,000
	LITHUANIA21,493	59. ESTONIA
	SANTO DOMINGO19,325 ESTONIA18,355	60. ALBANIA
		61. Saudi Arabia (Hejaz) 900,000
	Bhutan	62. HONDURAS859,761 63. PARAGUAY851,564
	SWITZERLAND15,940	64. NICARAGUA
	SALVADOR	65. Costa Rica527,690
	NETHERLANDS12,582	66. PANAMA
	BELGIUM11,752	67. Danzig
	ALBANIA10,630	68. LUXEMBURG300,748
	HAITI10,204	69. Newfoundland276,185
	Luxemburg999	70. Bhutan250,000
	DANZIG	71. ICELAND
•	Andorra191	72. MONACO
	LIECHTENSTEIN	73. SAN MARINO13,948
	SAN MARINO38	74. LIECHTENSTEIN 10,213
75.	Monaco 8	75. ANDORRA5,231
	VATICAN	76. VATICAN 1,006

APPENDIX 2

MAJOR EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

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THE STANDARD SPEAKING THEM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, 1930	German	Magyar	Greek 6,500,000 6,500,000	Lithuanian	Albanian	374,000,000
LATIN (ROMANIC)	Spanish 100,000,000 French 63,000,000 Portuguese 48,000,000 Rumanian 43,000,000	Hybrid Latin and Germanic English	Russian160,000,000 Polish		Totals	Estimated Total Population of World.

APPENDIX 3

ADHERENTS OF VARIOUS RELIGIONS ABOUT THE YEAR 1910 1

IN THE "WESTERN" OR "EUROPEAN" WORLD	CATHOLICS	ORTHODOX 2	PROTESTANTS	Christians	Jews	Moslems	Hindus	Buddhists
Europe	183,754,000	98,213,000	92,922,000	374,889,000	8,774,000	3,576,000		-
South America	36,125,000		362,000	36,487,000	22,000	10,000	108,000	
North America	36,693,000	1,000,000	64,488,000	102,181,000	1,820,000	15,000	94,000	5,000
Australasia	964,000	1,000	3,424,000	4,389,000	17,000	3,000	1,000	4,000
Total	257,536,000	99,214,000	000,061,191	517,946,000	10,633,000	3,604,000	203,000	000'6
OUTSIDE THE "WESTERN" OR "EUROPEAN" WORLD	CATHOLICS	Октнорож	Protestants	CHRISTIANS	JEWS	Moslems	Hindus	Buddhists
Asia	5,385,000	17,144,000	1,542,000	24,071,000	482,000	141,456,000	209,152,000	137,900,000
Africa	2,493,000	3,799,000	2,665,000	8,957,000	381,000	50,810,000	277,000	11,000
Malaysia and Polynesia	7,224,000		663,000	7,887,000	4,000	20,760,000	27,000	15,000
Total	15,102,000	20,943,000	4,870,000	40,915,000	867,000	213,026,000	209,456,000	137,926,000
Grand Total	272,638,000	120,157,000	166,066,000	558,861,000	11,500,000	216,630,000	209,659,000	137,935,000

¹ In addition to the religious adherents here tabulated, there were some 190,000,000 Confucianists and Taoists in China, some 25,000,000 Shintoists in Japan, and some 157,000,000 Animists and Fetishists chiefly in Africa.
² Including adherents of Armenian, Coptic, and other "Oriental" Churches neither Catholic nor Protestant.

APPENDIX 4

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note. The following bibliography is intended to provide the student of the history of Europe during the century from 1830 to 1930 with means of checking and supplementing statements in the foregoing text and conducting additional and independent researches. The bibliography is not exhaustive; and for other works, as well as for critical comments on many works here listed, the student should have recourse to such standard bibliographics as are cited immediately below.

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